AFRICA PUTS

The Security

Council's debate on South Africa, which New York, August 3 THE PERIOD in which the West will continue at the could call the tune or command the loyalty of its allies on major U.N. this week, is a colonial issues is over. So much is clear from last week's Security test case, says our Council debate on Portugal's policy in Africa. For the first Commonwealth time in the 18-year life of the Council the major Western Correspondent, by Powers—the United Britain and France-were reduced to voting in a minority of which the world will three at the end of this debate. Among eight nations who voted judge Britain and for United Nations action against

> attitude America would take on South Africa, for which the Portuguese debate was the curtain-

America.

Commitment to sanctions against Salazar would make it hard to resist demands for similar action against Verwoerd. But while the U.S. is nearing the point where she might be willing to burn her Portuguese boats, she is not yet nearly ready to commit herself so completely on South Africa.

Showdown

One important reason for this unreadiness is that neither President Kennedy nor his Secretary of State, Dean Rusk, has given any real thought to their policy on South Africa. It was not until the decision to force a showdown with the West was taken at the African summit conference in Addis Ababa last May that the South African question was regarded as having any priority in the White House. Today. if you go into the State Department, you find everybody from Dean Rusk and his economic adviser, Professor Walt Rostow, to the lowest officials wrestling with the problems of South Africa. But they are still only at the point of

WEST TRIAL

by Colin Legum

asking questions. They are nowhere near formulating any clear policy. That is why the West is almost

certain to go down to a second diplomatic defeat in the current Security Council debate on South Africa. (" Russia is sitting on the fence watching the West do the job for her in Africa," was the acid comment of the staunchly pro-Commonwealth Foreign Minister of Sierra Leone, Dr. John Karefa-Smart, a few days ago.)

There is an overwhelmingly strong feeling in Washington that there can be no effective Western initiative over South Africa without strong Anglo-American accord on this question. There is an equally strong feeling that such accord is unlikely to come from the present British Government. What Washington hopes for, therefore, is that the U.N. can be prevented from taking a strong position on South Africa for a year or so.

This has not, however, prevented the U.S. from taking its surprise decision to impose a total arms embargo on South Africa from the end of this year-to the great embarrassment of Britain which, on this issue at least, is likely to find herself in a minority

of two, with France, in the Secu Council.

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President Kennedy's decision impose an arms embargo ma an important turning point American policy. It also represe a defeat for those elements in Pentagon which insist on mak Cold War issues a priority American policy. But, altho the American position has chan on the question of an a embargo, Mr. Adlai Stevenson made it clear that the U.S. is determined to resist any form diplomatic or economic sancti-

The immediate Anglo-An can target is therefore to deny the African States the seven v they need under the rules of Security Council to decide diplomatic or economic sanct enforceable through machinery. To block these major African demands An American tactics are to detach of the eight votes that went age them last week. They might ceed in this stratagem, but at cost of great bitterness among 32 African States, who are deeply angry over apartheid.

Weakness

It is possible that the British American spokesmen are when they complain that I emotion than thought is going African thinking about the S African problem. But this cism would make more impa they could indicate more effe alternatives to economic and d matic sanctions. Because the major Western countries hav alternative policies, all they ca is react defensively. It is weakness that has let the initi slip from their fingers at critical juncture and proc their isolation in the internat community.

It is a situation that canno to give real satisfaction to Verwoerd, Mr. Khrushchev Mao Tse-tung.

Moderation

Portugal were such devoted friends

of the West as Nationalist China,

the Philippines, Venezuela and even one Nato ally, Norway. The

drama of last week's debate as

viewed from Washington was

the desperate behind-the-scenes

struggle fought by the U.S. and

Britain once they sensed the im-

pending loss of their initiative.

Adlai Stevenson negotiated for a week to find an acceptable accommodation with the 32 African States. He actually got them to moderate their original proposals to the point where he clearly thought his Government could decently vote with the majority. There is little doubt that Washington would have agreed if it had not been for pressure by Britain.

"Lord Home is the most baneful influence on American policies in Africa," a senior adviser of the Kennedy Administration expostulated as America's decision lay in

the balance.

President Kennedy's decision was not taken easily. Right up to an hour before the Security Council vote on Wednesday the Capitol was held in painful indecision. The President's action is only partly explained by his concern for Anglo-American and American-Portuguese relations. A more important consideration was the