

# **HISTORICAL SIGNIFICANCE OF THREE DAYS OF NATIONAL PROTEST, JUNE 6,7 AND 8**

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**It is by now a matter of historical record that on June 6, 7 and 8 this year our people staged the largest national mass action in the history of our struggle for national liberation. The full significance of this action goes beyond the large numbers of people supporting it, and its 3-day duration. To appreciate this, one needs only to look at the circumstances in which the action took place, and the character of mass support for the action.**

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**THE** action was called after two years of the most intensive, nation-wide assault on the democratic movement, and a campaign of systematic terror against the masses, particularly from 1986-7. The entire democratic movement, with the exception of the trade unions, had been driven underground. The most important mass formations, particularly the UDF and SAYCO, had been banned from operating since February 24, and COSATU had been restricted to dealing only with shop-floor matters. The unbridled and violent militancy of the ungovernability period (1984 to 1986) had subsided,

or rather been tempered into a more disciplined and cautious militancy by the harsh experiences of bitter battles and vicious repression. The open, highly visible profile of the mass democratic movement which had swept the country in 1984-6, was now being systematically suppressed by the state of emergency. The embryonic organs of peoples power, which spread like wildfire in 1986, first in urban and then in rural areas, had been severely hampered in many areas by the intense repression. The schools, for so long the site of intense and militant struggles, now appeared disorganised and directionless.

It was in this context that various academics and journalists predicted the failure of 3 days of national protest, decided on by the democratic movement at the COSATU special congress. They believed that the structures of the democratic movement had been smashed, that the masses had been intimidated into passivity by the emergency. In other words, they were deceived by appearances, and failed to look under the surface. The "experts" were not in touch with the mood of the masses and the hidden capacity of the democratic movement.

#### **The state and capital move on the offensive**

The bosses and the state were also taken in by their own propaganda. Convinced that the call lacked broad support they moved onto the offensive in the belief that the failure of the action would leave the organisations, particularly COSATU, isolated and defenceless. The action would then be a golden opportunity for the state and the bosses to move in and crush the organisations, particularly by victimising workers who supported the action. In this way they hoped to root out the key cadres of the trade unions, in the same way as the mine bosses had used last years NUM strike to try and break the union. This explains why capital took such a hard line, using employers associations such as SEIFSA and FCI to popularise the view that there should be mass dismissals in response to the action.

Threats of mass dismissals were supplemented by court interdicts brought by employers, intensive state and employer propaganda in the papers, TV and radio, and various repressive measures to stop people from organising for the action. Throughout the country, COSATU regional rallies held to popularise the decisions of the Congress were either banned or disrupted. Roadblocks were set up to stop pamphlets from being distributed.

In short, a range of repressive and propaganda resources were harnessed by the state and capital to ensure that the 3-day action would be an unprecedented disaster for the democratic movement. As it turned out, the 3-day action was a disaster for the state and capital, and an overwhelming success for the democratic movement.

### **The white minority miscalculates**

What went wrong? The state and capital completely underestimated the mood of the masses, and the power of the democratic movement. They had failed to learn from the lessons of the March 21st national stayaway, where everything appeared to point to the probable failure of the action: it was called less than a month after the February 24th bannings; the media gave virtually no publicity to the action beforehand; and COSATU failed to officially endorse the action.

Yet, despite these difficulties, the action was an extremely successful one with approximately one and a half million workers staying away. It was incorrectly assumed by the commercial media that the March 21 action was successful because it took place on Sharpeville Day, forgetting there is no strong tradition of stayaways on Sharpeville Day. It was the first time a national stayaway had ever been called on March 21.

The response of the masses stemmed from their anger at the banning of organisations and the impending execution of the Sharpeville Six timed to take place on March 21. With minimal time for preparation and under harsh conditions, the semi-underground structures of the democratic movement were able to mobilise for the action.

The March 21 and June 6,7 and 8 actions were specific examples of a trend which has been unfolding since 1986 - the general development of a political consciousness among the masses, particularly the African people; and the capacity of the mass democratic movement to command extensive mass support in every part of the country. The call for three days of national action on June 6, 7 and 8, wasn't a wild and unrealistic call, as it was interpreted in some quarters. The call correctly identified the objective development of mass consciousness and the corresponding capacity of the democratic movement. In other words, the masses were calling for action and the democratic movement was in a position to co-ordinate and lead that action.

## **1984 TO 1988: THE DEVELOPMENT OF NATIONAL UNITED ACTION**

The success of the 3-day action follows a clear trend of development which has unfolded over the past 4 years. This trend of development can be clearly seen if we look at the series of stayaway actions since 1986 and compare them to the stayaway actions from 1984 to 1986. What emerges quite sharply when we analyse the '84-'86 period is that there were a whole series of local and regional stayaway actions which reflected the local battles that were raging in the various parts of the country during this period. Most of the stayaways were highly successful, but all were limited to a specific part of the country. There were 12 local stayaways in the 20 months from September 1984 to May 1986, (but no national stayaway actions). From May 1986 to July 1988 there were seven national stayaway actions (involving 10 days in all), and a number of local stayaways.

This transition from localised to national stayaway actions reflects the general political transformation which was taking place over this period. The numerous local struggles which had been waged under the banner of the UDF, reaching fever pitch by the end of 1985, had paved the way for a truly national mass movement to take shape. By the beginning of 1986, mass struggles had spread from the main urban centres to towns and rural areas throughout the country. There was virtually no area in which structures of the democratic movement weren't starting to take shape. Hand in hand with this, rapid advances were taking place in mass political consciousness amongst all sectors of the population (not only the youth), and all parts of the country (not only the existing "political hotbeds".) The fierce struggles of '84-'86 were rapidly politicising large sectors of the population which had previously been passive and unaware, particularly in the rural areas, amongst older people, church goers and so on. Few people remained untouched by the campaigns of the democratic movement or the brutality of the state, SADF invasions, mass detentions, mass funerals, vigilantes attacks etc.

This "generalisation" of the struggle was reflected in the transformation of structures of the democratic movement; the UDF was being rapidly transformed from a loose front of organisations to a national political centre; the launch of COSATU in November 1985

saw the transformation of unions which had been fairly narrowly based on the shopfloor into a national worker body integrally part of the mass democratic movement; and the launching of the NECC brought all sectors into a national formation around the education question, whereas previously students had tended to fight their battles alone.

It was this combination of the rapid development of mass mobilisation, mass organisation, and mass political consciousness at a national level which coalesced in 1986. This was clearly expressed in March 1986 at the all-in conference of the democratic movement held in Durban under the auspices of the NECC. The significance of the conference went far beyond its deliberation on the education question. It was the first occasion on which the main contingents of the mass democratic movement were brought together at a national level to hammer out a programme of united action.

The conference gave direction on a wide range of issues including the education struggles, rent boycotts, and national action around May Day and June 16. The conference gave the democratic movement's backing to the May Day stayaway, the first national stayaway to take place in 25 years. The last national stayaway had been called by the ANC to protest the banning of the ANC and PAC and the declaration of a White Republic in May 1961.

### **May Day and June 16 stayaways 1986**

It had taken years of struggle to rebuild democratic organs which had both the organisational capacity and support of the masses to successfully call a general stayaway. This national political consciousness and organisation resulted in the largest (in absolute numbers) stayaways in SA thus far, with approximately 1,5 million people staying away on Mayday and even greater numbers on June 16. Particularly significant was the fact that the June 16 action came four days after the declaration of the national State of Emergency, and the heaviest wave of repression ever unleashed by the regime.

The June 16 action was the first of nine days of national stayaway action to be taken in between June 1986 and June 1988, involving the loss of at least 18 million man-days at the cost of at least R1,500 million rand (based on Assocom's estimate that the June 6,7, and 8 stayaway cost the country's economy R500 million. This is conservative: government sources estimated that each public holiday costs R500 million.)

The 1986 -8 actions probably drew in more people than all the

stayaways of the previous ten years combined. This clearly demonstrates that the rapidly accelerating political consciousness and organisation of the masses was not reversed by the national state of emergency. While the state of emergency hit the structures of the democratic movement hard, the political support of the masses for the democratic movement continued to grow at a rapid pace - calls identified with the formations of the democratic movement (particularly UDF and COSATU) received enormous support. Stayaway calls, on the other hand, made by fringe groups without mass support were ignored by the people. Their lack of mass support was also reflected in the totally inappropriate calls made by these groups, often in an attempt to "outdo" the democratic movement (such as that made by AZAPO and other black consciousness groupings for 10 days in June 86.) Even popular leaders have been unable to get a response from the masses when going over the heads of the democratic movement, as Bishop Tutu found out when he unsuccessfully called for a national day of protest in October 1985.

#### **Features of the national stayaways**

The post-1986 period was also characterised by a level of political discipline and unity which had not been seen before. The generally low level of violence corresponded to the high level of mass support for the actions. Large SADF/SAP contingents offering to "protect people who wanted to go to work" found few volunteers. And militant youth put their energies into informing people of the actions in advance rather than physically preventing them from going to work on the day itself.

Significantly the 1986 stayaways, unlike earlier stayaways, focussed largely on national political issues, such as the State of Emergency, the Whites-Only election, the Labour Bills, the banning of organisations and so on. Before 1986, stayaways had made national political demands, but their main focus was on the burning issues affecting local residents - local massacres, student struggles, increased rents, strikes etc. The capacity of the democratic movement to mobilise support around national political issues reflected the heightened political consciousness of the masses. This consciousness found particular expression in the overwhelming support of the African masses for these actions, accurately reflecting the African majority content of the national democratic struggle. Other oppressed communities have registered significant, and in some cases, impressive support for the stayaway calls, but the general

pattern has been for the most consistent and widespread support to come from the African majority.

The recent national stayaways have consistently expressed a broad community character. Spear-headed by the working class in all its political and economic organs, they have actively drawn in wider and wider layers of the community, extending well beyond the unionised workforce. Millions of non-unionised workers, unemployed, students, and the middle strata (traders, taxi-drivers, professionals, church ministers etc) have mobilised in support of the stayaway actions. The drive by the democratic movement to broaden the Front of anti-apartheid forces was becoming a reality in most townships as previously passive strata of the community were galvanised into action. Strata of the working class (eg migrant workers) and other sections of the community (eg taxi-drivers) who had previously actively or passively opposed stayaway actions were now supporting these actions in large numbers.

### **Broad versus narrow mobilisation**

This period has also shown that stayaway calls which are not aimed at the entire community are doomed to fail. In particular, calls aimed at exclusively unionised workers can only have limited success, given the fact that unionised workers represent a minority of the working class. This was clearly demonstrated in 1986 when COSATU called a National Day of Action on July 14 to protest against the detention of trade unionists under the State of Emergency. Unions throughout the country interpreted this as a stayaway call. The stayaway failed in Natal and the Transvaal and was called off in the Western Cape. The only area where large numbers of workers stayed away was in the Eastern Cape where the stayaway was also linked to community issues, such as the clampdown on schools under the State of Emergency. One reason for the failure of the action was because COSATU had failed to consult the UDF and community organisations and get their backing.

In addition the focus of the stayaway was too narrow (the detention of unionists) in a context when there were many other burning issues which affected the whole community, and the working class as a whole. This clearly showed that while trade unions can play a vital reinforcing and organising role in a stayaway, trade unions are unable to pull off a stayaway without community support. Stayaways are essentially community-based actions. All the successful stayaways since 1986 have involved not only the trade unions but the

entire democratic movement. The importance of community mobilisation was demonstrated by this years March 21 stayaway, which succeeded without the formal backing of the trade unions.

### ASSESSING THE THREE-DAY PROTEST

The 3 days of national protest was a major test of strength between the democratic movement and the masses on one side, and the regime and bosses on the other. It was the people's response to the regime's attempt to wipe out the democratic movement. The *action was a direct answer to the state's two pronged attack:*

1. The effective banning of organisations of the democratic movement, particularly the UDF, on February 24th, and
2. The attempt to reduce COSATU to an ineffective body, through restricting it from political activities on the one hand, and through breaking its economic power using the Labour Bill on the other.

This all-round political attack by the regime required an all-round political response from the democratic movement. This was the task facing the delegates to the COSATU Special Congress. The Congress identified two main thrusts: embarking on a programme of united mass action; and broadening and deepening the front of anti-apartheid forces.

The 3 days of national protest would be the first major show of strength in the programme of united mass action. The 3-day protest was specifically timed to put pressure on the regime not to renew the State of Emergency on June 10. This factor was strongly emphasised by delegates to the COSATU congress, who stressed that the protest should be separate from the June 16 action. A successful mass action would convey a powerful message to the white minority that the costs of imposing the State of Emergency would be high, and that attempts to crush the democratic movement would be fiercely resisted by the masses.

To convey this message effectively, the protest would have to be supported by the **broad masses of the people**. The stakes were very high: if the 3-day action failed it would look as if the democratic movement stood alone, that it was isolated from the people, and could be crushed. Overwhelming mass support would show that the state of emergency, the Labour Bill and the restrictions would be resisted by the entire oppressed people, and that two years of brutal repression had totally failed to isolate the democratic movement



from the masses and crush their fighting mood. A powerful national action would boost the morale of the masses and the democratic movement, and sow further confusion and demoralisation in the ranks of the ruling class.

## **THE CHARACTER OF MASS SUPPORT ON JUNE 6, 7 AND 8**

Following in the footsteps of recent national stayaways, mass support for the 3-day action reflected the national democratic character and potential of our struggle. Nearly every class and strata of the oppressed community mobilised in support of the action, in varying degrees, and in various ways, particularly in the African areas. The full extent of mass support for the action can be better appreciated if we break down supporters of the action into various categories:

### **1. Organised Workers**

Without detailed research, it is difficult to make an accurate assessment of the numbers of organised (unionised) workers who stayed away in different sectors, different parts of the country, and so on. But it is clear that organised workers supported the action in large numbers, and provided an active core which propagated the stayaway both in the factories and townships.

The high level of organised worker involvement in the 3-day protest reflects the rapid development of worker militancy and politicisation which has taken place in the past couple of years. The fierce struggles fought last year, in particular, have brought large numbers of workers into the democratic movement. The massive strike wave in 1987 resulted in the loss of 9 million workdays. New layers of the working class, particularly in the public sector (railway workers, health workers, postal workers etc) were brought into active struggles with the bosses and the state. Mine workers waged the biggest, and costliest, strike in the history of the country. Now all the gains which the workers had fought for were being threatened by the state's attack on the trade unions and democratic movement.

Labour analysts misinterpreted this year's decline in strike action as meaning that worker militancy had been crushed. But a degree of worker caution in the current climate was not inconsistent with a general increase in political militancy and consciousness. Worker

experiences of struggle and organisation over the last couple of years had profoundly affected them, and it was this tempered militancy which was fully harnessed in the June 6, 7 and 8 action. Worker's perception was that it would be foolhardy to fail to take action in the face of the state's onslaught.

Various indicators suggest widespread union support: -

- the union rank and file, particularly in COSATU, had agitated for action, both at the Special Congress and before the March 21st stayaway. COSATU itself had obviously played the leading role in making this call, together with its allies in the democratic movement.
- the fact that one of the main causes of the action was the state attack on the unions through the Labour Bill and the restrictions on COSATU. In a real sense, for the workers, it was a life and death battle to defend their unions and their hard-won gains.
- the decision of NACTU to support the 3-day call was an important step forward, reflecting the increasing drive from the rank and file for worker unity. NACTU workers were as members of the community supporting the campaigns of the democratic movement. NACTU couldnt afford to isolate itself from an action which their members would in all likelihood support. NACTU withdrew their call for 5 days of action, realising that such counter-calls had failed in the past. This was the first time that the black consciousness unions had committed themselves to a mass campaign. This show of unity could only benefit the action and increase the numbers of workers participating.
- In some instances, worker participation in the stayaway appeared to result from union activity rather than community mobilisation. This was true, in particular, for many unionised Indian and coloured workers who supported the action although the level of mobilisation in their communities remained relatively low. Examples of this would be the high percentage of Indian textile workers who stayed away in Natal, and the high percentage of coloured workers who stayed away in Uitenhage (boosted by the fact that car manufacturers closed down for three days, due to lack of supplies).
- The mobilisation of workers in local industrial areas is an ongoing trend. Industrial areas with a high union presence

have shown the potential to creatively combine mobilisation on an area basis (general unionism) with industrial unionism. In certain highly concentrated industrial areas this probably helped to mobilise ununionised workers for the stayaway. Delegates to the COSATU congress recognised this potential when they called for the formation of industrial area committees.

### **Note on the situation on the mines**

Much has been made of the fact that a disappointing percentage of mineworkers participated, despite the fact that NUM had pushed hard for a 3-day action.

It is not difficult to discover why the mineworkers didn't participate in the action in large numbers (35 000 participated, or about 15% of NUM membership.)

Firstly, the mine bosses took an extremely aggressive posture. They brought court interdicts against NUM to coerce workers to go to work. Mine security was deployed against miners, mines and compounds were sealed off, and workers were harassed, intimidated, and forced to go to work.

Secondly, the union was heavily battered by last years strike. About 50 000 NUM members were victimised by the mine bosses, including many of the shaft stewards and the most active and militant members. In this context, the mine bosses threats could not be taken lightly.

Finally, there are a series of material conditions which tend to isolate miners from community actions such as the political stayaway. Most obviously the compound system isolates mineworkers from political mobilisation which takes place in the communities, trains etc around such actions.

In addition, there is no tradition of mineworkers taking part in political stayaways, many of which are related to urban community issues. This is even more true for foreign mineworkers, who naturally relate firstly to political developments in their own country.

These factors have all resulted in relatively low mineworker participation in stayaways, despite the tide of organisation which has swept the mines. The main exception to this was the action by 210 000 mineworkers in 1986 to demand May Day as a paid public holiday; and to a lesser extent the action by 70000 mineworkers on June 16 last year, when the demand for June 16 as a paid holiday was part of the NUM package of demands. (The effect of recent

repression on the mines is shown by the fact that only 30 000 miners participated in the June 16 action this year, although June 16 as a paid holiday remains a key demand).

### 2. Unorganised Workers

The widespread and community-based character of the 3-day protest was reflected in the large number of unorganised (or disorganised) workers who participated in the action. The overwhelming support of all layers of the working class is reflected in the fact that about 3 out of every 4 workers who participated in the action were unorganised workers. That is, of the 2,5 to 3 million workers who participated approximately 2 million were unorganised workers.

This can be roughly calculated from the fact that (excluding NUM) COSATU has about 500 000 members. NACTU's general secretary disclosed after their recent congress that their membership is less than 150 000 (not the 420 000 they had previously claimed). Assuming that all COSATU and NACTU members supported the action, then it is clear that at least 2 million unorganised workers participated, a dramatic indication of the depth of worker support for the democratic movement and growing political consciousness of the working class, particularly the African working class.

### 3. Community mobilisation

On June 6, 7 and 8 entire townships responded to the call of the democratic movement. The entire community identified with the call, and different classes and strata contributed in ways which were appropriate to their positions. Those who opposed the stayaway, particularly apartheid functionaries, were in a tiny minority and in most areas this opposition remained silent and passive.

The task of popularising the action had fallen to the structures of the democratic movement. One method of mobilisation was to discuss the action in formal structures, such as the street committees and other organs of mass democracy. In addition cadres of the democratic movement, particularly the youth, informed residents through a variety of methods - in their homes, on trains and so on.

Propaganda, explaining and popularising the action was produced using clandestine methods in many areas. Thousands of anonymous "Azikwelwa" pamphlets supporting the 3-day stayaway

were distributed in many townships, and graffiti appeared in many areas urging residents to support the action.

At the same time, UDF affiliates placed advertisements in all the major newspapers, supporting the 3-day protest. Other organisations, such as NAFCOC, issued press statements supporting the action. Ironically, the wave of propaganda launched by the regime and bosses (particularly SACCOLA) only helped to popularise and promote the action amongst the masses!

Local structures of the democratic movement discussed the action in advance with organisations representing the "middle strata" traders, taxis, church ministers etc. The response was generally positive, and these sectors made their contributions in the 3 days. For example, in nearly all areas no taxis conveyed workers to work. This was an important contribution - COSATU estimated that taxis carried 1 100 000 less passengers than they normally would have. NAFCOC called on its members to observe the 3-day call and only to keep their shops open for limited hours.

Many Indian traders also shut down for the 3 days, both in town and in the townships. Some church ministers spoke about the forthcoming protest action in their Sunday 5th church services, and the SACC Convocation of church ministers from all demoninations pledged its full support for the action. This radicalisation of organisations of the middle ground, still a relatively new and undeveloped process, simply reflected the growing politicisation of their membership and pressure from the ground to identify more directly with the struggles of the masses.

The participation of hundreds of thousands of students in the stayaway (particularly in the Witwatersrand, OFS, Eastern Cape and Natal) took place in spite of the heavy repression which students had experienced in the past two years; and despite the fact that the stayaway took place at the same time as mid-year examinations. In some areas students successfully demanded that mid-year exams be rearranged to enable them to participate in the action. This revival of student militancy after a lull in the schools was already in evidence during the March 21 action when there had been a stayaway in many schools, particularly in Soweto, East Rand and the Eastern Cape. The supportive role of students for mass community actions reflected the political change since the early to mid eighties, when community action was in support of the students and not the other way around. To some extent, this reversal reflected the leading role which workers and parents were increasingly taking since 1985. But

the rapid decline in the role of students also arose because of the enormous repression unleashed on the schools after the 1986 State of Emergency. The resurgence in student militancy in 1988 although still patchy was becoming increasingly evident by mid- 1988 spreading from the Western Cape to Soweto and the East Rand. The June 6,7, and 8 stayaway call served to reinforce this process. Students could now play an important role in the mass democratic movement, without having to assume the leading role which had been thrust on them some years back.

### **3 days of peaceful protest**

When COSATU called for 3 days of national protest, they emphasised that the action would be peaceful. The (anonymous) pamphlet called for the action to be carried out with "discipline and unity". The spirit of unity and discipline which prevailed in the community during the previous national stayaway actions suggested that any violent conflict would come from the side of apartheid forces. As it happened, there was no significant conflict in areas where the apartheid forces kept a low profile. The support of residents for the action was so overwhelming, that even the SAP and PUTCO were forced to admit that the action was "generally peaceful and incident-free".

By and large, the violence was confined to attacks by cadres on various state targets and the sabotage of railway lines. Natal, however, was an exception to this. The ongoing conflict between the people and the apartheid forces in the region intensified over this period, with pro-apartheid forces determined to smash the stayaway action, and the people equally determined to make the action succeed. In many areas barricades were erected, and there was street-fighting between residents and kitskonstabels (vigilantes in uniforms).

The mood of discipline and restraint prevailing in most areas reflected the high level of political unity and reluctance to act in ways which would make residents vulnerable to state brutality or risk dividing the community. The youth, in particular, displayed a far greater discipline and political maturity than a few years earlier. This was largely due to the political leadership given to the youth by the youth congresses and SAYCO, encouraging a closer political relationship between the parents and the youth particularly in street committees, trade unions, NECC and so on. The youth were playing a vital political role in mobilising and organising the residents, rather

than relying on force and coercion. The youth had displayed a high level of political consciousness and discipline in the stayaways. Workers who had been exempted from the stayaway - health workers and journalists - were able to go to work unhindered. In fact in many areas, there was no picketing of residents on June 6, 7 and 8, reflecting both the conditions of repression under which the actions took place and activist's confidence that the action had widespread support in the community.

Some workers who decided to go to work, stayed in town to avoid retribution from other residents. But reports suggest that African workers staying in town "illegally" (eg in Hillbrow) observed the stayaway, although it would have been easy for them to go to work unnoticed. This indicates that people living in town have not become cut-off from the community and de-politicised, as some feared, but have in fact begun to organise themselves.

## **THE SIGNIFICANCE OF THE STAYAWAY IN DIFFERENT REGIONS**

Despite major variations in regional conditions (politically, socially, economically), the support for the stayaway was consistent in all national centres except for the Western Cape. Support by African workers for the stayaway was between 70 to 85% in all significant industrial centres outside the Western Cape (PWV, Northern OFS, Natal, East London, Port Elizabeth/Border). The stayaway also extended to small towns, but didn't affect the agricultural sector.

This pattern broadly followed that of the previous national stayaways since 1986 (although the stayaway rate had been higher in the E.Cape - 95%-100% - and lower in Transvaal and Natal - 60-80%). The June 6, 7, 8 national stayaway received the support of residents in all major townships of the country with the exception of the Western Cape, where African workers are in a minority. In other words, the national calls of the democratic movement are receiving more or less the same degree of support from African residents in all areas of the country, with one limited exception. The stayaway calls, however, remain essentially urban-based.

### **The Transvaal region**

Socially and economically the Transvaal is extremely important. A large percentage of industry and the industrial working class is

concentrated in the PWV region. Politically, too the region has occupied a vital role in the democratic movement: together with the Eastern Cape, the Transvaal has tended to set political trends for the rest of the country. Since the 1986 Emergency this has become more pronounced with the shifting of the centre of political gravity from the Eastern Cape to the Transvaal. At the mass level, the Transvaal has recently been the centre of many important struggles.

Examples of these would be the rent boycott, the bantustan struggles, the Front's Christmas campaigns, COSATU's living wage campaign etc. There has been increasing co-operation between trade unions and community organisations.

Despite this, some trade unions in the Transvaal resisted the pressure from the rank and file workers to step up combined campaigns, consultation and co-ordination between COSATU and the rest of the democratic movement. The Wits region of COSATU in particular was plagued by differences in political approach among the trade union leadership. The tide of events in the last couple of years however has largely swept aside these differences, as the mass of workers made it clear that they supported and demanded to be part of the politics of the democratic movement.

The massive support by workers in the region for the May 5 and 6 stayaway last year and the March 21st and June 6, 7 and 8 stayaways this year, was particularly important because it put beyond any doubt the fact that workers in the region overwhelmingly supported the politics of the UDF and COSATU. This was reflected at the Congress of the Wits region on 19 June this year where there was an unprecedented degree of political unity and support for a programme of united action with the entire democratic movement around burning issues such as the municipal elections, the rent boycott, the Angola/Namibia question, Save the Patriots campaign, and the conference of anti-apartheid forces.

A consequence of political developments over the last three years is that the floodgates for mass worker participation and leadership in all structures of the democratic movement have been opened wide.

Workers are increasingly occupying leadership positions not only in the trade unions but also in the civics, street committees, youth congresses and the Front itself. Differences of emphasis remain, but these differences are now being resolved in the heat of mass struggle, and not from the sidelines.



## Eastern Cape

The people of the Eastern Cape have a rich history of resistance to minority rule and colonialism. Before 1910, they fought fiercely against the dispossession of their land. After 1910 they played a key role in building the ANC into a national liberation movement which would spearhead the struggle for democracy in South Africa (eg the E. Cape was the centre of both the M-plan and the Defiance campaign). This rich history of mass struggle in the Eastern Cape laid the basis for a high level of political consciousness in the region. This political consciousness was a vital factor in the highly advanced organisation and mobilisation which developed in the Eastern Cape with the national revival of the mass democratic movement in the mid-1980s.

The people of the Eastern Cape led the offensive against bodies of minority rule in the townships in 1984/5. It was in the Eastern Cape where nearly every council collapsed, and councillors and black police were expelled from the townships. Massive school boycotts made it virtually impossible for Bantu Education to operate in the region. It was in the Eastern Cape, more than any other area, where the people made themselves "ungovernable" and apartheid unworkable. But by 1985, people in the region began to develop creative new forms of organisation to move themselves beyond ungovernability. In the vacuum created by the collapse of bodies of minority rule, they began to develop embryonic organs of peoples power (street, block/area committees, peoples courts, peoples education etc). By spearheading this move from ungovernability to peoples power the people of the Eastern Cape were pioneers of a new form of mass organisation which was to change the face of politics throughout the country.

In the course of developing these new forms of organisation people in the region waged various mass campaigns creatively combining new and old forms of struggle. Consumer boycotts and stayaways were launched with increasingly devastating effect. By 1986, stayaways and consumer boycotts were being waged with virtually 100% effectiveness in the African townships throughout the Eastern Cape.

When the national state of emergency was declared in 1986, the Eastern Cape was hit hardest in every way. SADF, SAP, greenbeans, and vigilantes unleashed a reign of terror in the streets and schools. Whole townships were sealed off with barbed wire. About ten

thousand residents, many of them ordinary members of street committees, youth congresses, student and womens organisations were detained in the biggest crackdown in the history of the Eastern Cape. The scale of repression made it virtually impossible for campaigns to be openly conducted or for organisations to function. It became suicidal for residents to openly confront the state. On the surface, it seemed as if mass militancy and organisation in the Eastern Cape had finally been crushed. This conclusion, however, would be very misleading.

Although organisations have suffered serious setbacks in the Eastern Cape, residents have continued to demonstrate their high level of political consciousness and commitment throughout the State of Emergency. National calls for action from the democratic movement have continued to receive a higher rate of response in the Eastern Cape than any other area. The average response to stayaway calls since the state of emergency has been 90% in the African areas in Eastern Cape (compared to 73% in the Transvaal and 65% for Natal). This clearly demonstrates that the state has totally failed to crush the spirit of resistance in the Eastern Cape, although the communities there are taking a much lower political profile than previously.

## **Natal**

If political conditions in the Eastern Cape favoured the rapid development of the democratic movement, political conditions in Natal placed numerous obstacles in the way of the democratic movement. The economic, administrative, and repressive stranglehold with which the KwaZulu/Inkatha axis gripped the Natal region had effectively contained the growth of the democratic movement there. The contradiction for the democratic movement in Natal was that while it had majority support from the people particularly in the urban areas, it was unable to transform this support into organisational gains corresponding to political developments in the rest of the country. Despite the democratic movement having the rudiments of mass-based structures, Inkatha was able to use economic and military intimidation and terror to prevent these structures from effectively harnessing their mass support.

The result was that the semi-insurrectionary situation which swept the country between 1984-1986 appeared to have little effect on the Natal region. In particular the development of un-

governability and peoples power seemed to pass Natal by. However, it soon became apparent that national political developments has not escaped the masses in Natal. Because of conditions in the area, it was taking longer for the masses to tilt the balance of forces in their favour.

By the beginning of 1986, the picture was starting to change. The masses began to effectively challenge the power of Inkatha, particularly in areas around Pietermaritzburg and to the north. In areas such as Sobantu and Pietermaritzburg Inkatha was effectively isolated and physically expelled. The ability of bodies of apartheid rule to govern was now being challenged. By the end of 1986 Inkatha was losing its grip in many areas, particularly the Natal midlands.

In this context, calls for mass action became a test of strength between Inkatha and the democratic movement. In fact, mass support by Natal workers for the May 5/6 stayaway was followed by an Inkatha backlash which had developed into open war by August 1987. Inkatha attempted to reassert control through the use of terror and forced recruitment, leading to the violent and protracted conflict between Inkatha and the residents which engulfed first the Midlands and then spread to the greater Durban area this year.

The Inkatha offensive had strengthened the UDF/COSATU alliance in the region, and forced residents to build structures to defend themselves (defence committees, street committees etc). The vicious methods used by Inkatha war-lords, kitskonstabels and police affected the entire population, regardless of whether they were UDF/COSATU members or not. The result was the mass alienation of Natal residents from Inkatha and their refusal to fight for the war lords. It became clear to residents that active involvement in the structures of the democratic movement was the only way to turn the tide of Inkatha coercion and terror, and to mobilise effectively against the regime. The democratic movement opened its doors to everyone including those who had been forcibly recruited into Inkatha. Increasingly, Inkatha was being reduced to an isolated clique of war-lords and Kwazulu bureaucrats without a mass base.

### **Buthelezi frustrated**

This loss of control over the masses, particularly in the urban areas, but also in the rural areas, was reflected in Buthelezi's inability to effectively frustrate the June 6, 7 and 8 stayaway in Natal. He called on Natal residents to ignore the call, and gave KwaZulu MPs a week off to mobilise against the stayaway. The week before the

stayaway Inkatha held a rally in Durban urging people to defy the call. Kitskonstabels (Inkatha members in uniform) were called out in force to coerce residents to work, and pamphlets were distributed by police calling on residents to ignore the stayaway. All these attempts failed hopelessly. Despite coercion and threats, residents staged the biggest stayaway in the history of the region. The Natal stayaway was as much a mass action against Inkatha as it was a protest against the actions of the central state. Clearly, the masses in Natal had thrown their weight behind the democratic movement, decisively tilting the balance of forces against apartheid and counter-revolution in the region.

### Western Cape

Although each area in the country has its own regional peculiarities, there are certain conditions which are common to all of them, which give rise at different points to national political trends. An example of this would be the development of ungovernability and peoples power. Material conditions, in the Western Cape, however, are so different that there is no certainty that they will follow national political trends at any particular point in time.

The reasons for this are complex, relating to the specific social and economic conditions in the area, political traditions and so on. Briefly some of these are:

- The policy of keeping African workers out of the Western Cape (the "Coloured Labour Preference Policy) has historically resulted in African people being a minority in the W.Cape, the only area in the country where this is the case. In 1980, 15% of the Cape peninsular was African, compared to over 50% coloured people and 30% white (although the number of African residents has shot up since then). This has meant that the motive force of the national democratic movement in the rest of the country, namely the African masses, has been severely limited in the W.Cape.
- The conditions of national oppression of the coloured community have differed in various ways from those in the African community. Coloured people have historically had slightly greater economic and political "privileges" in the overall schema of white domination. The apartheid regime has always done its utmost to exploit these social differences in order to create political divisions. These realities have posed serious, though not insurmountable, difficulties for

the development of the democratic movement in the W.Cape.

- This helps explain why there has historically been a weak tradition of mass-based organisations in coloured communities in the W.Cape. These conditions have also helped to give rise to ultra-left political groupings which were historically isolated from the mainstream of the democratic movement, and from the masses themselves. Groupings like the Unity Movement, although a handful of intellectuals, had a degree of influence in the coloured community and were able to confuse the people with their high-flown theory. The only grouping in the Western Cape to involve the people in mass action was the Congress movement, but they often found that mass actions were openly opposed by the ultra-left sects eg the 1961 national stayaway was opposed by the Unity Movement, which told coloured people to go to work. (Despite this, many thousands of coloured people joined the stayaway.)
- Another factor which retarded organisation and political consciousness in the coloured community was the weak tradition of worker organisation. Conservative TUCSA unions dominated most factories employing coloured workers eg clothing factories. This weak tradition of trade unionism also reflects the weak industrial development of the Cape Town region. There is very little heavy industry (eg engineering) in the area, most factories being light industries such as clothing and food processing. Factories are relatively small, and workers have weaker bargaining power because of the relatively "unskilled" and labour intensive character of this work.

### **Controls over squatter camps**

- The African community in Cape Town was kept small and vulnerable by the heavy influx control in the Western Cape. Many of the African workers were migrants from the Transkei, and settled residents were constantly under threat of removal. This has placed the African community in an objectively weak position. On the other hand, the mushrooming of "illegal" squatter camps has further complicated the problems of organisation in the area. Many squatters are recently from rural areas in the Transkei and

Ciskei and have had little contact with the democratic movement. Squatters' conditions of vulnerability have also enabled bandit networks to run the camps like bantustans (eg Ngxobongwana in Crossroads). The system has been able to exploit the situation politically. So although the influx of people is expanding the African community and shifting the African minority character of the Western Cape; it also has the potential for creating centres of counter-revolution; particularly in the absence of a powerful mass democratic movement based in the African areas.

These are some of the conditions which form the backdrop to the history of mass action and organisation in the Western Cape. The social and political composition of the area, however, is changing rapidly, adding to the Western Cape's unpredictability. Most importantly, the democratic movement has made major breakthroughs in the W.Cape in the 1980's. The UDF and its affiliates have un rivalled mass support in both the African and coloured communities. TUCSA has collapsed in the Western Cape and growing numbers of workers are being organised under the banner of COSATU.

However, because of the factors listed above, the rhythm of struggle in the W.Cape remains largely autonomous from the rest of the country. If we look at the successful national stayaways over the last 2 years, all of them were weakly supported in the Western Cape, particularly in the coloured communities. For the national actions where figures are available, average support by coloured workers in the region was less than 15%, but the average support by African workers in the region was about 51%. This indicates that in the absence of extensive mobilisation around such actions, the degree of political awareness and spontaneous support is far higher in the African areas than the coloured areas.

This pattern of support, however, need not be a fixed one. The situation in the Eastern Cape shows that where a high level of *political consciousness and mobilisation is generated, combined with strong trade union organisation amongst coloured workers*, there is the potential for a high level of support for political strike action in the coloured community. The strongest example of this is Uitenhage, where there has been consistently high support amongst coloured workers for national stayaway actions, peaking on June 6, 7 and 8 with 80% support amongst coloured workers in Uitenhage.

## JUNE 6,7,8 AND THE BALANCE OF FORCES

The success of the stayaway action reflects the overall balance of forces in South Africa. The state's aggressive counter-revolutionary strategy creates the impression of an overwhelming power which no opposition can stand. But this obscures the fundamental political weaknesses of the regime:

- its support base grows narrower by the day, while the regime is increasingly isolated within its own power bloc
- the forces ranged against it are increasingly united, encompassing broader and broader sections of the population

In these circumstances, a situation of apparent strength can rapidly turn into a defeat. The success of the stayaway was a dramatic demonstration of the weakness of the "powerful" when confronted by the organised strength of the "powerless". The democratic movement correctly identified the importance of the action in helping to shift the balance of forces further in our favour, thereby opening up greater possibilities to seize the initiative. This must be seen in the context of the overall shift of the balance of forces which had been gradually developing in the last 6 months: international pressure on the regime accelerated with the February clampdown on organisations; there was a decisive shift in the balance of forces in the Angolan/Namibian conflict; intensification of the armed struggle; sanctions were beginning to take a heavy toll on an economy already in crisis; the opening of a new front of struggle in the churches; growing fragmentation and difficulties in the white power bloc and the gradual disintegration of the tricameral alliance; growing corruption, squabbling and disorganisation amongst the bantustan rulers resulting in open conflict and coups; the rapid disintegration of Inkatha as a power in the Natal region; mass action in the schools after 18 months of relative quiet; and the rapid development of unity in action between COSATU and UDF affiliates despite the crackdown.

In the context of rapid shifts in the political terrain, the ability of the democratic movement to provide political leadership is a decisive factor in the struggles course of development. The 3-day action was a critical test of our capacity to implement a bold and far-reaching strategy to mobilise and unite the broad masses of the people. The

### 3 DAYS OF NATIONAL PROTEST

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success of the broad front approach hinged on the depth and extent of mass support commanded by the democratic movement.

June 6, 7 and 8 was a powerful indicator of mass support, considering that it involved 3 days of action in a difficult climate for workers, made worse by the combined aggression of the bosses and the state. This year workers had been cautious to use the strike as an economic weapon, because of the difficulties they faced. There were no immediate economic gains to be made from the stayaway. On the contrary, the action would mean economic sacrifice and possibly large-scale dismissals.

Despite this, workers had now shown that they were prepared to use the stayaway as a political weapon to act against the state's attack on the democratic movement. This confirmed the dominant view in the democratic movement that there was a high level of political awareness and militancy amongst the masses. The masses re-emphasised this a week later when they staged a spontaneous stayaway on June 16, despite the many dismissal warnings which workers had received after June 6, 7 and 8.

The weak response by capital and the state showed that they had bitten off more than they could chew. They were forced to back off from the threats they had made before the action. Both the Minister of Labour and SACCOLA changed their tune on the Labour Bill, and threatened mass dismissals didn't materialise. Nevertheless, the Labour Bill was enacted, the restrictions on organisations remained, and the State of Emergency was re-imposed.

The victory lay in the successful demonstration of power by the democratic movement, the failure of the state's and capital's intimidation strategy, the high morale and unity of the masses, and the demonstration that attempts to attack the democratic movement would be resisted forcing the state and capital to pay a price they could ill-afford. The action served to further undermine the state's strategy, deepen divisions in the ruling bloc, and further expose the fundamental political weakness of the regime.

The masses through this action showed the enormous potential for broadening the Front and building the alliance of anti-apartheid forces. Nearly all sections of the community and all types of organisations were brought together into a broad united action, laying the basis for further alliances and mass action. The stayaway also demonstrated that the so-called "middle ground of moderate blacks" which the government loves to talk about has no support in the black community. It exposed the fact that these "responsible



blacks supporting the government" are an insignificant minority consisting of apartheid functionaries and their hangers-on; not the 30% of the community the government would like us to believe. Apartheid elements were unable to oppose the stayaway anywhere, including Natal where the use of force was insufficient to frustrate the action. This shows that the forces of counter revolution in the black community, on whom the government is relying heavily for the success of their strategy, are isolated and without support. This gives a clear indication of the difficulties which face the regime in mobilising support for the October 26 elections.

## **WEAKNESSES AND POLITICAL CHALLENGES**

While the democratic movement's experience of the 3-day protest was generally positive, there were some weaknesses, which need to be overcome in future mass actions.

- There was inadequate strategising between COSATU and community organisations to ensure that the content and direction of the action was at all times guided by the democratic movement. In particular, the state, bosses and media consistently attempted to narrow the focus of the action by focussing only on the Labour Bill. No proper attempt was made to make sure that the demands, all equally important, were projected together. This helped to push the major issues of bannings of organisations and the re-imposition of the state of emergency into the background. As a result the political impact was not as powerful as it could have been.
- In the mine compounds and other places where workers live on employer's premises isolated from the community, it is necessary to set up alternative structures of communication with the workers.
- The participation of coloured and Indian communities in the national action was, on the whole, inadequate. The exceptions to this show that although material conditions of oppression differ in these communities, there is still the potential for mass mobilisation around such actions. We need to carefully analyse our successes and failures, and develop a creative approach which takes into account the

specific conditions in these areas.

- Our propaganda, although good in some areas, was inadequate in others. We need to ensure at all times that the politics of the democratic movement is effectively communicated through various forms of propaganda, from pamphlets to graffiti. We cannot rely on the commercial media to put the views of the democratic movement.

The success of the stayaway clearly vindicated our standpoint that we are far from crushed, and that the level of consciousness amongst our people is very high. But it would be a mistake to become complacent. Our actual strength is far from our potential strength: we need to continuously transform the militancy and consciousness of our people into concrete organisational forms that will advance our struggle.

One of our main tasks is to build and broaden the front of anti-apartheid forces, right from the ground at the local level up to the national level. The 3 days of national action was an important advance in this process. The conference of anti-apartheid forces will hopefully take this process even further.

But it is in the heat of mass struggle that the most effective unity will be built. A broad range of anti-apartheid organisations (such as sports, church, traders, cultural groups) need to go beyond resolutions and commit themselves to a programme of action against the regime. The tried and tested mass-based organisations (particularly the Front and COSATU) must make sure that they have joint structures which take up campaigns in an on-going way. Although our organisations will form the heart and engine of the broad anti-apartheid front, this in itself is not good enough. They must make sure at all times that they involve the broadest range of mass structures in action to ensure the broadest possible unity of our forces, and the maximum possible isolation of the enemy forces.

While we must continuously advance with a concrete programme of action, we must always make sure that we understand the mood of the masses. The militancy and political awareness of the people must not be confused with a preparedness to back any action, no matter how rash or ill-considered. While we are still capable of taking the struggle to higher levels, we should be careful not to be overconfident and embark on campaigns which do not correspond to the mood of the people. We should remember that the pace of a column is not determined by the fittest and fastest soldier but by the slowest and weakest. Let us march with the people to victory!

**NATIONAL STAYAWAY ACTIONS 1986 - 1988 Available estimates**

<b>DATE</b>	<b>MAIN ISSUE</b>	<b>ORGANISATION</b>
1. May 1 1986	Recognition of May Day as a public holiday	COSATU NECC
DECLARATION OF THE NATIONAL STATE OF EMERGENCY JUNE 12 1986		
2. June 16 1986	Soweto Day and protest against State of Emergency	UDF, COSATU NECC
3. July 14 1986	Detentions of union officials	COSATU
4. May 5/6 1987	Protest against whites-only elections	COSATU, UDF
5. June 16 1987	Part of national action against State of Emergency	UDF
6. March 21 1988	Restriction of UDF and 17 other organisations	UDF affiliates
7. June 6,7,8 1988	Restriction of organisations Labour Bill State of Emergency	COSATU UDF affiliates NACTU
8. June 16 1988	Soweto Day	

### 3 DAYS OF NATIONAL PROTEST

NUMBERS INVOLVED	% BY AREA	MINEWORKERS															
1,5 million	PWV 80% E.Cape 99,5 (+_ 55% coloured) Natal 70% (35% Indians) W.Cape 15% (80% African) (8% coloured)	210 000															
1,7 million	Tvl 90% E.Cape 99,5% Natal 60 - 80% W.Cape (78% African, 76% coloured)	50 000															
Unknown (possibly 100-200000)	Only significant in PE and Border	N/A															
1,5 million per day (and over 1.7 million students)	<table style="width: 100%; border: none;"> <tr> <td style="width: 50%; text-align: center;">May 5</td> <td style="width: 50%; text-align: center;">May 6</td> </tr> <tr> <td>Tvl 57%</td> <td>70%</td> </tr> <tr> <td>E.Cape 99%(35%*)</td> <td>96%(40%*)</td> </tr> <tr> <td>Natal 60%</td> <td>70%</td> </tr> <tr> <td>W.Cape 12%(2%*)</td> <td>42%(2%*)</td> </tr> </table> <p>* = coloured workers</p>	May 5	May 6	Tvl 57%	70%	E.Cape 99%(35%*)	96%(40%*)	Natal 60%	70%	W.Cape 12%(2%*)	42%(2%*)	50 000					
May 5	May 6																
Tvl 57%	70%																
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Natal 60%	70%																
W.Cape 12%(2%*)	42%(2%*)																
About 1,3 million	Tvl 60% E.Cape 93% Natal 55% W.Cape 40%	70 000															
About 1,5 million (SAP figures)	Tvl 80% W.Cape N/A E.Cape 80% Natal 60%	N/A															
2,5 - 3 million per day	<table style="width: 100%; border: none;"> <tr> <td style="width: 33%; text-align: center;">June 6</td> <td style="width: 33%; text-align: center;">June 7</td> <td style="width: 33%; text-align: center;">June 8</td> </tr> <tr> <td>Tvl/N.OFS 75%</td> <td>70%</td> <td>85%</td> </tr> <tr> <td>E.Cape 87(60*)</td> <td>85 (60*)</td> <td>85(60*)</td> </tr> <tr> <td>Border 80</td> <td>80</td> <td>80</td> </tr> <tr> <td>Natal 80</td> <td>78</td> <td>72</td> </tr> </table> <p>W..Cape (About 10% no proper figures available)</p>	June 6	June 7	June 8	Tvl/N.OFS 75%	70%	85%	E.Cape 87(60*)	85 (60*)	85(60*)	Border 80	80	80	Natal 80	78	72	35, 000
June 6	June 7	June 8															
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E.Cape 87(60*)	85 (60*)	85(60*)															
Border 80	80	80															
Natal 80	78	72															
About 1,3 million	Tvl + - 85% E.Cape +_ 85% Natal +_ 40% W.Cape +_ 25%	30 000															
<hr/>																	
18 million workdays																	

**COPY OF ANONYMOUS JUNE 6,7, 8 STAYAWAY  
PAMPHLET**

**AZIKWELWA!STAYAWAY!**

**June 6, 7, 8**

**3 days of united national  
action**

The workers have called for 3 days of national protest to be observed on June 6, 7, and 8 (Monday, Tuesday, Wednesday). We, the community, fully support this call and urge our people to observe these 3 days as a national stayaway. let this message be spread to every corner of the country so that our people, wherever they are, strike together in one mighty action!

Let each and every person, whether a worker, a student, a businessman, or unemployed know clearly the reasons for this 3 day protest. Indeed the regime, big business, and the International community must know why we are taking this action:

1. The boers have **banned** our organisation, the United Democratic Front (UDF)and many other mass organisations! They have also restricted Comrades Mbeki, Sisulu and many of our leaders.

2. They have restricted our mighty Federation, COSATU and now they want to use the **Labour Bill** to crush our trade unions and turn them into Useless Bosses Clubs

3. At this very moment, they are planning to impose a third year of the hated **State of Emergency** on our people. Thousands of our leaders, and many scores of children, are still sitting in jail after 2 years of the regime's "Emergency"

4. Every week, they are **hanging** our sons and daughters on Death Row!

5. They have **silenced** the peoples newspapers, New Nation and South, and are threatening to silence more!

6. They want to celebrate 40 years of **Nationalist Misrule** by pushing more bodies of minority rule (Great Indabas and councils) down our throats.

## **COPY OF ANONYMOUS JUNE 6,7, 8 STAYAWAY PAMPHLET**

**ARE WE GOING TO CELEBRATE OUR OWN OPPRESSION? WE SAY NO! WE ARE NOT GOING TO TAKE THESE ATTACKS LYING DOWN. WE ARE GOING TO STRIKE BACK! LET THE BOERS AND THEIR SUPPORTERS KNOW THAT THEY HAVE STRUCK A ROCK AND WILL BE CRUSHED.**

**TO THE BOSSES WE SAY:** You are making a serious mistake by siding with the Boers on these issues. You are wasting your time attacking COSATU. The workers expressed the feelings of the entire community by calling 3 days of national protest. Be careful that we do not redirect our anger away from the regime to focus on you. By threatening COSATU, you are challenging the entire oppressed community to treat you as the enemy.

**TO THE PEOPLE WE SAY:** On May 5 and 6 last year and on March 21 this year we showed our capacity for mass action on a scale which surprised even our supporters. The Boers and their supporters are doing everything they can to stop this action from going ahead because it is hitting them where it hurts most. These attempts will fail! Let us make sure that on June 6, 7, and 8 we stage an action which is more powerful than any mass action in the history of our struggle.

### **Guidelines**

1. No one is to go to work on June 6, 7 and 8 (Monday, Tuesday and Wednesday). This applies to all areas of the country (national).
2. The reasons for this action must be clearly explained to everyone.
3. Let us continue our tradition of United Action which is carried out with discipline and unity.
4. Health workers and journalists may go to work. Health workers wear uniforms and journalists show ID cards.

**END THE EMERGENCY!**

**UNBAN THE UDF!**

**SCRAP THE LABOUR BILL!**

COPY OF MAY 5,6 ANTI-APARTHEID ELECTIONS  
PAMPHLET

**2 DAYS of NATIONAL  
MAY 5,6 UNITED  
ACTION**

**Down with apartheid elections**

**Azikwelwa! STAYAWAY**

The United Democratic Front, Cosatu and the entire democratic movement has called for TWO DAYS OF NATIONAL PROTEST on the 5th and 6th May. We, the freedom loving people of South Africa, support this call. Let us demonstrate our rejection of the apartheid elections, our rejection of the State of Emergency, our rejection of the violence against our people by staging the biggest national stayaway in the history of our country.

Let every sector of our community demonstrate loudly and clearly that we have had enough! That we refuse to tolerate this regime anymore. That we are demanding the scrapping of this racist parliament and its replacement by a democratic South Africa based on the Freedom Charter. **THE PEOPLE SHALL GOVERN! LET EVERY WHITE VOTER GO TO THE POLLS ON 6 MAY KNOWING THAT THERE IS NO FUTURE IN THE RACIST PARLIAMENT OR THE BOTHA REGIME! WE DEMAND ONE PERSON, ONE VOTE IN A UNITED SOUTH AFRICA!**

**TOWNSHIP AND RURAL RESIDENTS SAY:**

\* Since 12 June, we and our children have been terrorised by the forces of the regime, particularly the council police, vigilantes and kitskonstabels. Thousands of our children and our leaders have been detained under the State of Emergency, many of as long as 11 months. We therefore demand: **HANDS OFF THE UDF!! DISBAND THE VIGILANTES AND KITSKONSTABELS AND COUNCIL POLICE! TROOPS OUT OF THE TOWNSHIPS! LIFT THE STATE OF EMERGENCY!**

\* For over a year now millions of our people have boycotted rents. We have refused to pay high rents for bad houses and bad services. We have refused to pay for our own oppression, for the corrupt councillors and the murderous greenbeans and kitskonstabels. Now the regime is evicting residents. The people of Soweto have shown they refuse to tolerate this. Let us reinstate those who have been evicted. We demand that the regime: **STOPS EVICTIONS!! AN EVICTION TO ONE IS AN EVICTION TO ALL!**

**WORKERS SAY:**

\* Our trade unions, particularly COSATU, are under attack. More and more the regime is sending its forces to attack the workers. We are outraged by the killing of SARHWU strikers last week. The assaults and killings of striking workers must stop. **HANDS OFF COSATU! POLICE GET OUT OF INDUSTRIAL DISPUTES!**

\* The government and SATS must come to terms with SARHWU and the striking workers. They must not think that we will stand by while they fire thousands of our fellow workers. A dismissal to one is a dismissal to all. **REINSTATE ALL THE FIRED SATS WORKERS!**

**COPY OF MAY 5,6 ANTI-APARTHEID ELECTIONS  
PAMPHLET**

***Down with minority!*  
**STAYAWAY — rule!**  
**TUES 5 MAY and WED 6 MAY****

THE PEOPLE DEMAND:

STOP RAIDS INTO NEIGHBOURING STATES!  
SCRAP THE RACIST PARLIAMENT!  
UNBAN THE ANC AND RELEASE POLITICAL PRISONERS!  
ONE PERSON, ONE VOTE IN A UNITED SOUTH AFRICA!

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**WARNING TO THE REGIME:** Further mass action will be taken if our demands are not met. In particular NATIONAL MASS ACTION will be taken on 12 June 1987 if the State of Emergency has not been lifted.

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\*\*\*\*\*  
APPEAL TO ALL OUR PEOPLE:

1. No shopping in town on 5 and 6 May.
2. No schooling on 5 and 6 May.
3. Shebeens to close on 5 and 6 May.
4. No-one to work on the 5th and 6th, except health workers and journalists. Health workers wear uniforms, journalists show identity cards.
5. No buses or taxis to town.

\*\*\*\*\*  
PLEASE NOTE: All the above must be observed in a disciplined and united way. Our youth must take responsibility to ensure that the stayaway call is explained to the people before the 5 and 6 May.

DOWN WITH WHITE MINORITY RULE! AZIKWELWA! 5  
and 6 MAY! STAYAWAY! FORWARD TO PEOPLE'S POWER!

**END BOTHA'S DICTATORSHIP!!**  
**THE PEOPLE SHALL GOVERN**

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