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MEETING BETWEEN A SOUTH AFRICAN DELEGATION LED BY THE MINISTER OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS, THE HONOURABLE R F BOTHA AND A UNITED STATES DELEGATION LED BY DR C CROCKER, ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF STATE FOR AFRICAN AFFAIRS :
SANTA MARIA : SAL ISLAND : 1 NOVEMBER 1984

THE MINISTER read the proposed South African press statement.

DR CROCKER said that the statement was very solid and forthcoming and would stand the United States in good stead. He asked whether South Africa could state a specific date for disengagement?

THE MINISTER replied that South Africa would give a date the next day through the Joint Monitoring Commission.

GEN GELDENHUYS said that South Africa would propose a number of dates to the Angolans.

MINISTER BOTHA said that he did not want to make it look as though South Africa had not consulted Angola.

DR CROCKER read the proposed United States press statement.

MINISTER BOTHA said that it was for the United States to say what it liked but did they not want to look at the word "durable". Africans might take it amiss if it appeared as though a super power, even if it were the United States, were intervening in the region.

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DR CROCKER said that they thought it might be a pax Americana?

MINISTER BOTHA said that it was for the leaders of Africa to decide about the affairs of their continent. However, he could live with the American formulation.

MINISTER BOTHA asked what would happen if he were asked about the details of the Angolan proposal? The whole world had known or had known since 1981 that although the parties did not agree on the details this was the clearest indication of linkage one could ask for. What would Dos Santos' reaction be?

DR CROCKER replied that he would say that it is not linkage. He would try to "save his ass". On the numbers the United States would say that matters were strictly between the governments concerned. The United States would not comment on the details. The United States had the impression that the Angolans had spoken to the Cubans about this but not to the Soviets. He did not think that they had spoken to the Frontline States. Therefore it was important that the details should not leak out.

MINISTER BOTHA said that the Angolan proposal contained some positive and some negative elements. There was sufficient reason for both governments not to like it.

DR CROCKER said that it was not possible to negotiate in public.

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MINISTER BOTHA said that if Dos Santos spoke to the world South Africa would have to react but he did not think that Dos Santos would do so.

MINISTER BOTHA said that his fallback position would be that he was studying the proposal.

DR CROCKER offered to give a few ideas concerning the timing of the next move. There were a number of obvious options in terms of South Africa's reply. South Africa knew the United States thoughts on this matter. This was not a US proposal. The question was, how would the two sides narrow the gap? South Africa had said that the negotiations could not be allowed to destroy UNITA. If South Africa and the United States could agree on that point, they would have a basis for decision. South Africa could say that in terms of the Angolan model South Africa would lose its bargaining power once its own forces had withdrawn from South West Africa. How could this form the basis for a fair deal? This would be a good argument. What were South Africa's thoughts in this regard? South Africa could also say that it had three choices:

Firstly, to insist on exact parallelism. Secondly, to stretch out the timing of Resolution 435, or if the MPLA needed more time, perhaps the MPLA should start Cuban withdrawal first, with a view to sending the Cubans home, some before implementation, some during implementation and some after implementation. However, if South Africa started playing around with Resolution 435, it would give the game to the Soviets. South Africa could also say that

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if the Angolans had such a serious security problem with UNITA, maybe they might want South Africa to play a role with UNITA on starting a dialogue on reconciliation.

MINISTER BOTHA replied that in South Africa's reaction just about every point mentioned by Dr Crocker would be included except one - it would not be possible for the South African Government to accept any Cuban withdrawal after the elections. By the time the elections take place, the Cubans would have to be out. Dr Crocker would know how this had come about. In 1981 South Africa had been on the point of breaking with Resolution 435. At that time, South Africa had indicated that it would not be possible to have a single blue helmet in South West Africa. The United States had spoken to South Africa and had asked whether it could not take 60. It would not be possible to continue with the process if this element were removed. South Africa had said that it could not go ahead because the internal parties were not permitted to address the Security Council. South Africa had been prepared for sanctions rather than to have unfair elections. The United States had acted very fairly. Two governments had then found a way out by removing one of the main sources of apprehension i.e. the Cubans. The South African Government was grateful for the lonely but strong stand which the United States had taken. The United States had had trouble with the United Kingdom, with West Germany and with the French. It had taken a severe hammering over linkage. That was why South Africa could not accept withdrawal after an election. It would not be able to explain this to its own public. However, if the Multiparty Conference accepted such a move it would be fine. South Africa would be guided by them.

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MINISTER MALAN said that South Africa had referred to two reservoirs. By the time South African forces had been reduced to 1 500 the Cubans would have to be out. He doubted if the people of South West Africa would accept anything else.

MINISTER BOTHA noted that Kito Rodrigues had said that it would be difficult for his government to go along with the principle of parallelism. However, the Minister had not received the impression that this would be impossible, otherwise there would be no implementation of Resolution 435. If the Angolans wanted to keep 10 000 Cubans, South Africa would keep 11 500 of its own forces in South West Africa.

DR CROCKER asked how many South African forces there were in the Territory?

MINISTER MALAN replied that there were 12 500.

MINISTER BOTHA said that he would like the Angolans to think that there were more.

MINISTER MALAN said that he was talking about the operational area.

MINISTER BOTHA said that there was a further difficulty. At the time of the adoption of Resolution 435, there had been ethnic forces in South West Africa. South West Africa now had its own security forces. There were not ethnic,

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they were mixed. Resolution 435 did not address the present situation.

DR CROCKER said that this matter could not be resolved by nomenclature.

MINISTER BOTHA said that South Africa could negotiate on this question.

DR CROCKER replied that there would be others who would have different ideas.

MINISTER BOTHA recalled that at that time South Africa had said that there were 3 000 plus the Police.

DR CROCKER said that everyone recognized that the end of the process had not yet been reached. Perhaps this was the beginning of the end. South Africa had spoken of the origin of linkage. DR CROCKER could not argue on this point. South Africa had insisted that its position on Cuban withdrawal had already been stated. The United States, however, had never stated its own position. The United States had spoken about Phase III withdrawal. The Angolans clearly wanted an extension of the time-frame. The United States had not told them that it had accepted South Africa's position. South Africa had several options. It could restate its present position or it could add on new elements. But what would happen if the positions became irreconcilable?

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MINISTER BOTHA said that he could not tie his government but it might be prepared to change Resolution 435. Let them have their residual Cubans and let South Africa have its residual forces.

AMBASSADOR FOURIE said that South Africa had made it clear that it would not reduce its forces if the Cubans were not withdrawn from Angola.

MINISTER BOTHA observed that the Angolans were already contemplating a Security Council Resolution which would modify Resolution 435.

DR CROCKER replied that they wanted a general implementation agreement. They wanted it covered by the UN, a step which would endorse linkage.

MINISTER BOTHA asked whether UNTAG would still be necessary in its present form if an agreement could be reached?

DR CROCKER replied that the United States had helped to write Resolution 435 and would not want to walk away and write a revision of the resolution. It had reaffirmed that the same number of basic units would be involved.

MINISTER BOTHA noted that the exercise would cost more than \$600 million. He asked who would pay?

DR CROCKER replied that the United States would pay 30%. It was certainly a big bill.

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MINISTER BOTHA observed that he could not even get a few million from the United States for Mozambique. Prime Minister Thatcher had bragged about giving Mozambique R5 million. He had no doubt that the United States would pay but he had not seen any provision in its budget for this. The United States had a big deficit. Congress would have to approve any such provision.

DR CROCKER confirmed that he had not put forward any specific numbers to Congress.

MINISTER BOTHA said that he just wanted to be assured that if Resolution 435 were implemented in its exact form, the money would be coming south.

DR CROCKER said that President Reagan knew what the price tag would be. With regard to the Angolan proposal he said that the United States had already hinted at some possible South African reactions. It would be possible to narrow the gap.

MINISTER BOTHA observed that there might be events which might facilitate agreement of which the parties were now not aware. South Africa would submit its suggestions. It would also like to inform Mozambique. He would want to give them the details and hoped that they would exert pressure on President Dos Santos. He planned to speak to Veloso in this regard. However, he did not want to involve President Kaunda.

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DR CROCKER speculated that Kito Rodrigues had probably already briefed President Kaunda but one never knew which side Kaunda would support.

MINISTER BOTHA said that Kaunda was inclined to support Dos Santos. Nevertheless, it would be very important to break the impasse.

DR CROCKER said that the Angolans would soon start briefing the Frontline States on the new realities. They had already spoken to the Cubans and the Soviets, although they clearly drew a sharp distinction between those two countries. They had asked the United States not to speak to the Soviet Union about these developments.

MINISTER BOTHA said that Silvino da Luz had told him that the Angolans wanted Moscow's blessing for their actions. They wanted to lessen Moscow's grip on them and move towards Cape Verde's own position of nonalignment. Silvino had indicated that the Luanda Government was not in the same position of independence as the Government in the Cape Verde Islands although it wished to move in that direction.

DR CROCKER said that the Angolans would have to try to save face for Moscow. However, they wanted freedom to negotiate. DR CROCKER then presented the South African delegation with the United States' draft of the agreed minutes of the meeting which had taken place between the two sides on that day and on the previous day.