

3rd November 1962.  
Lusaka.


The Secretary General  
African National Congress,  
Lusaka.

Dear Comrade Secretary General

Enclosed herewith are the draft plans for our work inside the country for the forthcoming short-term period.

We hope that the Working Committee will be able to consider these plans urgently in order that we can instruct the Senior Organs to commence work on their implementation as soon as possible.

Amendla! Matla!



J.K. Nkomo  
Secretary, NC.

Re. H/O ~~Comrade~~  
Reps]

1. This report is divided into four sections, namely, overt political work, propaganda, Underground work and military perspectives. The recommendations in respect of each area of work are made at the end of each section.

2. Overt Political Work.

This section of the report deals in the main with 5 distinct campaigning items as follows :

- a. The land deal,
- b. Removals,
- c. The Presidents Council,
- d. Community Council elections,
- e. The Orderly Movement and Settlement of Black Persons Bill (OM:BPB).

To varying degrees of intensity, these campaigns are all actually in progress inside the country. In order to place our campaign proposals within the context of this activity the report begins with an outline of the current situation in this regard. (Note ; under Campaigning Perspectives (Item 4) Points a and B and c and d above are dealt with as two items rather than four separate campaigns.)

3. The Current Situation.

3.a. The Land Deal.

The centre of opposition to the land deal has been confined primarily to those areas directly affected, namely Ingwavuma, Kanyawane and Zululand. GB in his statements and speeches has formulated the issue as a fight involving the Zulu and Swazi people. Where he has broadened the horizons of Inkatha's opposition to the deal this has been on a legal basis through the courts. However he is on record as having stated that he would mobilise the Zulu people for civil disobedience and that he would not restrain "his followers from taking up arms" if the deal went ahead. He further stated that more common ground existed now between himself and the "exiled ANC" than ever before.

Enos' abuse despite repeated efforts to persuade him to meet with the Swazi government by the regime is reported to have refused. He has appealed to the Swazi people to reject the deal and has made efforts to broaden the base of opposition to the deal by addressing meetings outside of his immediate constituency.

Apart from a single meeting in Johannesburg addressed by Tutu and GB there appears to have been very little organised opposition to the land deal outside of the above mentioned areas. The trade unions, whether individually or as federations have been noticeably quiet.

Contradictions within the nationalist Party have been manifested in the emerging conflict over the deal. This conflict has its roots in the right wing. Any united front on the land deal cannot hope to succeed should not include such elements.



### Removals.

Opposition to the ongoing process of removals taking place throughout the country has tended to be mainly based on information dissemination by such organisations as ANRA, Race Actions and Black Dash. Organised opposition has been restricted to particular affected areas and localities.

### 3. The President's Council.

It is necessary that the various positions and policies being adopted by the forces expressing their opposition to the PC be distinguished one from the other. The basis of opposition on the issue is fundamentally different in character to that of the lead deal. There are two emergent lines of this opposition and they define the critical questions which the ANC must answer in projecting the correct position in this campaign. The first is that proposition which holds that should Africans be accepted into the structures proposed by the PC then this would constitute a basis for serious consideration of the proposals. The second is that even if urban Africans were accommodated within the proposals, in the 3-tiered parliament they should be flatly rejected.

The above mentioned streams of opposition have found reflection on the one hand in the statements made by the Rev. Hendrickse who has stated that a four-tier system accommodating the African people would have been preferable. Although he further stated that the final decision of the Labour Party would lie with the Labour Party National Congress to be held in January, to which the issue would be referred in order that it could determine whether:

- the proposals are a basis for meaningful change,
- in the transitory period it could be politically expedient in assisting SA to get a new coalition.

The Reform Party on the other hand, despite the fact that it is working within the structures created by the regime is opposed to the proposals. This raises sharply the question of whether organisations such as the RP, working within enemy created structures can and should be mobilised to participate in campaigns outside of these structures in a broad front of opposition.

Statements against the proposals have also been made by White professionals, academics, PRP spokesman and representatives of "enlightened capital".

On the other hand the proposals have been rejected in their entirety by a wide variety of organisations particularly among the Coloured and Indian communities. With regard to the Coloured Community this has taken place largely at a local level where the Labour Party leaderships perversion on the issue has been condemned. The anti-SAIC, NIC, TIC, the Islamic Council, ANCOU, FCOU, GANI, CTMA and CAHAC have all expressed their total opposition to the proposals. However there is a body of thought within the African community which holds that African people should have nothing to do whatsoever with the proposals, including at the level of community councils. That is, a school of thought which suggests or implies even rejection of activity and opposition against the proposals - in other words a negative "we must have nothing to do with it" approach.

### 3.d. Community Council Elections.

It is necessary that the reasons behind the postponement of the CCF's be thoroughly examined. If the example of the SAIC elections can be used as a pointer the regime attempted by postponing the elections to mobilise support for them. However by careful preparation the progressive forces were able to ensure that the elections were turned into defeat for the regime.

The argument in favour of participating in the elections has come from GB and some community councils. On the other hand the community council elections have been condemned out of hand by civic associations and local organisations who have linked the elections with the PC proposals. Dr Notland of the Assets Committee of Tan is quoted as having stated that ((he).... would not soil our hands with this community council monstrosity".

### 3.f. THE OMBEPB - The Slave Labour Bill.

The Bill has been met with a deep sense of outrage and opposition from a wide variety of sources. On the one hand there has been a sense of panic among industrialists who express their opposition to the Bill because of its danger to "national economic planning" and the possibility that it might trigger off widespread industrial unrest.

Trade unionists across the spectrum have opposed the Bill, including reformist unions such as the skilled predominantly White union the Boilermakers Union. In Cape Town unregistered union members with permanent urban residence rights have given notice of their intention to opt for redundancy in the place of their fellow workers who face being endorsed out.

In essence the Bill confers the right to stay in urban areas on only two categories of African people:

- permanent residents and their dependants provided they have approved accommodation,
- permit holders in approved accommodation.

All other African people are subject to daily curfews with "illegals" facing fines and imprisonment as do people who house or employ such illegals. The Bill allows for summary removal of squatters if in the opinion of the Minister "their conduct is calculated to canvass support for the repeal or amendment of any law". The Minister is empowered to declare any area "in a state of unemployment" cutting off all recruitment. Citizens of the "independent" homelands will never be able to become permanent residents and face great difficulties in obtaining work in the White areas.

Linked to the slave labour Bill is the Intimidation Act which has been promulgated to attempt to stop what the regime refers to as intimidation during strikes. In fact the terms of this definition are so wide as to include virtually all acts of mobilisation on the shop floor.

Another development which has a bearing on the possibility of mounting a campaign around this issue is the recent bread price increase which has met with a great deal of opposition. A boycott has been discussed at meetings and union and



church involvement seems likely in a possible national campaign.

4. Coordinating Campaigns.

As was mentioned at the beginning of this report the above mentioned campaigns are already in existence. From the point of view of the ANC our perspective should be to mould these campaigns and guide and influence their development. It is vital that the ANC direct the process whereby every current of opposition be drawn into the campaign. It is therefore necessary that the key issues be highlighted to strengthen each one and ensure that all the divergent streams of opposition become merged into a single river of revolt. Accordingly each campaign should have its own perspectives and slogans but these should be within the context of an overall perspective and slogans for a national campaign of resistance. Thus it is necessary that a unifying slogan be thrust forward around which such a process can be mobilised on a long term basis. The slogan "One South Africa, One Nation, One Government" comes nearest to fulfilling this objective. However the door should be left open to further improvement of this slogan.

Concept  
Accept  
worded  
follow

Outlined hereunder are the specific proposals for the campaign:

5. The Land Deal.

It is necessary that the campaign should not be centred on KwaZulu and Ingwenyama. The campaign should be national, African-based and seek to involve all sections of the population. In view of the delicate nature of the land deal and because of the divergent forces involved in opposition to the deal there should be a care of leading people from the churches to spearhead the campaign and create the basis for co-operation with GB and Ubuntu. As yet no campaigning base exists. GB has restricted the campaign to a national and political arena. Although Ubuntu has attempted to widen the campaign he has not met with much success.

It is proposed that a core group should be established to lead broad front in the campaign. It should be borne in mind that such a broad front will have clear limits and cannot include right wing elements who oppose the land deal for the wrong reasons. The following personalities have been proposed for the core group who would initiate and spearhead the campaign: Uria, Mook, a White colleague (Hill, Russell, Hurley), the Rev. Lesa and a leading ANC steward out of either Archie Mbitima or Frances Baard. This core group could thereafter draw in an Indian, Coloured and White personality into the group.

Core  
Personnel

Pass  
speech  
points  
idea  
etc.

This core group would be charged with the task of creating the basis for a national campaign. Whilst the land deal generates and is part of the fragmentation of the country as a whole the initial starting point for the campaign should be the Basic Land Deal. Once the campaign has taken root it can begin to raise the wider dimensions and implications of the land deal in the context of the overall Southern African scene.

Within KwaZulu and Ingwenyama these are the campaign slogans should be:

Campaign Plan?

1/2

"One South Africa, One Nation - We do not move", and "We fight the main enemy - SA". However in the rest of the country the campaign should focus on the slogan:

"One SA, One Nation - no fragmentation of our country". The possibilities exist to ensure that through the churches the campaign is then taken into the "independent" Bantustans with the underlying theme that the problems of Ingwenza and Kungene are equally those problems.

The land deal is directly linked to the question of removals. Bantu people outside of Kungene and Ingwenza will be moved into the 2 areas and non Bantu people living within the two areas will be moved out.

Two million people have been moved since 1974 (??) under the regimes resettlement scheme and yet there has never been a national campaign on the issue. The campaign on the land deal, especially in view of its direct relationship to removals, has the capacity to grow into a much bigger national campaign including within it the wider dimensions of removals and the Bantustan scheme as a whole. The Bantu land deal campaign, correctly guided and projected, can serve as the focus which sets the national campaign alight.

The petition first sent by three regions ((Gauteng of Bophuthatsane, Bees of Matabele and Matabele of Mchweni)) should be projected in another national form. The petition should not be directed at the houses of the workers in that region but to the regime from all people throughout the country. The petition should be used as a means for mobilising and campaigning amongst the people but it should also provide the pretext for campaigners to go on to farms, especially in Kungene and Ingwenza to mobilise workers. Action by farmers against such campaigning would serve to isolate them as potential military targets (See Section headed Military Perspectives item 10.2.1)

This campaign should be viewed as a priority and the NEC be accordingly requested to make the necessary arrangements for Amos Mafusa to be invited abroad by an independent institution under some other pretext, in order that he be met and briefed on the need to initiate and stimulate a national petition campaign on the land deal question. *The tactics to be employed in this campaign will depend on the specific conditions pertaining in each Bantustan.*

#### 5.4. The Presidents Council.

It is imperative that the campaign against the PC proposals should include the African people. The need to fight against the negative "we will have nothing to do with it" approach is vital. Whilst the rejection of the proposals is paramount that rejection must be based on the positive mobilisation of people, including the African people in opposition to the proposals.

An additional important feature of the campaign must be the effort to ensure that the erosion of "democracy" for Whites splits the White community and increases the possibility of mobilising White activists for the campaign.



Thirdly it is necessary that the measures of the regime at a central government level be linked to those at a community council, LAC and Management Committee level.

Without aggressive activity which is based on opposition to the exclusion of urban Africans from the tiered legislature it is essential to mould the campaign in such a way that it opposes any measure on the part of the regime which is not based on the will of all the people. That is, no scheme devised by the ruling minority can be acceptable. The campaign against the PC must be shifted towards the direction where all discussions with the regime for minor reforms are rejected in totality. The Presidents Council should be termed the Presidents Circus and combined with the slogan "No talks with the Presidents Circus class".

Initially the focus of the campaign would be to mobilise the Indian and Coloured people but to widen it into a national campaign including the mobilisation of the CA's and the women organisations as important participants. This approach will ensure that the basis for a national campaign against the CIB's is generated.

Initially it is proposed that a small group of individuals be approached and briefed on the campaign and asked to go back to their organisations and constituencies with a view to canvassing support for the campaign proposals and to emerge with a list of people to serve on a national committee. The committee would then be charged with the task of canvassing a broadly based all in conference of organisations and individuals in all communities as the principal factor in mobilising against the proposals. The persons suggested are Keop Jansen, Zak Nkomo, Virgil Kumbane, Roy, Matlana, Magasa, Kain, Mrs Kgware and Mrs Motlana to be utilised to ensure the full participation of the women organisations. This committee would then draw in the mobilising elements such as Curry and Hendrickse.

*That finally Civic Associations & Community based organisations should always take up local policies such as water, electricity, etc. as a basis for organising people around them & thereby*  
5. The Campaign Against the Slave Labour Bill. *to challenge the community council election results*

Firstly it is necessary that the bill is opposed by correctly characterising its intentions and implications in a manner that will grip the imagination of the masses. It is proposed that the bill be termed the Slave Labour Bill. The emerging opposition to the Slave Labour Bill contains the possibilities for a very widely based and union led campaign. It is essential that the unions be placed at the centre of this campaign. This is especially important in view of the dangers involved that those elements who oppose the bill for reasons such as its threat to "national planning" be discredited. The main basis for the campaign must be the demand for the repeal of all influx control laws and legislation. The slogan around which mobilisation for the campaign can be based should be:

"Stop the Slave Labour Bill".

The wide condemnation and opposition to the bill in the trade union sector provides the basis for efforts towards trade union unity around a common platform. This common platform should be seen in the context of the great threat the bill poses for all workers and their unions. It is necessary that UNSA and the ANC spell out in more detail the grounds on which they oppose the bill.

Wider issues such as the regime's general proposals.

### Youth.

On the youth front it should be remembered that COBIA and ALMO are deeply involved in the Education Charter campaign. Furthermore it is vital that their efforts to consolidate their base be continued. It is envisaged that these organisations would be asked to ensure that their supporters participate in the campaign in a supportive role providing the activists in campaigning work.

### 7. International Perspectives.

To date the international campaign against the regime has been focussing primarily on the campaign for the repeal of the death sentences and military and economic sanctions. It is proposed that in addition to the above all three campaigns as outlined in this report should find international re-inforcement. The ANC should become the vehicle for developments at home in this regard to be disseminated to the international community.

7.a. Of particular importance should be the fact that the campaign will overtly be spearheaded by church personalities and the churches. Since this will be the case it is proposed that the churches internationally, including organisations such as the WCC, be requested to take a leading role in the international campaign through dissemination of information, mass campaigning and funding of the campaign internally, either through the ANC or through their own channels.

7.b. The ANC should pursue its existing policy and attempts to have countries bar all Baptist leaders. This should be extended to include any Africans participating in government created structures at all levels.

7.c. The Campaign Against the Slave Labour Bill must become a central feature of SACBY's and the ANC's international campaigning initiatives in support of the campaign inside the country. International unions can be requested to support the campaign and the unions involved inside the country through action in their own countries or through provision of funds to aid the campaign.

### 8. Underground Structures.

8.1. It should be noted that it had been hoped that mass mobilisation and national campaigns inside the country would yield recruits both for the underground structures inside the country as well as for MK. Despite successful mass mobilisation and national campaigns this has not materialised.

8.2. Accordingly the C M recommends that it develop a mechanism to categorise and list all our activists inside the country with a view to:

- a. Investigating the tasks that these operatives have been assigned - are they appropriate, enough, are their briefings adequate etc, with a view to make any improvements that may be necessary.
- b. Extract from the overall national list of operatives a list of key individuals to comprise core groups and ANC's with all the respective areas.



On the basis of the concrete data provided in the lists of operatives inside the country, these short lists of potential core group and/or APC's, after discussion by EC HQ, would be taken to the SO's to canvass their thoughts on the matter prior to final implementation. The creation of even a minimum number of APC's should generate the basis for the constitution of an underground network inside the country.

### 6.3. Recruitment.

Once the national campaign has commenced in earnest the underground APC units have the special responsibility for recruiting both for the development of our underground machineries as well as for NK. The critical question has been where the emphasis has been laid and how this task should be undertaken.

Certain clear guidelines or demarcations have emerged. Known ANC personalities and/or high profile overt political organisers must not be involved in recruitment. Furthermore when such persons are in key positions within ANC underground units they should not want to know either, who is carrying out recruiting in their areas/constituencies or who has been recruited.

On the other hand the recruiters must be present in the mass level work at a low profile level in order to monitor and "stake out" who the potential recruits are. It is not necessary that such persons undertake the recruiting themselves. This can either be done from the forward areas or by other "middlemen" etc. Whatever particular mechanism is employed, what is crucial is that the internal recruiting operatives are the "eyes and ears" of the movement.

During the consolidation phase following upon the Anti-republic Celebrations Campaign, the EC HQ instructed the SO's to concentrate on building the underground structures as well as the question of recruitment for NK. However there appeared to be an inadequate understating on the part of the SO's and the political implementation machineries as to how this task should be carried out. In the main at present recruiting is carried out through reliance on visits by potential activists to the forward areas.

It should be recalled that in the past a document on mass and underground work has been sent to the SO's offering guidance on these issues. However there appears to be a need for the SO's to be reminded of these guidelines. It is proposed that the original document on this question be amended and utilised for this purpose.

In the light of the above recommendations it is further proposed that at HQ an EC member should be charged with the task of monitoring and overseeing the progress made in relation to the establishment of APC's and the underground structures in general. Similarly one individual at an SO level should undertake a similar function and liaise closely with EC HQ in this regard. It is important that this task should not be confused with the question of recruiting, particularly from the working class for NK, which task has already been allotted to an EC member.

14. Targets.

In an effort to clearly link the subject of our military efforts with mass political work certain key individuals in the underground structures should be instructed to isolate and report on appropriate targets in these areas.

15. Propaganda.

In the light of previous experience it is imperative that the following tasks are carried out:

- a. Propaganda at HQ and from the SO's is rapidly printed and dispatched inside the country. Failure to do this in the past has resulted in ~~the~~ inadequate propaganda being distributed inside the country.
- b. The internal propaganda units are adequately and timely briefed to flood the country with propaganda in keeping with the general themes outlined in the above campaign proposals.

With regard to point 9.b. above it is important to bring about a situation where the internal propaganda units do not rely on the forward areas feeding them with information and/or setting any propaganda they might be considering. Such propaganda units should be instructed to respond immediately to campaign developments, particularly supportive MI actions, either in their immediate localities or further afield. The increasing restrictions on the mass media make such a procedure more important.

The SEC and SACIU should focus their propaganda efforts on the above mentioned 3 campaigns with particular attention to the Campaign Against the Slave Labour Bill.

The SO's should also be instructed to supplement the propaganda produced at HQ with their own material. The details of such propaganda to be worked out in conjunction with the VIP immediately these proposals have been agreed upon and work on production to commence immediately thereafter.

16. Military Activity.

16.1. The undermentioned military activity, in keeping with previous guidelines from EC HQ should be used as a guideline for co-ordinated military activity directed at guiding and stimulating popular resistance inside the country and not as an alternative to ongoing military work.

16.2. Our military activity must be used to be fundamentally raising the level and scope of our struggle. Accordingly whilst it is necessary to continue to select structural targets, at the same time the cutting edge of our military perspective should be our efforts to hit at enemy equipment. Thus attacks on structural targets would not be replaced by attacks on personnel but the two would be carried out concurrently, bearing in mind the need to raise the pitch of struggle by hitting the enemy where he is most vulnerable.



In the light of the above remarks the following targets have been proposed as those which should be singled out for special emphasis:

a. Farmers In Iandane and Inaswina.

It is vital that farmers as the first line of defence, especially in these two areas, be forced out. However those farmers who can be identified as being particularly fascist inclined, either through their actions against those involved in the petition campaign, victimisation of workers or for the maintenance of particularly bad conditions for workers should be singled out for treatment.

b. Wicked Elements.

Sell-outs from all communities, especially those participating in the PC, land deal administrators, leading figures in the CC's etc must be singled out.

c. Labour Bureau's. In the light of increasingly harsh influx and labour laws, (including those projected in the Slave Labour Bill), Labour Bureau's in the rural areas and Kantustans are no longer recruiting new workers. Only those workers with jobs in the "white areas" who are sent back to be re-recruited are given employment. Thus Labour Bureau's have become legitimate targets as they are seen by the bulk of people who cannot find work as meaningless and an instrument of the regime's repression.

d. Employers.

Employers, particularly of multinational companies, who are collaborating with the regime and the police should be singled out. Those managers who are especially vicious in repression of workers and trade union rights, eg; the Managing Director of Wilson Moutree's should be dealt with.

e. Reactionary Unions.

Those unions who are towing a particularly reactionary line and supporting the Slave Labour Bill such as Arrie Paulus's NU are also proposed.

f. SAP and SAP Personnel involved in removal and resettlement programmes as well as all "independent Kantustan" officials in White SA.

h. The SO's are further instructed to speed up the process of collection of material relating to communication and power lines especially those in the vicinity of the 70th degree.