

1 THE CHAIRMAN welcomed messrs Ian Smith and David Smith to the meeting of the SSC. THE CHAIRMAN said that the previous discussions that were held with Mr I Smith had been memorable moments. He paid tribute to Mr Smith for the contribution which he had made to create stability, civilized standards and order in Southern Africa.

2. THE CHAIRMAN pointed out that, personally, he had never hesitated to support Mr Smith, since they both fought for Southern Africa. THE CHAIRMAN felt it was his duty and privilege to support Zimbabwe Rhodesia military. In the past, other ministers took up the same attitude. This resulted in the RSA providing loans to ZR of more than R400 million during the 1970's. Furthermore in spite of the arms embargo against the RSA, it made available to ZR helicopters, transport vehicles, arms and ammunition, since the RSA had been inspired by the thought of a joint struggle. Lately, even soldiers were made available and his predecessor had also made police forces available.

3. THE CHAIRMAN said that the SSC now felt that it had come to the cross-roads. In the past, the RSA had refrained from interfering in ZR's internal affairs. However the country can no longer stick to that principle and the RSA now had a serious decision to make as to what road to follow. It was in the interest of ZR, the RSA and Southern Africa to have clarity about the different steps that would have to be taken in the coming three to four weeks. Referring with appreciation to a statement by Mr Ian Smith that there was not much choice to be had between Nkomo and Mugabe, the Chairman emphasized that it was of the greatest importance that Muzorewa, along with the Whites in ZR, should be in a position to form a stable Government in ZR.

4. THE CHAIRMAN reminded Mr Ian Smith of the meeting that was held at the Limpopo River more than a year ago and stated that he still kept to the principles identified at that stage, namely to try and establish a spirit of co-operation in technical and economic matters in Southern Africa in order to bring about the closest form of co-operation against Marxism. He said that the main reason for the present meeting was to find out where ZR stood and to establish the extent to which the

RS was to continue its share in the developments in ZR. He emphasized that if things went wrong in ZR and Whites and Blacks left the country, the RSA would be affected. However, he felt that a last effort could be made to secure the position on the RSA's northern borders.

5. Addressing the meeting, MR IAN SMITH said he was heartened by the Chairman's remarks. The RSA was perhaps their only friend in the world. The countries in the free world were, if anything, partial to the Patriotic Front in ZR. Many public statements were evidence of this. He also felt that, where they were told in London that Great Britain was on their side to ensure that the Patriotic Front would lose, action to that effect was not forthcoming. He was of opinion that under the Lancaster House Agreement, for example, the Patriotic Front, especially Mugabe, should already have been disqualified in view of his intimidation of the electorate.

6. MR IAN SMITH was deeply worried about the outcome of the election. His assessment, which concurred with that of the security people in ZR, was that there was very little difference between the three front-runners, Muzorewa, Nkomo and Mugabe, with the latter possible leading the field. This course of events was disheartening in view of the Lancaster House Agreement which had been sold to them with an assurance that the Patriotic Front would not come into power. It now seemed that no single leader would get a complete majority. They were now trying for some loose sort of agreement to get Nkomo and Muzorewa along with the Whites. He added that there did not seem to be any chance of the British acting against the Patriotic Front, since this would antagonize the Organization of African Unity.

7. MR R F BOTHA observed that the members of the Council and their Rhodesian friends had concensus about the basic aims in Southern Africa, namely to halt further Soviet aggression, but that there may be differences of opinion as to how to achieve these aims in ZR. In this regard he dealt with two aspects, namely the role of the Whites in the coming election and the attitude towards Great Britain.

8. As far as the role of the Whites was concerned, Mr R F Botha said that reports from his representatives in ZR would indicate a very acrimonious reaction from Bishop Muzorewa after Mr Ian Smith's statement that if need be, Nkomo was to be preferred to Mugabe. It appeared that the Whites were confused as to whom to support. It was Mr Botha's contention that the attitude of the Whites in the election should be dictated by one single aim namely to have Muzorewa win the election and therefore to muster maximum support for the Bishop. Any negotiation for greater unity with Nkomo and the Matabeles should only be undertaken after the election. It was important that Muzorewa received much Black support in the election since, if a Black party came to power who would only be able to govern with the support from the 20 White members, he predicted another onslaught on the Whites, whose 20 seats would be held out for its exclusiveness.

9. MR BOTHA also informed the meeting that he was told that Muzorewa had been approached in London by the Patriotic Front to join up against the Whites. Attractive proposals were made to him, but he turned them down. The Bishop now seemed to feel that he was being forsaken by the Whites, to whom he had previously given his word.

10. MR BOTHA then referred to the proceedings at the Limpopo meeting (confer paragraph 4) and the unwillingness of the Rhodesians at that stage to hold the 1979-election, since it was felt that the electorate was not ready for it. However, the RSA had convinced them to undertake the election and eventually more than 60 per cent of the population took part. If this was possible in 1979, it would just have to be done again. Everyone should have the hope to do it again. If Muzorewa did not win, there would be serious trouble.

11. As far as the attitude towards Great Britain was concerned, MR BOTHA agreed that the RSA itself had been disappointed in the long delay in British decision-making in the past. However, there was no alternative to the agreement that was reached at Lancaster House. Lt-genl Walls, for example, was completely satisfied with the agreement. He asked that the statements of the British be judged by the conditions of strain under which they were. Referring in this regard to the recent discussion in the United Nations (UN) of the

presence of RSA-troops in ZR, Mr Botha said that he knew the atmosphere here in UN and that the declaration by the British that they would not participate in the discussion, would have been painful to them. In fact, Great Britain had previously defended the RSA's presence when he said that he accepted the security forces in ZR the way he found them. The attitude of the British humiliated the representatives of the Patriotic Front. It was also significant that the USSR had already, at such an early stage, stated categorically that the coming election was a farce. Mr Botha reiterated that there was no alternative to go along with the British who had even thanked the RSA in public for its role in ZR. He emphasised that the attitude of the British was that the UN-resolution was non-existent and that they worked on the Lancaster House Agreement.

12. In conclusion MR BOTHA said that, judging from reports from ZR, there was no question that there was a bit of a rift between White leaders in ZR.

13. SEN HORWOOD enquired whether there was any chance that Muzorewa, on winning the election, would join up with Mugabe. Mr DAVID SMITH replied that Nkomo's second-in-command had said that their natural ally would be Mugabe and not the UANC. He continued by saying that the balance in the election would be with the Whites and the three main Black parties. In the past week there seemed to have been a small swing back to Muzorewa in the rural areas, where White employers had been taking their workers to meetings of the UANC. These employees would follow the lead of their employers to a large degree in the election.

14. SEN HORWOOD also mentioned that the RSA had assisted ZR financially where possible. For some time now the RSA had been feeling that the British should also be assuming some form of financial responsibility for ZR but that this did not appear to be the case. MR DAVID SMITH informed the meeting that as far as British finance was concerned, the Bank of England had made it clear that they would not allow a public issue for ZR. This accorded with their general policy on basis of which a similar request by New Zealand was also turned down. However, the Bank would help with any form

of private finance. In fact this was already being done. MR SMITH said that they had learnt not to rely altogether on the British and that other markets such as the New York money market was also being considered. However, everything depended on whether a government of moderation came into power in ZR. If not, there would be no money. If so, the country was in for a big economic boom. He added that it appeared to him that outside opinion would like to see the Whites control the economy of ZR.

15. MR S P BOTHA emphasized that the RSAs main concern was that the Whites people should win. It should be ensured that no division amongst the Whites in ZR came about and that everyone gave full support to the Whites and to Muzorewa. He asked whether Mr Ian Smith would influence the Whites to concentrate their efforts on Muzorewa.

16. THE CHAIRMAN emphasized that should the RSA know in advance that Nkomo or Mugabe was to come into power and/or if the Whites sided with Nkomo or Mugabe, the RSA would have to withdraw its troops and equipment and take the consequences. Under such circumstances it would be impossible for the Government to defend itself to parliament if the latter was told what the extent of the RSAs aid to ZR was. Therefore the Government had to know that the Rhodesian Front was going to support Muzorewa. If they had that assurance, they would try and help the Whites to establish a stable government.

17. MR DAVID SMITH responded with appreciation for what the RSA had done for his country. He would persuade the Whites to go for the aim of a government of moderation. Referring to the alleged division amongst Whites, he observed that this was probably of a superficial nature but also gave his assurance to do his utmost to check this.

18. THE CHAIRMAN asked whether there was anything that the RSA could do to assist ZR. He warned however, that the impression that the RSA would stand with ZR and South West Africa (SWA) under any circumstances was wrong. In SWA the Whites were divided and the Government was trying to unite them on principles. The same applied to ZR. The RSAs interest was at stake : its men, its money, its equipment. The message he wanted to convey to the Whites of ZR

w: to go all-out for stability and to support a government of stability. In this regard there was only one man who was free from the influence of the Russians, and that man was Bishop Muzorewa. THE CHAIRMAN offered to send an emissary to the Government in ZR to convey the above standpoint officially should information to the contrary reach ZR from any source.

19. MR S P BOTHA enquired further about how unanimous the White support for the Rhodesian Front and for Muzorewa would be and whether the White vote was divided. MR DAVID SMITH said that there was no division at the level where a choice was to be made between Muzorewa and Nkomo or Muzorewa and Mugabe. Muzorewa would be supported. However, there were some business tycoons who were scared to back the loser . He also noted that Nkomo was playing his cards very well.

20. THE CHAIRMAN remarked that these business men should be reminded of Nkomo's attitude towards the RSA and towards terrorist activities against the RSA. The RSA would act against Nkomo if the latter endangered the country's position. He saw danger when individuals were allowing things in ZR to take their own course and make the country a spring board for terrorist activities against the RSA.

21. DR VAN DER MERWE observed that the election machine of the Whites should be of a cohesive nature and be as efficient as possible. It should be seen to that everyone should be extremely well informed. He warned that public statements became serious issues in the heat of an election campaign and that such statements should be construed in a way that will not help any of the three Black parties.

22. MR HEUNIS said there seemed to be consensus that Muzorewa and the Whites might provide a government of moderation. The attitude also seemed to be that, unless Muzorewa was given unanimous support, things might go wrong in ZR. This observation should also be conveyed to the British, along with the message that intimidation by the Patriotic Front should be terminated. This might contribute to get the RSA and Great Britain collectively involved in ZR.

23. MR SCHLEBUSCH asked how Muzorewa's election campaign compared with that of the other parties and in what way his campaign could be strengthened. MR IAN SMITH was of opinion that the performance of Muzorewa's organization at party level was behind that of either Nkomo or Mugabe.

24. DR KOORNHOF asked Mr Ian Smith whether he was in agreement with the approach of the RSA Government.

25. MR IAN SMITH reacted in total to the preceding discussion. He warned the meeting that things were a little more complicated than was indicated during the discussion. It would be a disaster if the Rhodesian Front came out openly for Muzorewa, since this would push votes towards the Patriotic Front. Although the majority of Whites would support Muzorewa and influence their employees to do the same, there were reasons why some Whites could not do this. In Matabeleland no one would vote for a Shona. The Karangas would not vote for Muzorewa because he did not keep his promises. The main thing was to try and get people away from the Patriotic Front. Amongst the Karangas this purpose could be better served by forming a new party to provide them with an acceptable alternative to the Patriotic Front.

26. MR IAN SMITH was of opinion that Muzorewa was panicking. He explained that his statement that Nkomo was to be preferred to Mugabe (confer paragraphs 3 and 8) had been in answer to a question as to who to choose if the need should arise. It was merely a case of recommending the lesser of two evils.

27. As to the chances of the various Black parties, MR SMITH said his assessment for the past three weeks had been that the parties were running neck and neck. However, recent developments again seemed to indicate that the wrong agreement had been made at Lancaster House. Now only one option appeared to be open - and this was endorsed by some of the security men - namely to try and make sure that Nkomo did not go along with Mugabe.

28. Regarding the alleged division amongst the Whites, MR SMITH stated that the Whites were now more united than ever in their lives and

t. ; they had enough sense not to divide at this stage. However the Blacks were going to determine the future of ZR and he was telling his people to tell their workers not to vote for the Patriotic Front. Still, Muzorewa did not want to be supported openly.

29. MR SMITH said that their ideal was the preservation of the White man in Southern Africa and to get free democratic parties on their side. He urged the Chairman to have patience in taking a decision to withdraw from ZR.

30. THE CHAIRMAN enquired whether it was not a fact that Whites could help improve Muzorewa's organization behind the scenes. He also said that he had never taken the attitude that Sithole, for example, could not be supported, as long as this contributed to a government of stability and moderation. He reminded the meeting that they were confronted with two facts. The first was Nkomo's statement about terrorist organizations against the RSA. The second was that if some Whites said they wanted to support the Patriotic Front, the Government had to request Mr Smith to do something to prevent this. The White Rhodesians had to come to terms with the RSA that a stable government should be formed in ZR without Nkomo and Mugabe.

31. MR IAN SMITH was of opinion that there was perhaps one per cent of the Whites supporting the Patriotic Front. The rest would not do so and were telling their Black employees not to. This he would guarantee. Despite this, Nkomo and Mugabe had the majority of Black votes. The Whites helped Muzorewa in his campaign with finance, but they were being requested not to do it in public.

32. MR S P BOTHA made it clear that the RSA Government did not want to prescribe how things should be done in ZR. However, when it came to what to do, they wanted the assurance that the Whites would stand united.

33. MR R F BOTHA reminded the meeting of how he had conveyed the Government's viewpoint on the Lancaster House Meeting to the British Prime Minister and the British Foreign Minister. He told them that the RSA Government would not support chaos in ZR. He said, with due

r spect to mr Ian Smith, that to label the agreement as wrong at this stage would be to put the blame on Muzorewa. Everyone present should recall that the RSA Government had been asked whether they could provide ZR with \$700 million in the coming year should the latter decide not to go on with the agreement. The Government felt it could not. It was also known that Muzorewa could get only 35 per cent of the votes. But the members of the ZR delegation who were responsible for security said that the agreement was the only option. If the agreement had been wrecked, the RSA would have had to carry the responsibility for an escalating war.

34. Summarizing, the chairman said that knowing that the Lancaster House agreement was the only alternative and in consideration of the fact that the RSA had an interest in what would happen in ZR, everyone present was now in agreement that

- (a) it was in the interest of mutual co-operation and of Southern Africa that the Whites, along with Muzorewa and other parties, capable of stability, bring a government of moderation into power in ZR;
- (b) it was not in the interest of Southern Africa that Mugabe or Nkomo or both be in a position to dictate the future of ZR;
- (c) contact should be kept between the RSA and ZR in order that contributions could be made where needed.

35. MR SMITH was happy to say that he would support the chairman completely. He made two final points. Firstly, he noted that there were people who thought that he was an obstruction in London. This was not so. He was merely trying to get a better deal for his country. Secondly, there were a number of people in his country who say that they just could not have a Patriotic Front victory, since there would then be no future for them. He wanted to assure the meeting that they would not allow a Patriotic Front Government in ZR.