

## THE BELGIAN CONGO (II) TOWARDS INDEPENDENCE

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THE Belgian Congo joins the rapidly expanding community of independent African States on June 30th. Its future is by no means assured. Predictions about the outcome of independence range from gloomy forebodings of large-scale inter-tribal massacres and fragmentation, to less sombre assessments of the difficulties that will confront the new government after independence. Nobody is optimistic.

The speed with which the Congo has moved from political servitude to emancipation makes it impossible to forecast with any certainty what the future holds. The political parties and their leaders are unknown quantities; they are in a nascent state at the moment when they are called upon to assume vast new responsibilities. Untested in politics, untried in government, unversed in administration—it will be a miracle if the Congolese leaders succeed in launching their experiment without any major tragedy. Their traducers are ready to revel in their misfortunes; but those who know the circumstances of the Congo will understand their difficulties.

The crux of Congo politics lies in the struggle between nationalism and tribalism; between those who wish for a strong, unitary State in the Congo, and those who desire a federal State of largely autonomous provincial governments based on tribal alliances.

These two viewpoints are crystallized by what has previously happened in Ghana and Nigeria. In Ghana, Dr. Kwame Nkrumah triumphed in his demand for centralized government; but, to achieve it, he had to overcome the federalist demands of the Ashanti, the tribal chiefs in the Northern Territories, and the Ewe nationalists in Togoland.

In Nigeria, the nationalist demand of Dr. Nnamde Azikiwe was defeated by the insistence of Chief Awolowo and of the Northern Emirs that Nigeria should become a federation of the three major regions.

A similar struggle is being waged between the nationalists of Uganda and their traditional rulers. It was a feature, too, of the Sudan in the first year of independence.

Centralism versus federalism has bedevilled politics in the Old World for centuries; it may do the same in the larger countries of Africa. It is easier for the unitarians to win in small countries like Ghana than in the larger countries like Nigeria. The crucial question is whether they can win in the Congo.

The initiative in the Congo independence elections lies firmly with the unitarians. It seems almost certain that they will win the elections. But can they hold the country together against the sulky resistance of their opponents? It took Dr. Nkrumah three years to break the power of the defeated National Liberation Movement in Ashanti; he won in the end, but only after a very bitter struggle.

The difference between Ghana and the Congo is that in Ghana the Government was firmly entrenched. The C.P.P. party organization was broadly based and firmly united. None of these conditions applies at present to the Congo. If a newly independent government has to grapple with the tasks of setting up a new State while at the same time fighting off a determined secessionist movement, the outcome could be doubtful. To put the result beyond issue, the unitarians must achieve two results. Firstly, they must succeed in creating a powerful and united national movement capable of forming a strong and determined government. Secondly, they must succeed in routing the federalists in at least five of the six provinces. It may just be possible for them to deal with a challenge by *Abako* in the Lower Congo, provided that movement has no powerful allies in Katanga and Kasai, the two other provinces where federalism has a measure of popular appeal.

What does this all mean in terms of political parties and personalities? The complex and proliferate parties and their political rivalries only too vividly reflect the background of the Congo with all its immense diversities.

The country covers an area of 900,000 square miles with a population of 13,500,000 Africans and 113,000 whites, of whom 89 per cent are Belgian. The Congolese themselves are divided into 70 major ethnic groups, each of which is sub-divided into hundreds of tribes and clans. More than 400 dialects are actively used. Apart from French, known to the *évolués*, there is no *lingua franca*; although Kiswahili is widely spoken in the eastern parts, and Kikongo in the west. Nearly one-quarter of the Congolese are now urbanized; Leopoldville's population is 350,000, and Elizabethville's 200,000.

The Congo is divided into six provinces. The effects, if not the intention, of Belgian policy have been to develop separate, tribal governments based on district councils. Tribal loyalties have been fostered, and remain entrenched, even in the urban areas. All six provinces have developed characteristics of their own, partly historical in origin and partly due to more recent developments.

Katanga is the area of mining and industrial development, with a Congolese population of 1,650,000 and a white population of 33,500. As an industrial magnet, it attracted workers from many parts of the country. One effect of this immigration was that the indigenous Katanga people felt themselves numerically threatened by outsiders. Elizabethville is only a short distance from the towns of the Northern Rhodesian Copperbelt, and a degree of political affinity is felt between the whites of Elizabethville and those of Rhodesia.

Equatoria—a remote and undeveloped area lying well outside the mainstream of economic and political development—has a population of 1,800,000 Congolese, with only 6,600 Whites.

The Eastern Province, revolving around the expanding and politically lively capital of Stanleyville (the stamping-ground of Patrice Lumumba), has a Congolese population of 2,500,000, and a growing white population of 16,500.

Kivu, the scenically splendid and agriculturally temperate region, is in a minor sense the 'White Highlands' of the Congo: in this area official encouragement was given at one time to white settlement. Its Congolese population, organized into several powerful chiefdoms, totals 2,260,000; its white population numbers 14,000.

Kasai Province, plumb in the middle of the Congo, is the home of the Lulua, a self-conscious tribe who cling tenaciously to their traditional ways of life; this conservatism gave an opening to the ambitious Baluba. The advent of the political age has produced a sharp awakening among the Lulua. The Congolese population totals 2,345,000, and the whites 9,000.

Leopoldville includes the region of the Lower Congo, the home of the Bakongo, the most politically sophisticated of the Congolese tribes. The rapid growth of Leopoldville itself attracted large numbers of people from the Upper Congo; the évolué associations of these incomers came into conflict with the Bakongo tribal association, *Abako*. But the Bakongo comprise

a minority of the total 3,200,000 Congolese in the provinces. There are 33,600 whites.

This pattern of development naturally threw up tribal and provincial parties when the first flood of political consciousness overwhelmed the country in 1949. The effect of this was seen in the composition of the delegations that attended the Brussels Round Table Conference in January, 1960. Sixteen parties were represented by 50 leaders, many of whom had not met each other previously. The meeting at Brussels speeded up a process that had already started in the Congo for the formation of coalitions between like-minded parties.

Seen in retrospect, all the quarrels, suspicions and manœuvres at the Round Table Conference in Brussels were of purely transitory interest. Only two issues of lasting importance emerged: the division of the Congolese into two camps—Unitarians and Federalists; and a marked difference in attitude between a majority of the leaders who came to favour close and intimate relations with Belgium, and a strong, rather vociferous minority who remained deeply suspicious of the Belgians and who have sought immediate ways of diluting Belgium's influence in an independent Congo.

The two minority viewpoints—federalism and suspicion of the Belgians—are championed most strongly by Mr. Joseph Kasavubu, the leader of the *Abako* party of the Lower Congo.

Kasavubu has a great deal in common with Chief Awolowo, although he has never read the latter's book or speeches and has no more than a nodding acquaintance with the name of the great Yoruba leader and first Prime Minister of Western Nigeria. It is not surprising, however, that two such similar viewpoints should arise independently in Africa.

Awolowo's path to Nigerian freedom had as its starting-point the culture and political organization of the Yoruba. He argued that the first essential to future Nigerian unity should be the entrenchment of the interests of the Yoruba and of their affiliated tribes in the Western Region. Only thereafter was he prepared to consider their unification into a wider Nigerian State.

Kasavubu's starting-point is the Bakongo, who once formed part of the powerful Kingdom of the Bakongo. It had declined before the European advent, and was subsequently divided up between the Belgians, the French and the Portuguese.

Kasavubu has been inconsistent over the *Abako's* aspiration to separate the Lower Congo from the rest of the Congo and to

establish a separate Kingdom of the Bakongo following its old historical lines. When I saw him in Brussels in January, he firmly denied any separatist tendencies. "It is all colonialist propaganda." His aim was national unity in the Congo which, he felt, could only be achieved through a loose federation. With the growth of the spirit of national unity, he thought it would be possible to strengthen the central government.

He developed his ideas at greater length when I saw him in March in Leopoldville. In answer to my question whether *Abako* is a tribal party, he said: "It is a national party. This is shown by its struggles for independence for the whole country, not just for the Lower Congo. Our aim is to build the country up from below."

But although Kasavubu claimed that the idea of federalism was winning support in the Congo, his major complaint was over what he felt to be a deliberate attempt to isolate *Abako*. What would happen if *Abako* were isolated as a result of the election results? This is the crucial question likely to face the Congo after independence.

"The Belgian authorities," Kasavubu said, "are supporting our political opponents in trying to isolate us. They do not appear to see the dangers of isolating the Bakongo, whose struggle was primarily responsible for producing independence. They imagine it is possible to rule the country against the bloc of the Bakongo. This is a dangerous miscalculation."

There was a clue to his mind in the following extracts from my interview with him.

The Bakongo could, if necessary, stand on their own feet in the Lower Congo; the other regions could not. If there were tribal divisions in the immediate future, the fault would lie with the Belgian Administration. "If the Belgians try and divide us, there may be a tribal clash. If not, things could go peacefully. If nothing happens before June 30th, things will settle down afterwards. If it doesn't settle down, we would find practical ways of dealing with the situation."

He did not say what practical ways he had in mind. But he did elaborate on what might happen if things went wrong. "If it came to a clash we would try to live on our own, and then start all over again trying to build up from the bottom."

This statement contains a serious threat. What does Kasavubu mean? I can only attempt a personal interpretation.

Kasavubu is determined that when the constitution is drawn

up after the independence elections, it should be of a federal character. If he does not get his way, and if the Bakongo are reduced to a minority within the Provincial Government of Leopoldville (which is possible), the *Abako* may consider setting up their own State. Whether this State will come within the framework of the Congo is not clear. But in view of Mr. Kasavubu's statement that "we would try to live on our own and then start all over trying to build from the bottom", the possibility of, at least, a temporary secession cannot be ruled out.

I put this point to him. Was there not, I asked, a danger that he would be putting back the clock and risking the destruction of Congo unity? To this he answered:

"People outside, and colonialists, should know that we will never again accept the colonial role, even if decolonization should mean a period of tribal wars and bloodshed."

What kind of a man is Joseph Kasavubu, and who are his allies? He is short and squat, with mongoloid and Bantu features; he is suspicious and unforthcoming. He peers stolidly through large glasses; but this general impression of unfriendliness disappears if one succeeds in breaking down his natural reserve. He has a sly humour.

He was trained by the Roman Catholics, and remains close to the Church. But he is at the same time close to the Kibanguists, the separatist church movement of the Bakongo. His closest political adviser is Professor A. J. J. van Bilsen, a Belgian liberal and a staunch Catholic. As a student, he read classics and philosophy. He is a Thomist. After becoming a primary school principal, he studied agriculture by correspondence and later worked for 16 years in the Ministry of Finance. He has great political integrity. The Belgians accuse him of playing politics with Gaullist agents in Africa, and of making secret contacts with the West Germans. He has even been accused of being a Communist agent—a strange charge to level against a person who has maintained such close relations with the Catholics. Is he a foreign agent? His own explanation seems most reasonable. Such contacts as he has had with non-Belgians have been purely of an exploratory character to determine how much aid might be expected after independence to dilute the predominance of Belgian influence. It is easy to see why this objective should be distasteful to the Belgians; but this hardly constitutes a charge against his nationalist integrity.

Kasavubu is most powerful, but not the only leader of the

Bakongo. The party underwent a split (as did other parties) at the Brussels talks. But the oppositional Kanza faction, although a strong irritant, has not seriously weakened Kasavubu. It has, however, provided a lever for his opponents.

Theoretically, Kasavubu's closest ally should be the *Parti Solidarité Africain* (PSA), the other strong party in the Lower Congo. Its most effective leader is Cleophas Kamitatoe, a small, well-built, solemn-faced, fluent commune secretary.

PSA is a party of small rural workers and peasants spread over the 25 tribes who inhabit the Kwanga-Kwila region, one of the most heavily populated parts of the country. It stands for federalism, and began in alliance with *Abako*. But it has lately moved away from Kasavubu. If it goes into alliance with the non-Bakongo parties in the Lower Congo, it could become the most powerful party there. Such a manoeuvre would complete the isolation of *Abako*, so feared by Kasavubu, and would reduce the Bakongo to a minority position in the province, although they could still dominate their own territory in the Lower Congo.

Among the many uncertainties of the Congo, the position of PSA is one of the most teasing. Will Kasavubu and Kamitatoe end up in a strong federal alliance, or will they bitterly dispute for power and authority?

Outside the Lower Congo, pockets of federalist support can be found in Katanga (where Conakat speaks for the interests of the 'sons of the soil') and in Kasai (where some Lulua are defending their political position against the Baluba). There are small pockets of support, too, in Kivu.

A common feature of the federalist movement is that it finds support in areas to which Congolese from other parts of the country have immigrated in large numbers. It is a defence of the local tribe against the strangers. In towns like Elizabethville and Luluabourg, where the 'sons of the soil' are outnumbered, feeling is inclined to run high; and although Leopoldville is not in Bakongo territory, *Abako* consider it their home ground.

But the federalists are disparate and weakly organized. Except for the Bakongo, they often represent the least sophisticated of the political movements in the country. Their role is essentially defensive, and often negative; their policy is largely parochial and inward-looking. For all these reasons they have so far made less of an impact on the national front than the unitarians.

The first name that springs to mind among the unitarians is Patrice Lumumba, a tall rake of a man, with a tiny, narrow head



and a chinful of beard, "specially grown for independence". His manner is lively and vital; his smile is light and quick and frequent; his movements are rather like those of a praying mantis. His tongue is silver; he talks rapidly and ceaselessly. But his easy, pleasant manner is deceptive; Lumumba is earnest and tough and capable, if the need should arise, of being ruthless. His hero is Dr. Kwame Nkrumah; his model is Ghana.

"In a young State," he says, "you must have visible and strong powers."

He is a republican and a reformer. "Our need is to democratise all our institutions. We must separate the Church from the State. We must take away all power from the traditional chiefs, and remove all privileges. We must adapt socialism to African realities. Amelioration of the conditions of life is the only true meaning independence could have."

His outlook is firmly Western. "I am greatly impressed by Dr. Nkrumah's praise for the British. Mistakes have been made in Africa in the past, but we are now ready to work with the Powers who have been in Africa to create a powerful new bloc. If this fails, it will be the fault of the West. We are all ready to be friendly with a West which has helped us up to now. Provided our relations are based on real equality, we can work hand in hand to construct in Black Africa a grand well-organized society."

Ideas spill out, easily and well marshalled. He is a visionary and a realist. Also, he is a fly politician.

Patrice Lumumba heads the *Mouvement National Congolais* (MNC); which, like *Abako*, has split. Its 'moderate' and more Catholic wing is led by M. Kalonji. His own deputy-leader, Victor Nendaka, was expelled after a party rumpus over finance. The MNC appears to be getting a lot of money. Some say it comes from Belgian industrialists, others say it comes from the Belgian Administration; some say it comes from Accra; others say it comes from Moscow *via* Conakry. In the Congo today you believe nothing you cannot personally check.

Lumumba has been working his head off ever since he was released from prison—his manacle scars still lie white on his bony, brown wrists—to attend the Round Table Conference in Brussels. His main efforts are concentrated on party organization and in negotiating coalitions with other unitary parties.

His relations with the Belgians are now excellent. "I am delighted with the new spirit shown by Belgium." His chief



difficulties lie with the federalists, and with his fractious supporters in Kasai.

"The federalists want to divide the Congo, but our future lies in unity. The federalists seek to organize tribal feudalisms because they have no support on the national level."

Kasavubu he claims as a friend, but he is fiercely critical. "We fought together against colonialism. But because we fought against the colonialists that is no reason for wanting to establish a dictatorship, otherwise we are doing what the colonialists did."

He denounces *Abako* methods in the Lower Congo. "They have their private police, and run their own courts. They seek to frustrate the administration. The Lower Congo is full of complaints about the methods of *Abako*. They continue to behave as though they are still fighting the colonialists. They don't realize that things have changed. Because I seek to cooperate with the Belgian Administration under the changed conditions, Kasavubu accuses me of being bought by the Belgians. That is simply not true."

But Lumumba is optimistic about the future. "Our aim must be to have a truly national government. We simply have not got enough people to fill all the posts. With freedom and independence we can build a great nation." There is one qualification. "Every day we stretch out our hand to all the people, and to *Abako*, asking them to forget the past and to think of the future. If Kasavubu does not respond to this appeal, then we are going to have a very bad time."

Everything comes back, in the end, to Kasavubu. To the Belgians and the unitarians, he is the villain of the piece.

There are other fish nearly as big as Lumumba in the unitarian pool. Where they will end up in the election stakes depends on the stable colours they choose to run under when the final coalition lists become known.

Jean Bolikango stands out, at 51, as the prematurely elder statesman. Until recently he was head of *Inforcongo*, the Belgians' powerful and effective propaganda machine in the Congo. Bolikango leapt into the nationalist stream with a bitter denunciation of the role played by *Inforcongo*. He is a tall, broad, proud and handsome man; a strong Catholic, and the leader of the Bangala tribe. The main political influence in his life has been M. Leopold Senghor. But he also finds it possible to admire M. Houphouet-Boigny, the President of the Ivory Coast, "for his

wisdom and calmness." To his own people Bolikango is sometimes known as The Sage, and sometimes as The Moses. Most of his life was spent as a teacher; many of today's politicians were his students. His aim is independence and unity. While he is willing to concede a measure of provincial autonomy, he is inflexibly opposed to federation.

Bolikango stands to the right of Lumumba, and M. Bolya stands to the right of Bolikango. Bolya leads the *Parti Nationalist Populaire* (PNP) which was supposedly set up originally with the help of the Belgian Administration. But whatever its origins, PNP is now viewed with some respect by other nationalists.

Bolya comes from Equatoria. He has a strikingly unusual face, rather like a Congo mask. It is a surprise when it becomes animated. He has a lot of influence, especially among the Mongo; and he has a reputation for honesty. He has managed to weld twenty tribal parties into the PNP. "There is a flickering of tribal feelings. If the other leaders do what the PNP did, we can create a national leadership that can damp down this feeling. There is no reason why each tribe should not remain what it is, yet agree to co-operate on a national level". His policy is to blend unitarianism with federalism.

M. Kashamura is a politician of an entirely different hue. He is a militant socialist. "How is Mr. Nye Bevan?" he asked me. "Tell him when you see him that his illness gave us great concern. All over Kivu our people ask how he is getting on."

Bevan's 'In Place of Fear', and the works of a different type of socialist, France's M. Jules Moch, set Kashamura's feet straying from his close early associations with the White Fathers. He is one of the leaders of the CERE party in Bukavu, and his dream is to build socialism in the Congo. "The Africans are natural socialists." He took time off from the Round Table Conference in Brussels to venture behind the Iron Curtain. "I went as a tourist and I did not have enough time to form any definite impressions. There is good as well as bad; the same as in the West. We Africans will not throw away anything simply for the sake of doing so. We will be guided by our own African past, and take whatever is useful to us from both the West and the East."

His view of the future constitution is that it should be neither unitary nor federalist. It should provide for a strong central government, but with a broad autonomy for the provinces.

Kashamura is now 33, and knows prison life. He has been

a book-keeper and a journalist. His experience of working with Belgian socialists in the Congo suggests they are not 'sincere'. He believes that socialism can only come gradually to a country like the Congo. "We still need the industrial cadres, and we need to form effective labour organizations. Nationalization must come slowly so as not to frighten away capital."

For a country that for so long denied its people the right to politics, the Congo seems to have produced a reasonable variety of politicians. Their experience is limited, and their knowledge of the outside world is pathetically lacking. But perhaps their greatest shortage is of experts in economics.

The financial arrangements between Belgium and the Congo are still in the melting pot. If the Belgians strike too hard a bargain they could easily find themselves in the position of the Dutch in Indonesia. Despite its wealth, the Congo's financial position is most unsatisfactory. It has at the moment virtually no liquid assets.

The public debt is colossal; it stands at something like 49.438 billion Belgian francs. About 25 per cent of the annual budget is required to service these debts. To set off this debt, the new State will inherit the Congo Portfolio, which is valued at about 34 billion Belgian francs, most of it in the country's public utilities. But what is not generally known is that the Congo State will own almost one-half of the shareholding of the powerful *Union Minière*.

The prodigious flight of capital that was allowed to run an unchecked course throughout 1959 and for the early part of this year drained the reserves of the Congo Central Bank. The credit of the Congo Central Bank has been underwritten by the Belgian Central Bank, but on terms that tie the Congo hand and foot.

There are other aspects of Belgian financial policy that should give cause for concern—to the Belgians as much as to the Congolese. Although the Belgians are proposing to provide generous technical and financial aid, their method is open to criticism. It will not be based on normal international standards of government-to-government aid. The Belgians intend to operate their own technical aid scheme in the Congo. This could easily lead to friction and misunderstanding.

But these skimpy observations of Belgian financial relations with the Congo are of necessity tentative as, at the time of writing, I do not know the final outcome of the Round Table Conference on economic relations. The Belgians would, how-

ever, be wise to be both generous and unpaternalistic in their financial dealings with the Congolese. Their interests in the Congo are estimated at something like 350 billion francs; they dare not risk their loss.

Readers who may recall my first article on the Congo in *'Africa South'* (Vol. 4, No. 1) will remember my promise to deal with the report of the Parliamentary Commission of Inquiry that went to the Congo after the riots in Leopoldville in January, 1959. The report forms a useful postscript for multi-racial territories which might seek to profit from the mistakes made by Belgium in the Congo.

The self-deception of Europeans in multi-racial societies is undoubtedly the major political problem still facing Africa. European supremacy is firmly maintained on an elaborate structure of propaganda both intentionally and unintentionally designed to reassure the white rulers of the justice of their cause, and to prevent the outside world from understanding what is really happening.

The Belgians excelled at this practice. They genuinely deceived themselves about the success of their own paternalist policies; they laid a massive smoke-screen that prevented a proper assessment of the wide gaps between the claims of their policies and their actual achievements. Nobody achieved greater success in providing a rationale for their paternalism; moral fervour and intellectual argument were harnessed to their cause. Inforcongo—the Belgian Department of Information in the Congo—was one of the finest propaganda machines in the world; the only pity of it is that it was not put to any better use.

But the efficiency of Belgian propaganda was a double-edged weapon. For the awakening came with such shattering swiftness and force that it left the Belgians bewildered and aghast at their own self-deception.

The moment of truth came with the angry race riots in Leopoldville on 4th January, 1959. Four days later the Belgian Parliament sent their mission to discover what had gone wrong. Before the Commission's report was ready for presentation in March, the Belgian Government had already produced its famous declaration of independence which, in the words of King Leopold, was designed "to lead, without fatal delays, but without inconsiderate haste, the Congolese people to independence in prosperity and peace."

But the riot had turned into a rout; the assurance about

“inconsiderate haste” was swept aside with considerable haste.

The Commission discarded the propaganda, the pretence and deception and the bogus claims about the advantages of paternalism over democratic political rights.

Its starting point was that the murderous riots would never have occurred if there had been no fruitful breeding-ground. Unemployment in Leopoldville was one of the causes. But it set greater store by the failures in human relations; especially between the ‘*kleine Blanken*’—the ‘small whites’—and the Africans.

The Commission defined three stages in the evolution of a colony under white rule. The first phase follows on the period of occupation and pacification; the presence of the white man is accepted without discussion; he gives the orders and is obeyed. The rulers know their wishes. In the second phase the white man’s sense of responsibility for the black man grows weaker. “Blacks are increasingly looked upon as workers with no personality of their own; they must be educated and instructed, though chiefly to increase the value of their labour; they are turned into skilled workers and clerks. At this time the whites in the larger centres have no other relations with the blacks than is necessary for their employment. The blacks make no complaints; they submit themselves without opposition to the privileges enjoyed by the whites. But, gradually, as they become more efficient in their work, their intellectual vision rises and they begin to see things in a different light.”

The third phase comes with the declaration of human rights and the emancipation of colonies. Things become more difficult. “The whites are bound to a society in which the colour of one’s skin plays an important role; on the other hand, the black *évolués* seek the immediate eradication of all colour bars.”

The Commission moves on from this incisive analysis to consider the effects of deteriorating human relations. It shows how the whites become divided in their attitudes to the new situation; some are aware of the need for a new relationship; many remain indifferent; others poison relations by their words and actions. The ‘small whites’ feel threatened by the rise of *évolués* to fill their lower-paid posts; they assume a superiority complex, unsoftened by psychological insight.

Moreover, it is this group that is in closest daily contact with the blacks in their material relations.

On their part, the *évolués*—who become the political leaders

—are not always ready to bring about any improvement in human relations. They screw up their grievances. The absence of genuine social mixing leads to doubts about the sincerity of measures taken by the authorities. "In a country where the white man is both judge and jury, it is human that the black man should begin to feel that he can get no justice because he is black." Another cause of friction is the disparity in wages.

"The individual feelings of vengeance and of grievance are progressively increased; daily the dissatisfaction rises and is exploited by the black leaders in whose interests it is to spread hate against the Europeans. At the first opportunity the hatred explodes."

Apart from the doubtful judgment about the exploitation of racial hatred, this analysis applies as much to Kenya or South Africa or Central Africa as it does to the Congo.

The Commission showed the same honest spirit of inquiry in its careful dissection of Belgian policy in the Congo. Its findings are succinctly summed up in the heading of the chapter: "The tardiness of the Authorities; the lack of decision, and the weakness of the Administration."

The Commission's report put *finis* to the dangerous procrastination and illusions of the Belgians. It upheld the criticisms of those who for years had tried unsuccessfully to puncture the propaganda of Inforcongo. The much-vaunted paternalism was shown to be both ineffective and deceptive. Those who had praised it came to lament it. Even the Prime Minister of Belgium, M. Eyskens, was forced to say: "Indeed a political mistake was made in the past." But the mistake was discovered only after African nationalism had bolted from the stable.