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EXCERPTS FROM MEETING BETWEEN A SOUTH AFRICAN DELEGATION
LED BY MINISTER R F BOTHA AND A UNITED STATES DELEGATION
LED BY MR ROBERT MACFARLANE, NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISOR,
ON QUESTIONS AFFECTING SOUTH WEST AFRICA AND ANGOLA :
VIENNA : 8 AUGUST 1985

MR MACFARLANE said that he wanted to give South Africa his sense of what was possible. He wanted to discuss regional trends and South Africa's reaction to them against the background of political realities within the United States. What shape would regional developments take in the future? He also wanted to convey the United States' views concerning violence. In this regard incidents were always reported as South African violence. Without clear justification for such actions, United States reaction would be negative. People expected South Africa to exhaust all possible political channels before having recourse to violence. The United States Government should also be given a chance to exercise a moderating influence before violence was used. When such problems arose South Africa should accordingly let the United States know in advance. It must establish a record of having exhausted diplomatic channels before proceeding to violence.

DR CROCKER mentioned that South Africa already knew what the United States reaction had been to recent developments. With the Gaborone incident the United States felt that South Africa had not exhausted all its options. He took it that South Africa wanted to pursue diplomatic options in Lesotho. The United States had done this before

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and it had always been messy. It was important to understand that violence was a two-way street as was restraint. The United States could not accept the policy of striking first and talking later. These points should be discussed in greater detail. Over the years the United States had sweetened Resolution 435 through strenuous efforts. It had legitimized the question of Cuban troop withdrawal and had persuaded the MPLA to take the first step but there had been a lot of back-sliding. The United States had given Savimbi a window of opportunity. It had spoken of reconciliation in Angola. It had let it be known that it talked to Savimbi. The repeal of the Clark Amendment would further help the United States effort. However, South Africa's decisions since March had created problems for the United States. The MPLA was having a field day. South Africa had let the MPLA off the hook. South Africa's response to the United States' synthesis paper had been unhelpful. The question was how could the negotiations be brought back on track? It should be recalled that Savimbi's worst-case scenario was that nothing would change and there would be no progress during President Reagan's term of office. Savimbi had no illusions concerning the military outcome. UNITA had to have a strong public relations campaign, but Savimbi was worried. The repeal of the Clark amendment was certainly a safety card. It should be remembered that Ronald Reagan had not been elected to destroy Jonas Savimbi.

MINISTER BOTHA replied that the repeal of the Clark Amendment had convinced Savimbi. He had asked Minister Botha what the White House would do. President Reagan certain would not veto such a bill. However, Savimbi was

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suspicious. MINISTER BOTHA had arranged for him to meet with South Africa's top editors recently. One of them had asked a question concerning the repeal of the Clark Amendment. Savimbi said that he welcomed it. The idea of appointing a lobbyist in the United States was not Savimbi's. It was the Minister's. Chitunda was not doing a good job. There should be a proper United States public relations company working behind the scenes with those who favour UNITA's interests.

DR CROCKER said that trust and confidence bedeviled the negotiations between South Africa and the United States. The United States had been given a green light to pursue the framework which it had presented to South Africa in February. It had formalised its framework in March. South Africa's response made the United States wonder what it had been talking about.

MINISTER BOTHA replied that the United States' proposal had created a tremendous bad feeling in his President's mind. South Africa believed that the United States had supported the goal of simultaneous and parallel withdrawal. The package that they had come up with was what the Soviets had dictated to the MPLA. It would lead to the loss of the whole of the West Coast of Africa. South Africa had given the United States the history of the negotiations. It would be impossible to hold an election in South West Africa under such circumstances. If the elections were lost freely, that would be fine. However, South Africa would not tolerate Cubans anywhere else. In 1981 the United States had asked South Africa if it would change South Africa's position if the Cubans were withdrawn.

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South Africa had replied that this would be a new ball game. Now the United States said that elections would take place after seven months and that all the Cubans could still be in Angola. Solarz had asked the Minister in Pretoria if it would be negotiable if the bulk of the Cubans were removed after six months and 4 000 remained? The United States had floored South Africa with its synthesis paper. It was a war plan designed to destroy Savimbi and to get Nujoma in power in Windhoek. President Reagan had brought legitimacy to the question of Cuban troop withdrawal. Why did the United States not want to get them out?

DR CROCKER replied that it was the United States' goal to get them out.

MINISTER BOTHA replied that South Africa had bought time for Mobuto, for Savimbi and for itself. In the case of Angola the United States could achieve a major victory. It could save Africa. Angola was the key to peace in southern Africa. This gave everyone a chance for peace. If Angola was lost and if the Soviets took over, peace would be impossible. But if South Africa and the United States could help Savimbi to force Dos Santos to talk there would be a host of African countries which would want to support this. South Africa would be prepared to help the Soviet Union make an honourable withdrawal. If the Soviets won in Angola they would take over all of southern Africa. South Africa and the United States were ad idem in trying to stop the Soviet Union.

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MR MACFARLANE replied that the talks had really been worthwhile. He would share the details with President Reagan. South Africa and the United States' sense of the strategic stakes was very much the same as well as its sense of what both countries stood to lose. President Reagan did not want to see Savimbi defeated. He had already forced his policies through in difficult times. It was essential for South Africa and the United States to coordinate and to apply their resources to the best possible effect. But now it was necessary to maintain the support of the United States Congress. Even in central America the Administration had had a hard time to persuade Congress to give a pittance to avoid defeat. There was a primitive understanding of strategic concerns in Congress. But the United States needed South Africa's help with the pace of change and with a negotiating track on regional problems. President Reagan wanted to leave a legacy from his Presidency which would ensure that the Soviet Union would not take one more square inch of territory during his administration. However, this would require closeness and frank exchanges between South Africa and the United States to enable both countries to sustain their policy. Dr Crocker, President Reagan, George Shultz and he were a single team and were solidly behind the Administration's policy. President Reagan would receive a full report on these talks. He did not plan to change his course.

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