FOOTNOTES CONTINUED:

21. Ibid. Possibly interests in construction consortiums stood to lose business if the residents of KwaMashu had built their own houses.
22. BAD Files, no. 5, Chief Native Affairs Commissioner, Pmb., to Town Clerk, Durban, 17 July 1957.
23. Africans were allowed to buy their own houses in KwaMashu and by 1969 nearly 6 000 had. They were not permitted to buy land in freehold.
24. BAD Files, no. 5, Bourquin to Natal Chamber of Industries, 11 November 1957.
25. Quoted in *Natal Mercury*, 13 March 1958.
26. G.M. Gerhard, *Black Power in South Africa* (Berkeley 1978) pp. 167–172.
27. BAD files, no. 7, Town Clerk to Secretary Group Areas Board, 10 September 1980.
28. See Ladlau, 'Cato Manor riots', Ch. 3; KCAV, Interview with S. Bourquin, 18/10/79.
29. L. Kuper, 'African Nationalism in South Africa', *OHSA*, vol. II, pp. 464–65.
30. Ladlau; Cato Manor Riots, p. 126.
31. Ibid, p. 127.
32. *Race Relation Survey*, SAIR, 1962, p. 130.
33. BAD Files, Department of Bantu Administration to Town Clerk, 7 August 1962.
34. See BAD Files, memo. by Bourquin, 21 April 1961; Massdorp and Humphrey (eds). *Shantytown to Township*, pp. 61–63.
35. KCAV 175, Interview with S. Bourquin, 4 September 1979.
36. Ladlau; 'Cato Manor Riots', pp. 140–150.
37. These facts are to be found in Maasdorp and Humphreys (eds.), *Shantytown to Township* and in Moller, Schlemmer, Kuzwayo and Mbana, *A Black Township in Durban: A Study of Needs and Problems* (CASS, Durban 1978).
38. B. Bozzoli (ed.), *Labour, Townships and Protest, Studies in the Social History of the Witwatersrand* (Johannesburg 1978) p. 8.
39. KCAV 145, interview with Mrs A. Muguni, 19 July 1979.
40. KCAV 142, interview with C.C. Majola, 20 June 1979,
41. KCAV 137, interview with C.C.L. Mtolo, 12 June 1979, and unrecorded interview with "Mayor of Umlazi", 17 August 1979. More research is needed to clarify the interests of factions standing for election. The election of three independent candidates in KawMakutha (Amanzimtoti) in 1979 is seen by some as a defeat for Inkatha, see KCAV 162, interview with M.P. Gwala, 28 August 1979.
42. See BAD Files, Bourquin to City Engineer, 13 February 1958.
43. KCAV 168, interview with C. Mbutho, 25 October 1979.
44. C. Mbutho Papers K.C.A.L., Mbutho to Col. R. Jenkins, 20 April 1960.
45. KCAV 168, interview with C. Mbutho, 25 October 1979.
46. Mbutho has now clearly seen Inkatha as a respectable organisation. He is a paid-up member and in his capacity as Chairman of a local High School has given support to the introduction of Inkatha as a school subject.
47. KCAV 168.
48. The Mnguni's provide a good example. See KCAV 172.
49. KCAV 179, interview with S.J. Shange, 24 July 1979.
50. KCAV 151, interview with J. Moeli, 3 April 1979.
51. J. Rex, "The Compound, the Reserve and the Urban location; the Essential Institutions of Southern African Labour Exploitation", *S.A. Labour Bulletin* No. 4, 1974.
52. Maasdorp and Humphreys, *Shantytown to Township*, p. 85.
53. K. Sole makes this distinction in "Class, continuity and change in black South African writing", p. 145 in Bozzoli (ed) *Labour, Township, Protest*.
54. Interview with M.P. Gwala KCAV 162, 28 August 1979.
55. KCAV 162, interview with M.P. Gwala, 28 August 1979. This was confirmed by J. Moeli, whose own son fled the country in 1976.
56. KCAV 142, interview with C. Mbutho, 20 June 1979.

ORGANISED BLACK POLITICAL RESISTANCE, 1912—1950

First Part of a talk to NUSAS (1912–1930)

By Tom Lodge

In this talk I am going to be concerned with the evolution and development of organised black political resistance in the period 1912 to 1950. The period itself spans the years following the foundation of the South African Native National Congress in 1912 (the organisation which from the 1920s has been known as the African National Congress) to the opening of the decade of mass political organisation in 1950. I will principally be concerned with the progress of two organisations – the African National Congress and the Communist Party of South Africa – and the relationship which developed between them. I think it is important at this juncture to make the point that in restricting my scope to political organisations I am dealing with only one dimension of African protest and resistance to authority in these years, though an important one. Both the African National Congress and the Communist Party tended to be urban-oriented organisations though the ANC did try and extend its influence in the countryside by attempting to gain the support and loyalty of the chieftaincy. I do not have the time here to discuss the various instances of rural protest and rebellion that occured in this period though it must be emphasized that they form an essential backdrop to the militancy of the 1950s[1]. Another category of protest that we shall rather neglect is the more informal manifestations of resistance that took place – the more or less spontaneous riots, or, to use the official jargon, disturbances, that spatter the inter-war history of virtually all South Africa's major towns. These were usually sparked off by an immediate grievance – price rises, shortages, municipal brewing monopolies, police provocation, pass raids, and so on – but reflected a generalised pattern of worry, tension, and discontent. Of course the concerns of

the organisations I am going to look at would in part be stimulated by this general matrix of grievances, but their leaders often had special preoccupations of their own. The African National Congress in particular, in these years was not a popular movement and only intermittently took up popular issues. By focussing on organisations my approach inevitably is going to be an élitist one and the impression of resistance partial and incomplete.

One more point before I begin. 1949, the year Congress embraced a 'Programme of Action' which involved tactics of boycotts, strikes and civil disobedience towards a vaguely defined goal of 'self determination, freedom from white domination and political independence'[1], is often seen as a moment of truth, when the eyes of African leadership were finally opened to the political realities surrounding them. Much of the political activity preceding the 1950s is viewed as futile – flowing from false premises and resulting in total failure.

One of my purposes tonight will be to demonstrate that this kind of evaluation does not help us in understanding African politics during this period; that politicians were far from naive and by no means totally unsuccesful. However what I want to emphasize now is that while it is possible to detect how political behaviour can be related to certain class interests it would be quite wrong to ascribe to the leaders purely cynical or selfish intentions. What they did or did not do was usually done (or not done) in the sincere belief that it was in the general interest. Though an individual's beliefs and actions would to an extent be determined by those of the class or social group of which he was a member they would be informed by a variety of human feelings including altruism, compassion and charity. A totally unsympathetic interpretation of the motives of the people I am going to discuss would present as much of a falsification as a completely idealised one.

On January 8th 1912 there assembled in Bloemfontein several hundred of South Africa's most prominent black citizens: professional men, chieftains, ministers, teachers, clerks, interpreters, landholders, businessmen, estate agents, building contractors and labour agents. These men, after a lusty rendering of Tiyo Soga's Xhosa hymn 'Fulfil thy promise, God of truth' unanimously resolved to form the South African Native National Congress. Though not the first African political association in South Africa, its formation did mark a clear break with the past. Previously the focus of African politics had centred on electoral activity in the Cape Province where blacks with the required property and educational qualifications could vote and stand for office. Their voice in Cape politics was relatively important: at the turn of the century they constituted nearly half the electorate in five constituences and some men believed that the most effective way of accelerating African political advancement was to use the black vote to influence the election of men who would be sympathetic to African aspirations. The years following the Peace of Vereeniging witnessed the declining force of this argument. The founding of the SANNC marked the ascendancy in middle-class African circles of the contention that African interests could best be promoted not through sympathetic intermediaries but rather by action by blacks themselves.

There were several reasons for this change in opinion. Among some members of the African middle classes hopes initially raised by the defeat of the Republics in the Anglo-Boer War had been swiftly disappointed. Despite African expressions of Imperial loyalty intermingled with politely phrased complaints at the prevailing discrimination against men of 'training, character and ability'[3] the British Government made it quite clear that its paramount concern was white unity in South Africa. African hopes that the Cape Franchise arrangements would be extended to the defeated Republics were quickly disillusioned, and preparations for the Act of Union indicated that existing rights would not be respected in future. The Act not only removed the theoretical right of enfranchised blacks to take up seats in Parliament (which had existed in the Cape Province) but also made provision for the removal of the franchise from African voters through a two-thirds majority vote of both houses in joint session. Nor, by 1912, was African concern limited to constitutional issues. The first post-Union administration, responding to the mining industry's labour demands and the disquiet of white farmers suffering from competition from African agriculturists, moved quickly to safeguard its position with these groups. Breaking contract was made a criminal offence with the Native Labour Regulation Act, job reservation entrenched in the Mines and Works Act, and in 1911 the Land Bill was drafted which effectively limited African landownership to under eight-per-cent of the area of the country, dispossessing many landowners in doing so, as well as outlawing leasing or tenant farmer relationships between blacks and whites. Obviously there was more at stake here than the interests of that small group who initially through education at mission institutions had come to form an identifiable petty-bourgeoisie. The Land Act and complementary labour legislation were the legislative tools employed to destroy a whole class of peasant producers and force them into new and arduous social relationships – as farm workers, as mine labour, and later in the least skilled and most badly paid positions in urban industrial, municipal and domestic employment. And members of the group of men assembled at Bloemfontein in 1912 would have been well aware of the wider dimensions of the social tragedy that was being enacted around them. But they had a particular concern, the fear of any petty bourgeoisie at a time of crisis, of being thrust back into the ranks of the urban and rural poor. It was a fear which was eloquently expressed by one John Makue in his testimony to the South African Native Laws Commission in 1903:

> . . . Our earning power is very small. I think when we are forced to work there ought to be big pay. There is no decent black man that can manage to exist on £8 a month, pay all the taxes, and the upkeep of his house in the proper manner – I mean a civilised native. I do not mean the raw man who comes from the kraals . . .
> . . . now we are all blacks and measured with the same measure as the man who cannot look after himself and who is not in the same position as I am . . .[4]

The same feeling underlay an early Congress Civil Disobedience campaign in Pretoria to gain for African railway passengers access to First Class carriages.[5] Their exclusion from such facilities was sharply resented by African leaders. As Professor Jabavu pointed out at a Natal Mission Conference in 1920

> . . . (Railway) waiting rooms are made to accomodate the rawest blanketed heathen; and the more decent native has either to use them and annex vermin or to do without shelter imbibing wintry weather[6].

First and foremost the SANNC was to represent the concerns and anxieties of the small professional middle class which founded it. Its first President was John Dube, headmaster of the Ohlange Institute in Natal, its secretary Solomon Plaatje, one-time interpreter and editor of a Kimberley newspaper, and its treasurer Pixley Ka Izaka Seme, one of the four London trained lawyers who convened the

founding conference. These were men who had retained close ties with the chieftaincy, while anxious for the general advancement and 'upliftment of the race' (SANNC constitution)[7], they were also conservatives, concerned with protecting a moral and social order that they correctly perceived to be under attack. Congress was seen as, firstly a national forum to discuss the issues which affected 'the dark races of the subcontinent[8] and secondly as an organised pressure group which would agitate for changes through 'peaceful propaganda[9], the election to legislative bodies of Congress sympathisers, through protests and enquiries, and finally, 'passive action or continued movement[10]' – a clear reference to the tactics which were being employed by Gandhi and his followers in the South African Indian community.

However in the first six years of its existence Congress contented itself with less dramatic tactics. African leaders were eager to demonstrate their loyalty for the duration of the First World War. The leadership was in the hands of Cape-educated and influenced men (consistently tending to take a less confrontationist line than their Transvaal colleagues). John Dube, in accepting the Presidency announced his intention to place 'hopeful reliance in the sense of common justice and love of freedom so innate in the British character[11]'. Two delegations were sent to Britain in 1914 and 1918 to request Imperial intervention in South Africa and Sol Plaatje remained in Britain for much of the war writing his **Native Life in South Africa** and occasionally being received with some sympathy by Liberal politicians.

However, by 1918, there was a discernible shift in the apparent position of the Native Congress (which, from now on, to make things simpler, I'll call the ANC). Still a very small and weak organisation (not more than a couple of thousand subscribing members) nevertheless on the Rand Congress leaders were supporting striking municipal workers, by 1919 were involved in a militant anti-pass campaign, and in early 1920 some Congress organisers were addressing public meetings of mineworkers just before the great African mineworkers strike of that year.[12] Sol Plaatje attended the annual ANC conference in December 1918 and came away very disturbed. As he put it in a letter to De Beers in Kimberley:

> . . . The ten Transvaal delegates came to the Congress with a concord and a determination that was perfectly astounding to our customary native demeanor at conferences. They spoke almost in unison, in short sentences, nearly all of which began and ended with the word 'strike'. It was not difficult to understand the source of their backing for they even preceded the Congress and endeavoured to poison the minds of delegates from other parts . . .[13]

What had happened? First of all, wartime industrialisation had expanded the black urban population and industrial labour force, especially in the Transvaal. With black wages pegged at 1914 levels, sharp inflation, and municipal reluctance to do anything towards providing adequate services and housing for this population, there had been a dramatic deterioration in standards of living – among both black workers and members of the lower strata of the petty-bourgeoisie – clerical workers, sales assistants and the like as well as small traders. With the expansion of the industrial proletariat (easier to organise within than in the mining sector) and the example of immediate post-war white labour unrest black workers were becoming increasingly class-conscious. The less affluent members of the black petty-bourgeoisie shared many of the experiences of black workers: their income hardly differed, their wives had to work in the informal sector, they lived in the same miserable urban slums[14]. At the political level this situation was reflected in the developing interest taken in blacks by independent white socialist groups, still yet to coalesce into the Communist Party and the success of these in attracting some black support, especially the syndicalist Industrial Workers of Africa, the trades union movement started by the International Socialist League[15]. It was also expressed politically in the leadership change within Congress – in 1917 the executive was taken over by Transvaal men, under the Presidency of the Pretoria Estate Agent S.M. Maghatho. Hardly radical, nevertheless these men were less immune to the stresses provoked and stimulated by wartime industrial and social developments than their colleagues from the Cape. And in 1918, this leadership, prompted from below, and especially from ANC rank and file drawn principally from the most vulnerable and economically precarious layers of the lower middle classes, was willing to articulate such demands as the one shilling a day increase which accompanied the strikes by sanitation workers and others in 1918[16]. And when, in the following years, the emphasis switched to passes rather than wages **per se,** it was partly because the experience with strikes had demonstrated how important the whole system of labour allocation and control, of which passes were such an indispensible part, was in keeping wages down.

Nevertheless, though the apparent radicalism of Congress in the immediate post First World War period reflected common interests between working class and petty-bourgeois blacks, Congress hardly represented class alliance. As I have mentioned already, there was considerable unease at the direction Congress appeared to be taking in the Transvaal. Sol Plaatje's misgivings were also shared by Professor D.D.T. Jabavu: 'Bolshevism and its nihilistic doctrines (were) enlisting many natives up country. Socialism of the worst calibre (was) claiming our people'[17]. Jabavu and Plaatje were members of a group who had for years considered themselves as authentic and representative spokesmen for the African community: now, suddenly their role was being questioned. More conservative ANC leaders were being publicly denounced and shouted down at meetings when they counselled caution and moderation. These people represented an influential voice in Congress which would help to guide it towards different paths in the oncoming decade. But by themselves they could not have accomplished the deradicalisation of Congress. There were other, more powerful forces at work. From 1920 onwards, until the accession of the Pact government in 1924, the authorities produced a series of measures which though usually incorporating features that offended the integrationist and meritocratic principles of leading Congressmen, nevertheless mollified some of the immediate grievances of petty-bourgeois Africans and detached them from the movement set off by the popular classes. The 1920 Native Housing Act was a measure of this nature. So too was the provision of first class black railway accomodation. In 1923 the Native Urban Areas Act provided for housing programmes executed by municipalities, leasehold in townships and afforded some trading opportunities within the new townships for aspirant African businessmen. There were plenty of objections to the new arrangments: particularly resented were the municipal brewing monopolies enshrined in the new act, but nevertheless they went some way towards the Congress demand for 'some differentiation of treatment . . . between those who were educated and civilised and those who had yet to reach that stage'[18]. A final motive for

caution on the part of African leadership, was that the pass protests of 1919 brought in a new element – the urban unemployed, more volatile, more violent and much less easy to organise than members of the working class. From 1920, for a few years Congress leadership was to be diverted into safer channels – into the Joint Council movement which provided a medium of consultation between black and white liberals, and the advisory Governor General's conferences, instituted that year in which a select group could advance grievances and discuss policy.

However, from 1922, two other organisations had arrived to complicate the African political scene. These were the Industrial Commercial Workers Union of Africa, led by Clements Kadalie, and the Communist Party of South Africa. As regards The ICU, I will only discuss it briefly here, only in so much as it affected black political organisation and in particular the ANC. The first effect was a negative one. The ICU, while a worker's organisation tended to function as a mass based political party, its charismatic leadership voicing a wide range of popular grievances. Incapable of organising systematically on an industrial base it nevertheless attracted and diverted away from Congress massive support – indicative of considerable receptiveness among the urban and rural poor (especially among farm workers) to political ideas. So, first of all, the ICU contributed to the dwindling popular influence of an increasingly elitist Congress in the 1920s. The second effect was more positive: ICU spokesmen infused into the courtly and often pompous discourse of African politicians a fierce anger and acopalyptic imagery. Listen, for example to James Thaele, later a leader of the ANC in the Western Cape, writing in **The Workers Herald**, in 1923:

> We are fed up with the white man's camouflage, his hyprocrisy, his policy of pinpricks in the land of our forefathers. I am appealing to the racial conciousness of the radical aboriginal to use all means to rouse the African race to wake from their long sleep of many a decade . . . when those in authority become so unreasonably notorious . . . disregard that authority, be blind and damn the consequences . . .[19]

Kadalie himself in 1926:

> We natives . . .have always given the game away . . . we are dealing with rascals, the Europeans are rascals . . . There is no native problem, but a European problem of weakness, greed and robbery'.

Such sentiments were beginning to find a certain resonance among some sections of Congress, increasingly disenchanted with negotiation and moderation in the face of an increasingly repressive administration. By 1926 there was additional reason for bitterness. Two years earlier a political re-alignment had taken place in white politics, and with the accession of the Labour/Nationalist pact regime of Hertzog an administration more closely tied to white rural and labour aristocracy interests had come to power. It was less inclined towards co-optive measures than its predecessor and less inhibited with regard to embracing the full political and economic implications of segregation. In 1926 two bills, one removing from Africans the common roll vote in the Cape and the other expanding on the provisions of the 1913 Land Act were tabled. Though they were not passed for another decade the implication for African political leadership was clear: existing rights and privileges were under constant threat. To underline the situation still further, in 1927 the Governor General was given the right to legislate in African Affairs by proclamation.

But before looking at how Congress's leadership was behaving in the late 1920s it is also necessary to understand something of another radicalising stimulus – that is, the Communist Party of South Africa. The Communist Party had been founded in 1921 after a series of manoeuvres between various tiny left wing roups principally on the Rand and in Cape Town[21]. When the Labour Party had a split on the issue of whether to support the First World War those who had contended that it was an anti-working class imperialist struggle had broken away to form the International Socialist League. This, with various other radical marxist and zionist organisations, many of them informed by the experiences of Eastern European immigrants of elements of the European revolutionary tradition, were eventually to fuse together as the result of the stimuli of the Russian Revolution and the subsequent formation of the Communist International into the Communist Party of South Africa. The CPSA was not a large organistion but it was well organised – its centralised structure patterned on a Leninist model. Some of its members had been involved in earlier syndicalist attempts to organise black workers and so though it did not apparently have any blacks in its original membership it might have had some informal following amongst black workers. However the CPSA was not a syndicalist organisation – it was a political party, prepared because conditions were not yet ripe for revolution in South Africa, to work within and take advantage of existing political institutions. This was to cause some internal dissent – as well as later on criticism from other left wing parties. Though it could, on occasion be accused of opportunistic expediency over the race issue, in general the CPSA adhered to a doctrine that working class unity transcended racial divisions. White working class conciousness as it developed would, its leadership assumed, ultimately eschew racialism – in the short term therefore Communists were prepared to join forces with white labour on certain issues: for example in 1922 Communists were active in the Rand Mineworkers Revolt despite the explicit racialism of its leaders. Similarly it supported the Nationalist-Labour alliance in the 1924 election – but this was to lead to revaluation: the racist overtones of the campaign led the CPSA at its annual conference to conclude that 'our main revolutionary task is among the natives'[22]. The initiative for this switch in policy came from Cape Town where the local branch had a substantial coloured membership, and where the ICU had originated in a dockworkers strike.

The ICU, gathering strength in the mid-twenties, was the obvious target for party workers – it had a massive working class membership, and at that stage explicitly socialist goals. Communists joined the ICU and supported it by leaving the field open for ICU men to organise industrially. However by 1927 there were considerable tensions between the Communists and the ICU arising from both tactical and ideological differences. First of all the ICU was not functioning as a trade union organisation as the Communists understood the concept – its membership was scattered and diffuse and tended to be concentrated among farm workers rather than the industrial proletariat. Communists within the ICU tried to reorganise the movement into industrial branches based on individual concerns and this was sharply resented. Secondly the leadership tended to view achievement in petty bourgeoise terms – status, wealth and individual power, and hence could with some justification be accused of using the organisation to enrich themselves. Kadalie viewed the struggle as primarily a political one and because of this was to seek institutional respectability for his movement including international affiliations with reformist European labour organisations. Kadalie principally viewed the conflict as a national/colonial question and

could not share the Communist vision of a class struggle complicated only by 'false consciousness'. These tensions eventually resulted in the expulsion of Communists and a sharp turn to the right in the ICU as it withered and decayed[23]. Rejected by the ICU, Communists began to establish their own unions and placed fresh emphasis on African recruitment – by 1928 three members of the Central Committee were black as was most of the Party's 1 750 members. Concurrent with this emphasis on African mobilisation was a re-examination of policy towards the African National Congress hitherto regarded as a purely reactionary movement[24].

If you remember, ANC leaders by 1927 were increasingly alienated and disillusioned with the politics of diplomatic (and sometimes downright sycophantic) persuasion. Their susceptibility to more radical strategy was signified in an abortive scheme in 1926 for joint ICU/ANC mass demonstrations in protest against the proposed Native Legislation. In 1927 with the election of Josiah Gumede to the presidency the Congress leadership announced its intention to embark on a course of mass organisation involving the building up of branch memberships. The Western Cape was already the scene of an energetic recruitment campaign among farmworkers by two Communists working within Congress, Ndobe and Tonjeni. Here, in contrast to the rest of the country wage labour as opposed to labour tenancy predominated on farms[25]. Significantly, the initiative within the CPSA to work with black organisations had sprung from the Western Cape.

Josiah Gumede had been influenced in the early twenties by the American negro doctrine of Garveyism – a separatist doctrine based on race pride and black exclusiveness with a millinarian ring to it. But Gumede, in 1927 President of the Natal wing of the ANC was receptive to other ideas as well: he accepted an invitation to attend a Communist sponsored Conference of Oppressed Nationalities and later toured the USSR returning to South Africa much impressed with what he had seen. At Brussels the Conference adopted a motion put forward by Gumede and his compatriot, James La Guma of the Cape branch of the CP, endorsing

> 'the right of self determination through the complete overthrow of capitalism and imperialist domination . . . the principle of Africa for the Africans . . . . .'[26]

Under pressure from its black and coloured members as well as instigation from the Communist International[27] (itself inspired by Stalin's thoughts on the colonial question) the Communist Party in 1928 took an important step which laid the basis for any alliance with African nationalist organisations. This was the adoption of a vaguely worded slogan laying down as the goal for which party activists should work, 'an independent native republic as a stage towards a workers and peasants republic'. This formulation begged obvious questions which have never been satisfactorily answered but behind it lay an important recognition which when the 'native republic' slogan was shelved continued to inform party policy. This was that South Africa contained within it a colonial situation and socialism would be accomplished through two stages – first a nationalist democratic revolution involving many issues with which it would be easy to cooperate with reformist African petty bourgeois organisations and only then a socialist revolution.

The native republic slogan came at an opportune moment. First of all, it coincided with and complemented the impact of Garveyism on the African National Congress – both Gumede and James Thaele, President of the Western Cape, were influenced by Marcus Garvey's doctrines. The millinarian undertones of Garveyism would have reverberated strongly in rural parts of the Cape Province where there was considerable unrest among farm workers and where the ANC had succeeded in building up country branches. Second, 1929 was a year of intensification of coercive measures against Africans. A bitter election was fought that year on native policy as the result of the Pact government's inability to gain the required two-thirds majority to alter the franchise arrangments. The election was accompanied by a vigorous tightening of pass laws and mass arrests; in November 700 armed policemen took part in a tax collection raid on a Durban location. In response to this Communists established a 'League of African Rights' to campaign on basic freedoms including freedom of speech, education, the vote and abolition of pass laws. Gumede suported the League on behalf of the ANC and was elected its President. However by late 1929 Gumede was almost totally isolated from his executive – the ANC failed to support the League's proposed mass demonstrations against the pass laws.

In April 1930, after Gumede had addressed the ANC in conference on the need to present a massive challenge on the basis of the Native Republic slogan while the capitalist world found itself in crisis, he was voted out of the Presidency. In his place was elected Pixley ka Izaka Seme and with his ascendency the ANC shifted several degrees rightwards into almost total moribundancy. Meanwhile the Communist International, working on the assumption that 1930 found the capitalist world in a profound crisis, called for the withdrawal of the CPSA from any association with reformist organisations. The League of African Rights collapsed. The Communists, despite internal misgivings as to whether a revolutionary situation prevailed in South Africa, called for a general strike and embarked on a confrontationist strategy which, though heroic, was to leave the Party decimated (partly because of internal purges) and with its trade union organisation almost totally destroyed. The ANC and ICU's refusal to support the pass burning demonstrations organised by Communists in November 1930 in Johannesburg, Potchefstroom, Pretoria and Durban (where one activist was shot by the police) created a legacy of bitterness between revolutionaries and nationalists. Within the Western Cape, where the ANC had been most radicalised (and closest to the Communists), Congress split as dissedents increasingly distressed by the rightwing swing by Thaele set up their own short-lived Independent ANC.

NB. The second part of this talk will be printed in the May issue.

FOOTNOTES

1. See for examples, Hirson B, 'Rural Revolt in South Africa' in London University, Institute of Commonwealth Studies, *Collected Seminar Papers on the Societies of Southern Africa*, Volume 8.
2. Carter, G. and Karis, T., *From Protest to Challenge*, Volume II, Stamford: Hoover, 1973, p. 338.
3. Carter, G. and Karis, T., *From Protest to Challenge*, Volume I, Stamford: Hoover, 1971, p. 20.
4. *Ibid.*
5. Author's interview with Mr W.S. Letlalo, Soweto, 1979.
6. Carter, G. and Karis, T., *op cit*, p. 118.
7. *Ibid*, p. 78.
8. *Ibid*, p. 72.

FOOTNOTES Continued:

9. *Ibid.*
10. Carter, G. and Karis, T., *op cit,* p. 78.
11. Walshe, P., *The Rise of African Nationalism in South Africa,* London: Hurst, 1970, p. 38.
12. Author's interview with Mr W.S. Letlalo, Soweto, 1980.
13. Willan, B., 'From Tram Shed to Assembly Hall' in London University, Institute of Commonwealth Studies, *Collected Seminar Papers on the Societies of Southern Africa,* Vol. 8, p. 8.
14. Bonner, P.L., 'The Transvaal Native Congress, 1917 – 1920' University of the Witwatersrand African Studies Institute seminar paper, 1980, pp. 8 – 10.
15. Johnston, F.A., 'The IWA on the Rand' in Bozzoli, B. (Ed), *Labour, Townships and Protest,* Johannesburg: Ravan, 1979.
16. See Bonner, *op cit* and also Bonner, P.O., 'The 1920 Black Mineworkers' Strike' in Bozzoli, *op cit.*
17. Carter, G and Karis T., *op cit,* p. 124.
18. See Bonner, P.L., 'The Transvaal Native Congress', p. 6.
19. Carter, G. and Karis, T., *op cit,* p. 215.
20. *Ibid,* pp. 300 – 301.
21. These are described in Johns, S. 'The Birth of the CPSA' in *International Journal of African Historical Studies,* Vol. 9, no. 3, 1976.
22. Legassick, M., 'Class and Nationalism in South African Protest', uppublished seminar paper, p. 1.
23. A sensitive essay on the decline of the ICU is Bonner, P.L.'s 'The Decline and Fall of the ICU – a Case of Self-Destruction' in Webster, E. (Ed), *Essays in Southern African Labour History,* Johannesburg: Ravan, 1978. Otherwise the standard work is Wickens, P.L., *The Industrial and Commercial Workers' Union of Africa,* Cape Town: Oxford University Press, 1978.
24. Material on the Communist Party during this phase of its development is drawn mainly from Legassick, *op cit,* and Simons, H.J. & R.E., *Class and Colour in South Africa,* Harmondworth: Penguin, 1969.
25. Morris, M.L., 'The Development of Capitalism in South African Agriculture' in *Economy and Society,* 5, 3, 1976, p. 293.
26. Legassick, *op cit,* p.3.
27. The impetus for the adoption by the CPSA of the 'Native Republic' slogan is a subject of controversy. Roux, E., in *Time Longer than Rope,* views it as primarily the consequence of external influence whereas the Simonses are prepared to accord more importance to pressures within the Party.
28. Communist Party of South Africa, Johannesburg District, *Communism and the Native Question,* Johannesburg, n.d. (c. 1935).
29. Simons, H.J. & R.E., *op cit,* p. 484.
30. Further detail can be found in Bunting, B., *Moses Kotane: South African Revolutionary,* London: Inkululeko Publications, 1975.
31. Carter G. and Karis T., *From Protest to Challenge,* Vol. I., *ibid* p. 310.
32. *Ibid.*
33. Opposition to the legislation is discussed in Haines, R. 'The Opposition to General Herzog's Segregation Bills' in University of the Witwatersrand Development Studies Group, *Conference on the History of Opposition in Southern Africa,* January, 1978.
34. See for examples: Stadler, A., 'Birds in a Cornfield: Squatter Movements in Johannesburg' in *Journal of Southern African Studies,* Vol. 6, no. I, October 1979; Stadler, A., 'A Long Way to Walk: Bus Boycotts in Alexandra, 1940 – 1945', University of the Witwatersrand African Studies Institute seminar paper, 1979; O' Meara, D., 'The 1946 African Mineworkers' Strike' in *Journal of Commonwealth and Comparative Politics,* Vol. 13, no. 2, July 1975; Webster, E.C., 'The 1949 Durban Riots' in Bonner, P.L., *Working Papers in Southern African Studies,* Johannesburg: University of the Witwatersrand, 1977; Gerhart, G.M., *Black Power in South Africa,* Los Angeles: University of California, 1978, Chapters 2 and 3; Davie, K., 'Capital, Labour and the South African State', University of the Witwatersrand African Studies Institute seminar paper, 1979.
35. See Simkins, C.E.W., 'Agricultural Production in the African Reserves of South Africa', University of the Witwatersrand African Studies Institute seminar paper, 1980.
36. See report in *Daily Dispatch,* (East London), 25 1946, p. 10.
37. Gerhart, G., *op cit,* p. 41.
38. Carter, G. and Karis, T., *From Protest to Challenge,* Vol. II, p. 305.
39. The developing relationship between the CPSA and the ANC is described in Brooks, A., *From Class Struggle to National Liberation, the CPSA, 1940 – 1950.* University of Sussex, 1970.

JUST A RUMOUR?

It is rumoured that the SADF, acting on irrefutable evidence of ANC planning in the area, intends to carry out a parabat raid on certain houses in an unamed London suburb. The SADF has stated that it has no intention of harming British police or military personnel, but has strongly advised them not to interfere. An SADF spokesman has added that Mrs Thatcher has been given repeated warnings about the danger of harbouring people hostile to South Africa.

Vortex.

SUBSCRIPTIONS:
Send to: Reality, P.O. Box 1104, Pietermaritzburg 3200, R.S.A.

RATES (6 issues—published every two months)

N.B. SUBSCRIPTION RATES HAVE INCREASED.

ORDINARY SUBSCRIBERS	DONOR SUBSCRIBERS
S.A. R3,00 p.a.	S.A. R10,00 p.a.
U.K. £2,00 p.a.	U.K. £5,00 p.a.
U.S.A. $4,00 p.a.	U.S.A. $15,00 p.a.