

“THE POWER OF THE POWERLESS”

Czech Dissident Thought and the Contemporary South African Situation.

In 1985 South Africa seemed to many observers, both internal and external, a country in the grip of revolution. There was euphoria in many townships: Liberation was coming, next year we should be in Jerusalem. In 1987 the picture is very different. Counter-revolution is if not triumphant – the situation is too confusing to allow for clear-cut victories – at least dominant. Liberation has once again been pushed back into a wholly unpredictable future

To anyone concerned to see the emergence of a juster, freer, more humane society in South Africa recent developments cannot but be regarded as profoundly depressing. The best antidote to depression is always activity – and an activity of thought, an intellectual preparedness to grapple with the hard facts of reality, is needed now more than ever before.

The first need is to clear our minds of Utopianism, the abstract construction of ideal societies, an intellectual practice that has been such a striking feature of so much recent South African political thought. Utopianism pervades the whole Verwoerdian concept of ‘grand apartheid’. For all the genuine intellectual gratification to be derived by its advocates from the concept of ‘separate development’, the concept when applied to a country whose peoples had been drawn together by over a century of lived experience, was flawed by a fatal illogicality.

But it must also be said – bitterly though this assertion will be resented in many quarters – that the notion of ‘Liberation’ is also profoundly Utopian. The term has meaning in certain precise circumstances, as when it was applied during the Second World War to the freeing of Nazi-occupied Europe. Then indeed the visual spectacle of the military defeat of the hated invaders and occupiers made the concept of Liberation meaningful and real. It was possible to wake up and find that one’s town had been ‘liberated’ to trace on the map the progress of the Allied armies and the ‘liberation’ of great tracts of territory. But in a country such as South Africa where the original invaders have had a century and more in which to sink their roots deep into the soil, such a war-time analogy is quite inappropriate. More than that, the disparities in coercive power, the resources at the disposal of the state, the unwillingness, indeed the total incapacity, of powerful elements within the dominant community to accept any meaningful reforms, all point inescapably to the continuation of the present regime for the foreseeable future.

One way to bring fresh thinking to bear on the South African situation is to look elsewhere for inspiration. And this can perhaps best be found in considering the experience of those vigorous and creative minds who have had to grapple for many years with the problem, the ‘existential problem’, of living under profoundly illiberal

regimes. There are many such regimes in the contemporary world – but in very few has the technique of repression been worked out with such comprehensive subtlety as in Czechoslovakia, and so it is to the response of Czech dissidents that South Africans will find it well worth directing their attention.

At first sight the idea of comparing the apartheid regime in South Africa with the Communist government of Czechoslovakia may seem absurd, even offensive. Is not the one dedicated to upholding ‘capitalism’, the other ‘socialism’? What freedom of expression is allowed in Communist countries compared to the still substantial freedom permitted in South Africa? How can there be any similarity between the monolithic quality of the Czech regime and the plurality of parties so confusingly apparent in contemporary South Africa? Surely, whether you take your stand on the Left or on the Right, you will find it ridiculous – as much a waste of time as comparing a buffalo with an elephant – to set the two systems one against the other.* But forget for a moment political labels, go for basic structures. Such an exercise will soon reveal certain intriguing similarities. In the first place it can be said that both governments, Czech and South Africa, lack the full legitimacy of consent, a consent that can in the modern world be conferred only through freely conducted elections based on universal franchise. In Czechoslovakia the Communist Party came to power in February 1948 when the coalition government set up after the war with communist and non-communist ministers was overthrown by well-orchestrated demonstrations backed by the threat of Soviet intervention. Twenty years later Soviet intervention was stark and brutal in bringing to an end that brief and intoxicating explosion of reform known as the Prague Spring and reestablishing the Communist Party’s ‘old-guard’, who dubbed their counter-revolutionary policy ‘normalization’.

To white South Africans mindful of their country’s long tradition of parliamentary government it may seem offensive to talk of their government as lacking legitimacy, but South Africa, it should never be forgotten, is a state founded on conquest – a long process reaching back to the seventeenth century and not formally completed until the end of the nineteenth. Conquest, some would argue, provides its own special sort of legitimacy – but it is a legitimacy ultimately acceptable only when accompanied by a vigorous process of assimilation, designed to remove differences between conquerors and conquered. Such a process has never seriously been attempted in South Africa.

The second point of similarity lies in the fact that both regimes are heavily dependent on ideology. That Marxism-Leninism is an ideology capable of much wider appli-

cation than apartheid, is not really relevant here – nor the fact that it has inspired a much more extensive literature and touched a wider range of human actions. Both apartheid and Marxism-Leninism offer in their different ways blueprints for particular societies, ground plans for social engineers, an intellectual justification for intervention in the lives of millions of people.

'Bureaucratic centralism' is the term applied to the system of government developed in Communist countries. It is almost equally apposite to South Africa and so provides a third point of similarity. Certainly it can be said that the degree of state control – which extends to every aspect of life, cultural and social as well as economic and political – is more extensive in Czechoslovakia than it is in South Africa. But South Africa has seen in the last forty years the expansion of a massive bureaucratic structure, manifested not only in the traditional civil service and in the conventional instruments for maintaining law and order – the police and army – but also in the growth of parastatal organizations designed to provide control over many sectors of the economy. Bureaucracy must never be thought of in apolitical terms; its members, both in Czechoslovakia and South Africa, present a massive constituency with a vested interest in preserving the status quo and so ensuring their own well-being.

In contrast to this bureaucratic class – the **nomenklatura** as it is called in Soviet bloc countries – there stand many millions of ordinary people for whom the immediate future appears to hold no hope of a life free from intrusive pressures. Living in a country with a fertile soil and a very low population growth rate Czechs are of course preserved from many of the problems that afflict millions of South Africans – drought, shortage of agricultural land, unemployment. There are no shanty towns, no migrant labour system, no forced removals. But for many Czechs there is a bleakness about their present situation that would not seem unfamiliar to many South Africans.

'Normalization' as the Czech regime describes its policy is a term carefully chosen to conceal one of the most effective systems of oppression the world has ever seen. It is a system skillfully designed to avoid the headlines: few dramatic trials, no executions or concentration camps. The party that had allowed the emergence of the dangerous ideas that led to the Prague Spring had to be purged of unreliable elements. Others, who were not members of the party but who had publicly expressed subversive ideas must be taught a lesson. The regime had many sanctions at its disposal, ranging from the confiscation of a driving licence or the cutting off of a telephone through denial of access to higher education for the children of an offender to loss of job and ejection from accommodation. For many the mere threat of such privations was sufficient to ensure lip service to the regime. The recalcitrant could be worked over by the security police through long hours of interrogation and frequent house searches. The system bore particularly harshly on the intelligentsia – a social group more clearly defined in Central Europe than it is in the West and one that includes those involved in the arts, the media and education. Many intellectuals chose exile. Those who stayed on paid the price. Journalists became building workers,; philosophers, thrown out of university lectureships, survived by becoming hightwatchmen or porters; artists left Prague and found jobs on collective farms. Such

a squandering of talent and ability would seem to have been of no concern to the country's rulers: political stability had been reestablished, the future of 'socialism' was assured.

But after eight years of 'normalization' a few brave spirits found themselves – as one of them put it – 'growing tired of being tired'. A relatively minor incident shocked them into action. A group of young rock musicians who called themselves 'the Plastic People of the Universe' had been put on trial. There was no suggestion that they had been involved in any covert political activity. All they wanted to do was to make their own music and sing songs whose words were relevant to their times, but they fell foul of the 'sterile puritanism' of the system.

The shock of this trial served to bring a number of dissidents together. There were prominent people among them: some had once held high rank in the Communist Party, others were well-known writers, actors or scholars. They decided to act with scrupulous legality. In 1976 the government had accepted and published in the country's code of laws a number of international covenants guaranteeing human rights. In a declaration published on the first day of 1977 – henceforth known as charter 77 – and signed by over two hundred men and women – it was pointed out that in Czechoslovakia these human rights existed 'on paper only'. The Chartists went on to list abuses committed by the authorities. Here are a few examples:

Tens of thousands of our citizens are prevented from working in their own fields for the sole reason that they hold views differing from official ones . . . Deprived as they are of any means to defend themselves, they become victims of a virtual apartheid . . .

Hundreds of thousands of other citizens are condemned to the constant risk of unemployment if they voice their own opinions.

Countless young people are prevented from studying because of their own views or even those of their parents . . .

Freedom of public expression is inhibited by the centralized control of all the communications media and of publishing and cultural institutions . . .

Civil rights are seriously vitiated by bugging telephones and houses, opening mail, following personal movements, searching homes, setting up networks of neighbourhood informers (often recruited by illicit threats or promises) and in other ways . . .

'Responsibility for the maintenance of civil rights in our country', the Chartists pointed out, 'devolves on the political and state authorities – but not only on them: everyone bears his or her responsibility for the conditions that prevail . . . It is this sense of co-responsibility, our belief in the importance of its conscious public acceptance and the general need to give it new and more effective expression that led us to the idea of creating charter 77'. Charter 77 was not to be seen, the signatories were careful to point out, as 'the basis of any oppositional political activity'. Rather it was 'a loose, informal and open association of people united by the need to strive individually and collectively for the respecting of civil and human rights in our country and throughout the world'. The aim was 'to

conduct a constructive dialogue' with the authorities "by drawing attention to abuses of human rights and suggesting how they can be remedied".

Constructive dialogue was the last thing the authorities were prepared to offer. Instead they retaliated with the heavy-handedness many Chartists must have anticipated: house searches, long interrogations conducted by the security police, finally trials and imprisonment for some of the leading signatories. The official media embarked on a vigorous smear campaign and the party faithful were called on to send in stacks of petitions and resolutions whose signatories were prepared to condemn a document most of them had never set eyes on. The chartists found themselves, as one of them remarked, in much the same position as the early Christians stigmatized 'as the carriers of a contagious disease who should be expelled from society'.

But for all the machinery of oppression at their disposal, the authorities have not been able to eliminate Charter 77. The number of chartists is now said to be in the region of one thousand, with about thirty new adherents every year – a derisory membership in a country of fifteen million, at least to anyone who does not pause to reflect that all great movements in history have started from miniscule groupings (thirteen men in an upper room). The Chartists have concentrated on producing a regular series of documents covering not only human rights issues but also other important aspects of national life-education, the economy, ecology. The contents of these documents have been broadcast by stations such as Radio Free Europe based on Munich and so easily picked up in Czechoslovakia. In this way the ideas of Charter 77 are assured of a much wider distribution.

Among the publications of the Chartists was a remarkable collection of essays mostly written in 1978 and 1979 but not available in an English translation until 1985 when they were published by Hutchinson of London under the title **The Power of the Powerless**. (The page references that follow are to this edition.) The book took its title from the longest and most important essay in the collection written by Vaclav Havel, the internationally known dramatist and the most prominent signatory of Charter 77. Unfortunately Havel's essay has never been published in paperback in an easily accessible version. But it must be seen as one of the seminal works of our time – and it is impossible to read it without being struck by its appositeness and relevance to the contemporary South African situation in every paragraph. For this reason it seems well worthwhile summarizing what Havel has to say at some length – and to follow this summary by a brief reconsideration of the relevance of Havel's ideas to South Africa in its age of counter-revolution.

II

'A spectre is haunting Eastern Europe: the spectre of what is called dissent'. with these splendidly ironic words – they echo, of course, the first words of the Communist Manifesto – Havel opens his essay. This spectre is 'a natural consequence of the present historical phase of the system it is haunting'. For 'a thousand reasons' the system is no longer in a position brutally to eliminate all forms of nonconformity. At the same time it is too ossified politically to be able to incorporate nonconformity within its official structure. (p.23)

But who are these so-called 'dissidents'? Where do they come from? What role do they have in society? Can they actually change anything? These questions lead to 'an examination of the potential of the "powerless"? But first it is necessary to consider the nature of the power with which the 'powerless' are confronted. (p. 23)

The term 'dictatorship' is often applied to the Communist system – 'the dictatorship of the proletariat', 'the dictatorship of a political bureaucracy', but it is misleading. Classical dictatorship involves the seizure of power by a small group of people. It has both a local and a temporary character. Its power derives ultimately from its police and its soldiers. But the system which exists in Eastern Europe – and equally, one may interject, the system that exists in South Africa – is very different. The Communist regimes of Eastern Europe form part of a larger whole: each country has been 'completely penetrated by a network of manipulatory instruments controlled by the superpower at the centre and totally subordinate to its interests.' (p. 24). (At first sight there may seem to be no parallel between Soviet domination of Eastern Europe and the situation in Southern Africa. But when one stops to consider the concept of a 'constellation of states' as advanced from time to time by Pretoria, when one considers too the manipulatory powers possessed by Pretoria over its neighbours, both the so-called 'independent' homelands and the internationally recognized sovereign states of southern Africa, then suggestive comparisons begin to emerge.)

Classical dictatorships usually lack historical roots. But the Communist states of Eastern Europe can trace their intellectual roots back to the proletarian and socialist movements of the nineteenth century. These origins provide the system with 'a solid foundation of sorts'. (p. 25) (In the same way the architects of apartheid after 1948 had at their disposal a massive corpus of discriminatory legislation reaching back to the early nineteenth century.)

In comparison with classical dictatorships the Communist system in Eastern Europe 'commands an incomparably more precise, logically structured, generally comprehensible and, in essence, extremely flexible ideology, that in its elaborateness and completeness, is almost a secularized religion'. (p. 25) (The ideology of apartheid may not seem worthy of so lavish a range of epithets, but the importance of ideology in maintaining the apartheid structure must never be forgotten.)

Improvisation is a characteristic of the way in which power is exercised in classical dictatorships. The structure is not so solid as to be able to allow no room for opposition. By contrast the Communist system has now been in place in Eastern Europe for a considerable period of time. In the Soviet Union some of the system's structural features are clearly derived from Czarist absolutism, and the solidity of the system is further strengthened by its control over all the means of production. It is constantly able to 'invest in itself'. As the sole employer the Communist state is in a position to 'manipulate the day-to-day existence of all citizens'. (p. 26) (The South African system has never been able to accumulate the same amount of power as its counterparts in the Communist world, but the stress laid on 'total mobilization' shows that such a degree of power would clearly not come amiss to those who rule in Pretoria.)

The final contrast between the Communist system and classical dictatorship lies in the absence from the former of that 'atmosphere of revolutionary excitement' that characterizes the latter. The Communist system has now become an integral part of a larger world; Communist states now represent 'another form of the consumer and industrial society, with all its concomitant social, intellectual and psychological consequences'. (p. 27) (In the same way one may reflect that the heroic age of Afrikaner nationalism is long since past: almost all white South Africans and an increasing number of blacks are now subject to the subtle demands of consumerism.)

The Communist system of Eastern Europe is clearly then very different from 'what is traditionally understood by dictatorship'. To distinguish this system from classical dictatorship or totalitarianism (the term generally applied to the Soviet system in its early years) Havel proposes to apply to it the novel term 'post-totalitarian' (p. 27) (In the same way the present South African system has differentiated itself from all earlier forms of segregation, but the term 'apartheid regime' is sufficient designation.)

Within the post-totalitarian system ideology is of central importance – 'an increasingly important component of power, a pillar providing it with both excusatory legitimacy and an inner coherence'. (p. 32) Ideology operates both within the mind of the individual and at the same time it provides a link between the individual and the system. On the individual it operates with 'a certain hypnotic charm'. 'To wandering humankind it offers an immediately available home: all one has to do is accept it and suddenly everything becomes clear once more, life takes on a new meaning, and all mysteries, unanswered questions, anxiety and loneliness vanish'. (p. 25)

Between the regime and the people ideology acts as a bridge (p. 29). Alternatively it can be thought of as a glue. 'Without this glue the structure as a totalitarian structure would vanish: it would disintegrate into individual atoms chaotically colliding with one another in their unregulated particular interests and inclinations' (p. 32)

Gradually ideology loses touch with reality and turns into ritual. Reality is replaced by pseudo-reality. (p. 32) But this outcome was inevitable from the start. the individual who succumbs to the comfort of ideology 'pays dearly for this low rent home: the price is abdication of one's reason, conscience and responsibility, for an essential aspect of this ideology is the consignment of reason and conscience to a higher authority'. (p. 25)

In the post-totalitarian state 'the centre of power is identical with the centre of truth'. (p. 25). But 'between the aims of the post-totalitarian system and the aims of life there is a yawning abyss: while life, in its essence, moves towards plurality, diversity, independent self-constitution and self-organization, in short towards the fulfilment of its own freedom, the post-totalitarian system demands, conformity, uniformity and discipline'. (p. 29)

Life within the post-totalitarian system is 'permeated with hypocrisy and lies' 'Government by bureaucracy is called popular government: the working class is enslaved in the name of the working-class; the complete degradation of the individual is presented as his or her ultimate liberation; depriving people of information is called making it available; . . . the repression of culture is called its development

. . . the lack of free expression becomes the highest form of freedom, farcical elections become the highest form of democracy; banning independent thought becomes the most scientific or world views . . . Because the regime is captive to its own lies, it must falsify everything. It falsifies the past, it falsifies the present, and it falsifies the future, . . . It pretends to respect human rights. It pretends to prosecute no one, it pretends to fear nothing, It pretends to pretend nothing'. (pp. 30-31)

Individuals living within the post-totalitarian system are constantly confronted with the falsifications put out by the regime. They may not believe them, but they have to behave as though they did. 'For this reason they must live **within a lie**'. (The emphasis here is Havel's.) 'They need not accept the lie. It is enough for them to have accepted their life with it and in it. For this very fact, individuals confirm the system, fulfil the system, make the system, **are** the system'. (p. 31).

In classical dictatorships it is easy to draw a line between rulers and ruled. In the post-totalitarian system this line runs through each individual Even those at the very top of the system are trapped within it and are thus unfree. 'Everyone in his or her own way is both a victim and a supporter of the system'. (p. 37) By coming to terms with living within a lie, the individual turns his or her back on 'the essential aims of life' which are 'present naturally in every person': 'some longing for humanity's rightful dignity, for moral integrity, for free expression of being and a sense of transcendence over the world of existences', Instead, 'each person somehow succumbs to a profane trivialization of his or her inherent humanity'. (p. 38)

At this point Havel sees a connection between the post-totalitarian system and the consumer society. He points to the 'general unwillingness of consumption-oriented people to sacrifice some material certainties for the sake of their own spiritual and moral integrity', 'their vulnerability to the attraction of mass indifference'. In this case 'is not the greyness and emptiness of life in the post-totalitarian system only an inflated caricature of modern life in general? And do we not in fact stand as a kind of warning to the West, revealing to it its own latent tendencies?' (pp. 38-39).

Here we must pause to ask ourselves how relevant and applicable Havel's analysis of the role of ideology in the post-totalitarian system is to contemporary South Africa. Clearly there has never existed in South Africa so all-pervasive an ideology as has prevailed in a country such as Czechoslovakia, but the agents of apartheid have succeeded in enforcing at least a tacit compliance with the system. South Africans may not be required to turn out for mass rallies or decorate their streets with banners asserting loyalty to the regime, but every time an individual obeys a segregationist directive and so observes one of the still multifarious forms of discrimination, then he or she has become willy nilly an accomplice of the system. That the ideology of apartheid is a form of mythology based on lies has been shown often enough. Those who occupy leading positions within the system may indeed realize the falsity of the ideology, but they too are trapped within it. To assert that 'apartheid is dead' is to put forward one more lie. Apartheid cannot die because it is an essential component of the existing power structure.

This dominance of ideology helps to explain two other features of South African political life which Havel notes as characteristics of the post-totalitarian system: continuity and anonymity. In many polities – and especially in classical dictatorships – succession to power is ‘a rather complicated affair’. Power struggles between different cliques certainly occur within the post-totalitarian system. But the struggles take place behind closed doors and they do not threaten the very essence of the system. ‘The binding substance – ideology – remains undisturbed’. (p. 33) Surely the same point could be made of the Nationalist Party between 1948 and the early 1980s.

When ritual dominates individual character becomes unimportant, ‘Power becomes clearly anonymous’. The men at the top take on a faceless character. This helps to explain what might be termed the ‘identikit’ character of ministers both in Communist and in South African governments in recent years. The system is self-perpetuating; it has the quality of automatism. And so the reformer will find that ‘automatism, with its enormous inertia, will triumph sooner or later’. The reformer will either find him or herself rejected or else learn to conform. (p. 34). Within the post-totalitarian system and equally within the apartheid regime there is no possibility of reform. (That surely has been the most significant lesson of P.W. Botha’s presidency.) So what is to be done?

To illustrate what the individual can do, Havel imagines the case of a greengrocer who, as manager of a state-run shop, is required to place in the window a notice proclaiming “Workers of the World Unite”. The greengrocer never stops to think about the actual meaning of the slogan. It is simply an essential sign of conformity. He is participating in the prescribed ritual. But imagine that one day the greengrocer stops putting slogans in his window merely to ingratiate himself with authority, begins to say what he really feels at political meetings, expresses solidarity with those whom his conscience commands him to support. ‘In his revolt the greengrocer steps out of living within the lie. His revolt is an attempt to live **within the truth**’. (p. 39)

Punishment will not be long in coming: the greengrocer will be subjected to various forms of harassment. He has committed something incomparably more serious than a simple, ‘individual offence’. He has broken the rules of the game. He has shown that the emperor is naked. In such a system anyone who steps out of line, ‘threatens it in its entirety’. (p. 40).

‘Living within the truth’ takes many different forms, but all of them represent a ‘revolt against manipulation’: ‘anything from a letter by intellectuals to a workers’ strike, from a rock concert to a student demonstration from refusing to vote in farcical elections, to making an open speech at some official congress, or even a hunger strike’. (p. 43) ‘Living within the truth’ provides ‘the primary breeding-ground for what might, in the widest possible sense of the word, be understood as an opposition in the post-totalitarian system.’ (p. 41) Confrontation takes place first within the mind of the individual. Truth is a ‘hidden force’, ‘a bacteriological weapon’, (p. 42)

The decision to ‘live within the truth’ involves a moral act. – moral because those who make it are not seeking their own immediate interests or looking for any tangible reward. The individual who makes this decision is led on ineluctably to the realization that ‘freedom is indivisible’, that an attack on one person who is seeking to ‘live within

the truth’ is an attack on ‘the very notion of living within the truth’, (pp. 46-47). It was the trial of the young rock musicians in 1976 that provided the spark that led to the emergence of Charter 77. ‘People were inspired to feel a genuine sense of solidarity with the young musicians and they came to realize that not standing up for the freedom of others, regardless of how remote their means of creativity or their attitude to life, meant surrendering their own freedom.’ (p. 47) Moreover this realization came to individuals from widely differing backgrounds, both communists and non-communists, and so Charter 77 emerged as ‘a community that is **a priori** open to anyone’. (p. 47) (Many people involved in community associations, student groups or detainee support committees in South Africa will be able to bear out the validity of this insight.)

In the post-totalitarian state ‘all political life in the traditional sense has been eliminated. Deprived of open political discussion, let alone the right to organize politically, people’s interest in politics naturally dwindles. (p. 49) But there still exist within society individuals who have never abandoned politics as a vocation and who continue to think independently ‘Even in the worst of times, they maintain the continuity of political thought’. (pp. 49-50) When a new impulse begins to stir they can enrich it ‘with the fruits of their own political thinking’. So in Czechoslovakia almost all of those who were political prisoners in the early 1970’s came to be among the most active members of Charter 77 a few years later (How apposite this point is to the role of old ANC and PAC activists in the townships in the bleak years of the late 1960s and early 1970s.)

But these old activists suffer from ‘one chronic fault’ – ‘an outmoded way of thinking’. (p. 50). They ‘remain faithful to traditional notions of politics established in more or less democratic countries or in classical dictatorships’. They fail fully to grasp ‘the historical uniqueness of the post-totalitarian system as a social and political reality’. (p. 50) Losing touch with reality they find themselves in a world of ‘genuinely utopian thinking’. (p. 51). (How apposite again to South Africa – to the thinking of all those political activists who imagined in 1960, in 1976 and again in 1984-86 that ‘revolution’ was just round the corner.)

These old political activists also ‘fail to appreciate the political significance of those ‘pre-political’ events and processes that provide the living humus from which genuine political change usually springs’. (p. 50) Dissident movements in Soviet bloc countries have derived their initial inspiration from people in ‘non-political’ professions – writers, academics, scientists, ordinary working people. Not being bound by traditional political thinking, they are more aware of political reality. The old alternative political models no longer serve to inspire people. In the post-totalitarian system ‘the real sphere of potential politics is elsewhere: in the continuing and cruel tension between the aims of that system and the aims of life, that is, the elementary need of human beings to live, to a certain extent at least, in harmony with themselves, that is, to live in a bearable way, not to be humiliated by their superiors and officials, not to be continually watched by the police, to be able to express themselves freely, to find an outlet for their creativity, to enjoy legal security, and so on.’ (p. 51) (So in South Africa protests over rents, or increased bus fares or inferior education or the presence of the police in the townships have a far greater chance of securing popular involvement than rhetorical talk of a new order.) □

(to be concluded in the September issue).