



Problems of Government in African States

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THERE ARE GOOD REASONS for discussing problems of government in the whole of the African Continent, rather than in a selected area. If we were concerned solely with the problems of economic development, it might be better to divide the continent into geographical regions, or into areas of influence of the franc, the pound, and the dollar. There is even a case for dividing Africa politically into French-, English-, and Arabic-speaking areas. But we cannot really understand any region of Africa without reference to a number of factors, which are peculiar to the African continent and are to a greater or lesser degree parts of the environmental, historical, economic and political heritage of every country in Africa.

For example, Ivory Coast is a franc-based, French-speaking state, flanked by Liberia, Guinea, Mali, Upper Volta, and Ghana. In appearance and standards of living, it has much in common with Ghana, but its strongest economic ties are with France, with the countries of the Conseil de l'Entente (Upper Volta, Niger and Dahomey), and with the Organisation Commune Africaine et Malgache, whose members extend geographically from Mauritania to Madagascar and Chad to Congo. About one-fourth of its population is made up of immigrants from Upper Volta, Ghana, Togo, Dahomey and Nigeria, and through the influence of Islam it has ties with the Arab world. In political outlook, it has followed what Coleman and Rosberg call the 'Pragmatic-Pluralistic pattern' in contrast to the 'Revolutionary-Centralizing trend' of its 3 neighbours, Guinea, Mali, and Ghana, although it is also a one-party state and has for long been associated with Guinea and Mali through common interest in the R.D.A. It is pro-Western, rather than Pro-Asian or pro-Arab, and it has adopted a policy of growth which has been called 'state capitalism'. Ivory Coast is therefore not just another of the underdeveloped countries of the world which happens to be in West Africa: it is a country whose problems of development and government are peculiarly African and must be seen in the context of the whole continent of Africa. The Pan-African concept has become a political ideal, even though it is still far from being a reality. African states know that their strength lies in greater co-operation amongst themselves, especially in the economic field, though there are few that want the sort of union

advocated by Kwame Nkrumah. Pan-Africanism is not a gimmick, but an idea born of a growing appreciation of the historical unity of the continent of Africa, an idea which even Cecil Rhodes envisaged in his dream of a map that would be pink from Cape to Cairo. In 1944, the Cape Times published a map called "Pan-Africa", with a statement by General Smuts:

"Maps no longer demarcate the separation of states but emphasize their essential unity. Our common task in Africa today is to develop the heritage handed down to us by many men and many nations. This continent rich in untapped wealth, must be used for the common good if real progress is to be achieved. We can thus make Africa the continent of the future." (italics mine)

The extremities of Africa have been drawn together by a variety of processes: the regular stream of trans-Saharan trade united north and west Africa for centuries until the growth of coastal trade and slaving shifted the direction of traffic; the advance of Arab traders and Islam spread elements of cultural unity to places as far afield as Somalia, Libya, Morocco, Senegal, Northern Nigeria, Uganda, Tanzania and Malawi; the colonization of the British and the French brought together vast tracts of Africa by imposing common languages and systems of education, communication, administration and commerce, and most recently, the emergence on the international scene of thirty-five African states within a decade has stimulated a new continental consciousness, and a common desire for rapid social and economic development and the enhancement

of national power and dignity. As if to confirm the emergence of the Pan-African spirit, even the True Whig Party of Liberia awoke from eighty years of complacent oligarchy, the Americo-Liberian class began to turn its attention towards Liberia's African neighbours, and President Tubman formally proposed a community of independent African States at the Sanniquellie Conference of 1959. We in South Africa could well follow this example: our future lies in Africa, and if we do not abandon our nostalgia for a way of life that now exists only in the backward parts of Europe and North America, we may well become as ridiculous as was Liberia in the thirties.

While recognizing the special characteristics of the whole continent of Africa, we must never forget that each African state and its problems are unique. There may appear to be certain similarities between events during the last year in Uganda and Lesotho, even to the extent of the political roles of Catholic and Protestant factions; but if the two situations are studied carefully in context, it is clear that President Obote's masterly handling of the Ugandan crisis and Chief Jonathan's recent performance in Lesotho are very different in causation, motivation, and implication for the future. Comparisons may illuminate a social situation, but they neither explain it nor provide a ready-made solution to its problems. Knowledge and experience of a number of similar situations are merely guides to the analysis of one particular situation in its own context. I shall outline some of the phenomena that are peculiar to the continent of Africa, and some of the chief problems of government in African states: this may serve as a guide with which to approach the analysis of specific problems of government in any one state.

Obviously Africa is unique by virtue of its geography alone. It is not well endowed for the crucial early stages of pre-industrial development, as was much of Asia. Only the countries to its north and south have a mediterranean climate; much of its land is inhospitable, its soil is often poor, communications are generally difficult, and both effective agricultural development and the extraction of its underground wealth require *heavy capital expenditure*. Because of sharp drops to the sea, many rivers are not fully navigable, and the interior remained largely isolated until railway lines, and more recently air strips, were built. Twelve states out of thirty-nine have no coastline, and four have insufficient access, so that for them the goodwill of neighbours is essential. In comparison, out of twenty-four Asian and eleven South American states, only four and two respectively have no coastline.

All the states of Africa are underdeveloped and have a predominantly peasant population, and all, including South Africa, depend for their progress on a steady supply of local labour and massive importation of capital, skills, and equipment from the U.S.A., Britain, and other devel-

oped countries. In this respect, they are like other underdeveloped countries of the world, but there the comparison ends. As President Houphouet Boigny of Ivory Coast has said: "Our sole link with the Asians is underdevelopment, and what differentiates us profoundly is that they suffer from over-population and we from under-population". Gabon is typical of many African states whose productivity could be enormously increased if its population were doubled or trebled; while Uganda is one of the few whose population is at present well adjusted to its area and resources. Africa's population is also unevenly distributed: for instance, sixty per cent of Tanzania is unoccupied and seventy per cent of its population lives in ten per cent of the territory, and populations have too often grown in the areas that are already overpopulated. Africa's peoples have on the whole had a uniformly low standard of living, without the extremes of wealth and poverty encountered in Asia.

Since the era of the Greek and Roman Empires, and probably before that, Africa has had the misfortune of being a pool for the labour and raw materials which were needed to carry out the basic development of non-African communities in other continents and even in Africa itself. The Portuguese depended on African labour for the development of Brazil, and the slave trade played a crucial part in laying the foundations for the economic take-off of both the United States and Britain. Less is known of the activity of Arabs and Asians, but there is little evidence of any development in Africa comparable to what they did in their home countries. Until the period of serious colonization, contact with Europeans and Asians was largely to the detriment of the people of Africa: societies were turned against each other, plundered, decimated, broken; human relations were disrupted by the wholesale introduction of guns and liquor, and disease and misery spread rapidly by the devastation of the land and the disorganisation of its cultivators. The benefits of foreign contacts were tragically outweighed by the disadvantages: the introduction of hardy food crops has been of inestimable value to Africa, and the spread of Islam probably gave north and west Africa a flying start; but the upheaval precipitated centuries of political instability, or alternatively the formation of reactionary feudal societies such as those in Northern Nigeria which, though much appreciated by British administrators, have been a serious barrier to modern progress.

Another unique feature of Africa with which its rulers must contend, is its phenomenal cultural diversity. This may have been imposed naturally by the environment of thick tropical forests, deserts, and harsh savannah country, but an equally significant cultural factor has been the destruction of social security during periods of exploitation and conquest. Groups tend to react to change by cultivating their differences and developing their separateness, and this is par-

ticularly common in societies dominated by the rugged individualism of peasant producers. Africa's peoples have been divided by more linguistic and cultural divisions than are found in any other area of the world, except the highlands of New Guinea and the jungles of the Amazon, but they have shown a remarkable ability to modernize without losing their vigour. Most of the states of Africa are multi-cultural, and cannot be compared to the nation-states of Europe which emerged on the basis of common languages, cultures, and historical experience. Moreover, none of them became independent as a result of outright military conquest. Most of Africa's rulers accept the multi-cultural legacy and are trying to create new, truly national cultures which transcend the old divisions. This is one reason why the multi-cultural states of the U.S.A. and the U.S.S.R. are of great interest to Africans as experiments in nation-building. Because the U.S.S.R. is not very much smaller than Africa in area and population, and has a vast community of peasants, its existence holds out hope for the creation of a Pan-African federation.

Africa has the distinction of being the most recent great land area to be penetrated effectively by Western civilization, and in particular by Protestant, rather than Catholic, Europe. The last phase in the development of modern African nations and in the emergence of the Pan-African concept, began in the first half of the nineteenth century, with the creation of the Zulu nation, the foundation of Liberia in 1822, the Niger expedition of Laird and Lander in 1832, the conquest of Algeria by General Bugeaud, and the establishment of Christian missions in the west and the south, and later in the east, of Africa. After this came a hundred years of colonialism, which decided the pattern and much of the future of modern Africa. Although the colonial powers brought together diverse societies under one government and thereby created new and larger units, Africa has three times as many states as South America, allowing for their respective areas and populations.

Africa therefore has another distinction of having fewer people per state than any other continent. Europe also has many states in a small land area, but although on the average European states are nearly a quarter the size of African states, they have nearly three times the population. Thus in the United Nations, Botswana is fifty-five times as big as Gambia, but less than a fifth the size of India; Botswana has almost twice the population of Gambia, but one five-hundredth of the population of India: all three countries have one vote in the Assembly. African states have been quick to seize on the political and economic advantages of a multiplicity of voices publicly expressing the same views and asking for the same sort of aid and investments, but they are acutely aware of the expense of maintaining delegations, and of the frustrations of lacking the military and economic power

to carry out their intentions. The annual budget of even the relatively prosperous state of Uganda, with a population of over seven million, is less than that of the University of Wisconsin, Madison, with a student body of only 25,000. Even South Africa is not as rich as General Motors. African States have therefore had to develop new ways of acquiring international power.

African governments have inherited a legacy which is enough to daunt the most resourceful and energetic nation, and did in fact defeat the colonial powers. Even South Africa, with all its advantages of climate, capital investment, skilled personnel, and legislation to mobilize and control labour, has been able to develop only a tiny fraction of its land and peoples to anything like their full potential. The legacy comprises three sets of problems: environmental, cultural, and historical or colonial. But they cannot be considered separately.

In most African states, governments have to tame rugged land with a shortage of capital and machinery, and of skilled and even unskilled manpower; in addition, they have to mobilize, train, and create a nation out of a largely apathetic and self-contained peasant population; and thirdly, they have to cope with 'artificial' economic and social structures that were created to be of far greater benefit to the imperial countries than to their dependencies. Each set of problems impinges on the other. Development of natural resources depends on getting enough capital and suitably trained manpower, which in turn depends on the policy decisions that governments make about taxation, foreign investment, educational priorities, and relations with other states. The forms that such government decisions take will inevitably be affected by the patterns of development, government, and international relations bequeathed by colonial powers, as well as by the degree of modernization and national integration achieved by the local population.

There are a few basic differences between French and British colonial rule, which have affected patterns of government in several African states. For instance, the French adopted a policy of assimilation and centralized administration, and made French the language of administration. Africans were sitting in the French Assembly and holding French ministerial posts long before their countries achieved independence. The British practised indirect rule, used the local languages for administration, and tended to encourage the development of traditional systems. Until after the 1939-45 war, the British spent much more time than the French on development, and in particular they spent it on hospitals and schools, while the French concentrated on ports and railways. Now the French are giving far more aid than the British to their former colonies.

Both the French and British regimes geared education to the colonial set-up: there was a

tendency to boost literary education and decri manual work, and to train lawyers and literary critics rather than doctors, engineers, scientists and agricultural experts. In most states, there is still only a very small proportion of the population employed in managerial, technical, craftsman and supervisory grades, which are essential elements for productive efficiency and growth. Worse still, when independence came a large proportion of the skilled men available was swallowed up into political and senior administrative posts. Critical decisions have to be made about education and manpower, and a balance has to be struck between primary, secondary, technical and university education. Most states allocate between 10 and 15 per cent of their budget to education, whilst Nigeria decided to spend as much as 40 per cent. In 1966 South Africa and Sudan spent respectively 3.9 and 6.4 per cent on education and 14.8 and 14.1 per cent on defence. Liberia spends 6 per cent on education and 10 per cent on foreign delegations.* Universal primary education is an aim in most states, but it can be a mixed blessing and a political risk unless there is adequate employment or room in secondary schools to take up its products. In order to spend money profitably and equitably on the primary phases of education, Guinea decided early against creating a University, which would have been an effective prestige symbol, and has risked sending its students overseas for higher education.

The economies of most African states have been precariously dependent on the extraction of one or two minerals, or on the quasi-monoculture of cotton, cocoa, peanuts, palm oil, or some other product whose value depends on fluctuating world prices. The economies were predominantly agrarian, and industries were largely devoted to processing raw materials. Each unit was a part of the economy of a colonial power, and as such was designed to provide a few raw materials and

* Some figures for the percentage of national budgets devoted to education, health & defence in 1964 were:—

	<i>Education</i>	<i>Health</i>	<i>Defence</i>
Ghana	17.6	5.5	6.6
Kenya	13.3	4.9	2.2
South Africa	4.9	3.1	10.4
Sudan	6.1	4.6	9.8
Tanzania	18.3	7.7	15.3
Togo	13.8	11.3	12.6
Uganda	13.9	7.4	4.1
U.A.R.	12.7	4.6	24.3

Figures for 1966 show a tendency of some to spend more on defence and less on education:—

	<i>Education</i>	<i>Defence</i>
South Africa	3.9	14.8
Sudan	6.4	14.1
Tanzania	14.5	15.7
Uganda	10.3	10.2

to be a market for manufactured goods. The chief problem for governments is to diversify these economies and to spread development to areas which the colonial regimes ignored. Interstate co-operation is also necessary, to avoid reduplication of expensive industries and luxury enterprises.

The unevenness of African development, which was largely due to the economic objectives of colonialism, has led to serious problems of community development. The chain of events which led to the inauguration of the Uganda Protectorate and to the establishment there of coffee and cotton as cash crops, also led to the construction of the railway from Mombasa, through Kikuyu and Luo country, to Kampala, and to the foundation of Nairobi as a railhead camp and stores depot in 1899, and to the development of Kikuyu land by white settlers. Thus the Ganda, the Kikuyu, and the Luo were nearer the centres of modernization than other peoples, and in spite of all the disadvantages of the colonial regime they were given a flying start, which makes it all the more difficult for them to share their windfall with those who did less well out of the colonial economy.

The urban centres and lines of communication that have already been partly developed naturally attract further investment, and as things are at present South Africa is the only country whose government is able to dictate terms and direct capital to less immediately profitable areas — and even the South African government is not being as firm as it could be for the good of the country. Quite apart from doing what is necessary for balanced economic development, it is very much in the political interests of governments to show that all sections of the community will benefit from their schemes. There is inevitably a tendency for national politics to be used preferentially for the development of a section of the community, which thereby takes the lead and gets other benefits in education, commerce, and industry. National leaders and mass parties may have initially gained power by rallying groups on a communal basis, or identifying with traditional elements, but they cannot afford to continue on this basis. In Tanzania, President Nyerere is the son of a chief, but TANU (Tanganyika African National Union) is a very efficient national party, and communal politics do not figure in its activities. In Guinea, Sekou Touré gained much support by virtue of being a lineal descendant of Chief Samory, whom the French displaced in the late nineteenth century, but he came to power via trade unions, and the single party rule of the PDG (Parti Démocratique de Guinée) is socialistic and traditional chiefs have been abolished.

African governments have to direct their political programmes towards specific technical problems of national development and can ill afford to attend preferentially to the welfare of factions


or sections of their population. Sometimes, in the task of achieving national integration and full participation in economic development they may have to risk displeasing the very group that brought them to power. For instance, in Uganda it was the alliance with the royalist Kabaka Yekka party that brought the nationally-minded UPC (Uganda People's Congress) to power at the time of independence. But early in 1966, when it looked as if a faction of KY and UPC members would destroy the dominance of the more radical, nationally-minded UPC wing, the UPC had to consolidate its forces at the risk of alienating its KY support. Premier Obote's swift and decisive political action encouraged waverers to swing to the support of the UPC, and subsequent amendments to the constitution consolidated the power of the central government. The Kingdom of Buganda had been the main obstacle to this, but Buganda was sufficiently unpopular with some of the other kingdoms, such as Bunyoro, that the UPC was able to 'divide and rule'.

Even when a degree of national integration has been achieved, it is often difficult to know where power really lies, and what section of the community may suddenly erupt. In Kenya at the time of independence, the membership of KANU (Kenya African National Union) was predominantly Kikuyu and Luo, and it stood for a strong central government. Moreover, as I have said, the Kikuyu and the Luo had by accident become the inheritors of commercial development in urban areas, notably Nairobi, the seat of government. The opposition party, KADU (Kenya African Democratic Union), represented the smaller tribes and not surprisingly favoured regional control. Ultimately, in the interests of national unity, KADU was graciously dissolved in November 1964 by its leader, Ronald Ngala, who was rewarded with a cabinet post in May 1966. There was a further shift of power, when the left-wing KPU (Kenya People's Union), a splinter party of the Luo leader Oginga Odinga, was heavily defeated in June 1966 and certain left-wing members were banned. In September, Rembrandt Tobacco Company, under cover of Rothman's of Pall Mall, skilfully bought out Vice-President Murumbi, who was replaced by Daniel Arap Moi, an able politician who comes from Nakuru. He is hopefully said to represent the interests of the smaller tribes, and in particular the agriculturally oriented section of the community. However, it would be naive to think that Kenya's political future depends simply on the unification of communal elements, which President Kenyatta has apparently accomplished with great skill. Future power could lie with adherents of a particular policy, or with organisations that transcend both tribe *and* party, such as youth movements or the trade unions, through which Tom Mboya originally came to the fore. As a result of increasing modernization, new extra-party bureaucratic and technical groups could

begin to press for political power, and they might well find the administration of the ruling party weakened because its ablest men are involved in the business of government. (This has *not* happened in the one-party states of the USSR and Eastern European countries, however). Trouble on the border between Kenya and Somalia could indirectly lead to numerical growth and greater influence of the military in the political field. Military cliques have played an increasing role in African politics, though more often to seek relief for specific grievances, rather than political power. Even Tanzania's strong governing party (TANU) "was helpless in the face of a few hundred disgruntled soldiers striking for higher pay and accelerated promotion" early in 1964 (James S. Coleman and Carl G. Rosberg Jr. (ed), *Political Parties and National Integration in Tropical Africa*, University of California Press, 1964, p.677). New power groups could even emerge within Kenya's rural co-operatives, which have not been as successful as they have been in some French-speaking territories.

The future role of the predominantly peasant population of Africa is still an unknown quantity. Hitherto, they have been coaxed to the polls by the party that speaks their language, has the best organised transport, or is able to make some immediately intelligible appeal on the basis of a local issue. It is difficult to estimate how deep-rooted is their support of any regime. For centuries they have accepted oppression and protection, and the comings and goings of ruling dynasties, with indifference and patience. Only under very special circumstances, such as in Ruanda, have African peasants risen unanimously and conclusively against a regime. Peasants are relatively independent of other producers and of the market, and in many parts of Africa the system of land tenure is not feudal and chiefs are not landlords: as long as a family stays in the same area, the family farm is passed down from generation to generation, and it therefore remains a stable source of occupation and income. When peasants are encouraged to improve their land, they are often afraid that its better appearance will hasten its confiscation.

The most urgent priorities in Africa today are reforms of systems of land tenure, the full incorporation of peasants in modernization and development through the effective dissemination of new economic opportunities and values, and the urgent animation of the countryside in town-centred economies. The problem has been well worked out by René Dumont in *L'Afrique noire est mal partie* (Paris, 1962), and I will not discuss it further except to say that it is essentially a political problem: it requires a revolutionary outlook on modern values, and it is made all the more difficult by the fact that there has been a shocking lack of attention to agricultural development in many African universities. This is very short-sighted, because "an agrarian revolution must both precede and accompany an industrial



revolution". The main conclusion of Professor A. Lewis's report on *Industrialization in the Gold Coast* (Accra, 1953) was:—

"The most certain way to promote industrialization in the Gold Coast is to lay the foundation it requires by taking vigorous measures to raise food production per person engaged in agriculture. This is the surest way of producing the large and ever-increasing demand for manufactures without which there can be little industrialization."

Guy Hunter has commented on this (Guy Hunter, *The New Societies of Tropical Africa*, OUP, 1962, p. 69):—

"If there is to be an African personality in the modern world, a great part of it must be rooted in the land, round which both cult and community have been built, which is woven into every institution, which lies deep in the texture of language, and moves the heart and energies of every African more surely than any other

vision. Co-operative cultivation, common effort in clearing, in harvesting, in house building, in herding cattle all go back to ancient and still lively patterns of African life. If there is a place in the world in which 'human investment' can be harnessed to cut shorter the road into the modern world, it is to be found in the villages of Africa."

The growth of towns and the development of industries are, of course, essential features of modernization in any society, but I think it is high time that we questioned the assumption that urban life is synonymous with a modern outlook. It is not so in industrial Britain, and I can see no reason why it must be so in Africa. Many African cities are cluttered up with old-fashioned people who merely put on the trappings of modernity, while there are thousands of really modern people who have been brought up in the country. A modern outlook can only be acquired by association with other modern people and interestingly enough there are many Africans

whose close personal contact with seemingly stuffy missionaries in rural areas has helped them to become more modern than their urban contemporaries, whose contact with modern people has been very superficial. There is therefore hope that country areas will be regarded as places of modernization fit for modern people, as much as the towns.

There is another unfortunate colonial legacy which hampers the development of a truly modern outlook. Inflated wages and a life of luxury were introduced by, and for the benefit of, European settlers and businessmen. A pattern of living standards was set far above the average in Europe, let alone what can be rapidly attained in Africa, and it is unfortunately being maintained by the numerous expatriate businessmen, teachers and technical experts, who often do useful work, but at a price. It should not be forgotten that it was the poorest and least ostentatious of all expatriates who laid the *real* foundations of modern Africa: I refer not to early traders and administrators, but to the missionaries, who brought printing and education, without which no modern society could come into being.

The prevalent pattern of luxurious living adds to the difficulties that face the men who have taken on the mantle of government. The lives of colonial administrators were usually comfortable, though never luxurious, and they were assured of employment and a pension, whereas the salaries of their successors depend on the votes of their constituents. Under such circumstances it is hard for public servants to be entirely impartial and incorruptible and for a man to resist a chance to consolidate his position, or at least assure himself of an income should he fall from power. Even the incorruptible colonial administrators rarely hesitated to show favour to certain sections of the population. The source of their power lay in the forces they could command from the mother country, such as a gunboat, an infantry battalion, and access to or refusal of money. Their successors assumed their positions, but not their powers. Most African states lack an effective army or police force, and even if such forces exist, there is no guarantee that they will take orders from the civil power. If party support or legislation cannot ensure adequate power, at least wealth offers an alternative means. It becomes especially attractive when there is a class of people who are both rich and show it. Why should the new rulers be less impressive than expatriate residents and many of their own subjects? In assessing the quality of government in African states, we must remember that when there are rumours or established cases of corruption, they have often been precipitated by a representative of one of the 'advanced' nations, who has wanted import permits, TV rights, a cotton monopoly, a favoured factory site, buying preferences, or political influence. To my mind, the remarkable thing about

tropical African states is not that there is corruption, but that there is so little corruption, and that it is often criticized openly and even successfully rooted out.

Finally, before considering briefly what some African governments are doing about their problems, we must not forget the tremendous psychological difficulties that all governing parties faced after independence. The excitement of revolutionary political controversy faded into the humdrum problems of development, and 'the government', which as colonial government had for long been an object of abuse, had to become praiseworthy. Many governing parties were poorly organized and faction-ridden, so that the single party was by no means as effective as it might seem. However, the fact that independence was successfully achieved has created confidence in the judgement of certain quasi-charismatic leaders, especially the older men, and people are still prepared to accept what Houphouët-Boigny or Mzee Kenyatta ask them to do. Similarly, by truculence towards the West, and systematic non-alignment, a younger man like Sekou Touré has gained prestige and authority, as has Julius Nyerere by his cultivation of African values and his exposition of African Socialism.

Problems of government in Africa are primarily problems of development, but the success or failure of development plans depends very much on purely political decisions. If rulers see government as a problem of power, and tend to perpetuate the colonial solution of bureaucratic authoritarianism, making no distinction between politics and administration, it is because they feel that they need the maximum power to make free decisions and to carry out programmes for rapid development. Power is needed both to mobilize the local population and to attract the interest of other states for the sake of investment and development. Because of Africa's unique position in the world today, the methods of African governments are sometimes surprising, and may even seem to be diametrically opposed to their avowed aim of development. For instance, African states could gain much by co-operation with South Africa, especially in the field of education: as it is, many African leaders were trained at Fort Hare. But they prefer to pursue a campaign against South Africa, Rhodesia and Portugal, because they consider it necessary for their own future welfare. It is not a ploy to divert the attention of their own people from troubles at home, nor is it an attempt to lay hands on Southern Africa's resources and wealth. If African states can persuade the powerful nations that certain human values really are more important to man than material comfort, and if these powerful nations then show themselves prepared to act in support of those values rather than solely in the interest of profits in commerce and industry, there is a real hope that a new era may dawn in the social and economic development of Africa in particular, and

of the world in general, in which economies are organized to meet human needs rather than to reap profits.

To many African states, Southern Africa seems to provide a test case for the kind of relationship that the rich nations propose to have with the poor nations, and this is why the outcome is so important for their future development. If the Americans and the British could show that they are prepared to sacrifice commercial interests for moral principles in Southern Africa, they might do the same in other parts of Africa. They might then, for example, finance the building of factories in rural areas not because it is likely to be immediately profitable, but because it is necessary for the welfare of a depressed population. The constant refusal of African politicians to compromise on moral issues may lead temporarily to a decrease in the flow of aid and foreign capital. But many believe that in the long run the rich nations will feel the pinch, and that they will realize that neither paternalism, nor provisional technical aid, nor conditional foreign capital are a substitute for world economic planning, in which the economic surplus of the rich nations will be used for the *development* of the poor nations, and not primarily for investment in them. They want to show people that it is not Britain and the U.S.A., but individual British and American businessmen, that gain by trading with South Africa and Rhodesia, and that the *nations* of Britain and the U.S.A. might gain more by a different policy.

In discussions of development in African states, great importance is often attached to political stability, and a significant relationship between political systems and economic development seems to be assumed. What is too often forgotten is the astonishing political *instability* that has accompanied the economic growth of many European countries. Besides, in Africa there are countries in strategic positions which stand to get more in the way of aid and investment if they are a little unpredictable, and even unstable, politically.

In Africa, the political community is not yet synonymous with the economic community, as it tended to be under imperial or traditional tribal rule. The tribal system was essentially a technique of organizing the economic life of communities. Very often rulers did not share the same cultural tradition as their subjects, and if they stressed the value of those traditions it was done primarily to win support. Although people aligned themselves with rulers and factions for reasons of economic security, it was the political decisions that settled the courses that economies took. Similarly, the future of African states depends on sound economic planning, but it is the *political* decisions which determine the success or failure of these plans in the long run. We know what industries, hydro-electric projects, and other developments could and should be carried out in Lesotho. But how is the money to

be raised and how are schemes to be carried out and by whom? Will local men be trained to do most of the skilled work before a project is begun, or will the project be rushed through with the expensive assistance of expatriates, who will take money out of the country? Which private sources, or international funds will be tapped for what project? What will be the effect of such projects? Will they make the country stronger and more truly independent, or will they simply entrench Lesotho as a satellite of South Africa and improve the standard of living of only a small section of the community? These are the crucial decisions which affect the future of a country, and they are political decisions which governments ought to be free to make. They must be made in the best interests of the spiritual, as well as the material, well-being of a people. Aid and investment are of little value unless they can increase the dignity of a nation and its function in international affairs, as well as its material comfort. If some history seems to be determined by economic factors, and political action is related to economic growth, it is only because people abdicate their right to make free decisions. In the modern world, no state is economically independent of others, but every state has a chance to make an original contribution to the history of mankind by overcoming its economic disadvantages with vigorous political action.

The major problem of governments in African states is therefore to mobilize their *human* resources, in order to improve the appearance of the continent, raise standards of living, and to add a new dimension to the history of man. The world situation is such that no unit smaller than a state is likely to achieve much in Africa, and the co-operation of groups of states, or even of the whole continent, will achieve much more. There are the obvious technical problems of finding capital from home and abroad; developing the skills, energy and initiative without which capital cannot be made productive; and deciding rightly on priorities between industry and agriculture and as between infrastructure and productive investment. Attempts to solve these problems will be of little avail until African peasants really begin to move in the same direction as their governments, and both know more or less where they are going. The 'vertical' integration of elite and mass is a more real and pressing problem than the 'horizontal' integration of linguistic and cultural groups. African governments have opted for a high degree of state planning, and for a curtailment of certain individual freedoms, but few have produced original forms of government that incorporate the peasantry effectively in the process of modernization, and not many have pursued as vigorously as Guinea, Mali and Tanzania a policy of eradicating oligarchy and paternalism.

Most African governments have carried on in the colonial tradition. They have adopted the

colonial techniques of patronage, especially in the allocation of educational opportunities; of persuasion, conversion, and the integration of non-party associations; of electoral and constitutional changes, and even deportation, banning, and imprisonment.

If African states are to make a mark on the world, they must either beat the existing great powers at their own game, or they must start a new game. Not during the next fifty years at least has any any country in Africa a hope of equalling the United States, Russia, Great Britain, Germany, Japan or France in economic development and material prosperity. South Africa may be the richest and most overtly stable country in Africa, but I see little merit in its apparent aim of being a rather inferior carbon copy of the United States, or Germany, or Britain, especially as this achievement depends on the worship of materialism and the denial of Christian values. Tanzania, on the other hand, is one of the poorest countries in Africa, but it has the distinction of striking out in a new direction, and may ultimately make a greater mark on the world: it is a nation that stands for indigenous cultural achievement, non-sectionalism, non-communalism, non-racialism, and a new kind of democracy. The traditional African technique of talking until unanimous agreement is reached, rather than forcing so-called majority decisions, may be one which the world needs to adopt. President Nyerere has argued with conviction that the traditional type of African one-party democracy is freer than the organized two-party system of the West: he has even said, "How can you have a democracy *with* a two-party system?" He maintains that in states with one truly representative national party, voters stand to get better government, by choosing the individual instead of the party label. Furthermore, all points of view are fully and freely discussed at local party meetings, and by the National Executive. In Parliament, the party line must be followed, and there should be no unnecessary discussion, so that accepted legislation may be carried through as quickly and efficiently as possible. Even so, debates in many African parliaments exhibit a wide range of discussion and criticism, in spite of the contrary impression that is given in news reports.

There is, of course, a real danger that democratic one-party systems can become authoritarian, particularly in view of the colonial legacy. The distinguished Ghanaian, Robert Gardiner, was one of the first to underscore the authoritarian side of African political development, the interest in power for its own sake, and he stressed that there must be room for differences of opinion and a recognition of the idea of an 'adversary in good faith'. But he also suggested that the mechanics of government should not be emphasized to the exclusion of the purposes of government. The aims of opposition parties are generally considered questionable. For instance

many opposition groups were members of the pre-independence establishment, whose noses were put out of joint when the colonial government nurtured the revolutionary parties with mass following, and gave them an aura of legitimacy at the time of independence. The shortage of trained men had tended to create an elite, and that elitism has furthered the one-party tendency, because "it carries the implicit presumption that the governing group possesses a monopoly of wisdom and legitimacy. It follows, therefore, that in their view an opposition group recruited from the same social strata as the elite is either frivolous and irrelevant, or dangerously subversive because its members seek only power" (Coleman and Rosberg, *op.cit.*, p.662).

The struggle between opposition and government may also reflect outside interference in a country's affairs, and therefore have little to do with the welfare of the state. The present purpose of government in Africa is to achieve the ends of rural animation, the gradual industrialization of agriculture, and the raising of the standard of living of millions of peasants. One-party states, pan-African collaboration, and a policy of non-alignment are seen as means to this end. The crushing problem is poverty, and the sad fact is that the important economic decisions are not yet being taken in Africa. If careful and honest investigations were made, I think it would be found that the apparent political instability and the rise and fall of individuals and factions in some African states, are by no means due solely to the inadequacy of local politicians and administrators, nor even to the desperate shortage of skilled personnel. African states are too often at the mercy of political and economic forces in Europe, America and Asia in general, and politically biased advisers and investors or unscrupulous entrepreneurs in particular. African governments do not expect aid and capital investment without strings, but they prefer the stringent technical conditions attached to loans from international lending institutions, such as the World Bank, to the political and economic commitment of government-to-government finance. Several delegates at a recent conference on development in Nairobi even considered foreign private investment to be better than public investment, provided it can be controlled and directed.

There can be no single or approved solution for the mechanics of government to be chosen for the purposes of development and the attainment of national dignity in Africa. In spite of the tight and effective organization of the PDG, Guinea has not developed as rapidly as some other countries, while Tunisia, with the comparably effective organization, of Neo-Destour socialism, has done well. Similarly, states with looser organizations have developed both rapidly and slowly. Even if the Gross Domestic Product can be taken as a reliable index of growth, it does not fluctuate significantly with the course of political

events, with the possible single exception of the Congolese Republic, and in Asia the radically different systems of government in India and Pakistan have not produced any appreciable difference in the Gross Domestic Product per head of total population in those countries.

The term that is often used to describe the policy of most African governments is African Socialism, though each nation interprets its major tents according to its own needs. African Socialism is pragmatic: it rejects the Russian emphasis on class war, which it finds irrelevant in Africa; it rejects the Peking doctrine of the armed revolution; and it approves of the one-party state, which is opposed by democratic socialists. It asserts and assures the political personality of Africa, the cultural autonomy of each nation, a new concept of socio-economic development, and the propagation of African spiritual values. By adhering to the doctrines of African Socialism, African states are in a stronger position to maintain their policies of non-alignment, which protects their independence; single party rule, which is designed to hasten national integration; and Pan-Africanism, which insures against inter-African disputes and strengthens each state in its struggle for identity and purpose.

President Nyerere has warned Africans of the dangers of "the second scramble for Africa".^{*} He laments that even the socialist countries have joined the capitalist countries in using their

^{*} See Julius Nyerere, "The Second Scramble" and "Democracy and the Party System", reprinted in Rupert Emerson and Martin Kilson (ed.), *The Political Awakening of Africa*, New Jersey, Prentice Hall, 1965, pp. 162-165 and 122-128.

wealth for power and prestige, rather than the eradication of poverty, and that one millionaire will spend millions on destroying another. He argues that the pattern of imperialism has changed, and instead of one imperialist power fighting against another, Africans will be turned against Africans. The big powers are attempting by means of slogans to divide and rule Africa and to thwart African collaboration: talk of creating larger units is dismissed as 'artificial', although African colonial boundaries could hardly be more artificial; attempts to deal with tribalism are labelled 'dictatorship'; and moves for unity are 'communist' or 'imperialist' plots, depending on the affiliations of the power-hungry accuser. African nations must stand together and resist the destruction of their value systems and their hopes for a better standard of living. "African nationalism is meaningless, is anachronistic, and is dangerous, if it is not at the same time Pan-Africanism."

Years of dependence have brought to the people of Africa a hesitation to take responsibility, and the presence of rich, powerful, materialistic countries in the world can dull the spiritual drive of people and blunt the instruments and purposes of government in poorer countries. If decisions are made about Africa's future in London and Washington, African states are no more free than if they were made in Moscow or Peking. African states have to become masters of their own destinies, and the surest way to achieve both true political independence and ultimately the economic viability that entrenches it, is for them to commit themselves firmly to the Pan-African ideal and to reject any individual short-term economic gains which involve compromise of aims, or alignment at the expense of another African nation.

Separate but Equal

I WAS SITTING on my doorstep this afternoon, watching from a distance the official opening of a new Municipal Swimming Pool. The whole enormity of the crime and evil of apartheid with its hypocritical references to equal facilities hit me like a ton of bricks. We are close enough to have watched the whole thing being built. The Africans dug the pool, put in the filtration plant, grew the grass and got drunk on the site on Fridays for want of something better to do; today the same Africans put up the bunting, carried the wire for the loudspeakers, carried the tables and chairs for the distinguished guests and swept the concrete. And at the given time, who jumped in in their privileged hundreds? All the little white bodies, and the Africans stood and watched, now on the other side of the fence of course, and smiled. It's really those smiles which break my heart most of all — they only have to smile and everyone says what wonderful natures they have — a

happy contented lot whose jaws are probably aching with the strain.

As I went indoors and ran the bath for my children another aspect of 'equal facilities' came to mind. A friend of mine remarked recently that he didn't really mind filling his own bath at night with a hose through the window from the tap outside, and then waiting an hour and a half for the immersion heater to warm it up sufficiently — that he was used to — but what did annoy him was having to empty the bath afterwards, bucket by bucket, by which time the point of the operation was somewhat lost. The same good-natured smile?

If, in this day and age, a humble bath-plug becomes a privilege rather than a right then I am sick and ashamed of my race classification. We could do well perhaps to remember that the U.S. Supreme Court, in 1954 handed down a judgement which said that separate but equal facilities had proved inherently unequal. V.L.