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MEETING BETWEEN SOUTH AFRICAN DELEGATION LED BY THE
MINISTER OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS, THE HONOURABLE R F BOTHA
AND A UNITED STATES DELEGATION LED BY DR C CROCKER,
ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF STATES FOR AFRICAN AFFAIRS :
SANTA MARIA : SAL ISLAND : 31 OCTOBER 1984

AFTERNOON SESSION

DR CROCKER said that the two sides had covered the Eastern Front during the morning. During the afternoon he wished to speak about disengagement. The United States had been working for three years on Cuban withdrawal. It had been a difficult dialogue. However, the last six months had seen distinct changes. President Dos Santos had strengthened his position, based on a coalition of the Defence and Security Council which enable him to by-pass the Central Committee. In the past the MPLA had been incapable of making decisions. Now there was a new structure. There was also an urgent necessity for a settlement. Everyone with whom the United States dealt said so. During recent discussions half of the time Kito had headed the Angolan delegation. The other half of the time it had been Ndalu (Col Franca, Chief of Staff). It was clear that consensus had now been reached within the Angolan Government with regard to the departure of the Cubans. It was also clear that the Angolans now wanted it to be known that they were working with the United States. This was why they had given an interview to the Washington Post. They were saying that they trusted the United States and thought that the United States could engineer a settlement. Paulo Jorge had been dismissed. DR CROCKER observed that Foreign Ministers could sometimes be of assistance. However, Paulo

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Jorge had never been a great friend and his dismissal should be seen as a further indication that the Angolans wanted to settle. The United States had been working for 18 months on a proposal for Cuban troop withdrawal. Now at last the Angolans had committed themselves to Cuban troop withdrawal within the context of Resolution 435. They had argued this question out in all the organs of their government. However, there was a big difference between taking such a decision in principle and working out a final deal. The Angolans had abandoned old principles and had come up with new ones. They were now hooked and Dos Santos would not be able to reverse his position. He had taken an irreversable step toward a settlement. South Africa for its part wanted all the Cubans out of Angola. South Africa would want to emphasize as much movement as soon as possible. The Angolans had confidence in the United States and believed that South Africa was prepared to take some steps toward peace. However, they were very worried about UNITA. The threat to their security was now very realistic. What they wanted was a package settlement including the completion of disengagement. They were ready to talk if South Africa proposed a date. They expected a statement that South Africa would abide by and intends to implement Resolution 435. They wanted a ceasefire between South Africa and SWAPO in terms of Resolution 435, not today but later. Within this context they were prepared to make a declaration with regard to Cuban troop withdrawal. They also wanted a UN Resolution reflecting these undertakings concerning the Cubans and Resolution 435. DR CROCKER wished to emphasize that the Angolans had put forward their first official proposal. They knew that

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South Africa would have comments and would not accept it in its present form. The United States had not come to sell the Angolan proposal because it did not meet South Africa's requirements. The Angolan proposal simply provided a basis for discussions. From the beginning of implementation they would allow no more Cubans south of the 16° parallel. In the course of the following 24 months they would remove all the Cubans south of the 13° parallel amounting to some 20 000. 15 000 Cubans would leave Angola within 24 months and 5 000 would be redeployed north of the 13° parallel. The Angolans proposed specific months during which blocks of 5 000 Cuban troops would be pulled out. The central point which the Angolans made was a distinction between the north and the south. They started out with a figure of 30 000 combat troops. However, there was a fundamental difference between the security position in the north and the south. Those who would be left in the north would include 10 000 soldiers and that would be a separate matter. What they were saying was that the north was their economic heartland. The north also involved Zaïre and involved South Africa's relationship with Zaïre. They wanted to address their northern security concerns but had not ruled out a concrete calendar for the north. The United States valued good relations between Angola and Zaïre and felt that Dos Santos should talk to M^oabuto. It was encouraging them to talk. The most promising aspect was that M^oabuto might play a role in national reconciliation. So far, South Africa and the United States were involved but soon there might be African players. This could open up a Zaïrian dimension. The Angolans had suggested a definite calendar in the south. In the north

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it was open-ended. There would, of course, be questions concerning verification. The Angolans had accepted this in principle. One subject very much on the minds of the United States delegation was that the United States would not accept any preconditions with regard to diplomatic relations. The Angolans were also not asking South Africa to announce that it was ending its support for UNITA. They felt that the implementation of Resolution 435 would affect South Africa's ability to support UNITA. They would expect South Africa to say that it would respect the borders of Namibia and Angola and to make some statement on Angolan sovereignty and territorial integrity. The United States was not asking South Africa to cut off aid to UNITA and would not do so if it were asked. The Angolans saw this as a serious opening proposal. The question was, how should South Africa and the United States deal with it? What should the next steps be? The United States felt that there could be improvements. The Angolans would also like a tripartite meeting. The United States had not accepted or rejected this idea but had said that it could be useful at the appropriate time.

MINISTER BOTHA asked about the time-scale. As he understood it the shortest time-scale would be 24 months in the south? He took it that the schedule for the north would be open ended. He wanted to know whether this was also the time-table for implementation of Resolution 435?

DR CROCKER said that he wanted to go beyond this point. The Angolans had agreed that both sides could begin their withdrawals in parallel but they wanted time beyond the end

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of Resolution 435. The Angolans had no illusions about South Africa's attitude.

MINISTER BOTHA said that this was a major obstacle. When South African forces had been reduced to 1 500 the Cubans would have to be reduced to zero. South Africa was committed to this. It could not make concessions on this point. The Angolans clearly wanted Resolution 435 to be implemented to destroy UNITA. The Russians had advised them to appear reasonable, to fire Paulo Jorge, to encourage the belief that they would be committed to the withdrawal of Cuban forces. The Angolans knew they would lose in the north. This analysis fitted like a glove to the position on the ground. This was clearly the MPLA's last stand. Within two to three months they would have to surrender. Their moderate policy had given them away. South Africa knew what would happen in the north. However, there were some positive elements in the Angolan proposals. THE MINISTER had been worried until Dr Crocker had said that there was no intention of stopping South Africa from helping UNITA.

DR CROCKER said that the UN Security Council Resolution would have to be piloted through the United Nations at the appropriate time and would require the recognition of international frontiers.

MINISTER BOTHA replied that if South Africa were to withdraw its assistance then the Soviet Union must do so as well. He did not believe that they were in Angola legally. The MPLA could not hold elections. Dos Santos could not win.

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DR CROCKER replied that the United States did not demand elections anywhere.

MINISTER BOTHA asked what about South West Africa?

DR CROCKER replied that that was a different case.

MINISTER BOTHA said that South Africa was moving toward the recognition of UNITA as the sovereign government of Angola. The MPLA were rebels supported by the Soviets. South Africa would stop its military assistance if the Soviet stopped theirs.

DR CROCKER asked how both countries would play this situation together. South Africa and the United States would have to decide how to keep the Angolans on the hook of Cuban withdrawal.

MINISTER BOTHA replied that the Angolans were in trouble. However, due weight had to be given to UNITA. It would not be possible for the South African Government to accept UNITA's destruction. There was no provision made in the document for UNITA. The United States could not expect South Africa to throw UNITA to the wolves. South Africa would not be able to survive such an action in Africa. The Africans understood the truth. They knew that Dos Santos was finished. Why should South Africa put a Soviet agent in power?

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DR CROCKER said the Soviets were very unhappy. These developments represented the beginning of the end, but this wasn't a United States proposal. However, if it could be licked into shape it would be the best thing that could happen for Jonas Savimbi.

MINISTER BOTHA replied that he was not criticising the United States. Dr Crocker had worked hard. It was a beginning that might result in something that suited everyone.

MINISTER MALAN pointed out that the Angolans had not abided by the Lusaka Agreement.

MINISTER BOTHA said that peace in Mozambique would also help. He thanked the United States Delegation for their effort.

DR VAN NIEKERK pointed out that on page 3 of the Angolan proposal it stated that the implementation of Resolution 435 would practically end South African aid to UNITA. He asked whether this was the United States' point of view?

MINISTER BOTHA replied that this was the Angolan position, but it was the first concrete proposal in writing. At last South Africa could get its teeth into something.

DR CROCKER stressed the significance of the fact that the principle of linkage had been established. He noted that there had been a brief exchange on disengagement and said that he wanted to tackle this question in a tidy fashion.

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MINISTER BOTHA said that South Africa might just be ready to complete the process urgently despite the fact that the Angolans had not fulfilled their part of the deal. The security situation was still not one hundred percent, although the number of incidents had declined some two weeks previously. South Africa had only one problem and that was that if the expected summer incursion of SWAPO took place, the South African Defence Force would have to hit back. If the United States could put pressure on the Angolans and SWAPO to see to it that this did not happen, it would be very helpful. The Angolans could show their good faith by telling SWAPO to call off their offensive this year otherwise South Africa would hit back. However, the political advantages of completing disengagement outweighed the military disadvantages. South Africa would propose a date for a meeting of the Joint Monitoring Commission to discuss the ending of the disengagement process. Such a meeting could take place within four days if necessary. It would be good in general since the Angolans needed it and South Africa needed it. South Africa would convey the date to the United States and via Silvino da Luz.

DR CROCKER said the two sides could resume their meeting at any time.

MINISTER BOTHA said that South Africa knew the substance of the Angolan proposal. It knew that the two sides would not come to any conclusive decisions. He asked whether South Africa and the United States could not start drafting a press statement?

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DR CROCKER replied that this could be done the next day. The two sides could issue separate statements. There were clearly many points on which the South African side would like to ask blunt questions. It would be necessary to have a target so that the ball could be put back into the Angolan court.

MINISTER BOTHA replied that South Africa would come back with a counter proposal within two weeks. He asked whether three weeks would be too long?

DR CROCKER said that the Angolans were in a decisive state of mind. They would have to face even more serious decisions.

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