

step in and sustain it.

But the new Maseru government immediately conceded a number of Pretoria's demands, and has shown itself more susceptible to South African pressure than its predecessor.

Recent pressures against the Mozambican capital may, for the maximalists, play a similar function to the pressures against Lesotho Prime Minister Leabus Jonathan in January.

Attempts by both Pretoria and certain Western intelligence services to promote a negotiated settlement between the FRELIMO government and the MNR are now generally seen to have failed. From the maximalist point of view, intensified pressure would aim to push internal Mozambican contradictions to the point of social collapse.

For some time it has been obvious that Pretoria tries to target interventions at perceived contradictions in states which are destabilisation victims. In Lesotho there were obvious contradictions between a minority in the armed forces which supported the Basotho National Party Youth League, and the majority.

In Mozambique such obvious splits do not exist. But the literature of the MNR bandits (which to some extent probably reflects the views of the SADF) suggests that they see a potential contradiction between certain unspecified senior 'nationalist' figures in the Mozambican armed forces, more disposed to negotiate

with the MNR, and FRELIMO's political leadership, which is seen as intractable 'communists'. Recent statements by MNR spokesmen indicate that they consider that without Machel the two factions will not be able to hold together.



**A TESTING  
TIME  
AHEAD**

Machel's death (assuming that Pretoria had a hand in it) could represent a compromise between maximalists and minimalists. Removing the president may mean a change in political structures which might result in policy shifts, but would not involve the risks to Pretoria of a wholesale change of government. However that may be, in the medium term at least, some resumption of the intensified destabilisation campaign can be expected.

Whether this will take the form of an attempt to force the Mozambican government under a new president to enter negotiations on new, less favourable terms, or whether it will mean an attempt to provoke domestic contradictions to the point of rupture remains to be seen.

The FRELIMO leadership - now minus Machel - is in for a testing time, and will have to mobilise all the domestic and international support available if it is to weather the storm ahead.

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