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of organisation which were easier to defend and more difficult for the state to crush. Whole communities became mobilised and organised as the structures of the democratic movement became rooted in the masses.

Vast new areas of struggle opened up and creative new strategies and tactics were developed to take forward the struggle and defend the democratic movement. The struggle was taking on an increasingly broad based and national political character. No section of the community no part of the country was left unaffected.

Increasingly local struggles were being linked and were developing a national dynamic. All struggles pointed to the question of political power; to the demand for an end to minority rule. Never before had the people been so united, so mobilised and so focussed on this goal. The cohesion and direction of the people and the disarray and bankruptcy of the apartheid forces meant that the strategic political initiative had passed into the hands of the people.

**PART 2**  
**THE APARTHEID COUNTER REVOLUTION: A PERMANENT EMERGENCY?**

I have been asked to talk about the political context of the repression of children. The unleashing of wholesale violence against the youth of South Africa gives some indication of the depth of the crisis facing the regime. It has been said that a government which can only survive by waging war against children, is a sick government indeed.

However this government is not concerned with the morality of its actions. As we all know the system of apartheid itself is criminal and the apartheid government illegitimate. It therefore stands to reason that the methods they will use to preserve this system will be both criminal and illegitimate.

If we are to fully understand these methods and fulfill our human duty of putting an end to this inhuman system, we have to do more than condemn the brutality waged against children.

We have to see where this government is going, what is the underlying "method in its madness" and act accordingly.

When it declared the State of Emergency in 1985, the regime was admitting that it was unable to provide a political solution to the conflict, that it had to rely on the use of force, a military solution.

When it lifted the Emergency in March 1986 and was forced to conclude that the Emergency had been a failure, it didn't then decide that the use of force per se would not succeed. On the contrary, it concluded that its use of force hadn't been systematic and extensive enough.

It concluded that the terrain on which it was fighting trapped it in such a mass of contradictions that it could only move where it wanted to go if it totally reshaped the terrain through sheer terror and brute force. This was the purpose of the national State of Emergency which was declared on June 12 last year (1986).

When we look at what reshaping the terrain means, we can see that they had two major objectives in mind. The first was what the military call 'pacification': to break the spirit of resistance in the country.

If through the use of sheer terror they would crush the will of the people to fight, then the cycle of national resistance and struggle which had developed since 1984, could be broken and people demoralised.

The second aspect of "reshaping the terrain", which the Emergency was designed to achieve was to wipe out the forces of national liberation: the mass based democratic movement and the outlawed liberation movement. This would create a political wasteland into which the governments proxy forces and other co-optable elements would step.

### "PACIFYING" THE PEOPLE

I want to deal with the aspect of "pacification" first and show how it has affected the youth. When the State of Emergency was declared on June 12 last year the state launched a massive military operation against the voteless majority.

The South African Defence Force, a machine of war, was sent into townships, schools and villages in every part of the country. Soldiers and police the so-called "security forces" were indemnified for any act of violence committed against the local population. Soldiers as well as police had unlimited powers to detain, raid and search, break up meetings and funerals, set up roadblocks, impose curfews and seal off any township or village to prevent anyone from entering. Even aircrafts would be used in security force "operations" for surveillance, dropping of propaganda, as part of a show of force in rent evictions and for actually firing on demonstrations. Townships were put under spotlight to facilitate operations at night. There have also been reports of military units used in Namibian war zones now being deployed in the townships.

Some of these methods had been used since the invasion of Sebokeng township by 7000 troops in October 1984, and particularly in the 1985 Emergency. But the June 12 onslaught was nationally co-ordinated and intensive. It was launched throughout the country both in urban and rural areas and sustained for many months.

The mobilisation of the army against the black majority showed most clearly that it was the entire oppressed people who were seen as insurgents and therefore needing to be "pacified". This military operation, however was not conducted by the SADF alone. All repressive agencies of the apartheid state were involved.

According to a study conducted by the DPSC it is clear from hundreds of reports that it is impossible to separate the role played by different branches of the "security forces": "where arrests, assaults, torture and shooting are reported the SAP, SADF, security police and municipal forces feature with equal regularity and are reported to be using similar tactics."(The Star 22/10/86)

This state onslaught created a climate of general terror in communities

throughout the country with no-one (excepting identifiable/known agents of the state) being safe from attack. Reports reaching the churches and other bodies monitoring the repression around the country clearly indicated that after June 12, a wide range of people, regardless of their political involvement were being terrorised by the forces of law and order.

What emerges most clearly from these reports is that the main target of this terror has been the youth and the children. The most militant, energetic and courageous fighters against apartheid have been our youth and children. The role the young lions' play in our struggle, not only in the organisations of the democratic movement but also on the streets of our townships, has become legend. Many of these youth, frustrated as they are and driven by their hatred of apartheid daily engage in a battle with the security forces and all those they regard as enforcing apartheid.

The state therefore concluded that to break the spirit of the community they had to break the spirit of the youth. All the youth, not only those formally involved in the organisations of the democratic movement. With the National Emergency we saw a general campaign of terror being waged against our youth. Hundreds of reports reached us of apparently random assault, harassment and the shooting of youth in the streets, at school, on the way to shops, at funerals, at vigils and so on.

A pattern emerged which repeated itself in every part of the country. The attacks weren't simply the actions of overzealous security forces, but were actually part of a deliberate policy of terrorising the youth.

For anyone who thinks that it is an exaggeration to talk of a policy of terror, then consider the experience of a 15 year old boy who has never been an activist. (Statement read)

This policy of arbitrary terror extended right into the detention cells. In a survey of 65 child detainees analysed by the DPSC, only 10 children would be identified as having organisational links and leadership responsibilities. Further more, 64 of the sixty five children reported that they had been assaulted.

Many detained children have reported that they were terrorised and assaulted in detention until they 'confessed' the crimes they didn't commit. Even the courts are used as a weapon to terrorise the children. Children who have themselves been victims of security force violence are often charged with 'public violence'. If you have been shot, you are in serious trouble, not because you have been seriously injured or may die. The reason you are in trouble is that the security forces must have shot you because you were engaged in criminal activity, and now you must be brought to justice!

The circle of state violence is therefore closed: random victims of security force shootings are charged with public violence. The evidence of the child's guilt is his or her bullet wound. Thus the hospitals become factories for supplying young people who go from hospital to detention, to court, and in many cases, to long prison terms. It is assumed that young African males in particular can be credibly presented

as having committed certain types of acts. The state can show that they are bringing to book those responsible for the attacks on councillor and police homes etc. at the same time they are able to say that they have brought the situation of ungovernability in the townships to an end. Everything is under control.

According to the Minister of Law and Order, over 11 000 people were charged with public violence in 1986 alone. What these figures don't show are the vast numbers who were convicted on false evidence, were acquitted or had their charges dropped for lack of evidence. Occasionally the gross injustice of the whole process is exposed, as in the case of a 12 year old boy who had charges of public violence dropped against him.

The boy, a standard 2 pupil from Parys, had spent 11 months in detention under emergency regulations. The state said he had confessed to throwing stones at the car of the township superintendent in June 1986. But then the defence lawyer discovered that the 'confession' had been written in Afrikaans, a language that the boy didn't understand. Charges against him and 3 other boys were dropped on 4 September. (New Nation 10/9/87.)

Many young people who are detained aren't charged in this way. But many report that they are still beaten, humiliated and tortured, even though they are not organisationally involved and don't have information of any value to the security police. Their brutalisation is intended to terrify the youth and make them subservient and pliable, often in an attempt to force them to become informers. Many youth report being told that the violence against them would only stop, or they would only be released, if they agreed to become informers. One young detainee from Modderbee prison said that whenever young people went for meals they were assaulted and beaten. "We were then told that anyone who was prepared to become an informer would no longer be assaulted".

Others say violence was combined with promises of sums of money, free education and other bribes if they agreed to inform. These tactics are often, but not always, aimed at the less experienced and less politicised detainees.

A more devious programme to recruit youth has been the setting up of "re-orientation courses" both inside and outside detention. Here, attempts are made to brainwash youth against the UDF and the ANC, and to subtly win youth over in the camp of the state. Direct and indirect attempts are made to recruit the youth into the police and other branches of the security force. In May, detainees in Modderbee prison went on hunger strike because the authorities had attempted to recruit the youth into the "greenbeans" (or council police). The youth said they had been promised release if they agreed to undergo two weeks training.

All these methods and indiscriminate violence, arrests, assaults, torture, charging people, forcing them to become informers - are designed to demoralise the youth by showing them how powerful and vicious the state is and therefore lead them to conclude that it is pointless and useless to fight. This feeling of helplessness and

powerlessness is not only meant to be conveyed to the individuals under attack, but the community as a whole.

Public displays of force are designed to achieve the same objective. The imposing of curfews, door to door raids, shows of force at funerals and meetings, aim to intimidate and demoralise the whole community. Here again, it is the youth who bear the brunt of security action.

Our children have come under attack in the schools. When the Emergency was declared schools were occupied in every part of the country. Students reported that they were being terrorised by the "security forces". Soldiers and police interfered in the classes, attacked and shot children in the school grounds, whipped them into classes etc. (Read sworn affidavit from Tumahole teacher.)

Cases of mass arrests of school children have been reported. In one instance a whole school of 1 200 Soweto children were arrested, apparently because some children had left the school grounds when they were not supposed to. Only an urgent application to the Supreme Court secured their release.

A recent report to the SACC from Petrus Steyn in the OFS indicates that the onslaught against schoolchildren is still going on. People from the area report that on 2 September, students of the secondary school called a boycott of classes to protest the detention of two activists, and the actions of the principal, because he regularly assaulted students. When teachers at the primary school heard about the boycott, they sent the children home. As the children went home, police from surrounding areas allegedly arrived and attacked the children (aged 7 to 15) with sjamboks. An unknown number of children were arrested, the youngest about 10 years old.

#### CREATING A POLITICAL WASTELAND: THE ATTACK ON THE DEMOCRATIC MOVEMENT

I have outlined some of the measures of general terror used by the state to try and "pacify" the people. I now want to look at the actions designed to crush the democratic movement and totally wipe it out. But before doing that, I should point out that there are a range of measures which are intended both to demoralise the community, and make it difficult for the democratic movement to operate.

Briefly these measures are:

\* **The closing down of all legal space for mass mobilisation.** By banning and preventing all forums where the democratic movement could have access to the masses, the state aimed to isolate the organisations and to close off all avenues for mass mobilisation. Mass meetings had in the past provided forums where up to 30 000 people came together at one time. Throughout the country, meetings of the democratic movement were either outlawed by proclamation, or simply made impossible because meetings would be broken up and people arrested. The other important forum of mass mobilisation which was blocked off were political funerals, which were so restricted by different regulations and conditions to make it impossible for the community to attend. Whereas the community had generally ignored such restrictions before the Emergency, massive

security force deployment to enforce the restrictions now made this impossible.

\* **Muzzling the democratic movement:** The government used the Emergency in an attempt to completely muzzle the democratic movement. Many of the media regulations which have been enforced have been openly designed to stop the democratic movement from expressing itself on a whole range of issues. The government has attempted to throw a cordon of silence around the townships and villages of our country, thereby allowing itself a free hand to impose a reign of terror with minimum exposure of its activities.

By stopping reporting on state Unrest' action and mass struggles, the regime has deliberately attempted to create a vacuum of information and political comment. Then, using the Bureau of what is really **disinformation** and their other sources of propoganda, they have used this monopoly of information to impose their own version of what is happening in South Africa. In one story which they like most to tell, and it was also a favourite of the Smith regime, is that they are all-powerful, Unrest' has now died, that they are totally in control of the situation and that with the exception of communists and foreign terrorists', the people as a whole are grateful for what the government is doing for them.

Our people have been subjected to a weekly barrage of state propoganda pamphlets, distributed from helicopters, Casspirs and mysteriously appearing on street corners. Much of this propoganda has attempted to justify the State of Emergency and to project the democratic movement in a very negative light.

State radio, TV and pamphlets daily repeat the same themes:

- The State of Emergency has allowed the "security forces" to act as a shield for ordinary residents;
  - = to stop a minority of radical comrades from dictating to them and harassing them;
  - = to stop blacks from killing other blacks;
  - = to stop crime in the townships;
- People were detained because they were a danger to peaceful society'. In the words of a state pamphlet: "Unlike the present law-abiding community who are the backbone of the country, the detainees represent instability and chaos. This is the reason why they were removed from society."
- Finally, by removing the UDF and the ANC, the Emergency has "restored peace" to the townships.

The state's stranglehold on information aims to isolate and undermine the struggles in communities. By clamping down on information it hopes to break the national political dynamic which had developed by demoralising and confusing the people, and by isolating different local struggles from one another. The state aims to project the mass democratic movement as having been defeated, and itself being all-powerful. In this way it hopes to pacify' the people, at the same time as undermining and isolating the democratic movement.

It is also clear that the Emergency is designed to isolate the ANC

politically, to penetrate and crush its underground and military infrastructure and to defeat the movement militarily. Anti-ANC propaganda is designed to isolate the ANC from the masses politically. The intensification of so-called "counter-insurgency" operations, searches, roadblocks etc is clearly designed to make it impossible for the ANC to pursue its people's war'. Intensive surveillance, interrogation, torture and attempted recruitment of township activists on the other hand, are often explicitly directed at destroying the ANC's underground network. The assassination of ANC cadres both inside and outside the country aims to both disrupt and demoralise the movement and to create the impression that the ANC is being defeated militarily.

At the level of the mass democratic movement, the state has attempted to reverse the gains made in the year leading up to the emergency, and to destroy the infrastructure of key sections of the democratic movement. In particular, it is clear that the regime has identified the United Democratic Front as being the leading force at this level, and has done everything in its power to destroy it. But the emergency has been a broad-based attack on the entire democratic movement and its supportive forces. Anti-apartheid trade unions, churches, journalists, professionals, as well as community organisations, have all come under attack.

The attack on the UDF has been massive. The DPSC's estimate at one stage was that 79% of emergency detainees with known affiliations were members of the UDF or its affiliates, with most of the remainder (16%) being members of trade unions. A large proportion of the UDF detainees came from the UDF youth and student congresses. One can get a rough estimate of the number of youth and student detainees from a DPSC estimate that over 70% of detainees were under the age of 25 (with 40% being aged 18 or under). This shouldnt be translated too directly because a large number of the children and youth detained were not activists, but were just caught up in the state's dragnet. The state has attempted to cripple the UDF by detaining activists from every level detained in the 1985 emergency, about 30 000 people have been detained in this emergency.

The UDF has said that every national and regional official has either been detained, is on trial or in hiding. It has estimated that thousands of activists are in hiding, either in their own areas or are internal refugees' in other parts of the country. Where UDF leaders have not been detained, many have been attacked or assassinated, had their homes and families threatened and attacked, or have been served with gagging restriction orders. Those who have been detained have been assaulted, tortured and humiliated. Detainees who have been released have been harassed and threatened with re-detention, assault and death if they continue to be active in the democratic movement. All this is designed to disrupt the structures of the UDF and its affiliates, to break the link between the Front and the masses, and to make it impossible for activists to continue their involvement.

Earlier on, I mentioned that the democratic movement had made major new strides in four areas in the year preceding the June 12 Emergency. These were the areas of people's power in the townships; people's education in the schools; the trade unions; and the rural areas. The

regime has systematically used the Emergency in an attempt to reverse these gains and crush these sectors of the democratic movement.

At the level of people's power in the communities, scores of ordinary members of street committees from around the country have been detained, harassed and attacked. For example in Duncan Village alone more than 250 civic members were detained in June last year, most of them members of street committees. Throughout the emergency the state has been doing everything in its power to disrupt the street, block, zone and area committees. Apart from detaining members, meetings have been broken up and members of street committees harassed. Regulations were passed to stop the democratic movement from promoting street committees and people's courts. Attempts to criminalise street committees and people's justice is now being manifested in a series of show trials. Vigilante death squads and vigilantes in uniform - the so-called 'Special Constables' and 'Municipal Police' - have harassed, attacked and in some instances killed members of the democratic organs, particularly in the Eastern Cape. In this way, apartheid forces have attempted to regain control over the townships, to break the national rent boycott, and make it impossible for civics to operate.

A concerted attack was launched when schools opened in July last year to disrupt the movement for people's education, and to destroy the infrastructure of student organisation. The DPSC estimates that about one third of emergency detainees are students and teachers.

Apart from the occupation of the schools and general terrorising of the students discussed above, every attempt was made to identify, isolate and expel student leaders from the schools. Known student activists were refused readmission when schools opened. Many others were victimised when they refused to carry ID cards which the state attempted to enforce. Hundreds of students were detained when principals collaborated with SADF and police by handing them lists of politically active students. SRCs were no longer allowed to operate.

The most sinister development was the blatant assassination of student leaders after June 12. This has continued throughout the Emergency and the most recent known incidents have been the killings of

At the level of people's education, security forces occupying the schools interfered with classes to try and ensure that no people's education could be taught. Parents and teachers, as well as students, involved in the PTAs were detained, harassed and, in the case of teachers victimised. At the end of last year virtually the entire national leadership of the NECC was detained. In January this year the state introduced regulations which in effect made the promotion or teaching of people's education illegal. These regulations are now being incorporated into 'ordinary' non-emergency law.

A fourth major target of the Emergency has been COASTU. The attack on the trade union movement has been significantly different from the attacks on other fronts of struggle. While the detention weapon has been used against trade unionists, it has been used in a more limited way. The numbers of trade unionists detained has tended to be less than other sectors, and their length of detention has tended to be shorter.



The reason for this is probably the fear that lengthy mass detentions of trade union activists would seriously disrupt production, if workers were provoked into solidarity action. In 1986, the detention of individual trade union activists under the emergency (excluding the mass emergency detentions of workers on specific strikes) represented less than two percent of emergency detentions, according to the DPSC.

The onslaught on the trade unions, particularly COSATU, has taken a variety of forms. A massive propaganda campaign was launched against COSATU, particularly since the times of the SATS strike, linking it to the ANC and SACP. SABC TV, radio and smear pamphlets bombarded the people weekly with anti-COSATU propaganda. More sinister were the attacks by vigilante death squads on COSATU activists, leading to the death of a large number of workers, particularly in Natal. Numerous COSATU meetings, particularly around its Living Wage campaign, were banned. A large number of its offices, national and regional, have been attacked, bombed or burnt down. Furthermore the government has indicated that it intends to introduce legislation to curb COSATU's active role in the struggle for national liberation. COSATU has noted that with the rising tide of worker militancy and the growing demand for a living wage, employers are increasingly supporting the attempts to destroy COSATU.

A fifth aim of the Emergency has been to crush the democratic movement in the rural areas. The reign of terror in the rural areas, particularly the bantustans was if anything far worse than that in the urban areas. Villages were occupied and sealed off, many hundreds assaulted and detained, and tribal authority-linked vigilantes ran rampant. According to the DPSC twelve percent of the country's emergency detainees in 1986 came from the Transvaal rural areas alone. Structures of the democratic movement which had been established in 1986, such as the democratic village councils, came under attack as pro-apartheid elements attempted to reestablish the hated tribal authorities. As in the townships, the youth formed the most dynamic and militant section of the democratic movement, and they were earmarked for specially brutal attack. Many hundred rural youth and student congress members were detained. Many children fled the villages and in some instances hid in the mountains.

Bantustan authorities attempted to use the Emergency not only to crush the democratic movement but to impose their schemes on the people. These included attempts to incorporate Botshabelo into QwaQwa and to make KwaNdebele "independent". In KwaNdebele in particular a vicious reign of terror was unleashed against supporters of the democratic movement with many hundreds being detained and killed by the "security forces" and Mbokodo death squads. As I speak now, war is raging in KwaNdebele with approximately 200 people detained and we don't know how many dead. The Mbokodo vigilantes who were outlawed last year, have now re-emerged and are openly attacking the people with the backing of the "security forces". In fact many of the Mbokodo vigilantes are now in uniform, having been trained and recruited into the SAP's so-called Ritskonstabels'.  
((To make appeal to international community on KwaNdebele situation??))

### PART 3: THE STATE'S STRATEGY OF 3-PHASE COUNTER REVOLUTION

Government spokesmen openly talk of 'counter-revolution', 'low intensity warfare' and 'counter insurgency'. In the last year government ministers, particularly Vlok and Malan have repeatedly talked of a 3-phase strategy of counter-revolution. The first stage of this strategy is the use of generalised force and terror to crush the national uprisings and to destroy the democratic movement. The second phase takes place in the vacuum of political opposition and 'pacification' created by the first phase. This is the introduction of limited socio-economic reforms intended to co-opt and further pacify the people and the reimposition of apartheid structures. The third phase involves the introduction of a new constitutional dispensation by the government which will provide a political solution to the conflict on terms acceptable to the government. All these phases will have to be completed before the State of Emergency can be lifted.

If I can understand what the government is saying, then the onslaught which I have described above in some detail is regarded as Phase 1 of the strategy, and they would have seen themselves as having focussed on this phase during the first year of the Emergency. I have already dealt with this. I will now look briefly at what Phase 2 of the strategy involves.

This phase doesn't necessarily involve less terror or extreme methods, but the 'pacification' and disorganisation resulting from Phase 1 allows the state to use force and terror in a much more directed way. One aspect of this is to zone in and target areas and organisations which are still resisting. Key areas, such as the Eastern Cape, can be isolated and 'pacified' while Phase 2 proceeds in other parts of the country. Thus the Port Elizabeth townships have been literally fenced off, and a far greater level of repression continues to be imposed there than in other parts of the country. Areas such as the Eastern Cape are further isolated and pacified by the imposition of 'sanctions' for continued resistance such as the closing of schools, while schools are open in other parts of the country, and the threatened withholding of UIF benefits.

Where the state believes it has got the 'unrest situation' under control and that the democratic movement has been largely crushed, Phase 2 seems to have four major objectives:

\* Firstly, to reinforce collaborating apartheid structures and forces at the local level, and to supplement these with much more substantial resources. This would involve the setting up of collapsed councils and tribal authorities, recruiting an informer network, and reinforcing black police (SAP and council police). Since the Emergency and particularly since the beginning of this year, these forces have been supplemented by kitsconstablers, more council police and vigilantes. Far more money is ploughed into supporting these networks. In particular the introduction of Regional Service Councils (RSCS) in July this year provide the necessary financial support base.

\* Secondly, this enables the SAP and SADF to play a much lower profile, and in some instances even withdraw from the townships. The state wants to achieve two things here: firstly to "internalise" the conflict in

communities and in this way create as much division and confusion as possible, in order to prevent the re-emergence of unity, militancy and organisation. In addition, to remove the focus of residents anger away from the SADF and SAP and therefore the central state and in that way localise and depoliticise the conflict. This year has already seen an enormous upswing in the use of these proxy forces, with hundred being killed and injured around the country by 'greenbeans', kitskonstabels and vigilante death squads. This has also enabled security forces in many instances to withdraw or reduce their numbers in the communities and schools. In the schools, many principals have collaborated to such an extent supplying the names of student activists and victimising them, that the "security forces" have been able to withdraw entirely.

\* The third objective of this phase is to identify grievances and potential sources of conflict in the community and then diffuse them. "Action to diffuse grievances" consists both in identifying and acting against those who are articulating the grievances in an organised way, and implementing programmes to convince the community that the authorities are genuinely concerned about their grievances. This is a cynical 'hearts and minds' policy which is designed to show the community that they can get more benefits from the councils, SADF, and other state institutions than they can get from the democratic movement. The catch is that it is only when the community has some strategic importance and the level of resistance has been high that the state will regard it as a priority to address these grievances. So the likelihood of far-reaching socio-economic reform is very slim. The most important example of this strategy being followed is Alexandra, where there is a massive upgrading project at the same time as a vicious onslaught against the democratic movement in the area.

\* Finally, at the same time as imposing the counter revolutionary structures, the regime aims to prevent the re-emergence of the democratic movement and to finish off the remnants of organisation in a particular area. There is evidence that there is a programme of assassination of key leadership, co-ordinated by unknown elements and perpetuated by vigilantes, kitskonstabels and "security forces". Incidents of assassination appear to be increasing, as with the three student leaders I mentioned earlier, and with many others. Assassination is the most extreme form, but the state will use all other means at its disposal to destroy organisation .....(???)which it used in phases).. - assault, harassment, torture, informers, creation of divisions, misinformation and propaganda.

All these objectives of Phase 2 will be planned, co-ordinated and executed by the secret military dominated Joint Management Centres - which have become active during the Emergency. Operating at the local, sub-regional, regional and national levels, these bodies form the nerve centre of this counter-revolutionary strategy.

Finally, assuming that all this works, the state strategy moves into Phase 3, which is the introduction of constitutional reform on the governments terms. The government seems to have set itself October 1983 to reach this phase when it plans to hold elections for the already rejected National Council and the Black Local Authorities, based on the assumption that the opposition, particularly the UDF will have been

wiped out by them. They hope this will pave the way for a Muzorewa type solution, negotiated by the government from a position of strength. It is at this point that they see themselves as involving their former international allies.

#### CONCLUSION

Some of the points which could be included here:

- \* There is no way in which the government can achieve the 3 phase strategy
- \* They have declared war on the people of S.A. but the democratic movement and the people are still fighting back (NB see analysis of last year in FOUR FIGHTING YEARS)
- \* Like the Smith regime, they are deluding themselves that they can win a war which is unwinnable. Thus we see that:
  - a 'temporary' State of Emergency is in fact permanent
  - 'temporary' Emergency detainees are in fact long-term prisoners of war
  - 'media restrictions' are in fact war censorship, with censors in the newsroom
  - militarisation of S.A. society grows by the day
- \* The war against children will continue as long as there is a war against the people. Many children may be released from detention, but children and youth will continue to be shot, beaten, harassed and brutalised in the schools and townships as long as there is a war, because they are the "foot-soldiers" of the struggle and the government sees them as the enemy.