

SECRET

of South Africa



MINISTER OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND INFORMATION

1718 Hendrik Verwoerd Building
Cape Town
8001
Tel 455848

~~MB 10/1/1/4~~
MB 10/1/8

23 September 1981

The Honourable Alexander M Haig Jr
Secretary of State
WASHINGTON D C

Dear Al

I want to thank you for your willingness to designate Dr Chet Crocker to attend the just completed round of talks with Brand Fourie in Zurich. It was of great importance for the South African Government to clear up certain misapprehensions and uncertainties at this juncture. Now that the South African team has reported fully to the South African Government on the Zurich talks I am in a position to say that the Government welcomes the continuing growth of mutual trust between our two governments. The Government was much impressed by the open-hearted and direct manner in which Dr Crocker responded to our questions.

As we understand your letter to me of 10 September 1981 on the Cubans, in the light of the explanations now given by Dr Crocker, instead of the Cubans being in the process of withdrawal at the inception of Phase III, the approach of the United States is that the Cubans will be withdrawn entirely before Phase III is completed. The South African Government accepts this approach. It is presumed that reductions of South African troop strengths will be coordinated with Cuban withdrawals. I take it also that our two governments will consult closely and as often as necessary on this issue of first importance as indeed on a whole range of issues of concern to South Africa. Obviously the fundamental requirement that there must be peace before any reductions in the size of our forces can occur remains.

It is particularly encouraging that the United States will not press South Africa to proceed with a new phase before by mutual agreement the previous phase has been implemented to our joint satisfaction.

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I attach a copy of our reply of today's date to the message from the Five, handed to us on 12 September 1981. I believe Dr Crocker was shown the seven points which would form the basis of our delegation's submission to my Government. The reply approved by my Government was built around these points. Our interpretation of certain phrases followed the elucidations provided to us by Dr Crocker.

I by no means underestimate the extent and complexities of the problems that remain but I am happy to be in a position to inform you that probably for the first time the South African Government feels that there is a real prospect of an equitable solution. Our team in Zurich reports that Dr Crocker is persuaded that the reality is dawning on the Front-Line States that your initiative is the only hope for reaching a settlement and avoiding large-scale conflict in Southern Africa. There are elements of the proposal, which will cause us and the parties in South West Africa considerable problems, just as some elements will inevitably be difficult for SWAPO and the Front-Line States to accept. We recognize however that a settlement is simply not possible if each side insists on attaining every one of its objectives.

It was heartening to hear from Dr Crocker that you continue to believe that Dr Savimbi cannot be jettisoned and must receive his due. South Africa's honour as a trusted ally is at stake in this regard and there is no doubt that any short-term advantage that may be realized by dropping him would be more than outweighed by the long-term disadvantages.

I am in full agreement with the need, as I believe is perceived by Dr Crocker, for us to have regular meetings in the days ahead to take stock of developments at each stage as we proceed. You are welcome to send your representatives to South Africa and we are also willing to meet your representatives in the United States or elsewhere. In my opinion a very clear lesson for us for these future contacts was learned in Zurich, namely the fact that the press was unable to extract any information from either delegation contributed substantially to the progress which I believe was made.


I feel it is opportune to raise a matter with you which I touched on in my letter to you of 11 September 1981 in relation to an uncalled for demarché by the ten E E C countries; that is the public statements on South Africa itself by the other four members of the contact group.

It should be brought home to them that it is highly counter-productive for them to make condemnatory statements on South African policies and actions with which they happen to disagree. Peter Carrington inexplicably seems increasingly to be taking a lead in this way. The most recent example is his statement in the U N General Assembly yesterday, again on behalf of the Ten. Members of the Conservative Party of the United Kingdom assured me when they were on the verge of taking power that they were convinced that SWAPO had to be prevented from taking power in South West Africa and indeed were highly critical of the policies of the then American administration. Carrington has undergone such a transformation, however, that his policy is becoming indistinguishable from that of his predecessor, David Owen.

It is undesirable that our relations with the United Kingdom should continue to deteriorate, not only from our own point of view but from yours also, since we all need to support one another if the drive of the Soviet Union towards world domination is to be arrested. I am well aware of the scope of your own concerns and commitments. Nevertheless if you were to find an opportunity for pointing out to the Europeans the negative consequences of their public statements on South Africa I am convinced that you would be making a contribution which would also be in the interest of the United States. Our society has its imperfections but South Africans will not be persuaded by threats to accept change. They will accept rational and orderly, but not revolutionary, change. There is a deep desire in the hearts of our people to act justly towards all our peoples and to continue to move forward to a political and economic dispensation which will reasonably satisfy the aspirations of all.

Please accept my best wishes for every success in the execution of your onerous task.

With kind regards

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read 'Pik Botha'. The signature is written in a cursive, somewhat stylized script.

R.F. BOTHA

RESPONSE OF THE SOUTH AFRICAN GOVERNMENT DATED 23 SEPTEMBER 1981
TO THE MESSAGE OF THE GOVERNMENTS OF CANADA, FRANCE, THE FEDERAL
REPUBLIC OF GERMANY, THE UNITED KINGDOM AND THE UNITED STATES OF
AMERICA OF 12 SEPTEMBER 1981

1. The South African Government confirms that subject to the following remarks the message of the Five of 12 September 1981 reflects the understandings reached in exchanges between the Government of South Africa and the Government of the United States of America in May, June and July 1981:
 - (a) the date in the first paragraph for determining the implementation date, presupposes that Phases I and II would have been successfully concluded at that stage;
 - (b) the statement in the second paragraph that Security Council Resolution 435 "remains intact", is subject to South Africa's concerns being met on the size, deployment and composition of UNTAG;
 - (c) the expression "address your concerns" in the same paragraph is interpreted to mean the seeking of a mutually acceptable solution;
 - (d) the statement in the third paragraph that "none of the parties can possess a veto over the process", applies to all political parties including SWAPO;
 - (e) the statement in the fourth paragraph that "certain measures could be undertaken to assure all parties that the plan will be carried out in an impartial manner" is understood to mean that attention will be directed specifically to meeting the concerns of the internal parties;

- (f) the subject of Walvis Bay is not on the agenda; and
 - (g) the general understanding reached between the Governments of South Africa and of the United States of America provides the basis for the continuation of the negotiations leading to an agreement to implement a settlement.
2. The South African Government would wish to emphasize that it is of profound importance that the envisaged process towards independence should proceed rapidly and decisively. Past experience has shown that loss of momentum constitutes the greatest threat to our efforts to achieve agreement.

CAPE TOWN

23 SEPTEMBER 1981

SECRET

September 15, 1981

The Honorable
R. F. Botha
Minister of Foreign
Affairs and Information
Cape Town, South Africa

Dear Pik:

I understand you have expressed the hope that we could have an early meeting to discuss certain questions you have about the two messages sent last week. Unfortunately at present I am totally engaged with the conclusion of Prime Minister Begin's visit to Washington and with our preparations for the upcoming UN General Assembly. Therefore I would propose instead that Chet Crocker be available to meet in Europe with whomever you may designate to discuss your questions. He is fully conversant with the Contact Group and U.S. messages and could meet your people over the weekend or early next week.

I would like to assure you that the messages sent to you represent no change in our thinking as defined in my letters of July. We remain fully committed to that approach. At the appropriate time I will, of course, want to meet again with you to explore further how we should best proceed.

I have asked Crocker to stand by according to your preference on timing and venue to go into your questions and to indicate our reading of where matters now stand with the Contact Group and the African parties.

With best regards,

/s/

Alexander M. Haig, Jr.

SECRET



1718 Hendrik Verwoerd Building

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Ref MB 10/1/1/4

11 September 1981

The Honourable Alexander M Haig Jr
Secretary of State
WASHINGTON D C

Dear Al

We have encountered an unfortunate incident the past week involving the Governments of the ten member states of the European Economic Community which may have adverse repercussions on our current efforts to secure political support for your Administration's South West Africa/Namibia initiative. I therefore feel you should know about it. They made a démarche with the British acting as the channel. I am sending you a copy of this communication which I think you will agree, we have every right to consider presumptuous, with a copy of our response. The negotiating process having entered a delicate phase, it is most important to preserve the fragile basis of trust and confidence that we have been working on so carefully since Geneva.

You will therefore appreciate the harmful effect of the Europeans' action. It causes resentment and clouds the atmosphere of understanding which is essential to the negotiations at present under way.

With warm personal regards
Yours sincerely

A handwritten signature in cursive script, appearing to read 'Rik Botha'.

R F BOTHA