

CROSSROADS AND NYANGA: passes and places to stay

THE ARTICLE 'Legalism and Democratic Organisation' in WIP 18 raises a number of critical issues which are well illustrated by case studies of Crossroads community resistance, and the Nyanga bush confrontation.

An outline of events in the Nyanga bush until 26 July, 1981, was given in WIP 19. This article covers the Crossroads case study, an update of the Nyanga bush position and some comment on the similarities and differences.

CROSSROADS: 1978 - 1981

'The fight was actually won with the April 1979 statement of Koornhof which laid down the general rules for re-settlement.' - Urban Foundation Regional Director

On 5 April, 1979, Dr P Koornhof issued a public statement, which he presented as a blue-print to solve what he called 'the Crossroads problem'. The solution was a new township to be built between Nyanga and Guguletu. In it he made it clear that this was an 'ad hoc' decision for Crossroads and on the other hand stated that influx control measures would be increased to ensure that a similar situation did not re-occur.

Two years later it appears timely and important to review not only the events which gave rise to the issuing of that statement, but also

to review the implications of the 'solution' upon the community as a whole. The process demonstrates the confusion, division, co-optation and organisational disintegration when community resistance is met not by the bull-dozer of the past, but the negotiation and co-operation politics of the Dr Koornhof era. Crossroads is an example of total strategy at its best.

'The level of tension started high, but through communication this was lowered and they responded as any group under similar circumstances. They were not out of the ordinary.' - Steyn Du Plessis, Urban Foundation.

PRE 5 APRIL STATEMENT PERIOD

SINCE 1975 the people had been struggling to remain as a community in the area. During this time there were numerous pass raids, harassment and individual home demolitions. The women organised themselves into an ad hoc committee and solicited the help of a lawyer. As a result a number of successful court cases were won. (This early legal history gave rise to the later dependence and high expectations placed upon lawyers and legal battles). In 1976 the camp was declared a legal Emergency Camp and with this tenuous legality it escaped the 1977 demolitions of Modderdam, Werkgenot and Unibell. These demolitions and their effect upon the wider Cape Town public had future implications for the Crossroads community, since many of the people who later committed themselves to 'help save Crossroads' did it out of an emotional response to the demolitions of 1977 and early 1978.

In February 1978, Crossroads itself was threatened with demolition. The 'struggle for Crossroads' began a new phase.

The community, through its existing committees, let it be known that it was not willing to

move. The women, who had been loosely organised, formalised their organisation, electing a committee with a new chairwoman, secretary and treasurer. The Women's Committee took its place alongside the existing Noxolo and Sizamile Committees.

All three met once weekly at a joint committee meeting to follow and discuss the issues affecting their community. (Tensions already existed between various individuals of these committees but the threat of demolition forged a degree of co-operation and unity. These differences which were suppressed emerged at a later stage of the process.)

The women played the most important role in the community during 1978, tackling issues as they arose:

1. The threatened demolition of 400 homes by Divisional Council for non-payment of rental arrears was successfully countered by the women. For a period of 2½ months they screened cases from 07h00 - 12h00 and helped subsidize hardship cases.
2. A painting project was organised in all 4 sections of the camp as an attempt to upgrade the community and to express resistance to the alleged temporariness of the camp. The women collected 50c from members to buy the paint.
3. During the daily pass raids of June, the women organised a march of +500 women to see Brigadier van der Westhuizen (Chairman of BAWB) at Goodwood in protest against the raids, and to demand an explanation.
4. Close links were established with local and overseas press and frequent press statements were released by the women to publicise events as well as their interpretations of these actions to the public.

Whilst the other committees worked alongside the women, it is important to stress that it was the

women who took the lead and saw the threatened demolition as affecting them in particular.

Whereas many of the men had rights to be here, the majority of the women knew they were 'illegal' by Government standards and felt they had nothing to lose in openly resisting. They were present on the site during the day (to receive visitors and discuss strategies) while the men were at work.

External to the community was another organisation involved in this struggle - the so-called Crossroads support group. It had been called together by the Crossroads lawyer in February and consisted of a number of local individuals and organisations with a history of involvement in squatter and human rights issues.

This group was eventually to play a major role in the events leading to the intervention of Dr Koornhof. The issues of concern for the group included: family life, Christian concern, the maintenance of a stable, economically viable community (using the existing informal sector in Crossroads as an example), the spirit and unity of the 'model' community, and those who wanted to raise the political cost of demolition. The underlying causes of Crossroads were hardly touched, ie the migrant labour system. Some members of the group felt the issue should not be broadened and seen in its whole context if a solution was going to be found. (This strategy gave Dr Koornhof the leverage to be able to treat Crossroads in an 'ad hoc' manner and drive a wedge between Crossroads and the existing townships.)

The support group met weekly with a small number of community leaders throughout 1978. There was no clear programme of action. They tried the petition, community statements, liaison with local authorities, public awareness through

frequent newspaper articles etc. The dynamics within the community itself were not clearly understood, nor perceived as that crucial. Often community workers in the area found themselves having to confront key individuals on community development principles versus the success of the 'campaign'. Eg, the lawyer wanted to obtain funds to subsidize the women's painting project in order to have the houses painted in time for the Day of Prayer and became angry at the community workers' refusal to speed up what was a community initiated project.

Many in the group, not recognising the existing divisions within the community, operated as though working with a verified and democratic leadership. Others fostered the individualising of local leaders eg paying people to interpret when taking overseas visitors around. This caused some resentment, and led to difficulties in obtaining interpreters for community meetings.

Albeit with 'the best of intentions', the seeds for the later escalation of internal conflicts and divisions were being sown during this period of support group involvement.

Later in 1978, the harassment upon the community intensified with frequent pass raids. The biggest and last on 14 September culminated in the death of a resident. Overnight Crossroads became a household word and an issue beyond the wildest expectations of all concerned. The raids were followed by local and international outcry. Pressure upon the community continued. People were already physically and psychologically worn down and when in November (following the squashing of the plan drawn up by the SP, BAAB and Military in the Castle to surround and demolish the camp) Dr Koornhof intervened, indicating that he wanted to come to Cape Town personally to solve the Crossroads 'problem', he not only caught all concerned off-guard, but was welcomed by a

community weakened on all levels and by now dependent upon external solutions to their situation.

During September and October the Urban Foundation had become increasingly involved in attempts to negotiate on behalf of the community. They feared the international political and economic implications of Crossroads as well as the possible local political instability should it be demolished. They were secretly meeting with chosen leaders from the community and already discussing and proposing solutions prior to Dr Koornhof's visit to the camp in November.

When Dr Koornhof visited the camp in November it marked the end of the bulldozer era and ushered in a new one of co-operative politics and promises of humane solutions to the 'problem'.

Let there be no misunderstanding. There is a policy and the law. That is why your co-operation is so important. With your co-operation it may be possible to find a solution to the problem. If I get the co-operation of the churches I will do everything to look at Crossroads as a problem in itself.

The year ended with a memorandum to Dr Koornhof prepared by the Joint Committees, in which they put forward two proposals:

1. to remain on the present site and have the houses up-graded;
2. as an alternative, permanent accommodation should be provided for all residents in Crossroads in the greater Cape Town area.

Dr Koornhof rejected these proposals, but indicated that he was willing to enter into negotiations with an elected delegation in early 1979 in an attempt to reach a solution to the 'problem'.

If 1978 had its own particular problems and difficulties, in some ways they were easier to deal with than the complex and sometimes more subtle struggle which ensued in 1979.

The negotiations promised by Dr Koornhof

in late 1978 began in earnest in 1979 and lasted until the end of March, ending with the now famous April statement.

From the beginning it was clear that what was taking place was not a negotiated settlement but a solution in the interests of the government. The fact that Dr Koornhof was able to manoeuvre the assistance of the community's own representatives in obtaining the solution was a stroke of political genius.

A reading of the minutes of these meetings shows that there was very little room to manoeuvre on the part of the Crossroads delegation. Dr Koornhof indicated at the first meeting that he felt the solution to the Crossroads 'problem' was a township one and when questions concerning this were raised by the representatives he never gave direct answers. He merely asked the delegation to co-operate and trust him.

I am a preacher's son. I don't want to preach to you, but you must bear with me. I believe it is in your interest to do so. As I have said in the beginning. If you assist the officials to fill in these forms in a truthful way, we can solve this problem in a humane way. You have heard me say often that I want co-operation. I tell you now again that I want co-operation between the officials and you. If there is co-operation then things will go well.

I have been in this department for 30 years and these officials have put up with a lot of difficulties which you don't know of, but I know of and I really request you to make it as easy as possible for them by co-operating. If I was preaching my message would be simple, it would consist of two words "please co-operate". You will not be sorry. That is the way in which this problem will be solved. I wish you God's blessings. (Dr Koornhof, February 1979, in response to questions raised by community leaders re co-operating with the officials on a survey, given past experience and mistrust.)

The delegates were bound by confidentiality concerning these meetings and it was with difficulty that meetings were eventually convened to

review the negotiation process. Objective input from people outside of the negotiations did not appear to be seen as crucial to the process. Criticisms and advice were largely ignored, eg at the meeting at which the blueprint was presented containing the categories which would supposedly cater for the majority of the community there was concern and clear rejection of involvement in such a settlement using government categories. Despite these criticisms it was this very blueprint which appeared as Dr Koornhof's categories for Crossroads in his statement of 5 April. Other criticisms concerned the speed of the negotiations, the confidentiality and its effect upon the broader community and the inadvisability of meeting individually with Dr Koornhof. They appeared to fall on deaf ears. The process was clearly in the hands of a few specialists and although the advisors can and do argue that decisions were never their own, by the time the 'negotiations' ended the struggle was completely out of the hands of the people. Throughout 'negotiations' the leaders expressed unwillingness to agree to any plan which would divide the community and were sceptical of trusting the promises of Dr Koornhof. As a result of this mistrust negotiations did in fact break down in late March over these very points. However in a last endeavour to persuade the community to accept the solution the 'advisors' called in the Urban Foundation (Judge Steyn) who spent an afternoon convincing the community 'to acquiesce as opposed to agree'.

The factors of increasing pressure from the advisors, the Urban Foundation, Dr Koornhof, and the reality of their own position of weakness and simplistic political understanding led to the community 'acquiescing' to an agreement the implications of which they never fully understood.

These then were the major events which preceded the April statement - a statement hailed by many as a major break-through on the part of the government with high hopes that all would qualify for the new township. Others were less optimistic since state policy remained intact. The fact that there was to be an increase in influx control measures on blacks in general in the Western Cape seemed to escape the general public. The difference of assessment and trust of Dr Koornhof's promises set the tone of events which were to follow within the community and amongst those who had previously played a supportive role.

Dr Koornhof's statement of 5 April managed to a) defuse a highly political local and international issue, b) set forward a blue-print which would mean effective stronger control not only of Crossroads but of africans in the Western Cape, c) confuse and divide people further both within and outside the community.

POST 5 APRIL PERIOD

AS STATED above the immediate effect of the statement was to escalate the already existing divisions and confusion within the community. People were now forced to answer the question 'what were we really fighting for'? In reality nothing changed as the residents still found themselves arrested for pass offences and not free from the reality of being black and living in the Western Cape.

The first visible sign of a new process was the survey which Dr Koornhof had indicated would take place in an attempt to ascertain who would qualify for the new township.

The period May to July was filled with meetings between the Urban Foundation, BAAB, the 'advisers' and the committee in attempts to reassure the leaders that they had nothing to fear

in freely answering the questionnaires. Once again there was resistance and a dead-lock was reached as community leaders refused to agree to particular questions concerning present urban area qualifications. When Dr Koornhof heard this the lawyer was specifically phoned and sent by him to obtain the trust of the committees. Unless they co-operated, all would be lost was the message. The leaders were at this point in no position to argue. Much of their strength had already dissipated and the dependence upon external advice was firmly entrenched. (The issue was never taken to a mass meeting.)

Despite the fears, the survey proceeded and the close working relationship between local leaders and the BAAB officials began: a relationship which, as previously feared, ear-marked the further disintegration of community leadership; a liaison which eventually resulted in charges of fraud on the part of both committee members and local BAAB officials as permits were allegedly issued for R10 and a bottle of brandy.

The next significant event to take place in the community was an election. A new executive committee was ushered in during late July with Ngxbongwana as the elected chairman, with his own hand-picked committee - a committee which excluded women from the decision-making body and immediately dissolved all previously elected committees in Crossroads (from Sizamile to the school committees to the creche committee). Despite some resistance inside the community to the undemocratic handling of the elections, this went relatively unsupported by outside groups who chose to work with the elected body since it was felt to be expedient to do so if the Koornhof deal was to go through. A group was needed to relate to and make decisions. The internal dynamics and democratic processes of the community were largely ignored in an attempt to

achieve the 'solution'.

The divisions could not, however, be contained and 1979 ended with physical violence within the community as the different interest groups clashed, leaving two dead and the executive committee in total control. All who questioned their authority were attacked and ostracised.

As the year ended Crossroads appeared to be a different community with stark divisions, wholesale corruption and internal disorganisation. Members of the support group either pulled out or left confused as to what their role should be in the present situation.

1980 began with the arrest of 6 Crossroads residents for fraud; with L Fouche, the Secretary for Community Development, announcing plans for the new township in Nyanga called Nyanga Two (he indicated that the township would house Crossroads residents as well as others from neighbouring townships); and with reports that Crossroads residents applying for permit extensions at the Nyanga offices were being questioned by the security police - some were being given only 3 month extensions as a result.

In February, with the assistance of community workers, a 14 point memorandum was presented to Timo Bezuidenhout, Chief Commissioner of the Western Cape. The memo referred to:

1. an apparent break-down in the relationship between the authorities and the people;
2. large security police presence at the issuing of extension permits resulting in intimidation of residents;
3. the committee demanded security police withdrawal and impartial observers to be present at the Nyanga offices (to be chosen by the committee);
4. regarding permit issuing certain irregularities were taking place: reports that some

were even required to sign for their wives and families to return to the homelands before being granted extensions; some were told that unauthorised lodgers were reflected in BAAB records and, therefore, only three month extensions were given;

5. Crossroads residents were being charged for fraud, but questions were put forward about the officials involved and whether they too would be charged;
6. dissatisfaction with the name 'Nyanga Two' instead of the New Crossroads as promised;
7. difficulties were already occurring in the permit process and the promised Appeal Committee not yet operating;
8. Crossroads residents were informally promised jobs in the building of the new township and this wasn't happening satisfactorily;
9. meetings between BAAB and the residents shouldn't just be to inform the committee of decisions already taken, but should be meaningful consultation in the true spirit of the word.

Some assurances were given on the points raised, but there was growing community insecurity. This intensified when BAAB announced that Crossroads would become a formal township at the end of March. What formerly had been an abstraction was now becoming a reality and fears and doubts began to surface. As a result the executive took the issue to the broader community and were given a mandate to see Dr Koornhof.

The meeting with Dr Koornhof took place in April, 1980. He once again reassured them on all points raised, avoiding direct answers to questions about their future position. It was a repeat of his earlier diplomatic performance and once again the tension was lowered through direct communication.

For the remainder of the year things went

from bad to worse. The advent of Bezuidenhout as Chief Commissioner in the Western Cape (he replaced hard-liner Frikkie Botha in September 1979) was a significant move on the part of Dr Koornhof. He played an increasingly important role in co-opting the executive and playing off one power group against the other in the community.

With an executive which no longer reported to, and, therefore, took no direction from the broader community, with the careful political manoeuvrings of the Commissioner and his local officials, with the women no longer able to play a meaningful role and the increased presence of the Urban Foundation in the area (Kweza was sent in as a community worker) it became impossible to change the direction of events. The support group, including the advisers, were nowhere to be seen. The only hope being that eventually the general community would resist the dictatorship of the executive, as they experienced the reality of being left off the survey for the new township, or could take the financial exploitation of their leaders no more.

One could only hope that the day to day reality of oppression within Crossroads itself and the reality that not everyone was in fact qualifying for the new township (many were left out of the survey), would eventually force the general community to make its leadership accountable and revive their struggle.

During this period 'consultations' were being held over the new township. When notices were delivered for the first families to move, the women's committee (whose members had been monitoring and watching events up until this point) decided to re-engage in the decisions affecting their community and set up an appointment to see Bezuidenhout. (They had on a number of occasions attempted to speak with the executive, but without success.) This they did.

However, once again Bezuidenhout played off one group against the other. He phoned the executive to inform them of this meeting. This further polarised the men from the women.

In November 1980, the first families moved to the new township. The move found the community divided between those who wished to move, those who felt they couldn't move unless certain concrete guarantees were given, and those who wished to remain in Crossroads to explore the possibilities of a site and service scheme.

The degree of successful co-option of community individuals since the 'deal' was demonstrated by the fact that at the time of the move four of the executive were paid employees of BAAB. One of the men even drove the truck which removed the zincs and belongings of the residents in transit to the new area. The dismantling of the houses and subtle demolition of the community went relatively unnoticed. As Bezuidenhout stood at the side of the road watching the process, he could with some justification view it as a victory on the part of the State.

PRESENT SITUATION

IF ONE reviews the period from late 1978 to the Koornhof statement of April, 1979, there is a definite shift from the previous style of community organisation in the 1975-78 period (frequent mass meetings and reports-back) to a growing dependence upon external organisations and the advice of specialists who defined the nature of the struggle. This shift resulted in the leadership and broader community having limited understanding of the negotiation process and agreements, especially the implications of the settlement upon the community in the long-term.

It further created an elitist group of those directly in touch with the specialists, who saw themselves as separate from and above

the community - a factor which resulted in the early transition from such an elitist group to the extremely bureaucratic executive committee which emerged in mid 1979.

But organisation is not a static process. There are periods of progression and regression. The position of the community from 1978, until residents moved into the new houses in November 1980, was one of confusion, division and lack of direction. Organisation was retarded and the state was clearly in control of the process.

However, as one views the events of 1981 (up to the present - September) there appears to be a return of the struggle to the hands of the community.

WHY THIS SHIFT?

A NUMBER of pressures from the State, the community itself and other sectors have moved the process in this direction.

On the part of the state, confident that decisions could be taken with minimal challenge (if any) from what appeared to be a divided community, local officials

1. proceeded to re-house residents from the nearby squatter camp KTC in the New Crossroads township, by-passing the committee as a whole and the residents;
2. the issuing of permits was not satisfactorily completed with many not yet surveyed, who as a result found themselves subject to the 'normal' pass checks in the peninsula;
3. residents in New Crossroads were notified of additional water charges as meters were installed in the township (no other townships are subject to this). Some faced accounts of up to R80.
4. -children from the old Crossroads schools were told to attend the school in New Crossroads without consulting the existing school

committee;

- four teachers, including a principal, were installed in the new school, again with no school committee consultation;
- the position of the teachers at Noxolo school, resident in Crossroads, remained insecure despite assurances during the negotiations and subsequently that they would be transferred.

Pressure from the community to deal with all these issues forced the leadership back into a position of action and community accountability. Mass meetings were demanded (largely motivated by the women) and the bureaucratic nature of decision-making and the execution in particular, successfully challenged. Once again there is active community participation on key issues affecting the community. This is clearly demonstrated by focussing on the struggle over the school.

SCHOOLS

WHEN the school committee, parents and teachers at Crossroads were by-passed in the running of the new school the community responded by

- a) teachers and children initially boycotting the new school;
- b) the school committee calling a mass meeting (with the support of the executive committee) to explain the position and to obtain community support for their stand;
- c) demanding an explanation from the local school inspectors.

Community support was obtained. However, when the local inspectors met the community they made it clear that as far as their department was concerned the running of schools and decisions were no longer controlled by Crossroads people. This evoked a heated response and raised the concrete reality of township control versus community control in the history of Crossroads.

The meeting demanded to see Scheepers (Chief

circuit inspector). When contacted by the school committee the following day he refused to come to Crossroads but suggested that they send a delegation to him instead.

When this was put to a mass meeting it was viewed as an attempt to co-opt them and the position remained one of deadlock for a few weeks. Eventually (with instructions from above) Scheepers came to Crossroads and agreed to re-negotiate the position, but asked that they give the department until the present school term expired to do so. This was accepted.

However, when the new school term began, the position remained confused. The school committee was not contacted, the teachers' job positions in Crossroads at the old schools were still insecure, not all children were registered, and the new principal and teachers still remained at New Crossroads without being processed through the existing school committee.

Attempts were made to contact Scheepers, but to no avail. The leadership responded by calling a mass meeting on 26 July at which a decision was taken to stage a sit-in at the school in New Crossroads in an attempt to make the education authorities (particularly Scheepers) take note of their grievances.

Cars and buses transported parents and children to the new school early Monday morning. While this was taking place, the chairman of the Crossroads committee, Ngxobongwana, went to see Scheepers and advised him that he should come to New Crossroads and meet the parents and school committee.

At first reluctant, Scheepers was eventually persuaded (a frantic phone call from the principal at the nearby school helped) to visit the school and was met by singing parents and children. He agreed to a meeting which was held in the nearby community hall. Parents aired

their views concerning the existing confusion and dissatisfaction. Eventually Scheepers agreed to close the new school until such time as

- a) pupils were registered;
- b) the teachers' positions clarified;
- c) the school committee elected according to government regulations.

A deadline of 16 August was set. At this meeting a new school committee was democratically elected, consisting of most of the former school committee members, and accepted by the department as the official school committee. All future appointments of teachers will be approved by them. Pupils have been registered at the two new schools and all teachers from old Crossroads were transferred and satisfied with their present position.

The struggle over the school is in many ways a test case. It not only mobilised the community, but also illustrated that Crossroads community strength is being re-built and able to force concessions from the state. It tested Crossroads' response to the reality of normal township control compared with the decision-making processes in Crossroads which the community is clearly unwilling to relinquish.

In the struggle over the schools, the need to maintain closer liaison with New Crossroads emerged as crucial, if the unity of the entire community was to be maintained despite their geographical separation. A decision was taken to elect a working committee in New Crossroads to liaise with the existing committees in old Crossroads in an attempt to minimise this happening. New elections for the entire community have been discussed and are planned in the near future to consolidate leadership and strengthen the mandate for future action.

In addition to the pressures from the state, and the Crossroads community itself, which have helped shape present developments, a further pressure has evolved from the realisation that,

although isolated and treated as a 'special case' by Dr Koornhof, Crossroads residents in fact remain subject to the laws affecting all Africans in the Western Cape. When pressure was exerted upon the Nyanga bush people, questions concerning their relationship to this struggle and township people in general were raised.

The Crossroads leadership responded by inviting all community-based township organisations and a successful meeting took place at Noxolo school on 28 August.

At this meeting the present position in Crossroads was related and an appeal made from the Crossroads leadership for all township organisations to unite in their common struggle as black people in the Western Cape.

The community's response to all these issues shows not only a return to former mass community participation on issues, but also a move away from their reliance upon external advice, legal battles, etc, to deal with community issues. And, more importantly, a realisation that their struggle is not isolated from the broader political struggle.

It appears that despite the strategies adopted in 1978-79-80, lessons have been learned. There are clear indications that total strategy has not worked successfully and that Crossroads is no longer the divided, confused community of 1980.

NYANGA BUSH

THE HISTORY of the 'no name' camp next to the Peninsula Administration Board offices at Nyanga until 26 July was detailed in WIP 19.

The Crossroads Executive Committee and 43 community organisations had offered to help the Nyanga Bush people, but had been rebuffed by the Bush Committee which chose to work with church and outside (mainly white) support groups.

On 27 July Die Burger reported that officials

had to be brought from the rest of the country to cope with 1 100 people charged with pass offences in the Langa Courts. Lawyers had offered their services defending those arrested during the raids of the past few weeks. The number of defended cases slowed the notorious 'assembly line' pass courts. There had been some talk of not taking bail or defence at the beginning but it is not clear what happened to that strategy. Until Parliament debated the squatter position, the main news was the legal proceedings surrounding the bush people.

On 5 August Die Burger reported that Dr Koornhof had said South Africa would not tolerate a second Crossroads, and that the government had no intention of lifting influx control. On 8 August, Dr Koornhof denied that shelters had been removed from those in the bush and the Cape Times published a photograph taken on 17 July of a policeman removing shelter from an old lady.

Thomas Mandla, chairperson of the African Chamber of Commerce, said that those in Cape Town 'legally' were not against the rest - 'We'll share our crumbs of bread', he said in a statement to the Argus on 10 August.

Next morning there was another pre-dawn raid. American Congress members visiting Cape Town condemned the inhuman treatment of the Nyanga Bush people. By 13 August social workers, churchmen and relief workers were no longer allowed into the camp. A fund was set up to raise money for the squatters; a petition, strongly objecting to the recent evictions, arrests and intimidation, signed by thousands of Capetonians was handed to Dr Koornhof; a mass meeting in the City Hall condemned government action and four Progressive Federal Party (PFP) Members of Parliament had a long discussion with Dr Koornhof on 14 August. Helen Suzman said that they had had 'no joy' from the Minister.

News of the action was being published around the world.

The Bush Committee was told to expect a visit from Dr Koornhof that night. He did not arrive and instead released a 'new deal' through the press. According to the statement in the Cape Times (15 August) Dr Koornhof had made an agreement with the Transkei government that:

- Uncontrolled squatting could not be tolerated and would not be allowed in the interests of the squatters themselves;
 - No squatting would be allowed on the relevant site in Nyanga;
 - The case of each individual apprehended on the site in question as from 16 July to 3 August, 1981, would be considered on merit. Where the person was in employment, his/her position would be legalised. Housing would be taken up with the employer and, if accommodation was not available, the person would be accommodated on a 'single' basis.
 - The unemployed would be helped to find jobs elsewhere in the country. Steps had been taken to find them private sector employment in the Transvaal and Orange Free State where jobs were available. Women not having employment and men not willing to take up jobs offered could not be accommodated in the Western Cape.
- He added: 'The people can rely on me not to rat on or go back on what is written here, but we must have co-operation to resolve the problem'. Dr Koornhof repeatedly rejected criticism of recent actions, saying his department was trying to solve a difficult problem in as humane a way as possible.
- On 16 August Brian Bishop, chairperson of the Civil Rights League, said the deal was not acceptable as the people would not be able to take their families with them. He urged moderation and tolerance on both sides and added that 'if we

can arrange a meeting we would be pleased to do so although we realise that this will place our credibility at risk'.

Meanwhile eight PFP MPs had spent the weekend visiting Ciskei resettlement camps. This was the first public attempt to broaden the issue to forced removals and the public was informed about the scale and conditions of relocations.

By 17 August 2 500 people had gathered at the bush 'no name' camp, having heard that Dr Koornhof was offering jobs. People interviewed say that they were told to go to the camp if they were looking for jobs or passes. One even said that an official had told her to stay at the camp as the authorities were coming around to 'regularise' the people. (This was the second time such reports were made. The first was the time when people gathered on the night of 16 July. It is not impossible that this was a state strategy to gather many of those 'illegally' in the area in one place to be deported.)

The Chief Commissioner explained Dr Koornhof's statement to the people on 17 August. A meeting was scheduled for the next day for the Bush Committee to report what the squatters felt about the deal. It was cancelled and instead the camp was raided by 100 police in 80 vehicles with dogs at 06h20. About 2 000 people were arrested, taken to Pollsmoor and told to divide themselves into 'Ciskeians' and 'Transkeians'. Many people regarded themselves as neither. One man said that 'in Transkei everything is nothing'. He had worked in Cape Town 13 years and was one of the 800 meat workers who were sacked for strike action in 1980. He said he knew he could get a job if he had a Peninsula stamp; he did not need to be sent to the DFS or elsewhere.

Meanwhile the Transkei Minister of Foreign Affairs and Information, the Rev G T Vika, said on 18 August that the squatters had been incited.

They had refused jobs offered by Dr Koornhof, insisting that they be allowed to stay with their families. The same day the Urban Foundation made R10 000 available for relief work.

On 20 August 1 059 people were reported to have been deported. They were taken by bus to the Transkei, then given train tickets to the station nearest 'their villages'. 1 283 had been detained at the camp, six took job offers, 60 were legally in Cape Town and 74 had not been dealt with by the time of the report.

A meeting of 1 000 people was held at lunch-time at St George's Cathedral to protest and demand rights for the squatters. It was followed by an attempted march to Parliament to hand a memorandum to Dr Koornhof. It was handed to the Minister of Police while riot police dispersed the crowd. For the next week Parliament was in uproar with the National Party accusing the PFP of taking part in illegal activity such as marches.

On 21 August the Transkei 'border' was sealed and roadblocks were set up between Cape Town and the Transkei in an attempt to stop deportees from returning to Cape Town. On the 23rd Chief Matanzima accused South Africa of not recognising the status of the Transkei by sending people 'back'. Next day foreign diplomats in Cape Town tried to launch a joint protest but it was halted by the American representatives.

800 people were held in a pre-dawn raid on the Holy Cross Church at Nyanga on 26 August. Most were deported. The Langa Courts were no longer being used for those allegedly from the Transkei - they are deported in terms of immigration legislation as 'prohibited immigrants', while those from the Ciskei are being tried in Commissioners' courts in terms of the Urban Areas Act (until, presumably, the Ciskei becomes 'independent' in December 1981).

On 27 August 60 deportees managed to get

through roadblocks to return to Cape Town to fetch children and belongings left in the chaos. Kathy Lucket, a church worker, was trying to find 90 children of mothers stranded in the Transkei. Dr Koornhof announced in Parliament that about 43% of africans in Cape Town are there 'illegally'. The government estimated a de facto population of 199 600 and de jure 114 164.

On 1 September Dr Koornhof announced that he would always treat illegals this way. He named the Womens Movement for Peace, the Civil Rights League, the Western Province Council of Churches, the Black Sash and the Catholic Justice and Peace Commission as organisers behind the squatters, accusing them of inciting people and paying for them to return from the Transkei. The organisations denied the allegations. Dr Koornhof added that it was interesting to note that neither the Crossroads nor the 'legal' township people had become involved in the issue.

The deportees in Umatata were being sheltered by the churches, fed by the Transkei army. At the time of writing about 800 are still refusing to move until they can return to Cape Town. The Transkei government accused South Africa of not carrying out its undertaking of legalising those people with jobs in Cape Town. Instead the South Africans had deported everyone. It seems that PAB officials may be sent to investigate this.

In Cape Town townships were surrounded by roadblocks, particularly during weekends, with more than 300 people being arrested for pass offences on the weekend 5-6 September according to the Black Sash Advice office.

Having described the events surrounding the deportation of thousands of people to the Transkei, probably the first mass removal to that territory a brief comment on the current situation might be useful.

DEMANDS: PASSES AND PLACES TO STAY

GOING through press reports no demands of the bush people are to be found. A duplicated list of short and long term demands handed to the PAB reads:

SHORT TERM -

1. MORATORIUM in regard to all Board and Police action until negotiations resolved.
2. AMNESTY for those of community presently in prison or awaiting trial.
3. RECOGNITION that we are not criminals but ordinary people.
4. ERECT temporary shelters pending resolution.
5. FREE ACCESS to us for doctors, priests, lawyers, health and welfare services.
6. FREEDOM of religion and religious observance on site.

LONG TERM -

1. RIGHT to live together as families.
2. RIGHTS to live permanently in the Western Cape.
3. RECOGNITION as citizens of South Africa.

Talking to people waiting for a meeting with the Chief Commissioner on 18 August, observers were told demands were 'Passes and places to stay'. At no stage were jobs demanded. Many people are employed in Cape Town 'illegally' so that what they require is the right to live and work in Cape Town and access to accommodation. Dr Koornhof offered jobs far from Cape Town where it is unlikely that family accommodation would be available. Unemployment in the Transvaal and the Orange Free State is just as bad as that in the Eastern Cape. If Dr Koornhof had really managed to organise over 100 jobs, it is likely that the people of Orverwacht (a resettlement area of about 140 000 people outside Thaba Nchu, OFS) or Gannalaagte (a closer settlement in the Sannieshof district) or Kwaggafontein (a resettlement camp in KwaNdebele) or hundreds of other relocated areas in the bantustans, would

jump at the opportunity. The moment one group of people organises and has international media focussed on it (such as Crossroads), the government comes up with a 'deal', which attempts to make that group a little more privileged than the rest, thus dividing their struggle. But this time, however rudimentary the organisation, the people refused the deal. They were summarily deported and now sit demanding their rights in the Transkei which disclaims them, saying it is South Africa's problem. South Africa's response is that they are citizens of the 'independent' Transkei.

State strategy was successful in that having made a superficial attempt to negotiate, it could remove the people physically off the site and export the problem for the time being - out of sight and mind of the media. In spite of loose organisation over the last three months, the united stand of the people has been remarkable. They still demand to return to Cape Town. They have elected working committees to deal with day to day problems in the church halls and hospitals in which they are staying in Umtata, but when the officials come to see them, they speak as one body. The Bush Committee still exists in part in Cape Town. Most of them were never arrested.

The support group(s) strategy was not clear. Concerned individuals and groups poured food, clothing, firewood and moral support into the 'no name' camp. From the beginning there were tensions. Some saw their aid as humanitarian relief for people in terrible circumstances. There were those who saw the need for relief work, but felt that the issue was a political one and as such should be challenged by the church, by concerned citizens of Cape Town, or both. The community with most experience in such matters, Crossroads, was excluded apparently at the wish of the Bush Committee. The

township people and voluntary organisations that tried to get involved were also rebuffed. The supporters did manage to rally tremendous material and moral support among whites by petitions, a march, mass meetings, debates in Parliament, but involvement could have been much wider and the squatters' stand could possibly have been sustained had those closest to them been actively involved.

On 21 September four South African officials were held Hostage for three hours in Umtata by the squatters. The confrontation arose from a statement by the officials that only 50 squatters would be allowed back to Cape Town to find children and collect belongings. The 50 refused to be divided from the rest of the people at the Catholic Youth Centre and it was made clear that as officials had provided buses for them to be taken to the Transkei, until buses were provided to take them all back to Cape Town, no one would move.

After a month in Umtata the people are still together, morale is still high and it seems militancy is growing.

The same day a report appeared in the Cape Times detailing the grievances of the Crossroads Community. A mass meeting on 20 September had discussed their fears that Dr Koornhof might not be sympathetic. Several speakers at the meeting dismissed the 'Koornhof deal' saying they were not prepared to abide by its letter or spirit.

Influx control is not working and while the government may make short term gains, in the long term many lessons have been learned:

-The state has the force to implement its policies and uses that power despite public outcry, promises of humane treatment, international rugby tours, foreign investment and the threat of sanctions, should it be critical for the survival of policy which protects political and

economic privilege of the few.

-State officials are still state officials ie Dr Koornhof is Minister of Co-operation and Development, the department which implements the pass laws. He has clearly reaffirmed that he will not change the policy. Despite smooth talking to the contrary at times (eg April 1980: there will be no more forced removals), he is a Nationalist Cabinet Minister, not a frustrated liberal.

-The state does not always need to negotiate; it can gamble on using force. It lost in Crossroads in 1978, won in Nyanga three years later. Organised resistance from the people themselves makes the difference.

-The 'reformist' element in total strategy days is over - it is back to confrontation in Nyanga, Angola, the trade union movement, etc.

-The International climate is different with right wing leadership in the USA and UK particularly. South Africa need no longer be as careful about its 'overseas image'.

-Transkei is an agent of South Africa - forced removals cannot be refused by a bantustan.

-There is no substitute for organisation - demands should have been clearly stated by the people themselves, as they were in Crossroads, then outsiders could have related to demands rather than helping to articulate them.

-Resistance cannot be sustained without community support - the Bush Committee should not have refused support from 43 community organisations.

-Remarkable resistance and unity have been sustained for three months - in the short term the people have lost for the right reasons (direct repression) rather than for the wrong ones (co-optation in Crossroads).

It is not inconceivable that Dr Koornhof and the Cabinet could renege on their 1979 Crossroads agreement. Hundreds, if not thousands, were left

off the survey and as Crossroads is cleared, not all the people are qualifying for houses in the New Crossroads. Some who have qualified are being given three month permits, then told to return to the Transkei. It is possible that Dr Koornhof could claim that the Crossroads Committee has not kept its side of the bargain in not allowing new people into the area. The vast majority of those left off the survey (estimated over 3 000 by the Committee) have lived in Crossroads all this time and only become conspicuous as official sifting progresses.

Should the special status of Crossroads be withdrawn, it is unlikely that such a politicised community with a long history of organisation and experience from which to learn, would allow itself to be deported from the Western Cape. Crossroads leadership has reverted to holding general community meetings and is well in touch with township representatives. It would be an unwise state that tackles that alliance lightly.

BACK TO COMMUNITY RESISTANCE

WHILE the Crossroads people had clearly stated their demands before the negotiations, there was no real participation from or accountability to the broader community once the experts were brought in. Having won some limited legal battles in the law courts, they came to rely on the legal advisers for political advice, rather than on their own community. In the light of Dr Koornhof's demands for speed and confidentiality, it was almost impossible to take issues back for general discussion. The lawyers and experts were far more familiar with procedures as well.

The Nyanga people were not even given that opportunity. Draft agreements were drawn up by outsiders, an interdict was being discussed and compromises could well have resulted had the state not moved quickly with its offer of jobs

and subsequent deportations.

Clearly in Crossroads now there is healthy cynicism towards the Department of Cooperation and Development and its Minister. With the possibility of the hard won agreement being withdrawn, there may be scope for the selective use of legal strategies ie testing the 'deal'. The community and its leaders have moved through their dependence on outsiders. Their confidence in their own ability is being re-established as they organise themselves first. In turn the state seems aware of this resurgence and rumours are rife that the leadership is about to be arrested and charged with fraud (issuing passes illegally) - the same tactics used before when leaders sought direction from their own community.

Both groups of people - those from Nyanga-bush and those from Crossroads, old and new - are organising, with support from outsiders, but with the initiative firmly in their own hands.

Fears on 'Koornhof deal' at Crossroads

Political Staff

ABOUT 600 Crossroads residents held a mass meeting yesterday to voice their fears that key elements of the historic 1979 agreement reached with the Minister of Co-operation and Development, Dr Piet Koornhof, were collapsing. Several speakers expressed extreme dissatisfaction with the way Administration Board officials were implementing the agreement

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reached with Dr Koorhof in 1978.

However, Mr Timo Bousidenhoud, chief commissioner of the Department of Co-operation and Development in the Western Cape, last night strongly denied that the "Koorhof deal" was breaking down. "The community leaders have not approached me with these complaints and I am surprised that such facts are now being expressed."

"We will continue to implement the Crossroads agreement in consultation with Crossroads leaders," Mr Bousidenhoud said.

Grievances

The grievances of Crossroads residents centre on:

• Problems many face to get the necessary permit to be by Crossroads. Without these permits they cannot get at shops in New Crossroads and face the constant danger of arrest under the pass laws.

• The uncertain position of contract workers who say they were told not to apply for permits and now find they are unable to move to New Crossroads — in spite of Dr Koorhof's pledge that they would be included in the deal.

• The fact that people are being issued with temporary permits although they believe they are entitled to blanket permission to remain.

• The inadequacy of a survey conducted to establish which Crossroads residents could take advantage of Dr Koorhof's deal. Community leaders say many people who were in the area before the December 31, 1978, deadline were omitted from the survey.

• Anger at the deportation of several Crossroads residents back to the Transkei during recent pass raids in the Peninsula.

• Extreme dissatisfaction over high water accounts received by many New Crossroads residents. Community leaders have objected to the water fees, as no other townships are subject to such fees and the matter was not discussed with community leaders, although they were assured of consultation on all important issues.

Suspicion

There is also a deep-rooted suspicion within the community that the Administration Board wishes to bypass the elected leaders, under Crossroads "mayor" Mr Johannes Nqobongwana, and set up other leadership groups.

Mr Bousidenhoud rejected these allegations, saying there was "no truth" in them.

Several speakers at the Crossroads meeting said they believed Administration Board officials rejected the "Koorhof deal" and were not prepared to abide by its letter or spirit. They called on Dr Koorhof to take steps to ensure that the agreement was carried out.

Community leaders have also decided to request a meeting with Dr Koorhof if matters do not improve.

Residents hope that progress can begin today towards solving the permit problem, as they have been promised that an administrative committee will be reconvened to consider cases of people who believe they have a right to a permit.

INFORMATION

Transport

TRANSVAAL

Kagiso: It was reported (Sowetan, 30.07.81) that the Kagiso Residents' Organisation (KRO) had organised a meeting to protest against rent and bus fare increases. The residents had gathered around the local Lutheran church. They were refused entry into the church by the parish.

Police intervened to break up the meeting and a 'punch-up' broke out between the security police and people at the meeting (Sowetan, 31.07.81). The police attempted to make arrests. They were, however, fought off and eventually driven away by the crowd, amid chants and freedom songs.

At a subsequent meeting residents decided that they would boycott the Greyhound Bus Lines. The local community councillors were accused of being government stooges and the community council was asked to resign.

In addition, the R20-million hostel project in the area was slammed with people saying that 'We need houses, not hostels' (Sowetan, 31.07.81).

A few days later it was reported that KRO leaders had been arrested by Krugersdorp police after they attempted to march to the WRAB (West Rand Administration Board) offices in protest against increased rent and bus fares (Star, 03.08.81). The march came after 6 000 people had gathered in protest. Ten 'youths' were arrested after the stoning of Greyhound buses (RDM, 04.08.81). It was reported that a student in the area stated that there was mass confusion in the higher primary schools as pupils had

been told to go home as there was no school (Star, 04.08.81).

Chairperson of the community council, J Mango, said that classes had not been disrupted. Furthermore, he condemned the unrest and stated that if people hoped to solve matters through violence they should accept the consequences.

The RDM (05.08.81) reported that eight men and two women appeared before W Aucamp in the Krugersdorp Regional Court, charged with stoning buses in the Kagiso township. They pleaded not guilty to a charge of 'public violence, alternatively hindering workers from boarding buses and malicious damage to property'. Bail was granted and the hearing was postponed to 19 August, after the court had been told that the accused would be defended by Johannesburg attorneys.

Meanwhile, the day before the court appearance, police fired rubber bullets to disperse a group of 'youths' (Star, 05.08.81). They arrested four people who were released later. A teacher at Bosele Higher Primary School said that the day before (4 August) a group of young people from 'The People's Eye' entered the school and dismissed pupils saying that 'there was no time to sit at the desk while their brothers were fighting for their rights' (Star, 05.08.81).

The RDM (06.08.81) reported that the township was 'back to normal' as 'workers boarded buses to go to work and pupils returning to school without any incidents of violence reported'. There have been no further reports.

Putco - West Rand: J.L. Coetzee, financial executive of Putco, announced an increase application to come into effect in October (Star, 04.08.81). The company is seeking an increase in revenue of 35% which will be made