

# Workers in the State Sector: the Case of the Civil Administration

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"In the state information is confidential not secret."  
- Regional Director of the  
Commission for Administration

This statement sums up the problems in obtaining detailed information about internal state strategies with respect to its employees. Even an examination of the annual departmental reports only reveals the tip of the iceberg. The circulars and directives which daily pass through departments are the hidden details of what is really taking place. (1)

Public sector employment strategies have received very little attention or research. Exactly how the state organises its agents in the bureaucracy, how it establishes internal coherence and co-operation, how it disorganises and neutralises disruptive tendencies within its workforce, and at the same time maintains the entire society under racist conditions of domination/subordination, are important questions which this article attempts to address, albeit it in a very general manner.

In particular the article focuses on the changing employment conditions and strategies of the civil administrative apparatuses of the state, that is, branches of the state which fall directly under the Commission for Administration. The article is divided into four: an examination of the employment structure in the civil administration; the class struggles within the state which gave rise to this structure; the co-optive mechanisms used by the state to foster consensus within the civil administration and the divisive and discriminatory policy applied to other sections of workers; and finally, the implications for public sector unionism.

## I The structure of employment in the public sector

Defining the exact boundaries of the public sector is extremely difficult. As a working definition it can be said that

the public sector refers to all those enterprises, departments or institutions which either produce goods or provide services and which are totally or partially owned or controlled by the state. (2) These apparatuses could be national, regional or local. Presently in South Africa there are 3-tiers of government: central state, provincial state and local state. Although there is a "relative autonomy" in decision making in that each level has legislative powers, the regional and local levels of government cannot conflict in policy with the central authorities. The provincial administrations and the local municipalities usually pass ordinances which supplement parliamentary legislation, in order to meet specific requirements. Services such as roads, hospitals, traffic police, sanitary and other services are handled by regional and local levels of government. (3)

In their employment practices, conditions of service and salaries the provincial authorities follow the central state far more closely than do the local municipalities. Both the central state employees, as well as the provincial authorities' employees, have their conditions of employment determined by the Commission for Administration.

Cutting across the central and provincial levels are vertical divisions which could be described as follows:

- (a) civil sector - includes both "permanent" and "temporary" employees
  - (i) primarily administrative and clerical, eg. personnel officers and messengers
  - (ii) health service employees
  - (iii) productive employment, eg. forestry workers
- (b) parastatals or public enterprise - here we should distinguish between the South African Transport Services and the Post Office on the one hand, and enterprises such as Iscor and Sasol. There are at least three differences:
  - (i) SATS and the Post Office are central state apparatuses
  - (ii) different structures of accountability
  - (iii) Iscor and Sasol are involved in production whilst SATS and the Post Office are services.
- (c) uniformed sector - army and police. (4)

This paper, is mainly concerned with the practices taking

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place in the civil sector, although possibly some of the observations made may apply to the other sectors.

### Background

The creation of an independent national state in 1910, although still part of the British Commonwealth, had important effects on the policy that was pursued with respect to state personnel. As early as 1909, provisions were made in the South African Act whereby the Governor-General-in-Council appointed an "impartial" Commission directly responsible to the legislative authority. (5) Parliament gave effect to this injunction in the Public Service and Pensions Act 1912 (Act 29 of 1912). The establishment of an independent body - the Public Services Commission - was in order to "depoliticise personnel relations" and develop an efficient and competent administration. (6) The 1912 Act was amended in 1923 and again in 1957. After repeated recommendations to the cabinet to extend the powers and the sphere of activities of what became the Commission for Administration, revised legislation was introduced in 1984: the Public Service Act (Act 111 of 1984) and the Commission for Administration Act (Act 65 of 1984).

The present Commission for Administration consists of 3 members who are appointed by the State President for a period of 5 years. With a staff of 261, the Commission is responsible for the state's employment code; co-ordinates personnel used by departments; handles grievances not resolved at a departmental level and plays an important planning function on personnel matters. (7) It is this body which attempts to create uniformity and regulate employment practices within and between state departments. In order to accomplish these objectives, powers are delegated to the Commission and the types of action taken include: furnishing of informal advice to departments; making formal recommendations to departments; issuing formal directions to departments. (8)

The exercise of state power requires apparatuses and personnel and a division of labour which ensures accountability. This is an important function of the Commission. According to its annual report, its major objectives are:

1. The establishment of suitable structures and processes for execution of government functions by the rational

distribution of functions among different levels of government; suitable organisation design; effective control of establishments; design of rational procedures and the effective utilisation of computers and other aids.

2. The establishment of sound management practices and managerial self-sufficiency for departments and other government institutions.
3. The promotion of sound personnel and inter-personnel relationships in public management amongst the independent Bantustans, various sectors of the public sector, government institutions and the public, and between the state as employer and its employees. (9)

It is, however, important to note that, although the Commission can make recommendations, they have to be approved by a second party, usually a Cabinet Minister.

#### Employment in the civil administration

The civil sector has been an important area of both manual and clerical employment and has steadily grown over the last few years. It is likely to increase even more with the new tri-cameral system, and the creation of the departments for general and own affairs. (10) Since 1973, the growth in the authorised allocated posts in the civil service has been substantial, as the figures indicate: 1973 - 142,705; 1976 - 162,178; 1979 - 179,362; 1981 - 229,938; 1983 - 253,562. (11)

For decades, in the civil administration job reservation and preferential treatment of whites has been prevalent. Blacks who were employed mainly occupied temporary positions and performed menial tasks. This has now changed drastically. Recent state initiatives to make the public service an attractive employment area are designed to increase the number of blacks willing to play a role in the administration of the National Party's political objectives, as part of a national strategy of incorporation and co-option.

There are basically 3 types of employees in the civil sector:

- (a) "officials" who occupy permanent posts - includes administrative officials, clerical employees, professionals (such as engineers and lawyers), artisans and all those who have a specific technical skill or qualification, "General A Division" (usually engaged in supervisory

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activities, eg. matrons, inspectors and storemen), and prison staff. (12)

- and the following two "non-classified" grades - usually manual workers:

(b) "employees" or "temporary workers"

(c) contract workers. (13)

The statistics for the various posts, over the last five years, are as follows:

	1978	1980	1983
I OFFICIALS			
Administrative			
White	6310	7080	8709
Other		23	328
Clerical			
White	14555	16002	17281
Other			275
Professional			
White	8970	9409	10615
Other		259	1281
Technical			
White	8138	8781	9037
Other			136
General A			
White	1966	1951	1960
Other			138
Services			
White	8716	8200	8699
Other	6807	7620	8490
II NON-CLASSIFIED			
White	5149	5419	6207
Other	21293	22157	28780

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General B			
White	28561	30429	31536
Other	11923	13874	17264

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III EDUCATION\*

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White	6028	8168	10584
Other	41695	66467	92238

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Total                    170111            205840            253562

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SOURCE: Commission for Administration, Annual Report 1982-1983.

\* figures for education include both permanent and non-classified workers

II Struggles within the state:  
rationalisation and occupational differentiation

Since the mid-70s, especially after the Soweto uprising, which resulted in the virtual collapse of the educational state apparatuses, the National Party has begun to seriously examine the administrative mechanisms of the state. The increasing dissatisfaction among public workers over salaries and conditions of employment, as well as the effects of the "information scandal", which rocked the National Party, made it imperative to reorganise inter-department relations as well as provide an image of competent and clean government. Added to this was the increasing dissatisfaction that was being aired by senior officials concerning the moves towards a new form of political rule in the tri-cameral system.

These aspects must be seen against the backdrop of increasing concentration and centralisation of capital, resulting in monopoly capital's dominance in the strategic areas of the economy: mining, secondary industry, agriculture and the distributive sector. Whilst there has been economic concentration, the political aspect, especially the civil administrative dimension has lagged behind. This was most clearly seen in the criticisms, by capital, of government spending and overstaffing. Recent monetarist critiques argue that the

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burgeoning state salary bill will lead to disaster. Heavy taxation on big business without attendant political securities required that the civil administration be re-organised.

In 1979, after a fierce battle with Connie Mulder, P W Botha assumed the premiership and one of the first measures announced was the rationalisation of the public sector. It meant streamlining state departments, increasing centralisation and improving the image of the state, while also re-evaluating and reorganising employment practices. The number of departments were, for example, reduced from 39 to 22. Responsible for the supervision of this programme of rationalisation was the Public Service Commission (now the Commission for Administration) under the chairmanship of Dr P S Rautenbach. The area of investigation included all state departments, 1,000 agencies and commissions, 1,950 laws and 16,000 proclamations. (14) The hidden agenda of the Commission was to identify areas, and even personnel, which would obstruct the new direction the state was taking under the Botha government. The early (forced) retirements of well known conservatives in senior positions - in the old Coloured Affairs Department, Plural Affairs etc. - were indicators of the verligte/verkraampte conflict. It was a process of neutralising verkrampste civil servants who were critical of the "consensus politics" Botha contemplated.

Added to the rationalisation was a programme of occupational differentiation. (15) As part of the twin-strategy, occupational differentiation (OD) was designed to ease the transition (to centralisation) and maintain a loyal civil force in the wake of the impending socio-political changes. It meant devising an occupational and professional system which made civil employment attractive, secure and competitive with that of the private sector. Beneath the guise of the technical objective of "improving the quality and quantity" of the public services rendered, was the political and social objective of winning over civil servants to the state's new political orientation through improved material benefits and opportunities. It meant substantial salary restructuring, and a general package of improved housing subsidies and loans, pension provisions and other perks.

The occupational differentiation strategy had two objectives: on the one hand, it was an attempt to increase the number of

blacks entering the civil service - thereby making them active agents in the implementation of the new deal - and on the other hand, through incentives, it attempted to draw increasing numbers of academically trained personnel from the private sector, to undermine the conservative and, now, disruptive tendencies among civil servants, critical of the state's new initiatives. Although this did not necessarily abandon the previous employment and promotion practice of "coming through the ranks", it certainly did undermine it and reflected a decided shift from the past. Jobs were now increasingly advertised in newspapers, and journals, and even employment agencies, a practice not previously contemplated. Added to this was the high profile public relations work done by the Commission for Administration in getting new recruits. (16) Inter-department circulars were previously the only form of advertisement and it usually meant an experienced official moving from one department to the next.

Occupational differentiation which has taken place since 1981, is therefore a complete package spanning the entire personnel administration spectrum: from the provision of posts, recruitment, selection, appointment, remuneration, training and merit assessment to the termination of service. In the 600 occupational classes identified in the public service, the ruling National Party hopes through its programme of rationalisation and occupational differentiation to develop a professional layer of civil service workers - drawn from all population groups - not merely committed to public sector employment but to the very political objectives of the state. (17) This was most clearly expressed by the former Chairman of the Commission for Administration in an address at the inaugural meeting of the Public Servants Union:

If we were to examine our role as officials, we could do no better than consider the basic expenditure set forth in the preamble of the Constitution Act...In short, the preamble refers to the achievement of a society which is safe, orderly and decent. This is the prime goal of the state and thus the prime goal of every official employed by the state. In striving after this high ideal, let us give our full co-operation to all others who are engaged in the same pursuit, be they appointed officials or political office bearers. Without the sustained effort of the officials it will be well-nigh impossible to achieve the quality of life we so earnestly seek. All officials



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are important cogs in the wheels of government and administration and much is expected of them. In the face of tides of change and development, they provide stability and security and reassurance to all the peoples of our country. (18)

The effect, therefore, of rationalisation and occupational differentiation was that departments, and for that matter a number of statutory bodies which embodied and represented the interests of those classes and class fractions hostile to the new state direction were slowly beginning to lose their influence and political impact within the overall state network. An example was the break-up of the Department of Information which was brought under the control of Foreign Affairs. Consequently, rationalisation brought centralisation and concentration of departments, whilst occupational differentiation ensured a loyal body of personnel to serve the new alignment of forces.

The reform strategies were also to be reflected in the public union structures and their internal battles. Presently there are three unions (staff associations they are called): the Public Servants Association (PSA) is exclusively for white civil workers; the Public Servants Union (PSU), established recently under the wing of the PSA, is for Indians exclusively; and the Public Servants' League of South Africa (PSL) which is non-racial - its membership is predominantly Coloured, but also includes a large component of African workers. Whilst the PSA and PSU have their base in, and are led by, permanent officials, the PSL has its base mainly amongst temporary workers; the leadership, however, is predominantly permanent officials. This has been contested, however, particularly over the last two years at regional and national congresses, as well as in the workplace. The internal battles have been over the direction of the union and over forms of representation. Other contested issues have been the attempt to relinquish African membership in order to meet the state's racial recognition criteria; the rejection of the state's new tri-cameral deal; workers' control and democracy and over where organising should be directed (ie: towards permanent or temporary workers). The struggle has been primarily between the co-optable section (mainly officials), sympathetic to the state's new deal, and those committed to union democracy and workers' control (mainly temporary workers) who are critical

of the state's initiatives.

On the whole, the leadership of the 3 organisations are conservative and bureaucratic and are favourably disposed to the new deal in varying degrees. Their function it seems is to regulate state-worker relations. In the case of the PSA and PSU it seems this has largely been achieved. Within the PSL it remains an arena of struggle.

### III Personnel strategy and employees' grievances

There are two different strategies applied to civil workers. On the one hand, the co-optation strategies directed at permanent officials who are vital to the state and play an important function in the implementation of the new deal. The material incentives that are offered, and the ethic of loyalty which is fostered, ensures a functional civil apparatus in the face of enormous opposition by the oppressed classes. On the other hand, a divisive, disorganising and discriminatory employment policy is pursued with regard to temporary workers in order to stifle united action. The grievances of these workers have been important mobilising issues for organisation.

The 3 categories of employees identified earlier (ie. official, temporary and contract) have entirely different conditions of employment. Not only do the skilled-unskilled mechanisms play a role, but colour and gender are also vital in determining conditions of employment. Although the state declares that job reservation is not its policy, in practice this has been the case. Although there is a decided shift towards increasing the numbers of blacks entering the civil service, the numbers involved will be relatively small, and they are likely to be confined to the departments of own affairs. (19)

Whilst permanent officials have received increased benefits the temporary and contract workers have received no real material improvements. The thousands of unclassified, temporary workers have had to bear the brunt of low wages, bad service conditions and very few privileges. Even worse off are the contract workers with absolutely no benefits. They are usually employed for specific tasks or projects (eg. building dams) and once these projects are complete their contracts automatically expire. Job insecurity is, consequen-

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tly, a sceptre which haunts the contract workers.

### Wages

All the unclassified staff are remunerated according to the Local Wage Rate System (LW). The history of this system is not clear but has been present for at least 2 decades. It is based on the principle that the cost of living in various parts of the country differs, (20) and consequently, conditions of employment and salaries ought to differ. It also incorporates an element that so-called Coloureds and Africans have different material requirements in these different areas.

South Africa is divided into 6 regions. In each region, there are 5 categories of employees, namely Local Wage Categories 1-5. Each local wage category depends on the type of work performed or specific qualifications required. For example, LW1 might include a worker who works with elementary equipment such as a broom or spade which requires no training or responsibility. A LW2 worker will on the other hand use an electric saw which requires training. If both LW1 and LW2 workers live in region A (which includes say Cape Town) they will receive more wages for their respective jobs than workers performing the same tasks in say Region C (say George).

There again, an African worker doing the same job will receive less than Coloured and Indian workers although they may all be in the same region. The objective of this remuneration system is to obtain workers at the lowest wages possible and also to foster tension and suspicion among the workforce. This preferential treatment promotes racism and disorganisation within the ranks of black workers. It has been a source of immense dissatisfaction. And although various actions have been taken over the years, for example go-slows, and here and there work stoppages (at forestry stations and hospitals particularly), they have been infrequent and brought little, if any, meaningful change to the system. This is not to say that change is impossible. But unlike the private sector, where an individual and competing firm is usually confronted, workers in the public sector are up against the entire state network.

According to reports, the Local Wage System is to be scrapped, which would certainly be welcomed by workers. (21) But

it seems unlikely that wage determination will be the subject of negotiation between worker organisations and the state. No democratic or independent trade union has hitherto established a significant presence in the civil sector with the result that sweetheart staff associations have remained unchallenged. It has been the prerogative of the state, through the Commission for Administration, to decide, without consultation, what it considers to be a "reasonable and decent wage". Notwithstanding the scrapping of the local wage system, it seems that the fundamental principles of racist determination and geographical division are likely to remain. At best, there is the likelihood of streamlining and reducing the number of work categories.

### Pensions

At present there are two pension schemes. One is for permanent officials, the Government Service Pension Fund, and the other is for temporary workers. No pension provisions exist for contract workers. For officials entry into the fund is automatic with a 8% deduction. Gratuity and annuity are provided. Should the official die, prior to his retirement, a widow's pension, plus all the other benefits, is provided. In the case of temporary workers, in particular black workers, it was a long battle to secure pension provisions. (22) It was only in April 1967 that a Temporary Non-white Government Service Pension Fund was established. But entry was not automatic. It required a qualifying period of 5 years before a worker could contribute. What this qualifying period means is that if a worker started employment in a government department in say 1948, only 17 years' pensionable service has accrued, although the worker's service is actually 32 years. Initially, provision was made for the payment of a gratuity.

In October 1979 a new scheme was introduced called the Temporary Employees Pension Fund. The qualifying period was reduced to 2 years and contributions were to be 5% with the state's contribution being twice that of the employees. It also made provision for workers to buy back pensionable service years at specific rates. Many workers viewed the new pension provisions with suspicion. Although they agreed with pension contributions, they did not agree with the qualifying period. With the state's attempts at freezing pension pay-

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ments, workers viewed this as a ploy to increase control over them. Workers are now, for example, not paid a gratuity if they have more than 10 years' pensionable service. Instead, an increased annuity is paid in the form of a monthly pension. This measure caused a lot of tension, and in many areas of the civil sector, temporary workers threatened action; a very weak threat given their disorganisation. But it remains a major problem and certainly one which can be used to galvanise workers. The encouragement to workers to buy back pension is designed to shift the burden of expenditure onto workers. Should workers, for instance, buy back sufficient pensionable service, then their monthly pension would increase, and if this figure were to be higher than the civil pension, they would forfeit any claim to a civil pension.

### Housing loans and subsidies

Housing loans and subsidies have usually been thought to be a major incentive for working in the government sector. Although theoretically all state employees are entitled to apply for housing loans and subsidies, it is really only "officials" who enjoy these benefits. The vast majority of temporary workers live in council houses, share houses or use makeshift accommodation. Consequently this places them outside the scope of this "benefit". Where workers have been able to purchase a house, acquiring a loan and subsidy is still not automatic. Workers must be over 21 years and be contributors to the pension fund before they can apply for the loans and subsidies. In practice, temporary workers will have to wait at least 3 years (2 years for qualifying and at least 1 year as contributor) before they can even reach the first stage of applying. Secondly, the loans are pegged to salaries. Consequently, because wages are low, loans and subsidies are usually very small. The procedure is protracted and many workers have been frustrated in their efforts to obtain loans and subsidies. In any case, for ordinary workers even raising the initial deposit is usually impossible. Thus the loans and housing subsidies are virtually the preserve of the permanent officials.

Another problem, for example in Cape Town and surrounding areas, is that many Coloured workers reside in areas such as Mitchells Plain and have purchased their houses. But because the council and/or government has declared the area a "devel-

oped township", workers cannot apply for loans or subsidies to assist them. The same applies to African workers who, until recently (ie. with 99 year leasehold), were not eligible for housing loans and subsidies.

Where these benefits are made available, they become control mechanisms. Workers who are fortunate enough to obtain a house and enjoy the benefit of the subsidy are extremely cautious about union organisation and engaging in worker action. It makes for passivity and reinforces control at the workplace.

There are other grievances which workers have: job promotion, improved training, injuries on duty and hours of duty, all of which would require a detailed department examination. None of these problems have, to date, been addressed by the independent trade unions which have managed to gain a small presence in the civil sector (General Workers Union; the National Federation of Workers). A possible reason is because public workers, like farm and domestic workers, are excluded from the Labour Relations Act, thus not much organisational attention has been paid to them. This has not, however, prevented workers from organising themselves.

#### IV Implications for worker organisation

The dynamics in the public sector are vastly different to those of private industry. At a formal level, public departments are similar to productive enterprises in that they are independent of one another, are individually responsible for specific projects/policies/services and attempt to be as "productively" efficient in the handling of their services, with the least amount of outlay. The hierarchies of control, the supervision of the labour process and its mechanisation to improve efficiency and productivity, constantly receive attention. Competition, although not necessarily in the open, does take place between departments - to secure better personnel, extend spheres of influence (not in the market, but politically) and to improve budget allocations.

There the similarity ends, because branches of the state (departments) are essentially political structures through which the ruling class exercises state power. They are the structures which regulate and administer the political auth-

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ority of the dominant classes, success depending on the balance of forces. In South Africa, the agenda and priorities are determined by the National Party, the ruling party of the dominant alliance of classes. Consequently workers struggles within the state do not so much affect productivity and profitability, as they do in industry, but have direct ideological/political effects. This is particularly true in the case of action by typists, messengers, filing clerks and health workers, although forestry workers' action can more directly affect profitability.

The institutional framework of the civil apparatus is, therefore, the outcome of struggles. These struggles are waged over 3 areas: the struggle within the state between departments over resources, personnel and influence; at the workplace over forms of control, supervision, discipline and production/efficiency, and between employees and the state over the general conditions of employment.

The last struggle obviously affects officials and temporary workers in different ways. To minimise militant action by temporary workers, disorganisation and isolation through tightly supervised workplace control takes place. In addition divisions along lines of gender, colour and region are promoted, making united action difficult. Moreover, defending workers' rights is difficult because of the masked nature of domination. For example, wages at a hospital, forestry station or administration department are not determined by the medical superintendent, forester or director. It is the Commission for Administration (or Provincial Council), not easily identifiable and somewhat removed from the immediate scene of conflict, which decides wage rates. The effect of this centralised decision-making is to obscure the source of power and deflect workers' struggles. There is no tradition or concept of departmental bargaining. Consequently workers struggles have to be directed against the state as such.

Labour relations have been relatively peaceful in the civil administration. This situation can be ascribed to the largely unorganised state of the black workforce, the stifling and disorganising effect of the sweetheart unions, and the fact that workstoppages are prohibited. The tactic of favouring staff unions is likely to continue in order to ensure "exclusive representation" and to prevent workers from joining

unions of their choice. In effect these staff union bureaucracies are assisting the state to control and disorganise workers - making real concessions extremely difficult to obtain. Even with the recognised sweetheart unions the scope for bargaining is limited. A wide range of issues such as work rules, procedure, hours etc. are simply not discussed.

The situation has dramatically changed over the last 3 years. Despite the non-recognition of trade unions, some organising has been done by independent trade unions, although it remains at the initial stages. The workers most receptive to unionisation are the unclassified temporary and contract workers. They bear the brunt of low wages and bad working conditions. By contrast the co-option of black officials means they are unlikely to be sympathetic to the workers struggle. Despite the absence of unions, workers have increasingly taken matters into their own hands. But worker action remains isolated and sporadic, with no sustained project. But even these actions have revealed, in no uncertain terms, the state's likely hard-line response to unionisation or the disruption of services. It has become reasonably clear that organising in the public sector, to be successful, must take place on a national basis because isolated struggles have too often led to defeat and demoralisation. The General Workers Union dispute with SATS is a case in point. Because of the diversity of the public workforce, organising would need to be on a national, "departmental" basis; for example, as forestry workers, hospital workers or water workers.

The arena of the civil administration is still to be tested; the opportunities for unionisation and its limits. With no established democratic non-racial trade union tradition, public sector workers still remain outside the mainstream of labour activity. Despite this, their militancy during the present period destroys the myth that public workers are passive. This, together with the imminent establishment of the new federation on a national basis, suggests that public sector organisation must be placed firmly on the agenda.

#### Footnotes:

- 1 It is usually in confidential department memoranda that explanations are given for why certain policies or practices are pursued, how they are to be implemented, when



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- and where. Consequently my examination is tentative.
- 2 International Labour Organisation, Management Series Geneva, 1983, p7. This is an adaption of the position taken on public enterprises.
  - 3 With the new local authorities legislation it is not clear how these services are going to operate.
  - 4 There are 2 other structures which must be accounted for, the judiciary and the educational apparatuses.
  - 5 The Commission for Administration, Annual Report 1981-2, pp2-4
  - 6 The Commission for Administration, Annual Report 1982-3, p5
  - 7 Ibid, p10
  - 8 Ibid
  - 9 Ibid, pp9-11
  - 10 Sunday Express 3.3.85
  - 11 The Commission for Administration, Annual Report 1982-3, pp20-5
  - 12 Public Service Act (Act 111 of 1984)
  - 13 Ibid
  - 14 Work in Progress 11, February 1980, p11: a broader analysis of the monopoly capital and military link is given.
  - 15 This strategy was discussed as early as 1978-9 but was only implemented during 1981 with the final phase completed late 1984.
  - 16 The previous methods of recruitment and promotion usually entrenched conservative bureaucrats. The new methods are significant, no matter how superficial they may appear.
  - 17 This I think applies not only to the civil administration but to the entire state network.
  - 18 J van der Merwe, Chairman of the Commission for Administration, at the launching of the PSU, a union for Indian civil workers, 30 November 1983.
  - 19 Sunday Express 3.3.85. According to document: "Employment and utilisation of the various population groups in the public service", a process of controlled appointments to general affairs departments should take place.
  - 20 Exactly how this is determined is unclear.
  - 21 This was rumoured when the "occupational differentiation" programme for permanent officials was introduced.
  - 22 Information obtained from two documents: "Pensioenfonds Vir Tydelike Werknemers: Vordering van Bydraes" (no date); Department van Bosban, "Aanstelling in 'n Permanente Hoedanigheid" (no date).