

SADF and Civic Action:

blacks in the Defence Force

Recruitment of blacks by the SADF has increased enormously over the past few years. GAVIN EVANS traces this process and relates it to the SADF's expanding Civic Action Programme. The article is taken from his recently completed dissertation, 'The Role of the Military in Education in South Africa'.

'The onslaught against the Republic of South Africa is a total one, as is the case with South West Africa...Enemy actions are directed against the RSA in the political, economic, psychological and security fields. On its part, the RSA has to act or counteract in all these fields. It speaks for itself that all these actions are to be orchestrated towards the achievement of common objectives'.

-Major General Charles Lloyd.

The role of the SADF in black education is integral to (and probably the most important part of) its Civic Action Programme (CAP). Rather than trying to isolate the educational aspect of the programme, this article considers the CAP in its entirety. Because the emphasis on civic action is closely linked to the SADF's needs for blacks to play a greater role in its structures, part one of this contribution considers the question of black participation in the military in some detail. Part two goes on to look at the CAP and its relationship to black education.

An essential ingredient of the notion of a 'total and co-ordinated strategy' is the emphasis on winning the 'hearts and minds' of the people. Increasingly, war has been described by military leaders as being '80 percent socio-economic and only 20 percent military'. As Major General Boshoff put it,

'If we lose the socio-economic struggle then we need not even bother to fight the military one'.

This realisation and the restructuring of the state of which it is a reflection has led to significant changes in the 'ethnic' composition of the SADF. The military itself has tried to play a leading role in the '80 percent' of the struggle by attempting to alter its relation to the dominated classes, primarily through the Civic Action Programme.

In Namibia, the SADF was faced with a situation where their enemy, SWAPO, had the support of much of the population. As Willem Steenkamp, Cape Times defence reporter and SADF captain, put it, 'The motivation is to win hearts and minds. They want to try and convince the populace that they are better off under the present dispensation than they would be under, for example, SWAPO. (Mao) speaks of the fish and water theory - the insurgent is the fish and the local population is the water. If the water is friendly the fish will survive...Ultimately a Hearts and Minds strategy can't win a campaign, it can only contribute. Its better to get in on the early stages before insurgency starts and before the politicisation process begins, otherwise you start with a credibility gap. In Ovambo it didn't work that way. You should start with the hearts and minds campaign before the political action begins'.

Within South Africa the enemy has increasingly been identified as the ANC and those forces sympathetic to it. Since the 1976 uprisings there has been a revival of ANC activity both in terms of popular support as an emerging mass movement, and an organised political and military force. A central priority of the SADF is therefore to remove the political and

military basis for this support. As Defence Minister Magnus Malan puts it, 'Bullets kill bodies, not beliefs. I would like to remind you that the Portuguese did not lose the military battle in Mozambique and Angola, but they lost the faith and trust of the inhabitants of those countries. The insurgent forces have no hope of success without the aid of the local population'.

To attempt to secure these ends, a significant aspect of the SADF objective is, in their terms, to win the support of the local population and to eliminate friction points and grievances through good administration and civic action.

THE RECRUITMENT OF BLACKS INTO THE SADF

Both in terms of its policy, history and traditions, and in terms of its practices in its role as an emerging mass movement, non-racialism is central to the ANC's political programme. For the SADF it is important that ANC activities generally, and guerilla activity specifically, are not perceived internally or internationally as being directed against white domination. Instead, it is important that the struggle is seen as black and white versus black and white, of free enterprise against the forces of international communism. Black participation in the SADF serves to support this idea. In SADF propaganda, particularly that directed at international audiences - for example through Paratus - great play is made of the role of blacks in the SADF.

In the 1982 Defence White Paper, Magnus Malan set out the policy of the SADF towards the recruitment of blacks: 'It is the policy that all Population groups be involved in defending the RSA. This means the representation of all population groups in the SADF, in other words, a Defence Force of the people for the people'.

What is clear is that at least at the level of the rhetoric of the Top Brass, a multi-racial Defence Force is a priority. Until 1968 no blacks had been trained for warfare by the SADF, and in 1970 then-Defence Minister Botha stated that his department would only employ africans as labourers: 'If the Bantu wants to

build up a defence force, he should do it in his own, eventually independent homeland'.

However, since the mid-1970s, the image presented through the English press and Paratus has been one of a Defence Force which allows equality of opportunity - of black and white together against a common enemy in a racially integrated army, navy and airforce. Reflecting this image, Cape Times defence correspondent Willem Steenkamp said: 'Integration is carried out in a non-tokenistic way. You have Coloured officers commanding Whites, and you don't get petty discrimination. So the Black or Coloured man in the Army has self-respect. They know that no post is closed to them on the grounds of race. As a result, that all important principle of upward mobility is unfettered'.

However, despite the fact that the military has taken the lead in the reformist moves within the state, the reality of racial integration has tended to lag behind the rhetoric. The recruitment of coloureds, indians and africans has been ethnic in form. Cynthia Enloe has noted that 'For the three non-white ethnic groups which have now been specifically targetted for wider participation it is a question of balancing the chances for leverage and legitimacy versus the risks of further cooperation and exploitation. The Nationalist-headed Ministry of Defence has deliberately structured the recruitment of these three groups in a manner that underscores its ethnic character. Indians, Coloureds and Africans each have their separate military corps. Each has a specific sort of military function'.

Although there have been gradual moves away from this form of organisation, the SADF continues to strive for separate training facilities for the different 'race groups'. Where separate facilities are not possible because of operational or other requirements, other 'groups' are required to train with whites, but only in exceptional circumstances.

One reason why the SADF has reviewed its position over the recruitment of blacks during the last decade has been its role in pushing a multi-racial ideology with the emphasis on 'separate but equal' - in line with the ethnic basis of recruitment - often through the assistance of

'traditional' leaders.

Together with the increased black recruitment, on an ethnic basis, has come an appeal to whites to abandon racism. According to Major General Boshoff (in 1977) one sickness amongst whites was their fear of losing their identity. He said that bad race relations had already been identified by South Africa's enemies as a major chink in the armour.

Thus the propagation of a multi-racial ideology, as well as being used to improve the SADF's image internationally and amongst blacks internally, has also played a significant role in softening up whites within the SADF for the increased participation of blacks, and has tended to precede policy changes in this regard. Changes in the racial division of labour in the military (as elsewhere) tend to take place after a process of suitable ideological preparation.

A second reason for the increasing recruitment of blacks is that as the internal conflict intensifies and the military dimension grows, whites will become too thinly spread to effectively counter guerilla activity.

Thirdly, the turnover of SADF personnel has been high, partly because of competition with the private sector. As a cheaper, and relatively secure source of manpower, blacks have been recruited to counteract this tendency. Despite recent moves to equalise salaries at an officer level, black wages remain below those of whites. In 1977 black salaries averaged between 54% and 63% of white salaries at comparable ranks, and in 1982 there was only parity between coloureds, indians and whites in the officer ranks; between whites and africans parity existed only for chaplains.

In some respects the form of recruitment of blacks into the SADF has parallels with the situation in Zimbabwe before independence, although an important difference is that in Zimbabwe the war had reached a higher stage by the time a systematic policy of black recruitment was under way. Already in 1977 black South Africans (as well as black Namibians) were being employed in the operational area and by 1982 forty percent of the forces there were black, and doing most of the fighting.

RECRUITMENT OF AFRICANS INTO THE SADF

Since 1974 the SADF appears to have adopted a two-pronged strategy for the recruitment of africans. Firstly, recruitment directly into the SADF, and secondly, into the bantustan units. In 1974 the first black Namibian unit was set up, in 1975 the first african Permanent Force (PF) unit was formed, and by 1979 units had been set up by the SADF in the Transkei, Bophutha-Tswana, Venda, northern Natal and the eastern Transvaal. These Batallions - 111, 112, 113 and 121 - are strictly ethnically based.

Initially all africans were trained at 21 Batallion (affiliated to Natal Command) at Lenz. 21 Batallion (which consists mainly of South Sotho and Tswana and is meant to be non-ethnic) is an elite formation. It has been doing operational duty on the Natal and Namibian borders for the past six years. The regional units usually do not do operational duty outside of their regions, where they do all their recruiting, applying lower entrance qualifications than 21 Batallion.

In official SADF propaganda great stress has been laid on the participation of blacks in the SADF and on 21 Batallion in particular. Between June 1967 and June 1974, ten articles appeared in Paratus on this topic. From 1976 to July 1982, 48 articles appeared, and since 1978 a regular column entitled 'Black Man's View' has appeared, stressing that 'the SA Defence Force has taken the lead in fostering public relations among the different ethnic groups. Nobody can feel more at home than inside the services of the Defence Forces'.

November 1973, as Uniform put it, 'heralded a new era in the history of the South African army', when Magnus Malan gave approval to the establishment of an Army training sector for african soldiers. On 21 January 1974, 21 Batallion was created. After concerted advertising in the press, 16 africans were recruited for basic training, followed in August by a further intake of 38. In April 1975 authority was received to recruit africans into the PF. In December 1975, 21 Batallion moved to Lenz and by 1979 it had 362 african PF members.

After an orientation course of 17 weeks and 10 weeks of basic training, the troops are required to do 16 weeks of operational training and are then deployed on operational duty usually involving 12 week stints on the Namibian border. After this, they are joined by selected recruits from the 'homeland' and regional units. They are then transferred to various units and commandos in South Africa and Namibia.

By the beginning of 1980, 21 Battalion was recruiting over 500 africans a year which, according to the SADF, is about one-fifth the number who apply. In 1980 salaries ranged from R95 to R240 a month, with the highest rank being that of a Staff Sergeant; according to Commandant Swanepoel, the previous Commanding Officer, the chances of promotion are slim. Paratus claims that blacks volunteer for 21 Battalion mainly because they want to defend their country: 'The enthusiasm among the 21 Battalion recruits was almost unbelievable. Some of them had a comprehensive understanding of what communism and terrorism involves, whereas others only desired to fight for their country...All the men were aware of the threat facing South Africa'. Paratus admitted that there were other possible reasons for volunteering such as job security, career possibilities and education.

The SADF recruits africans it believes will tend to be supportive of the status quo. Most are of non-urban origin, often with already existing family ties to the state apparatuses. Most africans in the PF do not have section 10 rights in the urban areas, and this provides an incentive for joining the army; it also serves as a form of control as they are sent home if they 'misbehave'.

The SADF appears to have taken stringent precautions to ensure the 'loyalty' of african recruits. African volunteers are screened by psychologists, ethnologists and senior SADF personnel to check their records and 'personalities' before being recruited, and training programmes devote a large portion of time to indoctrination. The positive incentives for remaining loyal are considerable and include housing, pensions and education. Africans can qualify for

21 Battalion with standard Six, while for the regional units the qualifications are considerably lower. With the present unemployment figure being well over three million, opportunities for employment elsewhere may be minimal.

The next step in the process of integrating africans into the SADF appears to be officer training and the creation of urban african battalions. In 1979 the SADF authorised commandos throughout South Africa to recruit blacks as part of a support service corps, with volunteers being trained to serve in combat units and being required to do border duty, as well as being involved in area defence. A spokesperson for the Johannesburg East Commando announced that a plan was being established to 'help and protect the people of Soweto'. Magnus Malan recommended that urban commandos such as SASOL Command should include africans in their ranks. The establishment of fully fledged urban african battalions does not seem to be far off. As Willem Steenkamp put it, 'The government has learned the lesson from Rhodesia and its only a matter of time before (urban black battalions) are established'.

There also appear to be plans to set up rural commandos specifically for africans in certain areas. In 1979 Major General Lloyd said that the SADF intended to establish organisations in the Natal and KwaZulu border areas which could perform certain counter-insurgency actions. He went on to say that 'It is vitally important that the local population regardless of colour, participate in countering insurgency within their own areas. One should bear in mind, however, that terrorists normally return to the area where they were recruited and, consequently, the local population is expected to turn against and fight their own people'.

For africans, pressure against joining the PF appears to be considerable, especially in the urban areas such as Soweto where the military has been experienced directly as a repressive force. In this respect, Grundy refers to the 1976 Soweto uprising when families of 21 Battalion members were moved out of Soweto and into the Lenz Camp for their own protection. He also

refers to numerous polls which indicate complete opposition to the SADF. He argues that although the SADF may be feared and grudgingly respected, it is necessarily tainted by the structures which it exists to defend, and concludes that 'until White South Africans and their leaders appreciate this their efforts to include Blacks in the defence of South Africa are bound to be frustrated'. It is this contradiction which the SADF is attempting to resolve through the Civic Action Programme.

RECRUITMENT OF COLOUREDS INTO THE SADF

In 1963 the Cape Corps was established. Coloured enlistees were not armed, and were not accepted as part of the PF. Their role was to fill auxilliary, non-combatant functions, particularly in the navy. By 1967, 490 men had been trained, most of them filling posts such as storekeepers, stewards, chiefs, waiters and engineer mechanics.

The main reason for the formation of the Cape Corps was its ideological advantage to the SADF, combined with pressure from sections of the coloured petty bourgeoisie. By 1972 it had advanced to being an integral part of the PF, and by 1974 had been granted the freedom of Cape Town and was described by PW Botha as 'a feather in the cap of the Defence Force and the Coloured population as a whole'. In 1975 the Defence Act was amended, giving members of the Cape Corps the same status as their white counterparts. This meant, among other things, that whites were authorised to salute blacks. Seven coloured soldiers were given the rank of lieutenant.

In August 1976 the first company of coloured infantrymen left South Africa for operational duty in Namibia. By 1977 one quarter of the Cape Corps intake had joined the PF. In that year there were 4 000 coloureds and 750 indians in the SADF, together making up 10% of the PF.

In 1980 the SADF announced that 2 612 applications for joining the PF had been received during 1979 - 977 coloureds, 101 indians and 1 534 africans. All the indians applied to the navy, 453 coloureds applied to the army, 18 to the airforce

and 406 to the navy, while all the africans applied to the army. This led Paratus to comment that 'Our manpower recruiting campaign is therefore directed at all young South Africans in a society not plagued by class or caste distinctions and in which merit is the sole criterion of excellence'.

During 1980 the Cape Corps ceased to exist as a separate unit, with existing coloured members being incorporated into the PF after two years of voluntary national service. The Cape Corps now recruits nearly 2 000 national servicemen annually (out of over 4 000 applicants - an increase of over 400% in four years), meaning that national recruitment drives are no longer as necessary as before.

Coloureds have been in the navy as PF members for over 14 years (and before that as members of the auxilliary forces). Initially they were employed mainly in administrative, catering and other non-combatant roles, but they are now active in most facets of navy activity including the commissioned officer echelons, and they have served on all the major classes of warship.

The response of the 'coloured community' to the SADF is discussed in more detail below. However, it seems that at least partly because of opposition or antagonism to the military in the urban areas, the majority of recruits (up to 95%) come from the rural areas, with most of them being from working class backgrounds. Many join because they cannot find jobs elsewhere. Others join, according to one Cape Corps member, because 'they just like the guns, they just like to be a soldier and they get cheap brandy and beer'. Thus job security, pay, perks and the attraction of militarism seem to be the main motivating factors. These factors are strengthened by the rise in unemployment which has sent a record number of applicants to the Cape Corps, including a higher number of urban applicants.

A Grassroots survey in the Cape Flats on the effects of unemployment suggested that although the majority of those questioned expressed opposition to people joining the army because they were out of work (for example, James Abrahams of Elsie's River: 'People who go to the army are

stupid. We should regard them as sellouts. They betray their own people'), others, like Fanie Hendricks had the attitude that 'Dit sal alright wees on army toe to gaan. Hulle sal 'n man 'n living daar gee'.

In the Cape Corps the officers and many of the PF members appear to be drawn mainly from the petty bourgeoisie, and as well as being motivated by job security, important factors include their political backgrounds, promotion possibilities and the desire for status and respectability. For both officers and men the perception of the army as providing equal opportunities for promotion and relatively high pay are important factors. According to Steenkamp, things are very different with the police: 'A few years ago the police got very pissed off because many of the Coloured police were leaving to join the Cape Corps because pay and conditions were better'.

Despite this, and despite the growing number of applicants for the Cape Corps, opposition continues to be widespread. As Commandant John Cupido, officer commanding the Cape Corps, put it, '...quite a large part of the Coloured community saw the establishment of the Corps as part of the system, part of the system being the internal policy of the country, and to a very large extent that hasn't changed yet. Quite a number of people still see it that way, and we must be quite honest about this,... there is still a big amount of non-involvement at this stage in this Corps from the Coloured communities, and certainly I think the franchise has got something to do with it.... This attitude is still very prevalent... You see the problem is...that people see...the involvement of Coloureds in defence, as part of the political system, which we as soldiers don't agree with...The simple fact is that we as soldiers have divorced defence of the country totally from politics... It is our job to make this country safe and to keep this country safe, so that the politicians can operate here. That's our simple philosophy'.

RECRUITMENT OF INDIANS INTO THE SADF

A separate indian unit in the SADF

was formed in 1974 at the Salisbury Island naval training base (now known as SAS Jalsena) after discussions between the South African Indian Council (SAIC) and the SADF. The Indian Corps initially found difficulty in enlisting volunteers and, despite recruiting visits to cinemas in the Transvaal and Natal, and the distribution of brochures showing aspects of navy life to indian high schools, the white commanding officer of the new Indian Corps admitted that at the start of 1975 only 34 men had come forward to fill the 200 places for indian volunteers. He attributed this to low pay. At this stage, as with Cape Corps members, indian volunteers were only given weapons to be used in cases of self-defence in wartime, but they did not perform combat roles and were confined to auxilliary duties.

By 1977, however, this had changed and recruitment was becoming more successful with 750 being in the SADF at that time, having been recruited at a rate of 150 a year. By 1982, according to Commandant Johan Beyers of SADF liaison, only one-fifth of the number of indian applicants were elected for each intake.

All indians serving in the SADF are in the navy, which has proportionately more blacks serving in its ranks than either the army or airforce. Coloured and indian membership of the navy's PF increased from 17,4% in 1977 to 20% in 1979. Blacks are now also employed in an operational capacity. By September 1980, coloureds and indians made up one-third of the entire naval force and 80% of the enlisted personnel on some ships.

In 1980 Pertals Habial Singh, 31, became the first indian officer in the SADF. However, in December of that year, lieutenant Singh resigned his post, saying that he was being used for propaganda purposes, was being humiliated by his white superiors and was having less qualified whites promoted over him, and that he was being discriminated against in pay, benefits and accommodation. This incident caused the Indian Reform Party to issue a statement saying that indians would be urged to stop joining the Defence Force if these allegations proved to be true.

Clearly the rhetoric about equality of opportunity in the SADF for blacks

has not been completely in line with the facts. The process of the integration of blacks into the PF has been a gradual one, fraught with contradictions such as those faced by lieutenant Singh.

INDIAN AND COLOURED CONSCRIPTION

The possibility of conscription being extended to coloured and indian men (as well as white women) was put very firmly on the agenda in March 1982, after leaks about the contents of the 1982 Defence Amendment Act were released to the press. This had been preceded by announcements from General Viljoen and others that the SADF intended introducing conscription for coloureds as the government was preparing to counter the threats of insurgency and conventional warfare. After immediate and widespread negative reaction, the idea was temporarily shelved, but not dropped. Magnus Malan said that the idea had certainly been considered and would be re-examined within the next five years. He went on to say that the extension of the military service of white males was a temporary measure.

As early as 1977, PW Botha stated at the Cape NP congress that the conscription of indians and coloureds had already been accepted in principle. It now seems that government is waiting for the right political moment to take this step.

There were two reasons given for shelving the plans to conscript coloureds and indians: firstly, the SADF had insufficient finances, facilities and manpower to incorporate them immediately, and it is clear that the SADF would have major difficulties if suddenly confronted with over 30 000 new recruits; and secondly, as Transvaal NP leader FW de Klerk put it, 'You can't ask a man to fight for his country if he cannot vote'. The introduction of conscription for coloureds and indians now seems to be hinged on government's constitutional proposals.

According to the Evening Post, all SADF generals were in favour of extending the call-up to coloureds and indians, and for this reason they are believed to have put considerable pressure on the NP leadership to

extend the franchise. Steenkamp said the incentive for the current constitutional proposals came from SADF planning over five years ago. However, as the SADF has recognised, the major factor preventing the move at present is the likelihood of widespread opposition from coloured and indian people.

In February 1982, when the possibility of extending the call-up to coloureds and indians was announced, it was opposed by the Labour Party whose standpoint was 'How can I defend my country if I don't have a vote and I'm not recognised in Parliament?'. Similarly, the Democratic Party in the SAIC warned that there would be tremendous opposition to the move, and said that 'if the Government expects the Indian community to protect our borders as loyal citizens then we must first be given first class citizenship rights'.

Other responses were more vociferous. Hassan Howa said that 'to have conscription based on the apartheid system and racial discrimination is immoral and to be rejected'. The Natal Indian Congress stated that 'We object strenuously to such a measure. Our opposition to military training is not out of disloyalty to our country but out of rejection of the Government's apartheid policy'.

It thus became clear that, for the extension of conscription to become a political possibility, it had to be preceded by the extension of the franchise. For this reason, the issue of possible conscription has come up frequently in the campaign against the Labour Party's decision to participate in the new constitutional dispensation, with opponents claiming that by accepting the constitutional proposals Labour Party is tacitly clearing the ground for the conscription of coloureds and indians. The Labour Party has responded by reiterating that it would continue to oppose this move until further political rights were granted.

Although the likelihood of widespread resistance and opposition to conscription and the problems of integrating thousands of new recruits, have led to the shelving of the extended call-up for the time being, there continue to be strong reasons for the reintroduction of the idea in the near future.

Firstly, the converse of government's holding back conscription for coloureds and indians until they have a vote, is that once the new constitutional dispensation is in operation pressure for conscription, particularly from conservative whites, will increase. In fact, the issue of coloured and indian conscription was used to sell the constitutional package to sections of the white electorate. For example, at an NP information meeting, PW Botha asked: 'Do you want Coloured people fighting on the border or not?'. When the 1 100 people in the audience responded affirmatively, Botha said: 'We must then treat them decently. They must not go behind the backs of our sons to fight for the enemy'.

In other circles the constitutional proposals have been used to sell the idea that government is committed to genuine power sharing and if power is to be genuinely shared, then it is important for coloureds and indians to be seen to be defending their share of political power. This was expressed by FW de Klerk: 'Among the terms of the new dispensation is the guarantee that Coloureds and Indians will get full voting rights. It follows that their responsibilities will increase accordingly, which means they will have obligations to defend these rights'.

Government and military leaders have therefore made it very clear that the extension of conscription will follow the implementation of the constitutional proposals. As Major Gert Britz said, 'We believe we should give the Coloureds the opportunity to protect themselves...My feeling is that once the Coloureds go on the Voters Roll then they would have given someone the right to act for them and they must return the responsibility. We all have to protect what we have'.

Secondly, the nature of the war in South Africa needs to be considered. During 1982 it became apparent that the ANC was preparing to a transition to a more advanced stage of insurgency. After a series of visits to frontline states between March and June 1982, the ANC said it was moving from sabotage acts to attacking the enemy face to face; it said it was preparing for a sustained guerilla war in which increasing importance would be given to the military aspect of the struggle; guerilla activities would complement

and give impetus to a campaign of intensified internal political activity.

It is in this context that the call-up for whites was extended in 1982. With white males facing over four years military service, this source of manpower has now been fully tapped, especially with the new Act's emphasis on area protection through Commandos and the Civil Defence system. Although the SADF would find difficulty in absorbing over 30 000 coloured and indian recruits immediately, this is not likely to remain the case for very long. According to one report, military strategists believe that coloured and indian conscription would bring considerable relief to the white population, and provide a strategically vital boost to South African troops in Namibia, increasing the level of preparedness along South Africa's northern and eastern borders.

The 1982 Defence Amendment Act was a response to the likelihood of rapidly intensifying internal guerilla activity and preparation for more conventional military activity such as further attempts at destabilisation, as well as for the continuing SADF presence in Namibia. In this respect, white resources have been stretched to their maximum, with the increased call-up being a further drain on white skills. Coloured and indian conscription would reduce the unemployment rate without draining skills and resources from the private sector to the same extent.

- Thirdly, as discussed above, the importance of the guerilla war being seen as black and white against communism, not blacks against the apartheid system, is a further imperative for coloured and indian conscription. Militarily, politically and economically, it has become a necessity. However, given the political and logistical obstacles, it is likely that government will move gradually. A scenario predicted by Major Britz is a possibility: 'I'm sure they will be called up soon. They won't call them up all at once - the way it's likely to happen is that first they will ensure the registration of everyone. Then, maybe move ahead with the ballot system. But that's just my feeling'.

The possibility of conscription

for coloureds and indians is strengthened by the fact that the Naudé Commission looking into conscientious objection consulted people with expert knowledge of the Koran and Hindu Scriptures. This indicates that the SADF is anticipating future conscientious objectors who are either coloured or indian.

The question of black participation in the SADF is central to the Civic Action Programme generally, and to the role of the military in black education specifically (with the idea being one of 'win their hearts and minds and their bodies will follow'). It is partly in this context that these questions are considered below.

THE 'HEARTS AND MINDS' CAMPAIGN

'The Defence strategy of the RSA is a national counter-insurgency strategy involving

- a) Government and Government departments on central, provincial and local authority level, in respect of all ethnic groups in the RSA;
- b) all Security Forces;
- c) the organised private sector;
- d) the news media; and
- e) the general public.

It calls for action in the political, economic, social, psychological and security fields. Approximately 80% of these actions are non-military although the military forces have a keen interest in it and may, in its secondary role, participate in such action'.

It is the military's direct role in the '80%' which will be considered in more detail here. According to Major General Lloyd, the SADF's objectives through the Civic Action Programme (CAP) are to secure through administrative and socio-economic action the goodwill, support and co-operation of the local population by alleviating friction points, grievances and dissatisfaction; by improving their standards of living and by giving them something worthwhile to defend in a revolutionary war.

Lloyd goes on to explain that 'the SADF involved itself in these social upliftment programmes because of the vitally important role the local population has to play in

countering insurgency in the RSA and SWA. The loyalty, goodwill and co-operation of the local population have to be secured and the insurgents have to be denied every opportunity of exploiting friction points, grievances or dissatisfaction. At the same time the SADF utilises the opportunity to demonstrate to the local population that they are there to help and to protect them and not to harm them'.

Lloyd also warns that when their goodwill and loyalty cannot be won then 'we will have to move them out of the critical areas and settle them elsewhere'.

The broad and general political objectives of the CAP as Lloyd explains them have parallels in counter-insurgency situations elsewhere. What needs to be defined more clearly is the particular class, ethnic and geographical identities of various 'local populations' as the SADF's aims will vary considerably according to these. This was discussed by Major Britz. Outlining the differences in the CAP's process of political assessment in the western Cape from that in Namibia, he said: 'With our target groups our process of appreciating is the same - but the population is different - its far more complex - you've got Whites, Coloureds and Blacks and you get big differences within these groups'.

The SADF's Civic Action aims for rural africans include the development of organisation and support for countering guerilla insurgency. For urban africans, indians and coloureds, they are far more complex relating to political objectives such as building a basis for multi-racialism, military objectives such as preparing the ground for a future coloured and indian call-up, breaking down negative responses to the military, and driving a wedge into the process of the development of opposition to the SADF. It must also be taken into account that, as Lloyd points out, the military's role in the '80%' is a secondary although growing and particularly deliberate one.

In South Africa the relation between 'the people' and 'power' is often perceived of as being between the oppressed and the apartheid state. Particularly in the urban areas, one of the CAP's main roles is to mystify this relation and to obscure the connection drawn between the military

and the apartheid state. In this respect, there are important differences in the way the apartheid state is experienced by urban africans who have to face the reality of pass laws, influx control, administration boards and so on every day, and urban coloureds who do not face the same level of repression, and also experience some aspects of the 'differential incorporation' into the state apparatuses.

Furthermore, the repressive nature of the state is not experienced monolithically. For example, as Steenkamp pointed out, 'People (in the western Cape) don't bristle at the sight of an Army uniform in the same way as they might at a Police uniform'.

A recent study of the effects of military ideology on youth in a coloured community in Cape Town throws some light on these points. It involves interviews with youth group members, Cape Corps members and community organisers in the Hout Bay area. While not being extensive enough to draw any general conclusions from, it does provide some insights into the

contradictory way in which military ideology is received in a coloured working class community. The following points emerged:

1. People generally did not approve of the SADF, but were non-committal about those who participated in it.
2. People involved with youth, civic and trade union organisations had a better understanding of the SADF.
3. People generally saw 'communism' and 'terrorism' as enemies and were receptive to the propaganda on TV and to picture stories such as 'Grensvegter'.
4. They generally opposed the idea of conscription.
5. Anti-military propaganda had not reached many people.

The study argues that the dominant ideology, as perpetuated through TV, radio, schools and so on, is not accepted and reproduced in its entirety with respect to the military.

In the case of the SADF, on the one hand it is often not experienced directly but shown as neutral, fighting against an external enemy, while on the other hand the police are seen as part of a repressive government. But

those who join the army and wear uniforms may be seen in the same light.

In the light of these issues, part two of this article will discuss the Civic Action Programme in detail, and its relationship to education.

SOURCE MATERIAL

This article was based on the following sources:

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