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EXCERPTS FROM DISCUSSIONS BETWEEN A SOUTH AFRICAN DELEGATION LED BY MINISTER R F BOTHA AND A UNITED STATES DELEGATION LED BY DEPUTY SECRETARY OF STATE FRANK WISNER ON QUESTIONS AFFECTING SOUTHERN AFRICA :

CAPE TOWN : 13 MARCH 1986

United States delegation : Mr Frank Wisner
Ambassador Hermann Nickel
Mr Robert Cabelly
Mr Dick Barkley
Mr Edward Lanpher
Mr Ashley Wills
Mr Tim Carney

South African delegation : Minister R F Botha
Minister M A de M Malan
Mr R Killen
Dr J P Roux
Mr N van Heerden
Mr A L Manley
Mr D W Auret
Mr P Vermeulen

MINISTER BOTHA referred to a report which had appeared in "Die Burger" of that morning concerning certain remarks made by Dr Crocker in reply to questions put to him by Congressman Howard Wolpe at a congressional committee inquiry into recent events in Southern Africa. The State President was rather upset about this report. MINISTER BOTHA said that he had received a telex from the South African Embassy

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in Washington, but that it did not mention the remarks attributed to dr Crocker in the newspaper. In fact, he found some positive things mentioned by dr Crocker.

MR WISNER said that he would get a transcript of Dr Crocker's testimony so that the Minister could find out what the facts were. He said that he had come to South Africa at this point in time to see if the US and South Africa could move broadly forward to ensure peace and stability. It would be necessary to discuss issues concerning Mozambique, Angola and other parts of the region where South Africa was active. The lead item was the key statement made by the State President in Parliament on 4 March 1986. MR WISNER said that on his arrival in South Africa he had unfortunately found a number of issues which might complicate matters. He referred specifically to the capture of a US missionary in Lebowa and the way she was treated which shocked and saddened the American people, the White River police shooting incident, the banning of Jack and Fazzie and the Moutse/Lebowa issue. At this delicate time these sort of issues cut the US and South Africa's common capability to move forward. These were white hot issues in the US, whether in Congress or among the public and it detracted from South Africa's recent landmark decisions. The US Government was concerned and upset. These events called into question the South African Government's determination on powersharing. Having said that, he wanted to move to the key issues.

MINISTER BOTHA asked what Mr Wisner's opinion was of the present Mozambique situation.

MR WISNER said that it was almost 48 months since the signing of the Nkomati Accord. The US attached great

importance to it and was seeking support for it. During his discussions with President Machel he (Wisner) had stressed how vital Nkomati was and that the US would continue to underpin it. He had made an issue of Mozambique's adherence and had urged Machel not to undermine Nkomati. It would appear to him (Wisner) that Mozambique had lived up to their side of the bargain, that they sought to create a balanced relationship with South Africa and that that would continue to be their intention. He had also discussed the internal situation in Mozambique with Kaunda and Mugabe and they agreed with the US view that it was quite troublesome for a variety of reasons. These included a continuous high level of violence and erosion of Government power and structures. The US had concluded that the Mozambique Government was not about to collapse but that it was also not about to resurge. The US did not see a viable alternative to the present government. It did not see an alternative government in RENAMO - they were against the present government and not for anything positive. In these circumstances it was impossible to get on top of the economic situation in Mozambique, to co-ordinate aid programs, or arrange debt servicing facilities or to meet with IMF and IBRD requirements. With Nkomati there had been new hope that that situation would be reversed. However, Nkomati had thus far not achieved the stability which was needed. Both internal and external factors had been responsible for the situation. He believed that the continuous violence needed to be addressed but that there had to be a political solution as well. MR WISNER said that, as he looked back over the 48 months since Nkomati, he was worried about the relationship which had evolved between South Africa and Mozambique. The US had hoped that the institution would be broadened and that there would be a vigorous application of security measures. However, there were constant reports of

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assistance to RENAMO and of the flow of arms from or through South Africa. He had been told in Maputo that four helicopters coming from South Africa had on 4 March 1986 landed at Gorongosa. The perception existed, even among South Africa's friends, that South Africa did not strictly adhere to its commitments in terms of Nkomati. South Africa's capacity to play a role in Mozambique was consistently in dispute. This applied not only to the military situation but also on the economic front. MR WISNER said that, looking back on the plans South Africa had had, he came away empty handed. He saw little progress in the direction of the rail system and rail traffic. Investments and cooperative undertakings were also in bad shape. After two years it was hard to see what had been accomplished. The capacity of the US to work with South Africa was complicated by the fact that they did not know what South Africa's policy was. The US had felt more comfortable about South Africa's position two years ago.

MINISTER BOTHA said that there was obviously a big misunderstanding. South Africa's credit exposure to Mozambique amounted to more than R100 million. This included R6 million for roads and R8 million for railroads. The only successful food and farming project in Mozambique was South Africa's. A team of Consulting Engineers was busy with a feasibility study of Maputo harbour at South Africa's cost. The Mozambique Government's capacity to administrate was the real problem. It did not seem able to take decisions. Nine months ago, for example, South Africa had offered a new ferry boat to Mozambique as a gift to replace one which had sunk. Only now had they replied and on top of it had asked if they could use the money somewhere else instead of accepting the ferry. He (Minister Botha) had urged the South African private sector to invest in

Mozambique. He was now being hammered by them because they were losing out. MINISTER BOTHA said that he had dealt fully and openly with the allegations levelled at South Africa by Mozambique. He had replied in parliament to each and every charge concerning the Vaz diaries. The entries regarding dates, times and venues of meetings were correct, but not the purported records of discussions. It was clear that Vaz had used the diary as a kind of filing system but also as a report back to his commanders. The latter painted a distorted picture calculated to discourage a cease fire. His purpose had been all along to put to RENAMO that South Africa would not fund them, that they could not gain a military victory and that they were not recognized whilst Machel, on the other hand, was recognized internationally. MINISTER BOTHA asked on what moral basis could he accept things ascribed to him that he did not say. There was no way in which the South African Government could take action against an officer who categorically denied actions ascribed to him, unless evidence was brought to substantiate those allegations. The South African Government was publicly committed to Nkomati and to refrain from assisting RENAMO. Breaking that commitment would be reason for the State President and the Ministers of Foreign Affairs and Defence to resign. He gave Mr Wisner the assurance that that was the reason why he had gone to Maputo. He had explained everything to Veloso. He had handed two documents to Veloso in reply to the vicious attacks on South Africa. The State President, he himself and Minister Malan were on record criticizing and condemning RENAMO'S actions in Mozambique. At the same time RENAMO was on record condemning him (Minister Botha) and the South African Government. However, what was not on record was the Mozambique Government condemning the ANC or appealing to them to stop their atrocities. On the contrary, Mozambique encouraged

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the ANC. MINISTER BOTHA said that he had asked Veloso to clearly state in writing Mozambique's charges. The two Deputy Ministers could then get together to sort it out. Further, South Africa was willing that they be allowed to visit the people South Africa had arrested and question them. MINISTER BOTHA hoped that the Mozambiqueans would do the same. He said that the internal situation in Mozambique was in bad shape. This was due to RENAMO but also to bad administration. There were factions within the Politburo. South Africa was aware that Machel had reprimanded his officers recently. MINISTER BOTHA said that he wanted to give the assurance that if any South African military officer assisted RENAMO openly, the State President, he himself and Minister Malan would be finished. He said that he was in the predicament where he had to justify large projects of assistance to Mozambique. The private sector was anxious about stability and security risks involved. They were concerned that they did not get decisions because there was something wrong with the machinery in Mozambique. The instability in Mozambique also created other problems for South Africa. A year ago there had been 100 000 Mozambiqueans who had crossed the border into South Africa. Today there were roughly a quarter million. The Mozambique Government said this situation was a result of the fighting. It could however be proven that that was not the case. Many came from areas where there was no fighting. Stability in Mozambique was a prime target of the South African Government. It was the policy of the South African Government to continue a constructive relationship with Mozambique. What was needed was better administration and better management in Maputo. He said that South Africa was going in there big. Despite economic stringencies in South Africa, it was putting up a staff building in Maputo harbour. Equipment for this was being shipped to

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Mozambique from Durban. However, they did not give South Africa vacant land to store the equipment. He said that Machel had asked South Africa to build. They were going to but they did not get any decisions. South Africa would not go into Mozambique that big if it was not serious and did not want to stay. MINISTER BOTHA said that he had asked his Cabinet colleagues to help with assistance to Mozambique by making available additional staff, doctors, etc., but it was difficult if he did not get replies from Mozambique. The Deputy Ministers of Defence and Foreign Affairs had to meet with their Mozambique counterparts as soon as the latter were ready. It was necessary to remove from their minds their severe suspicions but they would have to do the same. MINISTER BOTHA said that he had heard that the US had firm evidence of South African military authorities assisting RENAMO. He asked that a way be found, without sources being revealed, to convey to South Africa the details. The South African Government would not run away from such information. It would enhance the South African Government's stature and credibility if Nkomati succeeded.

MINISTER MALAN said that he was fed up with wild allegations about the Defence Force. Through their experience in Afghanistan the US would know that it was the easiest thing to say they were supporting the rebels. But that would mean that thousands of tons of equipment had to move in which would be easily detectable. The Defence Force had extensive radar capabilities at Skukuza. All allegations of violations of the Mozambiquean airspace had been investigated. Not a single South African aircraft had violated the Mozambique airspace. Those were aircraft coming from the direction of Malawi, Swaziland and Zimbabwe. Mozambique had unilaterally disbanded the Joint Security

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Commission. MINISTER MALAN said that he had even gone so far as to deploy South African soldiers all along the border in the Kruger National Park. Now Zimbabwe was going to try to get FRELIMO and RENAMO together. He wished them good luck. They were both childish in their approach.

MINISTER BOTHA said the Portuguese had stopped him from going to Lisbon. He had wanted to talk to SOARES.

MR WISNER said that he did not come to South Africa as Mozambique's lawyer or bringing any messages from the Mozambique Government. He wanted to leave aside South Africa's individual problems. He was also aware of South Africa's projects with regard to Mozambique. There were two years behind the US and South Africa and the situation had taken on new features. He wanted to know what South Africa's strategies were. He extracted from the remarks made what South Africa's broad objectives were, namely that it was committed to Nkomati, that RENAMO was cut off and that national reconciliation was a high priority. He wanted to focus on how South Africa saw the situation and what strategies it intended to follow, also how South Africa planned to integrate the political, economic and military aspects of its strategy.

MINISTER BOTHA said that Mr Wisner had summarized South Africa's objectives quite well. The immediate objective was to get the joint investigative machinery off the ground in a way that would remove suspicions. It was of prime importance. He wanted his suspicions removed that Mozambique was supporting the ANC and he wanted to remove their suspicions that South Africa was supporting RENAMO. South Africa had proposed that the Deputy Ministers get together on 24 March 1986. He was still awaiting

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Mozambique's reply. South Africa did not only want to discuss security matters, but also matters of the nature of the development of ports, roads, etc. He had offered to VELOSO that he would act as mediator but their reply was not clear.

MR WISNER said that the US expected South Africa to continue with its efforts to act as mediator.

MINISTER BOTHA said that he was pleased that Zimbabwe was trying to mediate.

MR WISNER said that VELOSO had said that he (VELOSO) had given South Africa the yellow-green light and that he wanted things to get back to the situation on 4 October 1985.

MR WISNER asked what South Africa's political plan was.

MINISTER BOTHA said that he was trying to get to Portugal. He wanted to talk to Soares. He wanted to talk to the people whom South Africa knew supported RENAMO. South Africa's prime objective was to stop the war. He wanted to make it very clear that a victory for RENAMO would not help South Africa. The roles would then just turn around. The economic burden for South Africa would not be taken away. In South Africa's analysis a RENAMO victory would not be to its advantage or favour, nor would it contribute to peace and stability in southern Africa. Things were going better with Zimbabwe, Botswana, Lesotho and Swaziland. Only with Mozambique, with whom South Africa had an agreement, things were not going well because of suspicions, the Vaz diaries and the war. It was of prime importance that the war had to be ended. The only way to achieve that was to bring the two sides together. He did however not know how that would be done. If Swaziland and Mugabe wanted to play a role they were welcome.

NOTE: At that stage Ministers Botha and Malan had to leave the meeting. While waiting for them to return Mr Wisner had talks with Deputy Minister Miller. On Minister Botha's return a discussion concerning possible changes to the Mozambique Cabinet and FRELIMO hierarchy ensued, after which the original discussion was resumed.

MR WISNER asked if Minister Botha had reason to believe that Machel was trying to make contact with RENAMO.

MINISTER BOTHA said yes. He believed the church was seeking quietly to make such an attempt. The role of the church should not be underestimated.

MR WISNER said he wanted to expound on the attitude of the US Government on where it was going.

- It was the US intention to make every effort to sustain Nkomati;
- The US would want to give the Mozambique Government reason to believe it had made the right decision to move away from the Soviet bloc;
- The US would strive to maintain the best level of economic assistance and private sector initiatives;
- The war hung over every effort and impeded progress on all sides. The US believed that there was no military solution and that a political settlement had to be found.

He said that the US believed it could not play a role at the present time. However, should the negotiations take off there was a lot the US could and would be prepared to do. He wanted to emphasize that good developments with

regard to Mozambique would play an important role and would be a key issue to the US - South African relationship.

MR WISNER said he wanted to make two points before leaving:

- He would suggest that South Africa put before Mozambique on 24 March 1986 or whenever a very simple, very clear plan of action within a time frame for steps to be undertaken, in order to get Mozambique to make decisions. South Africa could share such a plan with the US and they would from their side urge Mozambique to take decisions.
- He suggested that South Africa designed a negotiating strategy in order to put it in the driver seat. The US would like to see that strategy so that they could work together and support South Africa's strategy.

MINISTER BOTHA said that South Africa could not at present go beyond what he and Deputy Minister Miller had said. Those points were very elementary. He had given Deputy Minister Miller due instructions. South Africa had suggested an end to the war through negotiations.

MR WISNER said that it was necessary to look beyond that. If Mozambique should give South Africa an ambiguous answer, there would be many options. There was a package of choices. There were other actors on the line who could be deployed while sticking to the basic objectives.

MINISTER BOTHA said that that was exactly where it was dangerous. There was the possibility of a meeting between the Mozambique and South African Deputy-Ministers. His problem was that as soon as South Africa would raise the involvement of other actors and it was suggested to

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Mozambique, suspicions would be created. Mozambique had to give him (Minister Botha) a free hand. They had to say that they were interested in talking to RENAMO.

MINISTER BOTHA said that he was sensitive that if he said anything it would raise fresh suspicions. Direct contact had to be established first. Then there could be other options. It was important that, whatever feedback the Mozambiqueans might receive later, it not be held against him (Minister Botha).

MR WISNER agreed that South Africa did not want to be charged with duplicity. In any event, Mozambique did not want to talk to the US about their peace plans. They were sensitive because they were weak.

MINISTER BOTHA thanked Mr Wisner and said that the Mozambiqueans were not so sensitive with South Africa.

MR WISNER said that his concern was that if South Africa sat with Mozambique and was asked for advice, South Africa could suggest that they also involve others. The heat had to be kept on Mozambique. There was a great amount of sensitivity on this. The Zimbabweans themselves were anxious about the situation in Mozambique.

MINISTER BOTHA said that it should be substantiated what sensitivities the Zimbabweans had. South Africa had been informed that they were suspicious of FRELIMO.

MR WISNER confirmed that they were suspicious of them.

MINISTER BOTHA said South Africa's approach was not to push too hard but also to work out various options. Turning to another topic he hoped the Zimbabweans would attend the

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coronation of the new King in Swaziland. He did not think that Machel would go. Both the State President and he (Minister Botha) would attend.

MR WISNER asked if Minister Botha planned anything beyond attending the coronation.

MINISTER BOTHA said he might be inclined to remain in Swaziland for a while in the nature of things.

MR WISNER said that the Swazi's would have to establish a new leadership with that coronation.

MINISTER BOTHA asked if, incidentally, the US would not have one million dollars for an urgent roads project in Swaziland. The Swazi's had asked South Africa, but his budget was rock bottom.

MR WISNER said that the US would not normally get involved in such kind of projects but he would look into the matter.