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MEETING HELD AT JAN SMUTS AIRPORT  
ON FRIDAY 25 MAY 1984

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PRESENT

A. DEPARTMENT OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS

Minister R F Botha  
Mr N Steyn

B. STATE DEPARTMENT, USA

Dr Chester Crocker  
Ambassador Herman Nickel  
Mr Bob Frasure  
Mr Mike Ranneberger  
Miss Nancy Ely  
Mr Doug McElhaney

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DR CROCKER thanked the Minister for taking time off from his obviously very busy schedule to make this meeting possible. He mentioned that he would see members of the MPLA on Monday, 28th May. According to United States information, SWAPO consider the door to be open but there had been conflicting reports concerning the MPLA and he would like to exchange views on this and other matters.

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THE MINISTER replied that it was his view after his recent visit to Lusaka (on 21 May 1984) that the MPLA were prepared to allow the Cubans to leave Angola on the condition that the MPLA government would not thereby feel threatened by either South Africa or UNITA.

Mozambique, through Veloso, had admitted last week that it supports the idea of Dos Santos and Savimbi getting together. Kaunda also supports it in private but would not admit it in public. Mogwe urged the Minister last night (24th May) to try to realise this. There may be other African Governments which may also be prepared to support such a meeting.

It was the feeling of the South African government that there was a majority in the MPLA hierarchy in favour of talking with UNITA and that it would not be possible to get the Cubans out of Angola unless the MPLA and UNITA leaders get together.

South Africa cannot stop Savimbi, who says he knows that he has majority support in Angola. The people in Angola are rejecting the MPLA.

Kaunda told the Minister that he was flabbergasted with Nujoma's behaviour in Lusaka.

Nujoma has now contacted the West German government and requested their assistance in arranging a secret meeting between the Minister and Nujoma in Europe. Rodrigues conveyed a similar request in Lusaka on 21 May 1984.

DR CROCKER mentioned that Nujoma had also contacted the French government with the same request.

THE MINISTER stated that he had informed the MPLA that South Africa knew that there were over 1000 members of the ANC in Angola in various camps and that the MPLA had been warned that if the ANC did not leave South Africa would enter Angola and remove them.

THE MINISTER stated that he had put three proposals to the MPLA, viz.

- (a) the establishment of a joint peace-keeping organization;
- (b) a joint declaration stating that neither South Africa nor Angola would allow any form of violence to be planned or implemented from each other's territory;
- (c) an invitation to visit Windhoek for talks concerning the Ruacana hydro-electric scheme.

Their reply was still awaited.

The Minister explained that his purpose was to get rid of the ANC without endangering the position of UNITA. It would not be possible to conclude a Nkomati-type accord with Angola.

DR CROCKER thanked the Minister for defining the massive problems which the MPLA are facing, adding that the Minister had put a number of balls in the MPLA's court. He understood that the United States could not offer the MPLA anything on UNITA.

THE MINISTER replied that the reality was that the MPLA must be prepared to govern Angola together with UNITA. This, the Minister predicted, would become a harsh reality in a matter of months and moderate members of the Politburo would do well to advise the MPLA to adopt this course.

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There had been contact in Europe between top MPLA and UNITA representatives probably without the knowledge of dos Santos.

The Minister had a two-hour talk with Kito Rodrigues of the MPLA. The truth was that the MPLA could not destroy UNITA.

The Minister made a plea for American and European economic assistance to Mozambique, adding that there would be a spill-over to Zimbabwe and that it might induce Angola to talk to Savimbi to obtain peace in order to enjoy the advantages of peace.

DR CROCKER stated that he did not intend to relieve the pressures on the MPLA but to point out the options which they have. He enquired whether South Africa could offer a fig-leaf, a face-saving agreement on a ceasefire.

THE MINISTER replied that South Africa might be prepared to send Genl Van der Westhuizen to Luanda after the Prime Minister's return from Europe with a message that Dr Van Niekerk would be prepared to hear what SWAPO had to propose as Dr Van Niekerk had already met Nujoma.

Guirirab and Hamutenya are the only two intelligent persons in the SWAPO hierarchy. Nujoma had the image and the other two had the brains. Hamutenya was bright and South Africa was convinced that Moscow was manipulating him.

The MPLA believed that the MPC would decide with SWAPO that Resolution 435 should be implemented without the quid pro quo of a Cuban withdrawal.

The Minister said that he had told Rodrigues of the MPLA that the USA would not withdraw their demand for a Cuban

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withdrawal. He was told that South Africa as a regional power would insist on Cuban withdrawal with or without a South West African settlement. Even if there was a government of national unity in Namibia South Africa would insist on Cuban withdrawal from Angola and would not be prepared to compromise on this matter even if a government of national unity in Namibia agreed that Cuban withdrawal was not required.

South Africa has demanded it and could not go back on Cuban withdrawal.

South Africa is not against SWAPO and the MPC holding talks on the future of South West Africa.

The Minister had made the proposal of changing the monitoring commission to a joint peace-keeping commission. This would prevent an escalation "with South Africa forced to cross the border once more should SWAPO persist with its terror in South West Africa".

It was hoped that the border would be reached by Monday (28th May). South Africa did not want the 30-day period to lapse without substituting the JMC with another suitable joint commission to deal with possible threats to the relative stability which would be achieved as a result of disengagement.

The disengagement was the first priority, then the peace-keeping commission idea. The Minister would not be able to speak to Nujoma. The latter was totally unreliable but South Africa was prepared to listen to what he had to offer through the MPC or Dr Van Niekerk.

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DR CROCKER stated that the United States was dead-clear on the Cuban withdrawal issue. He had come to South Africa to be reassured that South Africa had not changed its mind.

THE MINISTER stated that the peace-keeping commission should be attempted and once initiated, it should continue for at least six months.

DR CROCKER mentioned that when the State Department spoke to the MPC recently the latter kept talking about reconciliation and that they needed what had been done in Zimbabwe, viz. a constitutional conference.

THE MINISTER said that he was not aware of this but that he hoped to receive a report of their visit later today. Although he was not personally in favour of a detailed constitution as that may lead to fresh rifts, he would not oppose it. Nujoma had spoken for the first time about guaranteeing property rights etc. If the MPC and SWAPO could agree on a statement asking or demanding a cessation of hostilities (ceasefire) then South Africa would accept it.

The Minister had told Rodrigues to tell SWAPO that South Africa was not at war with SWAPO and had made the suggestion that the MPC and SWAPO could ask for the ceasefire.

A ceasefire was of great importance.

DR CROCKER enquired who would be the best host for future talks.

THE MINISTER stated that South Africa would continue to ask Kaunda to act as host, to which Dr Crocker agreed.

THE MINISTER felt that future talks should take place within the Southern Africa region and added that Kaunda enjoyed the role.

Touching on Lesotho, the Minister stated that a text had been agreed upon in respect of the proposed security agreement.

The Minister referred to his meeting yesterday with Botswana representatives and mentioned that he had told them that they should not try to bluff the Americans again. Botswana had been given examples of terrorist activity planned by the ANC from Gaborone with the assistance of the Russians. It had been agreed between South Africa and Botswana that security arrangements between their respective security forces should be concluded.

DR CROCKER mentioned that the Botswana visit to Washington had been arranged a long time ago. It was unfortunate that the Washington Post had been looking for a first page story and Masire had fallen into the trap.

Moving to Swaziland, Dr Crocker mentioned that they had heard from the Deputy Prime Minister of Swaziland about the growing Swazi concern in respect of the armed ANC and RENAMO members who move about in Swaziland.

THE MINISTER said that he felt the Swazi government was for the time being at least in control. The power was with the Liguogo. Swaziland was receiving a lot of help from South Africa - hardware such as rifles and vehicles. South Africa was grateful for their cooperation. The broken fences between Mozambique and Swaziland were receiving attention. There was a possibility that thousands of

RENAMO supporters could be offered work in South African mines or otherwise a fund supported by the USA and Western Europe could be formed with a programme to provide work both for RENAMO and FRELIMO supporters, e.g. food production, road building. This could be done through Maputo.

It was of great importance to South Africa that Nkomati should be a success. South African industrialists were visiting Maputo. It was important to end the war. FRELIMO has for the first time intimated that they might be prepared to talk to RENAMO..

FRELIMO has asked South Africa to denounce RENAMO. South Africa has suggested a joint declaration denouncing terrorism. Various means of economic help are being considered, including lines of credit. South Africa might also be able to buy gas from Mozambique. There was a dearth of expertise in Mozambique.

The Minister hoped that South Africa and the USA could work together on this behind the scenes.

DR CROCKER replied that he remained basically optimistic and that they were moving in the right direction. He was very pleased about the vibrations in the international scene of the situation in Southern Africa. He was also pleased about the Prime Minister's visit to Europe.

THE MINISTER said that the situation was looking good. Namibia was the only exception. South Africa was overburdened moneywise.

DR CROCKER said that he appreciated very much the in-depth exchange which had taken place this morning.



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THE MINISTER said that if South Africa withdrew its railways from Namibia as well as its budget assistance, R600 million would have to be found elsewhere every year. Nujoma did not appear to realise the importance of South Africa's financial assistance. Rodrigues now understood this. Dr Van Niekerk tried to explain this to Nujoma but the latter could not understand it.

DR CROCKER mentioned that Nujoma had for too long just been living in duty-free lounges in fear of his life.

THE MINISTER said jocularly that if one really wanted to punish SWAPO they should be allowed to govern Namibia. However, the Cubans must go if they wanted South African forces to leave.

In conclusion, the Minister mentioned that the Beyers Naudé story would cause some headaches. The West German government had put a lot of pressure on South Africa. It was something of a dilemma. The Minister had been in favour of lifting the restriction until he had seen the record. On the basis of the dossier he had seen he wanted to make it clear that he could not support the lifting of the restriction at this stage. Beyers Naudé was indeed assisting the ANC in its grave objectives. Minister le Grange had written a letter to Dr Beyers Naudé, which had been released to the press after Beyers Naudé had leaked his side of the story to certain members of the press. The Minister explained the contents of the letter to Dr Crocker, pointing out that Beyers Naudé had the right to refer his position to a Board of Review, which could take a decision which would be upheld by the South African government.

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The Minister mentioned that the South African authorities could not reveal certain very sensitive sources of information.

DR CROCKER told the Minister to "keep it up" and wished him and the Prime Minister good luck with their visit to Europe.

THE MINISTER reciprocated the good wishes and expressed the hope that Dr Crocker's present visit would be successful.

The meeting lasted 2 1/2 hours.

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