SECRET

MEETING BETWEEN SOUTH AFRICA AND UNITA: ROCKY POINT: 10 MARCH 1984

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South Africa:

The Hon. P W Botha, Prime Minister of the Republic of South Africa H.E. Dr W van Niekerk, Administrator-General of SWA The Hon. R F Botha, Minister of Foreign Affairs The Hon. M de M Malan, Minister of Defence Genl. T van der Westhuizen, HSI Genl. J Geldenhuys, Chief of the Army Brig C van Tonder, DST Mr D W Steward, Department of Foreign Affairs Mr D Auret, Department of Foreign Affairs Delween Couth Arm.

UNITA:

Dr Jonas Savimbi, President of
UNITA
Mr Poona, Secretary-General of
UNITA

After the <u>PRIME MINISTER</u> had welcomed Dr Savimbi to Rocky Point, he suggested that Dr Savimbi give the meeting a briefing on the latest situation in Angola.

DR SAVIMBI then gave a detailed exposition of the situation in Angola. He mentioned that UNITA was at present besieging Teixera da Sousa and hoped to capture it before long. His forces were now also operating north of Luanda in the Uige province which had traditionally been an FLNA stonghold. Dr Savimbi said that it was clear that UNITA had considerable support outside of his own Ovimbundu tribal region and UNITA had been welcomed wherever it had gone. UNITA had also infiltrated the MPLA organization and was in possession of central committee decisions within 24 hours of their adoption. The current offensive of the MPLA and the Cubans against UNITA was grinding to a halt. UNITA supporters had now grown used to FAPLA and Cubans tanks and had scored a number of successes. They also knew how to deal with Soviet built helicopters and had shot down several during the preceding weeks.

DR SAVIMBI said, however, that he was experiencing considerable difficulties as a result of MPLA propaganda that South Africa had abandoned UNITA. The MPLA was pointing to the current negotiations between South Africa and Angola as evidence of this development. As a result of this situation, Dr Savimbi had received many messages from his commanders in the field who had asked whether this was true and whether Dr Savimbi had made some mistake in alienating South Africa. This situation was also affecting the position of a number of moderates who had been on the point of joining UNITA. However, when it appeared to them that South Africa might have abandoned UNITA, they decided not to go ahead with their plan to join Dr Savimbi.

DR SAVIMBI said he had great admiration for the manner in

which South Africa was currently carrying out its diplomatic strategy in southern Africa. He understood and accepted that South Africa had been under great pressure from the United States and from the international community to withdraw from southern Angola. He appreciated that South Africa had to respond to this pressure diplomatically and that it had been successfull in doing so. It was also clear from all of the messages which he had heard that South Africa was operating from a position of strength. However, he was very worried about the possibility that Resolution 435 might be implemented. He said that he was sure that this was the main objective of the Angolan peace initiative. The Angolans felt that if they could implement Resolution 435 and have a SWAPO Government installed in Windhoek, this would cut off UNITA's supply routes from the UNITA was very deeply concerned about this possibility. Whatever happened, it would continue to fight but such an eventuality would greatly harm it. DR SAVIMBI said that although he and his staff had never doubted the friendship of South Africa these developments were causing many of his followers to wonder whether South Africa still supported UNITA.

THE PRIME MINISTER thanked Dr Savimbi for the exposition which he had given of the situation in Angola. He said that Dr Savimbi should bear three points in mind.

Firstly, that South Africa regarded UNITA as a friend.

Secondly, that South Africa would not implement Resolution 435 unless the Cubans were withdrawn from Angola. This situation should put Dr Savimbi's mind to rest.

Thirdly, South Africa distrusted the superpowers and was aware of what they were trying to achieve in southern Africa.

THE PRIME MINISTER then went on to say that although it was clear that Dr Savimbi was making military progress, it was now essential that he should also make political progress. He asked in this regard whether it would not be possible to launch political and of civil campaigns in Angola. time had also come for Dr Savimbi to make a major speech to his supporters. Such a speech should be made to several thousand of his followers in the presence of the foreign media. It should provide a review of the state of the nation and should make the points that Angolans now needed peace, food, schools and the other services which governments should supply. It was however clear that the MPLA Government was not providing these services and that this situation could be rectified only by direct talks between UNITA and the MPLA Government. The PRIME MINISTER added that Dr Savimbi should at the same time consider sending letters to Dr Kaunda and to President Samora Machel explaining his position on these questions. South Africa would be happy to deliver such messages but he assumed that Dr Savimbi had his own channel of communication with President Kaunda. The Prime Minister stressed that direct talks between Dos Santos and Dr Savimbi should be a main objective of both UNITA and South Africa. In his discussion with President Machel on 16 March he would stress the importance of direct talks between Dos Santos and Dr Savimbi.