

SOUTH AFRICA'S

MINORITIES

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SOUTH AFRICA'S MINORITIES

General Editor

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THE STUDY PROJECT ON CHRISTIANITY
IN APARTHEID SOCIETY

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WHAT IS SPRO-CAS ?

THE STUDY PROJECT on Christianity in Apartheid Society was established in the middle of 1969 and its work will be completed during 1971.

The aim of the project's sponsors, the South African Council of Churches and the Christian Institute of Southern Africa, was to call together a body of experts to examine the implications of applying Christian principles to the major areas of our national life and to make recommendations for a juster social order.

The original stimulus for Spro-cas was provided by the Message to the People of South Africa, which was issued by the Theological Commission of the South African Council of Churches in September 1968. The Message provided the basic theological foundation for the project, i.e. the Gospel as reconciliation.

Six commissions were established to study the following aspects of South African life, the 'apartheid society': economics, education, law, politics, sociology and the Church. The members of the Commissions were chosen on the basis of their intellectual and practical ability and their acceptance of the need for change in South Africa in the direction of reconciliation and love. Nearly 150 South Africans, who probably constitute the most broadly representative group ever assembled in this country to examine its national life, agreed to serve on the six commissions, either as members or consultants.

In addition, a large number of people outside the immediate membership of the commissions have been consulted and their contributions have significantly added to the depth of the work being done by the commissions.

Spro-cas is now approaching a position where it is possible to anticipate the publication of the final reports of the six commissions. These will be published independently of each other, in English and Afrikaans, during the first half of 1971, and will be followed by a co-ordinated report drawing on the findings of all the commissions.

As a preliminary to these reports, it has been decided to issue a series of Spro-cas Occasional Publications containing some of the working documents prepared for the commissions.

The first title in this series was *Anatomy of Apartheid*, published in November 1970. It is followed by the present publication, *South Africa's Minorities*. Other titles will be *Directions of change in South African Politics* (with contributions by Mr. L. Schlemmer, Mr. Alan Paton, Dr. Denis Worrall and Dr. Rick Turner), and *Some Implications of Inequality* (Dr. E.A. Barker, The Rev. C. Desmond, Prof. J.V.O. Reid and Prof. H.L. Watts).

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INTRODUCTION

editor

THE PAPERS in this publication were written as working documents for the Social Commission of the Study Project on Christianity in Apartheid Society. Together with many other documents prepared for Spro-cas, they warrant wider publication in view of the valuable insights and information they contain.

The selection presented here is loosely grouped under the title South Africa's Minorities, since they deal with the major non-Black groupings in our society. In relation to the Black group these are all numerical minorities. Professor van der Merwe explores the relevant concepts in his preface, while the writers approach their tasks from a variety of backgrounds and viewpoints. Two well-known literary figures offer us their crisp insights and pungent comments, while two leading social scientists contribute far-ranging and scholarly studies.

The papers are reprinted virtually as they originally appeared, although there has been some updating where necessary. No attempt has been made to edit them into a coherent whole, since this would be contrary to their nature as working documents for the consideration of the various commissions. It is thus apparent that the views of the writers do not necessarily reflect the findings of the commissions themselves, which will appear in report form in due course.

I hope this publication will add to the quality of public debate in our country. This is one of the prime aims of the whole Spro-cas undertaking.

NOTES ON THE PAPERS

The preface was especially written as an introduction to the four papers collected together in this booklet. Professor H.W. van der Merwe is Director of the Abe Bailey Institute of Inter-racial Studies at the University of Cape Town.

The four papers were originally written as working documents for the Spro-cas Social Commission, which wished to learn about current trends and attitudes in the major groupings in our society.

Mrs. Fatima Meer is a lecturer in sociology at the University of Natal. Among her published works is *Portrait of Indian South Africans* (1969).

Mr. W.A. (Bill) de Klerk is a leading Afrikaans novelist, poet, playwright and essayist.

Mr. C.O. Gardner lectures in English literature at the University of Natal.

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PREFACE:

WHAT IS A MINORITY GROUP ?

h.w. van der merwe

RECENTLY, when I referred to the Afrikaners as a 'minority group', a black American scholar objected very strongly and emotionally. Doubtless his reaction was due to the fact that the concept 'minority group', in current usage, implies a measure of sympathy for that group - the kind of sympathy to which, in his view, Afrikaners are not entitled.

Minority group relations refer to the phenomena which arise when groups of people who differ racially or culturally come into contact. The term 'minority group' refers to any sub-group within a culture which is singled out for differential and unequal treatment and who, therefore, regard themselves as objects of collective discrimination. Minority status carries with it the exclusion from full participation in the life of society.

One automatically thinks of South Africa's non-white groups in these terms. But apart from the fact that frequent reference is made to 'minority rule' in South Africa, the whites, and especially the Afrikaners, constitute minority groups in many other respects. In historical perspective, the Afrikaners constituted a minority group in South Africa for many generations. Also today, in global perspective, white South Africans are singled out for differential treatment in most major world bodies and are excluded from full participation in many of them.

In many respects the Afrikaners, English-speaking South Africans, Indians, and Cape Coloureds discussed in this monograph constitute minority groups in terms of Arnold M. Rose's de-

definition: 'The mere fact of being generally hated and being hated because of religious, racial or national background is what defines a minority group'.

But an emotional response to the myriad of problems with which we are faced in our multi-racial society does not always contribute toward better understanding. Obviously, minority group relations are not only characterized by prejudice and hatred. This monograph on four South African minority groups is an attempt by SPRO-CAS to see relationships in wider perspective.

In all four chapters emphasis is on relationships between members of the group and the wider society. For me, it is a welcome change from the interpretation of race relations in terms of individual psychological feelings of prejudice and hatred towards an attempt to see race relations and discrimination as *group relations*.

The reader is struck by the 'awful isolation' of the Indian community and their dilemma of choosing between two equally unacceptable alternatives of Afrikaner and African nationalism. The Cape Coloureds experience equally serious problems of identity and relationship toward Whites and Africans, Afrikaners and English-speakers. Among the Afrikaners there are *Verligtes* who 'seek gropingly to adapt to the demands of the age' and *Verkrampes* who 'pursue impossible ideals and principles'. While the English-speakers are not deeply and wholly convinced of the principles of apartheid, many of them are prepared to shelter under the wings of a racist regime.

Participants in SPRO-CAS naturally believe in greater involvement of social scientists in society. As members of society they are interested in the protection and promotion of certain values and concerned about inequities, hardships and deprivations. But our discussions have also been characterized by sincere attempts to overcome excessive emotional involvement. We concentrated on finding accurate answers to intelligently formulated questions in the spirit suggested by the late Professor James Irving:

'In the nature of ideological tension polarization is inevitable. By the same logic this process of ideological polarization must become subject to scientific inspection. This is a form of being in the battle and not above it, but we are in it on our own terms as intellectuals and not as ideologists'.

INDIAN PEOPLE:

CURRENT TRENDS AND POLICIES

fatima meer

INDIANS WERE first brought to South Africa in 1860 as indentured labourers, following an agreement between the British colony of Natal and the British Government of India. In terms of their contracts they were promised free citizenship rights on the expiry of their indenture, if they chose to settle in the colony. The majority chose this course, but within a few years, due to their economic success, became the victims of racial prejudice. The arrival of the 'Free' or 'Passenger' Indians, who like the *smouse*, hawked goods and set up trading centres, aggravated matters. The first laws whittling down the right of Indians to move, trade and reside where they pleased were passed at the end of the last century in Natal, the Transvaal and the Orange Free State. The result was that at the turn of the century further immigration from India was virtually stopped, Indian movement between the 'provinces' was subjected to special permit and the Orange Free State excluded them from her territory altogether. Their residence and trade in the Transvaal and Natal was restricted and controlled by special laws, and except in the Cape, they had no voting rights in the central legislatures. This position was confirmed at Union, so that both by tradition and law their social and economic opportunities were curbed.

The attitudes of white South Africans to Indians are formalised today in the constitutions of the governing National Party and its opposition, the United Party. Both pledge to protect 'All groups of the population against Asiatic immigration and competition (1). However, while the United Party promises to recognise and maintain 'existing rights of Asiatics born or legally domiciled in the Union', the National Party pledges to prevent further encroachment of Indians on the livelihood of the other groups by an 'effective scheme of Asiatic segregation and repatriation'(2) .

By the 'Cape Town Agreement', entered into by the Governments of South Africa and India in 1927, South Africa had hoped to eliminate its Indian population. An attractive repatriation scheme in terms of which the repatriates were given bonuses and free passages 'home' was offered. But since the majority of South African Indians were by then South African by birth, and had never visited India, the scheme was doomed to failure.

The attitude that Indians were a foreign and unassimilable people continued until 1961, and was made further explicit in statements made in the last decade. In 1956 the Minister of the Interior stated in the Senate that the Indian in South Africa had shown that he remained a foreigner, that he did not assimilate, and that economic competition had worsened the problem. He said that India's economic sanctions against South Africa had not made matters easier, and that amongst Indians there were communists, and people with like opinions who had incited Africans to civil disobedience, and who further had appealed to the United Nations on matters within South Africa's domestic jurisdiction, and who in the Transvaal had opposed population registration.

Discussions at the conference of the South African Bureau of Racial Affairs in 1956 reflected the view that, 'in the light of Indian imperialistic tendencies', motivated by Indian poverty, Indians in South Africa constituted 'a formidable Trojan horse within the walls.' Speakers warned that South African Indians could enjoy only 'guest rights' and never rights of established communities in this country, and that they should return to India and Pakistan. While they remained in South Africa Indians should curb their commercial activities.

However, this attitude of hostile rejection changed in 1961 when the Minister of the Interior announced in the House of Assembly (May 1961) that the Indians (3) 'are here and the vast majority of them are going to remain here, and although repatriation is used on a very small scale, we must realise that the vast majority of them are South African citizens and as such they are

also entitled to the necessary attention and the necessary assistance'.

This shift in policy was in keeping with the new approach to non-white affairs, prompted by the build up of political, economic and moral pressures against apartheid. Internal unrest - Sharpeville and the declaration of a state of emergency; the emergence of over thirty independent African states; the consolidation of Afro-Asian hostilities and a call for trade sanctions against South Africa - had shaken world confidence in the country and her economy. Besides this, the rising militancy of Negro Americans and a moral concern with colour throughout the world as well as South Africa's own break with the Commonwealth, and her changed relations with the London stock exchange following the establishment of a Republic, worsened matters. It became evident that in order to survive, the Government would have to project a view of apartheid that would be 'morally' acceptable. Consequently apartheid became redefined as Separate Development, in terms of which the Bantu would be free, within significant limitations, to develop his own political systems within his homeland and the Coloured in the Group Areas set aside for him in the 'white lands'.

South African Indians, though constituting the smallest minority, had been impressing their cause on the world conscience since the last century, and thus it was unlikely that there could be any appeasing of that conscience without some settlement of their status. Thus the Prime Minister, discussing his 'four parallel streams' policy in the Assembly in 1961, stated that if Indians co-operated they would be allowed to develop as a separate community, in their own areas, on the same lines as Coloureds, with their own elected local authorities, and a central council that would gradually assume control of all affairs related to Indians through a separate Government department (4).

The note of ambivalence, 'if they co-operated', was understandable. Indians had for decades militantly opposed racial discrimination. They had rejected the far more valuable United Party offer of Parliamentary Representation on a separate voters roll in 1946, and had launched passive resistance against the Asiatic Land Tenure and Indian Representation Act which, compared to the Group Areas Act, was a blessing. They had further embarrassed the Government by drawing world attention to the inequalities of segregation through the United Nations Organisation. In co-operation with the African National Congress they had mooted the Defiance of Unjust Laws campaign in 1952, and had convened the Congress of Democrats which had led to

the Treason Trial of 1956, and had organised several country-wide political strikes.

Yet in 1961 the Government was in a position to expect some Indian co-operation for it had gone a long way towards creating a vacuum in the body of Indian politics, as it had in the body of non-white politics generally. A large number of enactments had made practically every act of dissent, ranging from restraining a worker from proceeding to work by jeering at him, to organising an active resistance campaign, liable to terms of imprisonment varying from 150 days or a year's imprisonment to a life sentence. The two African organisations, the African National Congress and the Pan African Congress, had been banned and there were plans to ban all the effective leaders of the Indian Congress and thereby not only make the Congress itself impotent, but restrain new contenders for the vacancies created.

In contrast to the turbulent decade of the fifties, in which the national economy was at times threatened, the Government was well prepared to meet the exigencies of the sixties and was determined to bend the non-white will to the policy of Separate Development, through persuasion and intimidation.

Addressing Indians, it announced that they possessed no generally accepted body that could speak with authority on their behalf, and there existed no Government organ that could listen to such authoritative speaking. To remedy this, it created in 1961 the Department of Indian Affairs with a Minister at the head, who was empowered to appoint, in turn, a National Indian Council. It was stated that this organisation would eventually be replaced by an elected Indian council to which Parliament would delegate certain executive and legislative powers for the administration of the Indian people. Significantly, existing Indian political leaders, both radical and conservative, were ignored (although the Minister claimed both were prepared to co-operate) on the grounds that neither represented the Indian people. The popular Indian Congress which had for generations led Indian political aspirations, was dismissed as communist-led, without support (5), and holding power through intimidation.

The Department centralised a number of functions previously distributed among several central and provincial governmental authorities. It took over from the Protector of Indian Immigrants the administration of laws that related specifically to Indians, controlling their immigration, inter-provincial movement, poor relief, and the registration of their births, marriages and deaths. From the Department of Education, Arts and Science, it took over the administration of the University College for Indians, the M.L. Sultan Technical College and its branches, and the Arthur

Blaxall School for the Blind; and from the Provinces the control of Indian primary and secondary education. The Department of Social Welfare ceded to it the administration of all Indian pensions, poor relief, old aged homes, and welfare subsidies, while the Department of the Interior delegated to it the power to issue passports and all travel documents to Indians.

However, the legislation of most vital import, determining Indian social and economic security, the Group Areas Act, and the policy of job reservation, remained outside the scope of the Department. The Minister of Indian Affairs emphasized: 'It is not my function and the function of my Department to lay down policy in respect of the Group Areas Act, nor is it our function to determine the policy in respect of job reservation. My Department is simply the link through which the Indians can make representations to those Departments' (6).

In 1964 the first National Indian Council was appointed and in 1968 the Council, by then known as the South African Indian Council, became a statutory body.

The Indian Council as presently constituted is composed of 25 members appointed by the Minister of Indian Affairs to represent Natal, the Transvaal and the Cape, for three years. The Councillors in turn elect a chairman and an executive committee of five. The Minister appoints a chairman of the executive committee from among the five executive members. The powers of the Council are purely advisory, and its meetings may be attended by the Minister, the secretary and any departmental officials designated by the secretary, and while they may take part in the discussions, they may not vote. The members are remunerated, the rates being R600 per annum for councillors, R800 for executive members, R900 for the chairman of executive, and R1000 for chairman of the Council.

According to Government statements, the Council, whose members are at present nominated, will develop into a 'fully representative, democratically elected and statutory body with powers to partake in and exercise control over the administration of such affairs of the Indian community as may be entrusted to it by Parliament' (7). However, it is clear in terms of Nationalist policy, that Indians will never have representation in Parliament itself, and that they will have less fully developed political rights in their own group areas than those possessed by the Coloureds and Africans under Separate Development. The differences in the status and powers of the Indian and of the Coloured and Transkeian councillors are at the moment great. (8)

The South African Indian Council as the supreme national political organ of the Indian people is supplemented by local

affairs, or consultative or management, committees, designed to satisfy Indian and Coloured aspirations to local Government as urban Bantu councils and district and regional authorities are designed to serve similar African aspirations. Such non-white committees, except in a Bantu Homeland or full Indian or Coloured group area, are adjuncts of the white local authorities. There were, at the end of 1969, 15 Indian local affairs committees, most of them in the first stage of development, that is they are purely advisory in nature with nominated members. A few had reached the second stage, with partly elected members and only one was a fully independent, autonomous and wholly elected body, the Committee of Verulam.

After years of agitation through memorandums, deputations and passive resistance, the Indian people have today political representation in the form of advisory and consultative councils, which with one single exception, have no legislative or executive powers.

Indians have never at any point in their South African history, considered themselves untrained or unprepared to handle the affairs of government at all levels. Since the end of the last century, they have agitated for a share in political power, in order at least to safeguard and promote their own interests. It is inconceivable then, that they see the new structure as a first step towards self-determination. They see it rather, suspiciously, as new and unprecedented machinery to curb their aspirations through their forced and formal removal from the body of South African life into crowded and isolated group areas where their social, economic and educational development will be knocked into a predetermined shape to serve white nationalist interests.

At the time of the creation of the Department, not a single Indian voice was raised in support of it. Dr. G.M. Naicker, President of the Indian Congress, expressed unreserved hostility towards it. Mr. P.R. Pather, then President of the Natal Indian Organisation, and at the time of his recent death, Chairman of the Executive of the Government appointed South African Indian Council, stated that 'no reasonable member of the Cabinet can expect any co-operation from the Indian when he is told to move out of his hearth and home. Nor can he expect the Indian to agree for all time to be a third class citizen'. An editorial of the Indian weekly, *The Leader*, declared that 'uncompromising opposition can really be the only answer to a Minister who calls for Indian co-operation to give effect to the Group Areas and the so-called job reservation and racial discrimination of the worst kind'.

None-the-less, eight years later the Government has realised an unexpected measure of success in the Indian community by employing a two pronged programme. On the one hand they have made the Indian dependent on the Department of Indian Affairs for a large range of everyday needs, and on the other have stifled all resistance and protest outside the Government-created forum. This latter success was achieved by imposing penalties ranging from the terrible threat of life imprisonment and solitary confinement of up to 180 days for suspected opposition (which in terms of the Boss Act can proceed in secrecy without the necessity of giving any explanation of any kind to the public), to the relatively petty harassments of passport and permit refusals. For the first time in eighty years there is no spontaneous expression of Indian political aspirations, and no Indian political party represents the community. The Council is the only audible voice, apart from the opinions of *nom-de-plume* letter writers in the editors' columns.

Not a little measure of the Department's success is due to the tact with which its officials have related themselves to members of the higher echelons, at least, of Indian society. The platteland informality of the Afrikaner bureaucrat makes him more approachable, and the Indian, with his peasant roots, finds himself closer to him than he did to the English bureaucrat who preceded him. The two also share in common the insecurities and anxieties of a minority position, actual in the case of the Indian minority, and too fresh a memory in the mind of the Afrikaner minority to be easily dismissed. There is reason, too, to believe that the Afrikaner official, both high ranking and petty, has warmed to the caress of colourful garlands, and that close contact on the campus of the Indian University between Indian and Afrikaner on a selective level, has reduced petty prejudice. Indians who meet Afrikaners on these levels feel that they are more loved, or at least less hated than Africans, and there are Indians who speak today of the positive benefits of apartheid.

Since the creation of the Department, its staff has grown from less than 200, to almost five and a half thousand and the Indian employees have increased from 25 to 306 (9).

The present structure replaces a measure of integration that had existed prior to the coming into power of the Nationalist Government. In 1948 Indians in the Cape, provided they were males, at least 21 years old, and had incomes of £100 per annum or possessed property to the value of £150, were enfranchised on the common roll for the purposes of parliamentary and Senate elections. In Natal and the Transvaal in

terms of the 1946 Asiatic Land Tenure and Indian Representation Act, Indian men of 21 years and over, who had passed Standard VI and had incomes of at least £168 per annum or property to the minimum value of £100 could, on a separate voters roll, elect one member to the Senate and three to the House of Assembly, and two to the Natal Provincial Council. The councillors elected to the Provincial Council could in addition be Indian by race, which was the first time that non-whites had been allowed membership in a higher legislative organ. In the Cape Indians had served on local council.

Today members of the South African Indian Council have been selected by the Minister of Indian Affairs from the component Indian language and religious groups apparently on the basis of their association with commerce and industry, education, and welfare organizations. They are on the whole, articulate and sophisticated men, though only two have university training and few have had high school education up to matric. They take pride in the fact that they are able to air grievances at Council meetings, and that they have easy access to the Minister of Indian Affairs and to his secretary. There is a feeling of things being done, created by the sheer fact of problems being raised before persons who represent power. Reports of Council meetings, published in the Government publication *Fiat Lux*, suggest, however, that beyond Council, 'hearing with concern', or 'noting with great satisfaction', or receiving 'sympathetic hearing', little else happens. There is no doubt that the Council keeps the Government informed through the Minister of Indian Affairs of the sufferings of Indian traders, of the unfair and low compensation paid for properties confiscated by the Group Areas Board, and of the gravity of Indian poverty, but to date no redress has been forthcoming. Problems arising out of the application of the Group Areas Act consume most Council time. Other issues discussed include inadequate ambulance services, the problem faced by certain Indian minority religious groups who may not marry and bring wives from India, unsatisfactory cloakroom arrangements for Indians at service stations, the lack of Indian radio programmes in the Cape and Transvaal, and requests for improved and extended beach facilities. At one meeting in 1967, the Minister magnanimously announced that Indian objections at having to obtain a permit to pass through the Transkei had been reviewed and they would no longer have to obtain these from the Department of Bantu Affairs. The Department of Indian Affairs would issue these in future.

The Council, as presently constituted, serves very little purpose for the Indian people. The satisfaction that it appears

to give the councillors at the moment, may undergo drastic change when they are no longer nominated but elected men and there is a keener responsibility to the people rather than to the Government. Such a responsibility is bound to breed frustration, and ultimately lead to an eruption that might destroy the structure, as happened with the Transkeian Territories Council during the reign of the United Party Government.

For the time being the nominated councillors, with their built-in veneration for the white man, are delighted at the contact with officialdom that the situation offers. The prestige derived from such contact is often seen as an end itself and gratitude is observably expressed.

Some councillors may hope to use such contact to pursue personal ends, and others may see in the position a measure of relief from the vulnerable position in which they stand as Indians and non-whites. To the Indian the distance between him and the Government, even with the Minister of Indian Affairs as a channel, is so vast that the Government appears omnipotent and omniscient, and the Indian unable to comprehend its logic. lives in terror of being caught doing wrong. The terror is all the greater because he has ceased to understand what constitutes wrong.

This is a state of mind common to all powerless minorities, who because of their powerlessness are ever exposed to victimization, which, with time, is more likely to become worse than better. It explains the extent to which Jews in Nazi Germany were prepared to co-operate with the process of their own annihilation. Contact, and observable show of gratitude for contact and co-operation with those in power, deludes the 'victim' into thinking that he is making some headway in improving or at least forestalling the deterioration of his position.

To the Indian in the street, the departmentalization of Indian life has not meant any observable change. Separation was in existence before the event, and it continues. If there is a worsening, the process is almost imperceptibly slow, and there is no rude awakening to the fact. Indians have been used to a process of deterioration of the rights they have possessed. Better things may well have been in store for them at the end of the Second World War when democratic thoughts were seemingly more prevalent; the United Party appeared sympathetic, and had things gone differently by now the shape of things may have made a present-day Progressive appear quite reactionary. Two decades and a bit have produced a whole new generation under Nationalist rule and the memory of history is dim; it is difficult to recall the way the future looked at the end of the 1940's.

The Indian in the street is painfully alive to his vulnerable position, which he sees as sandwiched between two nationalisms, African and Afrikaner, and is grateful for all he can get. He is aware of disparities, reacts with deep hurt when he is insulted for his colour, but consoles himself when he looks at the rest of the world through South African eyes and believes that things could be worse. He has too, the ability to withdraw into his group, his religion, his work, his family, and protected by the shell he thus forms, he can be happy, and in his happiness he preserves some dignity and passes something of it on to his children.

The Department of Indian Affairs attempts to operate like a long-distance impersonal father, and overtones of benevolence are present in the speeches of officials. Discernible, too, is an effort to prove that Indian life has never been better and bigger since the take-over.

Hostility Against Indian Commerce and the Effects of the Group Areas Act

The extent to which the Nationalists have succeeded in their general design for Indians, is observed in the remarkable change that has been effected in the position of commerce in their occupational structure. In 1956, commerce constituted the largest single occupational category among Indians, employing 24.5% of the total employable population. In 1960, the proportion so engaged had fallen to 21.8% and industry, employing 26.2%, had replaced commerce as the largest employer of Indians (10). According to a recent ministerial statement, 40.8% of Indians are today employed in industry (11), and the percentage employed in commerce has dropped further.

The Nationalists have tended to see commerce as non-productive and parasitic, and have rejected Indians as non-productive and parasitic due to their association with commerce (12). The Deputy Minister of the Interior stated in Parliament in April 1960: 'The Indians have arrogated to themselves the right to be the only businessmen. Why cannot some of them also do some work? Why should white people have to use their hands and not they? They think that they only are entitled to do business' (13). One of the earliest statements made by the first Minister of Indian Affairs on assuming office was that too many Indians were involved in commerce and his Department was already engaged in creating other fields of employment for them (14).

Commerce has played a significant role in raising Indian status in South Africa. It is on the strength of their commercial

enterprise that they, as a non-white people, possess an observable and influential middle class, articulate and with sufficient economic power to provide for their own educational and welfare needs which they have done at times when the Government has remained impervious. The traders in turn have stimulated the Indian professional group.

There is little doubt that one of the prime purposes of the Group Areas Act is to eliminate, or at least reduce to a minimum, Indian commerce, and it is succeeding in doing so. While other social and economic circumstances have also contributed to the change in the importance of commerce in the Indian community, the effect of the Group Areas Act has been the most immediate and drastic. Whole communities of traders have been uprooted, not only from their homes but also from their businesses, without any compensation for loss of goodwill or depreciation in stock.

In 1963, the Transvaal Indian Congress estimated 87.6% of Transvaal Indians to be dependent on commerce. By 1966, only 7.50% of the Transvaal population had remained unaffected by Group Areas proclamations; 23.65% had already been moved and 63.97% were in the process of being moved (15).

Of the 500 traders evicted from Johannesburg to date only 50 have succeeded in re-establishing themselves in commerce. Notices have been served on another 1,350. Only a few hundred of these will be able to re-establish themselves in the contemplated Oriental Bazaar in Fordsburg, which will offer 340 licences. Since only 250 of the traders facing eviction own their stands, all other properties being leasehold, the vast majority stand to lose large amounts spent in capital improvements which are not recoverable (16).

In Pretoria, the Proclamations left 127 of 400 traders unaffected in 1958, but since the African and Coloured populations living in close proximity to the Asiatic Bazaar were required to move, few of the traders could hope to survive. The businesses of 127 alone in Prinsloo Street were valued at the time at ten million rands (17). In 58 Transvaal towns with Indian populations ranging from 44 to 6,458 the situation is similar. Very recent proclamations have affected a small number of Indian traders in Zululand and more than 60 in Northern Natal.

According to a statement by the Minister of Indian Affairs in 1963 (18) only 340 of a total number of 3,191 traders in Durban would not be affected by the proclamations. The rest, 2,057, were in controlled or frozen areas, whose ultimate racial definition was still in abeyance but where in the interim no further development was possible without ministerial con-

sent. 794 had to move. Last year the Group Areas Development Board intimated its intention to declare the controlled, central Indian business area in Durban (the Grey Street complex), white. 4,500 Indian businesses are concentrated there and the value of Indian properties is presently estimated at R54,435,079 on the Indian market, and half that on the white market (19).

Indians have repeatedly been assured by the Department of Indian Affairs that this generation of traders will not be deprived of their livelihood in terms of the Act and that personal cases of hardship will receive personal ministerial attention (20). In 1961, the Secretary of the Group Areas Board requested the Town Councils of Durban and Pietermaritzburg to bear in mind that Indians would not be able to make a reasonable living as a separate and self-supporting group if shopkeepers were confined to their own racial groups and suggested that in planning Indian areas trading sites should be placed on boundaries, and near access roads (21). The sincerity of such statements is suspect, particularly in view of stated policy that no Indian areas should adjoin African townships and that trade should not be created for Indians among the Coloureds or poor whites (22). It is a well-known fact that over 50% of the clientele in the Durban Grey Street complex is non-Indian, and over 80% of all trade in the Transvaal has been with non-Indians.

The Department of Indian Affairs, with a paternal touch, has suggested that the Indian trader should be encouraged, and at times assisted by the Industrial Investment Corporation, to develop industry and, in turn, assist his fellow Indians, so easily prone to unemployment in the South African economic structure, to find employment (23). This is of course an absurd notion, for a very small proportion of the grossly undercompensated traders can hope to branch out in that direction. Figures such as an increase in Indian manufacturers, from 142 in 1962 to 350 in 1967 (24), and a total investment of R20,000,000 (25) by Indians in industry in the two year period 1966-68, appear impressive, but pale into insignificance when pitted against the fact that in one Indian area alone, Diagonal Street in Johannesburg, the proclamation means a loss of R20,000,000 in business turnover to 310 Indian businesses and a further loss of R13,700,000 (26) in stocks, goodwill and facilities. Only a proportion of the loss in stocks alone is recoverable. By the end of 1966, there were only five small Indian owned factories in the Transvaal (27) and to date the Industrial Investment Corporation has assisted only three Indian textile mills (28). By contrast, Indian commerce had employed a large proportion of the Indian population; in 1960, of the 27,484 esti-

mated to have been thus employed, 22,355 were estimated to have been salesmen (29). Clothing is the most important Indian industrial enterprise, and in 1968, 80 clothing factories employed only 6,500 people (30).

The manner in which the Act has been applied and the basis on which compensations have been paid have further aggravated an already iniquitous situation. It has shattered Indian confidence in Nationalist compassion and has proved to Indians that apartheid is incompatible with Christianity. The peculiar position exists where the Group Areas Board not only proclaims an area, but also fixes the price at which properties should be sold and also has the first right to purchase such affected properties. Indians complain that as an interested party, the Board undervalues properties and then forces sales. Those with patience and time have contested such valuations with success, but few are in a position to do this and the impartiality of the arbitration court, set up by the Board, has been questioned. On 20 November 1966, a judge of the Natal Supreme Court asked two members of the three member arbitration court to recuse themselves; in Rustenburg an Indian property was sold to whites for R70,000 of which the Board retained R16,000, presumably as appreciation. Less than two years later the property sold for R453,000. The Board purchased an Indian property in Ladysmith at R6,630 and then resold it to a white for R9,500 (31). Such incidents have prompted Mrs. Helen Suzman of the Progressive Party to ask for an enquiry into the profits made by the Board.

Apart from the sheer hardships of removal, there are the hardships encountered on resettlement in poorly established, inadequately serviced new areas. Much of the burden of developing the new group areas falls on white local authorities. The smaller ones are not in a position to bear the financial burden, while the larger ones, in spite of a Natal Supreme decision of 4 July 1960, which stated that the Board should consider the provision of alternate, suitable, and equitable replacement before proclaiming an area (32), do not have the required do not have the required magnanimity to provide appropriate replacement.

In Nylstroom the local authority provided only 15 houses and 10 shops for the 40 affected families, and announced that the rest must build for themselves (33). Indians moved into the Indian group area of Lenasia near Johannesburg although in 1963 there were only two tarred roads, no sewerage, no hospitals or clinics, one public telephone, no street lights, no recreational facilities, no postal service and no police station

(34). The first sports stadium was built in 1968, a start on the laying of sewerage mains was made in 1967, and householders had to bear all costs of internal installation. At the end of 1968 there was still no police station or hospital despite a population of 34,000, and the transport and educational facilities were inadequate.

The Ministers of Planning, Community Development, Coloured Affairs and Indian Affairs said in 1968 in the Assembly that since 1963 their Departments had advanced no sums to local authorities for the provision of amenities such as sports fields or libraries (35), although provisions existed for monies to be expended for such purposes in the new areas.

At times, municipalities have pleaded for less hardship when depriving Indians of their existing homes and livelihood, but the Government has remained rigidly callous. The Durban municipality requested that Cato Manor, predominantly Indian, be proclaimed Indian; the Johannesburg City Council pleaded that Pageview and Diagonal Street, with large Indian investments, be left Indian. Both representations were turned down.

In most Transvaal towns, the Act has required entire Indian populations to be moved away. In Durban 41,000 Indians have been moved in terms of the proclamations and resettled in municipal housing schemes. Thousands more have been forced to make their own private arrangements. It is expected that 150,000 more will be moved in the next 10/15 years (36).

Such movements pose enormous sociological and psychological problems, to which authorities appear to have remained insensitive. There are indications that in the mammoth township of Chatsworth, where there will ultimately be 80,000 people, new and disruptive tendencies are emerging. There are reports about brothels and shebeens, encouraged in part by the absence of recreational and service facilities and inadequate transport. There is suspicion that crime, drug addiction, alcoholism and loose living exists in that area today, in a measure not known among Indians before.

Income and Welfare

Despite the fact that South Africa is enjoying a soaring economy, little of this is reflected in the Indian community, largely due to the rise in cost of living. The weighted average consumer price index rose in nine principal towns from a base of 100 in 1958 to 122.3 in 1967, and there has been a further rise since. Rise in wages has not kept pace with the rise in prices. Yet, at no time have Indians in their South African history so developed tastes for urban cum European consumer

goods as in the last decade. This has exposed them to patterns in expenditure which were generally unknown in the community before. The hire purchase system has become a feature of Indian life and there is a change in the attitude of the young, unmarried person to his earnings. Whereas before the bulk of his wage went without question to the family head, now the bulk is retained for personal expenditure on prestige goods. The indications are that there is more furniture in the home, and that earning members of the family, particularly the unmarried, wear more fashionable clothes. At the same time the diet of the family has declined. The rising infant mortality rate, in Durban, 42 per 1,000 live births in 1966, 45 in 1967, and 53 in 1968 (37), may be a result of this.

In 1960, less than two per cent of the national income went to Indians and the Indian per capita income was estimated at R136 p.a. (38). A 1963 sample survey by the Department of Economics, Natal, revealed that 64% of Durban Indians were living below the poverty datum line: more recent sample surveys estimate that 60% of the Durban population are living on incomes below those necessary for basic subsistence. The median incomes of Indian families are estimated at R77.30 and the average size 6.6 persons. There were in 1960, 3.2 dependents per wage earner among Indians (Coloured 1.8, and white 1.4). (39). The Indian birth rate appears to be declining, and if this trend continues this disproportion between dependant and wage earner may improve in the future. In 1966 the Indian birth rate in Durban was 35, in 1967 33, in 1968 31.

Despite their higher educational qualifications (5.7% of Indians in 1960 had matriculation or school leaving certificates (40), 1.5% Coloured, and 0.1% Africans) about 60% of the employable population is employed in the unskilled and semi-skilled categories. In the five year period ending 1968 only 629 Indians as compared with 4,573 Coloureds had registered apprenticeship contracts (41).

The effects of Indian poverty resulting from the growing tendency to spend money on the individual's own behalf instead of on the family, is observed in the increase in cases of domestic discord brought to the Durban Indian Child Welfare Society. In 1950, the agency investigated 164 new cases; in 1956, 207; in 1959, 497; in 1965, 540; and in 1968, 1,931. The trend also suggests that the Indian family is less able to cope with such strains than before, and more prone now to expose them to outsiders. The incidence of illegitimacy, too, is rising. In 1960 the Durban Society dealt with 150 such cases, in 1962 with 245 (42).

Due to the general shortage of manpower in the country, job reservation determinations (which in 1965 applied to 17 sectors of the economy employing 20% of South Africa's labour) have not affected Indians as drastically as expected. However, it is clear that they will be among the first to be hit by it if there is a recession.

Education

Some significant changes have occurred in the structure and content of Indian education since the Department took over its control from the Province and the Department of Arts and Science. For the first time a Department of Oriental Studies has become established in a South African University, though the University of the Witwatersrand runs an Asian Studies Programme, and for the first time too, Indian languages have been recognized as matriculation subjects. Other firsts are the appointments of Indian inspectors, Indians on the Administration staff, and an Indian planner of education. The salaries of Indian teachers have been raised to the level of Coloured teachers, though in fact the gap between these and those of white teachers is estimated to have increased.

For the first time too, a Government department is paying attention to specialised teaching needs in the community. A school of industry for 'wayward' Indian children was opened last year and the Department has taken over the single Indian school for the blind established by the Natal Indian Blind Society, a voluntary organisation. In the year 1966/67, R406,000 was spent on such schools in the Coloured community, and in 1968 there were 1,688 (43) schools for European children serving such specialised needs as those of the physically handicapped, epileptic, blind, deaf, and cerebral palsied. There are library allowances and bursaries available to Indian children but the extent of these is much smaller than it presently is for Coloured children.

The Department has sought general improvements in the quality of teachers, and has maintained a building programme which keeps adequate pace with population growth. The number of professionally trained teachers has increased; in 1966 only 47% of the Indian teachers were professionally trained, while in 1969 84% were so trained (44). The Department inherited a backlog of a thousand classrooms and within five years had wiped this out. In 1963, only 51 of a total number of 281 schools in the Republic had been built by the Government; the Indian community having spent R2,000,000 in 12 years on a rand-for-

rand basis to build the rest. By 1969, the Government had built an additional 80 schools. The number of children attending double session or platoon schools has also declined. In 1966, there were 33,000 attending such schools, in 1967 there were 13,000. (45).

While Indian education is not compulsory, nor entirely free, the Department gives out free text books on loan and pays a transport allowance to needy children. As a result the cost of education to the parent per Indian school child, which in 1960 was R7.60 p.a. (46) in primary school and R17.60 p.a. in secondary school for textbooks and fees, has decreased. Yet the unit cost per child to the Department does not appear to have changed significantly since the time Indian education was under the Province. In 1960, it was R47 in Government-aided schools and R68 per child in Government schools. In 1969, it was R53 per primary school child, and R84 per secondary school child. (47)

There were in 1969 275,166 Indian children at school of whom 23% were in post primary classes, that is, Standard VI to Standard X. At the time of transfer, in 1963, 15.2% were in post-primary classes. (48)

Yet despite such observable improvements, there has been a sharp drop in the matriculation pass rate of Indian pupils since 1962. In 1961, 74% of those who wrote passed, in 1963 62% passed, in 1964 the pass rate had declined to 48% and in 1967 to 34%. There has been a slight incline since and last year just over 40% (49) of those who wrote passed. This has caused grave concern to parents, striving for upward mobility for their children. While they have some understanding of the structural factors that account for this, there is also suspicion that pass rates are being kept down deliberately to accord with the Government's concept of the role of the Indian in South Africa.

Prior to the establishment of the University College for Indians in Durban, Indians were admitted to a large number of Faculties of the Universities of Natal, Cape Town, Witwatersrand and Rhodes. The enrolment at each of these has steadily declined due to legislation against their admission to the so-called 'open' universities. In 1959, there were 489 Indian students at the University of Natal, 133 at Cape Town, 193 at the Witwatersrand and 100 at Fort Hare. There were in 1969 a total of 757 Indian students at these centres while there were 1,621 students at the Indian University College in Durban. (50) That College began in 1961 with 114 students and 40 members of the teaching staff of whom six were Indians. It offered enrolment in 20 courses. To day students may register

in 341 courses and it has introduced a Department of Oriental Studies. The new buildings, attractively located at Chiltern Hills, are estimated to cost R9,500,000. In 1961, 601 Indian students were studying by correspondence through the University of South Africa, in 1969 there were 900 so enrolled. (51)

Despite tremendous expansion in the choice of courses at the Indian University College, such fundamental courses as Medicine, Engineering and Architecture are still not available, and Indians have to seek the Minister's permission to attend these at the white universities.

The unit cost per student at the non-white Colleges is, by South African standards, incongruously higher than for white students - white R577, Indians R644, Coloured R976 and at one African College, R1490 (52). This is due to the high cost involved in setting up separate facilities for small blocks of students. Despite the higher unit expenditure, the non-white colleges do not offer better academic facilities. The non-white colleges are staffed to some extent by inexperienced personnel or by academics called in from retirement. Further to this there is a general paucity of academic personnel.

The Indian believes his position to be the most precarious of all in South Africa. He has today reached a point where he considers Afrikaner nationalism, which he knows, to be preferable to African nationalism, the only apparent alternative, which he does not know, and about which he hears gruesome stories. This is in sharp contrast to the view he held in the fifties when he hoped that his liberation would come through local African strength. He had faith in the African National Congress, and faith in the efficiency and Christianity of its leaders. Today he has negligible contact with Africans, and even such contact as he has in sport is threatened by the extension of restrictions in terms of the Group Areas Act to sports fields.

Closed in, in his own Group Area, and with no opportunities for spontaneous inter-group contact, he views other groups with suspicion and projects towards them prejudices similar to those of which he is a victim. Desperate for security, and fearful of not obtaining it in the general social milieu, he searches for it in the intrinsically Indian cultural idiom. There is a lively revival of interest in Indian languages, religion, music, dancing, drama - scholars come from India and visitors go to India. But this in the main, is the comfort of the adult generation. The young knowing no other idiom but that of urban South Africa seek it in the South African idiom. There is anger, but the anger is directed against the parent generation and for the while, conflict is confined within the Group Area.

FOOTNOTES

1. National Party Constitution (Cape Province, 1952)
2. 31 January, Hansard 3, Cols. 495/514.
3. H.A. Prinsloo, *Fiat Lux*, May 1966, p.22
4. Assembly, 10 April, 1961, Hansard 12, Col. 4192, as quoted in M. Horrell, *A Survey of Race Relations in South Africa, 1961*, p.141
5. Mr. W.A. Maree, Policy Statement in the Senate, 17 May, 1962, said: 'We do not know whom we could approach to speak on behalf of the Indians. The Indian Organization has on occasion claimed that it is the mouthpiece of the Indians and the Congress alleges that it is the mouthpiece ...' Relating to the Congress he said 'I do not want to say anything further about that organization except that in the ranks of the Indian community there is growing resistance to the reign of terror of the Congress Organization.' *The Indian in the Republic of South Africa*, Minister of Indian Affairs, 1962, Government Printer, Private Bag 152, Pretoria.
6. Assembly, 20 May, 1963, Hansard 17, Col. 6376, as quoted from M. Horrell, *A Survey of Race Relations in South Africa, 1963*, p. 159.
7. Stated by the Minister of Indian Affairs at the Inaugural Meeting of the South African Indian Council, *Fiat Lux*, May 1966, p. 25.
8. The Coloured Representative Council by contrast, is composed of forty elected and twenty nominated members, has some legislative and executive powers, subject to the approval of the Minister and control over some finances. The chairman of Council receives R6000 per annum, executive members R5000, and there is provision for an entertainment allowance, the use of a motor car for official use, and a house at nominal rent for each. Ordinary members are paid R1500 a year. The remunerations of ministers and members of the Transkeian Council are: chief minister R4000 per annum, other ministers R3400 per annum and members of Legislative Assembly R800 per annum.
9. *Fiat Lux*, 1969, p. 5.
10. Census figures for 1956 and 1960.
11. M. Horrell, op. cit., volume 1969, p. 95.
12. Statement made at a conference of South African Bureau of Racial Affairs in 1956, as reported in M. Horrell, *A Survey of Race Relations*.
13. Assembly, 11 April, 1960, Hansard 13, Col. 5285.
14. Mr. W.A. Maree: *The Indian in the Republic of South Africa*, policy statement, 1962, op. cit., p. 6.
15. M. Horrell: *Group Areas, The Emerging Pattern with Illustrative Examples from the Transvaal*, as quoted in *A Survey of Race Relations*.
16. *Rand Daily Mail*, March 23, 1968.
17. M. Horrell, *A Survey of Race Relations, 1957-58*, p. 107.
18. Assembly, Hansard 19, Cols. 7,000-1 as quoted in M. Horrell, *A Survey of Race Relations 1963*, p. 222.
19. R.R. Pather and A.M. Moolla, Central Durban Indian Area Protection Committee Memorandum presented to the Group Areas Board, May, 1969, 104 Commercial Road, Durban.

20. Minister of Community Development, *Star*, September 6, Deputy Minister, Assembly, 19 February, 1960, Hansard, Cols. 1826-7. Minister of Indian Affairs, addressing Indian Council, 23 March, 1964. As reported in M. Horrell, *Survey of Race Relations, Volumes 1962, 1960, 1964*.
21. As reported in M. Horrell, *Survey of Race Relations*, 1961, p. 154.
22. As reported in M. Horrell, *Survey of Race Relations*, 1962, p. 137.
23. *The Indian in the Republic of South Africa* - policy statement by Mr. W.A. Maree in the Senate, May 1962, Department of Interior, Government Printer, Pretoria.
24. Minister of Indian Affairs, Assembly, 6 May, Hansard 13, Col. 5421, as quoted in M. Horrell, *Survey of Race Relations*, p. 100.
25. Statement by Minister of Indian Affairs as reported in M. Horrell, *op. cit.*, 1967, p. 208.
26. M. Horrell, *op. cit.*, 1968, p. 197.
27. M. Horrell, *op. cit.*, 1966, p. 206.
28. *Ibid.* April and May 1969.
29. Bureau of Census and Statistics, sample tabulation based on 1960 statistics.
30. *Fiat Lux*, June 1968.
31. M. Horrell, *op. cit.*, 1969, p. 107.
32. As reported in M. Horrell, *Survey of Race Relations*, 1959-60, p. 145.
33. As reported in M. Horrell, *Survey of Race Relations*, 1963, p. 172.
34. M. Horrell, *op. cit.*, 1963, p. 170.
35. M. Horrell, *ibid.*, 1962, p. 191.
36. Lawrence Schlemmer: *The Resettlement of Indian Communities in Durban and Some Economic, Social and Cultural Effects on the Indian Community*, in *The Indian South African*, South African Institute of Race Relations.
37. Department of Health, Durban.
38. A.L. Muller, *Economic Position of the Asians in South Africa*, South African Journal of Economics.
39. *Ibid.*
40. Dr. E.G. Malherbe: *Bantu Manpower and Labour* Paper presented at a conference on Bantu Education convened by the Institute of Race Relations, 1969.
41. M. Horrell, *op. cit.*, Volume 1969, p. 95.
42. These figures are abstracted from the Annual Reports of the Durban Indian Child Welfare Society.
43. Report of the Department of Education, Arts and Science, 1968, pp. 139-150.
44. M. Horrell, *op. cit.*, 1969, p. 203.
45. Figures kindly given by Mr. Jack Naidoo, planner of Indian Education, Department of Indian Affairs.
46. M. Horrell, *op. cit.*, 1962, p. 193.
47. *Ibid.*, 1969, p. 202.
48. *Ibid.*, 1969, p. 202.
49. Paper by Y.A. Chinsamy, member of South African Indian Council, and of the Verulam Town Board, 1969.
50. M. Horrell, *op. cit.*, 1969, p. 210.
51. *Ibid.*
52. M. Horrell, *op. cit.*, 1969, p. 211.

THE AFRIKANER: CONTEMPORARY ATTITUDES

w.a. de klerk

REINHOLD NIEBUHR'S book *The Irony of American History* could well find its equivalent in a treatise on the irony of South African history, with special reference to the Afrikaner.

On the whole Afrikaner conservatism has expressed itself and is once again expressing itself in terms which could be epitomised in two remarkable pioneer movements.

'The Great Trek of 1836 is the first of these, and represents generally a desire on the part of the Afrikaner to be himself as he is. Elements of fundamental importance would be: his whiteness; his being a Calvinist Protestant; his ethnic and cultural autonomy, 'against the whole world free'. It would express itself further in his being found in a particular land, to which he would form a deep attachment. On the whole these are Puritan values, characterised further by the classically heroic virtues of

loyalty (to one another); diligence; justice towards those who (by Providence) have been entrusted to his care, i.e. the non-whites of Southern Africa; moralism (as distinguished from morality); courage to pursue the way marked out for him; a certain shrewdness; and as part of this shrewdness, a lively practical sense.

It is precisely this attribute of practicality ('n boer maak 'n plan') which finally distinguishes the pioneer movement of the Great Trek of 1836 from the pioneer movement of the Thirstland Trek of the 1870's. In the case of the Great Trek the central institution was the laager. But the laager was a movable which served its purpose admirably as a defensive system *when occasion demanded*. When the occasion no longer demanded it, it broke up and moved on. It was thus the practical sense of the Afrikaner, his respect for life, in a manner of speaking, asserting itself. In essence this means his respect for the workability of things. There was no final virtue in isolation, or mere defensiveness. The object was settlement in some area which could be acquired by purchase, treaty or occupation, where the land was desolate.

The thing to note here is that what in most cases ultimately decided a course of action was not what is referred to today as a 'leuens- en wêreldbeskouing' (world view i.e. a pattern of principles which determines for all time the course of action), but the real demands of a concrete situation. This was no attachment to an abstract *at all costs*. This was a real movement into new lands; to occupy them (peaceably if possible), and then to settle there, and develop the new communities.

The Thirstland Trek was something else.

The story of the Thirstlanders and their passionate search for a definitive Calvinist state of beatitude, i.e. for final self-sufficiency in isolation, is the story of any group anywhere pursuing its impossible ideal at all costs. In the end the Ideal, for which no sacrifice has been too much, no measures too grim, proves mysteriously to be the very antithesis of what has so courageously, so comi-tragically been striven for. The heroic virtues referred to in the case of the Great Trek, are present

here in increased measure. The laager is no longer a movable, designed to serve a specific defensive purpose *ad hoc*, and then to move on. The laager has become the Trek itself. It is a permanent preoccupation with being himself - but a spurious self which has lost all contact with reality, and is therefore no longer himself. The laager of the Thirstlanders is an institution of final sanctity. In this deadly isolation, mesmerized by a sense of mission (a messianic sense has always characterised the human being pursuing his impossible ideal towards fulfillment, identity, security etc.), the Thirstlander is finally brought to what is the very denial of his strivings. In history the Thirstlanders never reached their Calvinist utopia in Portuguese West Africa although for many years many of them believed that they had. What they did indeed reach was a Catholic non-heaven.

The two movements - the Great Trek of 1836, and the Thirstland Trek of the 1870's - are by no means clear-cut. In the Great Trek there were many Thirstlanders. In the Thirstland Trek there were many Great Trekkers. In the case of the Great Trek, however, it was a real sense for what life itself required (as distinguished from principle) that decided. In the case of the Thirstlanders the principle, the '*lewens en wereldbeskouing*' drew on, and on, and on - towards final absurdity.

In the present state of the nation these attitudes can again be distinguished. The *Verligte* is a Great Trekker, who has discerned the sound and fury (or emptiness) of certain fundamentals (principles) and who seeks to adapt them to the demands of the age, while hardly admitting his being a party to it. His respect for the workability of things has brought him to this. The *Verkrampste* is a Thirstlander, who is pursuing his impossible ideal and his impossible principle at all costs. This means that he is becoming increasingly divorced from the life which is South Africa of the 20th Century. In the same way, as the lines of demarcation were not clear-cut between Thirstlanders and Great Trekkers, they are not so clear-cut between *Verligtes* and *Verkrampstes*. What is certain, however, is that the attitudes which dominate the respective groups are going to become increasingly apparent.

The irony of the Thirstlanders has found its equivalent in modern day South Africa. If the Ideal of a Calvinist heaven for

the Thirstlanders turned out to be a Catholic non-heaven, it is becoming clearer, as time elapses, that the ideal of the modern Afrikaner of a Southern African constellation of Separate Freedoms, may turn out to be a new imperium. Colonialism has surreptitiously crept in again. The Afrikaner is discovering himself to be the new Imperial Factor in Southern Africa, and many are not happy about it. They are the true *Verligtes*. They discern the strange fact that Coloured children now sing *Die Stem van Suid-Afrika* in the same remote, detached sort of way (because they have been detached from the South African Nation), that the Afrikaner child of 30 years ago sang *God save the King*.

There is an even deeper-lying irony. The Calvinist fundamentalism of the Afrikaner (*Verlig* and *Verkramp*) is built around the concept of Divine Ordination, i.e. the elect of God have been such since the foundation of the world. This is determinism in an extreme form and no amount of rationalisation will accomodate this to the free intelligence of the human being. The basic tenet is: everything from, towards God. For the free intelligence to move on his own when doing good, is impossible. The only possibility of his being free is that of freely doing evil. There is no opportunity here to go into the theology of all this, however. Enough if one points out that the idea of Divine Ordination is directly in conflict with the *Verkrampte* attitude that attachment-free, intelligent attachment, if you like - to a principle, i.e. an abstract, is the only way to establish final security. What happens to Providence? In a strangely ironic sort of way, the most fundamental of believers in fact do not believe: because if they did believe they would believe that, come what may, Providence would see to their future. Dread of the Future or apprehension would then be unnecessary. But as we have seen Dread lies at the heart of all ultra-fundamentalist thinking.

The *Verligte* is *verlig* simply because he is discerning (some dimly, other more clearly) the true demands of real circumstances. He is becoming conscious of the fact that ethics has everything to do with a living experience and nothing to do with a principle. He is discovering that beyond the abstracts there is a real world of existence which must be met. The *Verkrampte* denies all this, and is closing his laager of obstruction, of principle around him, believing that this is going to redeem him. What he does not realise, however, is that this is not life he is ensuring,

but death itself. The Ideal when attained, like the Great White Whale, or the *Bestemming* of the Thirstlander, proves to be death itself.

There is one more consideration. In our time a considerable body of Afrikaners have emerged, who are as far as *Verligtheid* and *Verkramptheid* are concerned, beyond good and evil. Often they are writers, theologians, philosophers, but also just ordinary people. They have no unbreakable loyalties but to their fellow creatures: to their fellowman, whose origin they share, whose responsibilities they share. Oddly enough, this usually means that they have a very real attachment to the people of their own ethnic group. This is because *they are at hand*; and they have no time for abstracts. They are concerned with the *created world around them*. In some measure this has expressed itself in Afrikaans writing during the sixties. There is evidence that it will be the case in increasing measure during the seventies. Here lies the true hope for the future: loving the created world in openness and humility for what it is.

Whether fundamentalist attachment to principles will prove to be too strong it is difficult to say. Should it indeed prove to be too strong, then there is only one end in sight: tragedy.

What may avert tragedy is a sense of comedy, which means a restoration of humility.

Whether we can manage this?

We shall certainly do our best.

THE ENGLISH-SPEAKING WHITES

c.o. gardner

I APPROACH my topic with considerable diffidence. I shall have to make a number of generalizations - and I am acutely aware that most generalizations turn out to be either too obviously true to be worth saying, or else largely false, and therefore not worth saying for that reason!

Needless to say, my remarks will be personal; and they will be based upon impressions, not upon statistics of any kind.

Most English-speaking white South Africans are, of course, of British stock. There are various non-British groups, most notably the Jewish community (or a part of it); but the British influence is undoubtedly dominant.

It seems to me valuable to consider briefly, though with due tentativeness, what might be thought of as the British temperament - or at least some aspects of it. I think it is significant that Britain (the land, obviously, in which the British temperament is able most fully to have its own way) should be renowned for its conservatism so far as political and social structures are concerned, and that it should also be the country in which empirical - common-sense, untheoretical - philosophical tendencies have had most success. The British tend, in general, to be sceptical about wild innovations and about large theories and enthusiasms. I think one might justly add (since I am dealing in precarious generalizations) that on the whole the British

seem usually, or often, to prefer tolerance to intolerance, justice (as they conceive it) to injustice, peace to war, and a quiet normal life to a life of glory and splendour and ambition. Britain seems never to have had a Napoleon or a Hitler; its great statesmen and warriors have tended to rise up in response to some need, often a need for *defence*. (How, it might be asked, do I account for the British Empire? I think any serious attempt to answer that question would carry me too far afield. But I will say this: the British desire for justice - as it conceived it - and for peace and for commercial 'normality' was often pursued, paradoxically enough, with considerable arrogance and pugnacity).

The history of Britain's response to Hitler in the 1930's and 40's seems to me illuminating. Very few Britons were attracted to Hitler's wild philosophy, even though Hitler took it upon himself to consider Britain almost a partner to Germany in the master-race business; but on the other hand Britain as a whole was very reluctant to recognize that it would be necessary to resist Hitler. Ultimately resistance became more or less unavoidable. In these special circumstances Churchill was able to rise to his great heights; and Britain - roused from her usual equanimity - allowed herself to have her 'finest hour'.

The British, then, I would suggest, tend to have both the advantages and the disadvantages of political and social scepticism. To switch one's gaze back to South Africa: it seems to me that most English-speaking white South Africans, however much they may be influenced or deceived by considerations of fear or expediency, are not really deeply or wholly convinced by the theoretical arguments of Nationalism, by the *mystique* of apartheid, by the almost religious sense of white destiny which seems to operate in the minds of a fair number of Afrikaans-speaking white South Africans. On the other hand, being human and vulnerable and also perplexed, most English-speaking South Africans are prepared (though their consciences are not really happy) to shelter under the wings of and to 'go along with' a Nationalist regime and a basically racialistic way of conceiving the nation's corporate existence. At the same time, being conservative, sceptical, indeed rather sluggish in their thought about social and political questions, they are on the whole, at the present time, unlikely to respond very warmly to the call of a Helen Suzman, a Beyers Naude, a Joost de Blank. They are secretly quite pleased, I suspect, that such a person as Helen Suzman exists, that she stands in parliament to represent something which most of them obscurely feel to be a part of themselves. And yet they don't really like or trust

enthusiasm, unless they are convinced that enthusiasm is warranted by special circumstances - and even in 1940, when enthusiasm had become permissible, Churchill's voice in his speeches was always remarkably calm and slow, in obvious contrast to the ragings and thumpings sometimes produced by Hitler.

One of the reasons why English-speaking people tend to distrust enthusiasm is that, in England and in most English-speaking countries, the political and social life has usually been so quiet, rational and fundamentally just (at least by the standards of the time) that enthusiasm, a hot reforming spirit, has normally seemed to most people to be uncalled-for. As far as English-speaking South Africans are concerned, the Nationalist Government has been very intelligent in maintaining many of the forms of a Westminster-style parliament: most English-speaking South Africans assume, unthinkingly, that if a parliamentary government is functioning, all must be well.

There have of course been a few occasions since 1948 when the Nationalist Government has introduced fundamental changes in structures and procedures which have outraged the English sense of governmental normality and fair play. Perhaps the most notable of such occasions was the referendum on the creation of a republic in 1960. In some English-speaking areas, and notably in Natal, the prospect of the removal of the monarchy and of the reassuring link with Britain produced, for a while, almost an atmosphere of 1940. English-speaking South Africans canvassed and voted with vigour, and many minds suddenly - but alas briefly - became abnormally flexible. Under the influence of emotions and thoughts which were admittedly a little confused - partly sensible, partly merely atavistic, certainly by no means simply altruistic and Christian - many ordinary white citizens were prepared to distrust the Government's treatment of non-whites. I was present at a meeting outside the Durban City Hall, late in 1960, at which a large crowd of white people from all over Natal allowed itself to be told that non-whites must be given an altogether fairer and squarer deal in South Africa But the 'Natal stand' fizzled out, partly no doubt because it was doomed to in any case, but partly I think because it was mishandled by politicians who did not understand it.

I mention this matter not because I think it would be possible or even valuable to reproduce anything quite like it now, but in order to illustrate what seems to me a characteristic tendency of English-speaking South Africans: the refusal to be enthusiastic, and thoughtful about society, except in rather special circumstances. This seems to be one of the solid and awkward facts which the Spro-cas Commissions will have to confront.

So much for some aspects of the 'British heritage', as I understand it. There are of course other reasons why English-speaking white South Africans should have tended to be uncommitted, unsure and uncreative as far as the communal life of South Africa is concerned.

Although the Empire in its old form has disappeared, many English-speaking white South Africans feel aware, consciously or subconsciously, that they have cousins or second cousins in other parts of the world. For this reason, they often do not feel quite so intensely committed to South Africa and to a solution of its problems as most Afrikaners do. They are also conscious of being relative newcomers to the country; and this makes them feel themselves to be, to some extent, outsiders, uitlanders. They are apt to be diffident and even - when they think of the Boer War - a little guilt-stricken.

There can be little doubt that in the last eight or nine years English-speaking white South Africans have grown more involved with South Africa and less aware of their British connections. (This latter point seems to me to be in some ways a good thing, but in other ways unfortunate. The English have, after all, a distinctive contribution to make to the South African way of life; but it would be a pity if they were to abandon some of their inherited riches at the very moment when they are perhaps preparing to play their part almost for the first time). Moreover it must of course be admitted and stressed that in many respects English-speaking South Africans are subject to the same temptations, pressures, challenges and delusions as all other white South Africans; it would be a mistake to over-emphasize the uniqueness of their situation or of their sentiments.

I have decided to say very little about the attitudes of different groups and classes of English-speaking South Africans. The variations of the general attitude I have described that are to be found amongst, say, businessmen, artisans, professional men, are more or less what one would expect.

I must say a little, however, about the more thoughtful sections of English-speaking white South Africa. Of the comparatively small amount of liberalism and racial openness that has existed amongst whites, a great deal has been found in the English-speaking community. Certain elements in the four English-speaking universities, in the English-language newspapers, in some of the professions (notably perhaps the legal profession) and in the predominantly English-speaking churches have been, at times, notable. At this level, one can validly talk of the British tradition as being liberal and humane - and therefore either genuinely Christian or genuinely in the spirit

of Christianity. But it must be stressed that this healthiest British tradition has been upheld vigorously by relatively few people, and that it has tended to become weaker in the last ten years or so. It does still exist, however - in a few quarters in a state of partial or complete dormancy. I believe that in the right circumstances it could still be evoked, and might prove to be, in some respects, fairly widespread and fairly potent and influential. It seems to me that, in the year or so that has elapsed since this paper was first written, this 'healthiest British tradition' may have become slightly less dormant, slightly more influential. It is important, of course, that the general trend of thought overseas - social, political, religious and economic thought - tends to reinforce many aspects of this British tradition; and English-speaking South Africans, however critical they may be at the moment, have always been more responsive to overseas thinking than the majority of Afrikaners (although Afrikaners are beginning to change somewhat nowadays).

What might be a fairly typical, not particularly thoughtful English-speaking white South African's view of apartheid? On the whole he accepts what the Government does without either strong complaint or vigorous enthusiasm. He reads the English press, and is a little critical of it; on the other hand he also listens to the S.A.B.C.'s version of political and social reality, and is a little critical of *that*. There are two respects in which he is rather unhappy about apartheid; he disapproves of obvious instances of callousness or injustice (for example the Limehill removals); and he is at present a little worried about the effect of job reservation and the manpower shortage on South Africa's economic prosperity. This worry has become distinctly more intense in the last twelve months.

As far as his *attitudes* are concerned, then, the theorists of apartheid would not be wholly satisfied with him. But as to his *practical life* (and this, after all, is more important) the theorists could have no complaint whatsoever: the average English-speaking white South African has no contacts across the colour line at all - except of course the relatively superficial and unequal master-servant contact. In practice, apartheid is for him the sum total of South Africa's racial situation.

What of English-speaking white *Christians*.

Some of their leaders, as I have said, have been distinguished critics of apartheid. But on the whole the critique of apartheid has not filtered down at all forcefully through the pulpits to

the people. Christianity, of every denomination, has tended until recently - in South Africa as elsewhere - to lay almost all of its emphasis upon personal salvation, and very little emphasis upon communal salvation and communal striving and awareness. The social dimension of the Gospels that is being discussed more and more - at least in some quarters - has not yet impinged very deeply upon the vast majority of ordinary church-goers. I think it would be true to say that most English speaking South African Christians are indistinguishable or hardly distinguishable in their racial attitudes and practice from their fellows who are either not really Christian or not Christian at all. (It is hardly necessary for me to add that a fair amount of South Africa's liberalism has been found in English-speaking white people who are adherents of the Jewish faith or who are non-religious humanists).

There are, however, a few English-speaking white lay Christians who have allowed their Christian awareness to produce tangible effects upon their attitudes and, to some extent, upon their lives. I am thinking, for example, of some of those good women who give of their time, money and energy to the promotion of Kupugani, various feeding schemes, welfare work etc.

In many respects the record of Christianity in the sphere of race relations is abysmally bad and depressing. And yet perhaps the largest hope for white South Africans in the field of racial contact and harmony lies with the Christians. Religious conviction seems to me one of the few channels - and certainly the most profoundly and intimately important channel - through which the English-speaking South African can be challenged in his customary inertia. The outlook at the moment, as I have said, is rather grim; but there are perhaps a few encouraging signs

If a fair number of English-speaking Christians were to begin to recognise the social and human implications of their faith, this dawning realization would soon have its effect upon other English-speaking people, and therefore upon South Africans as a whole It seems likely, however, alas, that the number of English-speaking Christians who would follow their churches into the strange and difficult crossing of the colour bar would be rather small; and indeed most ministers and priests seem at the moment unwilling and unlikely to take a lead in this direction.

Having mentioned channels through which English-speaking South Africans might be challenged, I must say something about economics and commerce.

An academic like myself has felt a certain reluctance to concede that commerce and industry may be creative and humanising forces. But that at the moment they are so, at least to some extent, it would be foolish to deny. South Africa's economy - with which, of course, many English-speaking South Africans have always been vitally concerned - seems, by its very energy and 'upward trend', to be making certain aspects of apartheid seem irritating, unacceptable, indeed absurd.

It is significant that apartheid should reveal its unnaturalness on a purely material and utilitarian level. And it is ironical that material considerations should sometimes have the ultimate effect of reminding some people of their better impulses. But of course economics by itself cannot effect deeply human and personal conversions. I am unable to believe that a society may become santified as the result of merely economic pressures! ... Yet when they are working their way through to a half-liberal attitude that has become dormant and encrusted with other sorts of material and selfish consideration, economic pressures may really represent, to a certain extent, the pressure of truth and reality.

THE COLOURED PEOPLE

m.g. whisson

THE COLOURED PEOPLE of South Africa are generally of mixed ethnic origin, and include all those people who are not classified as white persons or Bantu in terms of the Population Registration Act (No.30 of 1950). According to Proclamation R 123 of 1967, this section of the population is divided into seven 'groups', being the Cape Coloured Group, the Malay Group, the Griqua Group, the Chinese Group, the Indian Group, the other Asiatic Group and the other Coloured Group 'which shall consist of persons who are not included in the (six groups listed above) and who are not to be classified as white persons or Bantu.' For most purposes, both social and legal, such as the Group Areas Act (No 41 of 1950 as amended) the Asiatic groups are treated separately. This article will deal with the population made up of the first three and last of the above seven 'groups' and is written from the perspective of a 'non-coloured' person resident in Cape Town, where there is the greatest concentration of Coloured people.

Against a background of official discouragement and resentment or suspicion on the part of a large section of the community, formal field work of the type usually undertaken by anthropologists and sociologists is unusually difficult. The method used here has been a modification of the 'extended case study' (Epstein, 1967) in which an event is examined in some detail in order

to expose social facts. The event was the election of the Coloured Peoples Representative Council (C.P.R.C.) in September 1969, for which the hard facts are the statements made by the various party leaders and candidates, together with the voting or non-voting response of the electorate. With these have been considered matters such as religious affiliation and some economic information. These facts, together with impressions gathered through formal fieldwork in very limited areas, residence in a largely coloured area for two years and many informal contacts, have been used in order to suggest the underlying attitudes.

Political attitudes

The election of 1969 can only be understood in the light of the complicated political history of the coloured people. Marais (Marais, 1962) has described the early history of the coloured franchise, but the major events of relevance at the present time have taken place since the end of the period covered in his account. At Union in 1910, the coloured people of Natal and the Cape enjoyed a limited franchise, men complying with the income property qualification voting on a common roll with the whites for the national parliament. Coloured people in the Orange Free State and Transvaal were not enfranchised. The significance of the coloured voters was diminished with the enfranchisement of white women (Act No. 18 of 1930), the removal of the removal of the property and income qualification for white men in 1931 (Act No. 41 of 1931) and by the introduction of compulsory registration in 1954 (Act No. 40 of 1945). In 1956 the Separate Representation of Coloured Voters (Act No. 30 of 1956) removed the coloured people from the common roll.

In 1943 a Coloured Advisory Council was nominated by the Smuts government, an event which caused an immediate polarisation of coloured political views, and a loose coalition of all organisations opposed to the council and the Department for Coloured Affairs which was known as Anti-CAD. Boycott of all government-sponsored or government-aided segregated bodies was the dominant tactic of the Anti-CAD, together with verbal abuse of those who participated in such bodies. In 1950 most of the Coloured Advisory Council resigned and the council was abolished. In 1956 it was re-formed as the Union Council for Coloured Affairs, with fifteen nominated members and twelve elected members. The boycott movement was active, many of the better known coloured leaders declined to have any part in the elections and there was a very low poll. With the formation of the Coloured Peoples Representative Council the Union Council was abolished in 1969.

The parties which fought the election were in no way the heirs of past coloured political organisations, most of which are either banned or would have no part in the 'dummy politics'. The Federal Party, formed in 1964 after the passage of the Coloured Persons Representative Council Act (No. 49 of 1964) under the leadership of the chairman of the Union Council, Mr. Tom Swartz, was the first in the field. It appears to be the instrument chosen by the white government to act as the representative of the coloured people, and it used the years prior to the election well to organise and to make its leader known to the people.

The Federal Party 'is convinced that parallel development is the only logical approach to problems besetting our people.' (*Cape Argus* 19/8/69). Stress has been laid on coloured unity throughout South Africa and the appeal to the electorate was based largely upon the local interests of voters, such as a Post Office or a Police Station in the constituency. It was also made clear that since the government had no intention of giving the coloured people political equality, support for the Federal Party would get more out of the government than support for the forthright opponents of apartheid.

Its successes appear to have stemmed from three main factors. First, it was the best organised and financed of the parties and it alone was able to contest every seat. During the five years prior to the election Mr. Swartz was able to give publicity to his party whilst in the course of carrying out his official duties as chairman of the Coloured Council, and the party put much effort into the rural areas where it felt that the traditional subservience and conservatism of the electorate would give it greatest appeal. In the physically vast but numerically small constituencies of the Northern Cape and the Free State, organisations and finance were crucial. Second, although it was fairly clear that if the Labour Party could persuade the people to vote, the Federal Party was doomed to heavy defeat in the urban areas, the party exuded power and confidence. Organisation and finance were aspects of this, but the well-informed Federal candidates were fairly lavish in their promises to their largely illiterate supporters. To a farm labourer the promise of more schools, 'the immediate introduction of State-aided feeding schemes for all Coloured schools' (*Cape Times* 1/9/69) as if such will be provided in return for a vote, is more appealing than the pledge to oppose apartheid and injustice in general. Another aspect of the power of the party was the obvious support by many white employers for it. Even had they wanted to vote against the Federal Party, some of the poorer voters would have obeyed their

employers' direction in the matter, uncertain of the secrecy of the vote and afraid of repercussions. Third, in some areas the spectre of the swart gevaar and other racist appeals captured votes. The Cape region is largely protected from fear of African swamping by the limitations on the influx of African workers, although the traditional suspicion by the poor of the corner shopkeeper was translated into racist terms by attacks on Indian shopkeepers in coloured areas. In the Transvaal, the appeal was more blatant, and the idea of a 'pure' coloured nation protected from non-coloured non-whites was pushed both by the Federal Party and by the National Coloured People's Party.

In the event, the Federal Party won eight seats by election and gained three more unopposed. They did best in the Free State and the Transvaal, where coloured people were voting in a national election for the first time and so felt that they were making some political progress, and where there is strong feeling that the status quo is preferable to closer association with the Africans. Electorates were generally small (all under 10,000 in the Transvaal and under 5,000 in the Free State) and polling high, most over 70%, giving advantage to the best organised parties. In Natal, where the memory of the common roll was still strong, the party was completely crushed and despite polling fairly well in parts of the Western Cape, gained no seats in the nine constituencies in the coloured heartland. With electorates averaging over 22,000 and polls ranging from 18.4% to 48.8%, Labour swept the board.

The National Coloured People's Party was formed by an alliance between Dr. Clifford Smith, an outspoken coloured 'nationalist' from Johannesburg and Mr. C.I.R. Fortein, a veteran conservative from the Cape who had served on the old Coloured Council. It 'stresses that it is pro-Coloured but not against any other racial group (and) believes that this ideal (full citizenship for the Coloured people and a commonwealth of Nations for Southern Africa) can be achieved by 'vertical positive development' for White and Coloured people with equal opportunities, equal pay and equal social amenities...' (*Cape Argus* 19/8/69). However, during the election Dr. Smith, the national leader, accused the Labour Party of being 'kafferboeties' and 'koelieboeties' (*Post* 12/10/69). C.I.R. Fortein, the Cape leader and general secretary of the party, has long been a protagonist of the view that the coloured people should be a nation. In 1962 he wrote, 'The Coloured people are a distinct racial group with their own racial identity as an emerging young nation. The world is waiting and watching to see whether the Coloured

people will throw up Coloured national leaders like the Afrikaners, who produced liberators like Gen. Hertzog, Dr. Malan and Mr. Strydom'. (*Die Banier*, Sept 1962 2nd edition). The party was well organised in the Transvaal, where it won one seat and polled well in all, but made little impact elsewhere.

The Republican Party was largely a one-man show which, uncommitted on the crucial issue of apartheid, hoped to capture the Cape rural vote and in particular the Griqua vote through its leader, Tom Le Fleur. The Griqua leaders were not impressed for the most part, Le Fleur was defeated by a Federal candidate and the only Republican elected was in a constituency where no Labour candidate stood.

The Conservative Party fought a number of seats, mainly in the Eastern Cape and Natal, usually coming last in the poll with under 500 votes apiece.

The three splinter parties differed from the Federal Party mainly in the extent to which they were prepared to support the government's 'positive' policies openly. In some cases personal jealousies played a part and leaders may have hoped that they could usurp Mr. Swartz as the government's chosen coloured leader together with the perks which go with that position. Failing that, they hoped for nomination to the new council as leaders of active political parties. In the event, they were disappointed, all three splinter party leaders were defeated at the polls, none was nominated and the two men returned, together with the one successful independent candidate, have tended to throw in their lot with the Federal Party. The nominated seats went to Mr. Swartz, twelve other unsuccessful Federal Party candidates and seven Federal Party members who had not stood for election. One explanation of the nominations, by a leading Federal Party member, was that the government wished to encourage the development of a two party system and to discourage division among the pro-apartheid parties.

The 'conservative' parties all denied that they were in favour of apartheid as it is currently practiced, but all were prepared to work within the C.P.R.C. framework to further government policy in the promotion of separate development and a coloured nationalism. The differences between the parties and the government were in the emphasis placed on 'separate', 'development' and 'nationalism'. There are various reasons why such parties might obtain support from the coloured electorate. First, there are those who recognise that the government wields total power over the coloured people and that it is not prepared to delegate

significant powers to any autonomous and truly representative coloured body. This belief was confirmed when the government appointed Federal Party men to the Council and made Mr. Swartz chairman of the executive committee, which is the effective body for eleven months of the year when the full council is in recess. It was underlined by the then Minister of Coloured Affairs when he spoke during the white election in Mr. M.D. Arendse's constituency. 'I admit that the C.P.R.C. was loaded with 20 government nominees and I would do it again if necessary.' (Cape Times 23/3/70). Faced by such a situation, conservatives argue that they must go along with the men in power in order to get all that they can out of them. Coloured development, in their view, has been and can only be retarded by forthright opposition to the government and, in the long run, taking the crumbs and the scraps from the white man's table, together with the meals prepared by the white man for him, can enable the coloured man to grow to a point where he will be able to demand more. The power and influence apparently wielded by Chief Matanzima on behalf of the Transkeian Xhosa, which has grown during his years of co-operation with the policy of separate development, is seen as a model of what Mr. Swartz can achieve on behalf of the coloured people. The comparison does not take into account the fact that Matanzima represents a fairly homogeneous ethnic group from a large territorial base, while Mr. Swartz has no such constituency as a basis for power.

Second, there are doubtless some individuals who have hopes of personal gain through supporting the white government. Favours in the form of shop sites, liquor licences and business loans are widely believed to follow support for the Federal Party. The salaries paid to members of the C.P.R.C. (R1,500 p.a. and R6,000 for the chairman of the executive committee) for attendance over a period of about one month each year are very attractive to those who are in private business and able to take time off for the council sessions without losing their major sources of income. It has been suggested that the salaries paid will be one factor encouraging the members to oppose the government firmly on certain issues as re-election will be unlikely if a man is not on record as having achieved something for his electorate. It is also believed that 'pork barrel' politics may come into vogue with special aid being given to areas which returned Federal candidates and credit being given to Federal members for any development that takes place.

In the election, more votes were cast for all the other parties than were cast for the Labour Party, a fact leapt upon with alacrity

by government apologists who used it to justify the packing of the Council and to claim that the coloured people accepted apartheid. Such an argument must be seen in the light of the fact that the Labour Party did not contest every contested seat, hence in Haarlem (Humansdorp and Uniondale) where the Republican won against Federal, National and Independent opponents, all votes would have counted as 'pro-apartheid.' It also ignores the importance of personal followings in elections where organisations are not very strong and the electorate generally unsophisticated. Where two or three non-Labour candidates stood, votes which went on the basis of personal contact or very local influence could have cut into Labour's total as easily as that of the other conservative candidates, or not been cast at all. The argument also ignores the pattern of non-voting which shows that in the urban areas of the Western Cape, where political awareness is greatest and transport to the polls easiest, percentage polls were very low. In these areas, where the majority of coloured people live, many people refuse to vote on principle, others did not vote because they believed that to do so was a waste of time in view of the negligible powers of the Council. Apathy and lack of party machinery to reach the voters also played a part, but this probably hurt Labour, which was less well organised, more than the conservatives.

Elections tend to be lost and won on slogans which strike a chord in the emotions of the electorate sufficiently strongly for them to be willing to get out and vote. This is particularly the case where strong party loyalties have not developed over time and where party organisation is weak. The Labour Party had a simple 'gut' issue which was emphasised more and more in the latter stages of the campaign, and picked up by the English language press which was generally sympathetic to Labour 'A vote for Labour is a vote against apartheid, a vote for anyone else, or failure to vote, is a vote for apartheid.' In the Transvaal and the Free State, the conservatives also had a 'gut' issue which could command support - 'a vote for Labour is a vote to join the Africans - a vote for the conservatives is a vote for communal integrity.'

The Labour Party has had an uncertain career to date, its triumph at the polls having been subsequently tarnished by internal strife, lack of funds and even a *raison d'être* once a pro-government majority was assured to make the Council work. The party was formed in 1965 by Dr. R. van der Ross with the support of several leading coloured trade unionists and coloured ex-servicemen. Apart from the school teachers who, as government employees, have difficulty in involving themselves in poli-

ties and who also, for the most part, support the boycotters, the unions and ex-servicemen's Legion are the strongest nationwide coloured organisations. In 1966, M.D. Arendse, who had been virtually a one-man opposition to the Swartz group on the old Coloured Council, was elected Vice-President under van der Ross and, when van der Ross resigned to take up a post in the educational section of the Department of Coloured Affairs, took over as president and leader of the party.

The objects of the party have been to oppose apartheid from whatever platforms are legally open to it, holding that 'all persons should vote for and be eligible for membership of Parliament, Provincial Councils, Municipal Councils and other instruments of central and local government.' (*Cape Herald* 19/2/66). In this it is consistent with the philosophy of Arendse and van der Ross who whilst uncompromising in their aversion to apartheid, have felt that the boycott approach is sterile and ineffective. During the election campaign, the party made opposition to apartheid its main plank, claiming to be the only party in favour of political integration. It was attacked from the left by those who claimed that it was inconsistent in using an apartheid device (the Council) as a means to oppose apartheid, and that once in office the Labour Party would collaborate no less than the Federal Party. This argument, and the traditional boycott stemming from the inauguration of the first Coloured Advisory Council in 1943, swayed many people in the Cape Town area. From the right the party was accused of being communistic, as some of its members had been supporters of left wing organisations in the distant past, although it had stated from the outset, 'It is not Communist, and counts among its members many who have served in one war (and some in two) against the forces of dictatorship. The Labour Party regards Communism as something foreign and unwanted in South Africa.' (*Cape Herald* 19/2/66). The party also alleged that its supporters were being intimidated by the police (*Post* 8/6/69, 13/7/69) who were attending meetings and threatening people, and that white farmers were using bribery and threats to ensure that their labourers supported the pro-apartheid parties. (*Post* 24/8/69). A 'smear' letter suggesting that the Progressive Party was lending financial aid (illegally) to the Labour Party was firmly repudiated by both Dr. Steytler and Mr Arendse on behalf of their respective parties. (*Post* 3/8/69).

Ultimately, only two questions mattered for the Labour Party in the election. First, they had to break through the tradition of boycott and apathy among the coloured electorate: on this

depended their victory in the Cape. Second, in order to reduce the Council to the farce that they believed it to be, they had to win more than thirty of the forty elected seats, thus giving themselves a majority in the Council regardless of the government nominees. This they narrowly failed to do, primarily due to lack of funds and organisation. Despite having been in existence for four years, the party had not developed branches in every constituency and its campaign was of limited duration.

Labour's triumph at the polls was overwhelming but with the nomination of Federal Party members to the Council, the fruits of victory, whatever they might have been, were denied to the party. The initial reaction was one of anger on the part of the party supporters and indeed on the part of most of the coloured people other than those who cynically observed that the government's action had only confirmed the wisdom of the boycotters. As in the Caucus Race in *Alice in Wonderland*, everyone received prizes - the boycotters had their lack of faith in the government completely justified, the Labour Party had the satisfaction of winning 26 out of the 37 contested seats, the Federal Party were rewarded for their loyalty to the government by being given power. For its own supporters, the government acted as it felt it must. Stanley Uys summed up a very reasonable view: 'My private theory is that (the government) is not only making sure that control of the Council does not fall into anti-apartheid hands, but that its own supporters understand this fact, clearly and unmistakably.' (*Sunday Times* 12/10/69).

Government intentions were further underlined at the lively opening session of the Council. The Minister of Coloured Affairs (Mr. M. Viljoen) told the Coloured Representative Council in Bellville today that if members of the Council wanted to achieve anything for their people, they would have to operate strictly within the framework of the policy of separate development.' (*Cape Argus* 20/11/69).

The Labour Party's motion of no confidence in the Council was defeated and the party walked out, returning to propose and have passed a motion demanding equal pay for equal work for all government employees regardless of colour. The Council then adjourned until November 1970, a recess of about a year. During the 1970 session of parliament legislation was tabled extending privilege to statements made by members of the Council and also giving the minister the power to call the Council rather than the Executive Committee, or the Council itself arranging the times of meeting.

Subsequently the Labour Party has been endeavouring to formulate a policy for the future. Mr. Arendse suffered a mild hear

attack and was not in good health immediately after the adjournment. He then committed three political blunders which cost him his position at the head of the party. He went to see the Prime Minister alone, having demanded an interview when he was elected. This led to speculation among the left wing of the party that he had been bribed into doing a deal with Mr. Vorster. He then described himself on one or two occasions as the leader of the opposition, a title which, according to his opponents in the party, gave a status to the Council which it does not deserve and which implied some form of co-operation in its operation. Finally, at the annual conference of the party in April 1970, he suggested in his presidential address that the party might discuss the possibility of the whole of the Cape Province seceding from the Republic to form an independent democratic state. He emphasised that this was merely an idea for discussion and not a formal proposal on his part, but it was seized upon as indicating that he was thinking of some sort of 'kleurlingstan'. There was also gossip of personal misdeameanours. He was defeated by Mr. Sonny Leon, an ex-servicemen's leader from Kimberley, in the election for president and having suggested that the election had been rigged by the importation of new delegates without proper credentials, accepted defeat and pledged himself to work with Leon. In the following months there were occasional stories that he was likely to sit as an independent or even join the Federal Party in the Council.

The real issue at stake in the fall of Arendse was the extent to which the party is prepared to work within the Council. Arendse is seen as one who will endeavour to make the best of a bad job in the Council and seize on anything offered that will be of advantage to the coloured people. Some of Leon's supporters including some former boycotters who have joined the party since its electoral victory, would prefer a harder line to be taken in the Council with no co-operation with the government on any terms save those of steps towards a full enfranchisement of the coloured people. The issue is still not completely clear, but it seems probable that the Council will be enlivened by walk-outs fairly frequently during its short sessions. The Labour Party is also very short of funds to improve its organisation and to develop in those areas where it is not yet firmly established. Its failure to control the Council has brought to the surface frustration and disillusionment which may well produce the traditional response of boycott and withdrawal and lead to splits within the party.

Those who boycotted the election include many individuals

and groups which are heirs of Anti-C.A.D. and opponents of any form of co-operation with 'dummy' Councils of the Department of Coloured Affairs. Its supporters formed the Non-European Unity Movement which sought to consolidate opposition to the programme of segregation and apartheid through all educational, cultural and sporting bodies in which its members were involved. The movement was dominated by teachers whose organisation (Teachers League of South Africa) has maintained its firm opposition to the Department and all its works, collaborating only in as far as it is necessary for its members to remain in the profession and receive their salaries. The influence of the boycott movement has been enormous, but the rigidity of its tactic enabled the government to gamble fairly confidently in the organisation of the C.P.R.C., in the hope that the ablest organisers would not get into the field to win all the elected seats against the pro-government parties. There is a strong Marxist tradition in the movement, its language being couched in pre-1939 communist phrases, and it is divided on most issues other than that of participation in apartheid institutions. Stalinists, Trotskyites and even Maoists talking of peasant revolts among the townships on the Cape Flats are to be found among the boycotters, some of them involved in small cultural circles and educational associations, endlessly elaborating their own particular doctrine and damning those who disagree with them as revisionists, collaborators, C.I.A. agents, quislings or lackeys.

While the actual membership of organisations of boycotters is probably very small, outside the T.L.S.A. being measured in hundreds rather than thousands, the influence of the movement has been much wider. It has been led by men revered as intellectual leaders among the coloured people; many of them have been banned at one time or another and many more have left the country for more congenial places. Through the schools the tradition of boycott, the ideology and the language have all been maintained. Also, potential leaders of political groupings have been strongly discouraged from working within the government sponsored system by the pervasive appeal of boycott. If one assumes that in an election not opposed by boycotters a poll of about 70% would have been achieved, and that winners gained generally about twice the vote of the runner up, then in any constituency where there was a poll of less than 40% the boycotters positive influence was greater than that of any of the candidates who stood. Eight of the biggest constituencies, all in the Cape Town area where the boycott movement is strongest, attracted a poll of less than 40%, outside the Western Cape polls being generally between 60% and 80%.

In addition to those who registered but did not vote, there were some who took a harder line, which could have involved them in conviction in court, of refusing to register at all. These formed a small minority of boycotters who do not appear in the election statistics in any form.

If boycott is the response of the self-styled intelligentsia to political impotence, then religion, drink and violence are the responses of others. The attitude of all may be resentment of a system which either denies them a say completely or flatters to deceive, but the response varies. The boycotters have retreated into a ritualistic form of opposition, involving a dogmatic faith which demands little more of them than that they should believe and preach where safe to do so. Plans for the perfect society may be laid down and refined, but no means whereby the plans can be introduced or implemented can be discussed other than the 'cargo cult' fantasy that one day the mass movement will take place and the forces of the 'herrenvolk' will be swept away, just as the mass movements in Russia and China swept away the forces of the Tsar and the armies of Chiang. When the Africans of Langa marched in a huge orderly procession to the centre of Cape Town in 1960, terrifying the the whites (and many of the coloured people too) as they indicated the potential power of a mass movement, the leaders of the boycott movement did nothing, preferring to wait until the wave of protest broke under the para-military might of the government forces before announcing to their friends that the Langa march had not been the authentic mass movement.

Religion is another form of retreat, although one which frequently demands a more positive approach from its adherents than the boycott ritual. A comparison between the 1951 and the 1960 census showed that there had been a very slight but distinct swing away from the churches formally opposed to apartheid towards those which accept segregation and have formally constituted separate congregations. Three reasons have been advanced for this trend. First, it has been suggested that some people prefer to worship in a church which is consistent in faith and action and while the segregated churches are consistent, the integrated churches are paternalistic and hypocritical. Second, there may be a greater rate of population growth among the generally poorer Afrikaans-speaking coloured people who tend to patronise the segregated, Afrikaans churches. Third, the integrated churches challenge their members more vigorously to seek means whereby society can be changed towards a more Christian structure, hence pushing members back

into the politically frustrating world from which they might seek some escape through religion. The emotional worship of the pentacostalists and smaller churches, and the emphasis on personal piety on the part of the evangelical churches, which tend to accept segregation as being almost irrelevant to personal salvation, provide the individual with relief in his political distress and condition his political attitudes to quietude.

The drift towards a greater emphasis on individual salvation and emotional worship in small churches may well be a feature of the anomic slum and the characterless township, the latter becoming the home of more and more coloured people. In the older communities, whether in town or in rural areas (in the latter there were many 'mission villages' where membership of the church was virtually automatic (Carstens 1966, Leeuwenberg 1970) there has been a strong adherence to churches which emphasise the congregation as an hierarchical community and the unity of the church desirable for its own theological sake. Thus in Kalk Bay (Whisson and Kaplinsky 1969) a fishing village on False Bay, only one or two people who have married into the village are not Anglican, Catholic or Moslem, whereas in the townships such as Bishop Lavis, members of at least twenty different denominations are to be found, many of them only one or two congregations strong. For the most part the middle and upper classes among the coloured people, if they attend church at all, support the larger established churches or Islam, reflecting, perhaps, the ambivalence between resentment of white domination and the desire to share in the white world of privilege. The adherence to the independent groups may well reflect abandonment of the hope of sharing in the white man's social and religious systems, in favour of the more immediate satisfaction to be gained from participation in lively worship which promises personal salvation. The weekly 'emotional bath' may also be seen as a retreat into immediate gratification by people whose long-term goals have been systematically denied. When progress in any sphere is subject to official interference, as was so dramatically shown in the packing of the Council, when economic development is extraordinarily difficult for the individual due to the lack of training facilities and the principle that brown people should not have authority over white people, as well as to legal job reservation and discriminatory salary structures for government employees, then goals tend to become short-term rather than long-term, immediate gratification taking precedence over sacrifice for the future.

The abler and more articulate people feel the frustration

and inhibitions on their attainment of long-term goals more acutely than the majority because they have learned by experience that they are not inferior to those who are classed as white. This awareness is reinforced by the extensive kinship between whites and coloured people, thousands having known close kin who are white or who have succeeded in 'passing' and so obtained the advantages open to the whites. For some, the rationalisation of boycott as a political weapon or even as a symbol of defiance rather than impotence is satisfying, for others sublimation or retreat into religion provides the ideological means to cope with frustration.

The less educated and articulate people, while bitterly resenting the various specific injustices which strike them, such as low wages, arrogance and even violence on the part of whites in authority and forced removals under Group Areas proclamations, do not appear to systematise their responses or require a rationale for their plight. There is the rationalisation 'Gam is mos so' (Ham is like that), the acceptance that white people are more powerful than brown people, even that white people are superior to brown people. Ultimately the belief that one is truly an inferior type of person enables one to accept the status quo. For such people, a large but increasing part of the population today white people, despite their arrogance and injustice towards the non-whites, are seen to be superior people, ruling by virtue of their cleverness and their power. Such an attitude enables a man to beg, to humiliate himself before white authority without real anger at being forced to do so.

Despair at one's long-term prospects, frustration in one's attempt to attain the goals of economic and social self-respect that one's society idealises and sets before one, and the deeper sense of impotence and 'racial' inferiority, may all contribute to the problem of alcohol and dagga-smoking in the coloured community, particularly among the less educated and inarticulate.

To speak of social attitudes among this considerable section of the population is largely meaningless, as views are not expressed in general terms, nor are they integrated into an ideology such as those explained by their elected leaders or self-appointed spokesmen. Apartheid is seen as being unjust where it impinges directly, and hence those who were not pressured to do otherwise but who bothered to vote, tended to vote against it, although in many cases, promises by candidates to provide certain amenities if elected would have been enough to sway votes. Certainly the promises made by the Federal Party candidate to electors in the Namaqualand area were significant in swinging votes. An example of the more general attitude was provided by the

almost unanimous and vociferous support given by coloured spectators to the All Blacks rugby team in 1970, not only in matches against the all-white Springboks, but even against the local sides that they usually support. The angry reaction of some white spectators only served to emphasise the point of the 'protest'.

The concerns of the poorer sections of the population tend to be immediate rather than long-term. School education is seen to be desirable to help one's children obtain a decent job, but such a long-term aim may be abandoned if a paid job becomes available, if the children lose interest in school through being unable to maintain a satisfactory academic or social standard, or if money becomes unbearably short. The possession of goods for which considerable saving is required before they can be obtained may be accepted as impossible, but heavy commitments undertaken to pay off goods on hire purchase without one really knowing how the payments will be made. Possession and use may be the immediate problem, and this will be solved. The long-term problem will be left in the hope that something will turn up. The same attitude is found in some people under threat of removal under Group Areas proclamations. They may say that they do not want to be sent to certain townships notorious for violence or awkwardly distant from their places of work, but they will not attempt to find other accommodation before they are actually removed. (Whisson and Kaplinsky 1969). Such a task would be terrifying in that it involves all sorts of contact with authorities who may not be sympathetic, and almost hopeless in the light of the shortage of housing in the large urban areas (Whisson and Kahn 1969), but those are not the reasons given for not trying. Instead it is hoped that something will happen, perhaps there is even the attitude that since the government caused the initial problem, the government can solve it (a boycotters argument).

Drinking and drug-taking, the search for pleasure now, rather than sacrifice for happiness later, is consistent with this attitude. Heavy drinking is probably the most common of all social problems in all sections of the coloured population. (Gillis et. al. 1965). An experienced priest with an open mind on the occasional use of alcohol asserted that nine out of ten social problems that present themselves to him include a drinking problem in the family. Alcohol provides an immediate pleasure which cannot be taken away; a pleasure in the distant future may never happen. The sociologists of deviancy, following Merton (Merton 1957) might call such an attitude and reaction to life's problems 'retreatism' as socially approved goals are

abandoned and the proper means to achieve social approval are not followed - partly at least because the means do not work and the goals are unattainable. There is also a sub-cultural element involved - there is a tradition of retreatism, of heavy drinking and dagga smoking, so that it has become for many one of the symbols of manhood where the symbols of the respectable 'society' are unattainable for the poor 'outie'. The attitude is then one of admiration and approval for the man who can display aggressiveness and virility, drink heavily and smoke dagga fearlessly as indices of manliness.

Violence for political purposes seems to have been abandoned, at least temporarily, among the coloured people. The general orderliness and peacefulness of the coloured election stands out in sharp contrast to the violence that characterised the white election in those areas where National Party power was challenged by Herstigte Nasionale Party candidates or even by United Party candidates. The generation of political activists who believed that violence might trigger off a general revolution or create so much international publicity that the South African government would be forced to reverse its apartheid policy has passed and its protagonists are in jail, banned or overseas. For many people, of all shades of political opinion, violence is seen as ultimately the only means whereby the whites will be forced to share power with the majority of South Africans, but coloured people are not in the mood to initiate violent revolution which might leave them worse off than they are at present. Also, such is the balance of physical power and the efficiency of the police intelligence services that few are prepared even to discuss political violence, let alone involve themselves in any potentially violent organisation.

Individual acts of violence, which taken for the coloured people as a whole represent a serious social problem (Stone 1970 (i)) are related to the political attitudes in much the same way that drinking and drug-taking are related. Violence and boasting of physical prowess is one of the means whereby men can compete with each other and assert their manhood. Frustrated in other directions in their search for social status, young men readily turn to violence, sometimes in pursuit of material goals, often for its own sake as an index of manly courage and contempt for the impersonal forces of the state.

1 The events which preceded and followed the election of the C.P.R.C. may thus be summarised as follows. The frustration of the political aims of the coloured people (the primary goal being political integration with the whites) in the 1950's was

reinforced by their being encouraged to take part in the coloured election, and their clearly expressed will flouted by the government. However, the effect of registration, campaigning and voting has been to awake new interest in political affairs throughout the communities which will either find expression in the Council and the new parties, or will revert to bitterness and escapism. The successful Labour Party, having broken down the tradition of boycott to a remarkable degree, has tended to revert to the traditional attitude as a response to the frustration. The groups which placed no hope in the election through ideology, apathy or ignorance have continued to follow their previous patterns of behaviour, the dominant theme of which can be seen as responses to frustration.

The economic scene

In certain respects, the coloured people of the Western Cape are now benefitting from apartheid. The difficulty in getting African workers from the Eastern Cape has led to the full utilisation of all available coloured labour in the urban areas, wages have tended to rise markedly in industry and commerce and coloured people are being absorbed into occupations hitherto followed largely by whites. This process has led, among other things, to a desperate shortage of coloured schoolteachers to work for the Department of Coloured Affairs, as many teachers have abandoned the profession or gone overseas rather than suffer the professional interference and the discriminatory wages in government employment. Recruitment and wastage (including retirement) has been fairly evenly balanced at a time when the demand for schooling and the number of schools has been expanding rapidly. The wastage has been particularly serious among graduate teachers who have little difficulty in finding posts overseas.

The desperate shortage of artisans is being met, at least in part, by the upgrading of some coloured workers and by the proper apprenticeship of more. The skilled trades are attracting many young people as the wages paid in them tend to be based on the rate for the job fixed by the predominantly white unions, and overtime adds handsomely to the wage packet. It has also been observed that a coloured man with a skilled trade qualification can obtain employment overseas quite as easily and profitably as a teacher who has no degree. The income that can be obtained by a professional in government employment (the major source of employment for teachers, nurses and social workers) is no longer much greater than that which can be obtained by a skilled artisan, especially if he is prepared to

work overtime and do private jobs over weekends, and but for the status of 'clean work' there would probably be even more young men turning to industry for their career.

The publicity given to the differential salaries paid to doctors and nurses in government employment on the basis of colour in 1969 (e.g. Nursing sister, white R1560 x 120 - 2400. Nursing sister, coloured R840 x 60 - 1500) doubtless added to the widespread dissatisfaction, encouraging young people to seek training in spheres where they are not dependent upon the government for employment when they graduate.

Unskilled labourers' wages have probably not risen as quickly as those of skilled men and women. Many men who are fully employed as labourers are earning little more than R35 per month and few earn more than R60 per month. At the lower figure it is barely possible for a single man living alone to break even and nearly all live in households where there is more than one wage earner. Employers are usually able to arrange for African contract labourers to be brought from the Eastern Cape, although this involves much bureaucracy and is opposed to the policy of the government.

In the rural areas, wages are far lower, although comparisons are difficult when employees live largely off the produce of the farm or of their own plots, may be given 'rations' of varying value and live in tied cottages for which they do not pay rent. The hours worked are not regular but are probably considerably longer than those worked by unskilled men in town and overtime is rarely paid. In the Western Cape the computation of the real income is further complicated by the tot system, wine being given to the coloured workers which would cost them 25c per day (at least) if they bought it at a bar, but which costs the farmer only a fraction of that price. The tot system is not limited to the wine farms, but operates on deciduous and citrus fruit farms and even on grain farms. Some farmers claim that they could not keep their labour without it, others that labour turnover and productivity are unchanged whether they have it or not, others that a great improvement occurs in all directions when the tot is abolished and milk or cash substituted.

Farm wages range between less than R8 per month to over R30 per month, depending upon the area, the profitability of the farm, the humanity of the farmer and the skill of the worker, although the majority of examples noted tend towards the lower rather than the higher figure, falling as one goes further away from Cape Town. Wages for coloured men in the North West Cape, whether urban or rural, tend to be considerably lower than the

equivalent worker would get in Cape Town. The cost of living in the rural areas is, with the exception of rent, much the same as that in town, but the expected standard of living is lower and people can live more cheaply without feeling ashamed.

There is a steady drift of rural and small town workers into the greater Cape Town area, the rate adding 0.48% per year to the coloured population between 1951 and 1960. But for the desperate shortage of housing which drives migrants into shanties in the unsavory peri-urban slums of Elsies River and Grassy Park, the rate of migration would probably be much higher. There is, however, a strong conservative element in the older people in the poverty stricken areas of the North West Cape (Carstens, 1966; West, 1969; Whisson, 1970) and a fatalism which has accepted the drought and the cutback in fishing as being events about which nothing can be done. For those who have lived their whole lives in poverty and in areas where they have had little contact with middle class coloured people other than perhaps a dominee and a few school teachers, the aspirations of the mass of urban coloured people for a better life and 'nice times' have little meaning. They may hope for better things for their children, although when those better things mean little more than demoralisation and an occasional baby in return for R10 per month as a domestic worker in a poorer Cape Town suburb, their prejudice against the town is confirmed. Nevertheless, the drift continues and in the coloured communal reserves of the North West Cape, the population is made up overwhelmingly of children under 18 and of older folk over 50, some of the latter having tasted enough of the farm labourer's life to prefer the poverty of the reserves. (Leeuwenberg, 1970).

The economic situation of the people is a major determinant of their attitudes. In this very brief sketch of the urban and rural scene it is clear that there is a tremendous range of occupation income, professional training and attitude within the legally defined group. It is the great diversity which lies at the root of the deep resentment felt by many people at being called 'coloured' and hence assumed to have more in common with all other people called 'coloured' than with non-coloured people of comparable social and economic backgrounds. The chartered accountant in Athlone has no more in common with the fishermen of Port Nolloth than the English advertising agent in Constantia has with the trekboers of Namaqualand. Lacking a common cultural heritage or myth of origin, there is little to bind coloured people into a group. As the Coloured People's Convention declared in 1961, 'a coloured person is one who is discriminated against in a particular sort of way.'

Although there has been a drift to town, there is little tradition of migrant labour among the coloured people such as that which has been established for the Africans. Remittances by migrants may be difficult to organise, especially in those areas where the range of christian and surnames is very small and there may be a dozen or more Mrs. J. Coetzee's from the same village or slum area going to the post office to collect mail from an illiterate husband.

However, while the economic plight of the peri-urban, the small town and some of the rural coloured people is often desperate, they have, for the most part, the comfort of knowing or believing that the Africans are worse off than themselves. Even among the poorest coloured people one may hear remarks implying their superiority over the 'kaffirs'. The common nickname given to dark children 'kaffertjie' is primarily a reference to the colour and hair texture of the child so named, but it is not felt to be complimentary.

Variations in the social spectrum

It has been observed quite often that the coloured people have many class distinctions based on the subtle observation of many criteria. A man from St. Helena, having explained that he was not a 'Cape Coloured', despite his wife, family, residence and occupation, defined a coloured man as one who would not allow himself to be 'bluffed' by the next coloured man. The reference group for the most widely held concepts of social class is the wealthy, white, English South African. Thus a number of components go to make up class differentiation, all of which have

significance in determining a man's position in the class hierarchy, but not one of which, apart from poverty, is an insuperable handicap to upward social mobility.

There is a definite advantage in being light skinned, particularly if one can pass as white occasionally. Skin lightening creams are advertised as being the means whereby girls win beauty contests and men obtain superior jobs. Some jobs are advertised in the press as being for 'slightly coloured' girls - such creatures being employed in 'white' jobs which involve contact with a white public which prefers to be dealt with by light-skinned people. The advantage to the employer is that a lower wage can be paid to a coloured girl than to a white. There is also considerable colour snobbery within the coloured communities, a light skinned child being assumed to be abler than a dark skinned child, and character being in part judged by whether a person is light or dark. The matron of a coloured orphanage has described how difficult it has been for her to persuade her junior staff not to favour the lighter girls at the expense of the darker ones.

Associated with lightness is straight hair and light hair. In areas where sun-bronzed surfers, Mediterranean-born shopkeepers and sons of the soil mingle with people classified 'coloured', the most distinctive feature marking off those who are 'coloured' from those who are not is frequently the hair texture. Those with straight hair are generally considered to be better looking than those with negroid hair. The expression 'he's very dark' often means that the person has negroid features or hair, rather than being a reference to his actual skin colour.

The widespread belief that light people are better than dark people is, to a considerable extent, a self-fulfilling prophesy. Erik Erikson has said of this:

'A number of researches were devoted (at Harvard) to the possibility whether in a test or in a teaching situation the level of intellectual functioning of the subjects or the students can be decisively influenced by what different experimenters or teachers have been led to expect of them. In one school, where the teachers were given, by the investigators, a list of children of whom allegedly dramatic intellectual growth could be expected (although the names of the children were actually chosen at random) a strikingly high percentage of the children not only performed as expected but later also showed marked increases in I.Q.'

A similar experiment with rats and their 'trainers' gave the same sort of result. Transferred into the total social situation of school, home and community, the belief that 'white is bright' has doubtless conditioned thousands if not millions of people into advancement or retardation and so 'justified' the prejudice against darker people, both within the coloured group and within the total South African population.

A second index of social class is fluency in English. Most of the coloured people speak Afrikaans as their first language, but few speak it very well. Many who generally communicate in the Afrikaans patois (known as 'Gam taal') find it easier, as well as more congenial, to read the English language newspapers, and the two newspapers catering almost wholly for non-whites are written in English. An Afrikaans newspaper, allegedly supported by the government, designed for coloured readers, collapsed in 1965, by which time it had become largely bi-lingual. English is the language of the educated man. Afrikaans spoken well is the language of the dominee and of the oppressor, spoken badly the language of the street. The university to which most matriculated students would like to go is the University of Cape Town, an English medium institution, and even those students who go to the University of the Western Cape (for coloured students) do the greater part of their reading in English, struggling with the Afrikaans spoken by their lecturers and unhappily writing most of their examinations in Afrikaans.

Although the attitude is by no means universal and many would affirm the reverse, the majority of coloured people in the urban areas believe that the English speaking white South Africans (including and often particularly the Jews) are more reasonable in their treatment of non-whites. On hearing the early results in the 1970 white election, a coloured woman wept with relief that the National Party was actually losing ground and would not be returned stronger than ever, although the differences between United Party and National Party policies were very small. The gratitude felt by many people for the United Party's battle on their behalf in the 1950's has been largely transferred to the Progressive Party whose spokesmen have been most forthright in supporting the interests of the disenfranchised. Both the United Party and the Progressive have the reputation, which is largely deserved, for being the English parties, as against the Afrikaner nationalist parties. Until multi-racial parties were banned (Prohibition of Political Interference Act No 51 of 1968) the Progressives had a small but enthusiastic following among the coloured people who re-

turned their candidates to the Provincial Council on the one occasion that they had the opportunity to do so.

For the better educated people, English is also seen as the universal language which enables people to learn about the world as it really is, rather than through the limited perspective of the Afrikaner. It is the key to vast areas of knowledge and the key to international travel or jobs overseas. For these very practical reasons, as well as the subjective ones already indicated, English tends to be a higher status language than Afrikaans.

In the rural areas, where relatively little English is spoken, the social distinction between English and Afrikaans speakers is much smaller. Clergy find little opposition to the use of Afrikaans in their services in the rural areas, in contrast to the urban attitude, a reflection perhaps of the more conservative and fatalistic attitude of the majority of the rural people, but more a reflection of their ignorance of English.

The distinction between urban and rural is another status indicator. For the most part the rural people are poorer, less well educated and more passive in their outlook on life. For the older people in particular the past was better than the present, land and stock were more plentiful and children showed greater respect for their parents and their God. To a considerable degree such an attitude is justified by the evidence (Leeuwenberg, 1970), particularly in the areas where coloured people enjoyed some measure of autonomy and owned land and stock. But looking back to a golden era encourages a general attitude of conservatism which makes adaptation to the present more difficult. The urban dwellers on the whole do not look back to better times, other than those who have been removed from pleasantly situated 'villages' in the suburbs of Cape Town and sent to the violent and characterless estates of the Cape Flats, and those who find that the steady increase in their incomes is inadequate compensation for the rights and amenities which have been removed over the past twenty years or so. Far more than their rural counterparts, the urban dwellers place what hopes they have on present pleasures or on future social and economic justice. The urban man, the successful and high status man, looks forward and plans for change, the rural man tends to go to sleep counting the sheep that his father owned.

While skin colour, hair texture, fluency in English and an urban style of life are all factors affecting a man's social status and his attitudes to himself and his social situation, none are insuperable obstacles to individual social advancement. There are several dark, crinkly haired, Afrikaans speakers in the

tural areas who can hold their own socially in the highest echelons of coloured society, individual merit, education and income overcoming the other factors without apparent difficulty. But each of these stigma affects a man's self-image as well as the first impressions that others gain of him and may both deter him from seeking his own advancement and discourage others from giving him the assistance and encouragement that he needs.

As with other Western communities, the main determinants of status and social class are education, wealth and occupation. Despite the high drop-out rate in the schools, and despite the decline in the prestige of the teaching profession, the educated man remains the referent for most ambition, and the man who is most admired. The traditional respect of the Afrikaners for their educated dominees, which finds modern expression in the great respect accorded to the title 'doctor', the reverence accorded to the educated man (particularly the Koranic scholar) in Islam, and the dream of a life free from the drudgery of manual labour which is the heritage of urban working communities everywhere, but probably reinforced by the background of slavery, indentured labour and racially restricted opportunities all combine to compel respect for education. In a community where the vast majority of people are wage earners and not self-employed, education and technical training do indeed pay large economic dividends. With no more than six or eight years of education a man may never earn more than R60 per month. By obtaining a senior certificate and either university or technical training, a man may start at twice that salary and advance himself to ten times that amount.

Income and occupation, themselves largely dependent upon educational and technical qualifications although not wholly so, are also prime determinants of social status and attitudes. The small number of successful businessmen tend to owe their positions at least in part to the protection which apartheid has afforded them in the coloured group areas, although some of them suffered heavy losses as a result of their being forced to leave thriving businesses in more prosperous areas before proclamation. Some, whilst resenting bitterly the limitations on their social life which apartheid has brought, nevertheless recognise their dependence upon it for their success and fear that they might not have been able to compete successfully in a free economy. Support for the Federal Party and its policies, which have been of personal benefit to them, and which promise similar benefits in the future, has come from some of the members of this relatively wealthy and successful group. As with businessmen in most

parts of the world, they are highly pragmatic in their own interests, although some would argue, with some logic on their side, that only when the coloured people have economic strength can they hope to have political bargaining power, and that by taking every possible opportunity to build up businesses and a broader economic basis, the businessmen are gaining the respect of the dominant whites and providing that economic strength.

Those who take the pragmatic line, whether in their own interests or in the interests of the people as a whole, are generally castigated by the professionally trained (of whom the teachers form the vast majority) as 'quislings', 'sell-outs', or 'prostitutes'. They accept loans from the Coloured Development Corporation, whose heavy investment in liquor outlets has not endeared it to the political moralists, apply for licences, liaise with government officials in order to improve their businesses and are largely dependent on the goodwill of the government. The teachers on the other hand teach government syllabuses, in government schools and are disciplined and paid by the state, a position which, they reasonably explain, they must accept if they are to be able to follow their vocation and teach the children. To the outsider, the difference between one form of collaboration and another might appear to be one of degree; to those who take the line advocated by the boycotters and the Teachers League of South Africa, the difference is that between voluntary co-operation for one's personal gain, and compulsory co-operation accepted in the interests of a higher aim.

The social trend-setters, at least as viewed through the 'coloured' press, tend to be the business leaders and the teachers (and other government employees) who are not known for their strong anti-apartheid views. Included in this group one would find members of the Eoan Opera Company, a coloured amateur company which sings mainly Italian opera at a very high amateur standard. The Eoan Group, which pursues a number of cultural activities in addition to its operatic ventures, has been attacked as a pawn of the Department of Coloured Affairs and as a closed shop for a self-selected elite group. Neither criticism is wholly just, although both have sufficient truth in them to enable boycotters to sustain attacks on the Group.

The class distinctions based on these various criteria are reinforced by the attitude believed by many coloured people to be typical of whites. It is assumed, not unreasonably, that most whites look upon the coloured people as being socially and culturally homogeneous, the only important division being between Moslems (known as Malays for historical reasons) and

'Christians' (i.e. the rest). The Malays are believed, by many whites, to be 'better' than the rest. This is probably because those Malays who wear the fez are generally smartly dressed in a conservative, middle class, style. It is also the case that the Moslems, like the Jews in the white community, have a strong sense of minority identity and make great efforts to care for their needy and raise the economic and educational status of their members through their voluntary organisations.

The assumption among many whites that all coloured people (other than the Malays) are much the same and of the same sort as those coloured people with whom most whites have contact - domestic servants, dustmen, builders' labourers, flower sellers, hawkers, 'coons' at Coon Carnival time, drunks in the street and labourers in various other contexts - is bitterly resented by many coloured people who are not in those classes. Among many therefore, there is a great effort made to prove to themselves and to others that they are 'respectable'. Those who have accepted their lower class role mock the higher classes, calling them 'society' (as against 'outie' for the self-styled lower class) and dismissing the individual who tries to be respectable with the contemptuous remark 'Jy hou jou wit', (you act as if you're white). (Stone (ii) 1970).

Inter-group attitudes

There are some coloured people who would deny that there are any 'inter-group' attitudes between coloured people and the other legally defined groups. They argue that the coloured people are not a group and cannot therefore have group attitudes. The diversity of class and attitude has already been indicated, but a little more can be said.

In general, the closer that people are to a group that is defined in some way as different to themselves, the greater is the ambivalence in their attitude and, if the neighbours are seen as constituting a threat, the greater the potential hostility. These generalisations would appear to be as true for the coloured as for any other sections of society.

The appeal made by the conservative parties during the election to positive aspects of a 'coloured identity' and negatively to the evil qualities of Indians or the danger of black swamping, may have been effective in parts of the Transvaal but elsewhere it seems to have had little effect. Asked his views on votes for Africans, M.D. Arendse replied that he believed in one man, one vote - which probably cost him little in the Cape. Racial purity as a slogan has had little appeal for the coloured people who are made up in varying proportions of a dozen known ethnic stocks, although fear of competition

from Africans, jealousy of successful Indian traders and the desire for white privileges have been played upon from time to time, and biological rationalisations have been sought. At the University of the Western Cape graduation ceremony in May 1968, the Dean of the Medical Faculty at Stellenbosch (Dr. F. du T. van Zyl) warned the students of the dangers of inter-marriage with the 'Bantu' who, he claimed, had an incidence of schizophrenia twice that of coloureds and whites (*Cape Argus* 7/5/68) '.... the Bantu are different from the Coloured people and you all know it. Those who think that all races are the same, I can only think of as being far to the left of communism (rooi)'. (*Cape Times* 6/5/68).

There has been some hostility between individual coloured people and Indian traders, and a number of cases have come before the Race Classification Courts in which shopkeepers claiming to be 'Malay' (i.e. coloured Moslem) have been accused of being Indian. Such cases have usually arisen out of jealousy on the part of other traders in the area who have sought to have competition removed by the accused being forced to sell his shop and to move to an Indian group area. The vagueness of the law and the skill of advocates and attorneys have minimised the damage done to families and livelihoods by such actions. The corner shopkeeper, if he can be identified as being a member of an alien group, is a traditional target for resentment in poor areas and the Indians have suffered in this way. It was even suggested by the National Coloured People's Party leader (Dr. Smith) that all Moslems should be reclassified as Indians. 'This will immediately prevent the Indian from using the Malay as a bridge to exploit our people'. (*Post* 2/11/69). This attitude is shared by few people to any marked degree although there is a tradition of suspicion among coloured people about the magic powers possessed by some Malays. The expression 'a Malay trick' means virtually the same as 'bewitched' and probably stems from the remarkable powers displayed by Malays who thrust knives and skewers into themselves in Kalifa shows. Except where interpersonal conflicts bring the old prejudice to the surface, such attitudes are probably declining in the Cape.

Relations between coloured and African people in the Cape have become tenuous, other than in the work situation, as a result of apartheid and the removal of Africans living in Cape Town to the townships of Langa, Nyanga and Guguletu. Consistent with the view that lightness of skin is indicative of other virtues, the attitude of the coloured people towards Africans has

been generally that they are physically stronger, intellectually weaker and generally 'primitive' compared with themselves. Within the churches, which attract 'respectable' people, artisans and schoolteachers as councillors and leaders, there is sympathy for the Africans who are felt to be even worse treated than the coloured people themselves. The combination of sympathy and superiority leads almost inevitably to a somewhat patronising attitude, although not in the paternalistic form that is often observed among middle class whites.

Among the 'outies' and the African labourers there is commonly a measure of masked hostility as there is between African migrants and the *tsotsi* gangs which try to prey on them. The African can speak a language unintelligible to the coloured labourer, his physical strength and temper when enraged are legendary and he is believed to be cunning and clannish. But these powers can be matched by the greater experience of urban life that the coloured labourers possess. Hostility between individuals and groups in contact with each other in the work situation is uncommon, although these attitudes underly their relationships. The Africans for the most part prefer to keep themselves to themselves, eating their own food and avoiding trouble, and the coloured labourers do likewise. Despite the shortage of women in the barracks for African migrants, there is little trouble between Africans and coloured people over competition for women. Some casual and even permanent liaisons are formed between coloured women and African men, while other women make themselves available commercially. The same is true in the small towns for which information is available. (West 1969).

As with the coloured people, so the Africans in skilled and professional work tend to be employed within their own group areas, making regular communication and the establishment of natural relationships unusual and difficult. The churches offer a bridge in some instances, but the multi-racial political parties are dead and the business and professional associations tend to be established on 'racial' lines with little liaison.

At a more general level, the African masses present the coloured people with a problem. Given a three tier 'racial caste' system, the coloured people are in the middle, with the whites far above, outnumbering them by about two to one, and the Africans are a little below, outnumbering them by about seven to one. 'One man, one vote' would give the Africans power if one thinks in 'racial' terms and the average coloured man might well find himself worse off than before as he would have

to compete on equal terms with the mass of Africans. It is hard to argue that the injustices from which one suffers should be lifted only from oneself, and left on the Africans, but that is clearly what is in the best short-term interests of the coloured people. The rationalisation would be (and is) that the coloured people are 'civilised Western' in culture and hence properly identified with the white group rather than with the Africans. Playing on this theme has so far proved politically unprofitable, but the protection of coloured labour in the Western Cape by influx control and the provision of better facilities for coloured people in the future may be effective in encouraging more coloured people to accept their current second class citizenship, rather than gamble on losing their advantage over the Africans. The discouragement of any form of contact between coloured and African people, particularly at the level of intellectual or political leadership, tends to encourage the development of such an attitude.

Attitudes towards whites depend very much upon the social position of the individual and the various groups within the coloured people as a whole. Among the upper social groups, including the physically caucasoid, there is ambivalence - a desire to identify with the reference group on the one hand and a revulsion from discrimination and paternalism on the other. This is particularly the case in the families who have 'white' relatives. Those who have succeeded in passing are often hated, with a strong tinge of jealousy, as traitors to their families and to their people. A few have refused the chance to be classified as white because of the rifts that would arise in their families, others have refused to seek re-classification for fear that they might fail and be damned for trying. Those who have succeeded in obtaining white identity cards often live in fear that they will be re-classified and possibly lose their jobs, their homes and their friends. By avoiding coloured kinsmen and old friends, and by adopting a harsh attitude towards non-whites they protect themselves from accusations that they are, in fact, coloured. Such behaviour, while readily understood in the context of their social situation, creates bitter resentment among those who are on the coloured side of the crucial border of classification.

The people whose education, qualifications and experience would enable them to compete easily with whites on equal terms, and in particular those in government service who receive lower salaries for equal work and qualifications, are usually bitter towards whites in general and towards the state in particular. Apartheid and the fear of police intimidation at any multi-racial meeting, by forcing or frightening people

more and more apart, has probably hardened this attitude. Contacts become more forced and symbolic, less natural and expressive, and prejudices are reinforced. The very groups and individuals who are best equipped to build bridges across the gulfs created by apartheid and fear are also those who are most frustrated by the laws and conventions which prevent them from functioning efficiently within the system. Boycott, an often almost paranoid suspicion of offers of friendship and plans to leave South Africa for more open societies pervade the attitudes of many people in this position.

Those who have maintained contacts tend to have a more individual view of whites, recognising that there are good and bad, patronising and honestly friendly, helpful and deceitful, just and unjust, as in their own or any other community. The policy of apartheid has been successful in creating self-sustaining barriers which make group attitudes of suspicion more likely and individual non-racist attitudes less likely.

While resentment at white governmental injustice and personal experience of slights by white people influence the attitudes of most coloured people, there is a tendency among the poorer and the rural people to accept these fatalistically, aware that this has been the way of life for generations and that no change can be expected. But just as there is a long tradition of African and European peasants moving away from despotic chiefs when the chiefs exceed the acceptable norms of a ruler's rights, so there is a similar tradition among the coloured people. For the professional man and the artisan there is the ship to Canada or Australia. For the labouring man and the domestic worker flight from the country is impossible and inappropriate as such workers have a smaller scale view of their social milieu and would be lost in a foreign country. For them the response to individual acts of injustice by employers is to move away, to leave the job and go in search of another one. The disappointed white 'madam' whose servant leaves without notice or explanation (Whisson and Weil, 1970) and the farmer whose labourers quietly disappear or fail to return from holiday may be the unwitting victim of a social system in which Africans can readily be arrested and removed from their places of work if they cannot produce a pass. Equally they may be in the position of the Baganda or Swazi chief (Beatrice 1967) whose subjects have slipped away to live under a kindlier ruler, or in the position of the education section of the Department of Coloured Affairs, some of whose teachers have resigned from the service without giving any reason for their resignation.

The fatalistic attitude towards injustice is still strong in the

rural areas, but changing rapidly in the towns. The improvement in the working conditions and the bargaining power of many workers as a result of the labour shortage in the Western Cape and the packing of the C.P.R.C. have contributed to a more positive attitude among many younger people. Resentment of injustice is probably greater and more openly expressed than it was before the election campaign and before the labour shortages became a matter for public discussion. It is too early yet to indicate the form that this more positive attitude towards the whites and their government will take. It may even be a passing phase doomed to be drowned in alcohol, dagga and gang violence. The slowly increasing number of literate and semi-skilled men, as well as the increase in men with more profitable skills is a process which is unlikely to be reversed and it is probable that more efforts will be made in various directions to translate the positive resentment into action to remove its causes. The success of the Labour Party at the polls and the slight setback received by the National Party at the white election have suggested that the government need not have everything its own way all the time. This too may influence the attitude of the mass of urban people in particular the younger men, encouraging them to probe for other weaknesses among the whites which can be turned to the advantage of the coloured people.

Conclusion

The definition of coloured attitudes is an extra-ordinarily difficult matter as the people so classified form no cohesive group. The immense variations in background, experience, class and current social situation ensure that attitudes are equally varied. In this paper I have laid most stress on attitudes which can be described very broadly as political by drawing heavily upon events surrounding the election of the C.P.R.C. as dramatising and indicating something of these attitudes. It will be clear, however, that coloured politics are overwhelmingly politics of reaction; reaction to situations created for the coloured people by the politically dominant whites. Future developments will depend as much upon the actions of the whites as on the actions of the coloured people themselves and, as the white Prime Minister (Mr B.J. Vorster) has said, the National Party has no clearly defined policy for the coloured people. (*Cape Argus* 8/2/69).

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