

Strategic Issues in the Struggle for National Liberation
in South Africa

A recent issue of the periodical Africa Now ^(July 1983) ~~(8)~~ carried an article which detailed organizational changes within the African National Congress of South Africa (ANC). The most important consequence of these changes will be to bring the military wing of the ANC, Umkhonto We Sizwe (MK), more firmly under the control of the political apparatus of the organization. This move implies, somewhat belatedly, recognition of the profound political changes which have occurred in South Africa over the past ten years.

Up to the present time, the major burden of the analysis of the contemporary conjuncture in South Africa offered by the left in general, and the ANC in particular, has been to demonstrate that legislative and other policy changes, introduced by the regime - for example, provision for the legal recognition of black trade unions, the abandonment of the legal reservation of certain jobs for whites only, the spread of Africans into white collar jobs, concessions to black businessmen, some constitutional adjustments and the Bantustan policy - do not amount at all to real reforms of the system of Apartheid. Thus, not only have these analyses revealed the narrow limits of the policy shifts and how marginal their effects are when measured against the demands for the liberation of the black people as expressed in the Freedom Charter ⁽¹³⁾ ~~(2)~~, but it has also shown that "reformist" policies have been accompanied by an unprecedented expansion of the coercive apparatuses of the state and of external military aggression in Angola, Lesotho and Mozambique.

While this analysis is undoubtedly correct and while it is clearly politically important to expose the shallowness of the so-called reforms, nonetheless the pre-occupation solely with the question of whether or not the "reforms" amount to a substantial move towards the liberation of the black people is insufficient. That pre-occupation is inadequate because it assumes that since the "reforms" are unacceptable, there is no need to analyse their effects

1. The programme of democratic rights adopted at the Congress of the People in 1955.

upon the conditions of struggle. The extent, however, to which "reforms" meet demands by no means exhausts the analysis, for what remains to be investigated is how, and to what extent, the "reforms" transform the political terrain, set up new bases of conflict and contradiction and pave the way for possible ~~new~~ alignments.

This distinction appears obvious, but it seems to have been difficult to grasp in the South African situation perhaps because of the overwhelming opaqueness of the ideological and political structures of racial domination. The empirical pervasiveness of racial oppression functions to fuse the question of the acceptability of "reforms" with the question of their consequences for political struggle because it leads to the assumption that whatever changes are introduced, short of the total elimination of Apartheid, modifications in the position of specific black groups and classes, will have little lasting effect on the propensity of all blacks to unite in total opposition to the regime.

Underlying this position is the conception that the structure of racial domination is constituted as a fully integrated, monolithic and homogeneous unity which is neither subject to uneven development nor riven by contradiction. In this view, race will, under all conditions, assert itself as the unifying force. From this standpoint, the specific conditions which may affect the way in which black classes or class fractions define their interests and allegiances are not of major concern.

Given that, in this approach, race is prioritized, the conclusion is, perhaps, not particularly surprising. What is more surprising is the fact that even where racial domination is taken to be a function, or an instrument, of South African capitalism, as it is in much of the literature of the liberation movement, a similar conclusion is arrived at. At

least, insofar as capitalism and racialism are viewed as being ineluctably implicated in one another, then, so long as capitalism exists in South Africa, structures of racial domination will inevitably be reproduced. Since capitalism cannot shed, even in part, the racial structuring of social relations and since, consequently, struggles against racial domination are continuously generated, therefore, the common interests of all black classes against the political shell of capitalism, Apartheid, will assert itself. Thus, in this instance too, the specific conditions which may affect the formulation of differing interests among the various black classes or class fractions tends to be marginalized.

The pre-occupation with the reformist content of "reforms" leads, however, not only to the underplaying of the problem of class interests and alliances within the dominated black population, it also raises serious obstacles in the way of investigating the changing structures of the political sphere. Thus, there is a failure to analyse, for example, the relationship between the judiciary, legislature and executive, the existence and nature of extra-parliamentary centres of political organization, the legality of extra-parliamentary politics, the relationship between the coercive state apparatuses and the political practices among the black people. As will be argued below, this may have important consequences for the formulation of the policies and strategies of the national liberation struggle.

In what follows, my object is to identify major phases in the structuring of the political terrain since the present regime came to power in 1948 in order to discuss how this connects with class alliances and strategic issues in the contemporary conjuncture.

That the election of the National Party to power in 1948 inaugurated a new, distinctive phase in South African history has, by now achieved the status of a truism. Nevertheless, no satisfactory characterization of the specificity of Apartheid or of its major differences from the previous period of

segregation has yet been made. Most writers, while admitting the distinction between the two periods have, nonetheless, stressed the continuity between Segregation and Apartheid, arguing only that the latter represents the modernization, rationalization and intensification of the features of the former. Thus, on the one hand, the elaboration and extension of the structures of racial domination reflected in the Bantustan policy of separate development, the increased regulation of the African labour force, the perfection of the ~~system~~ system of social and political separation and so on, are said to define the racial policy embodied in Apartheid. On the other hand, the argument goes, Apartheid as an authoritarian system takes on an ever more repressive and coercive character than it inherited in 1948. Indeed, in the literature of the national liberation movement and also, rather more fully developed, in other writing, post-1948 South Africa has been characterized as a fascist or police state. In this literature, it is the intensification of repression (the introduction of "fascist measures") which transforms the state into a police or fascist state.

In all these analyses, then, Apartheid is seen merely as the development and extension of features which were already present in the earlier period of Segregation. In this approach there is a focus on discrete features of the society - repressive measures, labour control, fascist legislation - but since it fails to examine the structural conditions it is unable to contextualize the aspects which it analyzes. If, however, we look beneath the surface of the specific enactments and measures adopted by the regime since 1948, it becomes possible to identify three phases or periods each of which is characterized by a different political structure.

The principal characteristics of the political sphere which existed when the National Party gained power in 1948 may be briefly summarized as follows. The political subordination of the black community as a whole to the dominant white social forces was secured through a system in which: (i) whites only participated in a bourgeois democratic form of parliamentary

government. At this stage, the executive of the state was generally subject to the control of the legislature; (ii) At the same time, the judiciary enjoyed a considerable degree of autonomy from the legislature and executive and, indeed, exercised constraints both over the executive (for example, habeas corpus and the defence of other individual rights) and over the legislature (for example, the blocking of the first attempts to repeal the limited franchise of Coloured voters). (iii) The existence of strong, non-parliamentary organizations of national liberation organizing mass political action on a legally protected (albeit within limits) extra-parliamentary political terrain.

It is true that throughout the period between 1948 and 1960, precisely in response to the mass struggles, the government set in train a series of measures which both narrowed the sphere of legal politics and tended to enhance the power of the executive, and, in particular its coercive apparatuses, at the expense of the judiciary. Ironically, this outcome was achieved on the basis of the supremacy of parliament - the authority of the judiciary over the executive precluded the latter from acting outside of the law and compelled it to seek legislative powers through parliament. There is no need to dwell at length on these measures - they included the Suppression of Communism Act which, despite its title, empowered the arbitrary proscription of any organizations and individuals who opposed the regime and under this act the Communist Party and other organizations were banned as were hundreds of individuals from attending meetings or belonging to political organizations or trade unions; the Public Safety Act which provided for severe penalties for the commission of an offence (however trivial) by way of protest against state policies; the shifting of the burden of proof onto the accused in certain political trials; the limitation of the discretion of judges in such cases and so on.

All this notwithstanding and despite the extensive use of the

coercive state apparatuses, the possibilities of mass mobilization and political action^{existed} and were utilized throughout the period to organize a series of major campaigns against state policy. Amongst these were the Defiance of Unjust Laws Campaign in which thousands were imprisoned for the breach of racist laws, the Congress of the People which, after a country wide campaign, adopted, at a mass gathering, the Freedom Charter which embodies fundamental national democratic claims and which, still today, constitutes the basic document of ANC policy, freedom of speech campaigns, stay-at-home strikes against both policy and police repression, and the protracted struggles against the Bantu Education Act.

A major condition of possibility of these struggles, despite the growing power of the repressive organizations of the state and the gradual erosion of the authority of the judiciary, was, undoubtedly, the fact that the extra-parliamentary terrain continued to be protected in law.

This situation contained the seeds of a crisis, for, given the legal constraints built into the existing state structure, the regime was incapable of subordinating and controlling the political opposition which its policies generated and which was reflected in the increasing involvement of the black people in the mass struggles led by the ANC. The crisis erupted in March 1960 when an anti-pass demonstration at Sharpeville was broken up^{by} the police with firearms; 69 people were killed and some two hundred more wounded. This event sparked off strikes and demonstrations throughout the country. To regain control of the situation, the government declared a state of emergency, arrested and imprisoned thousands of political activists and called out the police and the army.

When the state of emergency was lifted some six months later, the stage had been set for a new phase in South African politics.

Sharpeville provided the occasion for the restructuring of the political terrain. Firstly, the ANC and the Pan-Africanist Congress, a breakaway organization, were declared illegal. Secondly, the attempt by the underground ANC and allied organizations to organize a stay-at-home in May 1961 was throughout subjected to intensive police harassment and the strike itself met, once more, by massive police and army action. The cumulative effect of these interventions and other similar ones was to radically weaken the already limited sphere of legal extra-parliamentary political action. The response of the national liberation movement was to establish a military wing and to embark upon a campaign of sabotage which was conducted by small units of Umkhonto we Sizwe. This, in turn, provoked a series of responses from the regime - the Sabotage Act which not only provided for extremely harsh penalties (including the death sentence) but also increased police powers, further limited the autonomy of the judiciary and placed a still heavier burden of proof on accused persons to ^{establish} ~~prove~~ their innocence in trials under the act; the law also provided for periods of detention, which could be repeated endlessly, at the discretion of the police and, in such instances, the courts' power to grant habeas corpus was abolished and the way opened for the interrogation under torture which has become an everyday practice; a massive increase in the powers of the security forces and, indeed, the constitution of the security apparatus as the dominant arm of the state

The outcome of these and a host of other measures was not only the abolition of virtually all legal rights to extra-parliamentary political activity, but, in addition, the substantial elimination of the organizations within this sphere by means of the banning of organizations and the proscription and imprisonment of their activists. In this period (1960 to 1973), then, the terrain of extra-parliamentary mass political struggle was abolished and the movement was driven into the narrow confines of sporadic acts of sabotage and leaflet distributions which largely exhorted general opposition to the Apartheid system. Now, the political space was filled by armed confrontation between liberation movement and the state. In this context,

there was no room for political campaigns around the sort of particular demands which had been at the centre of the liberation struggles during the 1950's - repeal of the pass laws, a living wage, the right to vote, the right to organize trade unions and to strike, the right to a good education and so forth. Now, the struggle was directly for state power unmediated by intermediate demands and conducted, not through mass campaigns but through the acts of underground units of the organization.

Despite the emergence of the Black Consciousness movement among students in 1967, this situation remained largely unchanged until well into the 1970's. The event which marked the beginning of the process which led into the third phase in which the extraparliamentary political sphere was reconstituted, was the large scale African workers strikes in 1973. These strikes, which involved some 60,000 workers reflected important changes in production and the labour requirements of industry, in the composition of the African labour force, in the economic plight of black workers, and other conditions, signalled the renewal of mass struggles not only in the industrial sphere but also within the urban black communities. The strikes ushered in a period of intensive industrial unrest in all the major industrial areas and an unprecedented growth of an independent black trade union movement. This has led to legislation permitting, for the first time, the legal recognition of African workers as "employees" and also the legal recognition and registration of African trade unions with the accompanying right, albeit under highly hedged conditions, to strike.

Side by side with the industrial struggles, mass opposition to the policies and practices of Apartheid, particularly as they affect everyday conditions of life, began to emerge in the black communities and, in particular, under the influence of Black Consciousness, in African schools. These conflicts culminated in the Soweto uprisings of 1976. The impact of Soweto on the political scene cannot be overemphasized because it established the fact that new conditions had arisen in

South Africa which made possible, once more, the organization and conduct of mass political struggles. Indeed, since 1976 there has been a mushrooming of black community organizations and continuous agitation on specific demands (transport, rent, social welfare, health, the position of women, schooling etc) but also, frequently, more general claims formulated explicitly with reference to the Freedom Charter and the ANC. This political activity, the political stance of the black churches, the increasing politicization of black culture, the recent revival of the Transvaal Indian Congress, the links between trade union struggles and the communities and the formation of the United Democratic Front as a broad political front to organize for the winning of the demands of the Freedom Charter, are all manifestations of the de facto reconstruction of the terrain of mass struggle.

This is not to ignore ~~the~~ the strong tendency towards the militarization of the increasingly powerful executive of the state (it is clear, that even within the sphere of white bourgeois democracy, the position of parliament has been considerably weakened by complex institutional changes which diminish its mechanisms of control over the various political apparatuses of the executive), nor the fact that the security and coercive organizations of the state are being continuously strengthened. Hardly any mass political or trade union activity occurs without police harassment, arrests and, often, violence. Nonetheless, political and trade union action intensifies and becomes more extensive, draws in more and more of the popular masses and broadens its scope. Furthermore, it is important to note that whereas in the 1950's the mass struggles were met only by repression, now the trajectory is different for they are met, in the present period, both by repression and by an ideology of reforms and, indeed, the introduction of policies which claim to be reformist and which have the effect of opening up a space of contestation.

It is precisely this reconstitution of the political sphere and the specific policies adopted by capital and the state in relation to it which makes the ANC's strengthening of its

political organization so significant. The significance lies in the fact that the rise of the independent black trade unions has raised the question of the politics of trade unionism and the development of community politics poses the problem of the relationship between the struggle for demands which are reformist in content and the revolutionary struggle for national liberation. In this context the position and role of the black petit-bourgeois assumes importance as does the class content of the liberation struggle. I want to address briefly each of these aspects in turn.

It seems clear that a number of factors contributed to the ~~eviction~~ ^{of the} regime's earlier policy to oppose, by all means including police repression, the formation, recognition and activities of African trade unions. Among these factors were: the strong cohesion among black workers which emerged in the 1970's and their solidarity against employers and the state in the course of strikes and other actions, the support given by the workers to the newly formed unions, the pressure on the government from sections of capital who believed that the disruption of production through strikes was due to the exclusion of African workers from institutionalized negotiating procedures, the attempt, within the governments' total strategy to establish a relatively privileged, stable urbanized black working class which would be divided from the working class based in the rural areas, particularly the Bantustans. Be that as it may, once established on a firm basis, formidable political risks would be involved were the state to attempt to return to the status quo ante by disbanding the black unions and rendering them illegal.

Instead, the regime has adopted a different strategy the central thrust of which is to try to control the unions and, in particular, to ensure that the unions abstain from politics and confine their demands and activities to wages and conditions of work at the point of production. In other words, the state (and employers) act to compel the unions to limit themselves to economic demands. To this end a variety

~~a variety~~ of tactics have been employed. Thus, a condition of legal recognition and registration is that the union must confine itself to strictly trade union matters; again, politically oriented trade union officials and activists have been detained without trial and subjected to torture; unions which have in fact taken up broad political issues and have aligned themselves with community organizations, have been met with state violence; some employers have refused to negotiate ^{with} unregistered unions.

As in other countries, the view that trade union activities should be restricted to wages and working conditions has received support not only from capital and the state but also from within the trade unions themselves. The debate, of course, is an old ^{one} but in South Africa it has been argued on the left that because of the pervasiveness of race and its penetration into the very productive relations in industry, every struggle in the factory is, at the same time both a trade union struggle and a political struggle. From this the conclusion has been drawn that, for the conditions of black workers to be reformed, the black unions must struggle against the structure of racial domination and, hence, must align itself with the national liberation struggle. A number of important black trade unions hold this position to-day.

by the Federation of South African Trade Unions (FOSATU)
 As against this, it has been contended/that, despite the intrusion of race into industrial relations, the job of the trade union movement is to struggle for the rights of workers in the work place. To go beyond this is, in the conditions of South Africa, to jeopardize the existence of the unions and hence to weaken, if the unions are crushed, the general workers movement since the unions constitute the basis of the political movement although they are not part of it. The material basis of this strategy is the fact that while the political unions are the most militant (and have won important victories on the trade union front), they are also the most vulnerable to state repressive action as I indicated above.

These differences between the two sets of unions have constituted an important obstacle in the way of the unification of the black trade union movement although, recently, because of the support that the politicized unions have received from the workers, FOSATU has been obliged to shift its position in a more political direction. Nevertheless, the issue of the political direction of the black trade union movement cannot be regarded as having been fully resolved. One crucial reason for this is the fact that there does not exist inside South Africa an organization of national liberation which, as such, is capable of organizing all the different oppositional elements - ^a trade unions, community organizations, churches, etc., - into/coherent force with the power to overthrow the regime. The ANC has accomplished much inside the country and it has enormous influence as the leading force of the struggle, yet it ^{has} neither ~~has~~ a legal presence as an organization and nor does it appear, so far, to have found the organizational form which would enable it to forge a hegemonic bloc of oppositional forces against the regime.

This lacuna has led to at least two responses. On the one hand, the FOSATU unions have, as I pointed out above, contended that the unions must restrict themselves to reformist trade union matters and that the political struggle must be led by an entity which they label "the workers movement" but which apparently has no organizational form or even an existence. On the other hand, the political unions, for example the South African Allied Workers Union, have both argued that the unions must intervene in community politics and have in fact done so. But trade unions are not organized to carry on political work outside of their own constituency; a union is not a political party. Thus, in one case the policy relegates the unions to an entirely reformist role, while in the other case it impels it into political activities which are beyond its organizational capabilities. The question of the role of the trade union movement in relation to the struggle for national liberation thus remains an urgent one which still requires to be resolved.

The community organizations and, more generally, the struggles in the African communities raise questions of a similar order - questions which, as I have already suggested, were irrelevant in the conditions of the 1960's when revolutionary politics ^{was} virtually confined to the arena of sabotage and armed struggle. In the contemporary period, the host of concrete demands made in the African communities - for housing, lower bus fares and rents, for education and health services - ~~use~~ for the national liberation movement the relationship between reformist demands and the struggle for the national democratic revolution.

This is not to suggest that it is either possible or useful to draw an absolute or hard and fast line between reform and revolution. Indeed, to do so may well have the effect of undermining political alliances without which the regime cannot be shifted. It is clear, for example, that demands which are reformist in content may well be revolutionary in their consequences or connotations and this may depend both on the context and/or on the way in which the specific demands are linked, in the political process, to the more general policies of national liberation. In a large number of cases, for instance, campaigns for specific reforms have been quite explicitly related to the general terms of the Freedom Charter. Again, the recently formed United Democratic Front represents an organizational fusion of organizations having specific objectives into a body which unites those objectives under common general policies.

Nevertheless, the question of reform and revolution remains and, in fact, tends, continuously, to be regenerated. The point ^{is} ~~is~~ that the formulation of concrete claims of a limited kind, however closely they be related to a revolutionary strategy, does provide the state and the dominant classes with the possibility of dealing with such claims piecemeal and of meeting them, at least to some extent. The legal recognition of black trade unions is an example of this. The proposals of the de Lange Commission for the desegregation of secondary education, although not at present accepted by the

regime, nonetheless further illustrates this point. The abolition of job reservation (whether a response to labour shortages or part of a political strategy), the employment of blacks in a range of jobs previously monopolized by whites, and the extension of industrial training facilities for blacks are examples of areas within the economy, where change has proved possible. Similarly, the government is tinkering with provisions for political representation of blacks - for Africans (outside of the Bantustans) in local urban councils (which have been boycotted) and for Coloureds and Indians via the tri-racial, tri-cameral parliament.

To identify these areas (and, of course, there are many others) in which the state can piecemeal meet, at least in part, the demands which are made, is not to argue that such "reforms" will automatically defuse the struggle and lead to ~~the~~ compliance in the status quo of the beneficiaries of the measures. Obviously, any concession may generate more far-reaching demands which cannot be met within the parameters of the existing structures. Yet, the capacity of the regime to respond to specific demands, which is not open to it in the situation where the struggle is directly for state power, does mean that, while modifications to the status quo may lead to an intensification of contradictions, at the same time they establish a basis upon which reformist positions among blacks can be justified and utilized to argue a non-revolutionary politics. The Bantustans provide the most important example of this since they provide the means for the development of an African petit-bourgeoisie who work the system even though protesting against it.

The Bantustans, in this respect, however, are a specific instance of a more general issue - the position and role of the black petit bourgeoisie in the present conjuncture. Recently, this problem has received some discussion, but generally the conclusion arrived at is that this class is small and insignificant, unable to develop because of its weak, dependent position and because, despite the contentions of some writers, the government provides no substantial

means for its growth and, in any event, "in the end", the racial or national subordination of this class will guarantee its alignment with the national liberation movement.

This latter position is widely held and exemplifies the view I criticized earlier that simply assumes the ultimate and inevitable function of race as the factor of unity of all black classes against the dominant forces. As I have already suggested, this approach precludes the analysis of the actual conditions which may affect political positions and asserts the immutability of the political and economic structures and the relationship between them. It may be that forces supporting the existing structure of racial political dominance are too strong to permit of any change and, in that event, South African capitalism may find itself in a political-economic crisis which it is powerless to resolve - caught between the demands of national liberation on the one side and of white supremacy on the other. The strategic question facing capital is how it can secure the process of capital accumulation under conditions in which the structures of national domination appear to impede the restructuring of the division of labour and the development of a home market and/generate intense struggles in the political sphere. Of course, it is possible to answer this question in advance by the assertion that capitalism in South Africa is unable to shake off the shell, which enabled it to flourish, without destroying itself. This is to forget, however, that capitalism has and does exist in many forms and that there are no grounds for drawing the a priori conclusion that it is incapable of changing from one form of existence to another. That change rarely takes place all at once; it is an uneven, contradictory and conflictual process. In South Africa, the black petit bourgeoisie is an important element in that uneven process.

Despite contentions to the contrary, there has undoubtedly been a significant growth of the black petit bourgeoisie in recent years. This growth has been, in part, due to state policy and in part it is the unintended consequence of

the expansion of white dominated capitalism. The data we have about the black petit bourgeoisie is very incomplete and, in particular we know very little about its internal differentiation. It is possible, however, to identify two broad divisions within the class of small traders and producers - the traditional petit bourgeoisie - each of which owes its development to different conditions.

In the areas outside of the Bantustans, particularly in the African townships attached to large cities, there has been a marked expansion in the number and size of trading enterprises owned by Africans and also, to some extent, an expansion of petty production. In large measure this expansion accompanied the increased consumption of the African working class, a phenomenon which was the outcome of the growth of capitalist production. Until well into the 1970's severe limits were imposed on the accumulation possibilities of this class - by law traders were restricted in the commodities they could sell, in the size of the trading premises and in the number of enterprises they could operate. Later, these restrictions were removed although African traders were still confined to African townships. Yet, in this respect Apartheid operated to grant a monopoly of an important sector of the consumer market to African traders since white merchant capital was, by law, debarred from operating within African areas. In fact, both individually and through the National African Chamber of Commerce, African traders invoked Apartheid against the attempts of white merchants to get trading rights in African areas. Despite this opposition, the law has been amended and it is now possible for white controlled merchant capital to set up enterprises subject to the condition that they are owned jointly with Africans who must hold 51% of the shares and who must take over completely after three years.

In the Bantustans, the formation of both the urban and rural petit bourgeoisie has been largely a product of the access to state power, albeit subordinate state power within the Bantustans. Incumbency of bureaucratic and legislative

positions within the Bantustan state apparatuses. ~~These positions~~ have given access to knowledge, to state and private capital, to trading and other licenses, to power over development schemes and to the acquisition of land. This petit bourgeoisie owes its existence and its reproduction directly to the policy of the South African state. Notwithstanding declarations of opposition, demands for more land and consolidation of the Bantustan land areas, this fraction of the African petit bourgeoisie is involved in the workings of a crucial mechanism of Apartheid.

It can thus be seen that despite the very different conditions of their formation, both sectors of the petit bourgeoisie are dependent on the Apartheid state for their development, however limited that may be. I have already pointed to the fact that the Bantustan petit bourgeoisie has a vested interest in the working of Apartheid and, in fact, works to sustain that system. But what of the other sector of the petit bourgeoisie? It cannot be assumed that economic benefits will automatically lead to its co-optation. But neither does the fact that the structures of racial domination continue to exist while economic constraints are being lifted lead automatically to the national liberation movement. Indeed, the black petit bourgeoisie, particularly through its different organizational forms, has gone out of its way to oppose revolutionary politics. One fundamental reason for this is the absence of a powerful, legal organization of the liberation movement to which this class fraction could politically attach itself. Instead it is largely driven back into a pre-occupation with specific economic demands which can improve its economic position. Once more a space is opened up in which the regime is provided with room to deal piecemeal with reformist demands. Only through the development of powerful political organizations of the national liberation movement and the formulation of policies which offer the petit bourgeoisie a revolutionary way forward will it be possible for this class to be won away from its economism.

This last point raises explicitly an issue which has been latent throughout the discussion, that of the class content of the national liberation struggle. The ANC regards the working class as the leading force in the national democratic revolution but it defines the content of that revolution in the general terms of the Freedom Charter which is fundamentally concerned with national liberation. The force of the argument in this paper, however, has been to show that the contemporary conjuncture places on the agenda the necessity to define more specifically and concretely how the national liberation struggle is to articulate the separate and distinct yet related and common interests of the different subordinated classes. That, however, is a question which will have to be discussed on another occasion.

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