

A Perspective on the Background to the ANC Constitutional Guidelines - Dr Ian Phillips, University of Natal, Durban.

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At the present time, the political turbulence and conflict that has become part and parcel of everyday life in South Africa shows no signs of receding. At the same time we hear more and more about "negotiation" and/or "political settlements".

At bottom, a negotiating process should involve some common definition of the terms under discussion, as well as a common commitment to the future. In South Africa, whilst there is common agreement in most political circles that apartheid has failed, overstayed its welcome, or is in decline, there seems little agreement as to what actually it is that should be eradicated and even more debate over what should replace it. In other words, the fact of the injustice of apartheid is not debatable, but what should replace it is. Some see political inequality as the main bone of contention; others go further than that. The Law Commission report, for example, stresses the need for the protection of first generation political rights of the individual; whilst the realities of South African existence demand that we go well beyond this, to incorporate the concepts of second and third generation rights in our conceptual framework. The first generation of rights refers to civil and political rights and the rights of due process (or recognition of the Rule of Law). Second generation rights refer to that body of rights concerned with social, economic and cultural matters. These received recognition in international law only in the 1960's. The third generation of rights refer to the rights to development, to peace, and to social identity.

In SA today, there are some who wish to restrict the transformation process to the provision of first generation rights, ie giving formal rights to people who won't be able to really change those rights into practice or into real rights. As one leader commented: the vote is important and necessary, but you can't eat it. Others, notably in the philosophy of the State Security Council and the JMC structures suggest that second generation rights are sufficient: provide bread and butter, but not the vote. Very few constituencies look to the third generation of rights. The democratic movement in SA proposes that we need address all three, try to combine them into a programme that extends democracy and the benefits that flow from it for the benefit of all, rather than restrict democracy and preserve elements of privilege/status embodied in the current inequities of the apartheid system.

Also of importance is the divergence between the historical experience of representative democracy through institutions

such as the exclusivist white Parliament and its successor, the tricameral system, and the development of theories and institutions of direct, popular democracy exemplified in the structures that emerged around the street committee system in townships and shop-steward councils in factories in the 1980's. There seem to be at least two different political cultures in SA: one based on unscientific notions of the absolute nature of ethnicity, racial groups and identity, exemplified through the operation of our own extra-parliamentary form of autocratic and irresponsible government, the National Security Management System; another culture is based on the idea of popular participation in government, in policy making and the administration of policy. This latter culture finds expression in the institutions that are popularly called 'organs of people's power'. This experience of diverse cultures is not unique to SA, but appears in societies that are torn apart by social conflicts. One thinks immediately of the examples of Brazil and Nicaragua.

As a starting point, then, let us be clear on what the ANC perceives apartheid to be, in order to place the Freedom Charter and the ANC Constitutional Guidelines into some kind of general perspective. One of their publications published in commemoration of the 75th anniversary of the movement in 1987 provided the following definition:

Apartheid is not merely racial discrimination. Its central feature is not the segregation of public amenities. Apartheid means not only inequality, racism, national and racial oppression and exploitation of the black majority in our country, but also the means necessary to enforce it, to defend it, and to guarantee its survival in the face of powerful forces of resistance fighting to defeat it. Apartheid is a form of violence that operates, every moment of the day, against our people and the other peoples of Southern Africa, to perpetuate a white monopoly of political and economic power.

I will return to this definition of apartheid and its broader significance at a later stage.

In general, there is a widespread belief that Pretoria has no intention of negotiating either now or in the near future. Alex Boraine referred to the process - of which this conference is a part - of creating a climate for 'negotiation'. The seriousness of our situation is evident in the horrifying proportions of poverty in SA's countryside and in the towns; in the deaths that are the result of political conflict, deaths that occur not only in our townships but also amongs the community of South Africans who have been forced to live in foreign lands. My own area of Natal witnesses between 60 and 70 lives lost each month, although

our newspapers are largely silent. A common perception has developed that it is no longer possible to "wait for government": the initiative for creating a democratic future that can be sustained must be taken by ordinary people, you, me, the people outside this hall. If government follows, all good and well. It has become necessary to extend the discussion about the country's future beyond the extremely limited parameters that the state tries to impose on us. We need, in short, to break the barriers that the state imposes on us ideologically and politically, if any headway is to be made. Perhaps we too should employ the tactics of "people's sanctions", the mobilisation of strategic public support against the policies and direction of Pretoria, policies that have clearly failed. At the same time, though, I am concerned with the prospect of discussions conducted "behind the backs of the ANC", or indeed, behind the facade of security provided by their illegal status that could encourage the perception that only once they produce a 'suitable' programme should they be allowed to participate in our politics. Gatsha Buthelezi can refer as much as he likes to the "ANC mission in exile", Pretoria can refer as much as it likes to the influence of Lusaka and Moscow. What both refuse to acknowledge publicly is that the ANC is here, at home, and is not considered a 'threat to security' or whatever by millions of South Africans. Alex Boraine pointed this out very clearly.

Ultimately, a "behind the backs of the people" perception is based on the notion that the important concessions should of necessity derive from within the ranks of the oppressed rather than the ruling groups.

Debating political options or settlements involves some recognition of the principle of negotiation. Most organisations in SA today have acknowledged a principled preference for negotiation. There is considerable difference of opinion about the mechanics and nature of negotiated settlements. Two rhetorical questions: Should they, for example, emerge from elite discussion and accommodation, the participation of ethnic identities in the nascent National Council, or from a sovereign constituent assembly based on individual selection and universal franchise? Does your idea of a negotiated settlement emphasize the preservation of privileges or elements of the apartheid system, or does it recognise the need to eradicate apartheid and to embark on a process of transformation?

At this stage, the state has not proscribed the ANC's constitutional guidelines as it did the Freedom Charter Charter for many years. More significant is the government's recent total ban on the ANC's statement on the question of negotiations itself. The symbolism of that act speaks volumes about Pretoria's intentions. The organisation's position on the issue is clear cut. You may recall Stoffel Van Der

Merwe's quotation - or should I say misinterpretation of the Sechaba editorial of September 1987 on the issue, and the subsequent permission to publish the piece. The fullest treatment of the issue is contained in a statement dated 9 October 1987. To briefly summarise the document:

The statement was drawn up partly as a response to the issue being raised internationally and locally, and partly as part of their desire to eradicate apartheid "as soon as possible and with minimum loss of life".

The ANC, like many other organisations and governments, is convinced the government has no desire or intention to negotiate at present. It sees the government's statements about negotiation as attempts to defuse the resistance inside the country and to get around the international isolation campaign. It argues that Pretoria's intentions must be defined in terms of their actions: namely the policies that they enforce through such things as the States of Emergency that are conflictual rather than designed to promote an end to, or resolution of, violence.

The document reiterates the ANC's position that it "has never been opposed to a negotiated settlement of the South African question." It stresses that the talks must be with "genuine representatives" and aimed ultimately not at the mere reform of apartheid or shaving off of the sharp edges, but rather at "the transformation of our country into a united and non-racial democracy".

It goes on to state that the issue of whether to negotiate or not should be fully discussed itself, with the leadership released from prison and in conditions of free association and organisation. Similarly, the government would have to show its seriousness through action, rather than mere promises.

Crucially, the NEC statement argues that "An essential part of the apartheid system is the definition and division of our people according to racial and ethnic groups, dominated by the white minority. To end apartheid means, among other things, to define and treat all our people as equal citizens of our country, without regard to race, colour or ethnicity."

The ANC's "Constitutional Guidelines for a Democratic South Africa" form an integral part of the turbulent context of the present. Not only are they the product of a major actor today, they also are linked to a powerful tradition of political struggle.

The guidelines formally have their origins in the work of the National Executive Committee's constitutional committee, the Legal Affairs Department, and a series of 'in-house seminars' that drew on many people from all sections of the movement.

The seminars, in particular, provided the basis of the ANC's hopes, priorities and plans. They discussed, inter alia, the role of religion and of education in post-apartheid South Africa, women's and workers' rights, the nature of different electoral systems, bills of rights and the creation of one South African nation. The constitutional committee conducted comparative analyses of dozens of constitutions: socialist and non-socialist, unitary and federal. Two major concerns, for example, included the ways in which workers' rights are protected both in law and in fact, as well as the relationship of central to local government, and how that affected theories of popular autonomy and accountability.

Debate within the ANC alliance is neither new nor surprising, yet it is clear that a number of influences began to coalesce prior to 1983/4 that merged to form its current approach to a post-apartheid South Africa. The basic principles enunciated in the preamble to the guidelines have their origin in the set of principles embodied in and developed through the programmes of the ANC itself: Its own Bill of Rights of 1923, its reaction to the Atlantic Charter in 1941 expressed through African Claims in 1943, the Programme of Action of 1947, the constitution of 1953, the Freedom Charter, Umkhonto we Sizwe's manifesto issued in 1961, the statements that emerged from their conference in Morogoro in 1969, comments in 1971 about the definition of a national convention, the important Kabwe conference in 1985 and down to the present time. Those principles embody a commitment to (i) judicial equality of people instead of the differential treatment of persons on the basis of ultimately spurious conceptions of race and/or ethnicity; (ii) a belief that government derives its authority from the people as a whole and that it is accountable to them; (iii) and that the struggle itself is not fundamentally between people, black and white, but rather is between a social system that is inherently evil, unjust and undemocratic and one that strives to be built on the foundations of democracy and justice.

First, there is a long tradition of discussion and interpretation of the Freedom Charter within the movement itself. The Charter occupies a special position within the Congress tradition, and in the history of ANC policy-making in particular. The Freedom Charter is more than just a document. The Charter represents an important contribution to international human rights literature in that it expressed a concern for 2nd and 3rd generation rights even before they had emerged. But the Freedom Charter also represents a process of policy creation, an attitude towards constitution making. Its background can be traced ideologically to the "Votes for All" demand of 1948. Its organisational roots, however, go back to ZK Matthews' call in 1953 in Queenstown that developed into the Congress of the People Campaign in 1955. The campaign around the Charter, the process of going out to the people, on farms, in the reserves, in cities,

black and white, ensured that the document itself is imbued with a popular or democratic culture and tradition. So too now with the Constitutional Guidelines: the people must discuss and create the blueprint of what kind of South Africa they desire.

Even before the Charter's adoption by the Congress in 1956, it had been the subject of numerous exchanges, many of them hostile. Significantly, many contemporary critics seem ignorant of the development of an internal debate about the meaning and role of the Charter. Nelson Mandela's New Age articles of the 1950's, the defence submissions of the Treason Trial, its assessment as a "revolutionary programme" in 1969, and the numerous discussion articles in the official journals of the ANC and allied organisations, all form part of an interpretive dialogue. The present guidelines continue the process of elaboration.

A second factor is essentially a pragmatic one. The apparent ill-preparedness of Zimbabwe's resistance movement at Lancaster House played some role in alerting ANC people to the need to establish a coherent set of proposals to bring to the table if negotiations began. Equipped with such a package, the ANC could hold a much stronger position than if they were caught unprepared or were armed only with slogans. Thus, from the early 80's at least, more solid proposals than the suggestive clauses of the Freedom Charter were considered necessary.

Another significant factor was the transformation in the ANC's status after 1984/5. It became a major contender for power, not only in the eyes particularly of whites locally, but also internationally, given the recognition accorded the movement by Pretoria's traditional allies. The ANC's visibility and obvious popularity within the country increased dramatically in the wake of the national repression that followed the stirring rebellion of 1983/4. That domestic challenge coincided with and reinforced the increasing success that the organisation achieved in its international diplomatic and public campaign to isolate Pretoria and its policies, most notable in Western Europe and the USA. Pretoria's dwindling moral authority after its violent response to the events of 1976/7, not least the death of Steve Biko, received another blow with the implementation of the States of Emergency and the failure of 'reform'. The ANC's increasing importance internally and as a semi-'government-in exile'(a status the ANC resists) also focussed critical attention on the organisation and its policies. Foreign conservative governments thought in terms of their foreign policy imperatives and the nature of alliances with an ANC controlled government; local critics looked for greater cohesion and a sense of pragmatism that they could not find in the Freedom Charter or the general statements of the movement. It is important to note that the constitutional



appraisal began prior to the high-profile exposure of whites to the ANC, and the subsequent complaints voiced in the "liberal" press about the ANC's reliance on vague formulations rather than solid proposals. The government, through its most recent mouthpiece, "RSA Policy Review", has attempted to show that the ANC constitutional guidelines are merely an attempt by the organisation to jack up its image in the eyes mainly of whites but also the international community; hence they deny the seriousness of purpose of the organisation. This latter policy of the state is just as pernicious and dangerous in the long run as their propaganda efforts to portray the organisation as nothing other than a gang of thugs with no accountability, legitimacy, or indeed mass support, or sense of justice.

It also seems probable that some people within the movement were also influenced quite considerably by the mood of the moment in 1984/5, when the regime appeared to be under considerable strain and near breaking point. The transition to a post-apartheid South Africa was not far off, in these calculations. Essentially though, it was accepted that objective and subjective features/conditions in SA were changing, and that a post-apartheid South Africa finally seemed imminent, rather than a mere vision or future dream. Hence the necessity to convert the Freedom Charter "from a vision for the future into a constitutional reality", or as Zola Skweyiya, chairperson of the Legal Affairs Department put it, "to take the idea past the slogans and towards realisation" .

The guidelines have a particular status that needs consideration. Both Skweyiya and President Tambo have stressed that the proposals are "no more than" guidelines. The document itself stresses that it comprises only "basic guidelines for the foundations of government". Originally, the organisation planned to publish a fully-fledged draft constitution. The idea was shelved, it appears, because of the recognition that although the Congress movement is in the forefront of the resistance , Congress itself is not representative of all anti-apartheid organisations. More pointedly, it argues that a new constitution should, ideally, be the product of the deliberations of a sovereign, popularly elected constituent assembly.

The existence of pre-conditions before negotiations can start in official statements of the movement and the allegation that they are ultimately only interested in insurrection are two elements that need not sow gloom or cynicism amongst whites who feel distanced from the ANC and its politics. Ever since the movement developed a theory of armed struggle and incorporated armed actions as part of a broader political policy, it has always stressed that such actions may indeed be dissolved if the conditions giving rise to the decision in the first place were removed. Agreement to

suspend the armed struggle formed part of the message the EPG was to deliver to Pretoria before that mission ended in failure when the SAAF bombed Lusaka, Harare, Gaborone, all members of the Commonwealth. Stoffel van der Merwe practically admitted the legitimacy of the decision for armed struggle in 1961, in an interview with the Detroit Free Press in July, 1987.

Significantly, the literature places a good deal of stress on the divisions that have occurred within the white community, particularly amongst groups formally closely aligned with the government itself. The threat of the consolidation of the white laager has for the most part not happened as the conflict has increased. Idasa's own rise is witness to this phenomenon. In January this year, the ANC declared that "In keeping with the intensified efforts to address the question of power, the ANC has tabled for consideration by all the people of our country a set of Constitutional Guidelines. We urge everybody to discuss these and make proposals so that finally a position emerges which reflects the broadest national consensus. In building that consensus, the possibility will be created for all of us to advance more purposefully together for the birth of the new South Africa which we together will have helped to define." The declaration was in effect an open invitation to participate in the creation of a new South Africa, rather than the presentation of a fait accompli. That too is in marked contrast to the politics of the government: the tricameral constitution was presented only to whites to declare their support or otherwise; it was then rushed through parliament, with less than one third of its clauses being discussed. Little wonder that it has failed because it bears no relation whatever to the reality of an integrated society.

What do the ANC Constitutional Guidelines include? The proposals have to be read in conjunction with the preamble, a section that has not been printed by most newspapers. It specifies some general principles. The Freedom Charter is placed firmly at the centre as the embodiment of "the political and constitutional vision of a free, democratic and non-racial South Africa". The removal of discriminatory legislation is not sufficient to create the new society: state structures and social practices associated with apartheid will have to be dismantled and discarded. Corrective action is necessary to guarantee "a rapid and irreversible redistribution of wealth and opening of facilities to all".

The protection of individual rights irrespective of race, colour, sex or creed, and the cultural and linguistic rights of all are guaranteed. The protection of group or minority rights based on ethnicity or race are specifically rejected, because such protection would entrench and perpetuate the status quo where the white minority controls/possesses 87% of



the land and 95% of the national wealth. The preamble also suggests that the success of the new system depends on the greatest possible involvement of all in every sphere of government and administration.

The guidelines envisage the establishment of "one central legislature, executive and administration" responsible to "the people as a whole", but permits the delegation of powers to subordinate bodies for administrative purposes. Traditional institutions such as "hereditary rulers and chiefs" will be transformed in accordance with Constitutional principles. State structures, ie "all organs of government including justice, security and armed forces" will be democratised and defined not in terms of loyalty to a government, but rather to the Constitution. The above proposals do not extend much beyond the 1969 Morogoro Conference analysis of the Freedom Charter which stressed the undemocratic and racist nature of state instruments under apartheid. The 1969 analysis referred more particularly, however, to the abolition of current structures and their replacement with "democratic organs of self-government in all the Provinces, districts and towns of the country". The current proposals' failure to specify what is meant by "transformation" and democratisation may highlight ANC reluctance to produce a final constitution. Still, the self-evident problem of democratising, say, the SADF, SAP or Special Branch cannot be minimised.

A Bill of Rights "based on the Freedom Charter" will embody the principles of the Constitution. It would guarantee basic human rights and stipulate pro-active duties of citizens and state institutions to eradicate the social and economic inequalities produced by apartheid. Basic freedoms, such as association, worship, expression, thought, press and the practice of multipartyism, are defined by the rejection and criminalisation of racism, fascism, nazism, and the incitement of ethnic and /or regional exclusiveness. The latter confirms, for example, the ANC's rejection of bantustans and ideas such as the 'boerestaat' , and an independent Kwazulu/Natal. Political parties that endorse racist policies and espouse racial membership, like the NP, KP and others, would also be proscribed. Apartheid and racism are rejected internationally with good cause. Significantly for the ANC, a Bill of Rights should extend beyond justiciable limits to become a legal programme, one that seeks to protect rights and eliminate racism and socio-economic injustice. Practical implementation of the latter desire is formidable but necessary: consider the issue of property rights, the unjust 13/87 % distribution pattern, in the context of agronomy.

On this point, let me cite one commentator's views on the land issue:

"In the past three decades more than three million South Africans have been forcibly removed from their homes and farms, on the simple legal basis that they were black. Apartheid law then conferred legal title on owners whose main legal merit was that of having a white skin. Whom would the proposed Bill of Rights protect: the victims of this unjust conduct, which has been condemned by all mankind as a crime against humanity, or the beneficiaries? Although oppression and poverty are not necessarily completely synonymous, they do tend to go hand in hand. Where would the people, condemned as squatters after living on land for generations, their homes bulldozed into the ground, get the finance to compensate the new owners with their legal 'titles', when the only collateral the dispossessed would have has no known market value, namely, centuries of suffering and dispossession?"

This is not to say that there are no white farmers with a deep love of the land, who in the future would have no role to play in the growing of the food the country needs. Nor is it to argue that the past humiliation of the oppressed can only be assuaged by the future humiliation of the oppressors. One of the main functions of a new Constitution would be to guarantee conditions in which all citizens, independently of race, colour or creed, could make their contribution to society and live in dignity and peace. But it is to insist that there be constitutional freezing of the present unjust and racially enforced distribution of land. There might be good arguments for careful study of transitional arrangements, for giving the present owners alternatives to sabotage and fighting to death, for taking care to maintain high levels of food production while generations of agricultural scientists are being trained, and for creating the conditions in which a common patriotism involving all South Africans is allowed to evolve. But these are essentially pragmatic factors that belong to the arena of political debate. They are not inalienable human rights principles that can be written into a Bill of Rights."

The misunderstood "national group" phraseology of the Freedom Charter has been dropped. Instead, there is now a clearer commitment to the creation of one South African national identity. The recognition of the linguistic and cultural diversity that exists in the country remains. Minority rights qua ethnic rights are rejected. Again, the present proposals echo the Morogoro analysis which elevated national and cultural rights to the level that whites had assured for their own culture, to the detriment of others.

The economic clauses are less direct than the Freedom Charter in its references to nationalisation. Against the backdrop of the preamble's comments about redistribution of wealth, the current document reserves to the state the right to determine national economic policy and direction. It confirms numerous

ANC statements that favour a mixed economy (how "mixed" cannot be determined abstractly.) An important attempt is made to draw the rural, peasant agricultural sector into the national economy through the combination of a co-operative sector with village enterprises, small-scale family and farm activities, all supported by the state. Affirmative action in the acquisition of managerial, technical and scientific skills is also promised. Finally, "property for personal use and consumption" will be guaranteed, restrained by the state's right to "direct and limit the rights attaching to the ownership and use of private productive capacity." Like the Freedom Charter, the economic references of the proposals do not envisage an inevitable transition to socialism. A restructured economy within the above terms in present-day South Africa would have a remarkable effect. Perhaps the one notable absence in the new proposals is a detailed definition of the land question and the issue of land redistribution. This latter element received more attention in the Morogoro analysis, and its exclusion here may be in deference to the practical problems of destroying the bantustan system, the question of nationalisation without compensation, and the like - issues of great magnitude that I have already touched on. The urgency of the question, especially given the phenomenon of resettlement, is paramount. The references to small-scale farming activities and co-ops in a post-apartheid South Africa could indeed refer to the break-up of current ownership inequalities and the redistribution among a newly established peasant class.

A good deal has been said about the inclusion "for the first time" of the rights of workers. The Morogoro analysis stipulated the freedom of "all who work...to form trade union, to elect their officers and to make wage agreements with their employers." Furthermore, that analysis maintained that the rights of all "miners, domestic workers, farm workers, and civil servants" were the same as other workers, namely, the right to form trade unions and join political organisations. Teachers also were assured this right.

Finally, the proposals elaborate a policy of non-alignment in international affairs and a commitment to work within the OAU and UN for world peace and disarmament. All the latter featured in the Freedom Charter, the Morogoro analysis and more recent statements as well.

Most critics argue that the guidelines are too inspecific and/or are prescriptive. The ANC scotched the idea of producing a detailed constitution as such. To demand too much detail is to contradict the allegation that they are prescriptive. Furthermore, such arguments mistake the ANC for a political party, rather than a mass movement. The guidelines are not final either, although a major difficulty here is how to engender discussion in such a way the feedback occurs. At the same time, the ANC works from the broad idea

that a constitution must not only reflect the formal structures of society but must also provide a programme.

Ultimately, the ANC Constitutional Guidelines form part of a wider democratic tradition underpinned by universal principles and a belief in nationhood. As such, they are part of a wider discourse about the future. That tradition is as rich and fertile as the heritage of Pretoria and sundry schemers is barren and bankrupt. A future dispensation may involve compromise and concession, but these must be defined within particular parameters. Some mention has been made that in practice the "non-negotiables" actually tend to become "negotiables" once the process starts. That worries me to the extent that it could provide the excuse for some constituencies to believe that pragmatic considerations should, rather than do, in many circumstances rule out or even replace principles.

What is central to the definition of apartheid mentioned in the beginning is the following: (i) the issue of political power, buttressed in ANC thinking by the principle of non-racialism which they espouse and practice in their movement and politics; (ii) the issue of economic power which they see residing overwhelmingly in white hands for white purposes, and (iii) the solution of the South African conflict cannot be resolved by concerns only with the issue of political power, precisely because that conflict takes place on the ground and in circumstances of real poverty, deprivation, land dispossession, violence, repression and the exploitation of labour. The preamble of the ANC constitutional guidelines makes this point simply and in a straightforward way. I stress these points because the 'scarey concepts' such as nationalisation or redistribution notwithstanding, it is essential for whites in particular to realise the intensity of feelings around these issues as well as to come to terms with them. Numerous scientific and journalistic surveys indicate the reality and far-reaching presence that the ANC has in SA today. Whilst workshops and conferences may deliberate on such elements as the federal/unitary aspects of constitutional systems, proportional representation as opposed to simple majoritarianism, nationalisation or presumptions of free enterprise, it is well to remember and realise that outside and beyond, people are waging a struggle in the streets, townships, factories and schools, that will not end unless the contradictions are firmly tackled and wrestled with. The "scarey concepts" are not scarey to the mass of the anti-apartheid movement. But everyone realises that transition and transformation is not an easy or simple task. If I may quote the words of one of Africa's great statesmen, Julius Nyerere:

"Political power for the people of SA is the key to a non-racial and democratic future for that country. It will be achieved, but its achievement will only be the beginning. It

will not by itself transform the social and economic conditions. For the racial, economic, and social structures which have been built up will not fall down, and all the effects of decades of racialism and oppression will not be wiped out, when the people take possession of political power through their representatives.

"Nor will those who internally and externally now support apartheid on that day suddenly become supporters of democracy and equality and justice. There will be those among them who will try to cause, and will encourage where they do not have to create, chaos and lawlessness and acts of angry revenge. And there will be many - inside SA - and even among those outside SA who do not like apartheid- who will complain when democracy and justice for all does not exist the day after a representative government takes over the reins of political power. And the people themselves, after all their years of suffering, will be impatient for radical change - for relief from the desperate conditions in which they live - even while their young government is still struggling to create and use new and democratic instruments of government.

"These things we must - all of us - recognise now. We must intensify our efforts to abolish apartheid. But as we do so we must not try to pretend that the struggle for justice and democracy in SA will end on the day when the apartheid government is replaced by a government of the people. For that new government will have urgent need of our support and understanding, especially in its early years.

"I say it again: changing the structures of political power in SA is the first task. Building justice and human respect and democracy in a society which has for more than 75 years been based on oppression, domination and racial discrimination, is the second task. And it will not be an easy task."

As one leading member of the ANC put it, "freedom" will be achieved "at all costs, but not at any price". To underestimate or to scorn the resolve of the liberation movement is suicidal and can only be rooted in an equally iron resolve not to recognise the injustice of apartheid and the rewards to the few that that system provides.