

MINUTES OF PLENARY MEETINGS HELD IN GENEVA BETWEEN 2 AND 5
AUGUST 1988 BETWEEN A SOUTH AFRICAN DELEGATION AND AN ANGOLAN
DELEGATION AND FACILITATED BY A U.S. DELEGATION

Participants:

South African Delegation:

Mr N P van Heerden
Dr L D Barnard
General J J Geldenhuys
Ambassador P J Koornhof
Mr J H A Beukes
General C J van Tonder
Mr G W Babb
Mr D W Auret
Mr J Boshoff
Brig J Sonnekus
Ambassador A L Manley
Mr A Jaquet
Mr R Desmarais

Angolan Delegation:

Lt-Gen Antonio Dos Santos Franca Ndalu
Lt-Gen Francisco Magalhaes Paiva Nyunda
Mr Fernando V Dias Franca van Dunem
Mr Venancio da Silva Moura
Antonio Pitra Neto
Manuel Pedro Pacavira
Armindo do Espirito Santo Vieira
Col. Antonio Jose Maria
Lt-Col Mario Placido Cirilo de Sa
Mr Gilberto da Piedade Verissimo
Mr Stone Carlos

Cuban Delegation

Mr C Aldana
General U Rosales
Mr R Alarcon
General R Acevedo
Mr J Arbesu
General J Bermudez
Mr R Puente
Colonel E Morejon
Mr A Hidalgo

US Delegation

Dr C Crocker
Ambassador H Cohen
Ambassador E Perkins
Mr J Woods
Mr C Snider
Mr L Napper
Mr M McKinley
Ms R Raphel

DR CROCKER welcomed the delegations to Geneva and said that the step-by-step approach which had proved useful in past meetings should now be continued. It was obvious that the parties now faced more substantial issues than in the past and he wished to hear what the approach of the delegations was and what their priorities were.

MR VAN HEERDEN said that a meeting so soon after New York was a sign of encouragement. Before turning to more substantive issues, he extended an invitation to the other delegations to attend a reception at Ambassador Manley's residence the following day.

GENERAL NDALU responded by saying that considerable headway had been made since New York and that delegations had put a great deal of work into the initiative. Angola was now in a position to make further progress. He restated his approach that there should be no winners or losers and that a solution acceptable to all delegations be found. He also accepted with thanks Mr Van Heerden's invitation to the reception.

MR VAN HEERDEN. (verbatim remarks) "As I have said before we are encouraged to meet so soon after New York to pursue the work that we started there. We would like to start our presentation by referring to the recent meeting at Sal Island

which did not in all respects produce the kind of concrete results that we had hoped it would. The South African Government did not find the proposals adequate and we must register the fact that we failed to reach an agreement to cease hostilities. The delegates at Sal agreed that the unresolved issues would be taken further and discussed and pursued in Geneva. We are ready to do so here.

In the meantime I can inform you that the South African Government has conducted a comprehensive review of the negotiations that we have had to date. As we had anticipated - and I believe I speak for all delegations - we will reach a point where we would need to address the core issues surrounding these negotiations. It is our belief that that point has now been reached. These core issues will require sober decisions on the part of all parties in their own sovereign right. As we have said before and as the distinguished delegate from Angola, General Ndalú has just again reaffirmed, it is also our view that there should be no losers in this negotiating process.

It is against this background and in the spirit of the principles to which we agreed in New York, that the South African Government has mandated this delegation to propose the 1st of November 1988 as the date for the implementation of United Nations Security Council Resolution 435(78) (UNSCR 435/78). In terms of this proposal elections in Namibia will take place on the 1st of June 1989. This will allow a period of three months, starting now, for the Secretary-General to make its preparations for the implementation of that resolution.

Secondly, in the spirit of the principles and understandings which resulted from the meeting in New York it follows that the phased and total withdrawal of Cuban troops from Angola by agreement between the Governments of Angola and Cuba will

be completed by 1 June 1989, the date of the elections in Namibia.

What are the implications of this proposal in practice? What are the things that we will need to do starting the very moment that we can reach agreement on this proposal? Firstly, we will have to have a reaffirmation of the commitment, which we believe has already been made, to an effective ceasefire and the cessation of hostilities - this we believe can be put in place with effect from the 10th of August 1988. Secondly - and I am dealing with the practical implications of our proposal - we will have the commencement of the process of withdrawal and redeployment of South African and Cuban troops from Angola and restrictions on SWAPO to prevent further incidents which might jeopardise the cessation of hostilities. Thirdly, the process of completion of withdrawal of South African troops from Angola by the 1st of September 1988. Fourthly, the establishment of a liaison and monitoring committee which we believe, Mr Chairman, should already be finalised here in Geneva while we are here, to decide not later than the 9th of August on a mechanism or mechanisms to put effect to this arrangement. Fifthly, the commencement of effective monitoring and verification of this arrangement starting on the 20th of August 1988. We believe further details of withdrawal schedules are to be determined in accordance with paragraphs A and C of the principles on which we agreed in New York. We also believe that this is an area on which more work has to be done by way of separate discussions in a format on which we may agree upon.

In addition to the above aspects there are other important implications of this proposal by the South African Government, flowing from the principles accepted at New York, - I am referring to the financial implications of Resolution 435 including the financial consequences flowing from South Africa's withdrawal.

from SWA/Namibia. In this regard South Africa would wish to know:

- a) how are the costs of the implementation of Resolution 435 to be defrayed. These costs are estimated variously but some will have it as high as R1,500 million;
- b) what arrangements will be made by the Permanent Members of the Security Council of the United Nations, to help finance the administration of Namibia including matters such as bank guarantees for loans for which the South African Government is responsible, after the implementation of Resolution 435 when South Africa of necessity commences its withdrawal from the territory.

A further important implication of the principles that we accepted in New York - I am now referring to point G of the principles - concerns, as far as South Africa is concerned the military support and training facilities provided to the African National Congress in Angola. This involvement includes the following; there are training bases in Angola where members of the ANC who have fled South Africa are provided basic military training:

- a) At Viana there is a transit base where approximately 300 people are housed in an area only 11 km away from Luanda.
- b) At Caculama there is a training camp which exists since 1981 approximately 50 km north of the town of Caculama.
- c) At Quibaxe there is a training camp also known as Camp 13 approximately 20 km outside the town of Quibaxe and

this base has been in existence since 1978.

- d) At Pango there is also a training base which has been there since 1979 also known as the David Rabkin Centre and it is known to us that in 1984 there was an insurrection at the camp and a number of the members of the ANC were executed before a firing-squad.
- e) Another camp for the training of the ANC is near the town of Malanje.
- f) Then we are also aware of the Quatro Rehabilitation Centre approximately 30 km west of Quibaxe.
- g) Finally, there is the Quela-farm near the town of Quela in the north east of Angola which belongs to the ANC.

This situation, Mr Chairman, is unacceptable to the South African Government. These acts which result in the killing of civilians in South Africa are committed from Angolan territory and that is not acceptable to the South African Government. This is an aspect which has to be addressed following on the principles that were accepted in New York.

I come to my conclusion and I wish to say that if the proposals that the South African Government has mandated my delegation to make to you today are accepted, it is our firm belief that there will be no losers around this table. The sovereignty of Angola will be put beyond question. SWA/Namibia will have its independence through free and fair elections and the missions of all parties will have been accomplished. Peace will have been restored to our region and the door will have been opened for all of us to attend to the social and economic development of the peoples of southern Africa."

DR CROCKER commented that the South African Government's proposal covered a lot of ground and was related to the agenda that the United States had put to parties before the meeting. It also related to the roadmap that had been distributed the previous day and contained a number of concrete dates. The South African presentation constituted wide-ranging and concrete proposals and the Angolan delegation should now respond.

GENERAL NDALU said that he had listened to the South African Government's proposal with great attention but required the statement in writing so as to offer the Angolan/Cuban side a chance to review the matter carefully.

Concerning the Cape Verde meetings, his delegation had thought that many issues could be wrapped-up but the South African delegation had left in haste and it had therefore not been possible to come to an agreement. There were nevertheless certain issues on which the Angolan delegation concurred. Firstly, the application of principles by all parties was self-evident. Secondly, he wondered whether it was advisable to revert to a discussion of the damages suffered by both parties due to the conflict, because this would bring up a discussion of UNITA and the ANC. This matter would be resolved when the principle that all parties must comply with principles was implemented. Thirdly, the financial considerations of implementation was a matter about which Dr Crocker should more correctly speak. It should also be realised that financial issues were a problem for the Cuban side since Cuban troop withdrawal would entail considerable expenditure.

MR ALDANA said that the meeting was now addressing some core issues. The South African approach represented a starting point in the discussion. As far as he was concerned, the core issue at stake was the independence of Namibia through

implementation of UNSCR 435(78). The statement represented a clear indication that the South African Government had the political will to implement UNSCR 435(78). The statement required further analysis so as to understand fully the political and practical considerations to be addressed. He noted that the South African side was not completely satisfied with the results of the Cape Verde meeting. The Cuban delegates at that meeting had returned home with the same sentiments. If all sides were dissatisfied, this meant that further meetings were indicated. The South African Government's present proposal included a cessation of hostilities on 10 August, a concept closely linked to the Cape Verde discussions. The time had now come to review and assess all that could be done to further this momentum. A group of military and civilian personnel should now discuss without constraint the issues at hand so as to achieve a better overview of matters of principle. The Cuban delegation also required time to review the South African proposals and would do so in the spirit of there being no winners and no losers, and on the basic assumption that the independence of Namibia and the security and stability of Angola had to be secured.

In the meantime, he wished to address the question of SWAPO raised by the South African delegation. He would not presume to ask for guarantees in respect of the behaviour of UNITA in Angola. The impression that the Cuban/Angolan delegation could dictate to SWAPO should be got rid of once and for all. What was needed now was a clear indication of a series of precise steps envisaged in the South African proposals. He wished to know whether this proposal was in response to a previous offer by the Cuban/Angolan side. No predetermined deadlines should be imposed at this stage but rather an open-ended arrangement should be sought. He also required South Africa's proposals in writing for further study.

DR CROCKER said he considered this request for the South African proposals in writing as a preliminary response from the Angolan/Cuban delegation, and enquired whether the parties wished to discuss the unfinished issues of the Cape Verde meetings. With regard to financial considerations raised by the South African delegation, he wished to emphasise that he was not in a position to comment on United Nations budget constraints. However, the UN would require a signal from Geneva complete with target dates before the Secretary-General could undertake detailed updates of the planning for implementation of UNSCR 435(78). One of the purposes of the meeting was to decide whether such a signal could be sent to the Secretary-General. In addition, he sought clarity from South Africa concerning the kinds of costs and the timing of the financial implications mentioned. It was one thing to talk about the economic and social development of Namibia but another thing to talk about the general administrative costs.

MR VAN HEERDEN agreed with opinions expressed earlier that delegations would have to look carefully at the proposals and allow enough time for proper consideration thereof. The South African delegation had both the time and the authority to deal in-depth with the core issues. He would be happy to provide the other delegations with the written text of his remarks within an hour and a half. He did not feel it an appropriate time to pursue the Cape Verde discussions. The Angolan/Cuban delegation should thoroughly consider the present proposal and then pursue the matter if it became necessary. With regard to the financial implications of an independent Namibia, he agreed to provide the required details at a later stage.

The meeting then adjourned and resumed at 11h00 on 3 August.

GENERAL NDALU said that delegations had left the previous

day's meeting on the understanding that there was a black-out rule concerning press comments. Less than one hour later, the South African Minister of Foreign Affairs had divulged in detail all the South African proposals. He had wondered whether it was worthwhile to return to the negotiation table and only on consideration of the good spirit that had prevailed at other meetings and in view of the ideals of negotiation had he decided to disregard this "public aberration and behaviour". He reiterated that diplomatic negotiations should be conducted in the same spirit that had prevailed at previous meetings. In keeping with the spirit the Angolan/Cuban delegation he wish to propose the following: (verbatim remarks)

1. The withdrawal of S.A. troops from Angola, is the sine qua non condition to be able to commence the implementation of all other actions that will come later. This withdrawal in our opinion will have to be carried out up to 15 August, 1988.

2. As far as the date for the implementation of SC Resolution 435/78, we are in total agreement with the mediator's proposal, that is, the 25th October, 1988.

3. The redeployment of the Cuban troops will be carried out in a period of 17 months, starting from the date of the implementation of SC Resolution 435.

4. The commencement of the phased and total withdrawal of the Cuban troops will be carried out starting from the 6th month after the date of the implementation of Resolution 435/78 and will take 48 months.

5. As far as the ANC issue is concerned, it could be dealt with later on, in depth and objectively at a more convenient time.

We feel that if all these conditions are gathered we would have made an important step towards the settlement of the problems of Southwestern Africa. In that context there would be neither winner nor losers."

MR ALDANA said that it was unusual, to say the least, that the previous night when he was busy trying to persuade to SWAPO leaders who were in Geneva that the South African proposals were serious ones, they showed him a telex received from Windhoek giving him a more comprehensive information than had even been revealed at the negotiating table by Mr Van Heerden. His delegation had felt that they were part of a select, well-informed group of people and this behaviour was not only unpleasant but not ethical and would cause further complications and difficulties in persuading the ANC and SWAPO to go along with the principle of a negotiated settlement. Many African leaders had told him that to negotiate with South Africa was to deal in fantasy. The action by the South African side had compelled the Angolan/Cuban delegation to hold a press conference which was currently underway.

He said that nevertheless something positive had emerged from the unpleasant incident. It showed that all parties would have to take all the interests in their home countries into account. The Angolan/Cuban delegation would go on with the discussions on the understanding that the press black-out rule once again applied.

MR ALDANA then provided the formal position of the Angolan/Cuban delegation on the substance of the discussions: (verbatim remarks)

"Mr Van Heerden, I pass on to comment on the common position of Angola and Cuba regarding the essence of our negotiations.

First and foremost we deeply regret that the Government of South Africa did not reaffirm the agreements which we believed had been adopted by consensus in Cape Verde through the efficient mediation of Mr Woods and other north American officials. You must know that as part of those understandings, among others, there was a commitment on our part to offer a three-month guarantee during which time the Cuban troops would not go beyond their present positions in the southwestern flank. I wonder if the rejection of the Cape Verde results includes the rejection of those guarantees.

I believe that at some point we should dedicate attention to clarify this issue.

I must admit that in Havana and in Luanda we also meditated on what was discussed in Sal, and more specifically about the withdrawal of the South African troops from the territory of Angola. I fully understand that this is a highly sensitive issue for you and for the government in Pretoria. We even understand that any decision in this respect has to be adopted taking into consideration the internal public opinion. For that we show understanding and respect. But, in view of the famous Roadmap which Mr Crocker proposes to us we invite the Government of South Africa to meditate on the convenience of withdrawing its troops from the territory of Angola by August 15, that is, fifteen days before the proposed date.

We believe that this is feasible according to the real actual number of South African troops inside Angola. In so doing, South Africa would favor the process prior to the implementation of Resolution 435 for which the Roadmap presented by Mr Crocker allots so little time.

With regards to the date for the implementation of 435 this can be one or another; here we are speaking of merely a few

days difference. We believe that October 25 would be more consistent with the idea as a whole.

With respect to the contention of SWAPO, to call it some way, we consider that it is unreasonable to pretend to confine SWAPO's military formations north of a set line before the South African troops have withdrawn from Angola. Nor do we think that this is really feasible not only at present but also when the formal cease fire foreseen by Resolution 435 is established because control over SWAPO would then correspond - and forgive me for my English pronunciation - to the Peace Keeping Force.

With respect to the withdrawal of Cuban internationalist troops, you must understand, distinguished members of the South African Delegation, the chemically pure linkage contained in the South African proposal is unacceptable to us. If it were to be carried out thus nobody would believe that it is a sovereign act by the Government of Cuba and the Government of Angola. We, Angola and Cuba, accept to include the withdrawal of Cuban troops in the package of agreements fully cognizant of the fact that the nation most interested in that withdrawal due to geopolitical reasons, is not precisely South Africa but our mediator, the United States. I feel it is unnecessary to repeat the arguments which we have put forward in other quadripartite meetings on the legality of the presence of Cuban troops in Angola. The link between that withdrawal and the independence of Namibia makes us Cubans proud but the fundamental questions of principles is the sovereignty and the security of Angola. It is unreasonable to present the problem of the withdrawal, that is, the dates and the pace of that withdrawal, aside from this issue regarding the sovereignty and the security of Angola which constitutes the fundamental political precondition. Naturally, there are other logistic, technical and financial realities. Regarding

the latter I would like to state very clearly that if unforeseeable matters of a material nature do establish physical and time limitations, the Government of Cuba does not intend in any way to subject the discussion and execution of the time schedule to economic issues.

At the same time, there are other practical considerations related in the first place to the establishment of the necessary conditions for the replacement of Cuban troops by FAPLA. I believe it is unnecessary to extend myself on this.

The other aspect in this question is UNITA. Yesterday when we listened to a fragment of the report by the South African Special Services on the alleged or real camps of the ANC in Angola I wondered if those same services could give us equal illustration on the camps, bases and garrisons of UNITA in Zaire, Namibia and Angola. Could they not offer us some facts on the atrocities perpetrated against the civilian population and the destruction of the Angolan economy. Here yesterday morning we heard of mutinies and executions in the ANC camps. Could someone tell us what became of the Kuanyama Chief Vakulukuta? Are the real circumstances known under which the veteran UNITA chief Chendovava died? Whatever happened to Chiguale? And to Chindondo? And to Sangumba? And even to N'Zao Puna himself? What will happen to Jeremiah Chitunda if he continues to receive such exposure.

Gentlemen, we are grown ups and our highest personal claim is to have a bit of common sense. No matter how much the propaganda services of some western countries strive and in spite of the fact that the dialectics learned by Savimbi when he was an enthusiastic sympathizer of Maoism fascinates some of the persons present here, UNITA is a barbaric organization whose disciplined rules include whip lashes, blindly racist and where unfit individuals take on high responsibilities

solely for being fortunate relatives of Mr Savimbi.

But that savage force today has sophisticated weapons, receives logistic and political external support and to this day they even receive generous support for the South African troops. We will not discover here the historic context in which UNITA was founded by the indulgence of the Portuguese PIDE, nor will we deny the realities that confer to this phenomenon several peculiarities. In due time, these will require a political and socio-economic treatment by the Government of Angola. What we must state here is that UNITA as a destabilizing factor in the Angolan reality cannot be set aside from any decision regarding the time schedule for the withdrawal of Cuban troops.

I would like to recall that Resolution 435 was adopted three years after the Cuban international contingent was in Angola and the Cuban troops are not even mentioned in that Resolution. None of the western countries which promoted that Resolution apparently considered that the Cuban internationalists were an obstacle or any other kind of difficulty for the independence of Namibia.

On the other hand, we at that time had already withdrawn on our own initiative without pressures from anyone and in spite of the counsel and the concern of many, two thirds of all our forces. Then the situation deteriorated and President Neto requested us not only to stop the withdrawal but to reinforce our contingents.

The causes that originated that decision are, unfortunately, much deeper today. Nevertheless we, Angola and Cuba, understand the particular situation that has been created and we perceive a juncture which - if all parties act soundly - will make it possible for Namibia to obtain its independence. From

our point of view this does not necessarily have to be viewed by South Africa as a defeat and it will guarantee sovereignty and security for Angola. This is the reason why we are willing to negotiate here the time schedule for the withdrawal of Cuban troops but not the verification of that withdrawal which corresponds - as is the case of the South African withdrawal from Namibia - to the United Nations the difference being that we have requested this spontaneously.

Since the proposal presented yesterday by South Africa represents total immobility with respect to the demands they have been submitting for years, we - just as my colleague Ndalú has done now - have limited ourselves to express the option which Cuba and Angola deem most appropriate, which is the one that General Ndalú has just outlined: to begin redeployment on the date of implementation of Resolution 435 and to complete it seventeen months after that; to begin the staged and total withdrawal six months after the arrival of the UNTAG troops to Namibia and to conclude it 48 months later.

Nevertheless, we are willing to make our stands more flexible within certain limits. Thus we find ourselves on the starting point of this round of talks in Geneva and we await an initiative on the part of the mediators once the position of both parties has been expounded."

DR CROCKER remarked that as far apart as parties seemed to be on issues of substance, both sides were in fact talking about a roadmap or a sequence of events. They were not as far apart as it might seem. The central fact was that it would take time for the United Nations to prepare for implementation of UNCSR 435 and that if all parties were serious about the business at hand, agreement would have to be reached about a sequence of events.

MR VAN HEERDEN said that he had listened carefully to the comments of the other delegations and some areas still appeared to be unclear. Consequently he wished to ask the United States mediators to provide his delegation with the Angolan position in writing. This would enable the South African delegation to consider carefully where agreement and disagreement lay. In some areas the parties were close; it was for instance inconceivable that after 10 years of discussions and negotiations, the parties could not agree on a 5-day difference between certain steps. He wished to address the comments of the Angolan/Cuban delegation on the release for the public record of the South African proposals. The issue of independence for Namibia and of the war situation in Southwestern Africa was an emotional and serious issue in South Africa as well as in Cuba and Angola. Even before the New York conference, the South African public had been exposed to extensive press comment by the Angolan/Cuban sides. He referred specifically to Mr Risquet's comments in Lisbon and Paris, Minister De Moura's comments in Harare and to President Castro's comments in Santiago de Cuba. These comments had revealed intimate details of the conversations in previous rounds and these disclosures had been made available to the South African public. It had therefore become urgent for the South African Government to state clearly what its policy was in this regard.

Further, the international community, including Angola and Cuba, had on numerous occasions in the past asked South Africa to demonstrate its good faith by setting a date for the implementation of UNSCR 435. This decision had been taken in the past days by the South African Government and put on public record because of domestic sensitivities, but also for the attention of international community. The Angolan/Cuban delegation should see this not as a breach of faith but as a public affirmation and confirmation of South African's seriousness.

DR CROCKETT, after some discussion with the other parties, for

MR VAN HEERDEN, invited the delegations to peruse the transcript of Minister Botha's comments, from which they would note that he had not discussed the details of the debate but had made a public statement about a sovereign decision of the South African Government in connection with the negotiations. Unlike Angolan and Cuban spokesman in the past, he had not divulged details of the discussions or reactions of other delegations. He wished to urge the Angolan/Cuban delegation to see the matter in that light. He was not setting new rules in this regard and would abide by the arrangement in the past whereby a press black-out on the substance of discussions would be respected. Delegations should now proceed to the business at hand and settle down to identify ways of agreement and find solutions to practical problems.

GENERAL NDALU said that it was now clear to him that the South African delegation understood his dissatisfaction over the matter and he was prepared to revert to concrete matters.

DR CROCKER then adjourned the meeting, saying that he would obtain a written statement from the Angolan/Cuban delegation.

The final plenary session commenced at 17h00 on 5 August.

MR VAN HEERDEN said he had been authorised by his Government to approve the Protocol of Geneva by means of initialing the document. The South African Government would ratify the Protocol after it had informed the internal leaders in Namibia of its decision. He regretted that this procedure would entail a delay of a few days but it was important for the South African Government to fulfil its commitment to the internal Namibian leaders. It would consequently be necessary to restrict any press announcement or communiqué to the minimum.

DR CROCKER, after consultation with the other parties, confirmed

that this agreement would be acceptable. He said that it was appropriate at that stage for the United States to salute the impressive advances that had been made by the delegations and that it had been an honour for him to facilitate these efforts. He wish to state for the record that the United States was not a party to the agreement and would not therefore assume concrete responsibilities for any undertakings made by the parties. He said he also wished to consider other practical questions such as a precise time and venue for the next round of talks.

MR ALDANA said that there was general agreement that the following meeting would take place during the week of 22 August 1988. He wished to repeat a suggestion he had made in New York, that the next meeting be held in Brazil. The Brazilian Government had indicated its interest in facilitating the meeting and had historic, economic and political interests in Southwestern Africa. Brazil had diplomatic relations with all the parties concerned in the talks and he was certain that outstanding facilities were available. Naturally, once the meeting had taken place in Rio, an African venue for the subsequent meeting was indicated.

MR VAN HEERDEN said that the South African delegation had come to Geneva on the informal understanding that the following meeting would be held in Africa. He had been instructed by his Government to propose that the following meeting be held in South Africa, and wished to place that request on record. He would take the proposal of a meeting in Brazil back to South Africa and would convey the South African Government's decision before Wednesday 10 August.

DR CROCKER said that when it became known that the parties had set a deadline of 1 September to resolve the most difficult issue which divided them at present, there would be great

interest and pressure from the world community. He pointed out that differences of opinion over a previous venue had cost the process of negotiations nearly one month, and a speedy decision would be in everyone's interest.

MR ALDANA, turning to the agenda for the following meeting said that a careful review of the road ahead would feature prominently at the next meeting. It was important that the succession of steps to be taken before 1 November, and the timetable for withdrawal of Cuban troops, which was correlated, be taken very carefully. The current negotiation process had left some areas in a nebulous state, and he felt that an indication of steps to be taken before 1 November would assist all parties.

DR CROCKER said his delegation would be providing a detailed roadmap to the parties before the next meeting. Turning to financial considerations, he said that when initial planning had been done for implementation of UNSCR 435(78), the Western Five Contact Group had been leading the effort to put the plan together. This was now a different set of circumstances and there was a new relationship between the United States and the Soviet Union. The Contact Group no longer existed and consideration would have to be taken of this new reality.

MR ALDANA agreed with Dr Crocker saying that he had kept in close contact with the Secretary-General of the United Nations and felt that the parties could now announce a date, to give the United Nations a three-month leeway which should provide an adequate timeframe to address these questions. Most of the planning had already been done and all that was necessary was an updating of the plan and that the "dust should be cleared on certain issue". He was certain that the United Nations' Secretariat would have the cooperation of all nations.

Once the present agreements had been ratified and once the new roadmap had been provided for the August 22nd meeting, it would be appropriate for the Secretary-General and his staff to commence their initiative. They were clearly already willing and prepared to accomplish their mission but needed clearer details to do so. It was consequently important to send the signal that Dr Crocker had referred to as soon as possible.

DR CROCKER said that he took note of the comments and would provide an updated roadmap as soon as possible. He then turned to consideration of how the enormous obstacle of the calendar of Cuban troop withdrawal could be resolved. The parties had agreed to make this a separate issue to be dealt with in bilateral meetings. However, a large gap still existed between the two formal proposals, both of which had been rejected. Technically it was up to the Cuban/Angolan team to respond.

In dealing with the issue, parties would have to realise that the situation in Angola concerning the presence of Cuban troops had changed fundamentally since 1985. It was consequently important that a factual basis be used for concrete discussions on the verified withdrawal of Cuban troops. A senior Cuban official had recently informed the world that the number of Cuban troops in Angola was 35,000 plus x. This was not helpful and a more concrete assessment was necessary.

MR VAN HEERDEN said that the South African delegation had some ideas which they first wished to discuss bilaterally with the United States. This was a pivotal issue for the South African Government and he would expect all parties to address this matter in precise terms. He undertook to submit some ideas to the mediator in this respect.

that into account.

GENERAL NDALU said that his delegation was in a position to

discuss this matter in substance and he suggested that the discussion start on the basis of proposals already on the table. The first step was the most difficult and consequently it would be appropriate for bilateral negotiations to take place first between the Angolan team and the US mediator.

MR ALDANA said that he had the highest regard and respect for all views expressed by parties at the table but felt it was not helpful to talk about tremendous obstacles. The issue had been tabled and was part of a set of problems. Despite the wide gap between the declared positions of the parties, there was agreement that three steps were required:

- a) Timing for an initial redeployment of Cuban troops north of the 13th parallel;
- b) the modality of withdrawal of all Cuban troops; and
- c) a timeframe or calendar for that withdrawal.

Cuba had agreed on the first day of the present meeting that Cuban troop withdrawal and UNSCR 435(78) were linked and would foster peace in Namibia. There was also the fundamental issue of Angola's security which could not be dealt with in abstract terms. Cuban troops were in Angola at the request of the Angolan Government. In Geneva his delegation had heard arguments concerning specific sets of circumstances that justified specific positions. He understood these problems but asked understanding for Cuba's problems. Troop withdrawal would give rise to other circumstances which would affect Cuba's interests vitally. He wished to point out that the 400,000 Cubans who had served in Angola at one stage or another were all volunteers. Any planned withdrawal of the Cuban presence would have to take that into account.

It was also important that withdrawal of Cuban troops be done in such a way that Angolan troops could replace Cuban troops under conditions of internal conflict. This amounted to replacing Cuban troops while taking part in conflict. He had taken note of General Geldenhuys' statement that South African troops were withdrawing under operational conditions. Consequently FAPLA would replace Cuban troops under operational conditions.

He was not questioning South Africa's political will but wished to point out that Angola and Cuba had shown good faith by requesting on site verification of Cuban troop withdrawals.

There were also political issues related to the various alternatives that faced Cuba for the orderly withdrawal of its troops. It should be quite clear that this was a sovereign act based on political realism which dovetailed the interests of Angola and Cuba. There was no question of disorderly withdrawal. The progress made in Geneva would pave the way for further discussions and he wished to state at this stage that Cuba had accomplished its mission in Angola by removing the threats from outside that country. Cuba was not in Angola to fight UNITA. Calculations on the withdrawal of its troops would hinge on the domestic capability and situation of the Angolan Government. Together with the President of Angola, Cuba had considered the effect of Cuban troop withdrawal. Cuba would take its cue from the Angolan Government and then persuade other parties around the table to fall in with those desires.

(The press statement and final copy of the Geneva Protocol was distributed at this stage and all parties agreed to a meeting between military experts at Ruacana on 15 August, with the participation of a US delegation.)

MR VAN HEERDEN, in his closing statement, extended to the

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Angolan/Cuban delegation his appreciation for the excellent spirit of the negotiations had largely contributed to the degree of progress made. The confirmation of a de facto cessation of hostilities was a significant achievement. He also wished to thank Dr Crocker and the US delegation for the role they had played in the success and the Swiss Government for the excellent facilities that had been provided.

GENERAL NDALU said that the limited diplomatic experience in his delegation had created some difficulty in monitoring developments during the negotiations but that nevertheless there had been success in presenting Angolan views and understanding South African positions. He thanked the mediators for doing an outstanding job and the Swiss Government for the facilities and support extended.

The meeting closed at 18h30.