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CALL BY UNITED STATES AMBASSADOR H NICKEL ON MR R F BOTHA AT  
10h30 ON 3 JUNE 1985 : STATE GUEST HOUSE, PRETORIA

Also Present:

Mr A L Manley	Office of the Minister of Foreign Affairs
Mr V J Zazeraj	Private Secretary to Mr R F Botha
Mr T Carney	Counsellor, U.S. Embassy

AMBASSADOR NICKEL said that pressures were building up "mightily" in Washington. The Congress would be sitting again from 4 June 1985. There was a need to get back on track in Southern Africa.

Despite the Angolan message, the United States Government did not think that they had slammed the door. Genl. Veloso had the same impression and had conveyed it to the United States Ambassador in Maputo. Veloso was depressed about the Cabinda incident. There was a need to put the Angolan situation back on track. A South African withdrawal from Calueque might be a useful sign of South Africa's good intent.

The meeting between Secretary Shultz and Ambassador Brand Fourie later today was important. There was a credibility crisis. Not only for the South African Government but also for the United States Administration because there was a perception that they had been deluded as to South Africa's real intentions.

AMBASSADOR NICKEL asked the Minister to give him some indication of what Brand Fourie would be saying to Mr Shultz, so that he could brief the State Department in advance. It should be borne in mind that constructive engagement was a regional policy.

MINISTER BOTHA said that it was not clear to him what the United States Government wanted. As he understood it, Frank Wisner thought that South Africa should say:

- a) that it remained committed to a solution based on UNSCR 435. But President Botha had said so in Parliament and the Minister had repeated it as recently as his Pietersburg statement of 30 May 1985.
- b) that the South African Government was not and would not be associated with action against foreign installations and would not condone it.

South African found this strange. Would the United States Government be prepared to issue a similar statement in respect of Central / South America. The United States was aware that there were ANC and SWAPO terrorists in Angola. These camps were also installations.

AMBASSADOR NICKEL said he was not talking about Cuban, ANC or SWAPO camps but about specific United States installations. The United States was asking South Africa to state its policy in public.

MR BOTHA said that South Africa's policy was based on the internationally recognised doctrine of retaliation. South Africa's retaliation would depend upon the extent of the damage done to installations inside South Africa. This related to damage done on South African soil. However, South Africa had not and would not get involved in attacks on Gulf installations. AMBASSADOR NICKEL asked whether that could not be made public.

MR BOTHA said that he could consider that but that he could not admit that there was a crisis of confidence. If Mr Shultz used the comments contained in his press guidance, Mr Botha would have to repudiate him.

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In his Pietersburg statement, Mr Botha had softened the Angolan message. It would appear that Angola was trying to use Cabinda to exact concessions from South Africa.

South Africa would take its decisions on Calueque / Ruacana independently of Cabinda.

AMBASSADOR NICKEL said that he did not know whether the Minister's impression of the events at Cabinda were generally shared. He did not know whether the South African operation in Cabinda was justified at this stage when action was being taken on Capitol Hill. Even friends of constructive engagement were now asking questions as a result of Cabinda.

MR BOTHA said that the South African Government had said all along that the United States could reconsider its policy towards South and southern Africa. The basic approach of the South African Government was that it would not tolerate the planning and execution of attacks in South Africa from neighbouring States.

The United States was leaning over backwards to keep in the good books of Luanda. They should also be saying something about that Government's friendship with Moscow. They should publicly acknowledge that the Luanda Government was the closest in Africa to the Soviet Union. The United States appeared to be siding with the Marxists. The United States was creating the impression that it did not want UNITA to gain the upper hand in Angola. This was a source of great concern to the South African Government.

AMBASSADOR NICKEL said that he would like to get the discussion back on track. He wished to get back to "this theory" of retaliation.

MR BOTHA said that it was not a theory but a principle of international law.

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MR CARNEY said that it was a doctrine.

MR BOTHA said that the United States had used this doctrine in Nicaragua. MR CARNEY added that it had also been used in Grenada. AMBASSADOR NICKEL said that what General Malan said about retaliation "anywhere" was unacceptable to the United States Government. There was a "perception" in the United States that the Gulf installation had been the target in Cabinda.

MR BOTHA said that he was very aware of the perceptions that had given the United States more details of the South African operation in Cabinda than he would dare to make public. He need not have shown Mr Nickel the photographs. The Pentagon was interested in knowing who had taken the photographs. South African personnel had taken some of the photographs but other people had also taken some of them.

Du Toit had not been in command of the operation. The leader had been someone else, who was now back in South Africa but whose identity would be protected for the present. South Africa had used a submarine and not strike craft. Du Toit could not have known in advance about the strike craft because they were only called up when it became known that there were injured commandos in need of medical attention which could not be provided in a submarine. It would be obvious to the Pentagon that Du Toit had spoken under duress, although this might not be quite so obvious to the State Department or the Washington Post.

Mr Wisner had made a useful suggestion about getting Du Toit to neutral territory which should be followed up.

Mr Botha would speak to the State President about making a public statement regarding United States installations in the Gulf.



AMBASSADOR NICKEL said that the South African Government should re-assert that the "Du Toit operation" was not aimed at Gulf. South Africa was being charged in public that its intentions were otherwise than it had stated.

MR BOTHA said that Dr Jonas Savimbi had accused him the previous week that it was as a result of South Africa's intervention that UNITA had not succeeded in blowing up the Gulf installation. The United States would have ways and means of checking this.

South Africa would not be party to the planning or implementation of actions detrimental to United States installations or citizens anywhere in the world. The South African Government was, however, gaining the impression that Luanda was trying to use the Cabinda incident to exact concessions from South Africa through the United States Government. "They are blackmailing us through you."

Mr Botha had personally warned Rodrigues in Lusaka to get rid of the ANC. The continued succour given to the ANC in Angola was making it difficult for President Machel. Fingers were being pointed at him in the OAU and elsewhere. They were saying that Dos Santos was doing more than Machel. Mr Botha's task, as Foreign Minister, was to persuade these neighbouring Governments not to harbour ANC terrorists because he was aware of the attitude in South Africa to retaliation.

The warnings to Angola about the ANC had been repeated through General Veloso and Foreign Minister Silvino da Luz of Cape Verde.

AMBASSADOR NICKEL asked how the ANC terrorists got to Botswana.

MR BOTHA said that they most probably went through Zambia and then through the Caprivi.

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AMBASSADOR NICKEL asked incredulously whether the Minister had said "through the Caprivi".

MR BOTHA said that there were parts of the Caprivi that were uninhabited. The previous year the South African and Botswana authorities had jointly traced the tracks of ANC terrorists back through Botswana.

The United States should rather concern itself with establishing the principle in Southern Africa that terrorists would not be harboured in other States of the region. If only this principle had been adopted from the beginning there would have been greater hope for the future.

The United States did not appear to be able to see this. There was an ANC camp near the Gulf installation. Why was it established there? Because the ANC calculated that South Africa would not dare to attack an ANC base so close to an American installation.

Mr Botha said that he had spoken to Dr Savimbi since the Cabinda incident. Mr Botha had said to him that it would be a good thing for Dr Savimbi to speak to the United States about Gulf. Dr Savimbi said that he would be prepared to talk directly with Gulf. He was convinced that the oil money was being used by Luanda against him.

AMBASSADOR NICKEL said that he would like to ask whether it was possible for South Africa to:

- a) say that it was not policy to hit Gulf;
- b) reply to the "synthesis paper" (basis for negotiation);
- c) negotiate flexibly on SWA/Namibia.

The United States was not putting the squeeze on South Africa because of Cabinda.

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He also noted the Minister's reaction to how to deal with Wynand Du Toit. He would also propose private bi-lateral discussions on South Africa's philosophy on intelligence gathering, i.e., ferreting out ANC targets beyond South Africa's borders.

MR BOTHA said that the United States was well aware of South Africa's policy. The two Governments appeared to disagree. It was strange that others could retaliate but South Africa could not. He had told the South African Government that Dr Crocker had agreed on the question of retaliation. It now appeared that he would have to rectify this impression in the minds of the South African Government. It must be borne in mind that South Africa did not start these things, it reacted.

Mr Botha was working on the reply to the synthesis paper but the reply would have to be cleared through the State Security Council on Monday, 10 June 1985 and then it was the State President's prerogative to decide when it would be considered by the Cabinet. The earliest that this could happen would be on Wednesday, 12 June 1985. However, he would say at this stage that it would appear from the synthesis paper that the United States Government had deviated from the position given in writing by the President of the United States of America and two Secretaries of State.

In respect of Calueque, it must clearly be understood that the removal of South African troops place the pumping of water to the people of SWA/Namibia in jeopardy. Calueque was covered by an international agreement between South Africa and Portugal, which responsibility had devolved upon the Luanda regime. The Angolan Deputy Foreign Minister had admitted as much during the recent meeting in Maputo. South Africa was being told to get out just to score a political point.

The United States seemed continuously to fall on the side of the Soviet Union in matters similar to the Angola situation. It appeared to be a strategy of the United States to fall short on its opportunities - in China, Cuba, S.E. Asia, Central America and Angola.

AMBASSADOR NICKEL said that one needed also to look at the United States' track record on Mozambique.

MR BOTHA said that the only reason that Mozambique had to come to the negotiating table was because they had been "softened up" by South Africa. In other words, the Nkomati Accord was a direct result of South Africa's acts of retaliation.

AMBASSADOR NICKEL said that Mr Botha must bear in mind that the Gulf tail did not wag the United States Government dog. It should be the South African and United States Governments' objective to create the climate for a similar agreement in Angola as was achieved with Nkomati.

MR BOTHA said that there was a basic lack of even-handedness in the handling of the Cabinda incident. Cabinda had merely been a reconnaissance operation. He had still not heard a word from the United States Government about ANC activities being planned outside South Africa.

He could tell the Ambassador, in confidence, that for the first time silencers had been found in ANC weapons caches. This was further evidence that, for the first time, the ANC was planning to assassinate South African leaders. Messages to this effect had also been monitored in other African countries. The United States must know this from the same sources.

Mr Botha said that the SWA water and electricity workers at Calueque were not prepared to be exposed to attack by SWAPO. It was his view that in terms of the international agree-



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ment, South Africa had a right to be at Calueque to protect its interests there. It worried him that the United States could not see this.

AMBASSADOR NICKEL said that the United States was worried about saving a process.

MR BOTHA said that South Africa had withdrawn from Calueque on 31 May 1985. Dr Crocker had said that sovereignty was a two-way street. He therefore hoped that there would not be a return to the 1978 position with SWAPO bases 10 kilometres from the SWA/Namibia border.

At the same time, the South African Government was involved in important domestic reforms. It was, however, imperative to maintain law and order as this was more important than any reform initiatives. This was where the Shah of Iran had failed. Mr Botha wanted to know whether President Reagan was being kept properly informed about the reform initiatives and of the South African Government's concerns.

AMBASSADOR NICKEL said that he had spoken to President Reagan personally. He saw the gains obtained through Nkomati and sought the same in Angola. There would be positive results in containing the ANC as in Mozambique. Mr Nickel had some understanding of cross-border violence but operating thousands of kilometres inside the borders of another country was something else entirely.

MR BOTHA asked the Ambassador what his reaction would be if South Africa attacked an ANC camp inside Libya.

AMBASSADOR NICKEL said that he could not answer as he was not responsible for that part of the world.

MR BOTHA said that it was the principle that counted. It was his understanding that Frank Wisner had wanted to know how South Africa saw the road ahead. Mr Botha could not

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tell the United States only what they wanted to hear. Al Haig had said that he did not want to see President Reagan paraded as a charade. Mr Botha had told him that he would be straight with the United States at all times.

The Mozambique and Angola situations differed markedly in many respects.

AMBASSADOR NICKEL agreed but said that the United States evaluation of the relative strength of UNITA differed from the South African evaluation.

MR BOTHA said that if that was the case, it was a serious matter. It was important that a small circle of South African and United States' Foreign Affairs and Defence personnel get together as a matter of urgency and reach agreement at least on the facts. Individual decisions based on the facts were a different matter but South Africa and the United States could not afford to differ on the facts.