

	Hanf 1977 Tvl/Natal %	Quail Commission Tvl. 1979 %	Buthelezi Commission 1981 Tvl/Natal % %	
"Life in general"				
"Very happy"/"Just happy"	22	10	6	8
"Unhappy"/"Angry and impatient"	57	72	79	78

Trendline results obtained from a scale of socio-political satisfaction/dissatisfaction, standardised by Theodor Hanf of the Arnold Bergstraesser Institute in West Germany, and applied to the Buthelezi Commission study.

Black South Africans — what they feel

The Buthelezi Commission revealed significant evidence of an increase in expressed political discontent and anger — which is now present among between seven and eight out of ten Black South Africans.

Actual militancy and an attitude of confrontation appears in between three and four out of ten Black South Africans.

In a section entitled "Political consciousness among Black South Africans," the Commission reported on detailed attitude surveys which were carried out.

The report indicated that most Black South Africans in all the regions surveyed expected moves towards equality with Whites as opposed simply to improvement in their circumstances.

Trendline results obtained from a scale of socio-political satisfaction/dissatisfaction, standardised by Theodor Hanf, et.al. of the Arnold Bergstraesser Institute in West Germany, applied in the Buthelezi Commission study, provided the noteworthy comparisons in the table above.

A view expressed among 45 to 55 percent of people across groups is that African National Congress (ANC) insurgents would receive sympathy and co-operation from *most or very many* Black South Africans; a view which extends to rural areas of KwaZulu.

In addition the overwhelming majority of Black respondents spontaneously predicted violence or adult social unrest on a large scale if meaningful policy reform did not occur in the near future.

Seven out of ten respondent, for example, predicted mass strikes if people were called upon to act by a credible leader.

Chief M.G. Buthelezi and Inkatha received clear majority support in all regions of Natal and KwaZulu and also have a substantial degree of support on the Witwatersrand.

The report went on:

There are four interconnected but nevertheless distinctive types of *dissident* consciousness among Black South Africans surveyed. Firstly, as indicated, there are groups which are ideologically conservative, relatively apolitical, but which have high levels of discontent with material circumstances, amenities and opportunities.

Secondly, there is a large formation of political consciousness which involves more than a sense of discontent or deprivation but which is characterised by a sense of relative deprivation.

A much sharper political consciousness is present among these people.

They want at least equality of opportunity and participation in decisions affecting their lives. They are not necessarily radical or militant in out-

look, however. A typical non-youthful Inkatha supporter would approximate to this type of consciousness. This consciousness is also coloured by African Nationalism and a concern with Black solidarity.

A third type of consciousness is tending towards an urban lower-middle and middle-class radicalism. This type of consciousness is not as wide-spread as the second type identified but nevertheless predominant among better-educated younger adults on the Witwatersrand and substantial among the groups in Natal and KwaZulu.

It involves a strong verbal allegiance to both the ideal of Black consciousness and the aims of the ANC in exile.

There is among this group a questioning of South Africa's institutions with quite a considerable flavour of socialism or African communalism. This group tends to have fairly high lifestyle aspirations and could not be called genuinely proletarian in outlook.

A fourth broad type is what one might describe as militant. It is probably among this group that one would find the most serious commitment to the current strategies of the ANC in exile.

This type is not necessarily associated with high education; in fact considerable hard core militancy is found

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among some semi-skilled and skilled manual workers, and among some rural subsistence people.

This consciousness is also not necessarily radical in ideological content: indeed even some people with a strong Zulu ethnic consciousness are militant. Militancy is also present among some younger or highly discontented Inkatha supporters.

The relative size of these types of consciousness is very difficult to estimate. Judging broadly from the Commission's results one might say that the second type is the largest in terms of its spread, followed by the first and then by the fourth and third.

Together all four types of consciousness, with variations and overlap, would encompass some 90 percent or more of the Black South Africans in the regions surveyed.

As we have already estimated, the militant category, including the more militant radicals of the third category, probably account for between three and four out of ten Black South Africans in Natal, KwaZulu and the Witwatersrand.

Results indicate that the second and largest category, although politically conscious and with strong feelings of relative deprivation, is moderate in terms of acceptance of policy alternatives. The militant and some of the radical types is less flexible in outlook.

Embedded hostility to Whites is present only among some of the militants and radicals, but is not a feature of the first two groups identified.

From this viewpoint it follows that not all the people who say that they support the ANC are likely to be militants. Some will support the ANC on the basis of the older sentiments of African Nationalism, some because it has become fashionable to support "liberation movements" after Mr Mugabe's ascendancy in Zimbabwe, some because the ANC currently symbolises a radical rejection of the "system" and some because there is, for them, a vacuum of leadership inside the country.

One cannot assume, therefore, that majorities of Blacks have a revolutionary consciousness. A militant and committed revolutionary consciousness with *intentions to act*, as it were, is probably still a minority phenomenon, found among the militant group we have described and among a small number of the better-educated urban radicals.

Even if the group with "intentions to act" is no more than five to ten percent of the young adults, however, it constitutes a disturbingly large number of people.

There is a widespread expectation of violence and a sense of its inevitability as well as considerable sympathy or verbal support for insurgency for a variety

of reasons.

These sentiments can have two important effects. Firstly, they create a climate in which insurgency can occur with approval which reinforces the motivation of the insurgent and in this shelter the insurgent may also expect protection and shelter.

Secondly, this consciousness undermines the credibility of internal leadership, which, if internal leadership becomes discouraged, leads to a vicious cycle of an ever-widening political vacuum within the country.

This coupled with the effects of separate development in "removing" internal Black leadership from the common arena of South African politics, could come to be seen as the only political instruments of the Black South African.

There is a clear need for political initiatives which will counteract this trend by building legitimacy for open, internal Black politics in South Africa and in the region.

The comments of the types of consciousness above also imply that there is to some extent a split between economic consciousness (type 1) and political consciousness (types 2,3,4). It stands to reason that politicisation is likely to spread, not decrease, and if the low-level economically deprived Black people become politicised a very significant deepening of the potential instability could take place.

Others fear for the future of S.A.

Whites, Coloureds and Indians acknowledge the need for reform

Less than one-third of Indian South Africans and less than one-quarter of White and Coloured South Africans claim to be confident about the future of South Africa.

The result's of the Commission's surveys among White, Indian and Coloured South Africans showed that the greatest degree of pessimism or anxiety is found among Whites who support parliamentary opposition parties — both to the right and the left of the ruling National Party.

In brief the Commission reported:

Supporters of the National Party appear to have an unusual degree of complacency about the future, which is perhaps partly because of faith in the policies of the governing party, but partly because of other reasons.

The view expressed by Heribert

Adam in the political report of the Commission — that White South Africans are too convinced of their superiority over Blacks to be fearful of Black reactions in the future — may be particularly relevant to the supporters of the governing party.

Substantial proportions of each group, however, see the future involving instability and disturbances in race relations. This, where present, is expected as a consequence of the present dispensation for different races or the state of race relations in South Africa today.

In response to these perceptions, very large majorities of Whites and virtually all Indian and Coloured South Africans see the need for reform in the socio-economic conditions for Black South Africans.

Substantially fewer than half of the Whites and less among Indian and Coloured South Africans believed that the present situation of the social and political separation of KwaZulu and Natal could last indefinitely. Among all minorities there is a very high recognition of the fundamental interdependence of all groups in the region.

Of particular importance was the finding that majorities among White businessmen, Progressive Federal Party and New Republic Party supporters, politically conscious and upper-middle status English-speakers endorse the item (in the surveys) that Chief Buthelezi should share in the government of the Province of Natal.

Generally Chief Buthelezi's significance as a political figure and his support among Black people in the region was well recognised.