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MEETING BETWEEN THE DIRECTOR-GENERAL OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND INFORMACION AND THE MOCAMBICAN MINISTER OF STATE FOR SECURITY AFFAIRS: PARIS, 5 DECEMBER 1980

PRESENT

Dr B G Fourie
Lieut-General P W van der Westhuizen
Dr J Boyazoglu
Mr D W Auret

Minister of State Valos Mr Doument Mr Vieiga

BERE

Mr Doumens introduced the members of the two delegations and said that he had taken it upon himself to arrange the bilateral contact between South Africa and Mocambique. This was the result mainly of the contact he had had with the parties concerned. He had come to realize that a feeling existed that because of the plural composition in Southern Africa and a community of interest, an area with an own identity south of the equator could be established which would eliminate interference from outside. There was common interest in solving the problems of the area concerned peacefully. Minister Valoso had a mandate to speak on behalf of Mocambique and Angola but it was imperative that this meeting be kept secret.

Everyone was aware that there would soon be UN discussions regarding SWA/Namibia and it was not the intention that the envisaged UN discussions would be superceded by other discussions in a different forum. It was, however, the desire on the part of Angola and Mocambique to have discussions with South Africa. When he had been approached in this regard, he had done all in his power to bring a meeting about. He wished to emphasize that this discussion was taking place in France and, as a Frenchman, he had informed President Giscard d'Estaing that the discussions would take place. The Ambassadors on both sides were not aware that the talks were being held.

He had the clear impression that from the side of Minister Valoso they were prepared to talk. He hoped that the discussions could be held in a positive spirit and that affairs in Southern Africa could start to move. As far as he himself was concerned, he wanted to say that he would withdraw if he was not required. He understood that nothing could be arranged in a few hours. But it was perhaps possible that some aspects could be singled out - that would make the discussions worthwhile.

Minister Valoso said that he was very pleased that these discussions could take place. He felt that the broad indicators of the way forward in Southern Africa in the future could arise from this discussion. That would enable the inhabitants of the region to benefit from the riches of the area and the new situation which could come about. The Presidents of Angola and Mocambique were convinced of the necessity of having discussions in this regard. It was accepted that this situation could/be arrived at overnight. Indeed,

there would have to be major changes in Southern Africa to bring this about. It was, however, recognized that these changes could not be brought about in a day but that it would take time. If agreement could be reached on common ground, he and the two Presidents were convinced that a broad platform could be found through which any problems which might arise could be solved and on which the economic development of all could be based. Mocambique recognized South Africa as an independent state just as any other state. All South Africans, irrespective of colour or origin were regarded as an integral part of Africa. The problem which arose was that of segregation but it was realized that it would require time to solve this matter. Mocambique also realized that great strides had already been taken to solve this problem. He wished to state categorically that, apart from the question of segregation, there was no other problem which would mar the development of relations between the two countries. This was Mocambique's firm position and he wished to stress that President Machel had consistently taken this position, even at the time of the liberation struggle in Zimbabwe. President Machel considered that all South Africans were part of Africa. Irrespective of the international situation, it was Mocambique's position vis-a-vis the points of view of the more radical African states and the socialist bloc. It was illogical to consider South Africa to be anything but a sovereign, independent African state. It was their impression that this view was also being accepted elsewhere. Mocambique has also e.g. on a number of occasions made it clear that it would oppose the formation of an African expeditionary force to act against South Africa. He wished to give the assurance that Mocambique would also not interfere in South Africa's domestic affairs. He also wished to emphasize that as soon as discrimination disappeared in South Africa, President Machel would be the first one to propose and work for South Africa's admission to the OAU. In summary the position thus was: Mocambique and Angola firmly believed that if the states of Southern Africa could move closer together, the Southern African complex, with South Africa as an integral part, could keep both the USA and the USSR out of the subcontinent. If the goal in Southern Africa, i.e. that the mineral and food rich area could not find a solution, then each country would in future have to defend itself. If this had to occur and each country had to defend its national interest, each would naturally seek its own friends, i.e. those who would help them

to defend themselves. It was his opinion that if that happened, one country would seek socialist and the other western aid. Any efforts at cooperation would then mean that outside elements would also become involved. As time passed it would consequently become more and more difficult to find the solutions which all desired. Mocambique and Angola were prepared to work in and outside Africa, both in the socialist and nonsocialist world, to find solutions for the problems of Southern Africa. These solutions need not necessarily be those which would be acceptable to the international community. The purpose would be to secure the solutions free from outside interference, free from military involvement and without subversion from whatever quarter. As far as Mocambique was concerned, they viewed the problems which South Africa faced as purely domestic problems. Mocambique was prepared to assist South Africa to gain the time it required to solve its problems and to achieve cooperation in Southern Africa. It was to be stressed that the Presidents and Governments of Mocambique and Angola firmly believed that South Africa should have the time it required to solve its problems. They were aware of the fact that there were countries outside of Southern Africa which saw developments in the area leading to the situation where the region would be ripe for the plucking. As they saw it, it was a global strategic problem. The final goal, i.e. regional cooperation, would not be quickly achieved. There were immediate practical problems which required solutions. It was these problems which had convinced the two Presidents that they now had to enter into a dialogue with South Africa. Mocambique and Angola were prepared to use their best efforts to contribute to the finding of specific solutions to these problems.

It was felt that as far as SWA/Namibia was concerned, the decision to hold a multi-party meeting in Maputo was a step in the right direction. All the interest parties would be present and Mocambique and Angola would try to assist as far as possible in achieving a solution. He would like to know how South Africa viewed the situation and how it thought they could be of assistance. He wanted to state that he thought that one had to be frank in discussin these matters and that it was important that these matters be discussed.

Mr Fourie thanked Minister Valoso for the opportunity of meeting with him. It was better to try to find solutions through discussion than by fighting. The outline which Minister Valoso had given was very important since one had to establish whether there was common ground which could be built upon. Only if a common goal had been identified could one work towards it. It appeared that the basis of Minister Valoso's approach was that Southern Africa should develop itself economically to the benefit of all the people of the region and, at a later stage, also to the benefit of others. In this respect the two sides were absolutely on the same wave-length. South Africa firmly believed that Southern Africa could develop together to a much greater extent than countries could individually. As could have been gathered from the South African Prime Minister's statements over the past 12 to 18 months, he had dedicated himself from his side to realizing this kind of development, not with the purpose of playing a dominant role in the region but because he believed that a peaceful and prosperous Southern African would benefit all the peoples of the subcontinent. On a limited scale South Africa had taken the lead and with the cooperation of certain others, certain institutions have been developed. It should, however, be emphasized that what South Africa was trying to do and was indeed doing was not to be considered in a limited sense. South Africa did not wish to exclude anyone and in fact desired cooperation on a broader basis. As Minister Valoso had said, one had to be practical and realistic and look at the immediate problems. Progress would have to start in a limited way. If the Minister was correctly understood, everyone was trying to work towards a common objective, and one should, therefore, work to eliminate problems which prevented one from reaching the greater goal.

As far as the venue of the forthcoming multi-party conference was concerned, it should be borne in mind that there were a number of parties on both sides of the issue who would have to agree on the venue. In discussions with Brian Urquhart, a number of possibilities for a venue were put forward, including Maputo. Unfortunately, while discussions were still continuing and before concensus had been reached with the parties inside Namibia, there was an announcement that the conference would take place in Maputo. The SWA/Namibia parties maintain that they had not been consulted on this matter. The first venue that had been suggested had been Gaberone, but

SWAPO was apparently not prepared to go there. At this stage, negotiations were still continuing regarding a venue and it was understood that the UN would sound out the countries concerned regarding a venue all parties would agree to. It had to be mentioned that there were definite advantages to Maputo but the problem was that there still had to be negotiations with the parties who had already taken a stand in this regard.

It was to be hoped that whatever venue was finally decided upon, that it would be possible to visit the city before the conference took place in order to check on the facilities which would be available.

Minister Valoso was probably aware of the purpose of the conference: during the discussions with the UN it was found that little progress was being made because of a lack of trust and confidence. The Angolans had helped South Africa in this regard and it was hoped that the conference could find ways and means of overcoming these problems. It had been interesting to hear Minister Valoso refer to the fact that Angola and Mocambique were willing to find solutions even if at the outset they were not completely acceptable to the international community. In this regard it was hoped that the forthcoming conference would succeed but if the goal was not fully realized it seemed that it might be useful if South Africa and Angola and Mocambique could prpeare the matter further to see what could be achieved.

Minister Valoso said that with regard to Maputo as a choice for the conference, Mocambique knew of the discussions regarding a venue but had not been directly involved. However, President Machel had been approached both by the UN Secretary-General as well as President Dos Santcs in a matter of a few hours with urgent requests that Mocambique should accept a meeting in Maputo. President Machel had decided that if a meeting in Maputo could help to solve the problem, or just show some progress, they would agree to whatever was necessary to help the success of the conference. Mocambique did not wish anything in return. If the meeting were to be held in Maputo it was not certain that every required facility would be available. The two sides might meet sometime in the future to take stock.

Regarding the announcement of Maputo as venue, the Mocambicans had been as surprised as South African when it had first appeared in the press. The story had been leaked in New York as far as they could tell.

Regarding the discussion of bilateral problems it should be pointed out that apart from the two Presidents who had spoken to each other on this matter, only one other person knew of this initiative. The two Presidents would in future be willing to discuss any problem which raised difficulties for South Africa in terms of the international community. For example, if sactions were in future to be instituted against South Africa, Mocambique and Angola would assist South Africa. Moreover, the two Presidents felt that in a delicate situation the two Presidents would be prepared to help South Africa in the face of criticism from the international community since such a position on their part would assist the Prime Minister's policy directions and because it would go a long way to achieving the final goal of cooperation in Southern Africa.

As far as Namibia was concerned, the two Presidents were prepared to try to in any way possible to help solve this problem without coming into too much conflict with the international community. They would go a long way to be helpful but it was necessary that they be consulted at an early stage. In this regard they would have to take a close look at how far they would be prepared to go. The two Presidents were involved with countries who were also involved with the problem and they had the means to work in a direction which could facilitate a solution, not only in Africa but also in the socialist bloc. The two Presidents were interested in helping as far as they could to push towards Southern African cooperation, to end wars and to assist as far as possible in achieving this goal. But they had to know what they had to do. A way had to be found in this regard, e.g. to meet on a regular basis to discuss these matters. This was an important point. It was strongly felt that as far as Namibia was concerned, everything had to be done to find a viable internationally acceptable solution at the forthcoming meeting. But if that were not possible the bridge which had already been explained remained intact.

Mr Fourie said that he had in the past been to Maputo a number of times. Matters of common interest had been discussed. Such common interest related to the supply of power to South Africa from Cabora Bassa, the use of Mocambican ports, etc.

Mr Doumeng asked whether it would be possible to achieve the same position with Angola?

Mr Fourie said that he thought it was possible and a great deal could happen e.g. with Ruacana. If SWA/Namibia did not get its power from Angola, it would have to come from the south which was a very much more uneconomical proposition. South Africa could also perhaps buy oil from Angola while it could sell maize to that country. The geographic pro-ximity of the two countries made these possibilities logical.

Mr Doumeng said that if South Africa said that it was not interested in interfering in the internal affairs of other countries, it should not just pay lip-service to this principle. The time would have to come when nothing happened to strengthen the possibility of sanctions against South Africa. Perhaps one should think of placing the question of contact on a regular footing.

Mr Fourie said that it was important to ensure that others did not bedevil cooperation. With Angola, the biggest problem in the way of cooperation was SWAPO and that problem should be eliminated. He though that a contact effort to eliminate these problems should be made.

Mr Doumeng explained that there was a difference between the situations in Angola and Mocambique. In the latter there was reasonable coordination while in Angola that was not the case - they had considerable problems in the south.

Mr Fourie said that in his opinion history had played tricks in Southern Africa. The Angola/SWA/Namibia border had been wrongly drawn with the result that one had people on both sides of the border who were related to one another but who were artificially separated. The border should have been drawn further south.

Mr Doumeng thought that it should be possible to find a way to ensure reasonable peace in the border areas through discussions.

Minister Valoso agreed with the points made by Mr Fourie and neither he nor the two Presidents had any problems with them. He thought that it might be possible to talk for example about additional supplies of electricity to South Africa from the new Cabora Bassa. He was sure that the two countries could even supply South Africa with alternative services of energy. But there were practical problems which would have to be discussed.

He felt that there was too much suspicion on both sides. There was a view in South Africa that Mocambique was Soviet orientated and Marxist. South Africa, it seemed to him, overreacted on this score. There was, after all, no military movement in Mocambique and the situation was different to that in Angola, where there was a military problem. People in South Africa perhaps thought that destabilization was a solution and he could see that since destabilization would gain South Africa time to solve its problems, this could be a logical idea. Angola, however, gave assistance to SWAPO and it was, therefore, easier for South Africa to act against that country. It could be said that South Africa attac ed SWAPO bases but this action against SWAPO could easily be extended also against other targets which were of assistance to SWAPO.

For these reasons, there were people in South Africa who perhaps thought that it might help to assist UNITA in Angola and the RNM in Mocambique. Maybe South Africa saw Angola and Mocambique as enemies and saw a danger that the Cubans and the Russians could attack South Africa from there. On the other hand, Angola and Mocambique thought that South Africa was their enemy and

consequently prepared for war and developed war material for mass distribution. The position thus was that each side saw the other as a deadly enemy to its interests. That was the basis of the problem. There was continual distrust between the two sides and each time there were discussions between the two it was only with regard to minor problems. When such discussions ended, each left with the idea that the other world still cause problems. The problem was how to get over this mutal suspicion since there did not seem to be any trust and confidence. How could the countries concerned continue with their contact in future despite the fact that each had different political systems and wished to maintain that which it had. Could there not be the development of trust on both sides in an attempt to solve problems. If one continued talking only about small problems but still constantly thought how each could destroy the other, there would be no peace. If the present situation continued, each country would still only be part of a larger bloc. How could a point be reached where the big problems could be solved? If any guarantees from third parties were required, what were they?

Mr Fourie said he thought that this was the cause of the matter. The situations with regard to Angola and Mocambique were dissimilar. In the case of Mocambique there were people on both sides who had certain ideas about what to do. The major problem was not a difficult one i.e. that the two countries had to persuade each other that they did not want to export their particular types of Government to each other. In principle it was agreed that the parties did not want to do so but one had to get down to the practicalities and to demonstrate that this was not the intention. On the South African side the major element which bred susicion was the problem of the ANC. Mocambique could say that the ANC was there but was not operating, but that did not allay the suspicions which existed. In the spirit of the discussions thus far, that problem was one which could be tackled with a view to eliminating it and together explore ways of achieving this. South Africa was realistic enought to know that Mocombique had a problem in this regard - it was said that these people were refugees - but if the two countries could get together on this problem a solution could be found. As far as Angola was concerned, if the SWA/Namibia situation could be solved, the problems between it and South Africa would be something of the past.

Minister Valoso asked whether South Africa would stop supporting UNITA once the SWA/Namibia situation had been resolved?

Mr Fouric said that to look at matters logically, the situation with Angola was the same as with Mocambique. South Africa was prepared to sit down with Angola and Mocambique and to work for the solution of whatever problems existed. UNITA and SWAPO were problems in Angola. One should perhaps have discussions on a bilateral basis with a view to finding solutions. Once the SWA/Namibia situation was solved, South Africa would no longer be on the border of Angola and it was a firm South African position that it did not interfere with matters which were essentially internal Angolan affairs. What would the possibility be for example, of achieving some sort of internal arrangement which would accommodate Savimbi?

Minister Valoso said that his personal feeling was that such a possibility was excluded in the present situation. If Savimbi did not have support from outside, he did not stand a chance in Angola. If he wanted to play a role in Angola, he would have to fight politically - but the fact of the matter was that he did not have any internal support.

Mr Doumeng said he thought that it might be possible to accommodate Savimbi politically.

Minister Valoso said that if he were Angolan, his position would be that all outside help to Savimbi would have to cease and he would have to fight politically. He thought that if the problem in SWA/Namibia were solved, Savimbi would no longer be a problem.

Mr Fourie noted that this was exactly the same position as between SWAPO and the democratic political parties in SWA/Namibia.

General van der Westhuizen said that it was well-known that Savimbi was of the opinion that the problem which existed in Angola had to be solved politically and by the Angolans themselves. There were a number of preconditions, however, i.e. that there could be no solution while there were still Cubans in Angola and secondly that there had to be free and fair elections.

Minister Valoso noted that this was an internal Angolan problem. All Angola asked of South Africa is that no assistance be given to Savimbi. Objectively, Savimbi controlled a group which, through the use of violence, fought against the established Government of Angola. Even if he did have internal support, he was fighting against the recognized Covernment. If he had the support which he claimed, he could surely achieve his goals on his own, without assistance from outside.

Mr Fourie noted that this was an interesting position of SWAPO was analogous to that of UNITA. The question could thus, hypothetically, be asked: if South Africa were to stop assistance to Savimbi, would Angola stop aiding SWAPO?

Mr Doumeng asked whether this meant military assistance?

Mr Fourie replied affirmatively.

Mr Doumeng said that as he understood matters, the Angolans felt that the position of UNITA was the same as that of the ANC vis-a-vis South Africa.

General van der Westhuizen said that Angola thus admitted that it supported SWAPO.

Minister Valoso said that Angola today had no choice but to support SWAPO because of the situation on its southern border. Once the problem of SWA/ Namibia had been solved, Angola would no longer support SWAPO. Angola had no choice in the matter because of the international situation, Angola's geographic location and the decisions of the UN.

Mr Fourie said that it seemed to him that there was a will on both sides to work towards a common goal. The question was how to achieve this in a practical manner. As far as Angola was concerned, the SWA/Namibia situation was a specific problem. In the case of Mocambique this was not the case. The first question which thus arose regarding Mocambique was to identify the problems and then get together specifically to try to eliminate them. Regarding Angola, and pending a solution to the question of SWA/Namibia, it was of concern that that country could not end its support for SWAPO - this was a serious problem.

Minister Valoso said that as for Mocambique it was agreed that problems should be identified and discussed with a view to finding solutions. The Mocambique Government did not support the ANC. The Mocambique Government, however, gave its full political support to the achievement of equal rights for all people. No concrete assistance to the ANC. This problem could and had to be discussed bilaterally. The thought arose whether the ANC could not be accommodated politically inside South Africa, but this was just a thought. If the direction which the Prime Minister was following continued, the ANC had no justification to act against South Africa from outside. There could then no longer be any justification for styling themselves as a "liberation movement". This development in South Africa could take place over 5, 10 or 15 years, but this should be a point for bilateral discussion.

Mr Fourie said that it was feared that the situation with the ANC could in time develop similarly to the situation with SWAPO vis-a-vis Angola. The ANC could then become an irritant and action against it could be taken. It was agreed that this problem should be discussed bilaterally.

Minister Valoso said that this problem as well as the border question should be agreed bilaterally. The greatest problem at present was the question of SWA/Namibia Angola agreed with this position.

General van der Westhuizen said that South Africa had positive proof that the ANC was being trained in Angola.

Minister Veloso said that this problem had to be resolved and should be discussed on a bilateral basis. The question of the ANC was one which Angola had inherited and must be solved. Neither Angola nor Mocambique wanted confrontation with South Africa. There was also the problem of refugees. He and Mr D had seen the Presidents of Angola and Mocambique before this meeting and he had now had to return to Mocambique to discuss these matters with his President. He would then proceed to Angola to also talk to President Dos Santos. He wished to know whether there were points for discussions regarding the UNITA situation, whether there was a possibility for discussions in future and whether Mocambique and Angola had a role to play.

Mr Fourie noted that he would also have to speak to his people in this regard but he wanted to state clearly that there was a definite possibility of further discussions taking place. He felt that talks should definitely be maintained and that contact could also be made at the forthcoming UN multi-party conference. He would recommend to his Government that the talks should specifically deal with the points which had been raised at this meeting. On the general question of SWA/Namibia, South Africa would like to keep in close contact with Angola and Mocambique at the forthcoming conference. As far as the other issues were concerned, he would recommend to his Government that there should in the not too distant future be discussions between South Africa, Angola and Mocambique on these questions. Apart from being trilateral discussions, bilateral discussions could also be held.

Minister Veloso said that he agreed that future discussions should be held but wanted to know whether the problems on the southern border of Angola was coupled to the SWA/Namibia question.

Mr Fourie said that in his view the discussions with Angola need not be linked to the SWA/Namibia question. It was the practical problem which had to be discussed.

Minister Veloso said that as far as Angola and Mocambique were concerned, the talks were not coupled to Namibia but were a separate issue. It was agreed that bilateral discussions should take place but he wished to point out that as far as SWA/Namibia was concerned, they had influence amongst other African states. Was there nothing they could do to assist in finding a solution by using this influence? They knew for example that the Presiient of SWAPO had his own ideas regarding SWA/Namibia - it was their opinion that he talked too much in any case - but maybe if they took a more direct view they could influence SWAPO's position. One should not take too much account of what the Pres of SWAPO said regarding a solution for the question and if South Africa thought that SWAPO had a role to play in Namibia, especially in the economic field, there could be an attempt to push Namibia in a direction which would make her part of a broader economic context. Could the Presidents of Angola and Mocambique discuss this with SWAPO and make it clear to them which way they had to go? To what degree did they have to influence SWAPO? If SWAPO had for example come to power in SWA-Namibia, Angola and Mocambique were in a position to exercise an influence on that organisation. The question also arose to which degree they could influence SWAPO before the conference took place.

Mr Fourie said that the problem with SWAPO was that when it made a statement they invariably talked about "ceasing things". The difficulty was as had repeatedly been pointed out, that there was a lack of trust and equal treatment. If SWAPO could be prevailed to drop their claim to be "sole and authentic representative of the Namibian people" that would be a step in the right direction. In a wider political context, SWAPO's statement seemed to make it clear that they were not interested in playing a constructive role in the sort of Southern Africa which South Africa, Angola and Mocambique envisaged, especially as far as economic cooperation was concerned.

Mr Doumeng said that he thought that if the Presidents of Angola and Mocambique talked to SWAPO about these matters, they would have to convince SWAPO that there would be no military movement on the border. South Africa would have to give such an undertaking, he thought.

Mr Fourie said that he would take this matter up with the parties concerned. He also wished to make the point that, as far as SWA-Namibia is concerned, a great deal of progress had been made. In essence, racial discrimination had for all practical purposes been removed, equal pay for equal work had been instituted and a uniform syllabus for all schools had been instituted. This had not come about overnight and consequently the time-schedule seemed to be a problem. It was interesting in this regard to look at what had happened at Lancaster House when a solution had been envisaged within two weeks and finally achieved only after a couple of months. This seemed to be one of the problems as far as the question of the forthcoming conference was concerned. Could a solution really realistically be achieved in seven days, and if not, did one then give up and negate everything which had been achieved in the past?

Minister Veloso said that he would speak to the two Presidents also in this regard.

Mr Doumeng said that to be concrete what would be required was that SWAPO would during the next three weeks have to be influenced to accept a more moderate stance as far as the vision of the countries involved for Southern Africa was concerned. South Africa would have to find some points which would facilitate this question.

Mr Fourie pointed out that he had raised some general points in this regard. He did not think it would be useful to now go into too much detail.

Minister Veloso said that in summary it could be said that the clearly strategic situation was agreed upon. On both sides the two Governments concerned would try to

SWAPO the necessity of a future Namibia being part of Southern Africa and that they should do so openly. He thought that from the South African side there would be an attempt military and political gap which would facilitate discussions at the forthcoming conference. If South Africa and Mocambique could meet before the UN conference to see whether there was further to be discussions, also as far as the conference is concerned, this could be useful. He did feel constrained, however, that the question of detail was something which had to be faced. One

point which he feel could also cause problems was that SWAPO had said that they would talk only to South Africa and that the internal parties could form part of the South African delegation. The South African point of view was that she would not talk to SWAPO directly and would only attend the conference as an observer. What was the position in this regard?

Mr Fourie said that through the good offices of Angola a formula had to i.e. that the first delegation would be led by the Administrator-General and that it would incorporate the members of the democratic and political parties. The Administrator-General was currently constituting the delegation. It should also be pointed out that the word "multi-party" as opposed to "all party" had been agreed to. This had been done in order to include only parties from SWA-Namibia which had represented a reasonable number of people.