



1718 Hendrik Verwoerd Building
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Tel 455848

MB 10/1/1/4

8 September 1981

Dear Al

I was most heartened by the Ottawa Summit statement on terrorism and in particular by the forthright manner in which the Heads of State and Government expressed their concern about the active support given to international terrorism through the supply of money, arms, sanctuary and training to terrorist groups.

You will recall that I raised the question of Soviet activities in Southern Africa during our meeting in May. I also discussed with Bill Clark, during his recent visit, the problem of the support given by the West to Russian inspired initiatives in this part of the African continent.

It is of particular concern to my Government that the Western nations actually aid and abet the terrorist movements in Southern Africa, directly or through the United Nations and its Specialised Agencies, even while they publicly profess to be concerned about the problem of international terrorism. A cursory perusal of United Nations documentation clearly reveals that almost every Specialised Agency is involved in some way or another in providing material or moral support to the so-called national liberation movements operating against South Africa and South West Africa/Namibia.

The issue was underlined in June when the International Labour Organisation adopted a new "Declaration concerning the policy of apartheid of the Republic of South Africa". The Declaration committed the ILO to increase its educational activities and technical assistance to the liberation movements and to supply them with additional resources from the regular ILO budget and from external

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The Honourable Alexander M Haig
Secretary of State
WASHINGTON D.C.

sources on a bilateral or multilateral basis. I was happy to note that the United States withheld its approval of the Declaration specifically because of this provision, although it was the only Western state to do so. The European Communities have already pledged about one million dollars to Zambia, Botswana and Zimbabwe in order to provide assistance to "Namibian refugees" between 1981 and 1983 in terms of this programme.

It would be difficult to estimate how much is annually spent by the United Nations and its Agencies in encouraging hostile action against South Africa. In the regular United Nations budget for 1980/81 alone nearly \$32 million were earmarked for the campaign against South Africa. In addition various UN Trust Funds, Specialised Agencies and associated international institutions have spent some \$109 million in the past few years on aid programmes for the anti-South African terrorist movements. This does not include expenditure on fellowships and training programmes, radio and other propaganda, administrative costs or the enormous amounts spent on international conferences aimed at mobilizing yet more support for these programmes. They are less easy to quantify but, by way of example, you will know that the International Conference on Sanctions against South Africa, which was recently held in Paris, cost the United Nations some \$751,000.

Since the Western Powers and Japan are responsible for over two-thirds of the United Nation's regular budget (25% of which is provided by the United States alone) and allow additional direct aid and moral encouragement to emanate from governmental, non-governmental and private sources, South Africans may be excused for believing that the West has become a valuable ally of the Soviet Union in its campaign to subvert their country and the entire sub-continent.

What is particularly perturbing is the manner in which terrorist movements have gained international respectability by the simple expedient of being called "liberation movements". Assistance to them is labelled as being for "humanitarian purposes" only despite the fact that all such assistance liberates funds to finance these movements' militant activities. The practice of channelling aid through the international agencies has institutionalised the process and has thus ensured the indispensable financial and moral support of the West. The Soviet Union and its allies are the ultimate beneficiaries.

I believe that I should raise the issue with you as I am sure that the United States Administration is equally perturbed by the subtle manner in which the Western Powers have been mobilised to support a trend that is clearly not to their advantage.

With kindest regards

A handwritten signature in cursive script, appearing to read 'Rik Botha'. The signature is written in dark ink on a white background.

R F BOTHA



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MB 10/1/1/4

29 July 1981

The Honourable Alexander M Haig Jr
Secretary of State
WASHINGTON, D C

Dear Al

Thank you for your letter of 21 July 1981.

I note that as a result of our meetings with Bill Clark and our subsequent correspondence, you and the other members of the Group of Five believe that the time has come to initiate as a group your proposed approach on South West Africa/Namibia with all the parties.

You indicate that there is broad support among your colleagues for the phased approach discussed in your letter of 5 July and my reply of 8 July 1981. You add, however, that the Contact Group "cannot accept the direct linkage of the Namibia and Angola questions as integral elements of a single plan".

In my letter of 8 July 1981 I set out how the question of the withdrawal of the Cubans in Angola had arisen and how as a result of the prospect of their withdrawal we modified our attitude towards the presence of "blue helmets" in the Territory.

You intimate that the five Western Governments are convinced that Cuban withdrawal and national reconciliation in Angola are objectives of the highest priority, adding that "we are prepared to dedicate ourselves to the determined pursuit of these objectives which we know are of central importance to your Government. We will pursue them in parallel with the phased approach on Namibia".

What is of even greater significance to us is your belief that "this parallel strategy can be successful in achieving the same results". I trust that this assessment will in the event be proved correct. If not we would feel that the approach now set out by you would be a deviation from the understanding upon which we modified our attitude on the presence of "blue helmets" in the Territory when Bill Clark visited us in June.

My Government takes this to mean that although you cannot agree that we now, at this point in time, insist on a guarantee that the Cubans would be withdrawn prior to phase III, you nevertheless believe that your efforts to get them to withdraw would at the commencement of phase III succeed so that their withdrawal would by then have been achieved or would be in progress. It is our firm conviction that neither peace nor fair elections can be realised as long as the Cubans or other hostile forces are stationed in Angola.

Cuban withdrawal is of paramount importance not only for free and fair elections but also for the establishment of peace in the area when phase III is to commence. As you know, the phased reduction of South African forces is inseparably linked to a complete and comprehensive cessation of hostilities. This is an aspect which has been emphasized throughout in all our discussions with the Five and with the Secretary General. The following excerpts are examples:

- a) Statement by myself in the Security Council on 27 July 1978:

"The reduction of South African troops in South West Africa will commence only after the comprehensive cessation of all hostile acts and the establishment of a visible peace. The South African Government regards its responsibility for the security of the people of the Territory in a very serious light."

(U.N. Document S/PV. 2082, pp. 114-115)

- b) Additional statement of 19 October 1978 by the South African Government following discussions with the Ministers of Foreign Affairs of the Western Five in Pretoria:

"1. The South African delegation stressed that the reduction of South African troops in South West Africa would only commence if and when a complete and a comprehensive cessation of hostilities had been brought about."

(U.N. Document S/12900, Annex III, p. 1)

- c) Report of the Secretary General of 24 November 1978:

"The Secretary for Foreign Affairs reaffirmed the

position of his Government on a cease-fire (S/12854) and added that the reduction of South African troops in Namibia would only commence if and when a comprehensive cessation of hostilities had been brought about."

(U.N. Document S/12938, p. 5)

- d) My letter of 22 December 1978 addressed to the Secretary General:

"There shall be no reduction of the South African troop strength in the Territory until there has been a comprehensive cessation of violence and hostilities."

(U.N. Document S/12983, Annex I, p. 1)

I have given in some detail the position that we have consistently taken to reaffirm the decisive importance that my Government attaches to this issue.

With warm personal regards

Yours sincerely

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read 'R.F. Botha'. The signature is stylized with a large 'R' and 'B'.

R.F. BOTHA

PERSOONLIKE BOODSKAP DEUR GENERAAL A M HAIG AAN
SY EDELE MINISTER R F BOTHA GEDATEER 21 JULIE 1981

GEHEIM
SECRET

"Dear Pik:

I have carefully reviewed the fruits of your meetings with Bill Clark and our subsequent exchange of correspondence. I have shared these results with my counterparts in the Contact Group at the Ottawa summit. We believe the time has come, as a result of these extensive exchanges between our two Governments, to initiate our proposed approach on Namibia as a group with all the parties. There is broad support among my colleagues for the phased approach discussed in our letters of July 5 and July 9. Specific suggestions on how to implement this approach will be prepared by a meeting of Contact Group experts in the very near future. In the meantime, I must inform you that the Contact Group cannot accept the direct linkage of the Namibia and Angola questions as integral elements of a single plan. This would not be acceptable internationally and is more likely to entrench the communist presence in Angola than to remove it. The Western Five Governments are convinced, nonetheless, that Cuban withdrawal and national reconciliation in Angola are objectives of the highest priority. We are prepared to dedicate ourselves to the determined pursuit of these objectives which we know are of central importance to your Government. We will pursue them in parallel with the phased approach on Namibia. While we cannot as a group endorse the concept of direct linkage in the final phase, we believe this parallel strategy can be successful in achieving the same results. I can assure you that my colleagues share your and my view of the high priority of strengthening the security of your region through addressing in a parallel

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way the Namibia and Angola questions. I believe, further, that they have a substantial contribution to make on both issues.

I want you to know of the conclusion we have reached on these issues. The proposals put forward in my July 5 letter remain in effect in all other respects and the protection offered to secure your interests remains as stated therein.

With warm personal regards,
Sincerely
Alexander M. Haig"



MINISTER OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND INFORMATION

Private Bag X141
Union Buildings
Pretoria
0001
Tel 30124

MB 10/1/1/4

8 July 1981

Dear Al

I have written to you separately in reply to your letter of the 5th July, 1981, on South West Africa/Namibia. I feel I must write to you also on a related subject.

During Bill Clark's visit last month, I told him that we had information indicating that Soviet weapons were increasingly being stock-piled in Angola. This development posed a serious security threat which we could not permit.

I have no doubt that the United States would view a similar threat to its security in the same light.

In this letter I wish simply to state again that we are concerned about this development and I feel I must let you know that it may become necessary for us, in the interests of the security of South West Africa/Namibia, to take appropriate action to eliminate the threat.

With kind regards

R.F. BOTHA

The Honourable Alexander M. Haig Jr
Secretary of State
WASHINGTON, D C

SECRET



Private Bag X141
Union Buildings
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0001
Tel 30124

B 10/1/1/4

3 July 1981

Dear Al

I write in connection with the case of the impounding in Houston in May of this year of the aircraft containing arms intended for a foreign power.

You will recall that we spoke about this incident and that I told you in confidence that the weapons were intended for a friend and ally of the United States. I now learn that one of the charges brought against the accused is to the effect that the arms were intended to subvert the United States.

I am at this stage not concerned about the other charges but as far as this particular charge is concerned, I hope you will agree, in the light of what I told you, that it is simply not true. I should be grateful if you could find it possible perhaps to raise this aspect with the Attorney General.

I am not asking that United States laws be by-passed or that your legal processes be interfered with but it is simply not true that the arms were intended, as charged, to subvert the United States or United States interests in any way whatsoever.

Yours sincerely

R.F. BOTHA

The Honourable Alexander M. Haig Jr
Secretary of State
WASHINGTON, D C



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MB 10/1/1/4
MB 10/1/8

8 July 1981

The Honourable Alexander M. Haig Jr
Secretary of State
WASHINGTON, D C

Dear Al

Thank you for your letter of 5 July 1981, which my Prime Minister and I have studied with interest. We find its content and tenor, in general, positive.

Subject to the comments below, the proposals outlined by you are acceptable to us and provide a basis of understanding between our two Governments.

There appears to be a difference in perception between us on the question of the presence and withdrawal of Cuban troops in Angola. It would therefore be useful briefly to recapitulate the position as outlined to you in Washington on 14 May 1981 and to Bill Clark during his visit from 10 - 13 June 1981.

You will recall that during our discussions I emphasised that it would not be possible for the South African Government to accept any United Nations military presence (blue helmets) in South West Africa/Namibia. This was also confirmed in my letter to you of 19 May 1981. When Ambassador Sole handed this letter to you, he orally conveyed a message stating that the South African Government would, however, be prepared to consider the attachment to South African units of military observers in numbers and from countries acceptable to us, on condition that they did not display UN insignia or wear UN uniforms.

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You will recall that in my letter to you of 19 May 1981 I gave you the reasons for our concerns in this respect. I said that the people of the Territory had acquired an entrenched view that the military component of UNTAG would represent the most glaring symbol of U.N. partiality towards and alignment with Swapo. The mere presence of a military component of UNTAG would be seen as a Swapo victory.

In addition to this consideration, I must also again revert to the question of UN impartiality. If progress is to be made in the discussions and negotiations in the months ahead, we must insist on strict adherence to the principle of impartiality. The people of the Territory demand this as a right due to them and it will not be possible for them to proceed with the various phases if the UN persists in favouring Swapo as it has done hitherto.

During Bill Clark's visit in June, I reiterated the position which I had previously conveyed to you, namely that the South African Government would not accept the presence of a single blue helmet in the Territory. Bill thereupon indicated that the United States required a degree of flexibility by the South African Government on this issue if we were to proceed with our efforts to find a solution, and asked what the position would be if the Cubans were to leave Angola. I immediately indicated that, provided they were not replaced by other hostile forces, a new situation would have been created. It was on this basis and taking into account the position which, we were agreed, UNITA should occupy in Angola that the six points which were handed to Bill at our last

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meeting in Windhoek on 12 June 1981, were formulated. I therefore believe that our views on this issue in fact substantially coincide. Our position as stated to you in Washington was subsequently modified after Bill had advised us of a US commitment to secure a withdrawal of the Cubans from Angola. Without that prospect our position would have remained the same as that conveyed to you in my letter of 19 May. However, while we would prefer their withdrawal as early as possible, we do not insist that the Cubans should be withdrawn prior to the commencement of Phase III.

I welcome your statement that the South African Government's "position on the acceptability of a scaled-down UNTAG military presence, with narrowed deployment and drawn from appropriate countries, is a positive step ...". That a free and fair election will in fact take place is of paramount importance to the democratic parties of South West Africa/Namibia and to the South African Government. I must therefore re-emphasise that the scaling down of the UNTAG military presence, its narrowed deployment and the selection of appropriate contributing countries must be done in such a way as to ensure that Swapo will not be given a psychological advantage over the democratic parties.

You state that "Cuban troop withdrawal is possible only in the context of some movement toward internal reconciliation which gives appropriate recognition to UNITA's role and weight in the country". I agree with you that it is essential that Dr Savimbi's position be secured if we are to make real progress. In particular I must emphasise that it would not be possible for us to become part of a plan which would destroy UNITA or which would make it impossible for Dr Savimbi to be assisted in his struggle against Soviet inspired control of his country.

Moreover, unless the Cubans leave Angola and unless Dr Savimbi and UNITA can exercise their legitimate role and weight in Angola, the internal parties in South West Africa/Namibia will not have a fair and equal opportunity to win the election.

We note with satisfaction that the proposals envisaged for Phase I will be discussed with the internal parties of South West Africa/Namibia. Indeed, I accept that the internal parties will be consulted throughout the process leading to independence. As you know, the basic South African approach to the question of South West Africa/Namibia is that it is for the people of the Territory themselves to decide their own future and with this in view to be afforded the opportunity to express their views on the political and constitutional future of their country.

In your letter you refer to Walvis Bay. Walvis Bay belongs to South Africa as your Government has itself confirmed in the past. I accept your statement that Walvis Bay does not arise as an element in the settlement process but I cannot agree that "its future is not prejudged in any way", as such a statement implies that there is uncertainty as to its status. On the basis of my discussions with Bill Clark in June I believe that you would not find it difficult to support our position on Walvis Bay.

With warm personal regards

Yours sincerely



R.F. BOTHA

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THE SECRETARY OF STATE
WASHINGTON

CRET

July 5, 1981

Dear Pik:

I have now had an opportunity to review in depth with Bill Clark the results of his extensive discussions with your Prime Minister, General Malan and you during his recent mission. Let me assure you at the outset that the Reagan Administration understands your central concerns: (1) that Namibia not become a springboard for Communist-backed aggression against the Republic and (2) that an independence settlement not be perceived as a defeat imposed upon your country and your countrymen at gunpoint.

We recognize that you cannot endorse an approach that fails to take into account the vital interests of South Africa. I am convinced that it is possible to design a settlement strategy that safeguards those interests and enhances the security of your region. In fact, it is imperative that we do so in our mutual interests. If we do not act now, the unity of the Western nations over Southern Africa will rapidly disintegrate, offering a virtual invitation to the Soviets and their clients to expand Communist penetration of Southern Africa. There can be no doubt that the Communist nations will exploit Western divisions. On the other hand, if Namibia can be handled creatively, I believe as we discussed in Washington that this will permit the development of a relationship of confidence between us, while also reducing Communist presence and influence in your region.

His Excellency
Roelof F. Botha,
Minister of Foreign Affairs
and Information of the
Republic of South Africa,
Pretoria.

SECRET

We seem to have reached agreement on a number of issues. Constitutional guarantees could become part of a set of principles accepted as a commitment worked out prior to the election of the Constituent Assembly. We also appear to agree that formal international guarantees of Namibia's future status would probably not be worth the effort required to negotiate them internationally. Paper guarantees are, after all, nothing more than that. On Walvis Bay, there is agreement that it does not arise as an element in the settlement process and its future is not prejudged in any way. Your position on the acceptability of a scaled-down UNTAG military presence, with narrowed deployment and drawn from appropriate countries, is a positive step that will advance our effort. Concerning the other transitional arrangements contained in UNSC Res. 435 (including its Annex and other ceasefire arrangements), I will assume as I proceed with our allies and the African states that these remain intact apart from the size and deployment of UNTAG and an agreement on its composition.

As Bill Clark and I have both stressed to you, we attach great importance to achieving the departure of the Cuban forces from Angola. We understand that success would significantly lessen your concerns about Namibia's independence. The desired outcome is clear. But we do not believe that the withdrawal of Cuban forces from Angola can be established at the outset of the process as a condition precedent of a Namibia settlement. Neither we nor our allies nor the African parties can accept such an approach. In this sense, the six points proposed to Bill in Windhoek seem to me to alter the approach you and I had discussed in May. Rather, we believe that as we gather momentum through demonstrable progress toward a Namibia settlement this will give us the leverage needed to press for Cuban withdrawal.

We are now at the point where we must have an agreed plan on which to proceed. The following approach provides the minimum basis necessary for going forward with the other parties. To safeguard your interests, the plan envisages three sequential phases; it would not proceed from one phase to another until agreement was reached on the issues at hand. We do not believe, however, that this approach will be attractive to our allies or the African parties unless the overall plan is conceived within a specified time frame

Phase I. Define and negotiate constitutional principles to guide the Constituent Assembly (including agreement on its operating procedures -- e.g. by two-thirds majority).

This phase would begin now, starting with development of Contact Group proposals to be discussed with the internal parties of Namibia, SWAPO, South Africa and the Front Line states. The objective would be agreement among the Contact Group, South Africa and the Front Line. Given the multiplicity of parties within the territory and their diversity of views, we do not believe this can be an all-parties agreement. We would envisage this phase to be completed over the course of three to four months.

Phase II. Refine Transitional Arrangements. Once agreement was reached on constitutional principles the Contact Group would address itself to tying down remaining details in the transitional arrangements foreseen in UNSC Res. 435 and seeking modification (as above) in the numbers and deployment of UNTAG.

Phase III. Once the above agreements are completed, we would ask that you give us a date for the commencement of implementation. My thinking is that this should be done no later than March of 1982, and that implementation itself would commence before the end of that year. We would undertake to use that date to seek a specific commitment to a schedule for Cuban troop withdrawal coordinated with the transitional security arrangements in Namibia. Our objective would be phased withdrawals coordinated with the arrival of UNTAG and the drawdown of your forces as provided in the UN Plan. My assessment is that Cuban troop withdrawal is possible only in the context of some movement toward internal reconciliation which gives appropriate recognition to UNITA's role and weight in the country. I can assure you that the United States will do what it can to facilitate this process.


We will of course continue to consult on how we proceed as the plan develops momentum. You now know our basic approach to Southern Africa and have my commitment that we will not depart from our basic objectives. I believe that this approach can be successful. Specifically, the United States reaffirms its commitment to work by all appropriate means to seek Cuban withdrawal and internal reconciliation. I, in turn, need an assurance from you that we can proceed in mutual confidence with the steps outlined above.

SECRET

In conclusion, I must emphasize the urgency of the situation before us. If we are to establish and maintain a unified Western approach to this question, it is essential that I have a credible and coherent strategy to discuss with our allies prior to the upcoming Ottawa Summit later this month. Before discussing matters further in the Contact Group, I need to know if these proposals provide a basis of understanding that can be said to reflect the position of your government. The courier who carried this letter is under instructions to stand by to carry back your response.

With warm regards,

Sincerely,



Alexander M. Haig, Jr.