

LABOUR, CAPITAL AND THE STATE

IN SWAZILAND, 1962 - 1977

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Foreign monopoly capital began to make its appearance in Swaziland in the 1950s. This implied a rapid socialisation of labour and consequently raised questions regarding the appropriate structures for regulating industrial relations. As Wilson, the Labour Secretary, put the matter in May 1961:

"The main problems (in dealing 'with labour problems associated with economic development') in which all others have their cause, are the rapid growth of a large permanent industrialised labour force, and the accompanying changes in the basic attitude to employment on the part of the Swazi workers. Gone are the days when all labour problems could be settled on the basis of a personal relationship between the employers and employee: the labour relations of the future will be dominated by mass attitudes. It is important therefore, that the law should provide a framework for peaceful industrial relations under these conditions, both by guaranteeing certain minimum standards

of employment conditions in order to minimise discontent, and by providing machinery for negotiation". (1)

Wilson was in fact commenting on the F.C. Catchpole Report On Labour Legislation In Swaziland that was released in May 1960 and constituted an attempt to modify labour relations institutions in the face of the growing socialisation of labour. The conditions of the working class were, as the Report pointed out, extremely bad. "The fixing of wage rates is at present the sole prerogative of employers and there is no machinery whatever for negotiating wages in any industry" (2) Although the Wage Determination Proclamation of 1937 (Cap. 123) enabled the Resident Commissioner, "where he has reason to think that the wages paid in any occupation are unduly low", to appoint with the approval of the High Commissioner a Board to report on the rates of wages and conditions of employment, to Catchpole's knowledge this enactment had never been used. (3) Furthermore, it was pointed out that there were no trade unions in Swaziland and only a few minor amendments were suggested to the Trade Union and Trade Disputes Proclamation No. 31 of 1942. Catchpole concluded that:

"There have been no industrial disputes in the territory and there is nothing to suggest that any are likely to arise in the immediate future. Industrial expansion is, however, proceeding apace and it is conceivable that problems and difficulties affecting labour may arise in the not too distant future". (4)

The Catchpole Report also pointed to a specific feature of industrial relations in Swaziland:

"There are no organisations of workers and the task of representing complaints and grievances to employers, which is normally the function of trade unions, is undertaken by Ndunas appointed by the Swazi National Council and allocated by them to particular employers Their task is to resolve any complaints, grievances and minor disputes which arise including any problems concerning earnings". (5)

However it was felt that this system had several important defects.

"In practice workers look to Ndunas for assistance in domestic problems. Ndunas are paid by the firm to which they are accredited and it is not unlikely that workers have in some cases come to regard them as representatives of the employers rather than of workers and that in consequence complaints are not pressed as vigorously as they might otherwise be It seems probable that some Ndunas have been appointed for their political rather than their industrial experience". (6)

Nevertheless Catchpole did not take a stand against the Nduna system which was also accepted by official government policy. (7) He merely suggested minor improvements to the system which had served reactionary purposes during the strikes in the 1940s at the Havelock Asbestos Mine owned by Turner and Newall. (8)

In May 1961, the Catchpole Report was discussed in the European Advisory Council. Here Todd again expressed the prevailing view when he argued that rather than address itself to the "need for workmen's compensation or some of these technical insertions" the Report ought to have considered "broader principles". In his view the "urgent problem in the territory" was "to protect Swaziland from the particularly mischievous type of trade unionism (developed) among Africans elsewhere on the continent ..." (9) Todd pointed out.

"From my experience of the African Trade Union movement, it tends to develop along sinister lines, rather than the regulation of industrial interests. It is advancement of their - initially - standards of living. But in the hands of the organisers it can be a weapon to develop political rights and there isn't the sense of responsibility towards either the economy or to the public interests, that you discover or find in the United Kingdom and the older countries, who have a well organised society and a responsible one. As I have said, on the continent of Africa

it has been used to advance political, rather than industrial interests". (10)

In Swaziland moreover there was an additional problem: "what we should fear is that the Trade Union movement would develop at the expense of the Swazi National Council" (11) (with whom the EAC and SNC had already concluded a political alliance for the purposes of the constitutional deliberations). Todd was not categorically against the establishment of trade unions. He admitted that "the difficulty of negotiating working conditions in industry.... is due to the fact that no trade unions today exist". (12) But he wanted them to be tightly controlled by the state. Specifically he proposed the selective registration of trade unions, and the introduction of a Works Council system which would consider only "the petty things that excite the native in industry to discontent", and exclude discussions on wages. (13)

The Strikes of 1962-3

The need for institutions that would stabilise industrial relations was amply confirmed by a rash of strikes that broke out in 1962 and 1963. The first of these took place at the Usutu Pulp Company, owned jointly by Courtaulds and the Commonwealth Development Corporation, in April 1962. These workers had formed the Pulp and Timber Workers Union, which became Swaziland's first registered trade union in March 1962. According to a member of the Executive Committee of the Union the main aims of the union were to improve working conditions and payment for all workers and to improve the promotion prospects of Swazis who did not receive promotion nearly as quickly as the white employees. (14) The union also attempted to unite workers on a broader basis and its constitution stated that "The union envisages a time when all unions of Swaziland will unite in a Swaziland federation of labour".

On April 6th a strike was called by the union after demands for a minimum wage were not met and after two members of the

union had been dismissed. One hundred per cent of the company's eight hundred mill workers stayed out and and were joined by a small number of the forest workers. (The company employed a total of 320 whites and 2,500 Africans). During the strike the mill was kept in operation by the white staff.(15) The workers were given wage increases after they agreed to go back.

A significant feature of the Executive Committee of the Union, one that was to a greater or lesser extent to be repeated in the case of the other unions that were subsequently to form, was that its members were active members of either the SDP or the Zwane wing of the SPP which became the NNLC in April 1963. Both these parties attempted to organise the support of the new petty bourgeoisie and the working class. As the SDP put it:

"We do not think the trade union movement should be a branch of a political party. But in the conditions which prevail in Swaziland and the rest of Africa the gulf between economics and politics is often so narrow that the trade unionist finds it in his interest to carry on his fight on the political plane as well".(16)

A further feature was the antagonism on the part of the union leaders to the Swazi rulers.

For the members of the European Advisory Council the strike, which was accompanied by more minor events at the sugar plantations at Big Bend and Mhlume and in the farming area of Malkerns, (17) necessitated the urgent implementation of their earlier proposals made in response to the Catchpole Report. For the Resident Commissioner "The advent of trade unionism in Swaziland emphasises the necessity for employers to recast their approach to labour relations generally and in particular to the provision of adequate negotiating machinery between workers and management".-(18)

However, before further action could be taken the latent contradictions that existed between capital and labour were given an organisational form and resulted in a widespread series of strikes that affected both foreign monopoly capital and the local

bourgeoisie. While these contradictions had been a part of the production process since capitalist production had begun, the political climate in 1962 and 1963 created the conditions for the mobilisation of the working class that hitherto had not existed. Under colonial political forms the working class was disorganised and the only kind of representation open to it was through the Ndunas appointed to the larger units of production by the Swazi rulers. Neither trade unions nor even works councils of one sort or another existed. However the situation altered drastically with the transformation of the colonial political forms. The introduction of more representative political forms in the run in to decolonisation created the possibility for the mobilisation of local classes and here the antagonisms that existed between the Swazi rulers and the petty bourgeoisie had a critical effect.

While the Swazi rulers had successfully established a mass base among the peasantry in the countryside, the petty bourgeoisie had not managed to do likewise until the beginning of 1963. Without a mass base it was clear that the petty bourgeoisie would not succeed in its struggles with the Swazi rulers, the latter would consolidate its position politically and come to be the class through which the bourgeoisie would constitute its rule.

However the contradictions existing between capital and labour and the contradictions that this in turn led to between labour and the Swazi rulers, given the role that the latter had come to play in the control of the labour process, provided the petty bourgeoisie with its opportunity. This opportunity was enhanced by the political alliance that had been established between the Swazi rulers and the local bourgeoisie.(19) After the Usutu Pulp strike the leaders of the petty bourgeoisie parties came to play a direct role in the organisation of the working class and in the pressing of its demands, a role that the Swazi rulers, in the light of the abovementioned factors, were precluded from playing. In this way sections of the petty bourgeoisie (it must be emphasised that some sections of the petty bourgeoisie played a different role) attempted to establish an alliance with the working class and in this way

establish a mass base with which to challenge the Swazi rulers and to press the demands of the petty bourgeoisie. However the petty bourgeoisie did not form a single political front. Part of the petty bourgeoisie polarised more towards the bourgeoisie and this part was represented party-politically mainly by the Swaziland Democratic Party and the Mbandzeni National Convention. Another part of the petty bourgeoisie that polarised far more clearly towards the working class was represented by the Zwane wing of the SPP that later became the NNLC. It will be with the latter group that this article will be principally concerned.

The Ubombo Ranches Strike, 14th March 1963

The Ubombo Ranches strike was the second significant strike to occur during 1963. The first occurred on the 28th February 1963 when 600 employees of the railway contracting company, that was building the railway to carry iron ore to part of Mozambique, held a one day strike. A subsequent confidential committee of enquiry concluded that the grievances included low wages and the alleged "ineffectiveness" of the SNCs Nduna. It was stated that the "strike was organised by clerical staff and other workers". (20)

Ubombo Ranches was started in 1949 as a cattle ranching company and it later also produced rice. Sugar cane was first grown in 1957. The directors of the company included Dr. H.J. van Eck, the company's Chairman who later became the head of the South African Industrial Development Corporation, and G.W. Lloyd, a British Conservative M.P. In 1957 the company had a quota of 12,000 tons of sugar per year but shortly after this was increased to 40,000 tons necessitating the construction of a new mill and a large expansion of the cane fields. During the 1960-61 season the company suffered a severe setback as a result of bad rains and because it had not been successful in restructuring its production process so as to produce the required increase in output. In 1961-62 the company only produced 28,000 tons of its total of 40,000 tons. In September 1961 a new Field Manager, P.A. Andries, was

appointed in order to re-arrange production in the fields. The Field Manager was in charge of the Irrigation, Field and Transport Superintendents who in turn were in charge of a number of white overseers. The latter controlled numbers of Swazi 'ndunas' appointed by the company to supervise the Swazi workers.(21) Under Andries a 'task system' was introduced in order to determine the set of tasks the workers had to perform each day and the remuneration they were to receive. It was later reported that it was "the task system which revolutionised the old order of things at Ubombo Ranches and changed the chaotic labour conditions into the efficient and productive field organisation it is now". (22)

Following this restructuring "there was trouble with weeders because of the allegedly unreasonable measure of their task and on two separate occasions the labourers refused to go to work".(23) When the retiring General Manager, Mr. Szokolay, handed over to his successor he "stated that his biggest worry had been the African Labour and that the disturbing influence of growing political activity in and around the Estate would certainly lead to trouble". (24)

This simmering discontent amongst the workers, particularly the weeders, irrigators and cane cutters in the fields who were in terms of pay "the less fortunate classes of labour", (25) continued and on the 20th January 1963 a large meeting of workers was called. Significantly this meeting was addressed by Mr. Dumisa Dlamini, the Secretary of what was then the Zwane wing of the SPP and by Mr. Frank Groening, a local member of the party. The following day a mass march, led by Dumisa Dlamini and Frank Groening, was staged and three demands were presented to the General Manager. The first demand was for a minimum of R30 per month for all workers (a demand obviously affecting only the more lowly paid and therefore excluding the new petty bourgeoisie). Secondly the dismissal of three supervisors was demanded: Andries, the Field Manager, Percival, who was in charge of the Labour Department and also was the Compound Manager, and Gizane Gamede, the Swazi police nduna who worked under Percival. Lastly,

the re-engagement of two Swazi employees was demanded. The participants in the march were then addressed by the General Manager and they gave him a further list of grievances detailing their specific complaints regarding labour conditions. On the 28th of January management replied to the demands rejecting the initial three demands but agreeing to some of the others such as improvements to the water supply and housing. On the 5th March all the workers at one of the compounds went on strike because of the transfer to that compound of an unpopular nduna. (26) Following meetings addressed by various SPP members including Dumisa Dlamini, Groening and Macdonald Maseko, a total strike of all labour on the sugar estate and the associated Bar Circle cattle ranch, including office staff and domestic servants, took place on the 18th of March. There were daily orderly processions led by leaders of the SPP waving the party's flag. Meetings of workers followed the marches and those meetings were, significantly, also attended by the subjects of various chiefs from the surrounding part of Swazi Nation Land. The strike ended on the 27th of March pending the outcome of the results of the official enquiry that had been ordered by the government.

The report of the Commission which was published in December 1963 contained an assessment of the causes of the strike. Significantly the major cause was seen as the influence exerted by "external nationalist forces" although it was acknowledged that there were important antagonisms that existed at Ubombo Ranches.

Firstly, the Commission reported the increase in wages had not matched the rise in the cost of living. Secondly, workers were expected to work overtime, but only rarely received overtime pay. Thirdly, water, sanitary and housing conditions were unfit for human use. Finally, errors of 'man management' had occurred. (27)

One further feature of the strike which was barely touched on by the Commission was the antagonism expressed towards the King's representative. One of the complaints put forward by the workers was directed against the representative who allegedly had failed "to perform his duties as Liaison Officer because of his employment

in the Company Office". (28)

In the end it required the King himself to make a direct intervention when he called about 40 employers, employing about 15,230 workers, to the royal residence. The meeting was also attended by Brian Marwick, the Resident Commissioner. The King talked of "cheap labour in Southern Africa" and said that this worried him since it implied that the workers did not receive the proper reward for their labour. In other countries trade unions watched the interests of employees and enforced their wishes through strikes. However this was not the Swazi way. "Although you people are used to strikes - it is in your tradition - we feel that it is not the right way of doing things". Unjustified demands may be made by workers such as when they demanded higher wages from an enterprise that had not yet started making profits. He then expanded on his view of industrial production "as a partnership":

"I begin to wonder what we mean by work. To whom does an industry belong? I think that in an industry there is no employer or employee. All have equal status. The man with capital cannot do the work without labour, and the labourers would have nothing to do without the man with capital. I always regard them as partners (whose aim is) to see that the enterprise is successful. They should regard the business as a child and take care of it so that it will grow. They must nurse it together. If we regard a business as belonging to one section of the people we must expect difficulties and troubles".

If all were partners working for the success of the enterprise why should there be a need for one section to threaten another? "That is something that has always worried me about trade unions and their way of doing things". (29)

To lend weight to the King's pleas the state deployed its repressive arm. Although the strike was generally very peaceful and no damage to property occurred, it proceeded to mobilise its repressive apparatus and to pass legislation aimed at controlling future strikes. During the strike the Mobile Force of the Swaziland Police was moved into the area "as a precaution" (30) and as a

result of the strike 17 persons were prosecuted and convicted. (31) In April 1963 the Industrial Conciliation and Settlement Proclamation was passed. Under this Proclamation the Labour Commissioner could approve the voluntary establishment of bodies for consultation and negotiation between employers and workers and could register industrial agreements if the parties asked. One part of the Proclamation provided for the voluntary reporting of trade disputes to the Labour Commissioner by either party, conciliation by the Labour Commissioner and/or Conciliation Board, and reference of a dispute to arbitration with the consent of both parties, or to a board of inquiry. The 'teeth' of the Proclamation, however, were contained in the provision which stated that no strike or lockout may take place during a compulsory "cooling-off" period which lasted until three weeks after a dispute had been reported. During this period it was an offence to "incite or give financial support to a strike or lock-out". In addition a number of other measures were passed increasing the power of the police. (32)

Other Strikes

On the 29th March 1963, 150 saw-mill workers at Peak Timbers went on strike demanding, amongst other things, higher pay. In the beginning of April teargas was used by police to break up a march of 60 women led by Dumisa Dlamini of the Progressive Party. They were protesting against a government prohibition against the sale of sour milk and porridge. On the 28th May about 300 workers employed by the Peak Timbers saw-mills went on strike for a few hours "as a protest against the retrenchment of five labourers because of the closing of a small part of the industrial section". (33) Far more important, however, was the strike at Havelock Mine.

On April 25th the High Court of Swaziland granted an interim interdict restraining Dumisa Dlamini and Macdonald Maseko from entering the property of the Havelock Asbestos Mine after the mine management claimed that they had attempted to organise the workers. On May 19th the management, in an attempt to pre-empt a

strike, announced the first increase in wages since September 1962 when wages were increased by 16 cents per shift to 53 cents. This amounted to a starting amount of R13,78 for unskilled recruits. (34) However, the workers were not prepared to accept this and they went on strike on May 20th electing Dumisa Dlamini to represent them. Their demands included a minimum unskilled wage of R2 per day (which had become a general NNLC demand), the dismissal of the compound manager, three ndunas appointed by the company and the King's representative "on the grounds of ineffectiveness and various malpractices over rations and accommodation". (35) They also presented complaints about housing, sanitation, working arrangements, rations and cooking. (36) A total of 1 350 workers went on strike but the 150 white employees, none of whom joined the strike, were able to maintain limited production. (37) On May 21st, 23rd and 24th discussions were held but these produced no result. The King then sent a message to the miners:

"No true Swazis would talk to me through the strike. If any misunderstanding existed arrangements for delegates to visit (royal) headquarters should have been made through Mntfwanenkosi (Prince) Masitsela (who had been appointed by the SNC as Labour Officer to the mine)". (38)

However the strikers ignored the King's telegram.

On the 9th of June as the NNLC was holding a meeting in Msunduzi, Mbabane news arrived that twelve of the strike leaders at Havelock had been arrested. The meeting resolved that there should be a stoppage of work on the following day and that "the people of Mbabane" would not return to work until "the arrested people at Mlembe (Havelock Mines) are released and their demands met with and until a minimum wage of.....R2 a day is enforced by Government Proclamation.(39) Furthermore the meeting rejected the British White Paper on the Constitution that had been issued the previous month on the grounds that it was "racialistic" and "undemocratic".(40) Significantly it was also decided that the members of one of the age-regiments (41) - the Malindane - should organise the Swazi population of Mbabane and peacefully prevent

people from going to work. In this way the urban members of one of the important institutions of the SMP were used in the attempt to press the demands of the working class. The attempt was extremely successful as Chief Justice Williams, who was later to investigate charges of incitement, pointed out:

"There is no doubt that the leaders with the aid of the malindane achieved a remarkable feat in that in a matter of a few hours they contrived a strike which was almost complete, they separated Mbabane into two separate communities and they organised these two processions to the town without any physical injury being inflicted upon anyone".-

(42)

During the Mbabane strike the King was asked by the Resident Commissioner to send his regiments to assist the police in "restoring order". However, as a later confidential committee of enquiry was to point out, "The Ngwenyama proved to be unwilling or unable to assert his authority over his own regiment". (43)

On the 13th June another strike broke out at Ubombo Ranches when all 1 700 workers protested against the delay in the progress of the enquiry into the March strike. They had agreed to go back in March pending the outcome of the enquiry. They now demanded a minimum of R2 per day (previously they had demanded R1), the release of the Havelock strike leaders, and the withdrawal of the British Government's constitutional proposals. A similar feature of this strike was that the malindane age-regiment was used here too in order to mobilise the workers. On the same day the King sent a message saying that he wished to see some of the workers' representatives. The company provided the representatives with transport and at their meeting with the King they were directed to call the strike off. The message was conveyed to the strikers but with no effect. (44) On the 16th the King called a meeting at the Lobamba royal kraal which was attended by many workers. He told them to go back and said that he would take up the matter of wages with the Resident Commissioner but again with little effect. (45)

The situation was now getting out of control. By the end of the year more than 66 000 days of labour-time had been "lost" (46) and one estimate of the total cost of the "civil disturbances" was put at R1,7 million. (47) Doubts also grew as to whether the local police force numbering 350 were adequate to the task. The Resident Commissioner therefore requested external assistance and on the 16th June an airlift of the First Battalion Gordon Highlanders stationed in Kenya was completed. By this time Dumisa Dlamini and Macdonald Maseko had been arrested and charged with public violence or incitement to public violence. On the 17th there was a meeting of 300 saw mill and forestry workers employed by Swaziland Plantations at Piggs' Peak (in the vicinity of Peak Timbers and the Havelock Mine). After the meeting a leader was arrested followed by another 62 arrests after 100 people had marched on the District Commissioner's office to demand his release. The remaining workers returned to work.

The State and Law and Order

With the arrival of the Gordon Highlanders the state declared its firm intention to restore "law and order". At 3.00 a.m. on the morning of the 7th June the whole battalion of Gordon Highlanders set up road blocks and threw a cordon around the picket lines at Havelock mine. Over 1 000 miners were "questioned" and after this about 500 declared their willingness to return to work. The remaining 480 strikers were addressed by the District Commissioner of Pigg's Peak and after this all but 153 went back to work. The latter were arrested and charged with being illegally on strike (under the Industrial Conciliation and Settlement Proclamation) and with intimidation. On the 18th the Gordon Highlanders assisted the police to arrest suspected strikers in the hills around the mine. (48) Ultimately of those arrested 87 were convicted on charges of "public violence" (49) and a further 10, including Dumisa Dlamini, were charged with public violence and with contravening the Industrial Conciliation and Settlement Proclamation. During the subsequent

trial in the Swaziland High Court the mine manager spoke of the "general tone of reasonableness" that prevailed during the strike and, in an attempt to maintain the "peace" that had been restored by the time the trial was held, light sentences were passed. Six of the ten were acquitted while the remaining four were found not guilty of violence but guilty of inciting to strike. Sentence on them was postponed for eighteen months and they were released on condition that they were not convicted of inciting to strike during that period.(50) Dumisa Dlamini was one of the four.

On the 18th June and the following day over 1 000 strikers at Ubombo Ranches were detained and questioned by the Gordon Highlanders and the police after which about 900 returned to work.(51) Later 24 people were charged and convicted for various offences and a further 10 were convicted in the Swaziland High Court of public violence. Extremely heavy sentences were passed: of the 10, 5 were given 3 years imprisonment with hard labour while others were given 2½ years. However, again in an attempt to maintain an atmosphere of co-operation, the Court of Appeal later suspended 18 months of each of the sentences for a period of 3 years on condition that the accused were not convicted during that period of any offence involving public violence or incitement thereto.(52)

In the case of the Mbabane strike 24 arrests were made and 7 people, including Dumisa Dlamini and Macdonald Maseko, were convicted of public violence. They were sentenced to 6 months imprisonment suspended for 3 years on the same conditions as in the case of the other strikes and the Resident Commissioner later remitted one month of the sentence.(53) The state thus followed a policy of "repressive tolerance" in dealing with the strikes: extreme repression with the arrest and intimidation of many of the strikers thus coercing most of them to return to work followed by relatively lenient treatment in the courts.

The local bourgeoisie responded in different ways to the strikes and to the question of the recognition of trade unions. In September 1963 it was announced that the Citrus, Agricultural,

Plantation and Allied Workers' Union, the seventh union to be formed, had lodged application for registration. However, at its annual congress the Swaziland Agricultural Union opposed the formation of trade unions in agriculture: "we farmers all feel that, as far as agriculture is concerned, they are not of practical value, either to employer or employee".(54) However, the commercial bourgeoisie took a different point of view:

"Trade unions are not only inevitable in the evolving social pattern, but highly desirable. They can provide us with an intelligent and articulate means of communication between employer and employee. They can provide a means by which peaceful negotiations and common sense will prevail....."

(55)

The Swaziland Chamber of Industries, the representative organisation of monopoly capital, likewise endorsed this position.(56)

Despite this relatively accommodating attitude of sections of capital, trade union influence remained limited. As the 1964 Board of Enquiry On Methods of Regulating Wages In Swaziland, pointed out, the trade unions were relatively new and were weak and generally disorganised. Furthermore the conditions made union organisation difficult. Amongst these, the "high rate of turnover militate(d) against efforts at organisation";(57) the large capitalist enterprises, mainly plantations and mines, were geographically widely dispersed which made union organisation and co-operation difficult; and obstacles were also placed in the way of union organisation by some employers and by the Swazi rulers. Although, as was pointed out, there was a growing acceptance of trade unions and recognition of their functionality by foreign monopoly capital and the commercial bourgeoisie, these sections of the bourgeoisie were extremely cautious in the light of their experience of the strikes and their consequent fear that the unions would be taken over by "extremist politicians". Thus the Commission was obliged to point out that although 11 trade unions had been officially registered by the government "only two of the registered Unions have been able to reach the situation of claiming and

obtaining formal recognition from the employers concerned.(58)

The opposition to trade unions expressed by the Swazi rulers was seen by the Commission as one of the most important obstacles in the way of the development of unions, and their power to obstruct grew in the following months. In the elections of June 1964 the King's party, the Imbokodvo National Movement swept the board. In the eight unreserved seats, the I.N.M. won 85% of the vote, and the N.N.L.C. only 12%.(59)

The election results thus proved the ability of the Swazi rulers to consolidate sufficient political support particularly as a result of their success in bringing in the peasantry as a supportative class. It was now clear that the rule of the bourgeoisie would be constituted by the Swazi rulers who were to become the "class in charge of the state". While the victory of the Swazi rulers was obtained at the expense of the petty bourgeoisie, and although the state had previously intervened in order to strengthen this class on the grounds that its co-operation was necessary in order to maintain stability, the election had shown that the petty bourgeoisie was only able to establish support amongst a relatively narrow section of the population. The continuing ability of the Swazi rulers to maintain their political dominance in the countryside had precluded the petty bourgeoisie from obtaining the support of the peasantry. As a result sections of the petty bourgeoisie which had hitherto consistently opposed the King's party began to swing into the King's camp, along with the main representatives of monopoly capital.(60)

Consequently, when workers mobilised in a new series of strikes in Manzini and Sidvokodvo in late 1964 and mid 1964 they found themselves faced with a still more unfavourable balance of forces.(61) Although employers were in 'moderate' trade unions, and in fact re-organised themselves into a single employers' federation with this object in mind, the Swazi rulers remained hostile to trade unions and wedded to the idea of Works Councils.(62)

Only towards the end of 1964 was a compromise reached. The

Swazi rulers accepted the principle of trade unionism but simultaneously intensified their efforts to extend the 'nduna' system.(63)

What this portended for workers became apparent in 1965. Two NNLC led strikes of agricultural workers were broken up by police, and many strikers were arrested under the Public order and Industrial Conciliation Proclamations.(64) Efforts to establish an opposition Federation of Trade Unions were also combated by an I.N.M. programme to form an Amalgamated National Union for Swaziland. The press release issued by the Swazi National Council to explain this development made the intentions of the Swazi rulers clear:

"The Swazi National Council envisages a sound trade union movement based on African aspirations and a progressive wage policy securing the maximum economic wage for the workers..... The Swazi National Council believes in the encouragement of industry and commerce and the investment of outside capital in the territory leading to full local employment. The Swazi National Council likens capital investment to a bird sitting on a tree. If you make threats the bird will fly away and the Council cannot afford to lose capital investors for the sake of self seekers who use the trade unions for their political ends".(65)

The Council's move however was coolly received by both employers and the state. In his annual address the President of the Chamber of Commerce declared that he did "not think that this is a good thing" while the President of the Federation of Employers warned that "The present trade unions do not appear to support this move for a national union".(66) The state itself, still under British control, opposed the attempts of the Council to exercise a direct effect in labour relations.

However the Government felt that further steps were necessary in order to prevent the trade unions coming under the control of "unsuitable persons". Measures were accordingly put forward in the Trade Unions and Employers' Organisations Bill. These included the provision that only citizens of Swaziland could hold office in a

trade union, a provision aimed at the not insignificant number of South Africans, some of whom were political refugees, who held important offices in the trade unions. Since most of them had close links with the NNLC it was hoped in this way to diminish the influence of this party in the unions.(67)

In August 1967 an amendment to the Industrial Conciliation and Settlement Act was passed through the House of Assembly which, as the Attorney-General said, provided "that any person who counselled, procured or instigated a strike other than over a trade dispute was committing an offence".(68)

In this way a combination of factors served to stifle the NNLC and its associated unions: the different forms of intervention by the state, the activities of employers largely through the Federation of Employers and the opposition of the Swazi rulers whose political muscle was significantly bolstered by the results of the 1964 elections. The consequences speak for themselves: In 1963 more than 66 000 man-days of labour were lost as many strikes involving thousands of workers occurred. In 1964 the figure was 4 130 man-days as a result of 9 strikes involving 572 persons. In 1965: 595 man-days, 3 strikes involving 388 persons; in 1966: 595 man-days, 3 strikes and 280 persons. The bourgeoisie, the state and the Swazi rulers could claim a great measure of success in their attempt to 'stabilise' labour relations through the period of transition to independent rule.(69)

Labour Relations after Independence

In essential respects the state in the post-independence period implemented the same labour relations framework that had evolved after the strikes of 1962/3. Although the law made provision for the legal establishment of trade unions, the state actively discouraged their formation but stopped short of preventing their emergence. Instead an alternative framework for labour relations was suggested, the basis of which was provided in the pre-independence period. Workers would organise at plant level by electing a Works

Council. The object of the Council was to "Provide a recognised means of consultation between the management and the employees on all matters of common interest not covered by any wage negotiating body".(70) A number of wage boards were established to determine minimum wages for specific industries. Although the Swazi rulers abandoned their attempt to form a "National Trade Union" under the control of the SNC or to infiltrate the existing unions, they continued to exert influence in the immediate process of production through a modified version of the Nduna system introduced during the colonial period. A representative of the King and SNC, or Ndabazabantu as he was now called, was appointed to the larger employers. The Ndabazabantu was to mediate between management and workers and although his terms of reference extended to work conditions generally he had a special function with regard to problems amongst workers that raised matters relating to Swazi law and custom. The Ndabazabantu was to co-operate with the Works Council, sometimes also referred to as the Libandla. The duties of the Ndabazabantu were spelled out in a memorandum from Prince Masitsela Dlamini on behalf of the SNC in August 1971. The Ndabazabantu was described as "the local authority over all the workers". He was to represent the interests of workers:

"He is the eye, the ear and the mouthpiece of the workers when making representations on their behalf to Management regarding complaints or requests or anything which is a source of worry on the part of the workers..... He will ensure that workers are not victimised or exploited because of their colour by those in...Management and see that workers receive wages commensurate with the work that they do.... and that their wages are not far below what may be called a living wage".

He was also to assist management in its relationship with Swazi workers:

"He will advise Management on all matters pertaining to Swazi law and custom.... and cultivate a spirit of co-operation and belonging which is conducive to economic

progress by affording the workers equal opportunity in order to narrow the gap between the haves and havenots".

However the Ndabazabantu was a representative of the Swazi rulers and he would serve as their mouthpiece:

"The King of Swaziland will speak to the workers and the Management on all matters affecting the workers through the Ndabazabantu - so will the SNC and likewise the Management to the workers. All requests for holding meetings of workers will go to the Ndabazabantu in the first instance. The Ndabazabantu, being the King's representative will attend the National Offices or at the Royal corral whenever he has been called upon, likewise he may be summoned with his Ibandla or he and his Ibandla might wish to attend at the National Offices to hold discussions with the SNC on matters affecting the welfare of the workers. The King's Representative will attend all the National Meetings which will be convened from time to time and he will report back to the workers and also the Management".

The Ndabazabantu was to instil in the workers the notion that, whilst they were entitled to a "reasonable" wage "not far below what may be called a living wage", capital was entitled to its profit: in fact it was the realisation of better profits that enabled higher wages to be paid:

"He will encourage the workers and build a sound sense of responsibility, respect and discipline - inspire the workers with a feeling of regarding the Industry in terms of a partnership - teach the workers to realise that any realisation of profits will result in better wages and better social conditions in their villages".

Finally, the Ndabazabantu was required "To fight against and wipe out any idea that there is what is termed 'cheap labour' in the Territory".(71)

Although trade unions were not outlawed, they were actively discouraged. Thus, for example, in a report of a public speech

made in May 1972 it was stated:

"(The King) condemned the methods and philosophy of the trade unions and said they were causes of industrial unrest through strikes ... thus bringing the national industrial growth to a standstill. He said those who suffered most from leaders who organised industrial strikes were the poor men in the street".(72)

The same point was stressed by the Deputy Prime Minister towards the end of the year. A report of a meeting between the Deputy Prime Minister and the Council of the Federation of Swaziland noted that the former

"was of the opinion that the trade union legislation did not fit the country's needs as trade union(s) had in their ranks members who had led and taken part in the (1963) strikes.... He felt that Ndabazabantu would defend the rights of employers and keep peace among the workers".(73)

A few days later the Deputy Prime Minister reiterated these views in a speech to workers at the Havelock Mine which also stressed the unity between the institutions of the SMP and the rest of the state apparatus. As reported:

" 'Trade unionism', said Mr. Khumalo, 'is a foreign ideology to the Swazi'. He said workers should form themselves into a Workers' Council which could hear the grievances of its members. They would examine the grievances and if necessary submit cases through the Labour Department, and if it was warranted these would reach His Majesty King Sobhuza II. Mr. Khumalo said that 'all workers in this Kingdom are His Majesty's regiments. The workers' Council, or Libandla, should embrace every worker'.(74)

However despite the onslaught trade unions continued to exist although they had been considerably weakened. The main reason for their continued existence was that many sections of the working class were antagonistic to the Ndabazabantu who was paid by the company and who, they felt, in many cases did not represent their interests. In this sense the same sentiments as those noted in the

Catchpole Report of 1960 regarding the Nduna system remained. For employers the existence of two distinct negotiating channels sometimes created difficulties. In this regard employers were divided depending largely on the degree of opposition to the Ndabazabantu amongst their workforce, the degree of unionisation, and the abilities and biases of the Ndabazabantu himself. While some felt that the system of Ndabazabantu and works council was adequate, others favoured trade unions. Others thought that a compromise between the two could be reached.(75) However in the light of the experience of the 1963 strikes and continuing fear of the political influence of trade unions, employers accepted the broad outlines of the state's labour policy and made no attempt to press for the wider recognition of trade unions.

From an outright discouragement of trade unions the state, in view of the outbreak of serious strikes in the Durban area of South Africa, changed the emphasis of its policy, and stressed the necessity to pay "reasonable wages". In a meeting with Swaziland employers in March 1973 the King pointed out that "We cannot sit back complacently and say it (i.e. strikes) would not happen in Swaziland". Although industry had been prospering "there has been no improvement in wages" and this was leading to discontent. The main purpose of the meeting, the King pointed out, "is for us to examine various possibilities of forestalling or overcoming this".- (76) In August of the same year the King expanded on his views at a meeting of labour representatives at the royal capital of Lozitha. While the worker should get "an equal share for his labours" investors "should get a good profit". Industrial unrest should be discouraged since it "scared investors":

"Speaking about investment in this country, the King said it is an accepted fact of life that two hands wash each other. Investors, he told the crowd, should get a good share of the profits from their money they have entrusted this kingdom, and the Swazi should get an equal (sic) share for his labours. Overlooking this cardinal principle would result in

a chaotic situation".(77)

Signs of unrest inside Swaziland were in fact multiplying fast. Between the end of 1969 and the end of 1972 the real living standards of the majority of the working class declined. This emerges clearly from figures given in Table I. During this time period prices rose by about 6%. However during the same period the following changes took place in the average money earnings of unskilled workers (who in 1972 constituted 78% of the total employed labour force in the private sector): in agriculture, which employed 53% of the total number of unskilled employees in the private sector (numbering 34,182), male earnings declined from R16 to R15 and female earnings from R9 to R8; in forestry, which employed 10% of the total, the money wages of males remained constant while those of females declined from R11 to R10. In manufacturing, while employed 13% of the total, male wages increased significantly from R26 to R34 but female wages declined from R15 to R11. This implies that more than 50% of the total employed work-force in the private sector had to contend with constant or declining MONEY wages. On top of this there was the increase of 6% in the retail price index for unskilled workers. Workers in the mining industry in Swaziland, which employed 5% of the total, were a little more fortunate - male money wages increased from R27 to R28, an increase of 4%. Therefore the real living standards of the majority of workers in the private sector declined somewhat during the first four years of independence.

Further information is also relevant. Between September 1972 and September 1973 the average money earnings of unskilled male workers (who comprised 76% of all unskilled workers) rose from R23 to R25, an increase of 9%. During the same period average money earnings of unskilled female workers rose from R11 to R14, or 27%. From October 1972 to October 1973 the retail price index for unskilled workers rose by 17%. (It is important in assessing these figures to bear in mind that the period under review occurs before the generalised international recession that began in about 1974.

Finally, it is necessary to look, not only at changes in real

wages, but also to ask how adequate were the incomes of unskilled working-class families. The PDL figure calculated for unskilled workers in the Manzini area for July 1973 was R81.(78) Assuming such a family had both husband and wife earning the average unskilled wage (which most did not since males constituted 78% of the total unskilled wage-force in the private sector) then their combined income would have been R39 or only 48% of the PDL. This figure indicates the degree of dependence of the average family on non-wage income (consisting of both marketed and non-marketed output). Given both the low productivity on Swazi Nation Land and the small extent of petty commodity production (even smaller in the case of working class families),(79) it is clear that most working class families faced difficult and deteriorating circumstances.

The 1972 election

Workers gave vent to their dissatisfaction in two portentous acts of opposition. In the 1972 election, the opposition Ngwane National Liberatory Convention won one of the eight constituencies into which Swaziland is divided, and thereby earned itself the right to send three out of the twenty four members elected to the House of Assembly. The Mphumalanga constituency where the NNLC won, bordered on Mozambique and extended to Natal in the south. The main feature of the constituency was its inclusion of the two sugar plantations owned by foreign monopoly capital, at Mhlume (Commonwealth Development Corporation) and Big Bend (Ubombo Ranches owned by Lonrho). Accordingly the constituency contained a significant concentration of members of the working class. Since these people were largely recruited from the surrounding parts of Swazi Nation Land their significance in electoral terms extended beyond their actual numbers.(80) In addition the constituency included the pro-NNLC small-holding farmers who were part of the Vuvulane Irrigated Farms scheme at Mhlume. In the 1976 election the NNLC had attained its strongest showing in the Mphumalanga constituency obtaining 47% of the vote. The fact that there was a

further swing to the NNLC in the 1972 elections was an indication of the dissatisfaction, largely on the part of members of the working class and the petty bourgeoisie, with state policies.

The NNLC's victory was to precipitate a restructuring of the form of state. One week after the election, Thomas Ngwenya, one of the NNLC's three victorious candidates, was arrested and deported to South Africa as an "undesirable" citizen. In mid-September Ngwenya successfully took his case to the High Court which set aside his deportation order. On October 16th Ngwenya was due to be sworn in as a member of parliament but government members boycotted the session and the Speaker, lacking a quorum, called an adjournment. Ngwenya was later re-arrested and restricted to an area of Swaziland thus preventing him from taking up his seat. In November an amendment to the Immigration Act was passed in Parliament establishing a tribunal consisting of five persons appointed by the Deputy Prime Minister. "It also specifically provided that the tribunal 'shall be entitled to hear and adjudicate upon any such matter (involving matters of citizenship, MF)...notwithstanding any judgement, decision or order previously made by any authority, tribunal or court on or in connection with any issue as to whether or not such person belongs to Swaziland....'"(81) A decision of the tribunal was not subject to the right of appeal to any court but a person affected by such a decision could appeal to the Prime Minister whose decision was final. The person concerned had the burden under the Act of proving whether he/she was entitled to Swaziland citizenship. On the 29th of March 1973 the Swaziland Court of Appeal, headed by Olive Schreiner, a former South African Supreme Court Judge, ruled that the Act was unconstitutional. On the 12th of April 1973 the constitution was suspended and the King assumed formal power.(82) Special powers of detention were given to the King-in-Council, the latter consisting of the members of the Cabinet.(83)

Schreiner's ruling was to herald the suspension of Swaziland's constitution, but one further development may have hastened this event. In the first week of April 1973, one week before the

constitution was suspended, a strike broke out at Havelock Mine. Only two months previously the King on behalf of the Swazi Nation had been given 40% of the mine's equity by Turner and Newall, the company's owners. (Dr. George Msibi, previous leader of the Mbandzeni National Convention and later an official of the Imbokodvo, had been nominated as a director of the mine by the King). Ostensibly the strike was the result of a refusal by the mine to pay the workers cash in lieu of food rations but these demands were accompanied by demands for wage increases of 30%. (84)

It was this mounting unrest that prompted the suspension of the constitution. In the King's words:

"...the constitution has permitted the importation into our country of highly undesirable political practices alien to and incompatible with the way of life in our society, and designed to disrupt and destroy our own peaceful and constructive and essentially democratic method of political activity; increasingly this element engenders hostility, bitterness and unrest in our peaceful society". (85)

Minister of Finance R.P. Stevens endorsed the King's action, arguing that,

"Swaziland was on the brink of severe industrial strife as a result of the activities of politicians, political parties and outside influences...." (86)

A "suitable revision" of the political situation would lead to greater "political stability" Stevens claimed. "Without this atmosphere of stability the tempo of our industrial expansion will be seriously affected". (87)

Accordingly, Decrees 11 12 and 13 announced by the Attorney General immediately after the King's statement suspending the constitution were directed against "all political parties and similar bodies that cultivate and bring about disturbances and ill-feelings". As was shown by subsequent practice, the latter referred also to the activities of all trade unions which were accordingly seriously restricted:

"All political parties and similar bodies that cultivate and

bring about disturbances and ill-feelings within the Nation are hereby dissolved and prohibited.

No meetings of a political nature and no processions or demonstrations shall be held or take place in any public place unless with the prior written consent of the Commissioner of Police; and consent shall not be given if the Commissioner of Police has reason to believe that such meeting, procession or demonstration is directly or indirectly related to political movements or other riotous assemblies which may disturb the peace or otherwise disturb the maintenance of law and order.

Any person who forms or attempts or conspires to form a political party or who organises or participates in any way in any meeting, procession or demonstration in contravention of this decree shall be guilty of an offence and liable, on conviction, to imprisonment not exceeding six months.(88)

Henceforth trade union activities were to be ruthlessly suppressed.

Conclusion

The changing form of the Swazi state in the 1960's and 1970's was the result of the growing contradiction between capital and labour. Secondary antagonisms undoubtedly contributed, notably petty bourgeois opposition to the alleged nepotistic practices of Swaziland's traditional rulers but these I have analysed more fully elsewhere. It was the alliance between these two classes, expressed in the 1963 strikes, and the 1972 Mphumalanga electoral victory of the NNLC, that prompted, firstly the devolution of the colonial state's power into the hands of Swaziland's traditional rulers in 1968 and secondly the suspension of the constitution in 1973. The problem presented in this latter instance - as the King accurately foresaw - was that the democratic representative institutions enshrined in the independence constitution were incapable of

containing the social antagonisms that existed in the society. The Swazi rulers were thus entirely correct when they claimed that competing political parties served to inflame social antagonisms in their attempt to win the support of sections of the population. What they did not understand, however, was that the social antagonisms existed independently of the activities of the political parties and would not disappear with the disappearance of the parties: the abolishing of democratic representative institutions was at best a short-run measure but the antagonisms were sure to reassert themselves, as was to happen in the teachers' and sugar workers' strikes in 1977 and 1979.

Footnotes

- 1 Reconstituted European Advisory Council, Minutes of Meeting (hereafter REAC), May 1961, p.41, emphasis added.
- 2 Catchpole, F.C. Report On Labour Legislation In Swaziland. Mbabane, May 12, 1960, p.7.
- 3 *ibid.* p.19.
- 4 *ibid.* p.23.
- 5 *ibid.* p.3-4.
- 6 *ibid.* p.6-7.
- 7 "In the absence of trade unions, the Administration encourages the appointment of tribal representatives at all the major industrial concerns". Swaziland, Report for the year 1960. London: HMSO, 1962, p.14.
- 8 The period around 1944-7 was one of labour unrest at Havelock Mine. Correspondence shows that the nduna sent word about impending labour unrest to the King who in turn notified the Resident Commissioner who initiated steps for the removal of the causes of the unrest. Swaziland Archives, File 1344.
- 9 REAC, May 1961, p.42.
- 10 *ibid.*
- 11 *ibid.*
- 12 *ibid.*
- 13 *ibid.* p.43
- 14 Interview with Zeph Lukhele, 12.3.77.
- 15 REAC, 10th and 11th April, 1962, p.14.
- 16 Swaziland Democratic Party and Swaziland Progressive Party. Sibani. No 19. Vol.1. 30th January, 1963, p.5.
(Among the new petty bourgeoisie I include lower level supervisors and clerks).
- 17 REAC, 10th and 11th April, 1962, p.123.
- 18 Times of Swaziland, 13.4.62.
- 19 M. Fransman 'The State and Development in Swaziland', D. Phil, University of Sussex 1979, Chap 3.
- 20 Confidential Report of Committee of Enquiry Into Unrest In Swaziland 25th June - 8th July 1963. Swaziland Government, 8th July 1963, p.2.
- 21 This information is taken from: Swaziland Government. Big Bend Strike: The Report of the Commission of Enquiry. Mbabane, 1963.
- 22 *ibid.* p.31.
- 23 *ibid.* p.10.
- 24 *ibid.*
- 25 *ibid.* p.27.

- 26 The term 'nduna' here refers to Swazis in supervisory roles appointed by the company and they are to be distinguished from the representatives of the Swazi National Council appointed by this body to large companies. The latter are henceforth referred to as 'Ndabazabantu', their current official designation.
- 27 Big Bend Strike... pps. 28. 19. 50. 23. 22. 47.
- 28 ibid., p.14.
- 29 Times of Swaziland, 29. 3. 63.
- 30 Times of Swaziland, 22. 3. 63.
- 31 Swaziland, Annual Report of the Commissioner of the Swaziland Police Force. Mbabane, 1963, p.7.
- 32 Proclamation 17/63. Public Order Proclamation 1963, Proclamation 18/63. Sedition (Amendment) Proclamation 1963; and Proclamation 27/63. Prevention of Violence Abroad Proclamation 1963.
- 33 Times of Swaziland, 31.5.63. The Anglo American Corporation had a large share in Peak Timbers.
- 34 Report of The Board Of Enquiry Into The Trade Dispute At The Havelock Mine. Written by Sir John Houlton, undated, (mimeo), p.7, 13. (Hereafter Houlton Report).
- 35 Confidential Report of Committee Of Enquiry Into Unrest In Swaziland 25th June - 8th July 1963. Mbabane, 8th July 1963, p.3.
- 36 Houlton Report, op. cit., p.7.
- 37 Times of Swaziland, 24. 5. 63.
- 38 Houlton Report, op.cit.
- 39 From recorded judgement delivered by Chief Justice Sir Peter Watkin Williams in the High Court of Swaziland, 21st January, 1964, p.4. High Court of Swaziland, Mbabane.
- 40 ibid.
- 41 See Fransman 'The State and Development in Swaziland, Chapter I for an explanation of the age-regiments to which all Swazis belonged.
- 42 Judgement by Sir Peter Watkin Williams, op. cit., p.8.
- 43 Confidential Report Of Committee of Enquiry Into Unrest In Swaziland..., op. cit., p.19.
- 44 Judgement by Sir Peter Watkin Williams, op. cit., p.7
- 45 Times of Swaziland, 21. 6. 63.
- 46 Swaziland Government, Swaziland Annual Report, London, 1964, p.4.
- 47 REAC, 10th and 11th December 1963, p.8.
- 48 Times of Swaziland, 21.6. 63.
- 49 Swaziland Annual Report of the Commissioner of the Swaziland Police Force. Mbabane, 1963, p.7.
- 50 Times of Swaziland, 21. 2. 64.
- 51 ibid., 21. 6. 63.
- 52 ibid., 13. 3. 64.
- 53 ibid., 6. 3. 64.
- 54 Minutes of the Third Annual Congress of the Swaziland Agricultural Union. September 21st, 1963, p.5.
- 55 Swaziland Chamber of Commerce and Industries, Minutes of a Special Meeting... op.cit., p.1.
- 56 Times of Swaziland, 13. 9. 63.
- 57 Whitson, H.A. Report on Methods of Regulating Wages In Swaziland. Mbabane, 10th June 1963, p.9. (Henceforth Whitson Report).
- 58 ibid., p.10.
- 59 Fransman 'The State and Development in Swaziland p.246-7.
- 60 ibid. p.249-250.
- 61 ibid., p.251-4.
- 62 ibid., p.259-261
- 63 ibid., p.263.
- 64 ibid., p.264-5; 269-70
- 65 Letter to the Times of Swaziland, 6. 8. 68
- 66 ibid., 10. 9. 65; 6. 8. 65.
- 67 Fransman 'The State and Development n Swaziland', p.270
- 68 Times of Swaziland, 7.8.67.
- 69 Fransman 'The State and Development in Swaziland' p.271
- 70 Swaziland Government, Labour Department, A Model Constitution For a Works Council, undated. (mimeo)

- 71 Prince Masitsela Dlamini for the Swazi National Council, Some of the Duties of a King's Representative, 19th August, 1971. (mimeo)
- 72 Report in the Times of Swaziland file on King Sobhuza, dated 23. 5. 72.
- 73 Minutes of the Swaziland Federation of Employers, 13th December 1972. Book 3, p.79.
- 74 Times of Swaziland, 15. 12. 72. p.8.
- 75 Minutes of the Federation of Swaziland Employers. Inter alia, 10th May 1972. Book 3, p.32; Minutes of the Matsapha Industrial Association, August 22, 1972. June 15, 1971.
- 76 Sunday Times, 4. 3. 73.
- 77 Report in the Times of Swaziland file on King Sobhuza, dated 27. 8. 73.
- 78 Fransman, 'The State and Development in Swaziland', chapter 3.
- 79 *ibid.*
- 80 See Chapters 3 and 4 for a more detailed consideration of the question of "worker-peasants".
- 81 W.A. Ramsden, "Judicial Protection In Swaziland", The Comparative and International Law Journal of Southern Africa, November 1973, p.379. (Ramsden was the first Attorney-General in Swaziland but resigned before the Constitution was suspended).
- 82 For an account of these events see, inter alia, Ramsden *ibid.*, J. Longman, "The Swazi Coup", South African Outlook, 103, 1224, May 1973; I. Marvin, "King Sobhuza II", Optima, Vol. 23, No. 2 June 1973; C. Legum (ed), Africa Contemporary Record, London: 1973/4; and contemporary issues of the Times of Swaziland.
- 83 Times of Swaziland, April 13, 1973.
- 84 Sunday Times, 8.2.73. Reporting of industrial unrest has been extremely bad probably in an attempt to protect the "investment climate" and it is possible that there were other significant incidents.
- 85 Times of Swaziland, April 13, 1973.
- 86 Times of Swaziland, April 20, 1973.
- 87 *ibid.*, April 13, 1973.
- 88 *ibid.*

TABLE 1

AVERAGE EARNINGS OF UNSKILLED MALE AND FEMALE WORKERS IN SELECTED INDUSTRIES
DEC. 1969-SEPT. 1975.

INDUSTRY	DEC 1969		SEPT 1971		SEPT 1972		SEPT 1973		SEPT 1974		SEPT 1975	
	M.	F.	M.	F.	M.	F.	M.	F.	M.	F.	M.	F.
Agric.	16	9	- ²	- ²	15	8	20	11	21	19	29	16
Fores.	22	11	20	9	22	10	24	10	35	13	43	22
Mining	37	27	36	32	39	28	37	30	47	45	60	47
Manuf.	26	15	25	22	34	11	34	19	41	25	43	17
Constr.	20	11	24	13	25	-	21	-	27	-	31	20

NOTES:

1. No employment survey carried out for 1970.

2. There was no information available for agriculture in the Sept 1971 survey.

SOURCE: Annual Statistical Bulletin

TOTAL EMPLOYMENT OF UNSKILLED WORKERS IN SELECTED INDUSTRIES SEPT 1972.

INDUSTRY	NUMBER	%	(Tot. = 34,182)
			PERCENTAGE OF TOTAL NO. OF UNSKILLED WORKERS EMPLOYED IN PRIVATE SECTOR.
Agric	18,234	62%	
Forestry	3,395	12%	
Mining	1,753	6%	
Manufac.	4,469	15%	
Construc.	1,569	5%	
<u>TOTAL</u>	<u>29,420</u>	<u>100%</u>	

SOURCE: Annual Statistical Bulletin.

CHANGES IN RETAIL PRICE INDEX 'B' (1) FOR MBABANE LAST QUARTER 1965-1975. (Beginning 1967 = 100)

1965	96,0	1971	111,3
1966	99,5	1972	113,9
1967	101,4	1973	127,1
1968	104,4	1974	151,6
1969	108,1	1975	170,0
1970	108,8		

This price index "reflects cost of living changes facing the low wage earning Swazi".

SOURCE: Annual Statistical Bulletin.