

SPRO-CAS: OCCASIONAL PUBLICATION NO.3

DIRECTIONS OF CHANGE  
IN  
SOUTH AFRICAN  
POLITICS

General Editor  
Peter Randall

THE STUDY PROJECT ON CHRISTIANITY  
IN APARTHEID SOCIETY

JOHANNESBURG

1971



DIRECTIONS OF CHANGE

IN

SOUTH AFRICAN

POLITICS

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## WHAT IS SPRO-CAS ?

**THE STUDY PROJECT** on Christianity in Apartheid Society was established in the middle of 1969 and its work will be completed during 1971.

The aim of the project's sponsors, the South African Council of Churches and the Christian Institute of Southern Africa, was to call together a body of experts to examine the implications of applying Christian principles to the major areas of our national life and to make recommendations for a juster social order.

The original stimulus for Spro-cas was provided by the Message to the People of South Africa, which was issued by the Theological Commission of the South African Council of Churches in September 1968. The Message provided the basic theological foundation for the project, i.e. the Gospel as reconciliation.

Six commissions were established to study the following aspects of South African life, the 'apartheid society': economics, education, law, politics, sociology and the Church. The members of the Commissions were chosen on the basis of their intellectual and practical ability and their acceptance of the need for change in South Africa in the direction of reconciliation and love. Nearly 150 South Africans, who probably constitute the most broadly representative group ever assembled in this country to examine its national life, agreed to serve on the six commissions, either as members or consultants.

In addition, a large number of people outside the immediate membership of the commissions have been consulted and their contributions have significantly added to the depth of the work being done by the commissions.

Spro-cas is now approaching a position where it is possible to anticipate the publication of the final reports of the six commissions. These will be published independently of each other, in English and Afrikaans, during the first half of 1971, and will be followed by a co-ordinated report drawing on the findings of all the commissions.

As a preliminary to these reports, it has been decided to issue a series of Spro-cas Occasional Publications containing some of the working documents prepared for the commissions.

The first title in this series was *Anatomy of Apartheid*, published in November 1970 and containing papers by Mr. Lawrence Schlemmer, Mr. Andre Brink, Mr. Robin Siedle and Dr. F. van Zyl Slabbert. The second was *South Africa's Minorities* (January 1971), with papers by Mrs. Fatima Meer, Mr. W.A. (Bill) de Klerk, Mr. C.O. Gardner and Dr. M.G. Whisson, and an introduction by Professor H.W. van der Merwe.

The present collection will be followed by *Some Implications of Inequality* (Dr. E.A. Barker, the Rev. C. Desmond, Professor J.V.O. Reid, and Professor H.L. Watts).

Advance orders for Spro-cas publications should be addressed to:

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## INTRODUCTION

THE WORD 'directions', as used in the title of this publication, has several inter-related meanings. It refers to both the ends and the means of political action; to continuing political trends in South Africa; and to the implications of these trends for the future. The five papers that follow touch on all of these themes, although they do so in different ways, and with varying emphases.

From the very start, the six Spro-cas commissions have faced complex problems of choice between various possible long-term goals, between widely different strategies to achieve these goals, and between divergent interpretations of current political trends in South Africa. The frank recognition of the complexity of these problems and the consequent re-examination of many long-held suppositions about and prescriptions for South African society have possibly been the most fruitful and exciting aspects of the commissions' work.

The Political Commission's analysis of the present political position in the country was given in the first volume in this series, *Anatomy of Apartheid*. Faced with the hard and complex realities of this position and the difficulties of bringing about change in line with the commission's principles of justice, equality and effective participation in government, the members recognised the need to examine in detail possible alternative political approaches. Some of the working papers which explore



these approaches are presented here.

Many members of the Spro-cas commissions have come to see that it is an over-simplification to believe that the ultimate political goal must necessarily be nothing other than a universal franchise within a common polity of the Western constitutional-democratic type, and that the only respectable action in our situation is that which undeviatingly propagates or facilitates this.

One of the questions faced in the commissions has been whether a slow, evolutionary progression towards a society based on the Western capitalist democratic model would merely replace racial with heightened class differences, encourage such attitudes as materialism and competitiveness, and perpetuate unequal access to political privilege. Possibly a pluralist form of political development would provide a better basis for the realisation of eventual political equality in the future. Our discussions have indicated a need for liberals, radicals and moderates who oppose apartheid to question their basic premises and to re-examine their goals. This applies equally to those who favour an integrated political system and those who advocate some form of pluralism.

Much thought has also been given in Spro-cas to methods of achieving social and political change and in this area, too, significant re-thinking has taken place. In the light of past failures, it is surprising that so many people working for change in South Africa persist in the repetition of self-justifying rituals of protest or persuasion, aimed primarily at changing the attitudes of the whites. More spectacular but equally dismal failures have to date followed on activities aimed at awakening political activism among the black proletariat.

Such activities often reveal a misconception of the strength of self-interest in society, of the potential effectiveness of marginal pressure groups, and, indeed, of the very nature of social change. Change, broadly speaking, comes about as a result of internal contradictions in society which become too serious to be accommodated any longer; as a result of conflicts between opposing interest groups powerful enough to influence each other's actions; as a result of adaptations to changing technological or economic conditions; or as a result of effective external pressures.

Deliberate action for change by individuals and small interest groups may thus be directly effective only when processes of social change give such groups heightened prestige or influence, or when the goals of the action are closely congruent with changing community values or needs. In the absence of such

favourable conditions, patient work aimed at achieving intermediate objectives may become necessary. It might, for example, be more realistic and creative at this stage to aim at the effective functioning of local government bodies for Africans than to press on bald-headed for the non-racial millennium.

Action for change must be closely related to continuing social processes, even at the cost of relinquishing some cherished idealism in practice. It must take into account the obvious fact that people involved in a social system often closely reflect that system in their values and attitudes. Despite obvious reasons for conflict or resistance and despite evidence of discontent, a considerable degree of consensus or compliance can still exist. To assume, for example, that South Africa's blacks are in a constant ferment over the injustices perpetrated upon them is to under-estimate the effectiveness of the very oppression and conditioning to which they are subjected. Similarly, most whites are probably sufficiently conditioned by our social system to be unable to question the very basis of their privilege: it would thus be surprising if well-motivated protest and exhortation were to make them feel guilty or apologetic enough to initiate change voluntarily.

In different ways, the five papers that follow deal with these and other fundamental questions which the Spro-cas commissions have had to face since their inception. The results of their work will be published, in due course, in reports which aim to make an important contribution to public thinking in the apartheid society.

## NOTES ON THE PAPERS

At an early stage in its life the Spro-cas Political Commission adopted the following statement as a guideline:

*'We accept as a basic principle that people of all groups in South Africa should be brought into meaningful participation in political life.'*

*'We do not believe that this principle is realised in the present political conditions in South Africa, nor do we believe that the application of it can be identified exclusively with only one political system or approach.'*

*'The problem facing us is not only what the best 'solution' may be in theoretical terms, but also how the transition from the present political situation, with its special difficulties and limitations, is to be achieved.'*

Much of the subsequent life of the Commission was concerned with the problem described in the last paragraph of this statement. This involved examining possible alternatives to the present political system in South Africa. Four of the papers contained in this booklet were written as working documents to assist the Commission in this task.

Mr. Schlemmer's paper was originally prepared for the Social Commission, which wanted an expert assessment of possible future political developments on which to base strategies for social change.

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# FUTURE POLITICAL IMPLICATIONS OF PRESENT TRENDS

lawrence schlemmer

SOUTH AFRICANS who are actively trying to encourage meaningful change towards greater equality in their society generally lack influence and bargaining power. While often realising this, they tend nevertheless to act as if sincere protest and rational argument will influence the thinking of significant numbers of Whites or their political leaders. I am not suggesting that these efforts have had no effect whatsoever, but it seems to be becoming increasingly obvious that alternatives which offer opportunities for more salient and significant action should be sought. In the search for effective strategies, a primary requirement is that action should be 'situated' and formulated in relation to likely future developments which might facilitate the effects of some types of action and weaken the effects of others. To this end, I have made an attempt to assess, in broad outline, what the current social and political trends in South Africa suggest for the future.

This exercise is not offered as an attempt at prediction as such, since it would be beyond the capacities of anyone to take account of the inter-relationship of all the variables likely to be involved in processes of change in South Africa. It is offered simply as a basis for practical action which might be preferable to blind hope or the self-justification arising from strong commitment which is so often the orientation within

which protest occurs. It is also hoped that this analysis will enable a clearer distinction to be drawn between the ends and means of protest and related political action in South Africa. All too often the goals of political activity condition the means employed: the Liberals who hoped for a common society felt constrained to mirror that goal in any political organisation they engaged in. Many less obvious examples exist. This approach, its obvious moral integrity notwithstanding, is often not politically appropriate, and the following analysis is aimed at helping to isolate practical approaches which could result in ends being achieved which might bear little overt relationship to the means employed.

In a previous paper (1) I have dealt with a variety of current trends in South African society and politics in some detail, backing up any conclusions drawn with as much documentary and empirical evidence as I could find. It does not seem necessary to repeat that exercise in this paper, and I will therefore simply refer to some of the evidence presented in the earlier paper, adding references to more recent developments where necessary. In the present paper the aim has not been to present an exhaustive review of trends among all groups, but rather to concentrate on those aspects which appear to be most relevant to political change in the future.

#### DEVELOPMENTS IN THE AFRIKAANS COMMUNITY

In the paper referred to above I have attempted to show that with increasing urbanisation, secularisation and occupational differentiation, popular Afrikaans attitudes are likely to become less homogeneous and in-group centred than they have been over the past two or three decades (2). More recent evidence supports this. The results of a very recent nationwide opinion poll, for example, suggest that roughly 86% of Afrikaans-speaking Whites are in favour of dual-medium education for their children (3). Another poll conducted in urban areas early in 1969 suggests that only roughly 9% of urban Whites consider that English and Afrikaans-speaking South Africans should not eliminate their differences and move closer to one another (4). While this trend suggests a weakening of Afrikaner nationalism in the traditional sense at the popular level it does not necessarily mean that rank and file Afrikaners are becoming less racialistic in outlook. There are studies which suggest that younger adult Afrikaners might have as great an aversion to contact with non-Whites as their elders have (5). By and large, I think it is safe to say that from now on Afrikaners in general will feel more and more

free to adopt political and social attitudes in keeping with their economic, occupational and class position. A factor of major significance here is that there is likely to be less pressure on individual Afrikaners to conform to political attitudes prescribed by the group. However for a long time to come, as a group they will probably be distinguished from English-speaking South Africans by more negative racial attitudes.

Even more far-reaching changes appear to be occurring among Afrikaans opinion leaders. In my paper previously referred to I quote extensively from the Afrikaans press to show the extent to which Afrikaans academics, churchmen, newspaper commentators, and writers are deviating from their erstwhile public conformity to the requirements of in-group solidarity (6). Among many of these influential individuals we frequently encounter trenchant criticisms of petty apartheid, discrimination, and, in regard to Coloureds, pleas for the acceptance of integration between Coloureds and Whites as a future inevitability. A very significant example was an article recently written by Willem van Heerden, former Editor of *Dagbreek*, and now Chairman of the Board of Directors of the powerful new weekly *Rapport*, in which he stressed the need to move away from narrow racialism, colour discrimination, and by strong implication, for the acceptance of Coloureds as part of the White group (7). In 1968 Mr. van Heerden wrote a letter to *Dagbreek* in which he flatly stated that Coloureds would have to be integrated politically with Whites (8). This loosening of view-points among members of the Afrikaans intelligentsia is due in part to the decreasing emphasis on narrow Afrikaner nationalism referred to earlier. They can afford to express attitudes at variance with commonly accepted group values without risking estrangement from the Afrikaner group, as so often happened to Afrikaner rebels in the past. It is also due to the weakening hold over the group of the traditional Afrikaner cultural leaders and organisations (9). The growing divergence in attitudes and positions is reflected in important bodies and organisations. Recently, while attending the Annual Conference of S.A.B.R.A., for example, I was surprised at the wide and significant differences in emotional reactions to race among prominent members.

Most of the Afrikaans leaders who are expressing controversial views do so within the broad framework of the policy of Separate Development, and this has important political implications. Notwithstanding the significant social changes taking place in Afrikaner ranks, most Afrikaner intellectuals think primarily in terms of cultural diversity and vertical stratification in South Africa, as opposed to the tendency among

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English-speaking South Africans to think in terms of class diversity and horizontal stratification, both tendencies being historically and culturally derived. This difference has important political implications, but I also consider that it does not necessarily exclude the possibility of some form of common ground emerging between members of the English and Afrikaans-speaking intelligentsia in the future. I will return to this point in a later section of this paper.

I consider that we can accept that there is a growing degree of enlightenment among Afrikaner leaders and academics and that increasingly these views will be made public. In contrast to this trend, however, there are indications that more traditionally orientated leaders are by no means losing control of powerful Afrikaans organisations. On the central synod of the Nederduitse Gereformeerde Kerk, the Afrikaanse Studentebond, the Rapportryers, the Broederbond, and other important organisations, people commonly regarded as traditionalists or as 'verkramptes' have achieved important positions in recent weeks. The only semi-nationalist organisation still under the control of 'verligtes' is the S.A. Akademie vir Wetenskap en Kuns (10). If positions of leadership in important organisations were consistently to fall to individuals with views to the centre of the two distinct factions which have emerged, then the possibility of maintaining unity in the membership of these organisations would be great. Since there appear to be important exceptions to this, however, the chances of an even more distinct polarisation of interests occurring among Afrikaans leaders in the future are great (11).

Members of the English-speaking opposition groups often state, possibly quite correctly, that the 'verligte' Afrikaner intellectuals have simply altered their terminology, tone, and certain aspects of their political sentiments, but that the political implications of these developments are very limited since they remain and will always operate very effectively within the ambit of stated government policies and the theory of Separate Development. This view, although probably largely correct at the present time, to my mind represents an oversimplification in regard to implications for future developments. I say this for various reasons.

Firstly, the extent of the divergence between different points of view on race among supporters of Separate Development should not be underemphasised. A man who accepts the mini-

imum aims of Separate Development and by so doing expresses negative political convictions (like hostility towards Blacks, etc.) is a very different social and political animal from a man who insists on the implementation of the maximum and ideal aims of Separate Development for positive, albeit ideologically conditioned reasons. The latter is a person who, although he might favour a strengthening of cultural pluralism, often regrets the present manifestations of prejudice and discrimination, is committed to a goal of 'decolonisation' and frequently genuinely believes that Separate Development is a way towards ending discrimination. Because of the present alignment of party political alternatives, these people presently find themselves supporting the same party. This might not continue if changes occur in the structure of White party-politics in South Africa. I will return to this point later on in the discussion.

Secondly, many of the more progressive champions of Separate Development, whether they realise it or not, might by their statements be weakening one of the cornerstones of popular support for Separate Development, this being rigid distinctions between races on grounds of colour alone and an aversion to contact with Blacks. Even among the generally conservative group of leaders in S.A.B.R.A., many individuals whose present political position is firmly pro-government are expressing remarkably 'tender minded' views on race; some of them are even pleading for greater contact at a personal level between the various groups (12). Many other examples of Afrikaans Nationalists emphasizing the need for contact across colour lines, or criticising aspects of so-called 'petty apartheid', can be found (13). These developments are significant. Although such attitudes have always characterised a small number of Afrikaans-speaking Whites, in the past this has constituted such a marked departure from group expectations that they have tended largely to sever affiliations with Afrikaans organisations. This is no longer happening; these developments are occurring within group boundaries and hence their potential effect on others in the group is greater.

However much these views are seen by those who express them to be safely within the framework of Separate Development, it is likely that as such views gain currency, some of those who accept them will begin asking themselves whether the policy is justified where marked cultural differences between ethnic groups do not exist. These developments should gradually weaken the 'stigma' of colour, at least among members of the Afrikaans intelligentsia. This might lead to an acceptance of the need for modifications to the policy of Separate Development,



involving compromises in regard to certain Black groups like Coloureds and urban Africans in certain areas. The impetus for rigid Separate Development derives not only from class interests and cultural factors, but also from the very consciously experienced racialism typical of most Afrikaans-speakers. If the latter factor is weakened among some groups by processes such as those referred to above, then Separate Development need not, for such groups (like the intelligentsia) involve an *absolute and total* distinction between individuals on grounds of colour (14). In this sense the 'verligtes' referred to above might be talking themselves out of their current political convictions, whether they realise this or not.

While discussing the implications of developments among Afrikaans opinion leaders, likely future developments in the Afrikaans press cannot be overlooked. The recent merger of the two major Sunday newspapers *Die Beeld* and *Dagbreek* is freely interpreted as being in effect a takeover of the ostensibly more conservative *Dagbreek* (15) by *Die Beeld*, which is owned by the less conservatively orientated Cape-controlled *Nasionale Pers* (16). In practice the editors of both these papers have in recent years, particularly since the death of Dr. Verwoerd, been emulating the relatively enlightened Afrikaans Cape Town paper, *Die Burger*, by presenting more and more controversial points of view, although generally remaining just within very broadly interpreted limits of government thinking. This departure from the formerly sychophantic adherence to official party positions has been partly due to the intense circulation contest between the two Sunday papers. The editors appear to have become aware that a faithful presentation of the expected, the dull and traditional points of view is not good for sales. Time will tell whether the new paper, *Rapport*, maintains this approach in its competition with the English papers. The fact remains, however, that new norms of Afrikaans political journalism have been established which will probably continue to put a stamp of respectability on controversy and dissent among Afrikaans nationalists (17).

Both Schalk Pienaar and Dirk Richard, former editors of *Die Beeld* and *Dagbreek* respectively, have even gone so far as to hint at the possible need for significant compromises in the policy of Separate Development. Richard called for 'a new blueprint for Apartheid', involving a new policy for Coloureds and a possible reconsideration of the position of urban Africans (18). These two statements have a significance which cannot be over-estimated. I have already referred to the possibility that increasing numbers of Nationalist intellectuals might

settle for a compromise. These editorials give an indication that this development is being anticipated by experienced political observers.

Another group of Afrikaans opinion leaders which has been showing increasing signs of deviating from traditional views are Afrikaans businessmen. This group has specific interests in high profits and high rates of economic growth. The severe shortage of White skilled labour is a problem which has become so obvious to virtually everyone in recent months that it requires little discussion. What is of importance is to note that increasing numbers of Nationalist businessmen and Afrikaans business organisations are expressing the view that non-White labour should be utilised to a greater extent in skilled positions (19). Mobility and occupational status for non-Whites above a certain level have political implications which makes the government hesitant to allow much latitude in this regard. This issue will be discussed presently, but it is important to note here that a parting of the ways between Afrikaans businessmen and politicians in regard to the utilisation of labour, economic growth rates, and ways of combating inflation seems likely.

In regard to the labour problem, it is interesting to note that, apart from the Mineworkers' Union, there appears to have been a softening in the attitudes of conservative labour leaders in regard to the employment of Blacks in more skilled positions (20).

### TRENDS IN PARTY POLITICS

The general and provincial elections held earlier this year suggest that effective support for the National Party, under present conditions, has passed its zenith. Various analyses of the election results (21) suggest that English-speaking voters who had given the National Party not inconsiderable support in 1966 reverted to supporting the United Party, that a higher proportion of Afrikaans-speaking Nationalist voters abstained than was previously the case, and that younger Afrikaans voters, who were expected to support the National Party, might to some extent have supported the opposition. The upshot of these shifts in voting patterns was that the United Party gained a small number of urban seats at the cost of the National Party, leaving the latter organisation with a somewhat depressed morale, but nevertheless still in command of overwhelming majorities of seats in both the central and provincial assemblies. These results have been interpreted by some as a return to voting along purely language lines and by others as an indication that the National Party is likely to

become progressively weakened in future years. One interpretation that is particularly unrealistic is that there has been a swing towards more liberal political views on the part of the White electorate. While I agree only in part with the interpretation of Molteno (22) I do take one of his general points that there is nothing to suggest that a shift of support from the National Party to the United Party reflects a greater acceptance of the possibility of eventual integration (23).

Two polls conducted just before the general election in April (24) suggested that over 20% of English-speaking Whites were likely to support the National Party (25). Support among Afrikaans-speaking Whites for the National Party appeared to be as strong as ever. From the results of the *Dagbreek* poll there appeared to be a slight tendency among Afrikaans youth in the age-group 18-24 years to support the National Party to a lesser extent than older voters. These polls were skilfully conducted and to all appearances the findings could be considered valid. The results of the two independent polls also tended to reinforce each other. The discrepancy between the polls and the actual election results might provide insight into a particularly important trend which has emerged in South African political life; this being a pattern of difference between political preferences and actual voting. Our understanding of this development is facilitated by an examination of various survey findings.

The vast majority of people, including English-speakers, support the idea of separation as a policy for the future in principle. The poll conducted by Market Research Africa suggests that roughly 40% of English speakers, just under 80% of Afrikaans speakers, and over 60% of both groups combined believe that "Apartheid is the only way to solve our Bantu problem." Slightly higher proportions in both groups support the idea of independent Bantustans (26). An earlier survey, conducted by Media and Communications Research (Pty.) Ltd., in major urban areas early in 1969, suggests that some 54% of English-speakers and roughly 77% of Afrikaners agreed with the government on "all or most points of policy" (27). In this study roughly 65% of the overwhelmingly English-speaking area of Durban agreed with the government on "all or most points of policy". As many as 20% of urban English-speakers endorsed the statement that South Africa was irreversibly set on the path of Apartheid and that no further discussion of alternatives was necessary.

By rights, then, the National Party should have swept the boards in the recent elections. It seems evident that a broad consensus exists among Whites as to how policies in regard to race should be directed. Therefore the high rate of abstentions among Afrikaners, the swing of English-speakers back to the

United Party, and the relatively low support for the government among Afrikaner youth is to be understood in terms of factors other than those relating to popular policy preferences; and this might partly account for the discrepancy between the polls and the election results. Grievances in regard to the rising cost of living, housing costs and the housing shortage constitute one series of factors, as suggested by the findings of the pre-election poll conducted by Market Research Africa (28). Disagreement with the methods employed by the government in implementing its policies is probably another factor which lost the government support. It is interesting to note that the poll by Market Research Africa suggests that roughly 68% of English-speakers and as many as 43% of Afrikaners consider that laws are not required to keep the races separate - they keep separate automatically (29). This view, held by over 50% of all Whites is in sharp contrast to the plethora of frustrating laws and regulations passed by the government. Laws relating to petty Apartheid are not overwhelmingly popular. Another major factor is the complaint among some Nationalists who support the principle of Apartheid that the government is spending too much on the Homelands, and among others who also support the same broad principle, the conviction that the government is spending too little on the development of the Africans. The Market Research Africa poll suggests that as many as roughly 40% of voters considered that the government is spending too much on the Africans and on the Bantu Homelands, most of these voters being Afrikaans-speaking (30). A further series of factors not to be underestimated is the serious contradictions and inconsistencies in government policy which have been discussed more openly in the Afrikaans press in recent years. These issues will be dealt with in greater detail presently.

Another factor of importance is that a not inconsiderable number of voters who support the principles of Separate Development consider that the opposition parties would in practice pursue variations of the same policy - which, of course, makes it easy for them to support the opposition. The poll conducted for *Dagbreek* suggests that roughly 23% of those who stated their support for the United Party and roughly 13% of Progressives were of this opinion (31). These voters are able to agree, albeit mistakenly, with both the government and the opposition in regard to race policy in general.

A point made by the editor of *Die Beeld* was that many young Afrikaners are driven to support the opposition because, as he termed it, of the 'sour countenance' of the National Party; its

### *Future Political Implications*

anachronistic, sombre, narrowmindedness in regard to most social issues (32).

A factor of utmost importance is one mentioned by both Molteno and Lever in their analysis of election results (33). This is the fact that South Africa has been through a period of relative calm in race relations in recent years. There have been few major coups in Africa (events which are bad for the image of Blacks), and virtually no internal revolutionary activity. Sanctions against Rhodesia have failed, South Africa has successfully defied the United Nations on the South West Africa issue, and important overseas powers continue in practice to support South Africa in matters of practical consequence. The years preceding the two elections have seen a general improvement in the morale and self-confidence of White voters (34). This general confidence has had the major effect of allowing voters, who in earlier elections supported the National Party because of its image of toughness and determination in the face of threats, to reconsider their choice on the basis of all sorts of more mundane and practical issues relating to their self-interest, and possibly also on the basis of matters of conscience.

The slow waning of fervent in-group feeling among Afrikaners is another development which has to an extent freed the Afrikaans voter of a sense of obligation to support the National Party.

Willem Kleynhans, the well-known political scientist at the University of South Africa, has predicted that the present trend in voting reflects a process that will lead to the emergence of a very large floating vote among Afrikaners in the future. He considers that the swing away from the National Party will continue until the advent of a change in government or a new political alignment in South Africa (35). This view, although plausible, requires qualification in the light of the preceding analysis.

It would appear that the present swing towards the United Party is likely to continue, up to a point, as long as popular grievances cannot be satisfactorily dealt with by the government (which seems likely, as will be discussed presently), and as long as the surface calm of political life in South Africa is not ruffled by developments which Whites will interpret as threats to their security. It is doubtful whether the major opposition party could ever match the government in times of perceived crisis or threat. However, I would predict that the current statistical 'swing' is likely to taper off before it results in a change of government in the future, for the following reasons. Race is perceived by White voters of both language groups as

the dominant political issue in South Africa, (36) and there is the broad agreement already referred to that this problem is best dealt with along the lines of separate development in one form or another. Popular grievances on material and moral issues will have to attain very serious and unlikely proportions before White voters will install a party in government which is not likely to pursue a policy involving a considerable degree of separation of the races. The United Party's present policy, which will undoubtedly involve a great deal of segregation if put into practice, but without the justification of a policy of separate development, is not likely to be favoured sufficiently to enable it to attain power. Survey results suggest that the United Party is generally not supported because of its policy in regard to the race issues: its strength lies in its policies in regard to the economy and to living conditions (37). Another reason, I would submit, is that while many Afrikaners might no longer feel obliged, on grounds of nationalistic loyalty, to support the National Party, far fewer are as yet ready to actively support what is perceived as the traditional enemy of the Nationalist movement, the United Party.

I am not suggesting that a change of government cannot occur at the next or in subsequent general elections. It seems doubtful, however, that the present major opposition party could achieve this within the present constellation of party political organisation. Some changed alignment of political parties would seem to be necessary for a change in government to take place. However, there do seem to be certain very real prospects of a re-patterning of party structures occurring in the not too distant future, and since such a development could be of critical importance for future developments in South Africa, we need to consider the prospects in some detail.

To this end, it might be useful, initially, to consider the distribution of socio-political attitudes among Whites. Limited survey data is available as a guide, but this material has to be supplemented with informed guesswork in order to present a complete picture. A useful way of doing this is to look at the supporters of the various political parties in turn.

The Progressive Party has spelt out its policies in great detail and these are well-known. It is the only party with policies which are logically and consistently based on a model of change for South Africa of the so-called 'evolutionary' type. These policies envisage a common society in the future, in which the fundamentally opposed class and caste groups in the society will have become increasingly fragmented by occupational, social and political mobility among individual members

of the non-White groups. Such a process is broadly similar to historical processes of change in the class societies of Europe, and it presupposes that the elites identify to some extent with the lower class groups; at the very least to the extent of regarding them as members of the same nation and culture as themselves. In South Africa, however, the highly visible divisive element of race, coupled with cultural differences between the White elite and the non-Whites, tend to reinforce the class system, making it extremely rigid and imparting a caste-like quality to the various classes. This cultural and ethnic pluralism accounts for the fact that very few Whites, other than a small number of well-educated people and a proportion of those who are sufficiently wealthy to 'buy' exclusiveness irrespective of any integration at lower status levels support policies such as those of the Progressive Party. On average, this party draws less than 20% of votes in middle income white areas, rising to just short of 40% in high-income white constituencies (38). In the country as a whole the Progressive Party commands support or potential support from no more than 10% of white voters (39). These proportions are likely to increase in relation to increases in income, occupational status, and education among English-speaking whites, but it is clear that with its existing platform the party is never likely to achieve majority support, even among the English group.

Support for the Progressive Party among Afrikaners is very low. The Dagbreek poll puts it at less than 1% (40). This is partly due to the fact that, unlike the English, even very enlightened, well-educated and wealthy Afrikaners do not adopt a legal definition of nationhood. Even among Afrikaners who are free of conventional race prejudice, a common society is, as *News Check* puts it, inconsistent with the Teutonic view of nationhood, which is based on descent, language, common experience and 'belonging' (41). This relates to the point made earlier that Afrikaners tend to minimise differences within a cultural-ethnic group and tend rather to stress 'vertical' differences between different cultural groups. The English-speaking South African, with his less nationalistic Anglo-Saxon heritage with its strong aristocratic tradition, tends rather to identify horizontal or status differences within a society. Any cultural differences or ethnic differences, although they are by no means under-emphasised, tend to be viewed as status differences and invidious distinctions are made on this basis. A well developed system of status-exclusiveness among the English-speaking section allows them to co-exist with foreign groups in the same society with much greater ease than is the case with Afrikaners,

with their frontier tradition of egalitarianism (within the group).

It is possible that the better-educated and higher-income Afrikaners, as a corollary of waning in-group sentiment, will in future tend to place more and more emphasis on status distinctions. Once their conception of differences within cultural groups becomes as acute as their sensitivity to difference between cultural groups, support for the Progressive Party, with its openly class-based policies, will increase. This is likely to a painfully slow process, however, since at present it seems that much of the chauvinism which formerly characterised the Afrikaner language-group identification has been re-defined to relate primarily to ethnic group loyalty.

The United Party has extremely heterogeneous support, judged in terms of the socio-political attitudes of its voters. This support ranges from conservative but not highly racialistically inclined English-speakers, through to people whose attitudes border on fascism. Hard-core supporters also include some 'bloedsappe' - Afrikaners who for generations have supported the Party of Smuts. The average United Party supporter probably is less racialistic than the average National Party supporter. There have been several studies pointing to this difference in regard to the extent of racialism. The most recent indication comes from the 'Dagbreek Poll', in which results of several questions in regard to mixed sport show the United Party supporters to be consistently more willing to countenance some degree of social mixing than is the case with National Party supporters (42).

In view of what appear to be major differences in the orientation of English and Afrikaans-speaking Whites in regard to cultural diversity, the largely English-speaking United Party supporters are probably more concerned with privilege than with cultural identity. Unlike the generally wealthier and better-placed Progressives, however, many of them probably feel their status and security threatened by non-Whites, and are therefore largely conservative. The fact that so many United Party voters support Separate Development in principle is probably due in large measure to these status and class threats. Among Afrikaners, these same interests are reinforced by greater racialism and by the general orientation in regard to cultural diversity which we have already considered. Therefore the average United Party supporter who values separation is probably not as deeply committed to it as is the case among National Party supporters. For the former other political considerations probably assume relatively greater importance: these being issues like the efficiency of services, standards of living, economic policies



and other similar concerns of every-day living. One would imagine, also, that separation involving inhuman treatment of non-whites or a ruthless regimentation of people is not likely to find favour among the rank and file supporters of the United Party. There is some evidence of this in the Dagbreek poll already referred to (43).

In view of this spectrum of political interests among United Party supporters, it is not surprising that the official platform of the party tends to be pragmatically orientated and is not characterised by grandiose blueprints for the future which involve a total manipulation of Blacks. The official colour policy, that of Race Federation, strikes one as a rather uncomfortable attempt to offer an alternative to the National Party's promise of a total solution to the colour issue. For its present supporters, the United Party probably does not require to formulate any grand blueprints. However, in order to achieve a majority in parliament it will probably have to, since it will have to compete for the support of the Afrikaans Nationalist voter from now on.

The National Party seems destined to enter a crisis in regard to policy matters in the years to come. It can no longer depend on language-group loyalty among Afrikaners to the same extent as in the past, and the trend which has brought this about is likely to be continued. More and more, it seems the government will have to account for itself in terms of its handling of the race issue and the country's economic problems.

In regard to the race issue it undoubtedly has a popular appeal for Afrikaners in its approach to the problem of ethnic and cultural diversity; that of total separation of the races in social and political life. However, as already pointed out, trends in Afrikaans socio-political attitudes appear to be such that the views of different groups are becoming more and more divergent within the broad framework of separation, and for this reason the National Party is going to find it increasingly difficult to please everybody.

Enlightened Afrikaans academics and intellectual leaders today are positively eloquent in their pleas for separation with dignity and without hardship and discrimination. They tend to desire a fairly equitable total separation of the races, involving considerable sacrifices from Whites in order for this to be achieved. Afrikaans businessmen appear to want separation without undue sacrifice of profits and without impediments to the most profitable use of Black labour. The traditional Afrikaans cultural establishment appears to favour total separation

but without the high rate of foreign white immigration that is a prerequisite for total Apartheid. The rank-and-file supporters of the National Party desire separation but without material sacrifices being required from Whites, as I have attempted to show in my earlier article (44). Working class Afrikaners, probably lacking much of the idealism of the others, want rigid segregation rather than separation, without any more being done for Blacks than is absolutely necessary. These are the widely divergent interests that the Party has to reconcile.

In regard to Job Reservation, the National Party leaders are aware of certain disconcerting political implications in upward occupational mobility among Blacks, but they find themselves supported in this regard mainly by the less-enlightened among their voters. Survey results already discussed show that more than 50% of Afrikaners consider that Africans should be allowed to perform more skilled work. The results suggest, however, that among lower-status Afrikaners the majority are opposed to this type of relaxation, for fairly obvious reasons (45).

Previously, these divergent views regarding the means and ends of separation were obscured by the fervour of in-group loyalty. Now that this is passing, clearer status divisions are emerging among Afrikaners and the divergent points of view have become more clearly articulated in, on the one hand, the policies of the *Herstigte Nasionale Party* (which probably represents only the exposed tip of an iceberg of hyper-conservatism within the National Party itself), and on the other hand, the 'verligte' movement, as well as the policy preferences of the Afrikaner business community.

The big question is, will the National Party be able to accommodate these deeply conflicting requirements? I would imagine not. As it is, Minister M.C. Botha had to reassure one Nationalist audience that only 6.9% of the country's total budget was spent on the Bantu in the 1969/70 fiscal year, (46) while on another occasion he felt it necessary to go into considerable detail about how much his departments were spending on Homeland development (47). In regard to the issue of how Black labour should be utilised, various Ministers openly contradict one another (48).

Increasingly the grand design of separate development as a *solution to the country's colour problem* is being recognised by Nationalist academics for what it is - an impractical and well-nigh unworkable policy. In my previous paper I quoted extensively to show to what extent the calculations of some of the government's own supporters reveal this (49). Subsequent forecasts have done nothing but rub the same message in over

and over again - at an unlikely best the Homelands will only be able to develop sufficiently to offer employment opportunities to match their own natural increase (50). Even more serious from the point of view of the thinking Nationalist is the fact that influential Afrikaans academics have heavily criticised the one aspect of government Homeland policy which stands a reasonable chance of success, the border-industries programme. Professors Hennie Coetzee and Potgieter have frankly warned Whites of the dangers of a programme which makes White-owned industry completely dependent on a potentially well-organised Homeland labour force (51). The government tends to expect those of its supporters who are deeply committed to Separate Development to have blind faith in miracles, as was openly stated at this year's S.A.B.R.A. congress. Massive disillusionment, though hidden, is probably already present among many thinking Nationalists.

Increasingly one can see signs of a lack of unity of purpose in the Cabinet. In the economic field the Minister of Planning states that he sees a high rate of economic growth as important for the successful implementation of Separate Development, which it undoubtedly is (52). The Prime Minister and the Minister of Labour, on the other hand, disagree, stressing the negative political effects of a high growth rate (53). The labour shortage and the under-utilisation of Black labour is beginning to affect profits adversely, (54) which means that the firm coincidence of basic interests between the government and businessmen which existed previously (because of the benefits to both of a cheap and docile Black labour force) is being seriously weakened. Businessmen, both English and Afrikaans, are likely to be far more outspoken in their criticisms of government curbs on the use of Black labour in future, as *Dagbreek* and the *Rand Daily Mail* have predicted (55).

Another major issue which is causing the government severe concern is the future of the Coloured people, who will equal the Whites in numbers in the not too distant future. The confusion in regard to this issue is openly evidenced in contradictory statements by various Ministers and M.P.'s. Minister P.W. Botha and M.P. Piet Marais on the one hand call for a new deal for Coloureds, involving closer links with the Whites, while Minister M.C. Botha sees a future for the Coloureds in which they will be increasingly separated from the Whites (56).

A very basic conflict emerging within the ranks of the Nationalists concerns the issue of 'petty apartheid'. As I have already indicated, an influential and growing body of Afrikaans opinion, including the press, is becoming increasingly critical of the negative and ritualistic aspects of Apartheid. The editor of

*Hoofstad*, Dr. Andries Treurnicht, speaking for an even larger body of Nationalist opinion, on the other hand, points out very logically and consistently that without petty apartheid the incentive for grand apartheid will be lost - he shows how absolutely necessary petty apartheid is for the maintenance of the system out of which grand apartheid has emerged (57). Dr. Treurnicht's influence is considerable and he is likely to remain powerful. For the 'verligtes' his message is clear: accept petty apartheid or abandon support for grand apartheid or Separate Development in its present uncompromised form. The lines of this conflict become clearer with every passing week.

The National Party cannot continue to run with the Nationalist hares and hunt with the Nationalist hounds. The election results attest partly to the serious disintegration of the Party's former image of steadfastness and consistency. No party can afford to have its Cabinet Ministers bickering in public. Enlightened Afrikaner and the 'progressive' pressmen like *Dawie* of *Die Burger* obviously have a powerful influence on the party leadership in this era of post-Verwoerdian Nationalist politics. They would have the party move in a 'verligte' direction, with a softening of petty apartheid, a move towards acceptance of the Coloureds, and a dynamic implementation of Separate Development. Many progressive commentators and observers pin their hopes on this pressure being successful. Yet, as Willem Kleynhans, the political scientist, points out, the majority of Nationalist M.P.'s are far from progressive in this sense, (58) and they represent various forms of narrow self-interest among the majority of the grass-roots electorate. The party will not risk another split to the right - with the emergence of each successive right-wing splinter party the threat to the National Party itself from this quarter has grown stronger. The realisation of these factors has caused Willem Kleynhans to call on 'verligte' Nationalists to break away and form a new party.

Willem van Heerden, the former Editor of *Dagbreek* and Chairman of *Rapport*, with the support of Piet Cillie, Editor of *Die Burger*, has called for a select committee to examine whether the 'real and imagined differences' between the National Party and the United Party cannot be bridged (59). Here is the first of what is likely to be a series of pleas for some form of coalition. The basic reason is possibly that some progressive Nationalists realise already, and many more are likely to realise this in coming years, that Separate Development of a more equitable character could be implemented far more successfully with the backing of the genuinely less narrow-minded opposition

supporters, and the support of the latter would also be a very effective counterweight to the present majority of 'verkrampes' in the National Party. Obviously the National Party cannot openly move in this direction, or take even cautious steps in this direction, without alienating most of its caucus and even some of its Cabinet Ministers. While it is not impossible that this will occur and that a major split in the party will result, it would constitute so 'unpolitical' a move that it seems very unlikely. It would seem that what Kleynhans pleads for is more likely to eventuate - that the progressive elements will disentangle themselves from the party. Until this happens, the government is likely to have to continue to perform the delicate balancing act that is its major preoccupation at the moment. There seems to be a crucial role for the opposition to play in this process, which I will touch on at the end of this paper.

I have dealt with White party-politics in some detail, because this is one area where the political situation appears to be fairly fluid, albeit within very narrow limits. In my earlier paper I dealt with other aspects of the political situation in some detail as well. However, it is unnecessary to discuss these in any great depth in this paper, and I will simply summarize some of the conclusions which were reached after a fairly extensive examination of documentary material.

### TRENDS IN REGARD TO LABOUR

I have already referred to the attitudes of Whites generally as well as to those of management and organised labour in regard to the training of Africans to perform more skilled work. Despite the fact that the government is aware of certain political dangers inherent in occupational mobility among Africans, the contribution of labour shortage to the problem of inflation (which is affecting White material self-interest), pressure from interest-groups in the private sector, as well as what appears to be a distinct softening of White attitudes in general will probably move the government to make concessions (60). This is one area where the government will have to risk annoying its working-class and extremist right-wing supporters. However, rigid control is likely to be maintained over Africans in skilled work, probably in the form of the need for concessions to be granted at Ministerial level. This control, as well as the overall control exercised in terms of the Physical Planning Act, is likely to maintain one aspect of the present position, which is that, despite a surplus labour economy, artificial shortages of African labour exist (61).

With steadily increasing numbers of Africans in skilled positions, even in 'white' areas, but presumably without commensurately high wages, and an overall shortage of all classes of African labour in 'white' areas, some general changes in the attitudes of African workers are likely to occur. These will be facilitated by changes in the attitudes of management towards African workers. Workers who have training and whose employers are clearly anxious to retain their services, and who recognise that they are not easily replaceable, are very likely to develop a sense of their own worth, which is a basic precondition for the development of an awareness of their rights as workers (62). With a completely free utilisation of African labour and with unlimited training facilities for Africans, these developments might take longer. There are ways in which governmental policies have consequences not intended by the policy-makers.

#### **SOME POSSIBLE CONSEQUENCES OF THE IMPLEMENTATION OF SEPARATE DEVELOPMENT**

In my previous paper I referred to certain long-term implications of the border-industries programme (63). Now, as we have seen, certain Afrikaans academics are also recognising these implications. Briefly, the position seems that more and more of South African industry will be concentrated near labour pools in homelands, particularly in Natal and in the Transvaal (Tswana Homelands). If political development in these homelands proceeds as it is doing at the moment, whether the initial political leaders are pro-government or not, the competition and in-fighting among candidates vying for popular support will tend to have the effect of politicising the masses. In those homelands with extensive border area development, the political interests of the citizens are likely to centre round wages and working conditions in the nearby White factories. It is not inconceivable that much of South African industry (in Durban, Pretoria, East London, Pietermaritzburg and elsewhere) eventually will be overwhelmingly dependent on increasingly politically coherent homeland labour. This has obvious implications for improvement in the bargaining power of African labour in South Africa, particularly if increasing proportions of such labour are more and more skilled.

The Coloured Representative Council is showing signs of becoming an embarrassment to the government that created it. Even though Coloureds might have less real political influence than they possessed when they were on the central voters' roll, today they certainly enjoy more publicity, and spokesmen for the Coloured opposition are adopting an increasingly mili-

tant stance (64). One effect of the activities of an ethnically exclusive organisation like the Coloured Council is that it can stimulate a very in-group centred awareness of political issues which affect the particular group. If anything can hasten the emergence of a 'Brown Power' movement, it will be the Coloured Representative Council.

The Urban Bantu Council in Soweto is another body created in terms of government policy which is showing faint stirrings of honest and forthright political activity (65). The fact that a 'shadow cabinet' composed of Soweto residents has been formed is a very interesting development, because it points to the possibility of a developing political coherence in Soweto. It seems that the critical stance taken up by the 'shadow cabinet' has caused some existing councillors to begin to speak out on behalf of their electorate for fear of losing their seats in future elections.

#### DISCUSSION

The government is undoubtedly intending to hasten the process of granting semi-autonomy or quasi-autonomy to more and more homeland territories (66). I use the phrase semi- or quasi-autonomy advisedly since, notwithstanding the frequent official promises of 'complete' independence, it is more than likely that any independent homelands, as a condition of their being granted independence, will be required to sign various treaties with South Africa giving the latter control over defence, foreign affairs and possibly labour recruitment and internal security as well.

These political developments will be in sharp contrast to the economic under-development and poverty in the homelands, and to the growing dependence of South Africa's economy on Black labour. This type of hollow political development and the continuation of oppressive policies in regard to Africans in White areas are likely to do nothing to reverse the increasing disillusionment among progressively orientated Afrikaans intellectuals, churchmen, and newspapermen. The inconsistencies in the system will simply become more blatant, and South Africa's policies will emerge as the most frightening example of neo-colonialist manipulation on earth. No matter how vehement the protests of its critics become, I cannot see the government being in a position to improve the situation in any material sense. Even if the politicians desired positive change, which is unlikely, the drag of their conservative grass-roots support and the threat of right-wing dissent within their own ranks would not allow it.

These largely unconvincing political developments will, however, provide Africans with valuable experience in political organisation. Like the Coloured Representative Council, the various government-created African bodies could also become vocal mouthpieces of protest. Most important of all, the quasi-democratic form of these bodies will allow African leaders, including those in homeland opposition factions, to communicate with rank-and-file Africans. Even if the government imposes severe control (which will largely defeat its own purpose) the activities of the Black puppet politicians and those of their competitors for status, must have a greater politicising effect than anything else which is likely to be permitted by the present government.

I have discussed various factors contributing to the political impotence of Africans at some length in a previous *Spro-cas* publication. Suffice to say here that three things which would do much to establish the preconditions of African political coherence are leadership, experience in engaging in organised political activity, and hopes and expectations among Africans for an improvement of their lot. However hollow and trivial they might be, the political arrangements created in terms of the policy of Separate Development can contribute meaningfully to meeting the first two requirements.

Political activism among peasants and oppressed proletariats has often been stimulated elsewhere when rising expectations are frustrated (cf. pre-revolutionary France and Russia, among others). If the promises of Separate Development stimulate expectations only to have the limitations of the policy frustrate them, then the idea of Separate Development might have been White South Africa's biggest blunder yet. I mention this as a possibility only. Against this one should also consider that the government's control over African political leaders is likely to be very great, and that the government will be in a position to reward and reinforce compliant leadership. However, that present policies will have the effect of slowly allowing rank-and-file Africans to become politicised I have little doubt. We should also consider that homeland politicians whose areas abut border-industrial complexes will sooner or later become aware of the potential bargaining power which their control over Black labour affords them.

The basic requirement of some hope for an improvement in their conditions among Africans could also be partially met if the White opposition to the government becomes very strong in the future. Some additional comments in this regard might be necessary. I have already predicted that progressively



orientated Afrikaans Nationalist opinion-leaders and their followers might, as a result of their disillusionment, come to think in terms of certain compromises to Separate Development in order to make the policy workable. My previous discussion of developments in party-politics suggests that the United Party, and even the Progressive Party, could accept the principle of Separate Development for some, but not all, Africans without risking loss of support. In fact, as the policy crystallises, sheer realism might force them to accept aspects of it, since much of the implementation of the policy cannot be reversed. In this way, as my previous discussion might suggest, a common meeting-ground for disillusioned Nationalists and opposition groups could come to exist. This will undoubtedly strengthen the opposition groups considerably and give at least the United Party a chance of gaining power. Whatever happens, an increase in the strength of the opposition will have certain important effects. Firstly, it will make the government more cautious in the application of oppressive laws and measures to the non-Whites. Secondly, it will discourage the government from retarding economic growth in the interests of avoiding the need to employ large numbers of Africans in skilled positions. Large-scale improvements in the occupational status of Africans could result.

Herbert Blumer and Frederick Johnstone (67) have both argued very convincingly to refute what Johnstone terms 'the conventional wisdom' that economic integration weakens political and ethnic discrimination in society. However, with Kaplinsky, (68) I consider that these views, like those that they refute, are probably over-simplifications. Economic integration, if it involves only ever-increasing numbers of easily replaceable and politically unorganised unskilled or semi-skilled Black labourers in insecure positions is likely to be of little political consequence in itself. If, however, the White elite do not have sufficient numbers to perform all the skilled work, and many of these more advanced positions fall to members of an oppressed group, the political consequences could be more interesting. In the early history of the labour movement in Europe the highly skilled manual workers tended to be more militant than others, probably partly because of the additional security against arbitrary dismissal which scarce skill imparts. Skilled workers in Europe lost this militancy to an extent because, as Kaplinsky (69) and many others have said, their protest was rewarded; they were accepted in large measure by the bourgeoisie and hence became absorbed by the system. The Black skilled worker's colour in a society like South Africa will prevent this acceptance, and if and when he becomes militant he is

far more likely than not to be forced to identify downwards with other less skilled Africans. However, this type of activity among Black skilled workers is not likely to emerge of its own accord. A changed political climate among Africans will probably have to come to exist first. Until there is more hope of protest being successful, many skilled Africans, like the present generation of African school teachers, are likely to be marginal people who emulate the Whites and hope that good manners will bring rewards. Whites are not dependent on African school teachers, however, whereas management will be more and more beholden to the cadres of skilled Africans in their factories. The changing attitudes of management towards these workers will probably encourage the development of the necessary expectations and hopes which are a precondition for political activism.

With a little imagination, many more dramatic forecasts could be made for the future of South Africa. However, the intention in preparing this paper was to guide practical and useful action and not to entertain. The speculation which I have indulged in seems to be all that can be offered with any degree of confidence.

### A BROAD STRATEGY FOR CHANGE

The purpose of this exercise was not to formulate any detailed strategies. However, certain broad guidelines for effective political action seem to emerge from the analysis, and it might be appropriate to mention some of these briefly. Firstly it would seem that there are aspects of Separate Development which should be encouraged. This is not to be taken as meaning that one should side with the government. Organisations can probably best assist this process by maintaining critical pressure on the government, but in a way that persistently calls upon the government to provide proof of its supposedly good intentions.

The analysis also suggests that certain aspects of Black-White relations are more likely to be meaningfully altered in the future than others, and with important broader implications. It would seem advisable for those desiring positive change to concentrate on these aspects and not waste breath and effort in broad protest about everything. The position of the Coloured people and the question of Africans being allowed to perform skilled work are examples of what is meant.

It seems fairly clear that a stronger white opposition to the government and other right-wing groups will do much to cause

the blanket of oppression in South Africa to be lifted somewhat, giving non-Whites more opportunity to organise and gather strength. A stronger opposition could emerge if the United and Progressive Parties were to accept those aspects of Separate Development which are now probably irreversible and can be implemented without human suffering. Here, I have in mind particularly the development of the homelands to serve the needs of their existing populations, and the creation of institutions of local government like the Urban Bantu Councils. To my mind everything should be done to encourage the White opposition parties to accept this type of development. I am, however, not implying the acceptance of Separate Development for the existing urban African population or the Coloureds and Indians.

If this suggestion is seen as a betrayal of liberal or Christian principles, the following considerations should be carefully weighed. Those party-political and other organisations in South Africa that propose *gradual* integration (either via a qualified franchise or in some other way), stand very little chance of these policies being accepted by more than a small proportion of the White electorate. Furthermore, if a policy such as that of a qualified franchise were able to be implemented immediately, it could easily result in a system in which class replaces colour and caste as the basis of inequality. A prosperous White community reinforced by a small number of prosperous Blacks continuing to exploit the mass of the Black people would be but a very small advance towards a just society. I wish to emphasise that this is merely one possibility - *gradual* integration need not necessarily be as negative in its effects as I have suggested. However, this *possibility* is relevant when considering whether a *partial* acceptance of aspects of Separate Development is necessarily morally reprehensible in comparison to the popular integrationist stance in South Africa.

#### FOOTNOTES

1. L. Schlemmer: *Social Change and Political Policy in South Africa*, Institute of Race Relations, Johannesburg, 1970.
2. *Ibid.*, pp. 9-13.
3. Poll by *Market Research Africa*, published in Argus Group press, see *Daily News*, 8.4.70.
4. See report on research conducted by Meda and Communications Research (Pty.) Ltd., in *News Check*, 17.10.69 - pp. 8-9.

5. J.E. Pieterse (Ed.) *Jeug en Kultuur*, Voortrekkerpers, Johannesburg, 1967, Chapter 9, and the opinion poll conducted for *Dagbreek*, 29.3.70. These results show an overwhelming rejection of inter-ethnic contact among younger Afrikaners and suggest that they are more in favour of stricter application of laws like the Immorality Act than older Afrikaners.
6. L. Schlemmer, *op. cit.*, pp. 12, 14-17. See also a review of various statements by Afrikaans academics by Mostert van Schoor in the *Sunday Tribune*, 23.8.70.
7. See *Press Digest*, No. 34, 3.9.70 and No. 39, 8.10.70.
8. See report in *Rand Daily Mail*, 2.11.70.
9. See editorial by Dirk Richard, editor of *Dagbreek*, in which he suggests that the power of the Broederbond is on the wane and that its membership is divided on issues of importance. *Dagbreek*, 13.9.70.
10. See commentary, *The Sunday Times*, 13.9.70 and the *Sunday Tribune*, 18.10.70.
11. An early example of what might occur is that of developments in the Afrikaans student organisation, *Die Afrikaanse Studentebond*. The leadership has tended to become more uniformly traditional and hyper-conservative while the organisation as a whole has virtually lost all popular support at the Universities of Stellenbosch, Port Elizabeth and R.A.U. *Press Digest* No. 26, 9.7.70.
12. See my report on the *Proceedings of the Annual Conference of S.A.B.R.A.*, 5th-7th August, 1970, Institute for Social Research University of Natal.
13. See for example, a report of a talk by Prof. Hennie Coetzee in *Press Digest* No. 41, 21.10.70, a report on a talk by Prof. W. de Klerk in *Press Digest* No. 33, 27.8.70, a review of statements in *Press Digest* No. 25, 2.7.70, an interview with Prof. Nic Rhoodie of Pretoria University in *Dagbreek*, 20.9.70, as well as my paper previously referred to: L. Schlemmer, *op. cit.*, p. 15.
14. There are already examples of convinced Nationalist intellectuals who plead for a new approach in regard to the Coloureds and the urban Africans. Professor Rhoodie of Pretoria University is one - see *Race Relations News*, November 1970, p. 3.
15. Over the past 18 months *Dagbreek* has been consistently as controversial and 'verlig' in its editorial policy as *Die Beeld*. Because of past policies, however, it is suspected that it would in future have sided with conservative elements in the National Party should any major crisis develop in the party.
16. This view is shared by the editors of the *Sunday Times*, *News Check*, and *Die Afrikaner*. See *Press Digest* No. 46, 26.11.70.
17. A good example of the widely divergent points of view presented in the Afrikaner press is to be seen in editorials on the recent case of an African family, the Msini's, where a husband and wife were separated by influx control laws. This case was merely one of thousands of similar tragedies, but happened to receive considerable publicity. *Die Burger* and *Die Volksblad* deplored the incident and called for a reappraisal of the system. *Hoofstad*, on the other hand, warned against exaggerated dogoodism. *Press Digest* No. 47, 3.12.70. Another example is to be seen in the fact that *Hoofstad* remains a staunch supporter of the ultra-conservative Afrikaans student

- organisation, the A.S.B., while *Dagbreek* has criticised it. *Press Digest No. 26*, 9.7.70.
- A further illustration is to be found in a radical disagreement between the former editor of *Dagbreek*, presently Chairman of *Rapport*, Mr. Willem van Heerden and Dr. A.P. Treurnicht of *Hoofstad*. This disagreement concerned inter-racial contact and the present political alignment among Whites in South Africa. See *Press Digest No. 40*, 14.10.70.
18. In an editorial, Schalk Pienaar, of *Die Beeld*, (12.7.70) called attention to adaptations in policy which a permanent urban African population might call for. The editorial statement by Dirk Richard appears in *Dagbreek*, 19.7.70.
  19. *Press Digest Nos. 32 (20.8.70) and 33. (27.8.70)*, give examples of statements by Afrikaner businessmen, academics and journalists calling for a utilization of non-White labour in positions formerly the preserve of Whites. These include Koos van Staden of *Dagbreek*, Tom Vosloo of *Die Beeld*, Mr. B.P. Marais, Chairman of Afrikaanse Handelsinstituut, Mr. A.J.M. de Vries of the Stellenbosch Bureau of Economic Research, as well as others. A fuller version of Mr. Marais' well-reasoned statement appears in the *Financial Mail*, 28.8.70, p. 747. The mixed reactions in the Afrikaans press in regard to the report by the Bureau for Economic Research at Stellenbosch University on an investment survey conducted recently are also interesting in this connection. The report quoted 76% of a sample of businessmen pointing at government labour policy as a major curb to growth. See *Press Digest No. 28*, 23.7.70. The Afrikaans press has also published commentary which has been severely critical of the Physical Planning Act, *Dagbreek*, 2.8.70 (Business Supplement).
  20. See *Financial Mail*, 28.8.70, p. 745, for a statement by the President of the Railway Staff Artisans Association and for information in regard to the official view of the S.A. Confederation of Labour.
  21. Professor Henry Lever in *Dagbreek*, 1.11.70, Robert Molteno, 'The South African Election', *South African Outlook*, July 1970, Con Botha, National Party candidate and former leader of the National Party in the Natal Provincial Council, in *Die Beeld*, 1.11.70, and Schalk Pienaar, editor, in *Die Beeld*, 1.11.70.
  22. Robert Molteno, *Op cit.*
  23. The United Party's voters appear to cover a wide spectrum of racial attitudes, ranging from near-progressives on the one hand to near-fascists on the other. People who renewed or commenced supporting the United Party in the recent elections could be of all shades of political and racial opinion.
  24. Poll conducted by Market and Opinion Research (Pty.) Ltd., for *Dagbreek* and reported in serial form in that paper on 21.12.69, 28.12.69, 22.2.70 and 29.3.70, and a Poll conducted for the *Argus Press* group by Market Research Africa, reported, *inter alia* in *Daily News*, 8.4.70 and 10.4.70.
  25. An additional finding in the polls was that roughly 30% of those who stated that they would vote for the United Party selected the National Party as a second choice. The National Party supporters, on the other hand, almost overwhelmingly rejected a second choice. This suggested a much higher degree of commitment to their party among Nationalists than among United Party supporters.

26. *Daily News*, 8.4.70.
27. See report in *News Check*, 17th October 1969, pp. 8-9.
28. The results presented in the *Daily News*, 8.4.70, suggest that of all problems for which a government can be held responsible, the rising cost of living and the housing problem evoke most concern among voters.
29. *Daily News*, 8.4.70.
30. *Daily News*, 10.4.70.
31. *Dagbreek*, 29.3.70.
32. Schalk Pienaar in *Die Beeld*, 1.11.70.
33. Robert Molteno, *op cit.*, and Professor Henry Lever in an address to the Executive of the S.A. Institute of Race Relations, July 1970.
34. This confidence is well reflected in the results of the survey conducted by Media and Communications Research (Pty.) Ltd.; see *News Check*, 17.10.69, pp. 8-9.
35. See interview in *The Star*, 31.10.70.
36. See the poll by Market Research Africa, *Daily News*, 8.4.70.
37. According to the 'Dagbreek poll' already referred to, only 6% of United Party supporters regarded the party's official policy of 'Race Federation' as the party's most important platform see *Dagbreek*, 29.3.70.
38. See Molteno, *op cit.*
39. See Dagbreek Poll, *Dagbreek*, 29.3.70.
40. *Dagbreek*, 22.2.70.
41. 'Can the U.P. win with Japie Basson,' *News Check*, 13.11.70.
42. *Dagbreek*, 22.2.70.
43. *Dagbreek*, 29.3.70. Over 20% of United Party supporters stated that they supported the United Party primarily because it would implement Separate Development in a more liberal and humane way than the government does.
44. L. Schlemmer, *op cit.*, pp. 6-7.
45. See poll by Market Research Africa, *Daily News*, 10.4.70.
46. *Daily News*, 13.4.70.
47. At the S.A.B.R.A. Congress, 1970.
48. Ministers Viljoen, M.C. Botha and a senior M.P. Bezuidenhout repudiated Minister Diederichs' talk of consultation with industrialists on the issue of non-White labour. *Press Digest No. 35*, 10.9.70.
49. L. Schlemmer, *op cit.*, Section V.
50. See editorial comment on recent calculations in *Rand Daily Mail*, 17.11.70.
51. Papers delivered at seminars at the University of Potchefstroom - see the editorial referred to above and *Race Relations News*, November 1970, p. 3.
52. At a speech at the Federated Chamber of Industries banquet this year.
53. See *News Check*, December 1970, and *Natal Mercury*, 7.11.70.
54. See results of a survey in *Sunday Times*, *Business Times*, 15.11.70.
55. *Dagbreek* (Business Supplement), 1.11.70 *Rand Daily Mail*, 24.10.70, (article by Allister Sparks).
56. See *Press Digest No. 45*, 19.11.70, *Sunday Tribune*, 23.8.70, and *Rand Daily Mail*, 2.12.70.
57. See *Hoofstad*, 21.8.70, 9.10.70, 6.11.70, 20.11.70, and *Dagbreek*, 18.10.70.

58. See statement by Kleynhans in *Rand Daily Mail*, 8.12.70.
59. *Dagbreek*, 4.10.70.
60. This has been predicted in the Afrikaans press - see for example the political commentary in *Dagbreek*, 9.8.70.
61. According to a recently published Federated Chamber of Industries survey, there is a shortage of 26,405 Africans in Industry alone, *S.A. Financial Gazette*, 8.11.70.
62. The strike of non-White Doctors in Durban, which though illegal, was partially effective, gives some indication of the potential bargaining power of a non-replaceable skilled labour force.
63. L. Schlemmer, *op cit.*, pp. 22, 23.
64. See, for example, interview with the leader of the G.R.C. opposition, Mr. Sonny Leon in *Sunday Tribune*, 1.11.70. Even the pro-government leader tends to criticise government policy in regard to Coloureds: see *Rand Daily Mail*, 2.12.70 and 17.11.70.
65. *The Star*, 30.10.70.
66. See statements by the Prime Minister and the Minister of Bantu Administration and Development. *Press Digest*, Nos. 36, 17.9.70 and 37, 24.9.70.
67. Herbert Blumer, 'Industrialisation and Race Relations', in Guy Hunter (Ed) *Industrialisation and Race Relations*, O.U.P. 1965. Frederick A. Johnstone, 'White Prosperity and White Supremacy in South Africa Today', *African Affairs*, Vol. 69, 1970, pp. 124-140.
68. R. Kaplinsky, 'Industrialisation, Race Relations and the Future of South Africa', *Radical*, No. 2, 1969. University of Cape Town, p. 15.
- 69: *Ibid.*

# SOME THOUGHTS ON THE COMMON SOCIETY

alan paton

1. I have strongly resisted taking part in this Spro-cas discussion on the political alternatives before South Africa. Some reasons are personal, e.g. age, a desire to do non-political writing, a desire to return to those other pursuits which occupied my time and used up my energy before I acquired this deep concern for the health of human society, and particularly our own South African society. Naturally one cannot simply banish this concern, nor would one wish to. But one can say, 'I have done that: now I am going to do something else.'

2. But there is another reason, not personal, why I did not wish to take part in this discussion. My passionate longing is still for one common society, but it did not seem to me to be profitable for Spro-cas to record passionate longings. Yet on the other hand, I did not (and do not) think it possible for Spro-cas to prepare any blueprint for that kind of ideal society where all men will enjoy justice, freedom, self-realisation, and a reasonable amount of happiness. The least that Spro-cas can do is to lay down guidelines as to how one should behave, as to what things one should do, in the circumstances in which we live, so that at least we move in the direction of this just and free society.



3. One of my readers has suggested that I should give reasons why I believe that Spro-cas should not attempt to prepare any blueprint for the ideal society. In my opinion only a continuing body (such as a political party) can prepare a blueprint for the future, because only such a body, by virtue of its continuing nature, can make those amendments and adaptations which will be made necessary by the passage of time and the incessantly changing needs of society. Furthermore the political party, in spite of its ability to amend and adapt, demands a relatively rigid adherence to policy, and it is common knowledge that party loyalty becomes the supreme virtue. It becomes a virtue to be loyal to the party even when one thinks the party is wrong. It is unthinkable that Spro-cas should behave like a party, or that members of Spro-cas should behave like members of a party.

This in fact is the main problem which confronts Spro-cas. We may agree on the ends, and differ on the means. If we agree to agree on the means, then we lose much of our freedom of thought and action. If we agree solely on the ends, we are in danger of achieving nothing. Luckily one cannot divorce ends from means in this way. The ends do in great measure determine the means. We may differ about the efficacy or practicability of means, but we are likely to agree on their morality. We are not likely - is this spiritual pride? - to be deceived into accepting ignoble means to achieve noble ends. That is surely why we are here at all, because we can neither accept the goal of complete separateness, nor the means by which it is to be reached. But we hope that we may be able to reach some agreement as to what courses of action are open to churches, Christian organisations, and individual Christians, by which they, although without temporal power, may work towards the just and free society.

4. Though I passionately long for the common society, I know that the obstacles to its realisation are great and many. Indeed if one were to listen to some, the obstacles are insuperable; among them are, white fear (encouraging greed, cruelty, callousness, arrogance etc.), fear of all other groups of the white, fear of all other groups of the black (especially black revenge), fear of change amongst rulers, uneven racial distribution of population, and others, including of course the general cussedness of human nature. When these obstacles are considered, the temptation is to turn with joy and relief to the ideal of racial separation, as being the only sane and practical solution. What the eye cannot see, the heart does not grieve over.

5. Although fear is such a powerful determinant of human behaviour, love and reason are also determinants. Christians accept it as a truth that perfect love casts out fear, but collective man regards such a possibility as suicidal. One must take note of this.

6. But one must also take note of something else. There is still a fourth determinant, and that is the apocalyptic vision which sees a world where the wolf lies down with the lamb, and there shall be no more death or sorrow or crying or pain. This vision is impossible of realisation and yet ineffable in conception, and is an enduring element in both Judaic and Christian traditions. One cannot make a blueprint for it, but it will affect profoundly our thought and conduct.

7. While it is true that in certain circumstances people may turn with joy and relief to the ideal of racial separation, and while it is true that they will use their reason to justify the ideal and prepare the blueprints, and will claim also that it is both a work of love and an apocalyptic vision, yet these same four determinants make it difficult for others, and for some impossible, to accept the ideal of racial separation.

8. It is my own view that territories such as the Transkei and Zululand will never (judging from our present knowledge of their resources) achieve any healthy economic relationship with white South Africa, and that therefore there is no likelihood that their citizens will ever enjoy justice, freedom, and self-realisation. What happiness they enjoy will be largely personal, but one must not exclude the social happiness that must come from living in a territory where one is not interminably harried and restricted. My view that these separate territories cannot achieve any true viability is determined by reason.

9. But I am also influenced by love and the apocalyptic vision. I do not wish that any young person, fired by the ambition to become eminent in his or her chosen calling, should find himself or herself the citizen of a nominally independent territory which can never offer the opportunities to realise this ambition.

10. It is even possible that fear might influence one to reject the ideal of separate development. Difficult as the achievement of inter-racial relationship may be, the absence of such relationship could spell grave danger for the future. Some of us fear the growing lack of communication between people of different races, and the growth of new nationalisms, which far from wishing to co-operate with the old, will desire only to destroy them.

11. A person like myself must therefore reject the claim of separate development to be a just or practicable ideal. But he must realise that at best he and his fellows constitute not more than one-tenth of the electorate. Nor does there seem, in the prevailing circumstances, much hope that this percentage could be increased.

12. I myself support Dr. Edgar Brookes wholeheartedly in his belief in the common society, in one country South Africa, belonging to all, in whose government all persons participate. This is the apocalyptic vision which is an essential element in the Judaic and Christian traditions. Sprucas, whatever else it does, should in my opinion affirm this belief.

13. I do not believe however that in present circumstances it is possible to do more than proclaim this apocalyptic vision, and to try to live one's life in such obedience to it as is possible. This was all that was done by the great Hebrew prophets. There are many ways of doing this, but political ways of doing it are few and circumscribed and they incur the intense hostility of the governing power. One cannot, for example, again use the instrument of the non-racial and multi-racial political party, which is now forbidden by law.

14. I should like to say in passing that I cannot from the point of view of reason, accept the political importance of an all-white party working for a non-racial qualified franchise. Even if the process were begun, it would be halted when the possibility of a non-white majority became real, *unless certain massive changes had meanwhile taken place*, namely, the removal of all barriers to training, education, and employment, the consequent narrowing of the present morally and socially catastrophic gap between white income and black income, and the removal of all barriers to racial intermarriage. We are confronted by two opposing views, *one* that such changes must precede political change, *two* that political change must precede such changes. I hold the opinion that political and social changes are concurrent.

15. I should also like to say in passing, that I cannot accept the policy of race federation for similar reasons. It offers political representation to non-white people, on conditions laid down by the white majority, conditions which if permanent would be morally indefensible.

16. Lastly I cannot accept the policy of perpetual white control, nor do I think that white South Africa dare return to it, except possibly in a time of panic. The consequence of such an act would be the destruction of Afrikanerdom.

17. What does one do then? If one decides that the common society is not a practical political policy, one is acknowledging that the fact of political power is a hard reality that cannot be removed by moral incantation. The political power - the power to do things, the power not to do things, the power to pretend to do things, the power to be cruel towards and contemptuous of those who do not have power - this power is in the hands of the white people of South Africa, the majority of whom have chosen the National Party to represent them. At the moment of writing this power and this party seem entrenched for some time to come.

18. This power and this party are fully committed to the policy of separate development. The theory, briefly, is that the white controlling power will entrust part of its sovereign power to the other groups in the country, in the case of Coloured and Indian people on a non-territorial basis, in the case of African people on a territorial basis, these latter territories being called the homelands. The theory allows for the final granting of their own sovereign power to the homelands, but this apocalyptic vision can be described as dubious rather than ineffable.

19. This policy of separate development may I think be rightly regarded as fantasy. As a result of population growth, more and more African people will have to be accommodated in the poorer areas, while the African people in the designated white areas will constitute a steadily increasing majority of the total population in those areas. It is hard to see how the policy of Separate Development will succeed in abating the fear of the white people of South Africa, and it is this fear that is the most important and intractable constant in the South African equation.

20. In fact, we are confronted with this situation. For better or for worse, white South Africa is committed to the policy of Separate Development. This helps to abate white fear, but equally important as an abating factor are white military and police power, especially the power of the security police, and the far-reaching security legislation. Yet the abatement is nugatory, largely because it attempts to deal with white fear externally, and the very external measures used become more and more difficult to maintain as the white minority dwindles.

21. How is one to deal with the white fear interiorly? In my opinion there are only two ways in which to do this. The first is by individual change or conversion, but this is not a remedy for collective man.

22. How does one deal with the fear of collective white man? Clearly one cannot destroy the objects of fear. One must turn them into something else. One must turn them into something not-other.

23. What now follows is often called 'strong meat', 'political dynamite', and of course, 'calculated to further the cause of communism'. But it is really an attempt to look at white fear in the face. Now white fear is not pretty to look at, and to make white people look at it is regarded as an act of indecency and treachery. However it is a task that cannot be shirked by us.

24. It is reasonably accurate to say that the greatest single cause of white fear is white numerical inferiority. It seems to be certain that the white percentage of the total population will continue to decline. It seems to be certain also, unless drastic action is taken, that the white percentage of the population in the white homeland will also continue to decline. It is a fact worthy of notice that newspapers and scientists continuously warn us of this decline, but their intention is usually to stress the impracticability of total separation. They seldom, if ever, draw attention to the fact that the greatest single cause of white fear is going to grow progressively greater. It is a thing not spoken about, and in fact its existence is often denied in very high quarters.

25. What does the white man do in these circumstances? His choices are few:

- (i) to increase continuously his military and police security
- (ii) to vacate the country
- (iii) to change the objects of his fear into something not-other.

It is clear that it is the third course that must engage the attention of Spro-cas.

26. As a final hors d'oeuvre to the strong meat, let us observe that only a drastic cure will avail against this intensely malignant disease.

27. There will never be any abatement of white fear so long as the white man devotes his political energy to the preservation of his own identity, to the preservation of the identity of others, and to the preservation of his position of superiority in all designated white areas, (and in other areas as well, though this

is not official theory). Indeed his fears will increase with the passage of time, as the tasks imposed on him, managerial, administrative, military, police, not to mention the provision of skilled labour, become more and more beyond his powers and numbers to execute. His problem is so acute that many observers (and some of us too) regard it as insoluble. When a man is fearful, the chances of his taking a wise and beneficial course are much reduced.

28. How do we define our task in these circumstances, bearing in mind our lack of temporal power? I do not think there is any validity in the view that we can do nothing. I do not want to give a sermon at this point, but there is no doubt that in our despondent moments we tend to doubt the reality of spiritual power, we tend to discount the influence of new and progressive and nonconformist ideas on hallowed and fossilised ways of thought, we tend to underestimate the value of spoken and written dissent, we tend to forget that the future is in great degree unpredictable, and we tend to forget that there are certain duties and obligations laid on Christians, and that they are to be performed without reference to rewards and consequences. What is more, we tend to forget that the lives and examples of those who tried to perform these duties and carry out these obligations are the real treasures of the Church, not their political and social achievements. Why, we ourselves are met here to try to find for our society, the mind of one whose life was in point of achievement a failure, and who went to his death in circumstances of loneliness that no one of us has ever experienced.

29. In my view, apart from verbal advocacy, the goal of the common society must now be striven for in the framework of separate development: for even if we believe that separate development is a deceit or a delusion or impossible of realisation, it has the monopoly of the instruments of power. These territorial creations, for all their poverty, have a potential dynamism. Changes are going to take place, and it seems to me highly probable that many of them will not be in accordance with the designs of the architects of separate development, but will in fact hasten the inevitable progress towards a common society.

30. I have chosen not to discuss the possibility that these changes may lead us to abandon the policy of total separation, and to create some kind of federal society, with a federal parliament in which all states or provinces are represented, exercising certain federal powers which will permit a large measure of

state or provincial autonomy. It is possible that the first federal experiment will still allow the continuance of a modified form of white supremacy, as a concession to that white fear that will otherwise make all real progress impossible. Who can even guess at the possibilities? For that reason I do not discuss the federal proposal, far less propose any blueprint for a federal society.

31. If we are ever to achieve a viable common society, whether by federal steps or otherwise, we must in the course of that evolution aim to bring about those changes without which the achievement would be impossible. And these changes spell one thing only, and that is the much-dreaded equality. Will white people in a white homeland, from which as many black people as possible have been repatriated, become less afraid of equality? Will white people decide, in their own interests, to drop the fiction that there is a coloured people, and to remove all discrimination, including laws prohibiting intermarriage, against coloured people? Will white people decide in their own interests to remove all discrimination against Indian and Chinese people? Will the removal of such discrimination pave the way for the removal of discrimination against black people? No one knows the answers to these questions.

32. The removal of legal discrimination will serve no purpose unless the tremendous gap between white income and black income is narrowed considerably. The Churches, Christian bodies, and Christian individuals must drive home the truth that separate development is a fraud unless tremendous efforts are made by governments, commerce, and industry, to raise the standard of production and wages. The unChristian principles that the needs of people should be met in accordance with the taxes they pay must be consistently exposed and condemned.

33. These same bodies and individuals must watch closely all the methods used for what is known as population resettlement. It is sometimes said that these watchdog activities are without avail. I myself do not believe this. Similarly all methods used by all authorities in their dealings with non-white people should be closely scrutinised. For good or for evil, the conscience of white South Africa is troubled, and we must go on troubling it. We may have no political power, but whatever moral power we have must be continuously exercised. If we have to go through the motions of separate development, which is a unique blend of idealism and cruelty, then let us ensure that its moral obligations are never allowed to be forgotten.

34. Whatever truth or wisdom or meaning that there is to be found in this paper can be summed up in four words of a language, regrettably dead: *per ardua ad astra*.



# THE UNITED PARTY PLAN FOR A NEW REALISM IN SOUTH AFRICAN POLITICS

g. f. jacobs

IN THIS PAPER a brief view is given of some of the first steps a United Party Government would take to *improve race relations in South Africa*. The aim is not to spell out long term objectives in detail but rather to indicate immediate reforms necessary to reduce internal tensions and to prepare a foundation for the future peaceful co-existence of the different communities in South Africa.

## FACTS OF THE SITUATION

Under a United Party Government there would be acceptance of the following fundamental facts of the South African situation:-

- (a) South Africa is a pluralistic society consisting of various race groups or communities at different stages of development.
- (b) The White section of the population is vastly outnumbered by the non-White sections which for various historical reasons are still at a different stage of cultural, economic and political achievement.
- (c) Whilst it is necessary to provide for meaningful participation in political affairs for the non-White communities it

is equally important to allay the legitimate fears of the White community against cultural and political domination by the more numerous non-White groups.

(d) South Africa's economic prosperity is based on the contribution that has been and is being made by all our different communities. As a result our economic system has become irrevocably integrated and forced fragmentation thereof would lead to the economic doom of South Africa.

(e) With both the Western Democracies and the Communist States vying for support in Africa and with international pressures on South Africa becoming more intense, the root causes of Communism such as ignorance, poverty, and denial of fundamental human rights should be eliminated and the basic tenets of the democratic way of life such as observance of the rule of law and respect for the rights and dignity of the individual be vigorously safeguarded.

#### THE UNITED PARTY PHILOSOPHY

A United Party Government would reject both the doctrines of forced partition and forced integration as unrealistic, dangerous and fatal to the maintenance of civilised standards and stable government in South Africa. It would be eager to share Western civilization with others but would not be a party to sacrificing it. It would aim at maintaining and extending the standard of civilization already attained in South Africa for the benefit of all communities and would regard consultation between the leaders of the various groups as essential for future peaceful development. Its approach is neither radical nor reactionary but is aimed at creating the climate for evolutionary instead of revolutionary adaptation in South Africa.

In cultural and social affairs it would accept the fact that the majority of the members of these communities desire to maintain their own identity. The purpose of social separation is to eliminate unnecessary points of friction, but separation merely for the sake of separation achieves the opposite effect. Guided by Christian ethics, equality of services and amenities would therefore be a priority objective and measures which serve only to destroy goodwill between the communities and which could be seen as symbols of oppression would be erased from the statute book.

In brief a United Party Government would aim at maintaining social separation by means of the magnet rather than the hatchet.

In economic affairs the complete interdependence of the various communities would be recognised. South Africa's sal-

vation lies in better education and better economic opportunities and standards of living for all its peoples. Current methods which place an artificial ceiling on the occupational development of individuals or of groups cannot fail but to bring disaster to South Africa. We must grow together or we shall perish together.

In political affairs a United Party Government would work consistently towards the development of a federal system as the best constitutional arrangement for allowing decentralization of political decision-making to the various communities whilst ensuring stability of the total structure.

The goal is that each community through its own elected Council will have control of those affairs that are of intimate concern to itself, including education, health, cultural and other community affairs. Matters of over-riding national concern, the keys to the safety and stability of the State such as Central Finance, International Trade Agreements, Defence, Communications and Transport and Inter-community Relations would remain under the control of the Central Government in which all Communities would have defined representation.

As far as the non-White groups are concerned an essential first step would be to provide for full political participation at the local and regional levels within each community. Greater involvement at the national level could only follow once this hiatus had been adequately filled. As the more mature and politically experienced community and because it will have to provide the bulk of the State taxes the White group's main political role becomes one of providing enlightened leadership in the Central Parliament. A United Party Government would zealously explore, together with their elected leaders, ways of furthering the economic and political advancement of the non-White groups, but there would not be an extension of their defined parliamentary representation without the approval of a decisive majority of the existing electorate.

The primary political roles of a United Party Government would therefore be those of guarantor of national stability, protector of minority rights and regulator of peaceful evolution in South Africa. Introduction of its policies would mean development of responsible citizenship, security for all, defined rights for every individual and fairness and justice in inter-community affairs. It would ensure the maintenance of South Africa as a co-ordinated whole and avoid its fragmentation and dismemberment. It would provide for political flexibility rather than barren rigidity. Its policies would contribute immensely to the release of inter-group tensions and give our friends in the outside world feelings of hope instead of despair.

Some of the practical steps that would immediately be taken on the assumption of power to achieve these goals are outlined in the following sections.

## ECONOMIC GROWTH

South Africa is rapidly becoming a fully fledged industrial State. Sustained economic growth is necessitated by our growing population, our declining gold reserves and our increasing defence commitments. There is also the need for expansion of our domestic consumer market to make us more competitive in international trade. Finally it is far easier to narrow the gap between the 'have's' and the 'have-nots' and to maintain racial peace in an expanding rather than a contracting economic society.

A United Party Government would therefore attach great importance to and do everything in its power to sustain a rapid rate of economic growth. This means removal of unnecessary controls and allowing greater interplay of normal market mechanisms, elimination of factors that unnecessarily inhibit growth and making optimum use of all our economic resources. South Africa's greatest single economic asset is probably its untapped and largely undeveloped human resources and development of this resource would be a major objective of a new United Party administration.

Presently the White group provides practically all the skills in our economic system. By persevering with this practice we are pegging the occupational advancement of large numbers of our Whites, placing an embargo on the development of our non-Whites and denying South Africa the unique advantages which flow from greater economic inter-action between the two groups.

A United Party administration would create new avenues of economic development for non-Whites within their own communities and homeland areas. It would also inaugurate in consultation with the Labour Unions and organised Industry and Commerce, a planned programme for introducing greater numbers of non-Whites into higher skilled tasks in the remainder of South Africa.

Section 77 of the Industrial Conciliation Act (the so-called Job Reservation clause) would be repealed as this has served only to restrict the advancement of non-Whites and has failed miserably in giving any real protection to the Whites.

The living standards and job security of White workers would be safeguarded by:

(a) Guaranteeing them employment at real wages not lower than those they earn at present. (If necessary in 'protected' occupations and industries).

(b) Imposing a national minimum wage.

(c) Applying the principle of the rate for the job at realistic, not minimum, wage levels.

(d) Ensuring statutory revision of wages in border industries every 12 months to guard against unfair competition.

(e) Encouraging Trade Unions and Employers to use the existing bargaining machinery for smooth adaptation of the present labour pattern.

(f) Establishing an Industrial Court of appeal to adjudicate on these matters.

A United Party Government would immediately introduce a Manpower Training Act aimed at providing on a co-ordinated basis accelerated industrial training for all our workers. It would establish machinery on a national level for determining our manpower needs and ensuring optimum utilization of our human resources.

It would not regard non-White workers as temporary sojourners or merely as labour units in the White areas but would see them as an integral part of the whole economic system destined to play a vital role in the growth and prosperity of our country.

In a country like South Africa there are cogent social, political and strategic reasons for planned decentralisation of industry. However, industry will only flourish where economic factors are conducive to its growth. As the existing industrial areas of South Africa must of necessity continue to play a vital role in economic development they should not be denied the necessary manpower. The Physical Resources and Planning Act would accordingly be amended to ensure that these industries are supplied with their legitimate labour needs.

Encouragement would be given to larger numbers of non-Whites to enter the professional ranks of South Africa. As far as conditions of service are concerned the aim would be to narrow the existing gap with a view to closing it. The principle is that there should be equal pay for equal work and equal qualifications.

In general the United Party Administration would aim at providing all our workers with good jobs and a secure future; with reasonable wages and congenial conditions of work; with decent homes and security in their old age. More goods would be produced by better trained and better employed labour and

there would be encouragement of free enterprise and a minimum of State interference.

In many ways economic factors set the pattern for subsequent political development. In South Africa economic growth undoubtedly gives us a key to future political stability.

## EDUCATION

A recent study by UNESCO covering nearly one hundred countries has shown that there is a direct and positive correlation between an index of higher education and the Gross National Product of these countries. Education is therefore the key to economic prosperity and a United Party administration would give high priority to the development of accelerated and more advanced education for all our citizens. Presently South Africa spends less than 4% of its G.N.P. on education. The United Party is committed to doubling this amount within a reasonable period of assuming office:

For the Whites this would mean:-

- (a) Educational facilities equal to the best in the world.
- (b) Higher education for all children who will benefit from it.
- (c) Education free from party political indoctrination.
- (d) Restoration of parental choice of language of instruction.
- (e) Education for unity through the introduction of more bilingual schools.

In the education of non-Whites the following goals would be set:-

- (a) Basic primary education for all children who could reasonably be brought within the compass of a formal school system.
- (b) Expansion of facilities for secondary and higher and technical education in the areas where the pupils are resident.
- (c) Free supply of textbooks and school materials.
- (d) Abolition of the practice of pegging the State's contribution to the education of African children to a fixed amount.

(e) Assistance to Churches and other voluntary organisations to provide supplementary education, night schools and continuation classes.

In the broader context a United Party Government would commit itself to:-

(a) Encouragement by way of tax concessions to private individuals and organisations to contribute towards education through grants and bursary schemes.

(b) Restoration of the right of Universities to admit academically qualified applicants irrespective of race or religion.

(c) Improvement of staff-student ratios and provision of more adequate educational equipment.

(d) Equality of educational qualifications.

(e) Improvements of entry levels, standards of training and conditions of service of all teachers.

(f) Acceptance of the principle that while education might be aimed at inculcation of a cultural identity it should also be directed at stimulating awareness of a common loyalty to South Africa.

The organisation of education would also be remodelled. Provincial Councils would have restored to them the responsibilities they previously had for primary and secondary education. The aim is to develop the same pattern as far as the Community Councils for the Coloureds, the Indians and the Africans are concerned.

At the central level all educational matters would be co-ordinated by a Ministry of National Education. In this way levels of education could be standardised, priorities established, a national education policy developed and substantial economies effected.

## SOCIAL SERVICES

A United Party Government would introduce improved social services for all our citizens. These would embrace the following:

(a) Better old age pensions through the establishment of a National Contributory Pension Scheme.

(b) Introduction of a State-assisted Medical Aid programme and expansion of existing welfare services.

(c) Improved provision of Hospital and Ambulance Services and financial assistance to Mission and other aided hospitals.

(d) Regular medical and dental inspection of school children.

(e) More adequate housing for all our population groups.

## POLITICAL RIGHTS

### *General*

Immediately on return to power the United Party would examine and review all legislation which is discriminatory, offends the rule of law or impinges on the dignity of the individual, in order to amend or repeal these laws.

It would establish Parliamentary Standing Committees for each of the main non-White groups in order to consult with and promote better understanding with the Councils serving these groups. These Councils would be bodies freely elected by the members of each of the Communities and would be charged with the responsibilities that have already been outlined.

In the central Parliament the various communities would immediately have representation restored to them on a scale greater than they had in 1948. Their representatives would be freely elected by the members of each community on a separate voters roll on the following basis:-

Coloureds by 6 M.P.'s and 2 Senators

(who may be White or Coloured)

Indians by 2 M.P.'s and 1 Senator

(who will be White)

Africans by 8 M.P.'s and 6 Senators

(who will be White)

### *The Homeland Areas*

The main problems presently facing the homeland areas include:-

(a) Poverty and overpopulation.

(b) Absence of economic infrastructure and sustained industrial growth.



(c) Lack of development capital and business enterprise and

(d) Inadequacy of the tribal system to meet the demands of the modern industrial society.

The United Party would regard the homelands as economically depressed areas and would work energetically towards alleviating the existing conditions. Immediate steps to be taken would include the following:-

(a) Preparation and implementation of a comprehensive regional development plan for each of the Homelands.

(b) Expansion of the facilities available for education and technical training.

(c) Introduction of White capital and White technical and managerial skills to promote industrial development. The interests of the indigenous peoples would however be entrenched as far as ownership of new enterprises are concerned, both with regard to land and share equity.

The primary role of the Homelands is to serve as economic and political growth points for these ethnic groups. At the moment economic development is seen by the United Party as far more important than political development and hence it would receive top priority.

In the political development of the Homelands the maximum degree of self government under their own elected legislative bodies would be aimed at. Whilst National Party policy is directed towards sovereign independence of these areas with secession from the South African State an inevitability, the United Party holds the view that the interests of the Homelands and the broad national interests could best be served by retaining South Africa as one political entity. Community interests make decentralisation of economic and political activity highly desirable - but common interests emphasise overwhelmingly the need for central co-ordination and direction.

### *Urbanised Africans*

Africans working in the industrial areas will become increasingly detribalised. It is essential that their conditions of living and of work be improved immediately. The following steps would be taken to achieve this end:-

(a) Provision of better residential, social and educational amenities.

(b) Accelerated training and increased opportunities for productive employment.

(c) Relaxation of influx control to allow greater job mobility and enjoyment of undisturbed family life.

(d) Development of a responsible middle class as a bulwark against agitators, by granting deserving Africans exemption from the Pass Laws and the right to gain freehold title to their homes in the African townships.

(e) Extension of the 'Urban Bantu Council' system so that Africans would have greater administrative control of their own Townships under their own elected Councils and Mayors.

In brief the United Party would regard detribalised Africans, like the Coloureds and the Indians, as being entitled to rights and privileges in the areas in which they live and work. It will set in motion a series of steps to remove unnecessary pinpricks and relieve tensions. Conscious of the factors that separate and of those that bind us together, it would seek in consultation with all groups concerned ways of creating from our present diversity a totality bigger and stronger than the mere sum of its parts.

## CONCLUSION

No one anywhere in the world has yet succeeded in devising a formula that will solve inter-community relations overnight. In South Africa much valuable time has been lost in trying to define different forms of political Utopia that try, on paper at least, to meet the aspirations of all our peoples. With an almost pathological emphasis being placed by other political parties on franchise rights and ultimate goals, the realities of our situation are being completely ignored and there has been a tendency to create elaborate political myths as a basis for dialogue.

The United Party vision for South Africa is not one that rests on reaching the end of the political rainbow. Conscious on the deep-seated prejudices that exist on the one hand and of the immense reservoir of goodwill that has been built up over many years on the other hand, it would harness the latter to counterbalance the former. It would strive to achieve inter-group harmony not on the basis of forced separation nor of forced integration, but by maintaining a situation of balance or equilibrium, and by creating a political climate within which there would be ample scope for all of us to work constructively towards the common ideal of the betterment of our society.

# THE PLURAL-STATE SYSTEM AS A DIRECTION OF CHANGE

denis worrall

ABOUT THE only firm conclusion which has emerged from the various papers submitted for the consideration of the Sprocas Political Commission is that there are no simple answers to the political aspects of the South African problem! Proposals have been short on concrete detail, and to the extent that particular policies have been examined the final assessments of their practicability have been gloomy. (An exception in this regard is the paper by Dr. Edgar Brookes on 'The Common Society', which the Commission discussed at its second meeting).

This paper does not claim to be an exception. The intention here is firstly, to state the political problem as I see it; secondly, to propose certain guide-lines the Political Commission might follow in its further discussions; thirdly, to elaborate the two broad directions of changes which have emerged from the papers; and fourthly, to present a personal preference.

## A. THE BROAD GOALS OF THE POLITICAL COMMISSION

As I see them these are threefold:

1. to suggest ways of dismantling the white oligarchy and of bringing all population groups into effective participation in the decision-making processes which affect them;

2. to recommend in co-operation with the other Spro-cas Com-missions ways of eliminating discriminatory norms (legal) from inter-personal relations; and
3. to recommend in co-operation with other Commissions ways of raising standards of living in the country as a whole and ways of ensuring fuller participation in the economic life of our society.

**B. IN APPROACHING THESE GOALS I SUGGEST THAT THE COMMISSION BE GUIDED BY THE FOLLOWING CON-SIDERATIONS:**

1. That the South African political problem (defined in terms of the goals above) is so complex and vast as to defy treat-ment in blueprint terms; and rather than think in terms of 'solutions', it would be wiser to think in terms of directions of change and processes of adjustment.
2. That there is no *one* Christian constitutional form, in-stitutional structure, or system of electoral representation, but at the most certain identifiable values which ought to underpin a Christian order and infuse government policy in a Christian society. From this it follows that there can be several ways of handling the South African problem - all of them perfectly re-concilable with Christian principles.
3. That the Commission recognise that there is considerable disagreement among enlightened and concerned Christians, both inside and outside the country, as to how the South African problem should be handled.
4. That the Commission should accept this diversity of opinion among Christians as a fact, and rather than strive at all cost to achieve an agreement on a particular constitutional or political form, it should aim at stating the more important positions in a manner challenging to their respective advocates; and
5. In formulating its recommendations, the Commission should pay close attention to the essential nature of politics - as described, for example by Eric Rowe in his *Modern Politics*:

*Politics is based in disagreement and, therefore, where there is freedom a great deal of politics is likely to be found. This follows because men have diverse views, interests, and characteristics. They differ in their views on the nature of man and his role in the world; have con-*

*licting interests as young and old, employer and employec, rich and poor, and also differ psychologically being cautious or impetuous, timid or brave and so on. This variety of human kind, in so far as it is reflected in disagreement, provides the basis for politics (p.2).*

### C. TWO BROAD DIRECTIONS OF CHANGE

In an earlier submission to the Political Commission (*Dismantling the Oligarchy: South Africa and the Politics of Diversity*) which in part dealt with the role of non-whites in the political and governmental process since Union, I pointed out firstly, that only rarely have they been consulted, and secondly, until a short time ago *all* shades of white opinion were noticeably paternalistic, and *all* policies were advocated under the mantle of trusteeship.

However, due to several factors, notably the greatly altered social and economic circumstances of South African society, the post-Nazi reaction to anything which smacks of racialism, the world-wide preoccupation with human rights, the advent of Afro-Asian independence, and the heightened politicisation of South Africa's own non-white population, the issue is no longer *whether* they should have self-determination and a share in government, but *how* this is to be accomplished. This change is reflected in the policies advocated and the choice of directions of change which is presented to the white voter: either power can be shared on the basis of eventual if not immediate adult suffrage with representation in a parliament of a common society; or power can be transferred on the basis of adult suffrage with representation in different parliaments corresponding to different parts of the country.

These two directions of change correspond with the principal ways of perceiving the South African situation (and their underlying premises) presented to this Commission: either the boundaries of the existing political system are retained as they are, and participation extended (either on a qualified or a universal franchise basis) to all non-whites, which is the common society approach, incorporating the common roll, advanced specifically by Dr. Brookes; or the boundaries of the existing dominant system are altered to accommodate non-white political aspirations in a Southern African multi-state system, as I have proposed.

This seems to me to be the vital choice we are concerned with; questions, for example, regarding the kind of institutional structure (whether parliamentary or presidential, or whether the legislature is unicameral or bicameral) and the form of

representation proposed (whether common roll or communal) are subsidiary questions.

Of some importance is the fact that this choice between two broad directions of change, although not sufficiently to the satisfaction of their respective advocates on this Commission, is represented within the existing political system. The Progressive Party (and to a less obvious extent, also the United Party) is committed to a common society approach; and the National Party to a plural-state approach. Moreover there is division also among Africans in their support for these approaches.

However, the advocates of a common roll in a common society can only with difficulty support the Progressive Party's qualified franchise, and there is also opposition to the federal aspects of its policy. On the other hand the objectives of the National Party, as stated, do not go far enough to satisfy the advocates of a plural-state system. The implications for this Commission of the point just made will emerge presently.

Before discussing the individual merits of the two directions of change mentioned, the following points should be made:

1. In principle both courses are reconcilable with Christian values and with the requirements of liberal-democracy (See in this regard, Denis Hurley: *Human dignity in race relations*, S.A. Institute of Race Relations, 1966, and R.F. Alfred Hoernle: *S.A. Native Policy and the Liberal Spirit*, Johannesburg, 1945, pp. 158 et seq; see also Gordon Lawrie's paper for the Political Commission - *Political Alternatives*).

2. Both approaches are consistent with the realisation of the other two goals of the Political Commission, namely, the elimination of discriminatory norms and the raising of living standards. (I wish to add that it is for this reason that I have avoided the terms 'separation' and 'integration'. The former confuses the important distinction between segregation and separation, as described by Hoernle: segregation he saw as 'an instrument of domination' *Op.cit* pp 68 - 169). 'Integration', on the other hand, confuses the common society and non-discriminatory norms. For if 'integration' is taken to mean the elimination of discriminatory norms from inter-personal relations, then one of the objectives of the partitionist is also integration. Thus to avoid confusion I have chosen to refer to the dichotomy of broad approaches or directions of change in terms of 'common society' and 'plural-state system'.

3. Bearing in mind B.(1) - 'The complexity of the South African problem and the limitations of blueprint thinking' - there will

be questions which advocates of both directions of change will be unable to answer at the present time; and because members of the Political Commission themselves are rooted in the political process, it would be unrealistic to try to answer all the questions which the situation poses in terms of grand-scale 'solutions' - so ignoring the element of chance and human whim and the inherent dynamism in the situation.

4. Neither change in the direction of a common society nor change towards a plural state system excludes the introduction of alternatives. For example, the communal council concept which is so central to United Party policy could be recommended as a form of minority representation in a common society, or, alternatively, as a way of linking groups domiciled outside their homelands.

#### D. THE DISMANTLING OF THE EUROPEAN OLIGARCHY

The dismantling of the European oligarchy and the extension of participation in a single undifferentiated political system is clearly a course which enjoys support among members of this Commission. I cannot support it, however, for the following reasons:

1. On theoretical grounds there is a strong presumption against representative democracy working in such a common society, given the heterogeneity of the South African population and the absence of a shared political culture. (Professor Rupert Emerson's views in this respect are fairly typical. While Emerson introduced the qualification that 'the historical record will sustain nothing approaching a blanket assertion that a nation of mixed races is impossible', he wrote in *From Empire to Nation* (1960):

*If one were to pick out a single element which more than any other is likely to be brought to the surface by the coming of nationalism and to bar the way to national unity, it will presumably be diversity of race. The concept of race, is for eminently sound reasons, in disrepute. But this disrepute does not touch the fact that, for much of mankind, the major divisions of the human species, as determined by skin colour and other external and physical characteristics, continue to be of central significance. Where there is a clear racial separation, as between Negro and White, Chinese and Malay, there must be strong*

*presumption that the knitting together of a single nation with actual equality for all will be a long and hazardous project at the best (p. 93).*

Emerson confirms this view in his subsequent work *Self-determination revisited in the Era of decolonization*, see p. 27. In this regard, see also Sir Ernest Barker: *Reflections on Government*, p. 62).

Apart from the views of theorists there are the lessons of experience in, for example, the sub-continent of India before 1947, Cyprus, the Middle-East, Nigeria and other African countries, and the Soviet Union with its 'nationality' problem. Even the United States, which Emerson in 1960 cited as an exception to the general point he was making above, might be added to this list. (Recent empirical studies have found that 'the melting pot' never worked so well as in myth. See, for example, Michael Parenti, 'Ethnic politics and the persistence of ethnic identification', in *APSR*, September 1967).

2. Quite apart from its workability in theoretical terms, the common society course does not recommend itself to either the short-term or the long-term interests of the dominant white minority, and it appears unlikely to gain acceptance within the foreseeable future when one considers that after ten years the Progressive Party, surely a conservative party in terms of the common society, gained no more than 3.5% of the total poll in the April, 1970, general election.

Two considerations which arise here are firstly, how much importance should be attached to the views of the white minority; and secondly, how much importance should be attached to the Political Commission's recommendations? With respect to the first question, obviously the wants of a majority in any democratic situation are an important factor; but in no situation can majority wants be the decisive ethical determinant simply because they are the wants of the majority. Moreover in determining how much importance or weight is to be attached to majority wishes, regard should be had to the nature of politics. Nobody, for instance, would suggest that Protestants in Northern Ireland are right merely because they constitute a majority or, conversely that the Catholic point of view should be ignored because Catholics form a minority.

The same reasoning applies to South Africa. Apart from the fact that the concept of 'majority' bears examination, it is quite understandable that leaders of African opinion would favour a common society; it is completely in line with their group interests. For the same reason the vast majority of whites



oppose a common society: they perceive it to be contrary to their best interests. The advocates of the common society can respond to this situation in one of two ways: either they can try to show that the white minority is mistaken in its perception of its interests; or they can detail measures which, if implemented, would secure white interests in a common society. But what advocates of the common society cannot do without ignoring completely the nature of politics and human responses in a political situation, is to condemn white opposition to the creation of a common society on moral grounds.

In regard to the second question, it is for individual members of the Political Commission to decide for themselves whether outright recommendation of a common society will influence the course of South Africa's political evolution, not to mention realise the Commission's goals. My belief is that, if this Commission recommends the establishment of a common society as the only way its goals can be achieved, its report will have only an ephemeral impact on white South Africans: it is likely to meet with outright rejection by the two biggest political parties, and, I would imagine, very qualified acceptance by the Progressives. Assuming that this is correct, the Commission is faced with the question of what is more important - to aim at influencing those who have it in their power to bring about change; or to reinforce that part of the non-white population whose political aspirations are directed towards the achievement of a common society? I grant that these two purposes are not wholly mutually exclusive; rather it is a matter of priorities. But the issue here is a decisive one.

3. To recommend change in the direction of a common society is to recommend not only a reversal in the existing direction of change, but also a reversal of white attitudes since Union towards non-white participation in the political system. Relevant in this respect are several of the conclusions to an earlier paper which I submitted to the Political Commission. They are:

*Regarding the political status of the Africans*

(a) The establishment of Union brought together several political systems - one dominant white system and several subordinate Bantu systems; African participation in the dominant system was negligible.

(b) From the inception of Union there were white demands for the total exclusion of Africans in particular and non-whites in general from all the functions of the dominant system. The process of exclusion, as far as Africans is concerned, started immediately after Union and has proceeded steadily down the

years until it is now nearly complete.

(c) Corresponding with this process new forces of political socialisation encouraged a dominant system - orientation among Africans and led to Africans increasingly demanding participation in the dominant system. These demands reached a climax, for the time being anyway, in 1960.

*Regarding official policy with respect to the political status of Africans*

(a) By and large official policy from Union until the late fifties has refused to recognise the right to self-determination of Africans or their right to participate in the decision-making process on a full participatory basis. What provision has been made for them was within the dominant system but on a subordinate basis.

(b) Official policy since the fifties has acknowledged in principle the right of Africans to self-determination, but has firmly rejected their participation in the dominant system, and has had as its goal in principle the creation of alternative political systems.

## **E. CHANGE IN THE DIRECTION OF PLURAL-STATE SYSTEM**

My reasons for supporting change in the direction of a plural-state system were set out in detail in my earlier paper, but briefly the more important ones are:-

*1. Change in the direction of a plural-state system is justified in terms of the politics of diversity*

Race relations policy in South Africa cannot be divorced from the problem of diversity, namely, how to achieve successful government in a heterogeneous society. In other words, the question as far as South Africa is concerned is not simply *how* to persuade the minority to share its power, but *what form* that sharing should take; and whether it leads to a collection of states in Southern Africa associated with each other only through their proximity, a commonwealth of Southern African states, a confederation of Southern African states, or a very loose federation of Southern African states, change in the direction of a plural-state system comes closest to the one which is recommended by both theoretical and practical considerations. Whereas theory and practice on the crucial question of the workability of representative government in a diverse society raises a 'strong presumption' against democracy working in

a single political system, the same considerations support the creation of a multiplicity of political systems to match the pluralism - cultural, national and racial - of the South African society (1).

### 2. *The realities of white South African politics*

I suggest that there are in principle two ways in which the white oligarchy can be dismantled; either the black African population is brought into the existing political system on a full participatory basis, or alternative political systems are created. Expressed in terms of the white political spectrum this means either that power is shared on a basis of eventual (if not immediate) suffrage with representation in the parliament of a common society; or power is transferred on a basis of adult suffrage with representation in different parliaments corresponding to different parts of the country.

The first part of my earlier paper showed that, from demanding the exclusion of Africans from the dominant political system, the majorities of white South Africans have now come around to supporting the *principle* (at least) of establishing alternative political systems for Africans. The possibilities of a change of opinion in this respect, given the nature of the South African situation, the composition of its population, and external pressures, seems, for good or for bad, to be very unlikely within the foreseeable future.

### 3. *The effect of present and potential forces of changes*

Present and potential forces of change are working towards a plural state system. Dr. David Welsh comes close to stating also my view in this regard - I think his time-scale is a little on the conservative side, and I think he underestimates the internal changes which are likely to occur - in his paper - 'The Future of South Africa' (2). His conclusion is:

*'My scenario of the future is as follows:*

- (a) *that the internal situation in South Africa remains much as it is for the next two decades, even if the Transkei becomes a formally independent state.*
- (b) *that a confederal-type constellation of states emerges in South Africa, including the cluster of embryonic South West African 'states', and perhaps Botswana, Lesotho and Swaziland. The constituent states of this confederation will be 'racially-dominated', that is either White or Black*

will be the dominant group within each state, irrespective of actual numerical proportions.

- (c) that the powers of the confederation would initially be severely circumscribed, but that subsequently confederation will become federation.

'It would be fruitless to examine minutely possible future constitutional arrangements in the sketch I have presented above. It falls far short of the ideal political dispensation to which I personally subscribe; but I must emphasise that I have attempted to show what I think will happen in South Africa and not what I want to happen'.

#### 4. Change in the direction of a plural-state system is compatible with liberal-democratic values

The point has already been made that in principle the creation of new political systems with or without a territorial base as a response to diversity has always been regarded as liberal-democratic. In South Africa not only have leading liberal democrats supported a policy of separate states, but they have very explicitly avowed its liberal-democratic character. (See Hoernle, *op cit.* p. 173).

#### 5. Official policy has registered some degree of success

Measured in terms of its purpose, namely,

- (a) to establish potentially self-generating political systems of the nation-state type;
- (b) in terms of which black Africans within South Africa's present borders will identify, and
- (c) to which powers of government with respect to these people will be transferred - with certain reservations (which relate more to its future) the policy is working (3).

#### FOOTNOTES

1. Detailed argument on this point is given in my earlier working paper for the Political Commission, 'Dismantling the Oligarchy: South Africa and the Politics of Diversity'.
2. Welsh, D: 'The Future of South Africa': paper submitted to a sub-committee of the Political Commission. Much of the analysis presented in 'The Present Political Position' (Spro-cas Publication No. 1 - *Anatomy of Apartheid*) is drawn from this paper.
3. For details in this regard see Worrall, D: 'Separate Development 1970: The Politics of Decolonisation', S.A. Institute of Race Relations, 1970.

# THE RELEVANCE OF CONTEMPORARY RADICAL THOUGHT

rick turner

THE OBJECT of this paper is to discuss the relevance of 'contemporary radical thought' to the South African situation. The phrase 'contemporary radical thought' includes the ideologies of various issue-oriented movements such as 'Student Power', 'Black Power' and 'Women's Liberation' groups, and also refers to recent developments in Marxist theory and in Christian thought. In political terms it finds expression in a number of parties situated well to the left of the orthodox Communist parties in the political spectrum.

Although among all these groups, currents and movements there are wide divergences as to tactics, there is an underlying unity of approach concerning immediate objectives and details of analysis. This lies in a common rejection of these patterns of human relations imposed upon people by the exigencies of modern capitalist societies. For example, the difference between the Black Power movement in the United States and previous Civil Rights movements does not consist only in a change of tactics and a greater willingness to use violence. A change in goals is also involved.

The desire is no longer to be accepted into white middle-class society, as though this were the peak of human attainment. The way in which whites treat blacks is seen as having

its roots in the way that whites treat one another; therefore what is aimed at now is the construction of a new kind of society with a different value-system and a different culture, a better culture. In particular, this involves a rejection of the whites' assumption that they have the right to select the criteria of 'acceptability', 'responsibility', 'civilisation', or even beauty. Similarly, the Women's Liberation movement is not based merely on the idea that women are economically exploited by men, through getting lower wages at work, and not sharing properly in controlling the home budget. It is also argued that in the present system the whole nature of the woman-man relationship is vitiated by stereotyped role-play patterns which destroy the spontaneity of relationships. While this is more damaging to the woman, it nevertheless damages the man also.

I shall briefly sketch the theoretical basis for this critique which is based on a particular analysis of the nature of human beings. Ethical concepts such as 'justice' and 'equality' refer to a desired type of relationship between individuals. This relationship is desired because of what it does to each individual in the relationship. That is, we believe that it is good for individuals to be treated justly and equally. Equality and justice are *means* towards the end of individual happiness. The significance of this is that the content which we give to such norms *depends on the way in which we believe individuals achieve happiness, or fulfil themselves*. I shall refer to a particular idea of fulfilment as a 'human model'.

If we advocate equality as a norm governing relations between people, we are not requiring identical treatment for all individuals in all situations. We mean that differences in treatment must be based on relevant differences in the nature or situation of the individuals concerned. In determining relevance, one factor which must be taken into account is this question of human models. The type of society one aims at depends on one's human model. If one sees human fulfilment in terms of a high level of consumption the sort of society one aims at will be very different from that which would be sought if one saw fulfilment as lying in achieving *satori*, or loving God, or communicating with one's fellows, or developing one's intellect, or serving the glory of one's nation. Central to any ideology is a human model. It is crucial to realise this, for often in political arguments the disputants fail to realise that they are operating with different human models, and so that they are giving different meanings to key terms.

If one accepts that different ideologies depend on different human models, then the problem arises of what criteria one

could possibly use in comparing various models. There are two possible approaches to this problem. The first is to say that an individual is fulfilled when his needs are satisfied, and so that it is necessary to find out what the needs of a human are in order to discover which model is correct. This approach suggests that there is an objective, empirically determinable answer to the question. However, such an answer assumes that there is a fixed and constant set of drives and needs: 'human nature'. Whether approaching the problem from an existentialist or from a marxist viewpoint, contemporary radical thinkers are unanimous in rejecting the concept 'human nature'.

It would require too large a detour to give their reasons for this with any rigour. Briefly, the fact of self-consciousness makes it possible for an individual to reflect on and reject his motives for any particular action. At the most elementary level, the statement 'man needs food' means 'if an individual wants to stay alive, he must have food'. The translation brings out the fact that the initial statement contains an implicit normative judgement, or an implicit choice-statement. Individuals can decide not to stay alive, and then they don't need food. Since nearly all people do in fact want to stay alive, the first statement is adequate for everyday use. In fact, in any given society, most people do seem to want roughly the same sort of things, and it is this uniformity which leads people to think in terms of 'human nature', as an explanatory hypothesis. If we are to reject it, we must replace it with a better explanation of the relative uniformity of human behaviour in any given society.

Once more, it is not possible to formulate such an explanation in detail. It is argued that people behave in terms of their culture and that a culture is largely a social product which is imposed on each individual by the socialising process to which he is subjected in his particular society. He is 'taught' a set of needs, and he acts in terms of these needs. This raises a number of problems, two of which are particularly relevant.

1. Once it is realised that a particular set of needs is merely the particular human model characteristic of that culture, one is faced with a value decision. Should one continue to accept this particular model? What criteria could be used in deciding between it and other possible models? These are very difficult problems in ethical theory. Here I shall not attempt to justify my own solution. I shall merely assume the validity of the Christian model, which I understand to be based on the concepts of freedom and love. Freedom means self-determination;

it means using one's powers of reason to the full in order to understand oneself and one's world, and in order to act in terms of this understanding. An individual remains unfree if he acts in terms of unexamined principles and socially-imposed norms.

The Christian principle of love implies that a certain type of relationship with other people is a way of achieving fulfilment. That is, community with other people is a good in itself, not a way of obtaining other goods. Love and freedom are interdependent. To love someone means to be open to him, to explore him, and this openness and exploration cannot occur where people are reacting to one another in terms of set, conventionally determined behaviour patterns. The development of reason and consciousness which underlies freedom can only occur in real interaction with other people, in community.

To repeat, love, freedom and reason are not means to an end. They constitute a way of life which is an end in itself, a mode of fulfilment.

2. Why is this particular set of needs imposed by this particular society? The structural functional school of sociology answers this question by pointing to the function which culture has in the overall social system. In order for the social structure to be maintained in existence, it is necessary for the individuals in the society to acquire the kind of behaviour pattern which is consistent with its continued existence, and the process of socialisation imposes this behaviour pattern. It has been pointed out by critics such as Easton (1) and Buckley (2) that the structural functional approach in terms of system maintenance introduces a conservative bias by assuming that it is necessary for the society to maintain its present structure, and so legitimising the culture which enables it to do so. Easton therefore introduces the concept of 'systems persistence'.

The distinction between systems persistence and systems maintenance makes it possible to distinguish between, on the one hand, the necessary prerequisites for the continued existence of some form of society, and, on the other hand, the much narrower set of necessary prerequisites for the continued existence of a given society *with its given structure*. One can then ask whether a given culture performs a 'maintenance' role or a 'persistence' role; whether it functions to maintain the given class, economic, and power structure, or whether it introduces the individual to an open-ended search for ways of living together with his fellows.

This distinction can be used to illuminate Marcuse's distinction between 'repression' and 'surplus repression' (3) (or



vice-versa, if you are more familiar with Marcuse than with Easton). Using his own version of Freudian psychology, Marcuse accepts that social living requires a certain amount of repression of libidinal drives, since both the material situation and the necessity of working in collaboration with other people makes a certain amount of abnegation inevitable. In order to prevent frustration and conflict every time this occurs, it is desirable that the socialisation process should impose a certain amount of repression. The less gratification possible in a given social situation, the more repression is necessary. Marcuse argues that in any given social situation one can distinguish between the optimum distribution of possibilities of gratification available with the best utilisation of the social and productive forces, and the actual distribution, which is a function of the way in which the society actually uses its resources, which is in turn a function of social organisation, and in particular of class structure. There may be a surplus of internalised repression required for the maintenance of the particular class structure. *That is, in order to produce people who will accept the type of life which the society can offer them, it may be necessary to impose upon them a highly limiting set of 'needs'.*

The 'Old Left' criticised capitalism largely on the grounds that it leads to an unfair distribution of wealth and an inefficient use of productive resources. On the whole it accepted the capitalist human model of fulfilment through the consumption and possession of material goods. The 'New Left' agrees with the initial criticism, but argues, further, that the human model imposed in capitalist society is a function of the needs of the capitalist system, and that it involves the destruction of important human potentialities. Galbraith makes similar points, using a different 'language game', in 'The New Industrial State'. For example, he shows how the concept of 'consumer sovereignty' no longer applies, since ways have been devised of controlling aggregate demand through advertising techniques in order to satisfy the need of the industrial system for a stable expanding market. He writes, 'But, as we have sufficiently seen, the system, if it accommodates to man's wants, also and increasingly accommodates men to its needs. And it must. This latter accommodation is no trivial exercise in salesmanship. It is deeply organic. High technology and heavy capital use cannot be subordinated to the ebb and flow of market demand. They require planning; it is the essence of planning that public behaviour be made predictable, that it be subject to control. And from this control flow further important consequences. It ensures that men and numerous women will work with undiminished effort however great their supply of goods. And it helps ensure that

the society will measure its accomplishment by its annual increase in production.... The management to which we are subject is not onerous. It works not on the body but on the mind. It first wins acquiescence or belief; action is in response to this mental conditioning, and is thus devoid of any sense of compulsion. It is not that we are required to have a newly configured automobile or a novel reverse-action laxative; it is because we believe that we must have them. It is open to anyone who can resist belief to contract out of this control. But we are no less managed because we are not physically compelled. On the contrary, though this is poorly understood, physical compulsion would have a far lower order of efficiency' (4). In a situation where productivity has reached a level at which rapidly increasing leisure possibilities open up, an ethic of consumption and need creation is imposed because the economy in its present form needs increasing demand, without there being any attempt to consider whether people need it.

The capitalist human model includes the following three elements:

- (a) Fulfilment through possession and consumption of material goods... what C.B. Macpherson calls 'possessive individualism'.
- (b) A tendency to compartmentalise life into a work sphere and a 'living' sphere, with work being seen as an unfortunate necessity, rather than an area of possible fulfilment. (This is because the work situation in such a society is not designed to be an area of fulfilment. It is designed to increase productivity, which is not necessarily the same thing).
- (c) The idea that exploitation is the natural relationship between people. In a capitalist enterprise the employee is essentially a 'means of production', who may be oiled to make him work better, as other pieces of machinery are, but who becomes redundant if he plays no role in the profit-making process. Human relationships become instrumental, rather than areas for finding fulfilment.

The use of personnel management techniques may make the worker more comfortable, but it does not change the nature of the basic relationship. Rather, it is a process of refining the system of controls imposed on the worker, of persuading him to co-operate willingly in his own exploitation. For example, giving the worker a token number of shares in the firm may make him feel that he has a greater interest and a more significant role in it, but it in fact gives him no real power. It is power which is the crux of the matter. The worker may be given

a consultative role, but power, in particular power to decide what shall be done with the profits, lies with ownership and management. The term 'exploitation' describes this power differential and its implications.

Contemporary radicals suggest two other areas of possible human experience which, they argue, are more fulfilling:

- (a) the idea of work as a creative activity. This means that work satisfaction should be seen as one of the products of the production process, and should not play a secondary role to narrow criteria of economic efficiency.
- (b) The idea of community, love, co-operation with one's fellows as an end in itself.

These two may be united in the concept 'participation'... a human model of fulfilment through creative involvement in the social process.

I said earlier that the Old Left had concentrated to a great extent on material problems. The lesser emphasis placed on such problems in contemporary theory is of course at least in part the result of much greater affluence in advanced capitalist societies. In such circumstances it is natural to turn to other unfortunate results of capitalism. But in South Africa our problems are perhaps closer to those of nineteenth century Europe than to those of contemporary Europe: an extremely inegalitarian society where large sections of the population still live at or below subsistence level. Any reasonable human model will include as real needs adequate housing, food, clothing and health, so perhaps at the moment in South Africa issues beyond this are irrelevant. Let us therefore consider the problem of inequality in South Africa.

There is certainly, in South Africa, considerable antagonism between the different 'race' groups. If we reject the thesis that this is due to some inherent incompatibility of the different 'races', we must inquire what the conflict is about. The history of South Africa since the beginning of white occupation is the story of the use by whites of political and military power to ensure first a near monopoly of land, and then a complete monopoly of skilled, highly-paid jobs. This means that today the large share of the wealth which accrues to the white section of the population is as much a result of their control of political power as it is of their actual contribution to production. It is this fact, I believe, that lies at the roots of conflict in South Africa.

Race prejudice itself is of course a reality, in that most whites in South Africa express, in their behaviour towards

blacks, and in their thoughts about blacks, attitudes based on prejudice; prejudice there is, and prejudice affects behaviour. But it is in two senses, very much a 'secondary reality'. Firstly there is no factual basis for beliefs about racial inferiority, or about the inherent unpleasantness of members of other 'races'. White prejudice against blacks is based on ignorance, whereas black hostility to whites is based on the hard facts of exploitation. Secondly, it is probable that, in South Africa at least, race prejudice plays an important role in justifying to the whites their right to treat the blacks in the way they do. That is, it is in some ways a rationalisation of exploitation: in addition, it is reinforced by the effects which exploitation has on the blacks. Black hostility to whites is based on real grievances. White hostility to black is based on the realisation that the blacks threaten white privilege. Conflict will not end until the grievances and the privileges end. But once these have ended, there is no basis in race difference for further conflict. That is, there is no reason why whites should expect to be discriminated against in a democratic South Africa because of their whiteness.

However, it seems unwise to assume that blacks will not use political power to end exploitation, since whites used it to install the exploitative system. The whites are so entrenched in the economic structure at the moment that the only conceivable way in which this could be changed would be through some form of socialism; that is, it would involve a radical change in the white dominated economic structure. Such a solution, by restoring some relationship between effort and reward, would also be a just solution. Any 'black' government is likely to be socialistic, and will be morally right in so being. The impulse which has led most independent African countries to declare themselves socialist will be enormously strengthened here by the fact that, in a country with a developed and entrenched business elite, there will not exist the possibility of a new black elite rapidly working themselves into a position of power in the private sector.

It is important to ask why the whites used their political power to exploit the other inhabitants of South Africa. After all, they could, 300 years ago, have started off by attempting to co-operate with the others to develop South Africa's resources for the good of all. The reason that they did not do so, I would suggest, is that the society from which they came was an essentially exploitative one, so that they saw exploitation as a natural relationship between men. In general, one cannot dismiss the surge of western imperialism, which led to almost total global

dominance, as being in some way accidental and extraneous to western culture. Western culture, as the lived norms of society, as opposed to its written expression in Kant or Marx, Christ or Russell, is still exploitative; the norms of western society are the norms required by the capitalist system for its survival.

This, I think, would be accepted by most people, but what one does about it depends on whether one sees the willingness to exploit as being part of human nature, or merely part of one human model. If it is part of human nature, then it would seem unlikely that change will come about in South Africa without violence since the whites will not stop exploiting voluntarily. A policy which tries to extend political rights to blacks in such a way that the rights will not be used by them to change their economic status (which, as I understand it, is the essence of Progressive Party policy) is not going to solve the basic conflict problem. On the other hand, if it is not part of human nature then it may be that some whites at least may be brought to accept another human model. It might be possible to show them that they too suffer under apartheid, that it deprives them of important areas of experience, that fear and cultural primitivism go together, and that it might be worthwhile exchanging a high level of consumption for community with one's fellows. That is, it might be possible to persuade them that loving one's neighbour is more fulfilling than the pursuit of wealth, which is the message of the 'western tradition', from Plato to Marx, and is also the central principle of Christian ethics and of contemporary radical thought.

This would involve an attack on the life-style of white society, and an attempt, on the cultural level, to show that there are other possible ways of relating to the world and to one's fellows. In working out the details of this 'counter-culture' it would be important to look at the human model characteristic of African tribal societies. Two important values here are a preference for leisure rather than for a higher level of consumption, and a wider sense of family.

A 'Black Power' movement is neither a return to tribalism nor a form of racialism. It is a refusal to accept the present standards of 'white western civilisation' as an ultimate, a refusal to accept the right of the whites to lay down criteria of responsibility or acceptability in any sphere. The basis of this refusal is not that they are white, but that their civilisation is inadequate. It is therefore an attempt to build a better civilisation and culture, in which whites also could share, and can therefore tie in with what I have said about the necessity for getting white South Africans to accept an alternative model of

man if they are to play any positive role in the future of South Africa.

Another important feature of contemporary radical thought is the attempt to work out political institutions for a socialist society. Both parliamentary democracy (as at present organised) and the soviet model are rejected. It is argued that present forms of parliamentary democracy centralise political power and take it out of the effective control of the people. Five-yearly elections are not an adequate check on government. When the voter's only major involvement with government is to cast a vote once every five years he is effectively alienated from the real political process, and develops little understanding of the issues and of their relation to his everyday problems. The political party as mediator between individual and government tends to take on the characteristics of the system itself, the 'party machine' dominates the membership and the rank and file become increasingly divorced from the actual policy-making. The party tends to become an organisation for the achievement of political offices for certain individuals, rather than a co-operative effort to carry out a coherent programme to attain certain specific ends. This affects political campaigning in such a way as to reinforce the political isolation of the individual. The political arena becomes polarised between an atomised mass and a number of small groups trying to manipulate the mass in order to get political jobs. The result of this is to move the source of power in society out of the political arena and into the control of functional power groups, for the politicians have no real power-basis in popular support, as opposed to popular acceptance. In a capitalist society the major functional power-groups are the economic powers. In a socialist society the central planning body would be the major functional power centre. Parliamentary democracy of the type I have described would not be adequate to control it. There must be other additional centres of power which can be used by the people to exert their control over the central body.

The most frequently suggested solution to this problem is some kind of workers' control. The advantages of this would be, firstly, that the workers' control of their own factory or industry gives them a source of power and a natural organisation; and, secondly, that their involvement in the day-to-day running of the business would increase their awareness of economic and political problems, and of the relation between general policy and their own particular area of experience, and so would produce a much more responsible and aware electorate. Of course there are many detailed problems to be worked out before

a working model of worker's control is arrived at. For the moment I merely wish to use it as an example in order to make the point that 'responsibility' is a function of degree of integration into the society's decision-making processes, and so that it is necessary to work out more effective ways of achieving this integration than have yet been put into practice.

Along with the rejection of parliamentary democracy as a solution, goes a greater willingness to use extra-legal and extra-parliamentary methods in the attempt to bring about change. Violence is only one such method, and has been advocated or used by a relatively small number of radicals in Europe or the United States. It has been realised that power cannot be divorced from organisation, and that organisation (as distinct from an organisation) can only be meaningful and lasting when it is related to specific and immediate problems. For example, in the United States black leaders have been organising tenants associations to take direct action against slum landlords. The importance of such organisation is that through it individuals learn to co-operate, learn that co-operation gives them power to achieve changes in their environment, and learn, through the attempt to deal with problems, the relation between their immediate problems and the wider political and social structure. In the present situation in South Africa this type of organisation is perhaps the only avenue left for fruitful political activity, on the part of both whites and blacks.

To conclude, I would suggest that the following aspects of contemporary radical thought are particularly relevant to South Africa:

1. The rejection of the materialistic human model characteristic of capitalism in favour of a more open model which is much closer to the Christian ideal.
2. The attempt to rethink the political problems of socialism and to go beyond the Soviet model towards a participatory society.
3. The realisation that to limit one's actions to the institutionalised political arena is self-defeating. Political activity must be accompanied by change-oriented activity in all sectors of society, in particular in the cultural sphere, and around people's daily work and living problems.

## SEEKING CHANGE

I would like to append a few general remarks about bringing about change in South Africa. I think that one common mistake on the part of people who consider this problem is to think in terms of ONE method or cause of change. They then seek this unique factor, and despair when they cannot find it; or when they see it as 'violence' and cannot bring themselves to be violent. However, there is not one exclusive method involved in bringing about change, nor one factor involved in change. Those who say 'Change must be brought about by the white electorate', and those who say 'Only the blacks can change South Africa' are both wrong. There are a number of different forces at work, and one has to situate one's own activity within the context of these.

1. Outside pressure against apartheid. It is very unlikely that this will decrease in future. As the African bloc's economic significance grows relative to South Africa's, its ability to persuade Britain to take action will increase. The significant black electorate in the United States, together with growing social awareness there, makes it likely that United States hostility will increase. This pressure has a continuing nagging effect on the white electorate, and in a crisis situation it could be crucial if it were suddenly stepped up.

2. Guerilla activity in neighbouring territories. This shows no signs of abating, and if it is successful, as it could be in the Portuguese controlled territories at least, then it will pose an even greater military threat to a white-supremacist South African government.

3. Internal economic problems. These, it must be noticed, can, and probably will be solved within the context of white domination, bringing blacks a little higher up in the social pyramid, but not altering the fact that the top of the pyramid is white. However, at present the frustration they produce for whites as well as for blacks injects a certain amount of fluidity into the situation. Also the solution is likely to have the effect of increasing black bargaining power by introducing more blacks into semi-skilled jobs, where the potential for organisation and for strike activity is greater.

4. Increasing restlessness among Afrikaner intellectuals with the fundamentalism of the authorised version of Afrikaner nationalism. This could lead merely to their integration into the more materialistic but equally exploitative main-stream of



'white civilisation', but it could also lead to a more radical critique of white society.

5. Black pressure against apartheid will probably find new channels for expression, including the kind of organisational work mentioned earlier, and the likely use by blacks of the institutions of apartheid, such as the Bantustan governments and the Coloured Persons Representative Council, as tools for organising and for bringing pressure to bear on the government.

Within this context there are a number of possible and useful types of activity. It is unlikely that the white electorate can, *in vacuo*, be persuaded to 'change heart'. But it is important that they should react rationally, rather than irrationally, to increasing pressure. On the one hand, rationally, they may decide to accept ever-increasing compromises, even to accept international supervision, or else to emigrate. On the other hand, they may decide to 'fight until the blood runs up to their horses' bits'. Which decision they make will obviously affect both the nature of the process of change and the structure of the new society. It is therefore vital to continue educational work among whites.

Within the white group there are a number of people who may be brought to welcome the idea of the new society, rather than to accept it as a lesser evil. To get such people to accept the loss of a privileged material situation, it is necessary to show them a different human model. This involves making a radical critique of the culture, values and life-style of white society in South Africa. People who want to change South Africa must learn to live differently now. As far as whites are concerned, this does not simply mean being nice to their black servants. It means rejecting money-values and seeing political activity, the attempt to relate to one's neighbour, as the core of life, rather than as a spare-time activity. Even a relatively small number of whites living this way could play an important role in educating the electorate, who, on a personal level, are reachable exclusively by whites, and could also help in other activities. There is considerable scope for small-scale social-political organising among the black (African, Coloured, Indian) population. It is likely that most of this work can be done only by blacks. In any event, one of the main purposes of such community organisation is to encourage local community leadership.

The process of trying to bring about political change is, on one level, a process of learning to live differently. Community organisation work means helping people to learn to

live differently with their fellows, both because this is a good in itself, and because it is the only way in which power can be equalised, the only way in which the institutionally powerless can begin to generate the power to change their situation.

FOOTNOTES

1. Easton: *A Framework for Political Analysis*, Prentice Hall 1965.
2. Buckley: *Sociology and Modern Systems Theory*, Prentice Hall 1969.
3. Marcuse: *Eros and Civilisation Sphere*.
4. J.K. Galbraith: *The New Industrial State* (p. 321-2), Penguin Books 1969.