

# INKATHA'S STRATEGY OF SURVIVAL

## A Comparative Assessment

When talking about Inkatha's strategy we need to look at both strategies which Inkatha needs to adopt for its own survival, and then at organisational strategies which Inkatha pursues in the struggle for liberation with the people of South Africa. For Inkatha, politics is the outcome of the interplay between these two levels of strategies and indeed many politically oriented Black Organisations in South Africa have over the years confused the one with the other. Let us then briefly examine the two sets of strategies as Inkatha perceives them:

The belief we uphold in Inkatha is that in order for a liberation movement to successfully pursue its programme of principles in the struggle, it must first ensure that it will in fact survive to be able to pursue that programme. After more than three hundred years of white oppression in South Africa we have learnt a lesson that the struggle for liberation will be long-drawn and arduous. Liberation movements who do not first maximise their capacity to survive in the struggle will therefore have been obliterated from the political scene by the time total liberation is ultimately won.

The strategy of survival is thus basic to Inkatha's overall plans for the total liberation of South Africa. At the Annual General Conference of the Inkatha Youth Brigade, the President, Chief Mangosuthu Gatsha Buthelezi (1980 : 8) reaffirmed this strategy when he quoted Chairman Mao Tse Tung as follows:

"The basic principle of war is to preserve oneself and destroy the enemy" <sup>1)</sup> Elaborating on Mao's theory, Chief Buthelezi further declared: "When one goes to war, one knows that this means coming

face to face with death. But in spite of the fact no wise General will not make sure that his soldiers are safe and that they only die at that moment when there is nothing else left for them to do." <sup>2)</sup>

How therefore does Inkatha seek to maximise its capacity to survive in the struggle for liberation in South Africa?

### NO HIDDEN AGENDA

One aspect in Inkatha's primary strategy of survival is that of operating openly in broad daylight. It is not a secretive organisation evolving code languages, holding secret meetings or pursuing objectives which cannot be confirmed as correct at open Annual General Conferences.

We have come to realise that in South Africa the tendency to pursue secret objectives comes from the mistaken view that elementary and amateur precautions are sufficient to hide agendas from the Security Police. It is also in part a response to the idealisation of revolutionary tactics and strategies.

More importantly, and tragically so, secrecy in politics in South Africa is encouraged by those who find political failure and martyrdom preferable to political failure leading to obscurity.

After a wave of brutal oppressive action by the minority regime in the late 1950's and early 1960's, politics in South Africa when through a protracted period of dispondency and despair. For almost a decade up to the 1970's there was no organised black political activity of any significance. It was Inkatha's strategy pursuing open politics which opened up the political debate and

re-introduced dialogue. During this period, no black leader in South Africa did more for the struggle than Chief Buthelezi, the President of Inkatha. He fearlessly quoted banned and imprisoned leaders like Mr Nelson Mandela and Mr Robert Sobukwe in his speeches and openly discussed banned organisations like the African National Congress and the Pan Africanist Congress. <sup>3)</sup> At his very first meeting with the then Prime Minister of South Africa, Mr John Vorster, Chief Buthelezi raised the issue of Mr Mandela's release from Roben Island, when all other black leaders in South Africa found it still risky even to whisper the name of Mandela.

The fact that name like Oliver Tambo, Walter Sisulu, Govan Mbeki, Moses Mabhida, M.B. Yengwa, Dr W. Chonco and others are known to the young people of South Africa is chiefly due to Chief Buthelezi who never failed to mention these names during his numerous public addresses to members of the Youth Brigade of Inkatha, the majority of whom were not yet born when these leaders operated openly in South Africa. Chief Buthelezi braved vitriolic attacks by right wing white groups who accused Inkatha of collusion with the ANC <sup>4)</sup> and Chief Buthelezi personally as an agent of the communists.

In 1979 Chief Buthelezi travelled to London with senior members of Inkatha to meet the leadership of the ANC at their instance. At the meeting in London Inkatha's strategy of operating openly in South Africa again came to the fore when the ANC leaders tried to suggest that the meeting should be regarded as secret. Chief Buthelezi told the ANC leaders that Inkatha operated openly in South Africa and that an attempt to hide the fact that the meeting

did take place would invite the inevitable attention of the South African Security Police. Indeed when the Inkatha delegation returned to South Africa the Security Police and the media already knew that a meeting between the ANC and Inkatha had taken place in London. Subsequent press statements by the President of the ANC Mr Tambo, attempting to deny that the meeting took place were therefore of no avail.

In South Africa right wing white groups as well as some Cabinet Ministers called for Chief Buthelezi's detention but the Chief of Security, General Johan Coetzee commented:

"Some people think he (Buthelezi) should be thumb-screwed, but I don't think it's as simple as that." 5)

Inkatha's strategy of operating openly is further motivated by the belief that in South Africa, detention, death and the destruction of organisations follow incompetent secrecy. Organisations need to adopt public programmes before they can involve ordinary people and establish viable constituencies. This Inkatha has done and the strategy of not attempting the impossible is one reason why it is succeeding.

### CONSTITUENCY POLITICS

Black people in South Africa come face to face with apartheid in their day to day living circumstances, and they can oppose apartheid more effectively in those circumstances than in abstract or symbolic politics. Workers form a constituency and they should be mobilised as such. Youth form a constituency; professional groups or traders may also form constituencies. The ideal of constituency politics is best served by having a multiplicity of cross-cutting constituencies, each of which has its own specific objectives, but all of which have a basic common goal. For Inkatha this basic common goal is the total liberation of black

people in South Africa. Consequently, in its constitution Inkatha provides for the affiliation of a variety of organisations viz: Trade Unions, Farmers' Associations, Chambers of Commerce, Teachers' Associations, Nurses' Associations, Education Inspectors' Associations, Church Organisations, Doctors' Associations, Lawyers' Associations and Social Workers' Associations. The majority of these associations are already affiliated to Inkatha. The underlying belief here is that an essential part of the liberation struggle in South Africa is to make it impossible for the South African government to implement any of its versions of apartheid. Each constituency at a particular point in time is in a position to become pragmatically effective in opposing any version of apartheid, provided it is properly organised and appropriately conscientised.

Inkatha thus believes that constituency politics rallies people together and we have to face the fact that this is the only way oppressed people in South Africa will be mobilised. Hordes acting in unison only when fuelled by anger are not acting in unison in the true sense of the word and their action cannot be one in which Black South Africa gathers accumulative power. The brand of constituency politics that Inkatha pursues in South Africa also enables different constituencies to maximise their capacity to sanction and curb the activities of counter-revolutionary elements in their midst, without calling in so-called external instigators who will only attract the attention of the ever-vigilant Security Police.

Constituency politics also serves to increase the cost to the state in case it attempts to act against a liberation movement by way of either banning it or banning its leaders. The secret of a banning order is the assumption that there is one person who is the moving spirit behind a movement; and that if that person is banned then the movement would fizzle out. Inkatha strives to ensure through consti-

tuency politics that if the state should act against its leaders then the masses themselves would see to the propagation of the ideals of the movement even when the leaders have been removed. Further, the numerical strength of a liberation movement keeps the state guessing as to what would happen if its leaders were banned. Nobody for instance can accurately foretell what would happen in South Africa if Chief Buthelezi were to be imprisoned or banned. 6)

A bitter critic of Inkatha was once prompted to write:

"Inkatha today constitutes a Black phalanx which, because of the diversity and solidarity of its support, poses a more organised threat to establishment of South Africa than the ANC did in the early sixties." 7)

### BLACK UNITY

The pursuit of constituency politics leads Inkatha to the acceptance of the responsibility for working towards black unity. Because Inkatha is people-oriented and it does not have hidden ideological agendas, and aspires to serve black South Africa as a whole, it welcomes divergent views and respects the right of everyone to present his views to the masses and to attempt to establish a movement with aims and objectives in support of his views. This is the very stuff of which democracy is made, and Inkatha does not begrudge anybody the right to be part of a democratic search for the best and most effective amongst alternative solutions. Chief Buthelezi himself once declared:

"We are a host of freedom fighters each using the means at his disposal for the destruction of apartheid." 8)

Inkatha has attempted to unify Black South Africa both formally and informally. The Black Unity Front in 1977 was the first attempt by Inkatha to bring Blacks of different political persuasions

together. The South African Black Alliance which was established in 1978, is another tangible attempt which Inkatha has made to establish Black Unity. While this alliance was originally formed between Inkatha, Inyandza, the Indian Reform Party and the Coloured Labour Party, it will accept any movement which works within the broad objectives of democratic opposition to apartheid.

Beyond these attempts to establish links through informal means. Prior to Steve Biko's death, Inkatha was engaged in discussions with both the external mission of the ANC and the Black Consciousness Movement in South Africa, to establish a united front, but such fronts have not evolved and to date the South African Black Alliance is the only successful attempt to do anything in this direction. No other movement has achieved greater success than Inkatha in unifying the people of South Africa. Inkatha does not believe that "holier-than-thou" political attitudes are beneficial for South African politics and has therefore at all times attempted to keep alive contacts with a wide range of organisations and leaders.

Leaders in so-called independent homelands are just as important as any others when it comes to forming a united front. Inkatha believes that it is fundamentally undemocratic and unrealistic to exclude any black constituencies from participating in black unity, if we are serious about black liberation in South Africa. We believe that even those so-called homelands which opted for altogether unacceptable Pretoria-type independence, have constituencies of millions of black South Africans who cannot be jettisoned by the democratic process. Moves are now afoot to draw these constituencies and their leadership back to the struggle for liberation in South Africa.

Every black South African, be he in jail, exiled or banned, is a rightful heir to the struggle for liberation in South Africa.

Many critics of Inkatha both in South Africa and abroad sometimes misunderstand and misinterpret Inkatha's strategy of black unity. For instance, Inkatha's eagerness to co-operate with any organisation whose main goal is black liberation in South Africa, is sometimes interpreted as a sign of weakness. The fact is that when Inkatha calls for this co-operation among black liberation movements in South Africa, it does so from a position of immense strength. It is the largest black liberation movement in the history of South Africa, and it has a unique capacity to mobilise people on a scale never witnessed before in South Africa. Therefore there can never be any political solution in South Africa — now or in the future — which can exclude Inkatha.



However, Chief Buthelezi, in spite of the tremendous power he wields through Inkatha, has always lamented the fact that continued white domination in South Africa thrives on black disunity. It is only for that reason that Inkatha today is a foremost protagonist of black unity in South Africa.

The other misconception is that when Inkatha speaks in support of alliances with movements like the external mission of the ANC, it is attempting to gain credibility by using the ANC. Nothing could be

further from the truth. The truth of the matter is that it is in fact the ANC that would benefit from any political alliance with Inkatha for the simple reason that Inkatha is in total contact with the oppressed masses in South Africa on a day to day basis. This therefore means that a movement like the ANC whose leaders have been out of the country for more than 20 years, cannot hope to effectively influence the political situation in South Africa without co-operating with influential and powerful internal movements like Inkatha.

## NON-VIOLENCE

In the very nature of the South African situation, one cannot achieve open democratic opposition leading to pragmatic actions

uniting people in a broad multi-strategy front, unless the ideals on non-violence are espoused. There is a particular kind of political dishonesty at work in South Africa at times. People who claim to be non-violent neither work actively for the emergences of non-violent opposition, nor have the courage to espouse violence in any effective way. One is thinking here of most of the Black Consciousness movements that emerged during the 1970's.

Inkatha's strategy of pursuing non-violence in South Africa is pragmatic for the following reasons:

- a. No single liberation movement in the history of South Africa ever adopted the strategy of violence while it operated inside the country. The ANC itself which now espouses violence as an instrument of change operated in South Africa as a non-violent movement for 48 years from 1912 to 1960. It only opted for violence when it was banned in 1960 and some of its leaders were sent abroad to establish an ANC mission in exile.
- b. For logistic reasons, an armed struggle in South Africa is not feasible for the foreseeable future. To be effective such a struggle would require a secure base near the borders of South Africa from which it could be launched. At the moment not a single country in Southern Africa is prepared to allow its territory to be used as a base for attacks against South Africa. While neighbouring African States need to be commended for giving our exiled liberation movements shelter as well as diplomatic and moral support, not a single one of these countries would like to incur the wrath of the South African Defence Force by allowing guerillas to establish military bases to attack South Africa from their territories. The barbaric raids at Amatola in Mozambique and Maseru in Lesotho are grim reminders of the brutality of the South African Defence Force when there is suspicion, no matter how unjustified, that neighbouring countries have bases from which guerillas can launch attacks on South Africa.

The fact that some countries in former colonial Africa like Mozambique, Angola and Zimbabwe were partly liberated through the armed struggle, has tended to obscure the fact that there are many other countries in former colonial Africa

that were liberated through non-violent means. In fact, comparatively speaking, the continent of Africa has witnessed very few wars of liberation in its history.

People also tend to ignore the fact that the political problems of South Africa are fundamentally different from those of either Mozambique, Angola and Zimbabwe before independence. Black people in these countries were faced with groups of white oppressors numbering hundreds of thousands, the majority of whom were settlers who could flee to their countries of origin after the liberation struggle.

In South Africa, however, we are faced with a determined tribe of white oppressors numbering almost 5 million, who no longer have another home to flee to and are therefore prepared to exterminate or be exterminated in defence of apartheid and white privilege. Moreover these white oppressors command the most lethal military machine and the most vibrant economy in the Southern hemisphere. <sup>9)</sup>

Inkatha believes that it is an unwise strategy to allow the enemy to lure you into a position where you will be forced to fight him from a position of weakness. The white minority regime in South Africa has ensured through discriminatory laws, that black South Africans remain unarmed so that in case of an insurrection they can be overpowered with minimum effort. That is what Chief Buthelezi (1979 : 78) means when he declares:

"I do not believe that it would be responsible for me to undertake a course of action which pins its hopes on controlled mass violence and in the process turn my people into cannon fodder.

From my point of view, large scale violence as a planned strategy will not serve the interests of my people. Blind condemnation of non-violence means not taking cognisance

of the consequences of violence to millions of people." <sup>10)</sup>

Inkatha is fully convinced that there are effective non-violent means of crippling the South African government besides the armed struggle. The soft underbelly of South Africa is its economy which depends almost entirely on black labour and black consumer power. Once black people are adequately mobilised in accordance with its strategy of constituency politics, Inkatha believes that it could force the South African government to capitulate by encouraging black people to withdraw their worker and consumer power. This cannot be achieved by simply scattering pamphlets on the streets at night, calling for a strike, as some liberation movements which are not in contact with the ordinary workers do. People need first to be organised and consulted if they are expected to support such a call. Chief Buthelezi underlined the growing importance of the power of black workers in South Africa when he asserted:

"We stand on the threshold of exercising our power in our places of employment and in the market place of South Africa. That is where the future drama of our liberation will ultimately unfold." <sup>11)</sup>

For all the above reasons Inkatha does not believe that the armed struggle is a viable strategy in South Africa at the present time. Nevertheless Inkatha does not condemn those liberation movements which have opted for the armed struggle. Neither does it attempt to oppose or undermine their strategy. Inkatha fully understands the reasons why many gallant sons and daughters of South Africa have had to sacrifice their lives in the armed struggle against apartheid. That is why it was possible for Chief Buthelezi to advise Inkatha Youth Brigade

members at their conference in 1979 as follows:

"Just as our policy is that of working for peaceful change, we have not stopped anyone who feels that he or she will serve the cause of Black liberation by skipping the country and joining the armed struggle." 12)

However, Inkatha does have some misgivings about the manner in which the ANC in particular pursues its strategy of violence in South Africa. We believe that for a movement like the ANC which has opted for a violent overthrow of the present government in South Africa, it is imperative that it must first win the confidence of the masses inside South Africa before it can even begin to mount an effective armed struggle. It is amazing, to say the least, that ANC strategists seem to have completely ignored this essential element of an effective armed struggle. On the contrary the ANC spend most of their time villifying and insulting Chief Buthelezi in their publications. 13) The negative attention that the ANC gives to Chief Buthelezi has led black people in South Africa to the conclusion that the priority in the ANC struggle is to attack Chief Buthelezi and Inkatha and not to overthrow the white minority regime in South Africa. Giving an account of the training they received during the war in Zimbabwe, a ZANU guerilla had the following to say:

"We were taught how to approach the masses and how to live with them and that we were the people's soldiers. We were taught that we had come from the people and that we had to go to the people, to stay with the people. The people were our source, shelter and security." 14)

It is thus clear that if the ANC is serious about mounting an effective armed struggle in South Africa, it still has a lot to learn about the tactics of winning the hearts and

minds of the masses who are expected to assist and give shelter to guerillas in the field. Surely this is not done by insulting and ridiculing influential leaders of the masses like Chief Buthelezi because in doing so they are actually insulting the masses themselves. One hopes that Inkatha will not reach a stage where it decides to incite the black population of South Africa against the ANC — something which Inkatha could effectively do if it chose to.

The other misgiving of Inkatha about the ANC's strategy of violence is that whenever acts of sabotage are carried out against the South African government the victims are in most cases black and not white people. Bombs which explode on railway lines in Soweto affect black and not white commuters. If it is not immediately revised, it is clear that this strategy of concentrating on black people as targets will further portray the ANC as a movement that is bent on venting its anger of oppressed fellow blacks and not on the enemy. In this regard the ZANU guerilla stated:

"After our political orientation everybody was able to understand the situation at home — the direction which had been followed by the Smith regime and the direction ZANU wanted to follow. Our political education taught us that when we went on to learn about guns we would know who were our enemies and who were our friends at home." 15)

#### PROTEST

Inkatha believes that it is essential to protest continuously at the inhumanity which characterises apartheid. Protests should be made at every opportunity and about everything that can capture the public's imagination. The process of protest consolidates political attitudes and symbolises the unity of all people.

Inkatha believes, however that no matter how important protest is,

we should not confuse protest with effective political action. Protest is valuable when it is part of a political action programme, but it is impotent on its own. For instance when Inkatha fought the decision of the South African Government to cede South African territory to Swaziland in 1982, protest was merely part of a comprehensive and properly planned action programme which included a campaign to enlist the support of the international community to oppose the land deal, a campaign to conscientise the people in the affected areas of Ingwavuma and KaNgwane, and a series of Supreme Court actions against the South African government. In its employment of protest as a strategy, Inkatha therefore differs from other liberation movements and organisations in South Africa which seem to believe that protest by and of itself can force the minority to reconsider its oppressive policies.

#### RADICALISM

Many critics of Inkatha classify it as a "moderate" or "conservative" movement and Black Consciousness groups in South Africa as "radical" or "progressive" movements. It is, however, not clear as to what criteria are applied in classifying a liberation movement as either moderate or radical. Within the context of South African politics there is no other liberation movement that has taken more radical actions than Inkatha in opposing the government of South Africa on a day to day basis; yet Inkatha is still mysteriously classified as a moderate or conservative movement. To Inkatha, a true radical risks everything for his people. So-called radicals who cast the world into the image of their own party will prove one day to be idealists. The true radical must be relevant to the interests of his people. For Inkatha the word "radical" has a positive connotation and Inkatha is undoubtedly committed to radicalism in South Africa. Inkatha's policies are

radical and its supporters are characterised by greater militancy of attitudes than supporters of other political organisations. The fact that this anger is led by pragmatism and a felt need to achieve, does not alter the nature of the radical support which Inkatha enjoys.

Chief Buthelezi is radically opposed to apartheid; he is radically opposed to oppression and he is presently the most outspoken radical in South Africa. At the level of newspaper comment, the nature of true radicalism is obscured by the propensity to report in sensational terms. The sensational is not necessarily radical. Inkatha's aims and objectives are radically different from those of the South African government. its Statement of Belief is radical in nature, and in no way conflicts with the Freedom Charter drawn up in Kliptown.

It might well be that one of Inkatha's strengths lies in its ability to ignore the need to appear heroic. The pursuit of political appearance at the expense of political achievement is so deeply mirrored in most political groups in South Africa. Theirs' is so very much the politics of imagery and symbolism. The clenched fist and the shouting of slogans without visible action programmes is all so very symbolic. Inkatha thus believes that true radicalism has within it an element of realism and pragmatism.

#### **Inkatha And the Youth:**

Another fallacy that is being deliberately propagated by Inkatha's critics is that Inkatha is rapidly losing the support of young people and that the majority of its support comes from older people and migrant workers:

"In Soweto Inkatha is supported by the older people and the hostel Zulus." 16)

This ignores the fact that out of a paid-up membership of 750 000, the Youth Brigade constitutes 44% of that total, i.e. 330 000 Youth



*Chief Gatsha Buthelezi with Youth*

Brigade members. 17) This makes the Youth Brigade of Inkatha the largest youth movement in the history of South Africa. The false claim that Inkatha is only supported by hostel Zulus ignores the findings of numerous past scientific surveys all of which have consistently revealed that Chief Buthelezi is the predominant leader in urban areas, that his support in these areas is 40% non-Zulu and that his general support in these areas clearly transcends ethnic or tribal boundaries.

#### **CONCLUSION**

Experience in the liberation struggles of Africa has taught us that the international community and interested groups can sometimes be terribly misguided in assessing the political significance of liberation movements that do not enjoy international recognition. In Zimbabwe Mr Joshua Nkomo's movement, ZAPU, was for many years flattered by the international community and the OAU into believing that it

enjoyed the following of the majority in Zimbabwe. For many years Mr Robert Mugabe's party, ZANU, which enjoyed real majority support in Zimbabwe was ignored by the international community and shunned by most African leaders simply because Nkomo's ZAPU had already claimed to be the sole and authentic voice of the people of Zimbabwe. However, when the people of Zimbabwe themselves handed down their judgement in the independence elections, Mr Mugabe's ZANU was the sole and authentic voice of the people of Zimbabwe. South African exiled movements like the ANC who are allowed by the international community to claim that they alone represent the black majority in South Africa should have learnt a lesson in the history of the struggle for Zimbabwe.

The investment/disinvestment question in South Africa is a case in point : Political differences between ANC and Inkatha are many, and investment/disinvestment in South Africa is one of them. ANC is one of the well known lobbyist against investment in South Africa. In this article **Inhlabamkhosi** attempts to assess this investment/disinvestment difference.

Twenty one years ago, before ANC was benned, on 26 June 1959, the leadership of the African National Congress (ANC), at what was to be its last commemorative meeting of South Africa Freedom Day, called on the international community, both singly and collectively, to take every measure to isolate Pretoria Regime. The meeting called for the severing of all relationships — political, diplomatic, cultural, economic and military — by the Governments and organizations of the world.

On economic boycott against South Africa, the late Chief Albert John Luthuli, President of the ANC made the point that: "the economic boycott of South Africa will entail undoubted hardship for the Africans. We do not doubt that . . ." The ANC Mission in exile pursued this economic boycott against South Africa. ANC as it claims to be the vanguard political organization in South Africa, together with its allies submitted its arguments to the International Non-Governmental Organization Conference for Sanctions against South Africa held in Geneva from 30 June to 3 July 1980. Since ANC Mission in exile has an observer status in the United Nations, the Non-Governmental Organizations Sub-Committee on Racism, -Racial Discrimination, **Apartheid** and Decolonization, in co-operation with the United nations Special Committee against Apartheid, adopted, during this conference, a resolution "calling upon all Member States to impose separate and collective sanctions against South Africa. More importantly, the international community came to appreciate that apartheid and racism in South Africa cannot be considered a "local" affair; that the implications of race rule and terror practised by Pretoria had

international ramifications precisely because the South African economy had over the decades of its development as a capitalist formation become the repository of vast amounts of foreign investment from transnational corporations; that the political representatives of capitalist countries constituted collectively the main stumbling block to the call for economic sanctions".

The transnational corporations provide economic support to Pretoria regime in two principal ways:

- (i) **Direct investment:** This is done primarily by way of financing the activities of their own branches, subsidiaries and associated companies in which they hold either a majority or minority of the share capital.
- (ii) **Indirect investment:** This takes the form mainly of short term credit facilities to South African private and public economic institutions and to the South African para-statal such as ESCOM, ISCOR, ARMSCOR, SOEKOR, SASOL & FOSKOR, all of which are Government controlled. The other form that indirect investment takes is through the granting of loans and the provision of export credit guarantees to the South African financial and industrial institutions. Two-thirds of the direct investment emanates from the European Economic Community (EEC) countries, with nearly 50 per cent from the United Kingdom, and one-quarter is from the United States of America. The United States and the United Kingdom have been increased their economic stake in South

Africa at a rapid rate, concentrating their impact on such strategic sectors of the economy as engineering, chemicals, mining, machinery and petroleum-related products.

A recent survey by the South African Financial Mail (September 1978) revealed the extent of international penetration of the South African economy by TNCs. On the other hand, without the massive injection of foreign investment from the early days of the discovery of gold and diamonds in South Africa the South African economy would not have been able to advance and develop into a fully fledged capitalist formation with all the characteristics of an imperialist power in its own right.

The ANC Mission in exile argues that racism and apartheid is more than just a system of national oppression of the black workers and peoples. At the heart of the policy of denying the black majority any political and economic rights and the policy of migrant labour, police brutality, repression, torture and murder witnessed at the time of Sharpville, Soweto and in the Cape, lie the real objectives of the system of race rule and repression. ANC states that "these funds have stimulated industrialization without any improvements in the economic, political, social and cultural lives of the black people. on the contrary, the more developed the economy has become, the greater has been the degree of oppression and exploitation imposed on the people and the bigger has become the gap in the living standards, incomes and power between the white minority and the black majority. Since the Second World War the real income of the black workers has decreased and the spectre of nearly two million unemployed now stalks the lives of the black workers, to be dumped in the barren wastelands going by the name of "homelands" and independent States".

Further, ANC states that industrialization and investments in the

apartheid economy have contributed enormously to the building up of the racist armed forces and the repressive State apparatus for the defence of white minority auto-cracy. The weapons they produce are used to shoot down black workers and to kill children in cold blood.

This call by the ANC Mission in exile is indicative of the fact that it is not involved in constituency politics and it does not heed the voice of the Black South Africa in the country. This is indeed a very serious misassessment of the South African situation when they established the disinvestment lobby. Every Black South African would agree with selective sanctions if they could be made to work in the short term and achieve real political gains. People inside the country do not want rhetorical politics and political programmes which are exercises in ideological marbles while the people starve.

On this disinvestment question, the President of Inkatha, Chief M.G. Buthelezi makes the point that:

“Every Black leader in the country knows that the vast majority of Black South Africans who are deeply aware of how unemployment, hunger and ill-health ravage their fellow human beings, would never advocate any line of action which has most disastrous effects amongst Blacks”.

The question of disinvestment is associated with quasi-socialist thinking. In this association, multinational corporations and the free enterprise system form related targets. The realities of the South African situation are simply that the industrial base on which economic expansion depends is already inadequate to cater for the needs of a population which is expanding at something like the rate of three per cent per annum. There will be no sound government in a liberated South Africa if programmes of political and social

reforms are held to ransom by economic under-development.

Black South Africans struggle not only for political liberation in the country, but they also struggle for liberation from poverty, want and disease, which will not be achieved by an idealistic redistribution of wealth. Equality of opportunity is an essential mechanism for redistributing wealth in South Africa, but Blacks want opportunities and continuing industrial development and economic expansion are essential for the aims of liberation. Those who are involved in constituency politics, like Inkatha, have to deal with the realities of day to day human misery. Chief Buthelezi moves amongst the people, organise the people and weld them into disciplined groups. He is dependent on following lines of thought which accord with the people's attitudes, and he cannot indulge in theoretical politics however much he may be applauded abroad.

Not a year goes by when mass meetings of tens of thousands, or Inkatha conferences drawing delegates from all over the country applaud Chief Buthelezi boldly and with enthusiasm for his stand on the question of investment/disinvestment. Inkatha rejects entirely the view that the lobbyists for disinvestment are acting on a mandate from the people of South Africa. Their action is motivated by ideological and sectarian interests. Black South Africans engaged in the internal struggle are frequently insulted by Western Governments who share platforms with South African exiles but who expect to consult with internal leadership in secret meeting through back-doors.

Blacks in rural areas in their millions know that they have at best a precarious chance of maintaining anything like a minimum level of subsistence. The areas relegated for Black occupation by apartheid South Africa are ludicrously inadequate to support the many millions of people who are expected somehow or other to

eke out a living in them. Many millions of Blacks are entirely dependent on cash wages. Around every major city in South Africa there are vast areas of squatters and shanty towns which are characterised by the most terrible poverty because of the very high rate of unemployment in Black society. These Black ghettos are neighbouring areas to affluent White suburban industrial areas.

**Inkatha** argues quite pragmatically that Blacks in South Africa have no social security systems and the lack of money means starvation and death. It is patently absurd to believe that these people would side with those who argue for disinvestment and the concomitant diminishment of job opportunities in the country. The Black population of South Africa is expanding exponentially at the rate of something like 3 per cent per annum and the existing industrial base is not large enough to provide work opportunities for the present generations of Blacks and for the foreseeable future. Blacks in South Africa can anticipate the continuation of a chronic shortage of work opportunities. Any impairment of the process of industrial and commercial expansion in the country will spell disaster to millions of people and in the end many millions more.

Black public opinion is totally opposed to disinvestment as a strategy. When Black South Africa first sent the ANC's Mission into exile, the Western World did not respond to our needs and by and large Black South Africans in exile have received greater support from the socialist bloc than from the Western industrial world.

When **Inkatha** observes the behaviour of people in squatter areas which are beyond the normal administrative machinery of South African society, because squatter areas are outside the jurisdiction of normal public administration, one sees a very natural tendency towards free enterprise.

These communities do not band themselves together under any kind of socialistic norms. Surveys have indicated that the oppressed people of South Africa need to be led by a leader who knows their needs, who suffers with them, who attends to their daily problems. **Inkatha** which is the largest political organisation in South Africa, led by its President, Chief Buthelezi, has proved to be the only organisation in the country that is relevant to the programmes of the suffering masses.

**Inkatha** has on many occasions in South Africa warned industrialists of the irresponsibility in practices and in codes of conduct as far as employees are concerned seriously prejudice the free enterprise system itself. **Inkatha** believes that industrialists in the West should play a two-fold role. On the one hand they should exert substantial influences on their Own governments to take a very much more definite stand in the Black struggle for liberation and become actively involved in supporting the kind of developments in Black society which foster the interests of freedom and democracy and economic development. The other aspect of the role of Western industrialists is that of identifying with Black groups in South Africa which are involved in the forefront of the struggle in such a way that broad Western industrial interest are furthered and the free enterprise system is underlined.

Chief Buthelezi is a Black South African leader, and **Inkatha** of which he is a President has a mass membership which has already passed the 750 000 mark and is climbing steadily. By the very nature of the South African demographic facts a membership this large must necessarily be dominated numerically by workers and peasants. **Inkatha** as a movement has members across the length and breadth of the country and it is as representative of people in urban areas as it is of people in rural areas. So, whenever he speaks of Black South

African, he speaks within the framework of Black public opinion. The recent George Meany Human Rights Award that was given to Chief Buthelezi by FLO-CIO is indicative of **Inkatha's** political relevance in the country.

Unlike in Western countries where there is Marxism, communism, socialism, etc, Black South Africa is not ideological. It is not ideological in the sense of consciously creating a bastion against interests, and it is not ideological in the sense of consciously working to uphold or reject capitalism and the free enterprise system. Generations of experience and years and decades of personalised experience in people's lives have led them to understand that hunger is placated by food, shelter comes from a house, care comes from a hospital and that security comes from work. Mass support in South Africa is withheld and afforded to strategies and tactics which the people face. It is this which distinguishes the relevant from the irrelevant.

It is in the depth of Black South

African suffering in the souls of Black South African which makes the Black South African leaders search for moral pragmatism. Leaders of Black South Africa are aware that their followers are poverty-stricken and that poverty cannot be alleviated by ideologists. The magnitude of suffering in South Africa, especially in Black Society is such that one would never dare to branch out into purely ideological politics.

The oppressed peasant eking out an existence from a dusty bowl in a parched land has no luxury of options or ideology. Leaders of mass organisations, such as **Inkatha** Movement, thought it wise and relevant to engage themselves in moral pragmatism and realities which face the poverty-stricken Black of South Africa. Leaders of mass movements have come to the realisation that mass support require a strategy and need to employ tactics which are durable. No ideological straight-jacket of whatever origin can be a salvation, at present, of our Black Sufferings in South Africa.

## CHIEF BUTHELEZI'S ALTERNATIVES AND CHALLENGE

Black political Developments have been curbed by an ever growing and already more than formidable body of repressive legislation. Whites came to recognise that the disenfranchisement of Blacks would lead to political ferment and ultimately to the destabilisation of South Africa. They have therefore determined to make a final separation of Black and White politics by creating so-called independent states in South Africa in which Whites have no political rights but over which they will be political masters. In return for excluding direct White political involvement in these states, so-called, Blacks would have to agree to relinquish all political rights in the rest of South Africa.

The challenge Chief Buthelezi faced when he was approached to serve in what was then the Territorial Authority was the challenge of not only putting an end to the erosion of Black political rights but to initiate a process of restoring to Blacks full citizenship and the democratic right to participate in the government of their country.

Thus, the challenge he faced has had only one outcome. He has to meet the challenge without arms. The practical challenge boils down to his exercising whatever ability is needed to mobilise the masses and to create constituencies in every walk of South African life. This was the challenge he had already elected to face when he