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MEETING BETWEEN THE HONOURABLE R F BOTHA, MINISTER OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND AMBASSADOR H NICKEL OF THE UNITED STATES : CAPE TOWN : 20 MARCH 1984

Also present:

- Mr Tim Carney, US Embassy
- Mr D W Steward, Department of Foreign Affairs
- Mr A L Manley, Department of Foreign Affairs

MR STEWARD mentioned that the meeting with the Angolan component of the Joint Monitoring Commission on 19 March 1984 had gone well. There was good cooperation between the South African and Angolan components and effective action was being taken to implement the Lusaka Agreement. Under these circumstances the Commission had recommended that its Headquarters be moved to Mupa. The Angolan component had also accepted that the 30 day clock should start with effect from 18 March, the date on which the Commission had begun to carry out effectively its task of removing SWAPO from the area.

THE MINISTER said that he would be grateful if the Americans could provide him with a text of the joint Angolan/Cuban statement of 19 March as soon as possible.

AMBASSADOR NICKEL undertook to do this as quickly as he could.

THE MINISTER then referred to press reports concerning the statement and said that he could identify six conditions

which the Angolans had set. The first condition, i.e. the unilateral withdrawal of South African soldiers from Angolan territory, did not present a problem since this was already underway. The second condition required acceptance of United Nations rulings calling for the withdrawal of South African troops from South West Africa/Namibia.

THE MINISTER noted that Resolution 435 did not call for the withdrawal of South African forces but for the reduction in their numbers. South Africa agreed with the third condition that South West Africa should be granted true independence. The fourth condition, that South Africa should cease acts of aggression against Angola, was partly covered by the present disengagement process. However, South Africa denied that it was involved in aggression against Angola. It had a different interpretation and believed that aggression was being perpetrated against South West Africa. The fifth condition, calling for a cessation of aggression against Angola by the United States and its allies would have to be answered by the United States. The sixth condition called for an end to aid to counter-revolutionary movements in Angola. The Minister denied this, depending on what was meant by aid. He also denied that UNITA were counter-revolutionaries.

THE MINISTER said that South Africa would not comment on the Angolan/Cuban statement until it had had an opportunity to study the full text. He said that South Africa planned to send a letter on 21 March, or the day after, to President Machel and President Kaunda. In the case of President Machel South Africa would remind him of the views which he had conveyed to the Minister in Maputo and which he had restated to the Prime Minister on the 16 March, namely that he was also in favour of a meeting between

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President Dos Santos and Dr Savimbi and would do all in his power to bring this about. He had already sent a special delegation to President Dos Santos and was awaiting a reply. President Dos Santos had had no time to reply before leaving for Cuba. This information was very secret and was not for distribution in the State Department. South Africa would also tell President Machel that it planned to convey the following message to Luanda through the South African component on the Joint Monitoring Commission:

"The South African Government has serious reservations on certain elements of the joint statement issued in Havana by the governments of Angola and Cuba on 19 March 1984 but in the light of the Lusaka Agreement, the South African Government would refrain from public comment on the statement, provided the Angolan Government similarly refrained from further public comment."

In the spirit of the Lusaka Agreement, it seems to the South African Government to be desirable that the two governments meet again as soon as possible for discussions at ministerial level."

THE MINISTER said that he would ask President Machel to use his good offices to get the various parties in the conflict together in terms of the proposal which South Africa had made on 11 March 1984 and which the United States had not liked. President Machel, however, thought it was a good idea. South Africa wanted the internal parties of South West Africa and SWAPO to get together. South Africa would

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be sending the same letter to President Kaunda. South Africa would remind him that Nujoma had said in President Kaunda's presence that he would be prepared to meet with the MPC under the chairmanship of the Administrator-General. South Africa would ask him what his views were and how it should proceed to get SWAPO and the MPC together. THE MINISTER said that in reaction to SWAPO's call for direct talks with South Africa he had stated the previous night that he did not think that he should comment on the statements of individual South West African parties. He would stick to that. SWAPO was simply looking for status. The South African Government had turned down several requests from individual internal parties to have talks. It had told them to speak to the Administrator-General. South Africa would speak to the MPC but not to individual parties. The MPC had made some headway on formulating broad principles based on Resolution 435 to prepare for a meeting with SWAPO so that they would have something to talk about.

The joint statement in Havana was, however, the main question at the moment. The letters to President Machel and President Kaunda would help to maintain interest and momentum in the meantime. The first priority was a meeting with Angola so that South Africa could ask what their intentions were. The two countries might find themselves close to consensus. Judging from press reports, the Angolan/Cuban statement was not such a bad document, and could be the basis for talks. It could provide an agenda. The progress which had been made was a matter of fact. THE MINISTER said that this time he had informed the United States of his plans. Ambassador Nickel could not tell him

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that he did not know what South Africa was up to. He would be sending the message to Angola today. However, not even the United States could agree to all the aspects of the statement. South Africa had serious reservations on certain elements. However, it would withhold comment if the United States would also do so. The time had come for talks. These would be followed by the proposed messages to Kaunda and Machel.

AMBASSADOR NICKEL asked what the United States' role would be.

THE MINISTER replied that he hoped that the United States would support a further meeting between Angola and South Africa. The United States would also be welcome. In Lusaka the Minister had seen that Rodrigues had been sensitive about the United States' presence in the Commission on Angolan soil. He had been inhibited, probably because of pressure from Moscow. The United States should support the proposed meeting as strongly as possible. Without letting Luanda know about South Africa's idea, the United States should independently suggest a similar meeting. It should be left to the Angolans. It would be a good thing if the United States could talk to President Machel and President Kaunda as well as to its other African friends with regard to the desirability of the parties of the Territory meeting with one another. The MPC had said that they would like to talk with the Frontline States. This would enhance the chances of Resolution 435 or of any other internationally acceptable settlement. The ground-work must be done by the parties themselves. It was their territory and their future. The

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United States should support this initiative since it would strengthen the perception that South Africa was serious about promoting a settlement. South Africa could not talk to Nujoma but the parties of the Territory could get together.

AMBASSADOR NICKEL said that the United States had reservations about anything outside Resolution 435.

THE MINISTER said that it could only do good if the United States were to speak at a high level with Savimbi. He could assure the United States that he had conveyed to Savimbi his impression that the Americans were not trying to double-cross him and that he could trust Dr Crocker. Dr Crocker had spoken the truth even though he had known that it would not please Dr Savimbi. The Minister was not sure that he had convinced Dr Savimbi. He had been grateful and appreciated the meeting but could not avoid the impression that the United States had decided to recognise the MPLA as the prize for getting the Cubans out of Angola and for this was prepared to sacrifice UNITA. There was nothing specific which Dr Crocker had said which had led to this impression. It was more an overall feeling.

AMBASSADOR NICKEL asked whether the MPLA was confident enough to meet with UNITA? He asked for confirmation that Machel had supported this proposition.

MINISTER BOTHA replied that Machel had sent Veloso to Dos Santos offering Mozambique as a channel. Evidently Machel thought that this prospect was credible enough to give it a

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try. The first meeting would be absolutely secret. Machel had told South Africa that the Soviet Union had been caught off guard. This could mean only one thing. The Minister believed that Machel would like to accomplish this without Moscow finding anything out. When he spoke to South Africa of outsiders he meant Moscow not the United States. The United States was not intervening in the affairs of southern Africa. President Kaunda was also in favour of such a meeting but said that we should try Machel because he had previously supported a government of national unity for Angola. Machel had repeated to the Prime Minister what the Minister had told him earlier concerning the damage done when two elephants fight. He had agreed fully with the methaphor. The United States should do all in its power to help bring this about but in the most expedient fashion. It would know how to proceed. THE MINISTER said that he wished to speak to all foreign representatives about the necessity of doing something to help Mozambique. South Africa had already given medicine valued at one million rand and apples worth a quarter of a million rand. The United States was giving two thirds of its aid to Israel and Egypt. He had called in the Japanese Consul-General and asked him to do something for Mozambique. President Machel had said that he had no objection to South Africa acting as Mozambique's unofficial ambassador. If ties with Mozambique could be firmed up it would have an irresistible effect on the rest of countries of the region. The new relationship had to work but South Africa didn't have the means to do everything on its own.

AMBASSADOR NICKEL said that the United States could try to float this idea at the annual meeting of the seven leading

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western powers. Their proposal could include aid for South West Africa. His colleague in Mozambique was putting this idea into the pipeline.

THE MINISTER replied that the United States should make its own sums on South West Africa. South Africa was going to stop paying.

AMBASSADOR NICKEL replied that bureaucratically it could be a good exercise.

THE MINISTER said that the West should put together R500 000 000 per annum for South West Africa and R300 000 000 for Mozambique. The West should be able to afford this if everyone pulled their weight. A success in southern Africa could mean a great deal to the West. Had the Ambassador considered what it could mean to the United States if southern Africa were to lean toward the West? South Africa was playing its full role already and was paying a high price.

At this stage a member of Ambassador Nickel's staff brought the Ambassador a copy of the text of the Havana statement. THE MINISTER read it in Ambassador Nickel's presence and at first indicated that it seemed to accord with the press reports. However, when he reached the last paragraph THE MINISTER immediately observed that it was unacceptable and might present an obstacle to continue with the peace initiative with Angola.

THE MINISTER said that he would be inclined to say South