

The how of federation

*This paper is one of the Maurice Webb Memorial Lectures presented by
DR ANDREW DU TOIT of the Political Science Department at
Stellenbosch University.*

The Bulugha Conference which was held near East London in November, 1973 was a remarkable and perhaps unprecedented gathering in our South African political history.

The people who had been convened there by Mr Donald Woods, the Editor of the "Daily Dispatch", to discuss and promote the idea of federalism in South Africa and who included most of the homeland leaders and a number of leading liberals were very conscious of this.

Mr Woods, in his opening address to the conference expressed his sense of the historical significance of the occasion in the following words: "If you look around you will see that you are now part of the most representative gathering of South Africans ever to assemble in one room — more representative of all our people than any parliament that has ever assembled in South Africa. We are therefore making history in this room tonight.

"While uniraical conferences elsewhere make unilateral decisions about the future of other races, we here meet together and talk together and decide together what is acceptable to all. Welcome, therefore, not merely to this conference but to South African reality. All else has been shadow. This is substance."

A little later, Prof Baren van Niekerk, one of the participants, solemnly dubbed the meeting the "Second South African Convention."

Afterwards the conference organisers described the meeting as "possibly the most significant discussions yet held in South Africa" and in January of this year a plaque was placed in the conference room with the following inscription "In this room the first national assembly of South Africans of all races met on November 9th, 10th and 11th, 1973, and drafted a federal formula to end discrimination."

Now I think the Bulugha Conference was indeed a remarkable and significant meeting, certainly for anyone interested in political change and federalism in South Africa, and yet one cannot avoid detecting a certain element of make-believe and wishful thinking in

the words I have just quoted. (Let me add at once that this is not true of all or even most of the participants: many of the contributions were marked by a sober, realistic and even sceptical assessment of the realities of our political situation.) But the point I wish to make is that however **federation might** come about in South Africa, it is not going to be in this way — and I think the people at the Bulugha Conference knew this very well.

We will have to meet together, talk together and decide together, indeed, but the meeting will have to include not just the genial and well-meaning people who were at East London, the talking will be rather different from the informal and extemporaneous exchanging of views which took place at Bulugha, and the decisions will have to bear rather more weight than the resolutions adopted at that conference.

For the moment there does not seem much prospect that this kind of meeting, talking and deciding is going to take place anywhere in South Africa.

We may still have our "Second South African Convention" some time in the future, but much will have to change to make that possible. Asking what the conditions for such a convention are, is in fact the same question as asking how a federation can come about in South Africa.

How, then, can a federation of Southern Africa come about? I want to discuss this as a political issue and not merely in general theoretical terms. Let us for the moment accept that federalism is an acceptable and appropriate formula for our political predicament in South Africa, and let us also assume that the South African situation meets the general requirements for a federal system of government — and I think that, all things considered, both of these are fairly reasonable assumptions.

We are then still left with the problem of motivation, and in the case of federalism this

is both an important and a very difficult question. Why would the people whose views and decisions matter want to bring a federation about? At the beginning of my first lecture I referred to the fact that federalism, unlike nationalism or socialism or liberalism does not seem to invite a deep commitment to an independent cause or to arouse passionate political feelings among individuals and groups.

■ There must be a positive political and ideological commitment to the primary goal of federation as an end in itself . . . not to federation only as a means . . . ■

In that lecture I tried to show that when one begins to look more closely at the emerging "federal consensus" in South Africa it appears that the South African liberals, the White minority groups and the gradualist Black leaders who agree on federalism expect quite different and even opposite things from it.

More important, when pressed it appears that none of these groups has a serious stake in federalism as such, and it can also be shown have good cause to be wary of it. How, then, do you mobilise a political movement aimed at federation?

Nor can this question of motivation and mobilisation for federation be avoided. It might perhaps be thought that the "objective" case for federation is so strong, that there are so many underlying economic, social and political factors going for federation that it does not really matter that there are not a majority of ardent federalists actively pursuing it.

Or it might be thought that though there is not a widespread positive enthusiasm for the idea of federation as such, yet the "negative" advantages of federation as the only way to prevent or contain polarised political and racial conflict might be sufficient to bring together the different groups and parties in a federal bargain or compromise.

There may be something to this, but the question of federal motivation remains crucial. In a recent book entitled "Why Federa-

tions Fail" Thomas Franck and his collaborators undertook a comparative study of such recent attempts at federation as the Federations of Malasia, the West Indies, Rhodesia and Nyasaland and the proposed East African Federation that was never realised. They conclude that the principle prerequisite for bringing about federation and ensuring it against eventual failure is that "the leaders, and their followers, must 'feel federal' (there must be) a positive political and ideological commitment to the primary goal of federation as an end in itself . . . not to federation only as means — such as, for example, a means to gain independence or financial stability but to federation as an end, as good for its own sake."

Franck suggests that we must distinguish between primary, secondary and tertiary factors and goals in federation-building. Tertiary factors are conditions such as ethnic diversity and balance, and goal such as the prevention of racial or ethnic conflict.

Tertiary goal-factors, says Franck, "give rise to a federal condition which can be described as bargain-striking, in which a federation is formed not so much to harness a genuine mutuality of interest as to prevent a clash of disparate or economic interests.

The motivation based on these factors and goals may, in certain circumstances, bring about a federation but they are not capable of sustaining federal unity and unless supplemented by more positive motivations they can be said to contain the seeds of their own defeat in themselves.

Secondary goal-factors according to Franck, are such conditions as an interdependent or complementary economy, a common institutional and political history, common language, culture and values and common enemies or challenges and goals such as the hope of mutual economic advantage, security against attack etc.

The presence of these factors which traditionally have been identified as necessary for federation says Franck, "may be *useful*, may even be *necessary*, but are not *sufficient* to ensure success."

The crucial determinant is the primary factor of a positive commitment to the federal ideal among the leaders and/or the people of each unit of the federation. Secondary goal-factors, and particularly that of a common challenge and common enemies, may produce a federal coalition and thereafter engender the primary factors, a "federal condition which

elevates the federal value above all other values and in which the ideal of the federal nation represents the most important political fact in the lives of the people and leaders of each part of the federation." Short of this, however, they are not sufficient to ensure successful federal union.

There is perhaps some danger of overstatement here, and one might add that unless there was a significant element of diversity of interests and aims a unitary state rather than a federation would be called for.

The federal idea itself would seem to entail a certain recognition of "antagonistic cooperation", in Morton Grodzin's phrase (*The American System*, 1966), of bargaining accommodation and rivalry while engaging in joint ventures on a regular basis.

William Riker has written that (positive) motives for federalism are seldom widely shared and he accordingly interprets federation-building more in terms of a bargain or negotiated working agreement between groups with different goals.

For our present purposes it is unnecessary to decide which of these relative emphases is more accurate though Riker's interpretation would certainly seem to hold out somewhat better prospects for bringing about a federation in South Africa.

Still, the issue of motivation remains important, and in this connection it is very instructive to note what the conditions are which, according to Riker, always attend the federal "bargain."

These are the desire to expand territory without the use of force and to ready its government for some military-diplomatic threat or opportunity.

"The bargain", Riker writes, "is between prospective national leaders and officials of constituent governments for the purpose of aggregating territory, the better to lay taxes and raise armies." In short, an external threat may provide the catalyst for bringing about a federation, and this can obviously apply to a decentralising state wishing to preserve national unity as well as to different states coming together to build a new national unity.

I think that the relevance of these considerations to our South African situation is fairly obvious, though perhaps also somewhat surprising. There can be little doubt that South Africa in the seventies is facing a serious external threat.

With the imminent prospects now of an in-

dependent Mozambique and Angola we must surely expect the guerilla war to move much closer to our borders and to open up on a number of new fronts. I do not possess the military and strategic competence to assess this situation, even if I had all the necessary information, but we may and must consider the political implications if only in broad outline.

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Consider the following: First, it is widely recognised today that a counter-insurgency war cannot be won by military means alone. The Americans have at their disposal the most powerful and sophisticated machinery of war in history and we all know what happened in Vietnam. If the guerillas can count on the support and cover of the local population the task of military defence becomes extremely difficult if not impossible.

The South African defence planners know this, and in the past year a number of top military spokesmen have already said in public that, in the last analysis, a political solution is called for. But what would constitute a "political solution", and which "political solutions" are possible if we want to reach them? I would like to return to this point later.

Secondly, it is clear that the small White population in South Africa cannot provide the skilled manpower to sustain both a large increase in the call-up for military service and to provide the needs of a growing economy.

As more and more White men would be taken out of the economy for longer periods to go to the border Blacks would have to be moved up into skilled positions hitherto reserved for Whites under the colour bar — or alternatively Black men would have to be called up for military service.

It is probable that something of both might happen, and it seems that this is already beginning to occur.

The first steps in opening up the Defence Force for Blacks have been undertaken in the past year or two — and this is a highly significant development in view of the long South

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African history of an exclusive White monopoly of arms, and the great symbolic importance of this to both Whites and Blacks. What would the political implications be in the long term if Black soldiers increasingly man our borders against external threats and attacks? Thirdly, consider what the likely effects of an escalating guerilla war on South Africa's own borders are going to be on the internal situation. Since the early sixties the government's security measures and forces have succeeded in maintaining a high degree of effective control of actual and potential internal security threats. The major political organisations of Black Nationalism like the ANC and the PAC have been banned; the strategic leadership have been rendered ineffective by internment, banning and exile; attempts at organised sabotage were successfully countered; and a network of informers as well as the extensive system of administrative and legal restrictions on the freedom of movement, association and expression of Blacks have prevented possible overt or covert resistance movements from making much impact. I don't want to go into the complex ramifications of this situation. There is a well-known book in political science entitled "Why Men Rebel": in South Africa the crucial question seems to be "Why Blacks don't rebel", and whatever the answer to that is, I am sure it is not going to be a single and simple answer. But I do want to raise one aspect of this complex question, and that is to ask what the effect on possible internal resistance movements is going to be of Black guerilla forces operating not in the Caprivi-strip or across the Zambezi but on South Africa's own borders, a couple of hundred miles from Pretoria and the Witwatersrand. However one looks at it, there seems to be two basic requirements for a resistance

movement: the motivation and the means. If urban Blacks in South Africa don't want to rebel, then they won't be persuaded to do so by the fact that the "liberation armies" are 200 miles and not 2 000 miles away. But if they do, or significant groups among them, *do want to rebel, but are restrained for lack of the necessary means*, then it becomes an organisational and logistic problem: how do you get the trained men and the necessary weapons to the strategic positions — and then I submit that the lesser distance can make a crucial difference. In short it is arguable that with an external military threat or guerilla war moving closer to South Africa's own borders the prospects of possible internal resistance movements and urban guerilla war would also increase. Which, of course, leads on to the next question, would the defence and security forces be able to cope with both an increasing external threat and internal disturbances at the same time?

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Consider, next, and within this context, the military and strategic implications of a series of independent and quasi-independent Bantustans. The Transkei is now definitely committed to "independence" within the next five years, and in his recent BBC-interview Paramount Chief Kaiser Matanzima has mentioned 1976 as a possible date. Though other homeland leaders have expressed grave reservations about the advisability of going for independence on the present terms, there will undoubtedly be increasing pressures on them to follow suit. I am not now concerned with the political, economical or territorial viability of such "independent" Bantustans, which we all know to be very slight, but with the implications for security and defence. Obviously the newly independent Bantustans themselves would pose no direct threat to the Republic in military or any other terms, and I

think we can also discount the possibility of some great powers coming in with large amounts of economic and military aid. The point is rather that the new governments are very liable to get caught in the middle between the Republic and the guerilla or terrorist forces. They would certainly offer a much easier and a more exposed target than the main citadels of White power in the South African "heartland." Left to their own devices it is hard to see how such Bantustan governments could cope with any serious local insurrections or external threats. Conversely, in the light of our earlier remarks, it would be very much in the interest of the security of the Republic not to allow the threat of guerilla activities to spread right to the doorstep of Pretoria and Durban. In short, in the event of increasing external threats and a stepping up of the guerilla war on our borders it would seem to be in the common security interest of the central government and of the homeland governments to contain that threat as far as possible on the perimeter of the South African sub-continent. Is it too far-fetched to see in such a situation something like the conditions for a "federal bargain" in Riker's terms beginning to emerge, i.e. a desire to aggregate territory in the face of an external military-diplomatic threat.

■ In the context of a serious and growing external threat there is a subtle but important shift in the dynamics of the interaction between the White South African regime and the independent or quasi-independent homeland governments ■

Now, I think someone might well be prepared to accept the relevance of most of these points, and yet refuse to concede that a federation or federal arrangement would follow from such premises. After all, the Government is very much aware of the threat to the security of Southern Africa, and government spokesmen have repeatedly envisaged that the future independent Bantustans would be link-

ed in some kind of defence pact with South Africa, but there has been no suggestion from their side of a possible federation following from this. Still, I don't think that such views have taken a full account of all the political implications in the changing situation. In the context of a serious and growing external threat there is a subtle but important shift in the dynamics of the interaction between the White South African regime and the independent or quasi-independent homeland governments. Until now the main momentum in the political development of the homelands have been provided by the aim of the Nationalist government to take the brunt of Black political aspirations "out" of the central political system of South Africa. Expressed somewhat crassly, the South African government would be only too happy if it could set up a series of quasi-independent Bantustans and then have as little bother from them as it now has from Lesotho or Botswana. In the face of an increasing external threat, however, the Republican government would acquire an important interest in keeping the independent Bantustans "in" the South African sub-system in some sense that would extend rather further than a purely military treaty. To put it in slightly different terms, it is conceivable that a homeland government may well use its strategic importance as a bargaining counter and require a political price for its cooperation in a Southern African defence pact. Here we are back with the crucial question: what would constitute a possible "political" rather than a military solution to the threat of guerilla war? What political options are open if the Republican government would want to use them? In this connection I think it may be very illuminating if we consider the land claims made by the Lebowa government earlier this year. As you know the Lebowa government's suggestions for the proper consolidation of its territory amounted to something like one-third of the area of the Transvaal including a dozen or so important towns. Now I have no knowledge of the precise motivation or purpose behind these claims at the time they were made, to see that Lebowa lies directly between Pretoria and Mozambique, with only the Kruger but one has to take only one look at the map National Park intervening. However preposterous and unrealistic these claims may sound at the moment, wouldn't they begin to look rather different when guerilla activities might

begin to spread from southern Mozambique through the Kruger Park? And wouldn't a South African government who wishes, as a matter of urgency, to ensure the political loyalty of Black people in that area then be well advised to consider such proposals more seriously? What, after all, are its alternatives — a purely military solution?

■ . . . it should not be taken too much for granted that an overriding common security interest with the Republic exists ■

Before I attempt to pursue the possible basis for a federal bargain under such circumstances, it is necessary to consider some of the major obstacles on both sides of the bargain. The weight of the obstacles on the part of the Black leaderships should not be underestimated: however precarious and ambivalent the independence or quasi-independence of the homeland governments might be, it should not be thought that they will find the terms of just any political deal acceptable. In this respect the experience of the LBS-countries, or former Protectorates, is instructive. It has been a longstanding goal of South African foreign policy that the Protectorates should "come in" and join the Union, yet despite possible economic advantages the little choice they had was exercised for "staying out", and this not merely since 1948 and apartheid. Mr Leo Marquard has cogently argued that a federation of Southern Africa should embrace these territories as well, and I think in the sort of military and strategic terms I have been using this would make sense as well, but it is quite certain that they will not even begin to consider a closer political union so long as everything like the present White minority government prevails in South Africa. What changes in the political order of the Republic would be sufficient to persuade Botswana or Lesotho to "come in"? The position of the independent or quasi-independent Bantustans would not be wholly comparable to that of the LBS-countries. Their political ties with the Republic would, in any event, be much closer and their very existence would be a product of the central government's policy. On the other hand, for that very reason, the homeland gov-

ernments would be exposed to much greater pressure from within Black politics to demonstrate their "independence" and to show that they are not Pretoria's "stooges and lackeys." The Bantustan governments would also, much more so than the present authorities of the LBS-countries, serve as the probable targets for guerilla and insurrectionary activities, and to the extent that the external threat moves closer the pressure on them would increase both to find an acceptable political accommodation with South Africa and to raise the conditions for such a political bargain. To this must be added the profound importance of the attitude which will be taken by South African Blacks to a guerilla war on our borders. The attitude of important sections of the Black population, and of a significant part of the Black leadership, even in the Bantustans, can hardly avoid being ambivalent in more senses than one. In the circumstances it cannot merely be a question of an "external threat" or a "common enemy" so far as the Black man is concerned. From their perspective the situation is more likely to take on aspects of a civil war. In short, it should not be taken too much for granted that an overriding common security interest with the Republic exists. Again the question becomes, what sort of political accommodations would be sufficient to sway the loyalty of both the leadership and the Black population at large to the common South African interest and against the "external threat" or "common enemy"? I would suggest that in a situation where a real choice of any kind becomes a possibility nothing that is conceivable within the framework of the present policy of separate development or on the basis of White supremacy in the Republic would prove sufficient. If they "come in" then, in the long run, it can only be on the basis of a share in the central government as well as the regional authorities, and that means a federal system.

Let us consider, next, the obstacles in the way of such a "federal bargain" on the side of the White regime. The general social, political and ideological obstacles in the way of any political accommodation which would give the Black groups a significant share in the central government of the country are too well known for me to have to enumerate them once again. They have proved to be decisive throughout the whole of South Africa's political history thus far. They may prove to be decisive in the future as well, even in the event of a seri-

ous external threat such as a spreading guerrilla war on South Africa's borders combined with internal insurrections and urban guerilla war. This would probably amount to some kind of White "garrison state", i.e. an authoritarian order, both with regard to the urban Africans and the White population itself, far in excess of anything we may already have today. The alternative to such a White garrison state — and it is surely to be hoped that in the kind of crisis situation which I am now envisaging there would be an alternative — must be a political accommodation with the Black groups in South Africa. It is the special obstacles in the way of bringing about a federal accommodation which we must now consider. The first obstacle may be provided by the very conditions of crisis which could make a new political accommodation necessary and possible. Even if an external threat or a common enemy might provide the catalyst in bringing about a federation, the federal bargain requires a willingness to negotiate and to compromise on all sides, and this also means a situation in which there is scope and time for such rational and pragmatic negotiation. Faced with the onslaught of an open war on its borders, or a revolutionary situation at home, the options which might still be open to any White regime would no longer include that of federation. "A federal situation", in the words of F. G. Carnell, "is a highly delicate balance of coalescing and conflicting forces. There must be a feeling of insecurity, but not too much of an outside threat, such as war. There must be economic divergence of interest between the units, but no one unit should have an overwhelming preponderance in population and resources. Differences of race, religion or language may help to maintain the federal balance, but fundamental cleavages may shatter it" (F. G. Carnell "Political Implications of Federalism in New States".) In short, a developing internal and external crisis that would be grave enough to overcome the traditional obstacles and to bring the Whites in South Africa to the point where they might seriously begin to consider a new political accommodation with their Black fellow-citizens, may easily prove to be a situation in which a federal bargain is no longer possible. Nobody would wish to pretend that it is possible to engineer or control the precarious balance between threats and options which seems to be called for — one can only hope that wise and prudent leaders

will make use of such opportunities as may present themselves before it is too late.

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The second obstacle to a political accommodation of a federal nature is provided by our system of parliamentary government itself. Our familiar Westminster-type democracy concentrates all political conflict so much on the single site of the general elections for control of parliament (and hence of the executive) that parliamentary sovereignty and parliamentary franchise have acquired an overwhelming political and symbolic significance. Within our present political system all Black claims for a share in the central government must inevitably be expressed in terms of representation in Parliament and hence of a possible majority control of the executive as well — precisely that which to the Whites represent their only means of having a say in governing South Africa. Parliament thus becomes the occasion and the symbol of an all-or-nothing conflict in which there does not seem to be any way in which both sets of claims could be satisfactorily accommodated. If a measure of parliamentary representation to Blacks is granted then either it is done under conditions which would still ensure a White parliamentary majority — and which would then scarcely satisfy Black claims — or a Black majority becomes possible and the Whites would have to hand over the reins of government. In short, all claims for political participation in national government inevitably involve parliamentary sovereignty, and that is a quantity which is not easily dispersed or fragmented: it does not readily allow bargains or compromises. The whole point of the "federal bargain" is, of course, to achieve just this through a decentralisation and multiplication of electoral sites and through the separation of powers between the legislative, executive and judiciary branches allowing a system of checks and balances. But it is not easy to see how such a federal bargain could be struck, or even be prepared, while White political power is still based on and expressed in terms of the Westminster model of parliamentary sovereignty.

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The third obstacle to a political accommodation of a federal nature is closely allied to this, and it is provided by the question of White unity and/or the unity of Afrikaner nationalism. A political arrangement between the Republican government as representative of a unified White group, as the "senior partner", and a series of fragmented Black groups represented by the Bantustan governments, as very much "junior partners", would, whatever else one might think of its viability, certainly not constitute a federation in any recognisable sense. A political alliance between, on the one hand, a state with an overwhelming preponderance in power and resources and, on the other hand, a number of smaller satellites would approach more nearly to some species of empire. In other words, a federation would require the South African heartland to be divided in a number of regions which would have a more or less equivalent status as the Bantustans with respect to the central federal government. But this would mean, among other things, that the political mobilisation of a unified White group or a unified Afrikaner nationalism would become very difficult. It is a marked feature of federal systems to encourage the decentralisation and the loosening of discipline of political parties and movements. In a sense the fragmentation of African nationalism into the various ethnic or homeland political structures may be regarded as an important step towards a federal politics. But it is another question altogether whether the leadership of Afrikaner nationalism would be prepared to do anything which might lead to the loosening of the bonds of the Afrikaner political movement. Afrikaner political leaders are very much aware that Afrikaner hegemony is based on "volksseenheid" or a unified Afrikaner nationalism. They

have been extremely careful in pursuing even the apparently quite safe goal of White unity for fear that it might endanger the strong ties of Afrikaner ethnic unity. It would seem to be highly unlikely that, if ever they would be prepared to enter into a political accommodation with the Black groups, they would do so in terms which must weaken their own surest political base. In other words, Afrikaner nationalism can hardly ever become a motive for federalising South Africa and must remain a powerful obstacle to any such development as long as it retains its present hegemony.

... the essential factor is that no-one wants South Africa

Still, bearing in mind the weight of all these major obstacles to a possible federal accommodation, we may nevertheless recognise certain federalising tendencies in the South African situation. The Nationalist government's policy of separate development aimed at a number of "independent" Bantustans already contains, in fact, certain crucial federative features. Thus consider, for example, the crucial question of the definition of citizenship and the delimitation of spheres of legal authority. It is well known that in terms of the official policy of separate development the citizens of the prospective Bantustans will consist not merely of the actual residents of the homelands, but also of the migrant labourers and of the urban Africans who are permanent residents in the Republic. However this may be expressed or qualified, the urban Africans will de facto (and de jure?) have a kind of dual citizenship: they will be subject to the authority of the South African government, and, if any kind of content is given to their citizenship of an ethnic homeland, they will in some sense be subject to the authority of that homeland government as well. Now this is a very curious situation, but it is precisely one of the defining features of federalism: in a federation the political authority is distributed between the Centre and the Regions in such a way that they have separate jurisdictions which both operate directly on the individual citizen (Sawer, Duchacek). Of course in the classic federations this is essentially organised on a territorial basis. In this respect the position of the urban African who is

also a citizen of an ethnic homeland is a peculiar hybrid. What we have here is neither a straightforward regional principle as proposed in the Progressive Party's federal policy, nor an outright communal principle as suggested by the United Party's policy of a "Race Federation", but a kind of combination of these: an ethnic unit which does have a territorial aspect as well. With regard to the Coloureds and the Indians the policy of separate development is, of course, much closer to a strictly communal principle, though there are strong pressures that some kind of territorial basis should be supplied here as well.

Consider, next, the financial and administrative relations between the central government and any independent or quasi-independent Bantustan. At present the budgets of the homeland governments are funded by the central government by something to the order of 80% plus. Of necessity this will have to be continued after "independence". In the case of the Transkei, Paramount Chief Kaiser Matanzima has already indicated that aid will not be sought in the form of loans but of grants, and it has also been suggested that this will proceed on some to be negotiated regular basis. Of course the Bantustan governments will seek to increase the amount and the proportion of their independent levies and taxes, but the scope for this is rather limited particularly if it is restricted to the territorial limits of the homelands themselves. The calculated national income in 1970 of Africans permanently resident outside the homelands was R1 093 million, almost double that of homeland residents and migrant labourers combined (R696 million). (Mercabank-report, Die Burger 22/8/1974). Of this a very high proportion was spent outside the homelands so that the Bantustan governments could undoubtedly make a strong case for a larger share of sales and other indirect taxation. In short, the potential structure of intergovernmental fiscal relations is, if anything, analogous to that between a federal central government and the regional states, but it is not at all comparable to that between independent states, even those joined in an "Economic Common Market". Similar remarks could be made about the administrative relations. It is, of course, unnecessary for me to remark on the complete interdependence of the South African economy which would not be affected in any way by the advent of independence or quasi-independence for the Bantustans. Suf-

fice it to recall the words of Chief Gatsha Buthelezi in his Hoernlé lecture: "The present on-going debate as to what independence is and its extent generates more heat than light . . . The essential factor is that no-one wants South Africa. I have in the past referred to the break-up of the resilient economy of it as the goose that lays the golden egg for all South Africans, whether they be White or Black . . . This is an issue that should also not be skirted for too long. This is where we should begin to agree that the economy of South Africa belongs to all the people of South Africa". One way of going about it would be through a federal arrangement. Whether that takes the form of a system of federal grants-in-aid or of national revenue sharing, and even if the distribution of resources and wealth would be very different from the present ratio, it would be a continuation of the present interdependent economy whose unscrambling remains unthinkable.

■Federation should not be envisaged as an antidote to the basic centralisation of power, at most it can provide a decentralisation of functions■

I am not going to attempt to spell out the details of how these federative features of our present situation might be extended into a full federalisation of South Africa. That would be both presumptuous and silly. At most we might try, always bearing in mind the major obstacles to federation-building, to anticipate in rough outline the crucial stages or transitions on the way to a federation of Southern Africa. I will, in conclusion give a brief sketch of what would be the three chief stages in such a process. The first stage would consist in a greatly accelerated and systematic decentralisation and devolution of powers in large part, though not necessarily exclusive, to the political institutions created in terms of separate development, i.e. to the homeland governments, the CPRC etc. To that extent it would be compatible with the political framework though not with the aims and the practice of that policy as we have known it thus far: it would rather amount to the giving of leverage to the countervailing aims of

the Black leaders in accordance with the "Buthlezi strategy". A number of general and also some more specific suggestions along these lines have been outlined in the Sprocas Political Report: South Africa's Political Alternatives where it is also argued that such political development need not be aimed just at the goal of "independence". We may perhaps just add one rather subtle but also important theoretical distinction which should be borne in mind, viz. that between the decentralisation of power and the decentralisation of functions. It is a well known feature of modern politics that an ever increasing process of decentralisation has taken place in federal systems as much as in unitary states.

Those who would decentralise power would reverse history

William S. Livingston has perceptively remarked that a federation should not be envisaged as an antidote to the basic centralisation of power, at most it can provide a decentralisation of functions: "It is no good talking simply about the centralisation of power . . . those who would decentralise power would reverse history. Since power has already been centralised, it is impossible to seek a decentralisation of power through a conscious decision of the national government, for the very decision to decentralise power could only be made by the government that possesses it. Indeed to seek a decentralisation of function is merely to concede that the power to make the decentralising functions is lodged in the place where it is made. The point, however, is that (in federal systems) the centralisation of power has not been accompanied by a centralisation of function; indeed the centralised power of the national government has frequently been employed to make the decision that the functions of government shall be decentralised" (W. S. Livingston.) In this connection it may be salutary to recall the argument of Barrington Moore that a similar development is also characteristic of totalitarianism: "Totalitarianism represents, in part, an attempt to allocate functions without granting control over the resources that the function requires, in order to prevent the growth of independent bases of power in the hands of subordinates" (Barrington Moore,

Political Power and Social Theory.) The moral is, I suppose, that unless the devolution and decentralisation of functions to the homeland governments and the Coloured Council etc. is accompanied or followed by a sharing of power at the central government it cannot be regarded as a federative move at all.

The second stage, which would move well beyond the present framework of separate development and which could come about as a response to the perception of a serious and direct external threat, might consist in the consolidation of regional states on the model of the Lebowa claims to which I have already referred. In other words the territorial authority of the homeland governments would be very extended to include substantial areas of present "White" farms and towns. Chief Gatsha Buthlezi and other homeland leaders have already repeatedly indicated that they are willing to welcome White residents as loyal homeland citizens and that they do not seek expropriation of all White property. Such a development would involve at least three marked departures from the present homelands policy: the homelands as political units would no longer be defined on an ethnic or racial basis; proper consolidation into regional units that are more viable from an administrative and economic point of view would become possible; and it would not be necessary to proceed with the present policy of spending hundreds of millions of rands in order simply to buy out White landowners. It may be added that the presence of White citizens and residents in these consolidated homeland regions would probably provide strong support for a closer political union with the Republic rather than a more "independent" state. In principle this stage would still be compatible with a continuing parliamentary sovereignty of the central government over the "White" areas as a unitary state. At the same time it would be necessary to devise new comprehensive machinery for political decision-making involving both the central government and the authorities of such regional states in matters such as public finance, economic relations, labour problems, influx control etc. A possible model here could be provided by the Australian Premiers' Conferences, and it might even be said that Mr Vorster's meeting with all the homeland leaders in March of this year represents a first tentative step in that direction.

(Continued on page 23)

suspended for three years, provided she left Paarl by February 28.

It was accepted by the court that Mrs Msolo had been living in Paarl for 22 years. But she could not produced documents to prove that she had resided legally in the area for 10 years, as the Act requires.

All the members of Mrs Msolo's family are legally entitled to remain in Paarl. Only she will have to leave.

Interviewed in her crowded but scrupulously tidy two-roomed shack, Mrs Msolo obviously found it difficult to accept the reality of the court's verdict.

'I feel nasty about the whole thing,' she said. 'Who will look after my children? Where shall I go?'

Eleanor Msolo was married by customary union in 1950. Two years later she joined her husband in the Wellington area, and in 1953 her first child was born.

In 1970 the Msolos were moved to the new

African township of Mbekweni, near Paarl. There they moved into a corrugated iron shack erected by the municipality. They were given to understand that they would eventually be allotted a family home.

But when Mr Msolo went to the township superintendent to apply for a pass for his wife, he was told that the authorities had no record of her entry into the area.

But she was given a monthly visitor's permit which enabled her to live with her husband and children. In 1972 this temporary permission was withdrawn. Mrs Msolo was told she must either leave the area or face prosecution.

The verdict in the Paarl court was Mrs Msolo's third conviction under the Act.

In a letter appealing for help at the time of her first conviction, Mrs Msolo wrote:

'I who have nothing in the Transkei, must now go there. I would go if I had a place there for my children. I don't know what to do. I need help.'

(Continued from page 21)

The third stage, which would constitute the transition to a fully federalised system of Southern Africa would require a number of different moves in fairly close conjunction. These are first, the division of "White" South Africa into a number of regional states on a par as federal units with the homeland regional states; second, the accession of the LBS-countries and Rhodesia (Zimbabwe?) as additional federal units; thirdly the creation of appropriate federal institutions at the centre, in particular a legislative assembly, a separately elected presidential or collegial executive, a reformed Senate or upper chamber with a distinct electoral base as well, and an independent judiciary with powers of judicial review; fourthly, similar federal arrangements and separation of powers at the regional level. The further details of the new federation of South-

ern Africa I am happy to leave in the hands of the "Second South African Convention" where it properly belongs.

Health, Healing and Society — L. G. Wells.

"The Zulus — with whom the author of this essay has come to identify himself — see disease as coming from wrong human relationships. If we accept this understanding as including social as well as personal relationships, we shall find ourselves in entire agreement with the Zulus before we have finished reading this short book."

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Detained

The Attorney General of the Transvaal has confirmed that there are still at least 26 people in detention with no access to family, friends or lawyers.

When will they be charged or released?