

SUMMARY MINUTES OF A MEETING HELD IN NEW YORK ON 11 AND 12 JULY 1988 BETWEEN A SOUTH AFRICAN DELEGATION AND AN ANGOLAN DELEGATION, FACILITATED BY A DELEGATION FROM THE UNITED STATES.

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S A PARTICIPANTS

- Mr N P van Heerden
- Gen. J J Geldenhuys
- Dr L D Barnard
- Maj Gen C N van Tonder
- Mr D W Auret
- Ambassador P Koornhof
- Brig J Sonnekus
- Mr J H A Beukes
- Mr J Boshoff
- Mr A Jaquet
- Mr J S Aldrich
- Mr C Kamp

ANGOLAN PARTICIPANTS

- Lt Gen Antonio Dos Santos Franca "Nдалу"
- Lt Gen Francisco Magalhaes Paiva "Nvunda"
- Minister Fernando Jose de Franca van Dunem
- Mr Venancio de Moura
- Ambassador Manuel Pedro Pacavira
- Col Antonio Jose Maria
- Mr Antonio Pitra Neto
- Lt Col Mario Placido Cirilo Desa
- Capt Gilberto da Piedade Verissimo

CUBAN PARTICIPANTS

Mr C Aldana Escalante  
Gen U Rosales del Toro  
Dr G Mazola  
Mr R Riente  
Mr J Arbesu  
Mr R Alarcon

U S PARTICIPANTS

Dr C Crocker  
Ambassador H Cohen  
Mr L Napper  
Mr M Bellamy  
Mr J Woods  
Mr R Schneider  
Mr M McKinley  
Mr L Silverman

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Dr Crocker welcomed the delegations and said that New York was a place where people did business and he hoped that this would characterise the present gathering. Since the Cairo meeting, the United States had been in touch with both sides. Pre-planning for the conference had worked well and several messages had been exchanged between the delegations. The previous day, the Angolan delegation had provided a document containing certain basic principles. The Angolan delegation had suggested that their document be used as a basis for discussion, and he invited the leader of the Angolan delegation to present the document and to provide clarification where necessary.

General Ndalu, said that before going into the document he wished to restate certain important issues. Four months had elapsed since the first exploratory meetings and he wished to thank the US Government for the facilities provided for the present meeting and for the historically important role the US was playing at the moment. He said that as was customary, the Cuban/Angolan delegation approached the meeting in a constructive spirit to seek a solution. He firmly believed that all parties would tackle the task with realism, devotion to duty and with respect for international norms, otherwise consensus would be difficult to achieve. Any agreement that could be reached would be a triumph not for those at the conference table, but for all the peoples of the countries represented.

He felt that in Cairo some headway had been made and recalled that two working papers had been developed. The Angolan delegation had in the interim tried to reflect on the content of the working papers to see whether consensus could be achieved and combined into one document. He had gleaned some basic South African concerns from the document and had attempted to incorporate these. Other points listed in the South African document had not been included but he would be glad to explain why this was so. He also wished to explain that the new Angolan document contained some new formulations and that his delegation wished to discuss all the issues raised in the new document. This was a serious attempt to reconcile both positions and demonstrated flexibility on the part of his government in an attempt to reach a peaceful solution and the implementation of United Nation Security Council Resolution 435/78. (UNSCR 435/78). His government was seriously committed to these talks and saw in them a possibility of reaching agreement on basic principles.

General Ndalu continued by making observations on some points that had not been included in the new Angolan document. Paragraph

2 of the South African working paper which dealt with Cuban troop withdrawal, contained a basic contradiction to the substance of paragraph 1. He wished to stress that UNSCR 435/78 should be implemented as it stood and that Cuban troop withdrawal was a sincere gesture of peace by the Cuban Government. Angola was not legally bound to bring about Cuban troop withdrawal but Angola and Cuba had agreed voluntarily to the withdrawal of all Cuban troops from Angola. His delegation had brought to New York firm proposals in this regard. Turning to paragraph 11 General Ndalu said that the states of the region had never been involved in military conflict and therefore the point was irrelevant. Only South Africa was engaged in military conflict. South Africa was the most developed nation in the sub-continent and was very strong militarily. Since the other states were merely defending themselves, it was unnecessary to include this problem in any agreement. This merely reinforced the fact that only international guarantees would bring about peace in the region.

The Angolan delegation felt that paragraph 14 of the South African working paper, was outside the scope and purpose of any agreement. South Africa and Angola were not in a position to bind other States in the region. Paragraph 12 of the new Angolan document attempted to address this problem.

General Ndalu said he wished to stress that in the view of his delegation the new document was balanced and in line with international legal principles, and he hoped that it would be acceptable to the South African delegation. It represented a serious effort on the Angolan side to demonstrate both flexibility and a constructive spirit. South Africa would be able to see that his delegation had tried to provide a synthesis of all the basic tenets of the two working papers. If the new Angolan proposal were accepted, South Africa would naturally wish to pose some

questions and he would be glad to reply to these as completely as he could.

Mr van Heerden thanked Dr Crocker for the provision of facilities and for the assistance the US Government had rendered. He also wished to thank the Angolan delegation for its constructive approach and said that South Africa had come to New York in a positive frame of mind, believing firmly that success was only possible if there were no losers in the discussions. South Africa had received the Angolan document the previous evening and had been encouraged by the spirit of the new document, which indicated a willingness on the Angolan side to join in seeking a consensus. The South African delegation had arrived in New York with a similar document, having done precisely what the Angolan delegation had done, namely to try to synthesise the two Cairo documents and had planned to present this document to the meeting. In view of the similarity between the document produced by the Angolan delegation and the document brought to New York by South Africa, it had been decided to use the Angolan document as a basis for discussion.

Mr van Heerden then indicated that he wished to deal seriatim with the points raised in the new Angolan document. (Note: All references to paragraphs below refer to paragraphs in the new Angolan document). He said that paragraphs 1 to 3 involved the two core issues, namely implementation of UNSCR 435/78 and Cuban troop withdrawal from Angola. In this regard South Africa had prepared a number of alternative formulations to address these problems, which represented the main focus of the present talks. With a view to saving time, he wished to present the Angolan delegation with a brief list of these alternatives only after having discussed the other principles raised. Since he presumed that the other delegations would need some time to consider paragraphs 1, 2 and 3, these could be set aside

and discussed after an adjournment, if all parties agreed to this procedure.

Mr van Heerden then proceeded to discuss the remaining paragraphs. Paragraphs 4, 5 and 6 were acceptable in their entirety, but he had noted that the word "each State" had been used as opposed to the earlier formulation of "States of south western Africa". He had no particular problem with the new formulation but understood that the Angolan delegation had a particular interpretation of what was meant by "each State." The South African delegation wished to reserve its position until a more complete explanation had been provided by the Angolan delegation on this score.

South Africa wished to add paragraph 8 of its Cairo principles, namely "The acceptance of the responsibility of States not to allow their territory to be used for acts of war, aggression or violence against other States" and wished to add to that "and other territories in south western Africa. South Africa agreed to the inclusion of points 7, 8 and 9 in their entirety. With regard to paragraph 10, the South African delegation preferred to revert to the formulation used in paragraph 7 of the Angolan document distributed in Cairo, namely "Recognition of the role of the permanent members of the Security Council as guarantors of the implementation of agreements" and wished to add to that the words "that may be established".

With respect to paragraphs 11 and 12, both were acceptable in their entirety. Paragraph 14 was also acceptable with the small addition at the end of that paragraph: "and of African countries". Paragraph 13 was totally unacceptable to South Africa. The reasons and explanation given in Cairo by the leader of the South African delegation had been extensive and those reasons remained valid.

Mr van Heerden by way of summary noted that the agreement between the delegations on paragraphs 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 11 and 12 represented an achievement of which the meeting should be proud. He wished to urge the Angolan delegation to consider including a small addition to paragraph 6, reverting to the original formulation of paragraph 10 and considering a minor adjustment to paragraph 14. That in essence concluded the South African delegation's comment on the document before the meeting and he wished to submit for consideration by the Angolan delegation the alternative formulations for paragraphs 1 to 3.

Dr Crocker suggested that since a great amount of ground had been covered it was important that there be clarity on all sides firstly about the points South Africa had raised concerning the Angolan document and secondly about the Angolan delegation's understanding of the definition of "State" was. He asked General Ndalu whether before adjournment, he wished to comment on his understanding of the word "State".

General Ndalu explained that the term had been lifted from a previous South African document. He had already explained that South Africa and Angola could not bind other States in the region in accords to which they were not party.

Dr Crocker then posed a further question saying that the formulation "each State" appeared in some parts of the document and "south western region of Africa" appeared in other parts. He wished to obtain clarity as to whether this meant South Africa, Angola and Namibia.

General Ndalu said that since South Africa had come up with this formula, it was for South Africa to comment.

Mr van Heerden said that he did not wish to make a big issue of this matter but merely sought clarity. It would be useful if the Angolan delegation could specify whether this meant Namibia only after independence since it was important to consider the position of Namibia before independence as well.

Dr Crocker characterised the morning's exchanges as useful and said that several points had been substantially clarified. He then said that he would call for an adjournment after the distribution of South Africa's alternative formulations for paragraphs 1 to 3.

The meeting then adjourned for lunch and reconvened at 15h00.

Dr Crocker invited General Ndalú to comment on South Africa's alternative formulations and other remarks that morning, and said that a further message had been passed between the delegations during the adjournment.

General Ndalú said that his delegation had received South Africa's counter proposals and that in order to save time he would first respond to all the points after 1 to 3. With regard to paragraphs 4, 5 and 6, he said that he had already explained how the expression had arisen and that the main concern was not to involve other States that were not party to the Agreement. He then suggested the phrase "of the States" and said that this formulation was agreeable to his delegation if the South African delegation concurred. He also wished to indicate his delegation's acceptance of the inclusion of South Africa's new paragraph 8, with the exception that the words "in southern Africa" should be deleted. With regard to paragraph 8 of his document, he accepted reformulation of the point concerning the guarantor role of the permanent members of the United Nations Security Council, in accordance



with paragraph 10 of South Africa's Cairo working paper.

With respect to paragraph 13, his delegation wished to reserve the right to think about the implications and to provide a response at a later stage. With regard to paragraph 14, he felt that it would not be correct to include African states. The US had for years been the mediator and it would not be helpful to recognise other mediators at this stage.

General Ndalu then said that he wished to address paragraphs 1, 2 and 3 which contained the fundamental aspects of the present talks. He was not sure that South Africa had really understood the position of his delegation. Paragraphs 1 and 2 of the Angolan document concerned UNSCR 435/78 and contained certain principles which were necessary for an agreement. As far as paragraph 3 was concerned, the Angolan/Cuban side, in an effort to advance the process, had been willing to accept the principle involved on a basis of sovereignty and free will, in order to create understanding and confidence by means of verification procedures. His delegation was prepared to discuss a calendar for total Cuban troop withdrawal and then sign verification accords by all parties. This already connected paragraph 3 to paragraphs 1 and 2. However, he wished to call on the leader of the Cuban component of his delegation to elaborate on this aspect.

Mr Aldana, after some hesitation, took the floor. (Verbatim. remarks).

\*Dr Crocker, Dr van Heerden

We have devoted most of our time this morning to the consideration of the proposals made by the SA delegation. We agree that an effort, a serious effort, has been made with a view to the breaching of the gaps. We now find ourselves closer than ever

to an understanding and agreement on the principles of the basis on which we would be able to conclude agreements on the understanding that the legitimate interests of all parties be considered and on the understanding that no one will come out of this or will attempt to come out of this as the winners. In other words the concept is that we have all made a contribution in the historic constellation of these events; a contribution to the settlement of the problem. The most important result of this is basically the creation of a new independent state in the international community. Now as far as we are concerned from our standpoint there is no way that this new independent state would have to be hostile to South Africa. In fact from the standpoint of SA prestige in the international community of nations, no one would be able to deny the contribution made by SA to create the circumstances to find a responsible and serious settlement to the problem. There is no way that this could be a threat to SA.

We understand that within the framework of the negotiations that we are currently holding, the question of the presence of Cuban troops bears a relation to the implementation of Resolution 435. Leaving aside rhetoric, we must recognise that there is a linkage. If it is not shown in this document it will be part of it, because there is a linkage. We cannot deny that fact.

Now how can we formulate or reflect this linkage? It is precisely in the spirit that Dr van Heerden has so happily pointed out: no one should come out of this as a loser. At other junctures, as we perhaps engaged in controversies, we rejected the concept of linkage. The question was debated in a variety of international fora and the idea was that if Namibia is to be independent, Cuban troops will have to leave Angola. We rejected that and there was great polemics about this. Now we do not deny that

if we were to reach a settlement, that settlement would involve the withdrawal of Cuban troops. We reached this conclusion as a result of a joint decision between the governments of Cuba and Angola in terms of which we would subscribe to an agreement and make that agreement known to the public. We are actually ready to have this agreement known and to allow SA also to express its views. This process requires a calendar. We recognise that this calendar is subject to discussion.

From our standpoint these are concessions and we are making them on the understanding that it is important that the Government of SA understands that these are concessions otherwise the climate of confidence which we have presently achieved will disappear. It is important to understand that the Government of Angola and the Government of Cuba do not wish to have Cuban troops permanently stationed in Angola. It is not in our interests. In Angola we are acting on our own behalf and what is at stake is the skin of our own people. And nothing could be more honourable than Cuban troop withdrawal from Angola of our own free will, in keeping with an agreement with the Government that called us there in the first place and as long as the implementation of UN Resolution 435 would be enforced which would foster the independence of a new nation. Thus we would be able to achieve peace and could open up new avenues of co-operation among the States - and here we can certainly use the term "States of Southern Africa".

We know that there is a great deal of mistrust and many people may be thinking that we have a hidden card up our sleeve. And so we propose of our own free will that our withdrawal be duly monitored and verified by the United Nations. Now we would have to discuss the composition of the teams that would monitor our withdrawal. In other words more important than the content of the letter of the agreement is that we really

achieve trust and understanding. Of course we do not expect you to take us at our word. That is why we are talking about agreements that would be endorsed by the United Nations. Cuba in this connection would not want to play any other role than the one that has been given historically by certain circumstances which we should not discuss at this point. We understand that as we talk about this paper each of the parties takes on certain obligations before its own public opinion and before its own government and before the political forces which may also have a say. We understand that it is incumbent upon us to come up with an acceptable formulation. We understand that.

Now when we contemplate the set of principles we find that there is an inter-relationship or inter-linkage of these points which are all part of this document. A practical link and a question of a time frame would have to be decided in practical terms and taking into account the political dimensions of this issue. And in this respect we are amenable to any further proposals on the basis that each of us is acting in a sovereign fashion. It would be a sovereign act by South Africa to withdraw its troops from Angola and to accept the implementation of Resolution 435 in other words to favour and to propitiate the implementation of 435. No one could think of imposing them on South Africa.

This is an agreement we conclude in a voluntary fashion and at this juncture we are really in a position to prevent that further situations arise, situations which no one really wants to come to pass. We do not want a disagreeable situation to evolve further to an escalation of hostilities. This is the very juncture at which each of us is in a position to take up its responsibilities and obligations before the international community under the auspices of the Government of the United States and before the eyes of the international community in a sovereign fashion.

Each of the parties would do this on the basis of the minimum modicum of confidence with the assurance that there are no hidden terms and that the legitimate interests of each of the parties would be protected.

I hope you understand that we cannot accept variations or any changes of wording that would show us as the enemies of the independence of Namibia. We cannot accept wording that implies that we are blocking or hampering the independence process; that if we withdraw our troops Namibia can become independent. How can we justify that politically? How can we explain that? In this document we undertake to implement Resolution 435, which is a commitment which involves the Government of Angola which means the immobilisation of SWAPO contingents in camps, a ceasefire and compliance with the terms of Res. 435. This also involves the Government of South Africa.

The second point of this document is drawn from a United States Government proposal. As it stands, we think it is literally and perfectly correct and we placed it in this order because it is linked to Res. 435 and we regard it as part of the same process as Res. 435. Because we then withdraw our troops as agreed by all the governments, we should not have any suspicions. This linkage does exist. It should be accepted that there is this linkage. So this is a clear statement that Cuban troops will be withdrawn - and we do not even use the word total because that is exactly what we are talking about: Cuban withdrawal. We have elevated this to a principle by allowing the monitoring and verification of withdrawal. I am sure that the distinguished representatives from SA will understand and will see that this is an act which from a political standpoint is of consequence and is most responsible. In some of our documents, the documents that we have submitted and are still pending discussion, the language is perhaps too political in our view for acceptance

by all parties. We understand that.

Now in this document and in view of your understanding of this document we have tried to use elevated and respectful language so that no one would feel insulted or diminished or disparaged and that no one should appear to have been forced to do anything. That is why I do not think it is now the time to get involved in semantic discussions trying to define the meaning of words like "concomitant". We should rather reflect the real fact which is that there is linkage and that 435 is accepted. Because the withdrawal of our troops is not only accepted in words, but we want to make an agreement and we want the United Nations to validate that. We want the United Nations to verify it.

I think on that basis both we and the Government of South Africa will be able to effect such an agreement and justify it before its people and before the political forces operating in South Africa, as a sovereign act and reject suggestions that the efforts that have been made have not borne fruit. Statements have been made and the impression may be that the Government of Cuba has not shared in these statements. We have informed the Angolan Government that we have taken our share of responsibilities because we trust in the seriousness of this process thanks to the validation provided by the mediation efforts by the United States and because we also firmly believe that the parties are in a position to reach an agreement which will respect their legitimate interests. This is what I have to add."

Dr Crocker noted that the response from the Angolan delegation had been a general reaction in broad terms on how to proceed. This was not a precise response to the South African document but the US had ideas about how a compromise could be reached. However he first wished to ask the leader of the South African delegation for comment.

Mr van Heerden thanked the Angolan/Cuban delegation for the additional information on its thinking. He noted that the other delegation was willing to consider South Africa's thoughts on the formulation of "each State" and "of States" in paragraphs 4, 5 and 6. He would give a firm and final response at the next opportunity to the other points raised. He also noted the acceptance of South Africa's paragraph 8 with the deletion of the last line of that paragraph, and that the Angolan delegation did not wish to expand on paragraph 14 at this stage. South Africa also awaited a response on paragraph 13.

He had listened carefully to the statements by the Angolan and Cuban delegates concerning paragraphs 1, 2 and 3. South Africa was cognizant of the sensitivities involved in Angola and Cuba. He had noted with particular interest the comments of the Cuban delegate on linkage between Cuban troop withdrawal and UNSCR 435/78 and understood that his statement was intended to substantiate that linkage. Firstly those core principles were mentioned in the same document and secondly linkage would be made concrete when the question of a calendar for Cuban troop withdrawal was addressed. He wished to have more time to consider these statements. He also wished to note that in the intermediate response South Africa had provided to the Angolan delegation in the morning, an attempt had been made to accommodate Angolan and Cuban sensitivities with the reformulation of paragraph 1. By the redrafting of paragraph 2, an attempt had also been made to accommodate reservations that may have been held about South African intentions in respect of UNSCR 435/78. In paragraph 3 the South African delegation had taken into consideration the offer of in situ verification. He wished to reiterate that the sensitivities of all parties had been taken into consideration since concessions would have to be made on all sides if there were to be no losers in the current negotiations. He accepted that all parties should act as sovereign states whose interests had to

be taken into account. This was accepted because it was also South Africa's view.

Dr Crocker then said that he wished to compile a fresh draft document reflecting the newly established agreements, with those areas of disagreement clearly marked by brackets. After adjournment, the Heads of Delegation would meet to address the questions of paragraphs 1, 2 and 3.

The meeting was adjourned at 19h00.

The meeting resumed at 11h00 on Tuesday 12 July, 1988.

Dr Crocker opened the meeting by saying that, with the agreement of both delegations, he proposed that final consideration of the joint document on principles be discussed further at Heads of Delegation level.

This was agreed to by both delegations and the meeting adjourned immediately. After a series of meetings throughout the day, a plenary session resumed at 17h00.

Dr Crocker started by announcing that a meeting would be held at 10h00 on 13 July, 1988 in the U Thant room of the U N Plaza Hotel for final consideration by the military authorities of each country of the matters they had already discussed. He then provided the meeting with the approved set of principles in three languages and said that once these had been approved he wished to support a South African suggestion that the principles be released simultaneously after five days in the respective capitals.

Dr Crocker said that the United States Government was not a signatory to the agreement but if it had been, it would have



thought seriously about paragraph K of the agreement, which defined the role of the permanent members of the Security Council as guarantors of the Agreement. He took it that "guarantors" was not used in the 19th century sense of the word. Paragraph K did not mean that the Great Powers would impose settlements on smaller nations, it merely underscored the key role that permanent members of the Security Council would have to play in facilitating and laying the foundations of any agreement.

He then arranged for the distribution of a press statement and called for preliminary comments from the delegations. The US delegation also wished to distribute a draft tripartite agreement proposal which had been drawn up by the US, based on ideas raised during the current negotiations and over the past four years. The language used was that of the mediators and not of the parties. He was not asking that this be agreed to immediately but that it would give all delegations a head start for the next meeting.

Mr van Heerden apologised for the delay caused by his absence and said that he wished to underline what he had previously said. He had agreed to the set of principles as formulated on a distinctly ad referendum basis. These proposals would be taken back to South Africa and the approval of the South African Government for them would be sought. He also agreed with the suggestion that all parties signify acceptance within five days, but wished to suggest for purely practical considerations, that this be extended to seven days since the lengthy journey home for all parties as well as the weekend would hinder a quick decision.

He then proposed that the useful conversations which had taken place between the military components of the delegations should not continue on the same evening, but should be postponed until

the morning of the following day. With regard to the press statement proposed by Dr Crocker, he agreed that the matter should be formalised on the following morning and wished to suggest two small amendments. He wished to suggest inserting the words "pending the agreement of governments" immediately before the third sentence of the suggested press statement. Secondly he suggested that the date of the next meeting be moved to the first week of August and that the venue be left open at this stage.

He also wished to raise another matter which bore no direct relation to the deliberations of the last few days. The two sides were moving towards two main objectives - implementation of UNSCR 435/78 leading to the independence of Namibia, and the complete withdrawal of all Cuban troops from Angola. Two questions had arisen on this score which he wished to place on the record. In the first instance, thought would have to be given to the financial obligations of implementing UNSCR 435/78. He had been personally involved in negotiations on this matter previously and knew what an obstacle the large costs had represented at that time. This was a matter which should receive timely consideration.

Secondly he wished to register the fact that with the implementation of UNSCR 435/78 it was envisaged that the South African presence in Namibia would be withdrawn. This had very serious financial implications for Namibia. South Africa contributed from its own budget towards the Namibian budget in addition to the considerable military expenses incurred there. South Africa would like to register its concern about the vacuum in the financial field that would be left once South Africa left Namibia. The South African Government had specifically requested him to pose the question and to ask whether any provision had been made in this regard.

General Ndalú said that it would be superfluous to refer once more to the good spirit of the negotiations. He felt that both sides had succeeded in fostering the conditions which would lead to a settlement. When Mr van Heerden had asked delegations to shake hands as a token of congratulation, this had meant, as far as he was concerned that consensus had been achieved and that the positions of the delegations had been dovetailed. He requested that copies of the press statement and of the draft tripartite agreement in each language be provided to the delegations. He then asked Minister van Dunem to address some questions of style in the Portuguese version of the text.

Minister van Dunem proceeded to make several stylistic adjustments to the Portuguese version of the press statement.

Mr Aldana then made similar adjustments to the Spanish version, focusing on the concept of consensus and on the northward redeployment of Cuban troops.

After it had been decided that all delegations would receive copies of the press statement and of the proposed tripartite agreement in all three languages, the meeting was brought to a close.

A further plenary session was held at the UN Plaza Hotel at 10h15 on 13 July, 1988.

Dr Crocker presented a draft press statement which he said reflected the discussions of the previous day. (After some minor adjustments the press statement was accepted.) Turning to the question of the next meeting, Dr Crocker asked the delegations

to arrive in time for preliminary discussions on 2 August, 1988, in preparation of plenary sessions on 3 and 4 August, 1988. He then called for suggestions as to a possible venue.

Mr Aldana proposed Brazil as the next venue, saying that with its Portuguese heritage and historical interest in Africa, it would provide a suitable location.

Mr van Heerden suggested that either Lisbon or Geneva could be considered as a European venue for the next round of talks. Delegations knew that South Africa set great store by the informal agreement that existed in terms of which the venues would alternate between Africa and Europe. However he was prepared to propose to his Government that the next meeting be held in Brazil on the understanding that the subsequent meeting would be held at a mutually acceptable venue in Africa.

General Ndalú commented that venues had been a problem in the past but as far as his delegation was concerned Brazil or Geneva in Switzerland were in order. Since there were still certain outstanding bilateral issues between Portugal and Angola, Lisbon was not acceptable.

Dr Crocker then said that after consultation with his colleagues and the other delegations a choice of venue would be made and communicated to all the parties. He now wished to turn to the next steps along the road to peace in the region. Several ingredients had contributed to the constructive atmosphere to the talks. Preliminary side meetings had proved most useful in understanding of the concerns of all parties. The US had listened carefully to these concerns and it was his impression that the parties had found some value in this process. He felt strongly that it was most desirable that similar preliminary meetings be held before the next round of talks. In the meantime,

the United States would attempt to develop a detailed road map that would include fairly precise timing of actions required by those concerned, as they related to the family of agreements that would have to be drawn up. The kind of bilateral exchanges that had occurred in the series of meetings had been useful but the time had now come to recognise the importance of action as well as documents. It served no purpose merely to prepare documents in a vacuum and the US would now pay attention to providing a road map that included precise timing.

He said further that the US delegation had provided a first draft tripartite agreement and while he realised that detailed comment was not possible at this stage, he would be happy to receive any preliminary comments the delegations wished to make. He realised that at the next meeting a need would arise for detailed work, including such things as the drafting of military operational plans. Delegations should therefore arrange to leave behind experts who could conduct such work after the Heads of Delegation had already left. Such aspects as verification and withdrawal schedules required careful planning, which was time-consuming.

Mr van Heerden proposed that the delegations initial one copy of the principles agreed to and then cross check the documents in other languages at leisure once they had returned home. This was agreed to by all parties and duly executed.

Mr Aldana said that he wished to respond to some questions raised by Mr van Heerden the previous day concerning the financial implications of implementing Resolution 435 and of other administrative expenses in Namibia. In fact, he had spent most of the previous night thinking of this aspect. There was another related issue, which was the major cost of Cuban troop withdrawal. Considerable financial questions were involved and although

there were no solutions currently apparent, he wished other delegations to reflect on the matter.

Dr Crocker said he was aware that there had been extensive planning in the past and detailed logistical plans for the deployment of UNTAG forces. This would prove to be a very expensive and complicated operation and the US felt that it was none too soon for a US team to begin strictly informal exchanges with the UN Secretariat to try and assess the problem. There was no reason why the US should not do so and he was not asking the permission of the parties. However he was aware that this action would send certain signals to the international community which might cause problems for the parties. Accordingly he would stress the informality of his contacts so as to protect the parties concerned.

Mr van Heerden welcomed this timely attention to the problem since he recalled previous problems that had occurred when the implementation of Resolution 435 had been considered. It was just as well to give attention to this matter in good time and to consider the financial dilemma that would arise when the South African contribution to the Namibian budget was stopped.

Dr Crocker asked if the South African delegation could indicate the size of the amount involved.

Mr van Heerden said that South Africa's financial contribution was made in several categories and involved not only direct budgetary assistance from the South African fiscus to Namibia, but also extensive hidden costs resulting from the integration of such services as transport, health and customs. He would provide Dr Crocker with more precise figures in the near future.

Dr Crocker then enquired what the costs of Cuban troop withdrawal would be and said that in any event the US was prepared to bring to the next meeting the results of its informal discussions with the UN Secretariat. This would involve such items as lead times for planning, costs and the composition of UNTAG forces.

Mr Aldana said that Cuba would be happy to provide precise details of the financial implications of Cuban troop withdrawal. He said that this would largely depend on the calendar and on whether troops would be transported by air or by sea.

General Ndalú said that the question of displaced persons and refugees should also be examined.

Dr Crocker said that UNHCR had done some preliminary planning in conjunction with UNTAG and that this question would be examined.

Mr van Heerden pointed out that Resolution 435 provided extensively for the position of refugees.

General Ndalú said he was aware of this but that these studies had been done a long time ago and the position had changed since then.

Dr Crocker then asked how the spirit of the discussions could be protected so that they were not broken down by selective interpretation by each side. The delegations would make separate press contacts, and he wished to outline the thrust of the comments he intended making to the press later in the afternoon. His general approach was that it had been agreed that there would be no losers, that this was part of a continuing process with a long history which had gathered momentum in London, Cairo and in New York. Each meeting had had important elements

and at present these efforts were on track although there was still a long way to go.

Mr van Heerden welcomed this approach, saying that South Africa would not discuss details beyond the joint communique. He wished to leave the thought with other delegations that it would perhaps be unwise to raise public expectations beyond realistic levels, until a signed and sealed agreement had been achieved.

General Ndalú agreed with this approach and said that no premature euphoria would be encouraged.

Mr Aldana fully concurred. Confronted with an inquisitive press, it was important that all sides should be consistent and not open up a Pandora's box of arguments. This question had been carefully pondered in Cuba and it had been decided to maintain a low profile. It would naturally be necessary to talk to the press but his unswerving purpose was not to go beyond the communique and not to volunteer information that would go contrary to its spirit. It was not possible to play both the role of propagandist and negotiator.

Dr Crocker said that South Africa had suggested that approval of the principals be signified within seven days. This meant that Wednesday, the 20th was the last day for this to happen. (All parties agreed).

Mr van Heerden said that he wished in conclusion to express appreciation to the Angolan and Cuban delegations for the spirit of the discussions although all parties had to guard against euphoria. It was however in order, in the privacy of the conference room to admit that the parties had indeed advanced the issue in a substantive manner. The South African delegation looked



forward to the next round and hoped that the following meeting would travel further down the road of peace. The meeting had been most useful to dispel the suspicion which to a large extent had characterised relations between the countries in the past. Over a bridge of personal acquaintance much greater confidence had been built which would be useful when the really difficult issues that lay ahead had to be confronted. He concluded by congratulating Dr Crocker and his team on his skilful and understanding approach to the negotiations.

General Ndalu concurred with Mr van Heerden's comments and said that all those present were aware that greater headway had been made than on previous occasions. Serious problems still lay ahead but now more than ever the parties could overcome these hurdles and have the document that had been produced ratified. Angola would consider its mission accomplished when this happened.

Mr Aldana said that when historians described this meeting in the future, they would probably be intrigued by the fact that neither he nor General Ndalu were professional diplomats. In fact their daily occupations were far removed from diplomacy. Whatever positive results had been achieved were due to this fact, because their presence indicated a political will to forge a lasting political settlement for once and for all. A good motto for these negotiations would be "if we achieve peace, there would be no losers". There was a great deal more to discuss. But the most important thing was to silence the weapons in the field. This agreement would be met with justified optimism in Cuba if as a result of the negotiations, the guns were stilled in Cuito Cuanavale and if there were no longer threats to young men on the border.

He wished in particular to convey his and General Ndalu's congratulations to Mr van Heerden for his outstanding performance

at the Head of his Delegation. This had produced the clear result that parties were able to meet each other half way.

He concluded by thanking the United States and Dr Chester Crocker personally and said that all delegations would leave the United States encouraged.

Dr Crocker thanked all parties and said that inter-disciplinary teams were gathered around the negotiating table. There were specialists in intelligence, propagandists, career military officers and professional and other diplomats. This is what made the process work and he looked forward to further progress at the next meeting.