Steelworkers, Craft Unions and Afrikaner Nationalism

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The early history of the South African Iron and Steel Trades Associations (ISTA) has suffered from confusion and neglect. This confusion has been caused only in part by the incorrect dates given for the formation of the union in some sources.[1] More importantly, the ISTA has posed real problems of analysis and categorisation for writers of South African trade union history. The union, founded in 1936, the same year as the Nasionale Raad van Trustees (NRT), a constant champion of 'European leadership', and predominantly Afrikaner in membership, is nonetheless difficult to define as christian nationalist. Members of the rival craft unions in Pretoria certainly believed the ISTA to have been financed by Albert Hertzog's NRT.[2] This, however, is most unlikely. Not only was the steelworkers' union founded some eight months before the NRT,[3] but, also, the 'official' history of Albert Hertzog's trade union activities makes no mention of the steelworkers.[4] Similarly, the steelworkers' union is hardly mentioned in the writings of those trade unionists who actively opposed Hertzog's activities. Only the official South African Trade Union Council (SACTU) history written in 1961 describes the ISTA as 'christian national minded'.[5] However, the establishment of the Co-ordinating Council of South African Trade Unions (CCSATU) in 1948, largely on the initiative of the steelworkers, was variously described by Sachs and the Simons' as 'inspired by the Nationalist Party' and a 'major success' for Afrikaner nationalism,[6] whilst Hepple ascribes the 1947 split and the establishment of the CCASTU to the issue of African trade union affiliation to the Trade and Labour Council (TLC).[7] The exact relationship of the ISTA to Afrikaner nationalism especially in its early years remains a dilemma.

Much of the confusion over the steelworkers' union reflects a particular ideological view of South African trade union history. This interpretation traces racism and division within the movement to the influence of nationalist organisations and christian national ideology. In fact, of course the ideology only succeeded where it struck a resonance with the perceived

needs of workers. It was equally possible for groups of white workers to evolve a strategy of racially exclusive state-oriented trade unionism, independently of christian national influence. In the case of the steelworkers' union, either it has been assumed that it fell under the definition of christian national trade unionism, or it has been largely ignored and attention concentrated on more straightforward examples like the South African Mineworkers' Union (MWU), which more closely fit the schema. Thus O'Meara dismisses the ISTA on the grounds that its withdrawal from the TLC in 1947 was not prompted by christian nationalism.[8]

Given this general neglect, it is perhaps necessary to emphasise the historical importance of the steelworkers' union. From a small nucleus of 300 members in 1936 the union has become the largest white union, with a membership of over 38,000 in 1976.[9] Moreover, the union has since 1947 consistently worked to organise the right-wing of the trade union movement according to principles of 'European leadership', first through the Co-ordinating Council and later through the Confederation of Labour. The establishment of the Co-ordinating Council was by no means catastrophic for the TLC, although the former general secretary of the ISTA, L.J. van den Berg, identified it as a turning point which marked the beginning of the breakup of the TLC.[10] Through the Co-ordinating Council, the ISTA assisted many smaller white unions, particularly in the state sector, such as roadworkers and civil servants.[11] Finally, the steelworkers provide an exemplary case study of a group of unskilled and semi-skilled white workers who sought to ensure employment in the face of competition from cheap black labour and who looked to the state to secure this objective.[12] In the process of advancing the interests of their membership, the ISTA clashed with the older craft unions, which although representing primarily the interests of artisans, continued to view the metal and engineering industries as their private preserve. These conflicts with unskilled blacks and skilled whites resulted from wider changes in the technical and social division of labour, and go some way towards explaining the strategy adopted by the ISTA.

Commercial metal working grew on the Rand on a small scale with the development of the gold mining industry.[13] However these activities remained limited to repair work and lacked the necessary plant for mass production. Initially metal products were almost entirely imported. From around 1909 a number of firms were founded which started to produce pig

iron. During the early 1920's the government sponsored a feasibility study into establishing, in conjunction with British, Dutch and German interests, a large-scale iron and steel industry in Pretoria. The Pact government, eager to encourage industrialisation, took up the scheme, although without calling upon foreign capital. In the face of considerable opposition, particularly from the mining companies which preferred cheaper imported metals,[14] the South African Iron and Steel Industrial Corporation Ltd. (ISCOR) was established in 1928, and in 1934 commenced production. In 1935 South Africa was producing 17.2% of its steel requirements, a figure which rose to 70.6% by 1955.[15] This growth formed the basis for the production of metal products and machinery.[16]

aThe Pact Government determined that ISCOR should be run with 'civilised labour'.[17] Despite state policy, white operatives perceived two threats to their position. The threat of undercutting by cheap black labour remained, whilst their presence was resented by the skilled workers who regarded them as a potential threat to their own craft status. Thus in 1940 the ISCOR management replaced skilled moulders on ingot moulding with semi-skilled men.[18] Increasingly artisans were restricted to maintenance work, whilst actual production was in the hands of operatives. On the first score, ISCOR remained subject to competition from more efficient overseas cartels. Protectionism simply raised prices and was opposed by industrial and mining interests. Consequently, from December 1937, ISCOR was obliged to moderate its 'civilised labour policy' in order to reduce costs. The company began replacing semi-skilled whites on boring and milling machines with black labour at lower wages.[19] By November 1938, 200 whites has been dismissed and replaced by Africans,[20] whilst some 875 jobs were involved in all.[21] Over 1,000 whites attended a mass protest meeting called by the ISTA. The association charged that ISCOR was 'following a policy of profiteering at the expense of the European workman',[22] and that as a state-financed corporation ISCOR's first duty was to implement the government's labour policy. Although the ISTA failed to prevent black labour being introduced into ISCOR, the white-black labour ratio remained high compared to private industry.[23] The Association's failure was probably in part due to the fact that it was still numerically small and was actively opposed by the craft unions. 'Until 1939 there was doubt whether the Association would survive'.[24] The insecure position of white operatives in ISCOR, and these early experiences of undercutting by cheap black labour, helps to explain

the development of a racially exclusive trade union strategy and the subsequent support by the ISTA for government legislation on job reservation.

Initially, semi-skilled steelworkers had been organised as a branch of the Boilermakers' Society.[25] However, the threat of deskilling produced a conflict of interest with the skilled members, and in 1936 a small nucleus of operatives in the ISCOR works formed the ISTA: 'because the interests of semi-skilled workers were neglected shamefully by the craft unions'.[26] Even so, objectors from the craft unions prevented the ISTA obtaining registration until 1937.[27] This animosity between the craft unions and the Association[28] continued over questions of demarcation[29] and 'poaching' of members.[30] In 1948 the ISTA absorbed 578 steel window makers, previously members of the Amalgamated Engineering Union (AEU).[31] In retaliation for poaching, the craft unions sought to enforce the closed shop agreement in such a way as to exclude the ISTA from certain categories of workers,[32] whilst there were several allegations of intimidation of ISTA members.[33]

As a consequence of these hostilities, the employers' organisation 'frequently found themselves confronted by conflicting sets of proposals when current collective agreements expired'.[34] The craft unions negotiated jointly through the Mechanics' Unions' Joint Executives (MUJE), from which the ISTA was excluded until 1964.[35] The result has been that the rival unions have undermined each others' activities. In 1946 the ISTA complained that its ability to win improvements for its members was being hampered:

> the major problem of the workers in the Iron and Steel Industry lies in the fact that the Craft Unions have the dominating say and they are principally concerned with the interests of artisans, production workers and operatives still receive second consideration with some of them.[36]

The metal unions were divided when it came to negotiating an industrial agreement in 1949 and again in 1951.[37] In 1952 certain of the craft unions who had not accepted the 1951 ISCOR agreement struck to increase rates for artisans.[38] They made no effort to gain the co-operation of the ISTA. Eventually the craft unions were forced to submit their claim to arbitration, and in turn received no support from the ISTA, which made a separate agreement with the management.[39]

The initial animosity between ISTA and the craft unions reflected the insecurity of the latter in the face of mechanisation. The establishment of ISCOR, which was capital intensive and required a predominantly operative

semi-skilled work force, challenged traditional work practices. However, in the post-war years as the metal and engineering industries as a whole were mechanised and as semi-skilled operatives were increasingly employed at the point of production, whilst journeymen came to occupy auxiliary positions in maintenance, planning and toolsetting, so the basis of conflict between the groups disappeared. These changes transformed the traditional craft unions, which were forced to open their ranks to admit white operatives into membership.[40] Conversely in the post-war years, the ISTA was successful in attracting artisans, particularly from the state sector, into membership.[41] After the unsuccessful strike led by some of the craft unions in 1952, a number of artisans lost confidence in their unions,[42] and by the end of 1953 the Association had enrolled 516 out of the 900 artisans employed in ISCOR's Pretoria plant.[43] It was in response to these developments that in 1954 the MUJE issued a series of acrimonious pamphlets attacking the ISTA.[44] The continued conflict was only in part due to 'poaching' members. More important, by the 1950's the ISTA and the craft unions had evolved different trade union strategies with diverging ideologies.

The ISTA appealed to its membership primarily as workers, rather than as Afrikaners. Although the membership was overwhelmingly Afrikaner, the union's literature was always published in both official languages. In the early days 'it was by no means an easy task for the leaders to make the members trade-union conscious'.[45] Many of the steelworkers came from country districts and had no industrial or trade union background. Moreover at this time, ISTA leaders complained, the Afrikaner newspapers and church leaders condemned trade unions indiscriminately. However:

> We (the leaders) explained to our people from the countryside that we had new ideas in mind for our trade union, and that our aim with the formation of the trade union is mainly an effort to achieve jointly what we consider to be our rights, while individually we are powerless against our influential employers.[46]

Despite later ideological accretions the ISTA continued to espouse a primarily economistic trade unionism:

> We must always remember that the first object of a trade union remains to improve the working conditions of a specified group of workers.[47]

It was on trade union rather than 'ideological' grounds that the Associa-

tion sought to mobilise white workers. Initially ISCOR's semi- and unskilled white workers received low wages compared to artisans.[48] Unskilled whites commenced work for as little as 4/6 per day, whilst the majority of white semi- and unskilled workers received under 12/- per day.[49] Lack of uniformity in wage rates provided a further grievance. Like the Garment Workers' Union of South Africa (GWU), the ISTA maintained the loyalty of the members because it succeeded in improving their material conditions. The first industrial council agreement negotiated by the Association in 1939 raised the minimum rate to 12/- per day, and was followed by regular increases thereafter.[50] In 1942 the union established its own medical insurance fund.[51] Again in 1945 the union established a co-operative bank, from which members could take loans. By 1952 the bank had over £25,000 in circulation.[52] These benefits could not be matched by the craft unions. Writing in the craft journal *The Crucible* in 1948, one artisan member warned:

> The mechanic is becoming a back number and the unskilled worker is coming to the forefront. He is joining a Trade Union which gives him sick pay, facilities to borrow money, co-operative stores and a host of other benefits which the old and staid Unions cannot and will not offer.[53]

The ISTA was established as an industrial union, the form of organisation most appropriate to a diverse membership which could not control the labour process by virtue of any monopoly of skills. It espoused industrial unionism as 'the only type of organisation that is able to safeguard and promote the interests of all classes and groups (of whites) effectively in our modern times'.[54] Thus, the ISTA consistently proposed that there be one union for all white workers in the metal industry. As early as 1943 the union was recruiting staff members,[55] and in 1949 the union established a branch in Pretoria for salaried employees.[56]

By 1954 the ISTA had 9,767 members.[57] The MUJE was sufficiently worried to issue a series of leaflets warning of the dangers of industrial unionism,[58] as a 'possible means of forcing Artisan's to be subservient to all other elements in Industry ... an Artisan's enemy can well be the semi-skilled European who has found a livelihood in the rapid growth of our Industrial activities'.[59] The ISTA replied that these arguments denigrated white operatives, many of whom had been accepted for membership by the craft unions: 'One cannot help coming to the conclusion that they accept the operators in their ranks with one object only, namely to retard their

progress'.[60] Some ten years later, in a further propaganda exchange beween the Association and the craft unions, the question of industrial versus craft unionism was still prominent. The ISTA argued that the conditions for craft unionism no longer existed:

> (the craft unions) turn a blind eye to the phenomenal industrial development and to the fact that the dilution of trades has reached a stage where the majority of the members of many so-called craft unions are operators today. Were the craft unions in a position to prevent this dilution process, their survival could possibly have been justified, but they were powerless because they stood alone.[61]

This analysis is similar to that used by left-wing enthusiasts for industrial unionism in the twenties and thirties, an indication that there is no necessary correlation between the structure and politics of trade unions.

The ISTA's approach to wage bargaining differed significantly from that of the craft unions. The latter argued that the primary task was to maintain the conditions and wages of the highly paid tradesman in order to set a standard to which less skilled workers could strive.[62] The ISTA 'adopted the standpoint that the position of the operator must be improved and then improvements for the Tradesmen follow automatically'.[63] This difference in approach may explain the recurring failure to co-operate on wage demands.

The ISTA's roots amongst white operatives resulted in further differences with the craft unions over the question of piece-work and productivity deals. The traditional craft unions had always interpreted such moves as an attempt to undermine the status of their craft. The operatives which the ISTA represented had no status to lose, and incentive bonus schemes provided an opportunity of bridging the wage gap with the skilled workers. ISCOR was operating a bonus scheme at least as early as 1942.[64] In 1951 the ISTA welcomed the intervention by the Minister of Labour to ensure the widest implementation of incentive bonuses, against the opposition of some of the craft unions.[65] The Association only stipulated that safeguards should be included to prevent employers from exploiting the situation.[66]

The Association's rhetoric about industrial unionism - 'that the basic interests of all the workers in a specific industry are identical',[67] was of course misleading. At no time was there any suggestion that this included black workers. The ISTA was perfectly aware that the security and conditions of its membership rested upon a basis of racial exclusion. Thus the union vigorously opposed attempts by management to introduce black workers at

lower wages,[68] and fully supported the 1956 Industrial Conciliation Act and the government's policy of job reservation.[69] The craft unions however rejected this strategy. Historically their artisan members had been guaranteed against undercutting by their monopoly of skills. In the Cape at least they had admitted Coloured artisans to membership and during the 1930's and 1940's they supported the non-racial stance of the TLC. Dilution forced the craft unions to open their ranks to white non-artisan workers, who could be undercut by cheaper black labour. To protect these workers the craft unions employed a closed shop agreement which reserved certain tasks to trade union members,[70] together with a policy of 'equal pay equal work' so that employers could not engage black workers at lower wages. The tactics were more delicate but amounted to the exclusion of Africans from certain categories of work.

The approach of ISTA and the craft unions also differed towards mixed unions and relations with black workers. The ISTA proposed a policy of 'European leadership'. Initially this did not necessarily involve separate unions for the different race groups, but rather that all decisions affecting white workers should be made by whites, and that mixed unions should be led and represented by whites. Although the ISTA affiliated to the TLC in 1944,[71] it continued to campaign for a federation of European trade unions, to be established on a non-party political basis.[72] When, in 1947, the ISTA led a breakaway of five Pretoria-based trade unions from the TLC, it was in response to the defeat of a motion calling for African trade unions to be expelled.[73] When the Co-ordinating Council was established in 1948 under ISTA leadership,[74] its policy was not to accept affiliation from any union in which blacks had voting power. 'It did for a time have one constituent union which had some Indian members but fulfilled this condition'.[75] After 1950, the Co-ordinating Council remained aloof from the newly-formed South African Federation of Trade Unions exactly on these grounds.[76] Some of the craft unions in the Federation had a substantial Indian or Coloured membership in Natal and the Cape. If these workers, many of them skilled, were to be alienated from their unions they might form rival unions and undercut established wage- rates. There was nothing altruistic about the policy of these white-dominated mixed unions. As the MUJE explained, they did not differ with the ISTA over fundamentals:

> The difference between ourselves and the (ISTA) is that the Associa-

> tion wants European leadership with Non-European enemies, whereas we want European leadership with Non-European Allies.[77]

It was only later as the Nationalist government spelt out its plans for industrial legislation, that the ISTA and the CCSATU adopted the policy of separate unions for the race groups.[78]

In attempting to analyse the links between the ISTA and Afrikaner nationalism it is important to distinguish between its relationship to the Nationalist Party and to nationalist ideology. Firstly the ISTA always denied any party political interest.[79] In 1944 and 1946 the ISTA promoted their own candidate, a local steelman standing as an independent in the Pretoria local elections.[80] In fact he appears to have stood in alliance with the Federation of Ratepayers' Associations, which was probably a front for Hertzog's Afrikaner Orde.[81] But the candidate's programme appealed simply to colour prejudice, rather than Afrikaner sentiment.[82] In 1944 the union's journal condemned both main political parties as agents of capitalism, and called for an end to 'racial party politics'.[83] At this point the ISTA supported the notion of a 'worker's candidate', as in Pretoria West, who would represent the interests of white workers.[84] Thus at the 1946 Conference of the TLC, ISTA's General Secretary, L.J. van den Berg, moved a motion calling for the Council to seek direct representation in Parliament. He argued: 'Labour (i.e. The South African Labour Party) will not win for many years ... We know that we cannot get our own members to agree on supporting any one party but they are sick and tired of these divisions'.[85] The motion was rejected and the opportunity of 'detaching a significant number of Afrikaners from their allegiance to the Nationalist Party' was lost.[86]

The official policy of the union towards party politics did not prevent members and officials from having more direct links with nationalist bodies. According to one source, after the union was established 'there were almost immediate attempts by the Nationalist Party and Die Federasie van Afrikaanse Kultuurverenigings (FAK) to gain control of the Association. This was at first resisted but by early 1938 prominent FAK members were well represented on the executive of the Association,[87] and the 1947 withdrawal from the TLC is given as evidence that it had come under nationalist control. However, van den Berg's motion to the 1946 TLC conference if successful would have diverted electoral support from the Nationalist Party. The Co-ordinating Council, when it was formed, professed the same non-political stance, although some of its affiliated unions ac-

tively encouraged their officials to become involved in party politics in support of the nationalists.[88] However, it would be naive to accept at face value the ISTA's protestations that it has always been non-party political. Certainly before 1948 there is some evidence to support this, but since that date the union has generally supported the activities of the Nationalist Government although with considerable hesitancy over the relaxation of job reservation in the sixties.[89] Indeed this policy was rejected by the Co-ordinating Council and also divided the Confederation of Labour. Even so, the union's opposition to the activities of the Conservative Workers' Party in 1961,[90] and the later opposition of the Herstigte Nasionale Party to the ISTA leadership,[91] would indicate the union's support, from the late forties, for orthodox nationalism.

This professed neutrality never extended to trade union politics. Thus the Co-ordinating Council supported white breakaway unions against established mixed unions. G.H. Beetge, a prominent member of the Co-ordinating Council, was active from 1949 in establishing the Blanke Bouwerkersvereniging in opposition to the Amalgamated Union of Building Trade Workers of South Africa.[92] These efforts were actively supported by Albert Hertzog. In 1953 Mr Nagel of the ISTA helped Mr J. Loubscher of the Blankewerkers se beskermingsbond to establish a breakaway leather workers' union for European members only.[93] In the 1960's the CCSATU gave support to the Blanke Distribusiewerkers Vereniging against the multiracial National Union of Distributive Workers (NUDW).[94]

In analysing the development of the ideology of the union, certain features remain constant. White racism, 'European leadership' and support for job colour bars did not falter, although specific policies, on mixed unions for example did change. Two develpments are paramount for the late 1940's: the growth of anti-communism, and the adoption of christian national categories and language. The ISTA had always voiced opposition to the Communist Party,[95] but it was the latter's policy of racial equality which was at issue rather than its Marxism. Likewise, when the ISTA left the TLC in 1947, it gave the Council's non-racial policy as its chief reason for doing so.[96] It was only after 1948 that talk of 'foreign ideologies' and the communist threat became obsessive.[97] By contrast, anti-communism had been the main plank of the various christian national trade union organisations since as early as 1936. The ISTA supported the government's Suppression of Communism Act,[98] and sought to undermine protests over its use against trade

union officials.[99] However, this outgrowth of anti-communism was as much a result of 'cold war' developments as of christian national influence.[100] The divisions in the world trade union movement were reproduced locally. Anti-communism was no longer the preserve of christian nationalism but was also taken up particularly by the older conservative craft unions.[101]

At the same time as 'cold war' anti-communism was winning ground within the trade union movement, the ISTA's language and rhetoric was also showing signs of christian national influence. During the early forties the union's journal, *The Steelworker*, took its vocabulary and its general philosophy from the established trade union movement. Thus one article dealing with trade unionism in Britain described its history in almost classic Marxist terms of class conflict.[102] The journal also ran a series of articles on Marxist political economy, one of which ended with the statement: 'it must be understood and remembered that under capitalism workers are slaves and under socialism they are free'.[103] References to the struggle of the workers against capitalism recurred frequently.[104] Of course when the ISTA used this language it had in mind only white workers. Nevertheless the existence of a common language drawn from a British trade union tradition helped make it possible for this white racist and predominantly Afrikaner trade union to remain in the TLC between 1944 and 1947.

By the late 1940's, after the break with the TLC, the ideology of the union had changed. The language of class conflict gave way to a philosphy of community of interest: 'The fact that the basic interests of employers and employees are identical is accepted, without argument by the majority on both sides'.[105] This statement may partly reflect the influence of the 'cold war', and similar sentiments were expressed by at least some of the craft unions.[106] The academic justifications for this rejection of class analysis which appeared in ISTA's journal, now renamed *The S.A. Worker*, were very obviously composed by christian national idealogues. One article, 'Die Proletariaat Moet Verdwyn' (the proletariat must disappear), concluded that liberal freedoms had allowed the unrestrained growth of capitalist power resulting in conflict with an expanding proletariat. The answer was to oppose liberalism and so prevent the growth of a proletariat.[107] In later articles the lessons were re-iterated: there were no classes only 'groups'; workers are not a class but are culturally, nationally and politically differentiated;[108] it was necessary to prevent 'the creation of a mixed proletariat which would suit communism'.[109] This could only be achieved by enforcing the colour bar

and protecting European labour from unfair competition. In this way, it was argued, it would be possible to prevent white workers 'who mostly belong to the middle class' from falling 'to the level of the Proletariat'.[110]

During the early days, when the union had been struggling to establish itself, the rhetoric of class conflict had served well enough when given a racial interpretation. Certainly the older craft unions saw no contradiction between their racially privileged position and the traditional rhetoric of British trade unionism which they continued to employ. However, in the long run, and especially after the Nationalists came to power, christian national philosophy proved to be more suited to legitimise the ISTA's strategy of racial exclusion, and its reliance on the state to implement this policy. Once again it was not that a particular trade union strategy sprang from christian nationalism, but rather that the ideology articulated underlying economic relations.

Footnotes

1 J.A.G. Coetzee, *Industrial relations in South Africa* (Cape Town 1948) p.63; Steel and Engineering Industries federation of South Africa (SEIFSA), *Organisation and structure of the metal and engineering industries in the Republic of South Africa*(Johannesburg c. 1966) p.43.
2 Interview (1977) with Mr B. Plunkett, secretary of the Pretoria Branch of the Ironmoulders Society of South Africa (IMS) from 1928.
3 A. Hepple, *Trade unions in travail. The story of the broederbond-nationalist plan to control South African Trade Unions* (Johannesburg 1954) p.38; ISTA Archive, pamphlet: 'Werkers: ervaring en bekwaamheid tot u diens, Pretoria, 1978, p.7.
4 L. Naude, *Dr A. Hertzog, die Nasionale Party en die mynwerker* (Potchefstroom 1969).
5 I.L. Walker and B. Weinbron, *2000Casualties: A history of the trade unions and the labour movement in the Union of South Africa* Johannesburg 1961).
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7 Hepple, *Trade unions in travail*, pp.84-5.
8 D. O'Meara, 'Christian-national trade unionism in South Africa, 1934-1948', paper to the University of the Witwatersrand Labour History Conference, 1976, p.1, p.12.
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10 ibid, mimeo: L.J. van den Berg, 'Koordinerande Raad van S.A. Vakverenigings', 1969, p.60.
11 ibid, p.61.
12 D. Kaplan and M. Morris, 'Labour policy in a state corporation: a case study of the South African Iron and Steel Corporation, Article 2', *South African Labour Bulletin* 2 No.8 (1976), 2-21, pp.16-17.
13 SEIFSA, *Organisation and structure of the metal and engineering industries in the Republic of South Africa*, pp.5-8.
14 D. Kaplan, 'The politics of industrial protection in South Africa, 1910-1939', Journal of Southern African Studies, 3 (1976) p.73.
15 D.H. Houghton, *The South African economy*, 3rd ed. (Oxford 1973) pp.126-7.
16 ibid, p.273.
17 D. Kaplan and M. Morris, 'Labour policy in a state corporation: a case study of the South African Iron and Steel Corporation, Article 1', *South African Labour Bulletin* 2 No.6 (1976), pp.21-2.
18 IMS Pretoria Branch minutes, 13.12.40.
19 ISTA Archive, pamphlet: 'Werkers: ervaring en bekwaamheid tot u diens', Pretoria, 1978, p.7.
20 Rand Daily Mail (RDM) cuttings collection, *RDM* 1.11.38.
21 Kaplan and Morris, 'Labour policy in a state corporation, Article 1', p.22.
22 Johannesburg Public Library (JPL) cuttings collection: *RDM* 7.11.38.
23 Kaplan and Morris, 'Labour policy in a state corporation, Article 1', p.21.
24 *The S.A. Worker*, August 1952, p.2.

25 ibid, April 1952, p.1.
26 ibid, January 1949, pp.6-7.
27 ibid, April 1952, p.1.
28 Interview (1977) with Mr B. Plunkett, secretary of the Pretoria Branch of the IMS from 1928: on one occasion this animosity led to an exchange of blows between officials of the rival unions.
29 SEIFSA, *Organisation and structure of the metal and engineering industries in the Republic of South Africa*, p.44.
30 *The S.A. Worker*, May 1953, pp.6-7: 'Statement in connection with our policy of expansion'.
31 *The Steelworker*, October 1948, p.7.
32 *The S.A. Worker*, April 1949, pp.9-11; July 1953, p.5.
33 ibid, April 1949, pp.9-11; March 1952, p.5.
34 SEIFSA, *Organisation and structure of the metal and engineering industries in the Republic of South Africa*, p.45.
35 ibid, p.47-8.
36 *The Steelworker*, October 1946, p.8.
37 *The S.A. Worker*, April 1952, p.2.
38 ibid, April 1952, p.4; March 1952, p.4.
39 ibid, April 1952, p.4.
40 See J.P. Lewis, Industrialisation and Trade Union Organisation in South Africa, 1924-1955, D.Phil History, University of Cambridge, 1982, chapter 5.
41 *The S.A. Worker*, may 1953, pp.6-7.
42 ibid, May 1952, p.5.
43 ibid, September 1953, p.4.
44 JPL Archive, a series of four leaflets entitled 'Questions to be answered', issued by the Mechanics' Unions' Joint Executives (MUJE), 1954.
45 *The S.A. Worker*, August 1952, p.2.
46 ibid.
47 ibid, March 1955, p.4.
48 Artisans received over £1 per day at this time.
49 *The S.A. Worker*, April 1952, p.1.
50 ibid, April 1952, p.2.
51 ISTA Archive, pamphlet: 'Werkers: ervaring in bekwaamheid tot u diens', Pretoria, 1978, p.7.
52 *The S.A. Worker*, August 1952, p.2.
53 *The Crucible*, September 1948, p.5.
54 *The S.A. Worker*, March 1952, p.3.
55 *The Steelworker*, 29.8.43., pp.15-16.
56 *The S.A. Worker*, March 1949, p.14.
57 ISTA Archive, pamphlet: 'Werkers: ervaring en bekwaamheid tot u diens', Pretoria, 1978, p.9.
58 *The S.A. Worker*, January 1954, pp.4-9.
59 ibid, p.9.
60 ibid, p.4.
61 ISTA Archive, pamphlet: ISTA, 'The trade union tragedy in South Africa', Pretoria, 1964.
62 Lewis, Industrialisation and Trade Union Organisation, chapter 5.
63 *The S.A. Worker*, May 1953, p.6.
64 *The Steelworker*, 23.10.42., p.3.
65 *The S.A. Worker*, March 1951, p.2.
66 ibid, November 1951, p.4.
67 ISTA Archive: pamphlet: ISTA, 'The trade union tragedy in South Africa', Pretoria, 1964.
68 e.g. *The S.A. Worker*, August 1954, p.4; June 1955, p.3; November 1955, p.7.
69 ibid, June 1955, p.3.
70 ibid, June 1956, p.3: in fact all the registered unions in the metal and engineering trades, including the ISTA, agreed to this arrangement.
71 *The Steelworker*, 23.6.44., p.1.
72 ibid, 21.7.44., p.7.
73 Walker and Weinbren, *2000 Casualties*, pp.234-5.
74 *The Steelworker*, August 1948, p.6.
75 M. Horrell, *South African trade unionism*. A study of a divided working class (Johannesburg 1961) p.16.
76 *The S.A. Worker*, November 1951, pp.5-6; April 1953, p.2.
77 ibid, January 1954, p.8.
78 ibid, June 1954, pp.5-9.
79 Star cuttings Collection: *Sunday Times*, 30.10.49.
80 *The Steelworker*, 17.12.43.; 21.1.44., p.4.
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