

Negotiations, armed struggle and the ANC

Stanger meeting, Thursday 19 July 1990

We live in a most remarkable country. For many years now the people of South Africa have been locked in a struggle between democracy and apartheid repression. For many years the regime attempted to control and then to eliminate the organisations and people committed to building democracy in the country. The regime used a combination of military and repressive measures; it used political trickery to establish dummy institutions like the tricameral parliament; it used economic policies to ensure the continued deprivation and exploitation of the majority of our people. The results of those policies are clear for everyone to see: apartheid has long failed, even indeed to provide security for the white minority who were supposed to benefit from it. At this stage the regime has gone only so far as to admit that apartheid was "a mistake", and has come to publicly embark on a programme to remove and reshape elements of white minority domination whilst protecting minority and other rights. In the process it has now begun to talk about negotiations, to talk about the need for a political settlement of the South African crisis. But negotiations in the regime's view is meant to relieve international pressure, to devise new strategies to upset the liberation struggle. It demands of the ANC in particular and the majority of people in general that they prove their commitment to "peaceful politics", whilst the regime remains armed and unwilling to curb the blatant racism and violence of the rightwing and the regime's surrogate forces. It demands of the ANC a renunciation of violence and an end to the armed struggle and of international sanctions in the face of continuing apartheid violence and the implementation of apartheid laws.

Now it seems that there is some difference of opinion between the various parties to the conflict about exactly what the issue is. Apartheid is not simply a mistaken set of policies that can be corrected by simply changing them or removing them from the statute book. It is not simply a question of the Separate Amenities Act or the Group Areas Act or the Labour Relations Amendment Act. Apartheid is not the National Party government either. Rather, apartheid is a system of political exclusion and socio-economic domination that has become rooted in the very fabric of our society and is seen and lived in the inferior schools for black people, in the conditions of ruthlessly exploited farm labourers, those who have been forced off

their land, in the ghettos of our cities, in the separate and powerless political institutions of government, in the bantustans, in the violence that bedevils the country and particularly in Natal, in the realities of homelessness, malnutrition, poverty, street children, and a host of other social and economic forms. Apartheid laws, in short, over a long period of time have bitten so deeply into the political, economic and social fabric of South Africa that the removal of apartheid, its eradication, involves the wholesale removal of the system, not some tinkering with fine details within it. We do not need to reform the system, we need to root it out. We need to transform South Africa into a country in which its people can share a common humanity, a democratic order that informs our political and social activity, a just society that treats all its people equally, fairly and according to universal principles, a non-racial society that strives to contribute to the forces for peace in our troubled world.

In order to do this in the face of incredible hostility and against immense difficulties, the ANC for its part has consistently and deliberately chosen a particular path of action, guided by its political principles through a combination of different strategies and tactics determined by the historical conditions of the time. Over the years, the principles have become clearer, more defined perhaps, whereas the strategies and tactics have developed according to the situation as it has changed.

I want to divide the discussion into three parts, hopefully touching on issues that will raise questions and discussion:

1. ANC approach to negotiations and armed struggle in a historical context
2. what should negotiations be aimed at achieving and how best should this be done
3. what has happened since the Grootte Schuur meeting, particularly on the issue of stumbling blocks to negotiations.

1. historical background to negotiations and armed struggle in ANC thinking

ANC has never been opposed to a negotiated or political settlement of the South African question. Indeed, its history illustrates its commitment to this view: from 1912-1961, a period of nearly 60 years it struggled to put its views to the rulers in a peaceful manner. With the development of the apartheid system in the 1950's in particular, the ANC's commitment to a democratic order became stronger and stronger

and its determination to achieve those ends intensified too. It only included limited forms of sabotage as a form of struggle to complement previous policies after (a) the regime banned it for political reasons, and (b) after the Verwoerd regime refused even to acknowledge the call for a national convention of all South Africa's people to create a new constitution. Instead it imposed its whites-only Republic ushered in May 1961.

Even then, the ANC did not reject negotiation. The Manifesto of Umkhonto we Sizwe of 16 December 1961 stated that the limited armed struggle was being launched in an attempt to bring the whites and their government to their senses, to realise the stupidity of their racism and to prevent the development of a massive conflict in the land. It also warned that if whites did not respond positively, then the way was set for a determined and bloody war between the forces of progress on the one hand and the forces of reaction on the other. The point quite simply, is that the founders of Umkhonto we Sizwe, drawn from the ranks of ANC and the SACP, even at a time of formulating military strategies against white domination were concerned about how to deal with a situation if whites did indeed come to their senses. At Lobatse in 1962, the first consultative conference since banning resolved, amongst other things, that the regime should create a climate of normality, what we today would call a climate for negotiations by unbanning the people's organisations, allowing exiles to return, unjust laws had to be removed, those in prison had to be released, and the like.

We all know what the response was: the regime built itself a massive arsenal of laws and weapons behind a wall of white privilege, determined to prevent democracy from taking root in our country. Again in 1971, in response to calls for a limited national convention, the ANC put its position clearly. It argued that such a convention should be sovereign and have unlimited authority to change South African society in all its aspects. It repeated the need for a specific political climate which would make it possible to work: unbanning of all political parties and the return of exiles; release of political prisoners and the lifting of restrictions on individuals; the full participation of all leaders in the deliberations of the convention in all aspects of its work; total agreement with the Universal Declaration of Human Rights; the repeal of apartheid legislation such as the then Terrorism Act, etc.

It restated its position at Kabwe in 1985, where the National Executive Committee was given authority to consider the question on an ongoing basis, again in

greater detail in 1987, and in numerous statements since then, where negotiations have been defined as complementary to other forms of struggle. In this context, the four pillars of the general struggle have included - for a variety of historical and strategic reasons - support for the mass struggles of the people; the extension of the armed activity of Umkhonto we Sizwe; the consolidation of the ANC within the country in conditions of illegality; and a two-pronged international campaign to (i) isolate Pretoria and its supporters, and (ii) encourage and build support for the democratic movement in South Africa. The cumulative effect of the domestic struggles, coupled with the developments in Angola and Namibia and the change in the balance of forces in the region against the Pretoria government and internationally in the form of the new international relations have opened the way for a negotiated settlement to be placed on the agenda.

Now all of this history is not meant merely to prove the regime's intransigence in these matters. The record in that regard is clear. What it is meant to stress is the very different view of the world that the ANC projects. It also shows a very different attitude towards constitution making, if you like. In the process of building the apartheid state over the years the regime stripped all semblance of democracy from its relations with black people generally. But, significantly, with the onset of Botha and his securocrats operating behind the tricameral parliament and buttressed by death squads, states of emergency and such like, the regime challenged and removed in effect what little democracy whites enjoyed in their own little world. I would argue that De Klerk, even with his return to "parliament" and the changes he has introduced still operates within the basically undemocratic vision of the white political culture which he helped build all those years he has served in government. Thus, even after all of these centuries of white minority rule, we hear him demanding the continuation of minority rights which will effectively hamper the majority in their ability to govern according to clearly articulated and widely accepted democratic principles.

2. What do we perceive the purpose of negotiations to be; what is the best means of getting there?

First of all, it is important to stress that as far as the ANC is concerned, the issue of negotiations cannot be isolated from the mainstream struggle to destroy apartheid. As such, it does not replace other strategies that have been used

successfully up till now in that fight. As such, negotiations exist side by side and in conjunction with these other strategies until a point is reached where for particular reasons the role of one or more of these will be reconsidered. This is the reasoning behind the position that suggests flexibility on the questions of sanctions and the armed struggle, but that these can only be reconsidered when the time is ripe, when the processes are indeed irreversible, and when the obstacles to the fulfillment of negotiations have been removed. This is so precisely because the struggle is the removal and end to apartheid, not simply negotiations for their own sake. In other words, because negotiations are concerned with the future well-being of all our people, to isolate them from the violent conditions of people's everyday existence is to doom them to failure.

As indicated earlier, we perceive negotiations as one way towards establishing a democratic South Africa that encompasses the following principles: unitary, non-racial, non-sexist, non-exploitative, fully democratic, rejecting ethnicity, creed and race as building blocks or components of a new constitution but accepting the rights of religion, language, culture and other rights entrenched in a Bill of Rights; a new system of equality before the law and a new legal system supervised by a non-racial, independent judiciary. A new South Africa would operate within the confines of the Charters of the OAU and the United Nations, committed to respecting the rights and sovereignty and territorial integrity of all countries and pursue a policy of peace, friendship and mutually beneficial co-operation with all peoples. These principles are all contained in the Freedom Charter; the basic policy documents of the ANC, the Constitutional Guidelines for a Democratic South Africa, the Principles of the Harare Declaration and are shared by vast numbers of people and organisations within South Africa and the world.

We further believe that certain processes are better to deal with the establishment of a new constitution for our country than others.

In this regard we believe that (i) a constituent assembly and (ii) an interim government are best suited to South Africa's needs, for the following reasons:

...a Constituent Assembly is democratic because it contains the representatives of those parties and constituencies, big or small, that have a proven support base within the country. As Thabo Mbeki has stressed, the election of a Constituent Assembly will resolve the so-called numbers game once and for all, proving in democratic fashion which organisations enjoy the support of the people, rather than

those who merely claim to represent the people. We do not believe that the vast majority of South Africa's people should be held hostage by a small, sectarian group of people, black or white, unwilling or unable to endure the creation of a democratic South Africa. More than that, we believe that the people of South Africa themselves must be part of the process of building the new constitution, and not merely be involved in the ratification of a document after the event. This is in keeping with the democratic, mass-based tradition of the ANC in particular and the democratic movement in general. The needs and desires of the people must be reflected every step of the way in the creation of the new South Africa. Finally, the Constituent Assembly, as a sovereign, authoritative body will not need to be regulated by veto powers of either the tricameral parliament or sections of the South African public.

...on the issue of an interim government, the following can be said. First of all, De Klerk and his government do not stand above the politics of South Africa as if they are independent of it. No, in fact they are part and parcel of the very system that needs to be thrown out. Thus for them to demand the position of both player and referee of the transition makes no sense at all. The legitimacy of the apartheid regime has been successfully challenged both at home and abroad. What is more, its historical record shows clearly its inability to even reform itself without being pressured to do so. The regime represents but a tiny percentage of South Africa's people. The National Party does not even represent a majority of the whites, let alone the black majority. It still administers apartheid laws in the fields of education, security, the economy and the vote, to name just a few, even though it says that apartheid is a "mistake". Therefore to signal in principle its desire to break decisively with the past and practically to recognise its shortcomings the regime should accede to the demand for an interim government not only to supervise the processes associated with the constituent assembly but also to administer and govern the country as a whole during that time. It cannot be allowed to continue with apartheid policies whilst the system they support is being dismantled.

3. The post-Grootte Schuur period.

The meetings or "talks" as they have been called between the regime and the ANC need to be carefully defined. There are a number of differences between discussions

or talks; consultations; and negotiations. Discussions or talks relate to swapping views on issues with a view to discovering points of agreement or disagreement. Consultations refer to discussions that take place between allies, to work out common strategies or common understandings about issues. Negotiations on the other hand refer to deliberations between opposing parties or forces and occur in a specific manner, linked to a deliberate timetable of change, and to a definite programme of reconstruction. As such, talks occur at a very early stage of a longer process that can but might not, for a number of reasons, develop into negotiations. What we see at the moment is not negotiations as such, but a process meant to clear the path towards negotiations.

The discussions so far, and indeed even the February 2 speech by Pres De Klerk, are directly related to the developments of the past eighteen months or so. The effects of the State of Emergency began to be rolled back in dramatic fashion from the beginning of 1989, beginning with the success of the hunger strikes in January and February, the defiance campaign, and the reemergence and "unbanning" of peoples organisations. The events of 1989, of course, followed the major defeat of the Botha government during the campaigns around the Municipal and local government elections of October 1988. The violence and shake up that followed the general election in September last year accelerated the collapse of the regime's State of Emergency strategies. Second, the economic problems of the country as a whole began to bite deeply and laid the basis for the further development and consolidation of workers struggles, particularly around the amendments to the Labour Relations Act and the Living Wage Campaign. Third, in August last year, after extensive discussion and debate, the Harare Declaration was adopted not only by the OAU, the Non-Aligned Movement and the United Nations, but it was also endorsed by the Conference for A Democratic Future in Johannesburg in December. That Declaration included a set of basic principles to govern the new South Africa, a detailed plan to establish a climate for possible negotiations, a set of procedures to govern the process of creating a new, post-apartheid South African constitution, and a programme of action for the international community. The Harare Declaration presented the regime with a formal, widely legitimate set of conditions for securing a political solution to the conflict that apartheid had created. In many ways all what De Klerk has done since he came to power is respond to that declaration with a set of counter-proposals.

The Harare Declaration sets out clearly what the ANC and many organisations and international bodies perceive as the best way forward for South Africa.

In practical terms it foresees mainly two processes: the creation of a climate for negotiations after which a negotiation process itself can develop. That climate has not yet been created, although De Klerk has gone some way towards its creation. The details are well known by now: release of all political prisoners and detainees unconditionally and refrain from imposing restrictions on them; lifts all bans and restrictions on all proscribed and restricted organisations and persons; remove all troops from the townships; end the State of Emergency and repeal all legislation, such as the Internal Security Act, designed to circumscribe political activity; and cease all political trials and political executions. It appears some further progress has developed to address these issues through the work of the Joint Working Committee established at Grootte Schuur. But recently, some other problems have surfaced, but more of this later.

Now it is in the interests of assisting the regime to identify and to remove the final obstacles to negotiation - such as the end to the violence in Natal which is a national issue, not a local issue; the question of rightwing mobilisation and activity; the definition of political offences, prisoners etc - that the ANC engaged in the Grootte Schuur discussions with the government. In other words, those were not even "talks about talks" but rather "talks that might help to get talks about talks and negotiations going" at some later date. That is where we seem to be now. What is not formally on the agenda at this stage is the discussion of constitutional issues and concerns, although these are thrown around quite a lot. This is important, for two reasons: (i) the ANC itself, not the government, first made the suggestion of starting that round of talks to which De Klerk responded positively; and (ii) the withdrawal of the ANC from the initial round in reaction to the developments that culminated in the Sebokeng shootings did not illustrate their fear or distrust of negotiations as such, but rather were a signal to the regime of the seriousness of the delicate situation that had developed at that time.

Once a climate has been created, the Harare Declaration sets out a set of broad proposals for implementation to see the process through. The nitty-gritty details are being sorted out at the moment. The objective is not negotiations by themselves, but rather the eradication of apartheid and the inauguration of a new South African constitution. Negotiations are a means towards that end, not an end in themselves. The Harare proposals are as follows:

1. discussion must take place between the national liberation movement and the regime about a mutually binding ceasefire to bring about a mutual suspension of hostilities on both sides

2. negotiations to establish the basis for the adoption of a new constitution then follow. The foundations of that new constitution rest on agreeing on amongst others the Principles of the Harare Declaration, principles basically embodying the broad outlines of the Constitutional Guidelines

3. agreement on the principles should be followed by negotiation over the necessary mechanism for drawing up the new constitution. This is where our demand for a Constituent Assembly, as elaborated in the resolution of the Conference for a Democratic Future, comes in

4. agreement must be reached on the role of the international community during this transition period, such as monitoring

5. next is the "formation of an interim government to supervise the process of drawing up and adoption of a new constitution; govern and administer the country, as well as effect the transition to a democratic order including the holding of elections."

6. after the adoption of the new constitution all armed hostilities shall be deemed to have formally been terminated.

7. the international community would then lift sanctions.

Having said all of that, we must note that there are at least two sets of developments that are cause for major concern as they represent effective stumbling blocks to the further progress of the negotiation initiatives of the ANC and the government. These include the emergence of a well-informed, organised rightwing assault mainly on the democratic movement, but also against everyone involved in the current discussions. The second factor is the continuing and unabating escalation of the violence in Natal.

Now, both of these have been with us for a long time before this "talk about talks" period. For generations the people of South Africa have been subjected to reactionary violence from the state and its supporters. What is different now is that the violence of the rightwing exists side by side with the continued violence of the state, for example, in the form of the CCB, the actions of security forces in Natal, the Boland, the Vaal triangle and other areas.

Over the last months, an increasing number of bomb attacks, assaults and even murders of members and supporters of the democratic movement, have all been the responsibility of these reactionary forces, whether from within or outside of state structures. They have openly declared war on the ANC and its allies, members and supporters, threatening the assassination of our leaders, the bombing of our property and the random killing of our people. Their motivation for these attacks is to sabotage attempts to construct a democratic order in South Africa. As such they are the enemies of transformation.

Assuming for the sake of argument that De Klerk wants to control his security forces and keep them on a negotiation footing, he seems to be singularly unsuccessful in this task. A few arrests and detentions of rightwingers does not convince the serious observer of the state's efforts to contain the right wing. This is because the media and many commentators talk as if the rightwing military threat is something of an aberration, something that has its roots and source outside of state structures. Thus there is an assumption that the rightwing threat is external to the state. That assumption is probably a false one. The rightwing violence feeds on those sources of state violence that were streamlined during the period of the States of Emergency. To a large extent the rightwing has the skills and ability to wage war because they have been exposed to the conscription in the SADF and find justification in the racism of state policies that they were brought up on and defended. It has the protection of anonymity because, it seems, the hunted are in many cases the hunters. At least in an institutional sense, the SAP, for example, are looking for their own people. They are the products of apartheid, who have been trained in the art of destabilisation by the ruling regime. Responsibility for their actions, their public mobilisation into white vigilante groups, their wartalk, lies with the De Klerk regime. The state must assume that responsibility with due haste to prevent their actions from destroying the goodwill that has been created so far.

The violence in Natal is part and parcel of the countrywide violence that threatens the progress along the path to creating a climate for negotiation. This is so because the essential features of that violence are similar to what has and is happening elsewhere: the vigilantes, the death-squads, the police involvement, the activities of a bantustan governing authority, the overcrowding, the poverty, the education crisis, etc, are all common-place. The difference with the Natal region

is the high level of concentration of those forces in one area, coordinated largely by one political organisation. Furthermore, the origins of the recent violence can be found in the threat that Buthelezi identifies as a loss of authority of himself and his movement as a result of the historical pressures operating around and overtaking him. His attempts to retain or even hold onto power are linked to his inclination and desire to play a significant influential role in a negotiating process and even in a post-apartheid South Africa. As such, the violence is directly linked to the events that are occurring in national politics, and as such form part of that national politics.

The great bulk of the violence, from whatever quarter and in whatever form, either from the rightwing and the state, or indeed as we experience it here in Natal, is aimed specifically against the struggle of the majority of our people for the creation of a democratic, non-racial society based on majority rule.

The point has often been made by a number of people that the lifting of the ban and the partial lifting of the State of Emergency, the release of some prisoners etc has indeed opened up the political atmosphere to the extent that free political activity exists. In such conditions it is argued, the original need for the armed struggle in particular has fallen away. Indeed, it has even been suggested that it is the armed struggle of the ANC that is holding up progress, and that it is this violence that is forcing the rightwing to do what it is doing.

To argue in such a manner is in fact to simplify and distort the issue. As I indicated before, the struggle is against the apartheid system; the armed struggle is aimed against the violence inherent in that system. Cde Mandela stressed shortly after his release from prison that "As I said when I stood in the dock at the Rivonia trial 27 years ago and as I said on the day of my release in Cape Town, ANC will pursue the armed struggle as long as the violence of apartheid continues." He stressed in Soweto that "Our armed combatants act under the political leadership of ANC, cadres of our people's army are engaged not only in military affairs but as the political commissars of our movement. We are therefore disturbed that there are certain elements amongst those who claim to support the liberation struggle who use violence against our people. ... We condemn that." Essentially, Cde Mandela was differentiating between the legitimate use of armed action against the regime and the system of white minority domination, but condemning the wanton violence of thuggery and confrontation against the people. The regime and many others want to

confuse the two, as they have done for example in Natal. The violence in our province has as its origin the violence of forces acting in their own narrow and Pretoria's interest and against the democratic movement. But the concept of legitimate armed struggle goes further than this example as well. Apartheid is still with us, but more obvious perhaps is the emergence and strengthening of so-called rightwing violent formations operating in a number of places, notably Welkom. That violence springs from the children of apartheid who have no desire to witness the dawn of a free South Africa. They are part and parcel of the legacy of apartheid and responsibility for controlling them lies therefore with the apartheid state. In conditions where the regime is seen to act with benign tolerance towards their actions and their continued mobilisation, it is only fair to conclude that such action bedevils that spirit of hope and promise behind the current political initiatives of the regime.

Basically, the verbal promises of the new era need to be delivered through concrete action on the ground, not the piecemeal release of prisoners, the partial lifting of the state of emergency, and so on. This is all the more important when signs exist of state inaction in crucial areas relating to their responsibilities at this stage. Furthermore, the regime has not yet attempted systematically to popularise the idea of negotiations within the white constituency itself. Whilst on the one hand the democratic movement has worked tirelessly through public speeches, workshops, seminars and informal discussions to debate and discuss the position and principles of negotiations, the Harare Declaration and other initiatives, there is very little evidence besides some SABC commentaries or NP statements that the government has done anything concrete to develop a sense of legitimacy for what it is doing, particularly amongst whites.

In this atmosphere, we have, as the Chief of Staff of Umkhonto we Sizwe has said,

We have a moral duty to defend our people and deprive the government the monopoly of violence. As long as this violence continues, we shall continue with the armed struggle and continue to call on the people to strengthen and participate in the activities of Umkhonto we Sizwe.

South Africa is definitely at the crossroads. Many lives have been lost. Violence is escalating. The edifices of apartheid are crumbling and it is clear that neither the country nor its people can be ruled in the same old way. There is a growing awareness that change is not only necessary but possible. The regime alone cannot effect this

change. The path to a non-racial democratic future can only be charted through the collective efforts of all South Africans and their various representative formations.¹

As far as the argument about the ANC's armed response being responsible for the rightwing, I can mention the following. For many years we heard the same arguments when people claimed that the regime and whites in general could not talk to the ANC because of the armed struggle. Well, that situation has changed. But it is worth while noting what President Tambo said in 1987 in response to those claims: "The Pretoria regime is refusing to negotiate not because there is an armed struggle, but because it is unwilling to give up white minority domination." His views were supported by the Eminent Persons Group, for example, when it reported that the government, at that stage, was prepared only to negotiate on its own terms, which, "in regard to objectives and modalities, fall far short of reasonable black expectations and well-accepted democratic norms and principles." It went further to stress that "To ask the ANC or other parties, all of them far weaker than the government, to renounce violence for all time, here and now, would be to put them in a position of having to rely absolutely on the government's intentions and determination to press through the process of negotiation. ... A suspension of violence or a commitment to non-violence, if in the government's view the meaning is the same, would obviously in the present context require a commitment to suspend the violence arising from the administration of apartheid."

Basically, the rightwing have declared war on the people not because of the armed struggle, but because they are fundamentally opposed to the democratic politics of a new South Africa. Why they act in such an open way, also in opposition to the regime itself, is because they believe that the regime has sold them out. Their's is not a liberation movement as they think. It is a renegade movement, based on the philosophy that was defeated in World War 2, and they are bent on using terrorist methods to secure their exclusive will. They are opposed to the principles of the ANC primarily, and oppose the strategies and tactics of the movement because of what they are aimed at achieving.

Let me close with the words of Mwalimu Julius Nyerere addressed to representatives of the international community at Arusha in 1987 when the storm clouds of repression hung low over South Africa:

1 Chris Hani, "ANC and the Armed Struggle", paper delivered at the "Future of the Security and Defence in South Africa" Conference, Lusaka, 24-27 May 1990

Political power for the people of South Africa is the key to a non-racial and democratic future for that country. It will be achieved, but its achievement will only be the beginning. It will not by itself transform the social and economic conditions. For the racial, economic and social structures which have been built up will not fall down, and all the effects of decades of racialism and oppression will not be wiped out, when the people take possession of political power through their representatives.

Nor will those who internally and externally now support apartheid on that day suddenly become supporters of democracy and equality and justice. There will be those among them who will try to cause, and will encourage where they do not have to create, chaos and lawlessness and acts of angry revenge. And there will be many - inside South Africa - and even among those outside South Africa who do not like apartheid - who will complain when democracy and justice for all does not exist the day after a representative government takes over the reins of political power. And the people themselves, after all their years of suffering, will be impatient for radical changes - for relief from the desperate conditions in which they live - even while their young government is still struggling to create and use new and democratic instruments of government.

These things we must - all of us - recognise now. We must intensify our efforts to abolish apartheid. But as we do so we must not try to pretend that the struggle for justice and democracy in South Africa will end on the when the apartheid government is replaced by a government of the people. For that new government will have urgent need of our support and understanding, especially in its early years.

I say it again: changing the structures of political power in South Africa is the first task. Building justice and human respect and democracy in a society which has for more than 75 years been based on oppression, domination and racial discrimination, is the second task. And it will not be an easy task.

His wisdom spells out the demand that we "claim no easy victories and avoid the temptation of euphoria".

Finally, in the words of Rev John Lamola of ANC Religious department, "Peace in South Africa is coming. But its authenticity and durability shall be determined by how it comes. Let us insist on true peace, peace with justice."

Ian Phillips