

SOUTH AFRICAN LABOUR BULLETIN

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in World Perspective.**

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(The views expressed in the articles are not necessarily those of the editorial board).

THE WORKERS AND RURAL DEVELOPMENT.

Trade Unions cannot look after the interests of their members without at the same time favouring policies which will solve the general problem of unemployment. In South Africa this problem is associated with the economic underdevelopment of the rural 'homelands', from where many workers come as migrants to the industrial areas. Everybody knows that migrant labour is a Bad Thing. But it is not enough merely to condemn the effects which it has on the lives of the migrants. It is necessary also to understand its role in the economy, and its relation to the problem of employment and rural development. What are the economic and social forces underlying the system of migrant labour? To what extent is the South African economy organised around the migrant labour system? What is the nature of the economic and social relations between the rural homeland areas and the industrial core? What strategies are available to homeland leaders in order to improve the employment situation in the homelands? It is vital for trade unionists to attempt to answer these questions. Any policy which increases employment in the homelands improves the bargaining position of the urban workers.

In this issue we print four articles which deal with various aspects of the problem. Francis Wilson shows to what extent migrancy has become a world-wide phenomenon. But he also shows how differently the problems which arise from it are dealt with outside South Africa. This is born out by the 'Migrant Workers' Charter' drawn up by the International Confederation of Free Trade Unions, which we reprint. John Rex offers an interpretation of migrant labour in South Africa which differs on many points from that suggested by Wilson. A pseudonymous economist at present working in Lesotho gives a more specific account of the problems of underdevelopment and migrancy as they affect Lesotho. Alec Erwin suggests some strategies which might be adopted by the peripheral homeland areas to achieve a better bargaining position. None of these articles pretends to offer the last word on a subject which is under-researched and still, in spite of the confidence with which people offer solutions, little understood. But there is one thing which all four articles illustrate with great clarity. It is the extent to which the problems of the rural peasants and the urban workers have a common root, and can only be solved by close co-operation between the two groups.

LESSONS THAT REFUSE TO BE LEARNT.

Strikes by african workers are continuing throughout South Africa. Elsewhere in this number we describe seven strikes which have occurred in Durban in the last month. There have also been more

than a dozen strikes on the Witwatersrand, and a wave of strikes in East London.

There are three very clear lessons to be learnt from the seven strikes in Durban;

1. In most cases the strikes were associated with a previous pay rise. In several cases the rises had been preceded by rumours to the effect that there would be large increases. In none of the cases were the workers actually consulted about the rises. They were simply presented with the management's decision. The lesson is that such unilateral decision-making is use-less. Unless workers are involved in consultation and negotiation over wage increases, the vicious circle of rumour, disappointment and strike cannot be broken.

2. In all those cases where there existed a works committee or a liaison committee it played no constructive role. In one case, the alleged victimisation of a liaison committee spokesman was the main cause of the strike. These committees are not functioning properly. Indeed, they cannot function properly since they are virtually dependent on management goodwill, and do not have the confidence of the workers.

3. In a number of cases the workers felt it necessary to call in or consult an outside body, such as the Kwazulu government or the General Factory Workers' Benefit Fund. It is evident that the workers feel that they need support from outside the factory, and that they have more confidence in the Kwazulu government or the Benefit Fund than they do in either management or liaison committees. Workers need a spokesman who is outside the control of management. They need a spokesman who has the resources needed for meaningful wage negotiations with employers. They need a spokesman who is responsible to them and whom they can instruct and in whom they will have full confidence. These three criteria can only be fully satisfied by a trade union.

Chief Buthelezi has once more repeated his call for full trade union rights for african workers, saying, "The economy cannot stand battering from strikes every other day of the week. We realise that this does not do anyone any good". Management can only bring some order into the present chaotic situation by recognising trade unions. This is the lesson of the present strikes. It is also the lesson of the bloody history of white worker organisations before the passing of the Industrial Conciliation Act in 1924. And it is the lesson of every other advanced industrial society. Some people seem to be slow learners.

THE COMPOUND, THE RESERVE AND THE URBAN LOCATION

THE ESSENTIAL INSTITUTIONS OF SOUTHERN AFRICAN
LABOUR EXPLOITATION

This paper is a contribution to a conference on the sociology of developing countries. It is delivered, however, by one of that growing number of sociologists who believe that much of what passes as the sociology of development is a part of the conscience-salving ideology of colonial exploitation. Like the comfortable and respectable sociology of ethnic minorities in the metropolitan countries themselves, the sociology of development claims to be policy-oriented. It assumes that those responsible for directing affairs in colonial contexts are motivated by a genuine desire to ensure increasing standards of wealth for the colonial people, just as the sociology of race relations or of ethnic minorities in the imperial metropolises posits a government which earnestly seeks the integration of minorities and the overcoming of all forms of racial discrimination. The view taken here is that these assumptions are about equally false, but, what is much more important, even if they were not, it is characteristic of the research programmes in which these assumptions are made, that no attempt is made to prove them.

More specifically, however, than this general dissociation of what I have to say from policy oriented research, is the reaction which I share to the sociology of development with A. G. Frank. I do not believe that there is any context of post-colonial or neo-colonial society in which what we are dealing with is solely an under-developed society. Colonial societies are societies which have been and are being systematically dedeveloped in the interests of the affluent and advanced capitalist world. This is true of most of Britain's former colonial territories in Africa. It is even more true of those territories which are subject to the direct exploitation of the settler territories, where responsibility for the management of the society and economy as a whole rests, not in distant legislatures and boardrooms, but with the local centres of settler power. Thus, far from the former so-called protectorates of Southern Africa now known as Botswana, Lesotho and Swaziland being territories in which independent governments now

face the task of bringing their peasant populations into the market economy and into the whole swim of the modernizing process with the aid of a benevolent trustee who now provides aid where it is needed, what we actually see are poverty-stricken rural areas utterly dependent for their existence on the sale of their labour to the South African mines, left without any significant aid which might help them towards economic independence and completely circumscribed in the political and economic decisions they can take by the economic and military dominance exerted over them by the South African political system. Such situations exist in some degree in most of the dependent countries of the world. They even exist for the more backward countries and regions of Europe. But they rarely exist as clearly as they do in the Southern African dependencies, and there is, therefore, much that can be learned for the world at large from a study of the sociology of Botswana.

I am not exactly sure what sort of contribution I was expected to make to this symposium. I was in fact asked as one who was thought to be working on "dualism". Now I am not sure what that term means, but I imagine that it refers to situations in which there co-exist two economies and two social orders, one based upon the world market and on urban-industrial institutions including the production of cash crops in rural areas, and the other upon a subsistence world in which government and administration encounters the local populace mainly for law and order purposes, and through the agencies of the chieftainship and the kinship system. In fact, I know little about such situations, though there seemed to be the makings of one in parts of Sierra Leone where opportunities for advancement through the production of rice for the Freetown market were being neglected, during my stay in the territory, by cash-crop farmers. What my own work has been concerned with is the exploration of problems of race relations in what have come to be called "plural societies", and, even there, I have come to the conclusion that an understanding of the problems of these societies can only begin when one sees them in their colonial context and judges institutions in terms of the contribution which they make to attainment of the purposes of colonial exploitation or to those of the anti-colonial revolution. The dualism and pluralism which I detect in these societies is, therefore, the dualism or pluralism of goals which may be pursued by the participants and receive the sympathy of the observer. I, therefore,

follow Myrdal not simply in accepting the inevitability of value-oriented research. I follow him in asking that the ends to which policies and institutions may be deemed functional or dysfunctional should be brought into the open.

If, however, I feel that it is necessary to dissociate myself from the ideologies of development sociology, I find it equally necessary to disown what Mannheim would have called in his own strict sense of the term "utopias" borne of the anti-colonial revolution. I have much sympathy with these and indeed I happen to be prepared to give them whatever political support I can. But in my role as a sociologist my duty remains clear. I cannot pretend that the status quo of colonial society in Southern Africa looks destined for an early overthrow, and what I shall, therefore, be describing is a situation, in which a particular kind of labour exploitation, of a historically distinctive kind, takes place without too much difficulty, and, indeed, has within its institutional resources the means of making this exploitation even more effective and smoothly-functioning in the immediate and foreseeable future.

Naturally, in any discussion such as this we are dealing in ideal types. I do not really wish to deny that there are villages and aspects of the life of village people within South Africa itself, and in its neighbouring dependencies, which merit analysis in terms of models which have no reference to the mines of the Witwatersrand. Nor, on the other hand would I wish to deny that there is developing amongst the African labour force which migrates to the African towns, and amongst their peasant cousins, a revolutionary undertow which already drags the tide of South African history in directions other than those which the mineowners or the Afrikaner nationalists would wish. What I do wish to assert, however, is that in our usually tame professional sociology, which runs for cover when its conclusions do not fit easily into ideological patterns, what is missing is that aspect of a total sociological analysis which would derive from another model or ideal type, namely that of one of the most effective, if most inhumane systems of exploitation which the world has known. I propose, therefore, to develop this ideal type by analysing the three essential South African institutions of the compound, the reserve and the location in their dynamic unity, and, having pointed out how they may be seen to be

operated within South Africa's borders, to show how they may be thought of as setting the framework of the social and economic formation likely to be found in her imperial dependencies, whatever the superficial political forms which appear to operate there (e.g. Portuguese imperial rule, British protection or independent African rule).

One of the central mistakes made by Max Weber in his analysis of the essential institutions of capitalism, was his insistence that only free wage labour was ultimately compatible with its rational-calculating spirit. As he saw it, there were at least two major difficulties about the extreme alternative, namely, slavery. The first was that the continued supply of labour could not be assured. The second was that it was irrational from the point of view of a productive enterprise to have to maintain labour during times of market recession. What he did not pursue, however, was the possibility that other forms of unfree labour might emerge, given suitable background political conditions, to which these difficulties did not apply. It will be contended here that what emerged in South Africa through the conjunction of the overcrowded native reserve and the mining compound was a system of labour exploitation which was about as rational as it could be from the point of view of the exploiter.

The free wage labourer sells his labour by the week, or even by the hour or the minute. Attempts to win a longer period of guaranteed work have generally been held to be too restrictive in a free economy. On the other hand, the employer is not regarded as having any responsibility for the worker's family other than that of paying the worker himself his due wages. Any kind of guarantee of income in times of unemployment, therefore, has been left to the provision which the state is likely to make if it is subject to democratic pressure by workers' parties. The slave on the other hand is bought once and for all, for life and, so long as he is his master's property, the duty as well as the interest of the master is to keep him and his family alive so that he will not suffer either a loss of his existing capital or that which he is breeding for the future in the form of the slave's offspring.

The logic of slavery did, in fact, prove in the long run to

be incompatible with capitalism, but other forms of unfree labour lived on. Under the guise of humanitarianism, schemes were often worked out to apprentice the children of the emancipated slaves, as well as of conquered colonial peoples, farmers settled on land already inhabited and turned the existing inhabitants into labourers who were required to give labour service domestically and agriculturally, and the system of indentured labour was devised so that, at least for a period, the worker was as completely at the disposal of his master as was a slave.

All these labour forms, however, suffer from one great defect which makes them ultimately incompatible with the structure as well as with the spirit of capitalism. This is that they confuse the master's oikos and the family life of the worker with the operation of the capitalist enterprise. What is necessary, therefore, is an institution which reduces the period of "indentures" to such a length of time that the effective use of the worker's labour can be guaranteed, and which divorces the worker's role qua worker, both from the structure of the master's oikos, and from his own family life. This can be achieved if the worker is brought without his dependents to live in restriction in accommodation provided by the employer during the period of his contract. Thus, one finds that the basic form of labour in South Africa, at least in the mining industry, is compound labour. The compound is a kind of bachelor barracks in which workers retire when off shift to bunk beds in communal dormitories and receive their food in specially provided communal kitchens. A very high degree of rationality can be achieved under such circumstances. Enormous economies of scale can be made in what would otherwise be the worker's spending pattern, and he can be effectively sealed off from subversive forces which might lead to his trying to form unions to bargain over the price of his labour. The one great irrationality with which capitalist enterprises have to cope, namely the labour market, is, therefore, excluded. The cost of labour can, therefore, be not merely a precisely calculable, but a fixed cost.

There are, of course, difficulties in securing a labour supply which will accept these conditions and the difficulty becomes more acute when the political conditions immediately following conquest no longer exist. It is nonethe-

less worth noticing that despite the fact that its people enjoy the special protection of the United Nations Organization itself, every adult male citizen of Ovamboland in Namibia has had until recently to accept assignment to an employer merely by virtue of being an Ovambo. Moreover, one would be mistaken if one underestimates the political pressure brought to bear upon rural Africans to seek employment in the mines and on European farms. The most important forms of pressure, however, are not political but economic.

The term "reserve" has a curious ambiguity as it is used in the areas of white settlement in Africa. In theory it is supposed to refer to an area of land which has been reserved for native as opposed to settler occupation, thereby preventing the total expropriation of land by the settlers. That reserves do and must have this character will be made clear in a moment. But, if total expropriation has to be prevented, so has anything like the attainment of a supply of land necessary to support subsistence agriculture. Land must be kept in short supply and the worker must be forced into the money and wage earning economy. Thus, in South Africa the African reserves constitute only 15% of the total land even though the African people form 80% of the population; traditional communal landowning systems have been broken up so as to give tenure to some while turning the remainder into a landless proletariat, and a poll tax, introduced on an adult male per capita basis, has forced every family to require a money income. Similar systems were also introduced under settler pressure in Central and East Africa. This much, moreover, is not merely a matter of speculative ideal type construction. Here manifest and latent function as well as sheer intention are the same. The historical record shows that Rhodes in South Africa and his imitators in the North quite openly and explicitly introduced the kind of reserve system which would proletarianize the African.

But the function of reserve policy is not merely to act as a compulsion to peasants to become workers. It has also to ensure that the employers are not left with those responsibilities which, in the absence of a welfare state guaranteeing unemployment benefits and family support, they would have to assume. The reserve has to be, in theory at least, an economic and a social system which will supple-

ment wage earning employment as a means of support for the native. It is possible, of course, for employers to be crudely cynical about this and to talk, as the South African Chamber of Mines has done, of the great good fortune of the African who, unlike the British worker has, not one, but two sources of economic support, yet not, in fact, to take any steps whatever to see to it that the second source exists. But it is clearly also possible, given this background, for the whole system to be improved, reformed and rationalized so as to actually provide more resources for the African worker who returns to the rural area.

In fact, one of the things which the Nationalist government in South Africa has been quite consistent about doing has been to rationalize its reserve policy, both internally and so far as the dependencies beyond its boundaries are concerned. One of the first acts of the Nationalist party on its assumption of power was to set up a commission, the Tomlinson Commission, to investigate the possibility of a viable social system of apartheid. This notion had little to do with the segregation of black from white in any total sense. What it sought to do was to work out what steps would be necessary to achieve a situation in which by the year 2000 there would be so-called white areas of the country, in which not more than 50% of the population would be black, and black areas where the remainder of the population would live. The Commission reached the conclusion that this would only be possible if considerable sums of money were spent on rural rehabilitation and if the problem was looked at on more than a national basis so that the black areas to be taken into consideration would include what were then called Bechuanaland, Basutoland and Swaziland

At first it seemed as though the South African government would not go any way at all towards meeting these demands. But the succession to power by Dr. Verwoerd in the wake of Mr. Strydom probably involved a considerable shift of policy towards doctrinaire apartheid, or, as Afrikaners were to say, emphasising the positive aspects of apartheid. The notion of Bantu homelands began to loom large in Nationalist thinking, and, when Verwoerd was assassinated and Dr. Vorster undertook to "continue on that road along which Hendrik Verwoerd fell", it was this that he had in mind.

It is in fact not surprising that the Afrikaner Nationalist government, representative as it is of the poor white but free wage worker, should take action of this kind. Its interests lie in preventing at all costs any competition between cheap black free wage labour and its own. It could do this, of course, by totally restricting african entry to the cities, the mines and industry, but this is neither politically practicable, because it would mean the destruction of the economy, nor even advantageous, since the afrikaner worker has no desire to fill all the unskilled jobs himself. What he needs to do, therefore, is to make the compound and migrant labour system work, and this is something he can best do by turning into a reality the pretty theories of the Chamber of Mines.

Such a policy cannot, of course, be carried through without offence to other interests which the government must seek to represent. Industrialists, including the increasing numbers drawn from the Nationalists own ranks are likely to become concerned if the reserves become a featherbed encouraging african idleness, and the afrikaner farmer must rely to some extent upon a migrant labour force, which will have even less agreeable conditions than those pertaining in the mines, and which, therefore, requires economic pressure to be put on the african peasant. Thus, one might well expect splits of the kind which have developed in afrikaner Nationalism between the so-called "verligtes" and "verkrampes". The usual account of the origin of such differences is the emergence of more enlightened attitudes as afrikaner Nationalists succeed in business. A more complex hypothesis is suggested here.

What Vorster may be expected to do is, not to move towards some kind of liberalism in which african workers become more like their counterparts in Europe, with trade union and welfare rights. What he will do is what is suggested in the title of a recent and very perceptive study of South African politics, modernize racial domination. And that process of modernization will include not merely and probably not mainly rural development, a pretty hopeless task without massive investment anyway, but the increasing devolution of political authority for the management of the reserves on the Africans themselves. Once the range of choice available to independent african governments has been effectively restricted in practice, no great danger to the system

ensues from creating independent legislatures. Indeed the establishment of the reserves as Bantustans strengthens the whole system in many ways. It is also no accident that the South African government could tolerate an independent group of african states on her border and appear to extend to its own people the same rights as had been accorded by the British to the Tswana, the Sotho, and the Swazi. In due time similar policies could be applied in Malawi, and perhaps in Rhodesia, Zambia and Mozambique, if suitable african allies could be found. All of this simply serves to confirm how essential and how effective the rural reserve is within the South African system. For it is not simply a reserve of land set aside for the protected use of the native people. It is a reserve army of labour which has to be maintained as efficiently as possible at the minimum necessary cost so that it itself is cheaply available when and where required.

No doubt the ideal world of apartheid would be one in which all native people lived in reserves except during temporary periods when the able-bodied were summoned to live in urban compounds and do labour service. Something like this appears to have been the Ovambo system. But this cannot be simply achieved since the urban migration of families has been going on now for a very long time. Moreover, so long as uncostly arrangements can be made for providing the minimum necessary service for the unemployed and the families of workers in the towns, so that this cost does not fall on the employers, there are positive advantages in having a further reserve of labour, including female labour, readily at hand in the urban areas.

The existence of a residential community of families and other more complex households, however, does present certain difficulties to the system. Above all it raises the possibility of community-based political and trade union action. It is, therefore, imperative that the urban migrants should be subject to total control and perpetual scrutiny. As long ago as 1922 the Stallard Commission distinguished between the redundant and the non-redundant African, defining the latter, who was acceptable as an urban migrant as one who ministered to the wants of the white man or to the

documents proving his right to be in town. Even then he would be required to reside only in specially segregated areas of the city. In these areas, called "locations", a location superintendent responsible to the local authority ruled with absolute authority aided by a specially recruited municipal police force concerned with implementing the dozens of laws which in his everyday life the migrant, or his wife or his children might break. In the location a continuous programme of pass raids, liquor raids and other forms of harassment creates a total insecurity which effectively prevents any but completely clandestine political organisation. It is not too much to say that a family is always uncertain as to whether its male head will return at night because he might be arrested at work, while the male head may well return to find that his family are in the process of being deported to the rural areas.

The harassment and close scrutiny and supervision of inhabitants which goes on in the locations serves to supplement and strengthen the paternalistic controls exercised in the workplace. There the worker may be subject to Master and Servant legislation which makes it a criminal offence to leave his employment and, instead of being able to negotiate about his wages and conditions of work through a trade union he is required to present his complaints directly to a government official. The result is that any move towards a collective bargaining situation, such as exists and exists strongly amongst the white labour force, is effectively prevented.

The management of the semi-settled urban labour force, however, requires more than police control. Drains must be provided if disease is to be prevented and disease must be prevented because it spreads through domestic servants to white homes. Street lighting is essential to the effective prevention of crime. And beyond these more mundane material services it is also necessary to provide a minimum range of human and personal services to prevent unnecessary suffering and grievance which make for inefficiency. Yet there is a difficulty about providing these services. The native urbanites cannot afford them, and the white ratepayers, who are alone enfranchised, will not pay for them. Thus, so far as social services at least are concerned, an alternative source of income must be found. This is found through

the creation of a municipal monopoly in the brewing of native beer. The enforcement of this monopoly adds to the complexity of the policing measures, but the profits do provide the location superintendent with a budget which is his to command, and which cannot be cut by the white rate-payers. Thus, the central institution of the native location is the municipal beer hall, and, insofar as there are occasional and desperate political outbursts, the likelihood is that they will be directed against the beer-halls.

No-one who has been concerned with the administration of these locations would deny that there is a great range in the degree of efficiency or inefficiency with which they are administered. Those who are charged with their administration develop almost a craft skill in administering the various regulations effectively. But precisely because this is the case there is also great room here for improvement and reform. The lower level police may harrass the people unnecessarily and sadistically. They can be subject to control. The actual legislation which prevails in a particular location or nationally may be unnecessarily confusing, internally contradictory and intolerable. It can be rationalised and reformed. And, even within the existing framework, there is room for improvement of social services provided from the beerhall budget.

Improvements and rationalizations of this kind have, of course been carried out by the modernizing and reforming government of Dr. Vorster. As an efficient practitioner of apartheid, he has had to be firm about these reforms against the opposition of his more benighted colleagues at national and local level. But such reforms do not of themselves exhaust the strategies which he might use. The long term aim of apartheid in the urban areas is to relate it effectively to the policy of maintaining the reserves and Bantustans. Better than merely reforming the laws of urban life and using african clerks and police to administer them, is the goal of bringing the whole location system under the control of tribal authorities. To achieve this the first step is a segregation, not merely of black from white, but of tribe from tribe. To those who are mere pragmatists this might seem to be "apartheid gone mad". To the intelligent practitioner of the system it is the ultimate and essential cornerstone of the policy. The reserve

army of labour will exist not merely in the families whose life is split between the compounds and the reserves, but in the families and the community structures of the urban location. And the simplest way to govern it all is through unitary and compliant tribal authorities. Thus, the proposal that urban Africans should not have an urban franchise, but should share in electing their own tribal authorities is not an aberration. It represents the logic of the peculiar social system which is South African apartheid carried to its logical conclusion.

This is not the place to speculate about the long term viability of the policy of organising labour exploitation in terms of racial supremacy and apartheid. It should, however, be noticed that neither white racial supremacy nor the mere fact of segregation were the invention of the present Nationalist government. They were established residentially, industrially and politically by the South African Party government of Botha and Smuts and the United Party governments of Hertzog and Smuts. Indeed, one might go further back from this and say that they were established in their essentials as soon as the mining industry was established by Cecil Rhodes. What the Nationalist governments of Verwoerd and Vorster have done, however, is to perfect the essential institutions of the system. In the first place they were arrived at pragmatically and in a way which made them extremely vulnerable to political and economic change. The modernizing Nationalists have merely understood the logic of the system and carried it through to its conclusions. It is little wonder that they have won the grudging support of their white political opponents and the admiration of overseas investors.

To point to these hard facts is by no means to join in the chorus of european hallelujahs at the success of white supremacy in one part of the dark continent. That one would do, only if one rejoiced at the fact of racial domination, or if one judged South Africa's economic system by the profits which it yielded. On the other hand, the sociological problem which this sets for those who wish to work for the revolution is how that revolution will come about. Clearly, it cannot follow the classic Marxist pattern of a revolution led by the urbanized african workers. Indeed, so far as the unionized workers are concerned the main thing to be noted about them is that they are white,

and that they will be active in their support of an overall system which brings them great material benefits. What is far more likely is that the revolution will develop in the countryside and in the residential urban locations, involving attacks on compliant tribal chiefs, police, clerks and beerhall managers, together with any other Africans who collaborate in modernizing the system. And once such compliance has been prevented, the way will be opened to the effective withdrawal of african labour and the commencement of guerilla activity in reserves and locations alike. Once again it should be pointed out, however, that we are not making suggestions here as to what should be done, let alone recommending how racial peace might be established in South Africa. It is not the sociologist's task to suggest solutions to political problems. What he has to do is to assess the situation and suggest the likely course of events. We suggest here that, although the skill of Dr. Vorster has been successfully applied in breaking legal and illegal opposition alike, the possibility of revolution remains, but not in anything like a classical european form and not even perhaps in one of the forms which have been successful in China, Algeria and Cuba. A unique labour system in a highly successful capitalist society will produce its own revolutionary forms.

All of this may, of course, seem rather irrelevant to a conference on the sociology of development as that notion is normally understood. What I have to say about that is simply that what is going on in South Africa is a highly successful form of development, although not one which will appeal much to those who equate the sociology of development with some kind of good works.

So far as the sub-heading under which this paper is given - that of "dualism" - is concerned the implications are much clearer. We see dualism in Southern Africa, only if we ignore the political and economic realities and the nature of the developmental process. It is no accident that development in Botswana, Lesotho and Swaziland proceeds but slowly and with meagre capital resources. What the total system of which it is part demands is that it should guarantee sufficient poverty to ensure a labour supply for the mines and sufficient development to provide a "homeland" which can act as a substitute for a social security and welfare system. The only real accident would be if one of

the dependencies were to have a windfall in the form of the discovery of hidden resources which would make them partially independent. This might mean the emergence in the South of another Zambia, and if that were to happen the sociology of development might be interestingly combined with a political sociology, which explored the institutional means whereby such wealth might be independently developed. In the absence of this situation, however, many of the earnest enquiries of the development sociologist turn out to be purely ideological. This is particularly true in the Southern African case, but that case may itself offer us pointers to the way in which we might analyse colonial exploitation situations of a more subtle kind.

The topic which I wish to discuss today is "Migrant Labour in World Perspective". I shall begin by looking briefly at migrant labour in different parts of the world, and in particular around the Atlantic perimeter, where it seems to be most extensive. I shall then look at migrant labour in South Africa and ask why migrant labour exists, and whether its reasons for existing in South Africa are any different from those in France or Latin America or elsewhere. Then I shall ask where migrant labour in South Africa is heading.

Let me start with the problem of definition; what do we mean by a 'migrant'? In the South African context I would define a migrant as somebody who moves from his home to his place of work at a distance which is greater than commuting distance, so cannot do it on a daily basis. If, on the other hand, we look at migrant labour in western Europe, the term migrant is applied only to foreigners, not to internal migrants. It also includes those who come with their families, though there is something of a class distinction here. A doctor living with his family in Geneva and working for WHO would not be called a migrant, whereas an Italian roadbuilder living with his family in Geneva would be. This difference in definition means that there is some difficulty in making a comparison in statistical terms between migrants here and those there. Nevertheless, bearing these difficulties in mind, there are some comparisons which are worth making.

Let me begin with Argentina, where there is a certain amount of migrancy from neighbouring countries into Argentina where the standard of living is higher. Bolivians come in for the sugar harvest under very bad conditions indeed in terms of recruiting and wages. They may then move out of the rural areas into the cities, bringing their families and living in the slums. Thus migrants include the 'swallows' who fly back and forwards, the oscillating migrants, and also those who stay in the cities permanently. I mention Argentina for two reasons. Firstly, so that people should be aware that there is a phenomenon of migrant labour in Latin America, and secondly to bring out the global implications. The movement of people out of the limitrophe countries into Argentina has largely taken place since the middle fifties, because of the development of migrant labour in Europe. Before then there was a considerable flow of migrants from southern Europe to Argentina, but since then have been attracted both to France and Germany. Thus what happened in Argentina was inter-related with what happened in Europe.

In the U.S. migrant labour is all sorts of different things. Firstly there are internal migrants, primarily agricultural migrants, who move with their families from the gulf of Mexico where they spend the winter, up through California or up the east coast

to harvest vegetables. Because America is such a big country, there are continual seasonal changes; each row of beans is getting riper as you move north, so you can go on harvesting beans for a long period of the year. This is what the Americans would call migrant labour, and there are many serious problems with it, but it mustn't be forgotten that many people are moving with their families. One point that I want to make about internal migration is that there is a seasonal pull to the place of work in the agricultural area, but at the same time, when the harvest is over, there is a push of the people away from these areas. The President's 1951 Committee on migrant labour quoted a Californian farmer who said, "When the harvest ripens we wait with anxiety for the migrants to arrive, and when the harvest is over we wait with equal anxiety for the migrants to go away again". That is, they don't want to have to pay medical services for them during the winter, look after their kids, educate them, and provide the whole social infrastructure. So people are being used as labour units, but are not really thought of as members of the society.

The other form of migrant labour in the U.S. are those that come from outside, from Mexico to the West and the South West, or from the Dominican Republic and Puerto Rico in the South East. The movement of Mexicans has been largely during the 1940's and 1950's either legally or illegally as 'wetbacks' swimming the Rio Grande. There has been a lot of political resistance to this by the working class in the U.S. who argue that the impact of these migrants coming in is to hold wages much lower than they would otherwise be. Unscrupulous employers have exploited the labour, employed the workers at wages well below the PDL, not paid their social security, and not enabled them to strike. They will therefore say "keep these Mexicans out". Here I would like to raise a moral question to which there is no answer really; what is the right thing to do; to keep the Mexican migrants out or to let them in? From the point of view of the migrant being kept out, he can earn 5-7 times as much if he can get into the U.S.. On the other hand, if he is let in he can be used and manipulated by the employers to reduce the living standards of those who are already inside. I see a real conflict of interest here, and I do not see any final moral answer. If this goes on for a long period of time, so that Mexico becomes dependent on agriculture in California, it may be that Mexico should close her border and develop her own industry. This brings out the kind of problems which are relevant much closer to home.

From the Dominican Republic and Puerto Rico there is a movement of migrants into the cities, into non-seasonal work. In the case of Puerto Rico in the 1950's workers were drawn to the cities for 1-3 years and then returned. The point that I wish to draw out of this is; what is it about Puerto Rico that has made this movement of workers out of Puerto Rico and back again good for the development of Puerto Rico? It seems to be the case that the movement of migrants, sending back cash and then returning themselves, has enabled

the whole island to develop in a way in which it would not otherwise have been able to do. This can be contrasted with Sicily or Lesotho, where the drain out of migrants has impoverished the area. Lesotho today is a poorer country than it was a hundred years ago. Sicily is being impoverished by the draining out of labour. Why in one case is it beneficial and in the others not? Once more I do not have an answer.

In Western Europe there is a long history of migrant labour, in the sense of people coming from a great distance into the industrial areas; in the 1850s Irishmen being brought into Manchester, Poles coming into Germany, Italians to the coalfields of Belgium. With the outbreak of the 1st World War, a lot of migrants were from hostile or unfriendly countries and so were sent back home. In the 1920s there was some improvement in the economy before the great depression of the 30s, so there was not much in the way of migrant labour in Europe with the single exception of Nazi Germany which during the 30s was using not migrant but forced labour. In 1945, the real worry of those managing or thinking about the economies was whether they were going to be able to employ everyone. This was particularly the case in the truncated Federal Republic of Germany, where there was not only a smaller country than before but also 10 million refugees pouring into the country from the east. But in fact the opposite of what was feared happened. Britain, Germany and France expanded very rapidly and soon needed far more labour than they could get in the country. Consider the case of West Germany; the number of foreigners employed rose from 73 000 in 1954 to 169 000 in 1971, a thirtyfold increase in 17 years. There was a similar rate of growth in France, Switzerland, Holland, and other parts of the continent. There was also a change in the source of the labour supply. In the 1950s Germany drew its labour from Italy; first from the north, and then, as northern Italy developed rather as Puerto Rico did, from the South. But as Italy developed further, Southern Italians went to Northern Italy, and Germany had to look elsewhere. The trend was, first Italy, then Greece, Spain, Portugal, and then in recent years, Yugoslavia and Turkey, as is illustrated in the following table:

FOREIGN WORKERS IN GERMANY.

Sources (As a % of total foreign labour)	1959	1971
Italy	29%	19%
Yugoslavia	4%	22%
Turkey	0%	20%

In Britain there is a similarly changing pattern. First, Britain drew migrants from Ireland for a hundred years or so, and then as

Ireland grew economically, with Germany investing in Ireland, Britain started to look elsewhere, to the Caribbean and the Indian-subcontinent; West Indians, Indians, Pakistanis, Bangladeshis came into Britain in the 1960s. In France the same thing happened. They started with Italian workers, and Algerians and other North Africans, and then in the 1960s there occurred an enormous growth of Portuguese on the one hand, and of Africans on the other. The increase from Portugal was partly because of people wanting to escape from having to fight in Mozambique and Angola. Today in France 28% of foreigners come from North Africa, roughly a third from the Iberian peninsula (Spain and Portugal) and 15% from Italy. The number from black Africa has increased from almost nothing to about 100 000 in the last 15 years, but it is still a very small proportion of the total. However, it is worth considering it further as it exemplifies a familiar pattern. The Soninke group live several hundred miles due east of Dakar, where Senegal, Mauritania and Mali meet on the upper Senegal river, and it is from that fairly small area that most of the migrants from black Africa to France come. They move first to Dakar for two months, and spend this time working out how to get into France illegally, which costs them about twice as much as the usual fare. They may get smuggled into France in the back of a truck over the Pyrenees, and land in Paris, where their conditions are not good in terms of housing and so on, but they make good money, which they send home to pay migrants to their home from further South to do the work which they are no longer there to do. Eventually they return to Africa.

In West Africa there is another migrant labour movement which is largely agricultural. People move from the inland savannah zone, either due west to harvest peanuts, or south to harvest cocoa and coffee. This is largely a seasonal dovetailing, since when labour is needed on the coast there is a slack period inland, and vice versa. There is a considerable debate going on at the moment between those who think that this movement is beneficial to economic growth, and those who argue that it has been good for the coastal regions, but very bad, to the point of exploitation, for the inland region.


Coming further south, the last place I want to look at before South Africa itself is Central Africa, the migrant labour pattern on the Copperbelt and in the Union Minière in Katanga. The interesting point here is that in the 20s and 30s Union Minière and the Copperbelt made use of migrant labour just as the gold mines always have. They brought in workers from outside, housed them in hostels, and then sent them away again. But at the end of the 1920s for Union Minière, and at the end of the 1930s for Roan Selection Trust and Anglo American, there was a switch in policy towards a more stable labour force. People came with their families, earned higher wages, and were provided with houses, education and social security. Today there is a completely stable labour force on the Copperbelt with virtually no turnover at all.

Why is it that the Copperbelt should move to a stable labour pattern whereas the gold mines which started using migrant labour 50 years earlier, are still using oscillating mine workers? Why, on the other hand, do you still have migrant labour going backwards and forwards in West Africa? There are all sorts of different patterns. In some places migrant labour is being maintained and in others changed. What are the economic and political forces at work?

In South Africa we have a long history of migrant labour, starting primarily if not exclusively with the mines; first diamond mines and then from 1886 gold. A huge compound system developed so that today you have 99% of the 350 000 workers in the goldmines housed, on a single basis, in huge hostels of about 7 000 workers. There is also migrant labour in agriculture - maize, sugar and deciduo fruit - and, this is one of the important points to note, also a rapid growth of oscillating migrancy in manufacturing. This has occurred particularly in the last five of six years, with the massive growth of hostel accommodation in Durban, Pretoria, Johannesburg, Cape Town, Port Elizabeth, and elsewhere (with the exception of East London). Every second African man legally working in the urban areas is housed there as a 'single' migrant, without his family. The proportion varies from 20% in Port Elizabeth to 86% in Cape Town.

The main sources of migrant labour are; Transkei (192 000), Kwa-Zulu and BophutaTswana (roughly the same as the Transkei), Lesotho (192 000), Mocambique (130 000), Malawi (100 000), Botswana (55 000) Swaziland (30 000), Angola (5-6 000). Over time there has been a change in the sources of labour. The mines used to recruit nobody from the tropical areas north of 22° S, whereas today one third of the mines' labour force comes from these areas. This is not because migrants from the earlier sources are no longer migrating. Rather, they are moving into manufacturing, where wages are about twice what they are in mining.

Why, then, do we have migrant labour? Is it because of economic forces at work, quite independent of pass laws and apartheid, as elsewhere in the world? This is the question I want to ask. To answer it I shall build a very simple model, more a clarification than a model, and think of four sets of forces.



If B was a rural area, we could have a model of seasonal dovetail-

ing, as in West Africa. There would be a pull (force 1) during the harvest season, and a push away during the off-season, and the reverse pattern in A, so you will get a process of labour oscillation without or even over political forces, as a result of the economic factors. I don't think that we will ever succeed in not having rural migration for harvesting; it happens all over the world, and all that one can do is to try to improve the lot of those engaged in it.

It is the urban migration which is more important. Here force 1 is the pull to the urban areas as a result of economic growth; for example the growth of the labour needs on the Witwatersrand from nothing in 1886 to 100 000 14 years later. Anywhere in the world, the process of economic growth leads to an increase in jobs in the urban areas at a rate greater than the natural population increase. Force 2 is the push from the rural areas, which may take many forms. It may be as the result of the political machinations of those who run the society, whether it be the Enclosure Acts in Britain, of Cecil Rhodes' Glen Grey Act here, where there is a squeeze on those in the rural areas, pushing them into the cities. There is also a push from the rural areas as a result of the mechanisation of agriculture; combined harvesters, tractors, or weedkillers, which do away with many skoffeling jobs. For example in the U.S. you have the development of oblong tomatoes which can be picked more easily by machine without being bruised and cut and canned without taking too much space. This process of mechanisation means that you can produce the food you need with less and less labour. The third possible push from the rural areas is rapid population growth, as a result say of malaria control and better clinics, with a rural economic structure which is not able to absorb it.

In the other direction, you have force 3 that pulls people back to the rural areas again. This is mainly a social security pull-back in the early stages of industrialisation. People coming from the rural areas come in to the bottom end of the economic pyramid, where, in the early stages of industrialisation, there is no social security, no unemployment insurance, no old age pension and nobody looks after you if you are sick. On the other hand the rural areas from which the migrants come have an extended family network; people know you, and if you go back you are not going to be left out in the cold to die. There will be a little food, and some kind of old age security. Thus there is social security in the rural areas at the early stage of industrialisation compared with that available in the urban centres.

The force 4, the push back to the land, is really a political push from the employers, and it rises from the fact that, even if you are employing labour all the year round, it may nevertheless be in your interests to employ migrants. They are unskilled workers and the cost of turnover is not very high, so you may reason thus; "If we employ these people who have a home in the

rural areas where their wives and children fend for themselves, then their wages do not have to cover the maintenance of their families. Also, we do not have to build houses and the whole urban infrastructure which we would have to build either by paying taxes or by paying higher wages so that people could afford them themselves". So there is an employer political push, pushing them out again as soon as they are not needed.

During the early stage of industrialisation you get these four sets of forces ; two bringing people to the cities, two more taking them back again. People become urbanised in a tentative sort of way. Afrikaners moving from the OFS to the goldmines in the 1920s considered themselves farmers coming to the mines at the time the drought was on; when the drought is over, back they will go. But as the economy continues to grow, the balance of the forces starts to change. Force 1 grows stronger as the demand for urban workers increases, whether in construction, or in South Africa, in the civil service, or anything else. At the same time the rural push is increasing because of mechanisation and/or population increase; the rate of growth of jobs in the rural areas may actually be negative, or at least less than the natural population increase.

On the other hand force 3 is getting weaker, because of the rise of social security in the urban areas. The whole politics of the welfare state, which has been the major political battle of the last hundred years in Britain, France, the U.S. and elsewhere is about social security for those in the urban areas. There is also a weakening of force 4 since as the economy goes on growing there is a greater demand for skilled labour; you don't want somebody who can lift a bag of mealies onto a truck, you want somebody who can drive a fork-lift truck carrying ten bags of mealies. He will have to be skilled and so it will no longer pay you to have a high turnover. So the political push weakens as a direct result of economic growth.

So as the economy goes on growing, forces 1 and 2 are getting stronger and forces 3 and 4 are getting weaker, and so more and more people are moving into the cities. This is taking place all over the world, including Western Europe. What is happening there is that the national rural area has dried out, and so it is necessary to go further afield, to Italy, Turkey, Yugoslavia, or India, and this is creating problems because there is a political boundary involved. But all the evidence is, and this is a fundamental difference from South Africa, that Europe is trying to come to terms with this by widening the boundaries over which people may move freely. In terms of Common Market Regulation of 1964, anybody living in the ECM can move to any other member country. There is also an agreement between Germany and Turkey in terms of which Turks will be able to move back and forth without any difficulties with passports and so on. But in South Africa exactly the opposite is happening.

What is happening in South Africa? As in Europe, as the economy grows at 5½%, or at whatever the planned rate, so urban jobs, in building, in the civil service and in manufacture, grow very rapidly. The jobs which are not increasing relatively as fast as the increase in the natural population are mining, and agriculture itself. So there is a steady push from the rural areas, in the one case from the mechanisation of white farms, and on the other hand, owing to population pressure in the Bantustans. So there is a double push from the rural areas. At the same time, the social security pull back has weakened enormously, not because, as in other societies, of the development of urban social security, but because the rural social security available to black workers is far less than it used to be. In the Ciskei one third of the family heads living there have no arable land of any sort. The majority have not got enough land to produce enough for themselves let alone to look after somebody returning from the urban areas. Contrasting this with the situation 150 years ago, the evidence is that this area is now much poorer and more crowded, so there is no social security to pull people back.

At the same time force 4 is also weakening although more slowly because the consequence of the colour bar is to prevent blacks from doing more skilled jobs, and so as long as blacks are unskilled it pays to push them back again because the cost of turnover is not high. But the economy goes on growing and the consequence of this is that the colour bar begins to shift upwards. Instead of a worker loading bags by hand, he will now be using some piece of equipment. He may be laying irrigation pipes or working looms in a textile factory. He is much more skilled, and the employer will be much less willing to let him go and bring in an unskilled man in his place. The cost of turnover increases and force 4 weakens. So you find the balance of forces changing to bring more and more workers into the cities as a result of goal number 1, which is economic growth. But in South Africa there is a second goal, goal number 2, the goal of separate development, in terms of which black workers are citizens of politically independent, economically viable, homelands, which is the rural area in our model. If you want workers to be workers in the city for goal number 1, and citizens in the rural homelands for goal number 2, the only way to do this is to keep them on the hop with a migrant labour system.

What used to be a nice, satisfactory labour system operating without undue hardships, has now changed because the balance of forces has altered as a result of economic growth. If you want to maintain migrant labour you have to bring in the force of law far more strongly than you did before. This is done in two ways. Firstly, the pass laws put in a filter which ensures that only those who are needed in the city as workers can move; no wives, no children, no grandchildren. At the same time you must ensure that those who move do not settle. This is done by the 1968 Labour Regulation Act, which says that a worker can come to the city but only if he contracts to leave it again after one year. If he doesn't he will be

arrested; consequently you have an enormous increase in pass law arrests, simply to keep the system going. At the beginning of the 1920s there were 48 000 convictions each year under the pass laws; in 1948, 176 000, in 1962 385 000 and in 1971 the number of prosecutions was 613 000. The figures are down a little at the moment from what they were 2 or 3 years ago, but still more than one person every minute of the day and night is being prosecuted in terms of the pass laws. Within the present political framework, economic growth is going to expand the process of oscillating migration. More hostels are going to have to be built in the cities, and more people are going to have to be arrested in order to keep people who should not be in, out and to kick people out again after they have been allowed in. This is going to be the consequence of pursuing both these goals.

My conclusion is that I do not believe that we have to go on having the pattern of migrant labour in South Africa. Indeed, I would argue that it is so appalling in its consequences that steps should be taken to end it. I also believe that such steps would not necessarily involve changing the governing party. There is a possibility of change within the present framework, partly because such a change is at the micro level not threatening. To allow a person into the city with his family is not really a political threat to white workers in the same way that a trade union might be a threat. But this change is not going to take place just by waiting for the economy to go grinding on and making the system evaporate. It is not going to evaporate. It is going to get worse and worse unless political action is taken to end it. This need not be on a party basis. It would cut right across parties and colours. We need to understand that if, as we are doing, we are trying to build a common economy, the implication of this is that we must also build a common society.

NOTES ON THE MIGRANT LABOUR SYSTEM IN LESOTHO.

The economy of the kingdom of Lesotho and the workings of its migrant labour system deserve close study by all who are concerned with the southern african labour movement and its organisation. There are at least four good reasons for focussing attention on Lesotho;

1) Lesotho is an example of the complete labour reserve economy. Five out of every six citizens holding jobs work in the Republic of South Africa. At any one time, 45% of the adult male labour force are absentees; are working in the R.S.A. Of a total population of about 1.1 million, an estimated 150 000 are migrant worker. In the course of his working life the Basotho mineworker spends an average 12½ years on the mines. (More precise figures are available on the 100 000 mineworkers because accurate records are kept by the recruiting organisation - the Chamber of Mines Mine Labour Organisation (NRC) which has a monopoly of all recruitment in Lesotho to the South African mining industry).

An interesting study by McDowall (*f*) of a sample of the records of the NRC indicates the relationship between poverty, landlessness and migrant labour. Some 49.7% of recruits in the sample were recorded as landless. Landlessness, (that is, not having the right to any field) is to be expected among young, unmarried recruits. However, the same sample indicates that 73.4% of recruits were married. The sample indicates that migration is highest among the landless and substantiates similar indications by Morojele in the 1960 agricultural survey. (*ff*)

Monthly recruitment figures of licensed recruiting organisations also give some understanding of the flow of migrant labour. These indicate that recruitment is highest in January (especially in the lowlands and foothills when ploughing for summer crops is usually completed). But there is no truth to the claim that migrant labour is a seasonal phenomenon - a useful supplement to the peasant families' income while crops are ripening. Monthly returns of the number of Basotho in employment in South African mines do not fluctuate significantly. If the supply of labour is insufficient, then the NRC offers smaller periods of initial contract, that is 4, 6, or 9 months. Regardless of the period of initial contract, the average length of stay is the same - about 13 months (under the pass laws, foreign Bantu cannot reside in the Republic for more than 24 months at a stretch). If there is no shortage of mine labour, then longer and fewer contracts are offered. These figures indicate how effectively the recruiting organisations control the flow of labour.

The migrant labour system has a long history in Lesotho and has dominated the economy since the 'disintegration' of the peasant

f M. McDowall: "Basotho Labour in South African Mines".

ff 1960 Agricultural Census: "Agricultural Holdings" - C.M.H. Morojele.

economy in the 1870s' and 1880s'. Lesotho is not an agricultural country. Despite high yields in maize and sorghum this year - and recent increases in wool and mohair prices to the farmer - Lesotho cannot hope to be a self-sufficient agricultural economy. The long-term trend is towards a decrease in output and yields per acre.^(f) The long and deep structural nature of Basotho migrant labour is indicated by historical records. The following table indicates the growth in migrant labour both in absolute terms and in % of the total population;

Year	Male	BASOTHO MIGRANTS: 1911 - 1966. ^(ff)			Migrants as % of total de jure population.
		Female	Total		
1911	21 658	2 972	24 630	5.8	
1921	37 827	9 314	47 141	8.7	
1936	78 604	22 669	101 273	15.3	
1946	95 000	32 000	127 000	18.5	
1956	112 000	41 992	154 782	19.5	
1960	-	-	206 424	23.2	
1964	-	-	164 000	-	
1966	97 529	19 744	117 273	12.0	

Historical records indicate substantial labour migration in the last quarter of the nineteenth century. Clearly, the structure of the labour reserve has deep historical roots in the colonial penetration of Basutoland and has not altered substantially since then.

2) What are the prospects for the absorption of migrant workers in the domestic economy? Since independence in 1966 Lesotho has striven to industrialize to create more jobs at home and thus lessen its dependence on migrant labour. The Lesotho National Development Corporation has encouraged foreign private investment. Domestic 'border industries' have been set up on the Lesotho side of the border (Maseru and Ficksburg Bridge) for the manufacture of ceramics, candles, tapestry, weaving etc. But this industrialization has not succeeded in creating a large number of jobs. There are an estimated 25 000 jobs in the non-agricultural domestic economy. In the first 3 years of the current plan period, 1970/71-1974/75, an estimated 4 000 new jobs have been created. The largest single employer is the Holiday Inn. While this is a considerable achievement, it is insufficient to provide domestic employment to absorb the labour surplus. It is not even enough to

- f* L.B. Monyake: "Lesotho - Land, Population and Food: The Problem of Growth in Limited Space" (Paper delivered to National Population Symposium, 1974.)
- ff* J.C. Williams: "Lesotho: Economic Implications of Migrant Labour" (S.A. Journal of Economics, Vol 39, No. 2, 1971)

keep pace with the increase in the adult labour force. Without substantial protection from white South Africa and without positive inducement to labour-intensive industrialization, Lesotho's current economic development efforts will not be sufficient to absorb the migrant labour in the domestic economy.

Lesotho's experience of economic development also indicates some of the ways in which the 'independent' labour reserve operates to the economic advantage of the Republic of South Africa. As an independent state, Lesotho qualifies for foreign aid. As one of the poorest 12 states in the United Nations Lesotho qualifies for multilateral aid on a scale no bantustan receives. Hence independence relieves the R.S.A. and to some extent Britain of the aid burden of sustaining the labour reserve economy. A second benefit to South Africa is the training of its labour force. Artisans, carpenters, plumbers and a growing number and range of skilled workers are educated and trained at great cost to Lesotho's educational budget only to find work in the Republic, where wage rates are higher and the cost of living lower. (This 'brain drain' is checked only to a limited extent by the natural aversion of the Basotho to living under apartheid laws.)

3) There is a clear need for more 'hard' information about the performance and the potential of the labour reserve economy, both within the R.S.A. and within the whole catchment area of foreign migrant labour. It is remarkably easy for the research worker to carry out field research in Lesotho due to the fact that it is an independent state. Much more is known about Lesotho's economy than about any comparable labour reserve in southern Africa. Hence Lesotho can provide useful, comparable data about how the labour reserve economy functions and, *pari passu*, about economic prospects of the bantustans. However, there are very few resources available. Library services (except for the University at Roma) are very limited and the government archives have only a very rudimentary catalogue. This situation is in great contrast to the R.S.A. where much greater resources for research are available but where access to field research is very restricted.

4) The tight control over mine labour supply exercised by the Mine Labour Organisations (NRC) makes the task of unionization supremely difficult. Accurate recruitment records are kept, enabling 'troublemakers' to be weeded out. Control by management and police over the compounds is tight. In the villages, control by the chiefs and the youth league of the ruling Conservative Basotho National Party (BNP) over militants has been tightened even further since the coup of 1970 and the 'troubles' in January and February of this year. The vast array of controls - in the village, in the recruitment process, at work and in the compounds do not differ substantially from one 'foreign' migrant labour source to another. (The situation of the Nyasa mineworkers is fundamentally no different to that of the Basotho).

But these controls have tended to backfire in recent months. Riots (spontaneous strikes) and 'disturbances' at the mines have certainly worried management and disturbed production. The riots at Virginia and Loraine in the Orange Free State goldfields in June, indicated that management needs an effective workers' organisation to deal with. Management would naturally prefer a docile and subservient union but may be forced to settle for what they can get.

For information on the Lesotho economy see in particular the 1960 Agricultural Census Basutoland, the 1970 Agricultural Census Lesotho, the 1966 Population Census, Percy Selwyn: "The Dual Economy Transcending Natural Frontiers: the case of Industrial Development in Lesotho". M. McDowall: "Basotho Labour in South African Mines - an empirical study"; G.M.E. Leistrer: "Lesotho: Economic Structure and Growth"; Roger Leys: "Lesotho: Non-Development or Underdevelopment"; J.C. Williams: "Lesotho: Economic Implications of Migrant Labour" (S.A. Journal of Economics Vol 39 No. 2, 1971). J.C. Williams: "Problems and Prospects of the Economic Development of Agriculture in Lesotho" (doctoral dissertation submitted to the University of Natal, 1970)

SUGGESTED STRATEGIES FOR RURAL DEVELOPMENT.

The low wage structure in South Africa is partly the result of the fact that there is a regular flow of new workers from the peripheral African independent states and homelands into the white-controlled industrial areas. This flow of workers ensures that there are always more workers than jobs, so that it is easy to keep wages low, especially when workers do not have effective organisations. The main cause of this situation is that the policy of successive governments in Southern Africa, from the nineteenth century onwards, has been to limit the amount of land available to Africans, and to discourage development in the small area left to Africans. Such an explanation applies just as much to a country such as Lesotho, which lost nearly all its most fertile land to Boer conquest in the nineteenth century, as it does to the Transkei or Kwazulu.

Because the state of economic development and employment in these areas is of such great significance for the trade union movement in the white-controlled industrial areas, it is important to ask whether these areas can be developed. If we consider agriculture in South Africa, the state has used public money to support and develop the white owned-farms, but has given almost no assistance to black peasant farmers. As Merle Lipton has written, "While 90 000 rich, educated white farmers have 3 000 extension officers (plus enormous injections of easy credit, marketing facilities, and guaranteed prices) 600 000 black farmers have less than 1 000 extension officers..... the black peasant has not yet been given a chance" (Lipton p266). White farmers get loans at cheap rates to buy farms, and develop their farms, as well as short term seasonal loans to be repaid when the crop is reaped. They get grants for fencing, donga control, dam building and conservation of catchment areas. They get subsidies for seed, and buy fertilizer and fuel at a specially subsidised price. Their crops are marketed by Control Boards, which set prices to protect the farmers. In times of drought they are offered special loans, cheap railage for food-stuffs, and paid compensation if their stock has to be moved. Virtually none of these many services has ever been made available to black farmers. This neglect, together with progressive over-population, has helped to ensure a continuous decline in the productivity of the agriculture of the reserves.

But this is not the whole answer. These areas are underdeveloped also because of their relation to the rest of the southern african economy. Development requires the formation of capital which can be invested and reinvested to bring about an increase in the productivity of labour in agriculture and industry. This capital can be supplied by the state, as was largely the case for white agriculture, but not for black agriculture. But it can also come either from outside investment or by a gradual accumulation of capital in the territory itself. Why has neither of these things happened?

South Africa has sometimes been described as a 'dual economy',

that is, as a society in which there coexist two different economic systems, the industrialised market economy, and the subsistence economy of the reserves. If there really were two different economies, then it should be possible to bring about changes in one of the economies irrespective of what was happening in the other. But this is not the case. The economic system in the homelands is not an independent subsistence economy. It is a completely dependent sub-system of the wider market economy. This has two consequences. Firstly, its relation to the rest of the economy is such as to discourage outside investment. Secondly it is such as to discourage internal capital formation.

1) Outside Investment.

Because the homeland and the white-controlled industrial areas are part of one market system, new industries in the homelands have to compete with those already established in the urban areas, and to attract new industries the homelands have to be able to offer conditions more favourable than those prevailing in the urban areas. Under most circumstances an already established industrial area has advantages over nearby non-industrialised areas. The industrialised area is both a market and a source of many of the materials which the new industry needs. If the new industry is sited away from the established area, it will probably have to send its goods there to be sold, will probably have to pay extra transport costs to get the goods it needs from there, and is cut off from the wide variety of service and maintenance facilities which any large industrial area inevitably generates. These facilities include technical and repair facilities as well as legal and financial services. These disadvantages can only be overcome if the new industrial area has any positive advantages. The homelands do not have any such positive advantages. The reserves were sited where they are largely because those areas were believed to have the least economic potential, either agriculturally or for mining. Since then, the development of the South African economy has been designed to benefit the white areas exclusively, as a result of which the homelands have virtually no transport infrastructure. 40 years ago Professor MacMillan wrote, "To locate the Native Reserves, it is no bad rule for the Union at large, as we suggested for Natal, to look for the areas circumvented, or entirely missed, even by branch railway lines". This remains true today.

The one positive advantage which is sometimes claimed for the homelands is that they have even lower wage rates than do the urban areas. But even this advantage may be mythical. Maasdorp points out that what is important for a manufacturer is low wage costs, not low wage rates. He cites a study which shows that "in Botswana, Lesotho and Swaziland it was found that labour productivity was substantially lower, costs of training were higher, and in certain cases unskilled and semi-skilled wage costs were consequently higher than in the core (South Africa)" (Maasdorp p16). The reasons for this are plain. Low wages have the same bad effect on productivity in the homelands as they do elsewhere. If wages are substantially higher in the urban areas, then any workers who acquire skills are

likely to move, and so the homeland industry will probably find that it is left with the poorest quality workers who do not have the skills to get better jobs elsewhere. This could only be overcome by an even more brutal imposition of influx control measures, perhaps by tying workers for long periods of time to these industries. The only other alternative would be to make the amenities in the homelands vastly better than those in the cities, but this could only be done, in part, by taxing the new industries, and thereby offsetting even further any cost advantages to them.

So it is very unlikely that meaningful development in the homelands can occur as the result of an influx of investment capital. Very large incentives might offset the above economic disadvantages, but the Republican government does not seem to be willing to bear such costs, and the homeland governments cannot afford to.

2) Internal Capital Formation.

Can the homelands produce the capital that they need through the savings of their inhabitants, without needing external capital? Very few of the economic activities in the homelands produce a surplus. Instead, the labour of african workers produces a surplus in the white controlled industrial areas, a surplus which is saved by Whites for Whites. The economic activities in the homelands have been accurately described as 'sub-subsistence', and do not produce much which can be saved and reinvested. The economies of the homelands are so dependent on the white-controlled areas that what surplus is generated quickly leaks away. This happens in two main ways. Firstly, as Maasdorp points out, "the homelands obtain their imports from and through the white areas and their comparatively small volume of commodity exports is sold to South African firms and distributed through South African marketing channels, sometimes on the basis of quotas determined by white interests, e.g. sugar from Kwazulu" (Maasdorp p8). This means that the profits from trading largely accrue to white entrepreneurs. Most of the cash earned by migrants is spent within the white-controlled sector. Even in the case of border areas, where the workers live in the homelands but work outside, studies have shown that most of the money is spent in the white-controlled areas, mainly because of the way in which the commercial sector is organised.

Secondly, even when money is saved, either by migrants or by homeland inhabitants, it is saved in white-controlled institutions such as banks, building societies, insurance companies and the post office. The capital which is made available is almost exclusively invested in the white-controlled areas, in the light of policies related to the needs of those areas. This applies whether the cash is put in a bank, in the city or in the homeland, and continues to apply whether the homeland is independent or not. According to an economist from the University of Botswana, Lesotho and Swaziland, two-thirds of the personal savings collected in Lesotho are channelled to South Africa. Given the present economic institutions, there is very little chance of any capital at all being created in the homelands.

What, then, can the homeland governments do? If they cannot hope to bring about large-scale development, what policies can they adopt to help their citizens? If they are to remain dependent for the foreseeable future on migrant labour, then it seems obvious that one important feature of any strategy must be to attempt to improve the bargaining position of those workers. That means that any development strategy should be evaluated not only in terms of its consequences for growth in the homelands, but also in terms of its effect on the labour market in the white-controlled areas. Of course, there may well be no conflict between these two needs, but this cannot be taken for granted. For example, if a very low wage and anti-union policy made it possible to attract much industry to the homelands, the overall advantages for citizens of the homelands might still be less as a result of a competitive decline in wages in the cities, and the weakening of the trade unions. From the point of view of the urban workers, whether migrant or not, the most important question is the extent to which any policy either increases or decreases total unemployment, because low wages are very much dependent on high unemployment. Policy should therefore have two aims: a) to absorb as many workers as possible in labour-intensive agricultural or industrial developments; and b) to increase the income which the families of migrants can get from agriculture.

a) Labour Intensive Employment.

To create a new job costs money which has to be invested in the equipment needed to employ each worker. The amount which needs to be invested per worker will vary from sector to sector. For example, in India the amount of extra employment created per unit of investment is almost three times higher in agriculture than in industry (Lipton p265). It will also depend on the type of technology which is used. The same products can be produced with different mixes of capital and labour, and which mix is selected is partly a function of the interests of the particular group which makes the decisions. In the South African economy these decisions are made by entrepreneurs in the interests of themselves and their share-holders, and as such may not be at all in the interests of increasing black employment. Furthermore, the choice of technique is also influenced by relative prices which in turn result from a particular consumption pattern and income distribution. The system both perpetuates itself and militates against the use of more labour intensive techniques. It is homeland agriculture which probably has the greatest possibilities for labour-intensive development. Lipton points out that the assumption underlying development planning in South Africa tends to be that land is plentiful and labour is scarce, so that any development would require a large input of capital. But in fact in the homelands land is scarce and labour is plentiful. This labour could be used for labour-intensive methods, either to improve the present crops, or to introduce new labour-oriented crops. For example, the renowned french agronomist, René Dumond, has suggested that silk-worms would be ideally suited to the kwazulu climate. In agriculture the use of labour

varies with the seasons, and in the slack periods the abundance of labour could also be used directly for rural development projects such as dam-building, fencing, road improvements. Shovels instead of bulldozers would take longer but, to the extent that they used labour which would otherwise have been unoccupied, would be far cheaper and just as beneficial.

Edward Roux, Professor of Botany at the University of the Witwatersrand, suggested in 1963 that the reserves were understocked rather than overstocked. He said that "The serious erosion which is characteristic of these areas is due in the main to the absence of paddocking, the kraaling of beasts at night, and the long treks the cattle must make to obtain water. As a result the grass in certain places is completely trampled out and a network of paths covers the countryside. Paths become dongas and accelerated erosion follows." These problems can be overcome by labour investment. For example, Kwazulu is in many places a very hilly country in which the rainfall occurs in the form of flashfloods which run off very quickly. It should therefore be possible to capture much of this water in a network of small dams which would be available to water the cattle, as well as for irrigation. Erosion itself can be halted by a large labour input in contouring, blocking dongas, improving catchment areas, and so on. It is of course easy to enumerate the techniques, but the actual introduction of these techniques into a complex socio-economic environment is much more difficult. I shall return to this point shortly.

An employment intensive development policy must concentrate on agriculture, but this does not mean that other sectors should be totally neglected. In order to discourage the leaking away of funds, commerce and service industries are important, particularly in areas near the white-controlled cities, such as Umlazi. But this should also be designed in such a way as to increase employment. For example, supermarkets employ relatively fewer people than an equivalent range of smaller enterprises. Maasdorp argues that there is also potential for employment-orientated strategies in what he calls the 'small-scale sector' of small manufacturing industries, handicraft producers, small building and construction firms, and so on. In Swaziland, the cost of creating a job in the small-scale sector is approximately R1 000, as compared with R5 000 in the large-scale sector.

b) Helping the Families of Migrants.

Whatever development strategy is to be adopted, the homelands will remain labour reserves for the white-controlled core economy. Many of the inhabitants will be the families of migrant workers, dependent to a large extent on cash sent back home. One objective of any development strategy must be to increase the self-produced income of these families, and this probably also requires a strategy of labour-intensive agriculturally-oriented development. It has been argued against such an ameliorative approach that the main effect of improving the standard of living of the families in the

reserves is to give justification for paying lower wages in the industrial areas. The counter to this, however, is that a more likely effect will be to strengthen the ability of the urban workers to strike, by providing some protection for their families against the immediate effects of loss of income.

There is a similar, more general argument against the whole strategy of agricultural and service sector development which I have advocated. The argument is that any society with an agricultural economy remains dependent economically on its supplier of industrial products, and therefore that industrial development is vital for economic viability. This is perfectly true, but it misses the point. The homelands cannot hope to develop as independent societies, and they cannot hope to solve the problems of their citizens in that way. The problem of black poverty in South Africa and virtually all the other problems of the black people of South Africa can only be solved within the at present white-controlled areas where the majority of the black people work, and will inevitably continue to work. It is here that redistribution of wealth and resources has to occur. I am arguing that any development policy in the homelands has to start from that axiom, and be based on a strategy which will improve the bargaining position of black workers in that struggle. It is therefore necessary to stop even dreaming about the possibility of economic independence for the homelands.

I have suggested a number of techniques which can be adopted to do this, although of course much more research is needed before these suggestions could be made applicable. But the greatest difficulty lies with the question of the socio-economic environment within which these techniques are to be applied. To work they require changes in behaviour, the shedding of old habits, and a willingness to risk previously untried techniques. Experience in many different countries has shown that it is always difficult to bring this about. We cannot be satisfied with listing possible technical innovations. We must also investigate the social and organisational methods which could be used.

There are, broadly speaking, two possible strategies for agricultural development; the encouragement of a 'master farmer' or 'progressive farmer' class, or the use of some form of co-operative farming.

1. Master Farmers.

In any society there will be individuals who will react more quickly than the rest to the possibilities offered by new techniques and market-production. It is therefore possible to encourage these individuals by material incentives and aid, in the hope that they will be able to increase agricultural production rapidly. This cannot be done with a system of communal tribal ownership of the land, because there is no great incentive to improve land to which one does not have a legal right of continued tenure. To

encourage a master farmer class it would be necessary to grant freehold tenure on an individual basis, and to provide certain forms of advice and aid to all farmers. The more efficient would take rapid advantage of this, would soon be able to buy out the less efficient and would consolidate the small holdings into larger and more economical units. In this way innovations would be spread more rapidly and yields would increase.

There is no reason to believe that african peasant farmers would not take advantage of opportunities in such a way. In fact, Bundy has shown that something like this happened in the Eastern Cape in the nineteenth century. With the development of the market economy a number of progressive african farmers quickly adopted new techniques, produced for the market, and were able to buy up more and more land, from less efficient black and white farmers. These african farmers produced at least as efficiently, and often more efficiently than their white competitors. Bundy quotes one observer in 1870 as saying, "Taking everything into consideration, the native district of Peddie surpasses the European district of Albany in its productive powers." Another said, "taking man for man, and acre for acre, the native produces more from a smaller extent of ground, and with more primitive appliances, than the Europeans." It was not until the whites speeded up the expropriation of the land and began to use their political power against their black competitors that this growing black agriculture was destroyed. It is necessary to take with a pinch of salt the claims often made about the natural conservatism of the african peasantry.

But what would be the consequence of the development of such a master-farmer class? The first consequence could be that many people would have no direct access to the land. There would be a class of capitalist farmers and a class of landless labourers. This would have serious social consequences, and probably produce great social conflict. Migrants would probably lose land very quickly, and the traditional patterns of social security would be destroyed. The new landowning class would have no motive to choose labour-intensive techniques, and, strongly influenced by the example of white agriculture, would probably try to cut down on labour, so increasing unemployment and the move to the cities. A master-farmer policy then, would generate tensions in the rural area, and also be very damaging to the interests of the urban workers. The growth of a rural elite class would probably also in the long run slow down the spread of new skills, because education would tend to be moulded to suit the needs of this class, and they would be able to acquire a monopoly of information.

2. Co-operative Farming.

At present land in the reserves is communally owned, but cattle and crops are cultivated individually. The master-farmer policy is intended to cut out the communal ownership. The alternative policy is to replace individual cultivation with communal or co-operative cultivation. This has many obvious advantages, if it can be done.

It directly encourages, rather than discourages, labour-intensive techniques. It is much easier to practice labour investment in a co-operative situation than in an individual situation. A whole village will have an interest in improving the roads or the irrigation works during the off-season, where no single individual would have such an interest. Larger-scale activities with better use of resources and crop-rotation can be engaged in without the necessity of producing a class of landless labourers. Such a system strengthens the traditional system of social security, and leaves a place for the families of migrant workers. This method of farming also encourages rather than discourages other forms of community activity, such as credit co-operatives, literacy drives and other self-help schemes. It makes it easier to suit education to the immediate needs of the community. Above all, it strengthens community ties and provides organisational solidarity.

Despite these many advantages, the introduction of co-operative agriculture is never simple. It also threatens established customs. Conflicts which, in a system of private ownership, would be resolved unilaterally and without appeal by the boss can smoulder on and finally tear apart a co-operative enterprise. The problem of corruption is likely to be great. Under private ownership it is legal and normal for the person in charge to run off with all the profits, but in a co-operative system this must not happen. Many of these difficulties are likely to be even greater in a situation in which the norm of the economic system is aggressive individualism, as it is in the South African economy. This means that if co-operatives are to work, they will have to be carefully prepared by trained and motivated organisers, and backed by thorough research into both agricultural and social problems. This will cost money. But it will probably cost less money per job created than will alternative development strategies.

A strategy of agricultural development based on co-operative agriculture does not necessarily exclude the encouragement of external investment in industry. We must therefore look at the extent to which these two approaches are compatible. We have seen that such industrialisation is not likely to occur on a large scale. How beneficial will it be, to the extent that it does occur? Obviously a new industry creates a certain number of new jobs, and to this extent is important. But the real significance of industry for development is the extent to which it encourages the development of more industry. It can do this by providing profits which can be reinvested, by providing a tax base for the homeland government, and by encouraging the growth of other industries to suit its needs (linkage effects). If an industry does none of these things then it has no overall impact on development. New industries in the homelands are usually granted large tax concessions, which may need to be even larger when the homelands become 'independent'. There is little incentive for the profits to be re-invested, and given the proximity of the much more highly developed existing industrial areas, the linkage effects may well be small.

New industries will create jobs but are not likely to generate a process of autonomous development. It is important, therefore, not to exaggerate the importance of attracting outside investment.

There are four possible disadvantages to be weighed against the advantage of the new jobs which might be created by outside investment.

1. We have seen that the 'small-scale sector' has some potential for new jobs. To a certain extent outside investment will create openings for this sector, for example, in construction. But it may also compete with it, and will almost certainly tend to encourage capital-intensive techniques. According to Maasdorp, "The majority of potential entrepreneurs are South African, and their activities in the homelands may form only a small part of their total operations. It is unlikely, therefore, that they would make any special effort to develop labour-intensive techniques in their homeland operations" (p21-22). There is a risk, therefore, that the indirect consequence of such investment would be to decrease employment, or at least to increase it less substantially than it appears to do. This would not be an objection if such investment were likely to occur on a large scale, since then the total amount of new capital would be greater than could be raised in any way related to small-scale and labour-intensive investment. But it is not likely to occur on a large scale.

2. New factories built in the homelands will not be run on the same colour-bar lines as are businesses in the white-controlled areas. This will mean that there will be increasing opportunities for Africans to become members of management staff. This might at first sight seem to be a great advantage, but a look at the lesson to be learnt from many African countries shows that it may well be a disadvantage. It is apparent that there is a very rapid development of an elite with much political influence, and interests opposed to those of the mass of workers and peasants. This could weaken social solidarity, and also have a bad effect on co-operative agriculture. This is not, of course, an argument for keeping everybody poor, but it is an argument for taking great care in selecting the policy which is designed to make everybody better off.

3. The third objection derives from the very peculiar political position of the homeland leaders, in relation first to the South African government, and second to important sectors of world opinion. The homeland political institutions are the creation of the Nationalist government, and are seen by many as a device to divide the black people of South Africa and to deprive them of their rights in the at present white-controlled areas. For this reason those black leaders who have agreed, whether under protest or not, to co-operate in any way with separate development, are regarded with initial suspicion outside South Africa. This is significant for the problem of development because it makes many in-

ternational agencies with skills and funds available for development unwilling to assist the homelands. In South Africa itself there is a tragic shortage of people with the knowledge, time and inclination to do the basic research and planning which the homelands need. As Merle Lipton has said, "South African planners and officials are extraordinarily out of touch with advances in the theory and practice of development that have taken place elsewhere. Most of them still believe unquestioningly in the misconceptions and myths of twenty years ago..." (p266). This applies also to academics, and almost certainly to the homeland leaders themselves. These leaders have a heavy administrative load to carry under very difficult circumstances, and so can hardly be expected to keep up with the increases in understanding of the problems of development which are taking place elsewhere. One of the most important changes over the last few years is a growing distrust in international corporations, and a new belief that foreign investment is very far from being the cure for all the ills of underdevelopment. This distrust in foreign investment is quite distinct from the political issue of whether or not investment in South Africa should be discouraged. The result is that when homeland leaders attempt to encourage foreign investment it often increases suspicion even further amongst those people who could provide the needed technical help. For example, some of the most important research into development and employment has been undertaken by the ILO in its studies of Columbia and Kenya. Studies of this sort could be invaluable to the homelands, but are not likely to be undertaken as long as some people can argue that the homeland leaders are not only tools of the Nationalist Government, but also the 'puppets of international capitalism!'

A great stress on the importance of foreign investment may therefore destroy the legitimacy of the homeland leaders in the eyes of people who could offer valuable help. This aid could be financial as well as technical and, given the relatively small amounts of direct investment which are likely, could be just as valuable as direct investment.

4. Homeland leaders anxious to encourage investment may feel that it is necessary to be able to guarantee a docile, cheap labour force. They may therefore feel unable to support the african trade unions in the urban areas, and may thereby seriously weaken these unions. This would have two important consequences. It would assist in holding down wages in the urban areas, and thereby decrease the proportion of South Africa's wealth which might otherwise have gone to the black workers. If it were necessary to discourage unions and worker militancy to get more investment, this might increase the total number of jobs slightly, but at the cost of a nett decrease in black incomes.

Furthermore, worker militancy and the existence of strong unions is one of the most important supports which the homeland leaders have when attempting to win further concessions from the Republic-

an government. The various legislative assemblies are platforms from which government policy can be attacked, but they do not provide any real power which can be used in negotiations over South Africa's future. It is only if they are seen to have some organised backing, such as is constituted by, among others, a strong trade union movement, that those who at present hold power are likely to feel that they need to make any concessions.

Strong trade unions could also be of help in the process of social mobilisation and education which would be needed for a successful policy of labour-intensive co-operative agriculture, especially because so many workers are migrants with a direct interest in the rural areas. I began by arguing that the urban workers and the trade unions had a legitimate interest in the development of the rural areas. I should like to conclude by pointing out that this interest is reciprocal. The trade unions can help the homeland leaders and the peasantry. They can be an important educative force for migrant workers in their role as peasants as well as in their role as workers. The trade unions can also encourage popular participation and thus be an important support for democratic government in the homelands, and an ally of the homeland leaders in their attempt to work for peaceful change in South Africa.

References.

Many of the ideas in this paper, although not all the conclusions, are drawn from:

G.G.Maasdorp: "Economic Development for the Homelands" (SAIRR 1974)

Other references are to:

Merle Lipton: "The South African Census and the Bantustan Policy.
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MIGRANT WORKERS' CHARTER OF THE INTERNATIONAL
CONFEDERATION OF FREE TRADE UNIONS.

PREAMBLE.

Bearing in mind that its constitution proclaims the right of individuals to social justice, to work and to choice of employment and also calls for the elimination of any form of discrimination, the International Confederation of Free Trade Unions has frequently, since its inception in 1949, taken action in favour of workers.

Affirming that workers should not be forced by economic circumstances to migrate for the purpose of obtaining employment, the ICFTU pledges itself anew to the task of achieving full employment in all countries. It will promote common efforts by countries of immigration and emigration to bring jobs to workers, on the basis of active labour market policies and strong regional policies.

Large numbers of workers migrate from certain countries because of the unacceptability of political conditions there; the ICFTU will continue the struggle to bring about democratic systems in these countries, and success in the struggle will remove another reason for involuntary migration of workers.

At the same time as working to remove the causes of forced migration, the ICFTU must provide an international rallying point for the efforts of its affiliated national centres and associated International Trade Secretariats to prevent exploitation of migrant workers and to improve their conditions of work and life in general. It will accordingly pursue vigorously the aims contained in the following migrant workers' charter.

A. EQUALITY OF RIGHTS WITH NATIONALS.

1. Employment.

The employment rights of migrant workers should be equal to those of national workers. This principle should apply particularly in the following fields:

- (a) remuneration and related benefits;
- (b) conditions of work;
- (c) security of tenure of employment;
- (d) opportunities for seeking new employment;
- (e) access to employment and vocational guidance services;
- (f) access to vocational training and retraining;
- (g) opportunities for using skills acquired either in the country of origin or in the country of reception;
- (h) opportunities for promotion.

The ICFTU calls for concerted efforts by public authorities and other bodies concerned in countries of reception of migrant workers in order that theoretical employment rights may be enjoyed fully in practice.

2. Social Conditions.

Migrant workers should have access to the same social conditions as nationals.

In particular:

- (a) Migrant workers and their families should receive equal treatment with nationals in respect of social security, including medical assistance. Waiting periods for benefits - where these are not waived through reciprocal social security arrangements - should not be longer for migrant workers than for national workers. Family allowances should be payable on the same basis as for nationals. National legal retirement, invalidity and widows' pensions should be payable either in the country of reception or in the country of origin of the beneficiary at the same rate in both cases; if a migrant worker or his widow is able to benefit from a national retirement, invalidity or widows' pension scheme to which he has paid contributions, his own contributions should be returned to him. Migrant workers coming from countries not forming part of the European Economic Community and working in a Community country should, when they visit another Community country, have the same rights to social security benefits as nationals of the Community country where they work.
- (b) Tax allowances for dependents should be on the same basis as for nationals, irrespective of the place of residence of the dependents concerned.
- (c) Adequate housing should be provided for incoming migrant workers by the authorities of the country of reception or by employers before they begin work. Special efforts should be made to deal with overcrowding and insanitary conditions, whether these occur amongst migrant or national workers, and minimum standards of lodging should be enforced. Housing should be available to migrant workers on the same terms as nationals, and undue concentration of migrants' housing, segregating them from the national population should be avoided. The wishes of migrant workers to have their families to join them in the country of reception should be taken into account in planning for the provision of housing.

3. Participation in community activities of the country of reception.

1. Migrant workers should have the same right as national workers to join trade unions in the country of reception, to express their aspirations through them and to hold any office in them.
2. Migrant workers should have the same rights as national workers in respect of works councils, health and safety committees and similar bodies on which the personnel of the firm is represented. They should have the same rights

as national workers to participate in procedures for the settlement of industrial disputes.

3. Migrant workers should have freedom to express their social, political, cultural and religious opinions, in the same way as national workers.
4. Public authorities and other bodies concerned in countries of reception should make concerted efforts to bring migrant workers into community activities, so that they can play an appropriate part in these and seek solutions to problems of migrant workers at all levels.

B. RESIDENCE AND FAMILY REUNION.

4. Residence.

1. Migrant workers who have been authorised to take up work in a country should be allowed to stay in that country and have a job there.
2. Formalities connected with the residence of migrant workers in the country of reception should be kept to a minimum.
3. Low-cost legal assistance should be provided to migrant workers involved in legal processes connected with their residence, as well as on other occasions on the same terms as nationals.

5. Expulsion.

1. Expulsion of migrant workers should be connected only with a limited number of offences against the law, and even in these cases expulsion should not be automatic. Minor offences against the law should not give rise to the expulsion of migrant workers.
2. The power of expulsion should be in the hands of a court, allowing for all due processes of law. If nevertheless expulsion can be decided on by an administrative authority the decision should be signified to the migrant worker concerned together with the precise motives for the decision; there should be a right of appeal to a court of law.
3. Decisions concerning expulsion should be suspended while an appeal procedure is in process. If the expulsion becomes effective, the migrant worker and his family should be allowed sufficient time to put their affairs in order and to try and obtain admission to another country than their country of origin if they so wish.
4. Migrant workers should not be forced to return to countries which they have left because of opposition to a dictatorial regime.

6. Family reunion.

1. Migrant workers should be allowed to bring their wife/husband and children normally living under the same roof as the head of the family, to join them in the country of reception. This right should take effect as soon as the

- migrant worker has suitable housing available for them.
2. In the case of migration of workers from certain countries, account should be taken of the fact that the concept of a family does not present the same characteristics as in Western countries. The family policy in the country of reception should respect these specific characteristics.
 3. Where the family of a migrant worker remains in the country of origin, the migrant workers should be entitled to visit them on the occasion of annual holidays without losing any rights as a result of absence from the country of reception. Alternatively, the migrant worker should be entitled to be visited by his family for a reasonable period each year. Public authorities and employers should facilitate such travel.

7. Naturalisation.

Procedures for naturalisation in countries of reception should be simplified and costs should be reduced to a minimum.

C. OVERCOMING LINGUISTIC AND OTHER HANDICAPS OF MIGRANT WORKERS.

8. Preparations before departure.

Migrant workers should receive in their country of origin an introduction to the language of the country of reception and instruction in the work organisation and social life of that country, as well as precise information about the job to which they are going. Such pre-departure training should be organised jointly by the authorities dealing with the labour market in countries of origin and reception, and they should ensure that only objective information is imparted. The courses should not affect in any way the authorisation given to individual workers to migrate.

9. Reception and information.

1. On arrival in the reception country, migrant workers and their families should be given all appropriate information and advice in their own language, as well as assistance for their settlement and adaptation.
2. The authority or the employer concerned of the country of reception, with the collaboration of the trade union movement, should provide an introductory course for migrant workers, where these have not been able to attend such a course in the country of origin.
3. The trade union movement should receive every facility for meeting migrant workers on their arrival, in order to give them appropriate information and assistance.
4. Where the migrant worker is engaged through a written

work-contract, the employer should provide this in the migrant worker's own language.

10. Language problems.

1. The authorities of the country of reception should facilitate the teaching of the language of the area to migrant workers and their families. Migrant workers should be enabled to attend an appropriate number of lessons in the local languages during working hours without loss of pay. Language courses should be organised with the collaboration of the trade unions.
2. Where a plant employs substantial numbers of migrant workers who cannot speak the language of the country of reception, interpreters should be engaged, to assist and interpret for migrant workers. They should be appointed in consultation with the trade unions and should have the right to circulate freely in the plant. They should be present and interpret in the handling of grievance procedures.
3. Migrant workers should be allowed to communicate with public authorities in their own language on matters concerning their rights.

11. Vocational training.

1. The authorities of the country of reception, the employers and the trade unions should make special efforts to ensure that migrant workers are informed about their rights to vocational training and about the advantages to be obtained from attending such training.
2. Wherever practicable migrant workers should be allowed to develop vocational skills acquired in the country of origin, so as to be able to obtain appropriate qualifications and employment in the country of reception.
3. Wherever possible migrant workers should be encouraged to undertake vocational training which is not only relevant to their advancement in the country of reception but would also enable them to find suitable employment in their country of origin, in case of return there.
4. In view of the connection between vocational training and technical and general education, as well as for other reasons, the access of migrant workers to all fields of adult education should be facilitated.

12. Health and industrial safety.

1. Special attention should be paid to the health of migrant workers and their families during the period of adaptation to the environment of the country of reception. Doctors speaking the language of major groups of migrant workers should be encouraged to establish practices in the

- areas concerned, or the services of interpreters should be available to migrant workers attending consultations. Firms employing migrant workers should ensure that their medical services are able to cope with the needs of these.
2. Migrant workers should be given training in industrial safety precautions, taking into account their language difficulties and possible unfamiliarity with industrial conditions. Employers should have responsibility for ensuring that safety instructions are understood by all migrant workers.

D. CULTURAL QUESTIONS, EDUCATION OF CHILDREN AND RETURN HOME.

13. Cultural links with the country of origin.

The authorities of the country of reception should facilitate activities of migrant workers in connection with their native culture. These authorities should also stimulate the interest of the national population in the cultures of the major groups of migrant workers present in their country.

14. Education of children of migrant workers in the country of reception.

1. The children of migrant workers resident in the country of reception must comply with regulations concerning compulsory schooling as soon as they are of school age. Taking into account differences of programming of education in different countries, courses for catching up and literacy courses should be instituted, to allow children of migrant workers to undertake studies in the country of reception in favourable conditions; teachers for such courses should receive special training and have knowledge of the culture and language of the country of origin of the children concerned. Migrant workers' children should have opportunities for further education equal to those of nationals. Special efforts should be made to make the parents aware of the educational choices open to their children.
2. Children of migrant workers receiving education in the language of the country of reception should be enabled to study the language of their country of origin through special lessons organised for them by the authorities of the country of reception.

15. Return home and reintegration.

1. Where migrant workers wish to resettle in their country of origin, the authorities of the countries of reception and origin should collaborate in assisting them to find employment appropriate to their skills in the latter

country, through giving information about job vacancies, through employment creation programmes and in other ways. Occupational qualifications gained abroad by migrants should be recognised in the country of origin.

2. Every assistance should be given by the authority of the country of origin in connection with other problems of resettlement.
3. Educational qualifications gained abroad by migrant workers' children and periods of study abroad should be recognised in the country of origin. Special classes for improving knowledge of the language of the country to which the children have returned should be instituted.

E. TRADE UNION PARTICIPATION IN DECISIONS CONCERNING MIGRANT WORKERS.

16. Decisions concerning migrant workers at international, national, and local levels.

1. There should be multilateral agreements on migrant workers' conditions covering all countries of origin and of reception of a substantial number of migrant workers. Pending the extension of existing multilateral agreements, bilateral agreements should be concluded between governments, where these do not already exist. The objective should be to raise the conditions of all migrant workers up to the level of the best.
 2. The International Confederation of Free Trade Unions should play a full part in the formulation and execution of all multilateral agreements concerning migrant workers.
 3. Trade union movements of countries of origin and reception should participate in the formulation and execution of bilateral agreements between their respective countries. Trade union movements of the two groups of countries should conclude bilateral agreements on mutual co-operation on migrant workers' questions, where these do not already exist.
 4. Trade union movements at national and local levels should play a full part in the determination of overall policies concerning migrant workers and in all procedures of public institutions concerning these workers.
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RECENT STRIKES IN DURBAN.

In the last month there have been seven strikes in Durban at the following factories; Balatum Pty Ltd, Acme Timbers, Eskom Power Station, Tayclo Pty Ltd, Sandock Austral and Reckitt and Coleman.

BALATUM PTY LTD.

At Balatum Pty Ltd, a linoleum factory, 180 african labourers went on strike. This constitutes the entire african work-force. The average wage at Balatum is 30c an hour for a 46 hour week; that is R13.80 per week. The workers stopped work after management refused to consider their request for a wage increase to 50c an hour (that is, a 66% increase, raising wages to R23.00 per week). One worker said, "We think we must earn at least 50c an hour just to keep our families in clothing and fed" (Daily News 27/6/74). The strike was shortlived, the workers returning to work the next day. Management made an offer of a 2c per hour increase, which means a weekly wage of R14.72. Workers said that they were dissatisfied with this, "but there is nothing we can do. The management told us if we did not like it we could leave and we all need our jobs".

The strategy of returning to work in order to negotiate seems to imply that the workers perceived the strike as a means of expressing their dissatisfaction rather than as a means for negotiation. They returned to work before management had responded to their demands. This strategy could have been chosen either because the workers merely wanted to draw the attention of management to their grievances or because they correctly perceived the limits of their bargaining strength. The workers were unskilled labourers with presumably a heightened sense of job insecurity, given the reserve pool of labour. Hence the threat by management to fire the workers was sufficient inducement for them to accept the unsatisfactory offer made. In the absence of a bargaining situation in which workers have the power to force management to compromise, the management at Balatum was able to force workers to accept a token increase. However, by striking the workers were able to extract this from management.

ACME TIMBERS.

The strike at Acme Timber industry - a subsidiary of the Anglo-American group - involved 90 African and Indian workers from the Timbrik Model Homes Division. This represents 93% of the work-force; the rest are monthly paid workers who did not strike.

The workers who were labourers or semi-skilled were receiving an average weekly wage of R17 - R18, there being no differentiation in wages between Africans and Indians doing the same job, and no differentiation in the nature of their jobs. They demanded a 25% increase, R3 a week. Management reported that on pay day the workers received their fourth wage increase since the strike in 1973. This is said to represent a 10% increase of the wage bill, with the lowest paid workers getting R1 added to their R14 - R15 wage, and more skilled workers receiving larger merit increases. Management also said that the workers had been promised a review of wages on

the basis of cost of living increases in November.

On Monday after clocking in, the workers refused to start work. Management offered them an ultimatum - return to work by 9am. or be fired. The workers chose the latter, signed themselves off, and were told to collect their wages later in the day. Management agreed to re-employ some of the fired workers on a selective basis only, because it believed the strike to have been initiated by a small group of workers who, it is said, threatened to assault anyone who returned to work.

The reason management gave for firing the workers was that "it could not bow down to threats". It is reported that the Managing Director said, "We do not object to the workers asking for more money because everyone has that right, but they should not have threatened us by striking without first negotiating. We could not give way to threats". There is a works committee at the factory formed in 1973, the members of which tried to persuade the workers not to strike but to use the works committee as a negotiating channel. Their strategy was unanimously rejected by the workers. The workers must have chosen to strike because they perceived this as a more effective means of achieving their ends. A strike is potentially a more powerful basis from which to negotiate, whereas a works committee has no power behind it to force acceptance of its demands. Having no power it cannot negotiate successfully. The workers obviously had little faith in the ability of the works committee to satisfy their desires. And this distrust is validated by the fact that management perceived the strike, a bargaining situation as a threat; a threat to its monopoly of decision-making powers.

The next day the entire work force returned to work at the original wages and on the basis of the existing 10% blanket increase and of promises of a further 10% increase in November. This was arranged at a meeting held between the workers and the Department of Labour. In South Africa the effectiveness of strikes is limited by the fact that there is a reserve pool of labour. If unskilled, african workers strike, there is no protection against mass firing and this leaves the workers powerless, and with no alternatives other than leaving the job or accepting the conditions determined by management.

Acme management seemed to be surprised by the strike. It saw itself as pursuing a 'progressive' wage policy and as having an harmonious relationship with the workers. But the workers hadn't participated in determining the structure of wage increases. There is no such thing as a 'progressive' wage policy determined unilaterally by management. Therefore, it is not surprising at all that workers resorted to striking to express their disapproval. Management's perceptions of an harmonious relationship between them and the workers is expressed in the following statement;

" It was a friendly strike - the strike was caused by a few instigators - the workers are getting a fair deal". Management's application of the 'agitator thesis' to explain the events is a function of their perception of industrial relations at the firm as harmonious and connected to this, of their perception of themselves as 'progressive'; workers were assumed to be satisfied with their wages.

ESCOM POWER STATION.

The strike at Escom Power Station, the first since its formation in 1954 arose out of a demand for wages and a demand for the reinstatement of Mr. Khumalo, a member of the works committee. The committee, consisting of 6 members, was established in October 1972 before the introduction of the Bantu Labour Relations Regulation Act. In December 1973 management granted a yearly service increment of 2c an hour to the average basic wage of R66. The workers instructed the members of the works committee to demand an increase since the effects of inflation had negated the increases given in December. In May, the works committee informed the workers that the manager had said that he, in consultation with the Director in Johannesburg, would consider the issue.

Between the time of the demand and the firing of Mr. Khumalo, the workers report that he was given double the amount of work and told to work every Sunday. Previously he had been working only two Sundays a month, but was now expected to work a seven day week. The manager is alleged to have said that if Mr. Khumalo was not prepared to do this, then he must bring his reference book to be signed off. Although such a demand is illegal, Mr. Khumalo did work that Sunday so the workers felt that there was no reason other than victimisation behind his firing the following Tuesday. Mr. Khumalo was the one who had expressed the worker's demands at the works committee meeting.

In response to this the workers struck. The labourers, who gathered outside the plant premises to await the arrival of company officials from Johannesburg, said that they would return to work only on the condition that management agree to a wage increase and agree to re-employ Mr. Khumalo. When the manager asked the workers to return to work until he had discussed the matter with his Directors in Johannesburg, they replied that they "had no faith in him because we appealed to him in February to give us more money but he told us that he was not going to give us more money since what we are earning is 10% above the bread-line".

The workers went to the General Factory Workers Benefit Fund to which most of the workers belong. They made a statement, which included a request for a statement from Mr. Khumalo to be used in a charge against the employer for wrongful dismissal.

Mr. L. Roberts, the Personnel Manager flew down from Johannesburg to speak to the workers. He promised to convene a meeting of

company officials on 3rd July to discuss a cost of living increase and to meet with the works committee the following day to discuss the fate of Mr. Khumalo. He agreed that the workers were low paid. Although in material terms they had not achieved more than they had when the works committee had asked for an increase, they had achieved a more binding promise by management to consider a wage increase due to the publicity received and the fact that they could expect another strike if the promises were not kept. Their effectiveness in this aspect was demonstrated on the 3rd July when management granted a R7 blanket increase a month. The workers however, did not translate their needs into money terms, did not make a specific demand. Thus they couldn't use the strike as a means of negotiation. They used it to pressurize management into making a decision.

Management refused to re-instate Mr. Khumalo. This can only lead to an enhanced sense of alienation from and mistrust of works committees by workers. Without trade unions to provide protection, such bodies intrinsically allow for victimisation, the occurrence of which generates worker unrest. It could be asserted that works committees are counterproductive and contrary to the aims of those behind their establishment.

TAYCLO PTY LTD.

The strike at Tayclo Pty Ltd is interesting in that it focuses attention on the workings of the Industrial Conciliation Act and on the subtle distinctions between a lock-out and a strike.

Tayclo is owned by the largest Indian employer in the Garment industry. The 80 Indian and Coloured workers involved in the dispute were machine operators in two shirt departments. They were expecting a R3 increase laid down in the Industrial Council Agreement which was gazetted on the 24th May 1974. Prior to the Agreement Tayclo workers were receiving a weekly bonus of between R1 and R3. They were expecting, and management had promised them, that they would receive the increase plus the bonus. However, management did not pay them their bonuses over and above the new rate of pay so that the Agreement had not resulted in any material improvement. The continued payment of bonus schemes was not included in the Agreement, this being only tacitly agreed upon. Most employers in the industry continued to pay them.

On Monday 14th June, the workers refused to start work after having clocked in, demanding that the bonus scheme be re-established. The shop-steward was sent by the workers to inform the manager that the workers wanted to speak to him. He told the shop-steward, Mohan, and the shop-stewardess, Joyce Chetty to wait in his office while he met with the Director, Mr. Amod Lockhat.

Meanwhile the director and the manager went to speak to the workers telling them that they could choose between working without a bonus or clock out, collect their wages and cards and leave. The direc-

or insisted that the chargehand clock Mohan's card out, which he did. When the workers heard of this, they decided to leave. They allege that the chargehands clocked out their cards and that the director refused to have the cards of those workers getting above the rate clocked out. He then told them to leave the premises. Mohan was asked by the workers to inform the director of their wish to speak to him. He was told that the decision made was final; the workers must leave. The workers report that he advised the wage clerk to make up everyone's notice.

The workers then marched en masse to Bolton Hall where the Garment Workers' Union is situated. A meeting was held with the union organisers and the agent for the Industrial Council. That afternoon the workers went to collect their wages. It is alleged that when the agent went to speak to Mr. Lockhat he claimed that the dispute was not a lock-out as the workers claimed but a strike, because it was only after the workers had refused to start work that they were told to go. That is, they had caused their own dismissal. He said that he was prepared to re-employ all the workers without a 'penalty' being imposed on them with the exception of six 'agitators' (among whom was the shop-steward). It is alleged that he agreed to pay them for the time worked plus holiday pay, and would issue them their cards. However there would be no notice pay; termination would be mutual.

The agent agreed with this interpretation of the events. The workers and trade union organisers however felt that the dispute was a lock-out. The manager had told the workers to leave because they would not accept a change in the conditions of employment, and he had refused to re-employ all the workers. Thus the workers demanded a weeks pay in lieu of notice. They also felt that re-employment on a selective basis was victimisation and refused to return to work on this basis.

On Monday, 17th June, the workers once again congregated at Bolton Hall. They wanted their cards and holiday pay in order to find other employment. Previously Mr. Lockhat is alleged to have said that the workers returning to work would not be penalised but in a complete reversal, said on Monday that those workers wishing to leave would forfeit all benefits. It is said that the reason for this change of attitude was the attitude of the trade union organisers and of a Natal Mercury Reporter both of whom interpreted the dispute as a lock-out. Mrs. Bolton, Secretary of the Garment Workers' Union said that on the contrary without publicity some workers could have also been fired as management wished to weed out the 'ringleaders'.

On the 19th June the Industrial Council met to consider the issue but no action was taken. They felt that the dispute was a strike, that the workers had caused their own dismissal and therefore were not entitled to protection by the Industrial Council. Mrs. Bolton criticised the way the agent had handled the dispute.

Firstly, the manager should have been told that victimisation is illegal. But the agent seemed to support it. Secondly, after failing to arrive at a mutually acceptable settlement the agent should have declared a dispute and called a meeting of the Industrial Council. The organisers too failed to press the legal aspects of the case with the result that the employer was able to break the law, without retribution.

At the Industrial Council meeting some employers offered to employ the Tayclo workers at the increased rate plus bonuses. Although not legally obligated to do so, there is a shortage of labour in the Garment industry and an excessive amount of work. Mrs. Bolton thought that the only reason why employers agreed to pay another increase in spite of the fact that they were already paying above the rate, was the present nature of the industry where a competition for labour exists. If this had not been the case, the worker unrest in the industry could have spread.

About half the workers rejected offers made by other employers, choosing to return to Tayclo without a bonus. The others have found employment elsewhere, benefiting materially from the increased rate.

RECKITT AND COLEMAN.

The strike at Reckitt and Coleman, manufacturers of household and pharmaceutical products, involved the entire work force of 400 Africans and Indians. They were dissatisfied with the increase announced by management on July 9th which was to be effective from July 2nd. In terms of this increase the minimum wage of R21 would be raised by R1 and those earning more than this amount would receive a blanket five percent increase. The workers were dissatisfied with this as they expected a R5 a week increase. They said that this was promised them in December, R1 to be received immediately and the remaining R4 over six months. That period had expired and when management announced the new scale of increases the workers went on strike. They refused to accept it and demanded the R5 promised them.

The manager said to the workers that he would only negotiate with them when they returned to work and if they did not do so they would be fired. The Bantu Labour Officer attempted to persuade the workers to return to work but was unsuccessful. The following day, the workers congregated on the company's football field and were addressed by Mr. Solomon Ngobese, Urban Ambassador for the Kwazulu Government who had been called by the manager. They were also addressed by the company's vice-chairman who had flown from Cape Town. One of the grievances voiced by the workers was the lack of communication. They found the liaison committee inadequate. The manager then promised the workers that if they returned to work, two works committees, one for Africans and one for Indians would be established. He is reported as saying, "Previously I have explained to workers personally the nature of wage increases

It now seems necessary to approach the matter in a more formal manner". He saw the issue as being one of improving the channels by means of which management informed the workers of its decisions rather than one of permitting workers to participate in decision-making. Management again reiterated its ultimatum that if the didn't return to work they would be fired. 60 workers returned to work after these discussions. Some said that they are underpaid and were determined not to return to work. Others said that they wished to return but feared intimidation from other workers. It was management's threat to fire the workers which broke their unity. They said they deliberately assumed a 'hard line' attitude to get the workers back to work because production had been brought to a standstill. The strikers were told to fetch their pay packets the next day. They waited outside the factory gates, watched by the police in riot vans before returning home.

The following day July 12th, 160 workers returned to work, the rest collecting their pay packets. Mr. Ngcobese and Department of Labour officials again addressed the workers. They said that they would return to work on Monday, which they did, on the basis of a promise that works committees would be established, that there would be no victimisation of the leaders of the strike and that they would be paid for the four days they were on strike. But they would not get the wage increase they expected.

The 4 day strike cost the firm R10 000. Management obviously preferred to bear the costs rather than agree to a R5 a week increase which would in one month have equalled the costs of the strike.

SANDOCK AUSTRAL.

350 african labourers at Sandock Austral shipyard went on strike on the 15th July. They demanded a R1 increase over the basic hourly pay of 32c an hour (that is, R14.40 per week). Their grievances included the following;

1. They worked a 45 hour week but were often called upon to work up to 12 hours continuous overtime on any single day without being given reasonable notice. Management's reply to this was that the nature of the ship repair industry demanded unusual working hours but that no-one was forced to work overtime. Given the low wages in fact the workers are forced to do overtime to compensate for their wages.
2. They resented the attitudes of certain white overseers who called them 'Kaffirs' and other derogatory names. Management claimed to know their feelings better than they themselves saying, "Our supervisors have close liaison with the african workers and the majority are very happy".
3. They had no confidence in their liaison committee which was elected by management. They said that liaison committee members did not represent their interests and workers who complained to

the liaison committee members were usually fired. Management denied this.

4. Workers compensation was often not paid to workers injured on duty.

Management said that new workers would be employed if the workers didn't return to work immediately. The workers however refused to return. Management then said that although no new workers had been employed, they would only re-employ the workers on a selective basis. The workers wishing to return would get a 7c per hour increase effective from the 1st July and management would consider a further increase later. This increase was intended to become operative only in August but management had decided to bring it forward to induce workers to return to work. They were unsuccessful however, their offer being rejected with jeers and catcalls by the workers. The next day management said that if workers didn't return to work that day they would be fired. They all returned to work receiving the 7c per hour increase offered them by management.

Management were surprised by the strike saying that "labour relations at the yard have been considered good until now". But given the inadequate means of communication, management could have had no idea of the nature of the workers' feelings. They call labour relations good when there are no strikes but fail to take into account that the strike is a culmination of resentment and ill-feelings which germinate in a situation of bad labour relations, a situation where the workers have no viable channels for laying complaints and making demands.

G.G. Maasdorp: Economic Development for the Homelands.
SAIRR 1974 R1.25

This is an extremely valuable, brief survey of the problems facing the Homelands in attempting to develop their economies. It is valuable because of its theoretical framework, the empirical material it presents, and because of its sharp criticisms of the present development strategies.

Maasdorp points out that, "A detailed economic survey is required for each individual homeland. No long term economic development plan for the homelands exists; The Tomlinson Report is outdated and government policy frequently appears to be based on ad hoc decisions rather than on a coherent strategy"(p28). There has been an enormous amount of research done on development planning in the last decade, but much of the most original work seems to have passed South Africa by. "Contrary to popular belief, development does not merely mean the establishment of a few factories by foreign investors in a homeland"(p3).

So there is really nothing to go on, and it is necessary to start from the beginning in working out development strategies. In doing this, the main mistake to avoid is that of treating each homeland in a vacuum; describing its internal poverty, but failing to see it as part of a wider economic system which effects every detail of the economy of the homeland. Maasdorp therefore suggests that it is necessary to treat the homelands as 'peripheral' countries round the 'core' of the white-controlled industrial areas; "The core-periphery relationship is one of dominance and dependence.....Important decisions tend to be taken in the core country; financial institutions and potential investors are found there and the pattern of trade may involve dependence"(p5). Migrant labour is only the most visible aspect of this dependence, which also affects the process of capital formation in the homelands and makes it very difficult for industry in the homeland areas to compete with the more established core industrial areas.

The popular belief that the homeland areas can attract industry through offering a lower wage structure may also be wrong, Maasdorp suggests. All the arguments about the relation between low wages and low productivity still apply, and it may be that the wage costs could be higher in spite of lower wage rates.

The concept of border industries cannot help at all in the development of the homelands; "It is merely a misnomer for white, South African industrial decentralisation, but as a policy for developing the homelands it is nothing more than an economic irrelevance"(p11). Large scale industrial development within the homelands is not likely to occur. Maasdorp suggests that the only possible strategy is to foster labour-intensive methods in agriculture and small-scale industry. Maasdorp does not believe that

such policies can be anything more than a palliative; they cannot produce economically viable states. But, as argued elsewhere in this issue, such an employment-oriented strategy will also have important and helpful consequences for urban Africans. This study is therefore very useful not only for those concerned immediately with homeland development, but also for trade unionists seeking to understand the South African labour market.

Francis Wilson: "Migrant Labour in South Africa." (f)
(Spro-Cas, 1972.)

Dr. Wilson's book on migrant labour in South Africa provides a much-needed study on this crucial aspect of the South African labour market. The South African economy rests very heavily on an oscillating migrant labour system to the extent that at least one out of every two of the 2,5 million Africans working legally in the common (white) area is a migrant labourer. At the same time migrant labour is virtually universally condemned on moral grounds. As Professor J.J.F. Durand stated in a review of this book in *Die Burger*: "Anybody who still wants to make out a case for migrant labour other than that it is a necessary evil suffers from moral blindness". (*Die Burger*, 19/2/73)

Dr. Wilson wrote this 'report' at the request of the South African Council of Churches as part of the Spro-cas programme "to examine our national life in the light of Christian principles and to make recommendations for change towards an acceptable social order". It is, in fact, a full-blooded book ranging over a remarkably wide field with very much new and up-to-date material much of which was gleaned at first hand by on-the-spot surveys by the author. It becomes clear upon reading the book that Dr. Wilson did indeed travel 'the length and breadth of the country' in collecting information.

As if that is not sufficient it contains six appendices dealing with diverse topics such as the legislative framework, pass law contraventions, an interview with David Russell on Dimbaza and a contribution by John Kane-Berman on South West Africa.

What follows is an outline of the contents of the book stressing some of the important findings and conclusions. At the same time criticism and suggestions are levelled where they are felt to be necessary.

Historical Background.

A very brief historical background of migrant labour is sketched, which attributes the origins of migrant labour to the closed compound system adopted on the diamond mines which was subsequently extended to the gold mines. Such an account is, however, only half the story, namely the demand for labour side. The other half, namely the supply of labour, also requires to be covered. The basic question to ask here is why Africans were willing to become migrant labourers at such low wages? This question has become all the more important because it has recently been shown that african peasants responded very positively to market forces in the last third of the nineteenth century and sold enormous surpluses

f This review was published as "The Cancer of Migrant Labour" in "South African Outlook", April 1973.

of crops and wool to the mining areas. The indications are that various methods were used that forced Africans to provide their labour cheaply on a migratory basis. In all fairness to Dr. Wilson these methods are very briefly outlined in chapter 8, but a more comprehensive account in the historical chapter would have been appropriate.

In the mining industry Dr. Wilson points out that the system of oscillating migrant labour is firmly entrenched. With the sole exception of the Phalaborwa Mining Company which aimed at stabilising its african workers, enabling them to live with their families near the place of work, the mining industry (including gold, diamonds, quarries, manganese, iron, platinum, copper etc.) employs 560 000 Africans who are virtually all oscillating migrant labourers. No mention is made about the collusion in the employment of african labour by the gold mines but since Dr. Wilson's earlier book, 'Labour in the South African Gold Mines' deals extensively with this topic, this is an understandable omission.

The chapter on agriculture concentrates on the Western Cape and from it two major findings emerge. First, in spite of declared government policy that the number of Africans employed in this region should be reduced annually by 5%, the number of african migrant labourers have been increasing over the past 6 years. Indications are that this trend will continue in the future as well. Second, farmers in the Western Cape have started colluding in the recruitment of migrant labour and have already set up six recruitment agencies, the largest and best known being the Hex Rivier Boere Groep. The economic effect of such policies is to employ less labour at lower wage rates than would be the case if free market forces were to operate and to create an artificial scarcity of labour in the region.

Industrial Centres.

When considering industrial centres Dr. Wilson concentrates on two points; the type of accommodation available to Africans and the extent to which the labour force is migratory. Here, particularly, the reader benefits from Dr. Wilson's extensive travelling and on-the-spot surveys. Two major findings emerge from this chapter. The one is that, similar to agriculture in the Western Cape, the absolute number of migrant labourers in Pretoria is increasing against the expressed policy and desire of authorities. The other is the shocking conditions under which migrant labourers are housed so that they can reside in the urban area in order to meet the ever increasing demand for labour of the white owned industries. Although Dr. Wilson appears to be fair in describing both the good and bad accommodation available to Africans, the following indicates one of the worst places he visited in Johannesburg. "I walked into a room measuring approximately 30ft. by 45ft. housing 56 men packed like sardines in very narrow double-decker concrete bunks separated from each other by a low (6 inches to 9 inches) thin partition so that the only way to get onto one's

bed was to crawl in from the bottom". (p.38)

Other features on the industrial centres is the way in which single ('bachelor") quarters are being established at the cost of family housing and how rigidly men and women are kept separate because every child born in the urban area has a right to permanent residence in that prescribed area under present legislation. Some of the development in hostel accommodation in Alexandra has a distinct Orwellian sound; "Amongst the administrative offices outside the gates of the hostel are three rooms; a police charge office; a thickly walled cell; and a control room. Inside the latter is a switch-board. From this switch-board go wires to all corners of the hostel where they are connected to steel doors which are fitted in every corridor in such a way that they can roll down from the ceiling to seal off the corridor from the staircase that leads to the courtyard. Thus, at the touch of a button, any group of rooms in the building can be locked off and the men incarcerated. Strikes or riots will, it is believed, be more easily contained by such methods".(p.43)

Unfortunately Dr. Wilson's book does not provide us with any information on the industrial employment of migrant workers. There is a dearth of up-to-date information on a national scale on all aspects of the employment of migrant labourers. Questions which need to be answered are; what are the wage rates, fringe benefits and social services provided to migrant labourers, what pension schemes exist for them, is there any correlation between the wage rate on the one hand and the frequency and duration of migration, the length of time spent with one employer, and the level of skill and occupation of the migrant labourer on the other hand. Comparisons between settled and oscillating migrant labour of the above economic variables also need to be made in order to ascertain to what extent migrant labour per se is responsible for the plight of Africans at present. These questions await further re-research although Dr. Wilson assumes some of these relationships to exist when he weighs up the arguments for and against migrant labour.

Grim Picture.

The picture painted of the situation in the homelands is even more grim than the industrial scene. The most worrying fact to emerge from this chapter is the way in which separate development is being implemented and its direct tie-up with migrant labour. By all accounts the homelands without exception all have far greater populations than the areas can provide for. Yet, at the same time, one of the declared aims of separate development is the resettlement of 'redundant' Africans and Africans living on 'black spots' in the homelands. Dr. Wilson found ample evidence of such resettlement taking place regardless of whether job opportunities existed in or near the area. For instance, Nqutu in Kwazulu, had a population of 32 000 in 1959 and the Tomlinson Commission estimated it could only carry a population of 14 000 at a reasonable

standard of living. However by 1970 the population in this district had increased, as a result of natural increase and population movement, to 86 000.

Another alarming trend of separate development which directly causes migrant labour is the 'amputation' of townships from cities to a remote homeland township. Thus, for, instance, the township of Itsoseng in Bophusetutswana has been built not to serve local industries but to be the home of families of men working in such centres as Klerksdorp and Potchefstroom, 133 and 180 kilometres away respectively. Likewise, in Witsieshoek a new township is being developed to house the families at present living with their husbands and fathers who are working in Welkom and Kroonstad.

Dr. Wilson's conclusions on the homelands are worth noting. Many people live in appalling poverty which is increasing in many parts of the homelands. This acute poverty is alleviated to some extent by the movement of oscillating migrants who go to the cities. (p.104)

A most useful chapter of the book deals with international perspectives and briefly examines the migrant labour phenomenon in other countries including the U.S.A., Latin America, China and Western Europe. What emerges from this international comparison is that China and South Africa appear to have pursued similar policies and objectives with regard to migrant labour. The hsia fang movements were campaigns to reduce the size of the urban population by encouraging unemployed workers and non-productive persons to return to the countryside. What is more, 'draconian controls' over internal migration were imposed after 1958 and official labour bureaux existed to control the influx of labour to the cities.

International Comparisons.

An investigation of the 'gastarbeiters' in Germany reveals some interesting comparisons. Contrary to South Africa, migrant labourers to Germany are allowed to bring their wives with them (half of those who were married did so in 1968), 77% of the 2,2 million migrant labourers are living in normal flats, they are protected by labour legislation and can belong to trade unions. Finally, the German government is recognising the permanence of many of these workers and granting them social and political rights.

The reader would desperately like more information on these international comparisons, but in a book of 280 pages which was originally meant to be a report, more detail could hardly be expected.

The nerve centre of this book is the two chapters that deal with an economic analysis of oscillating migrant labour and a consideration of an alternative to migrant labour. The economic analysis is most powerful and appears to be irrefutable. It rests on the assumption that there are four economic forces which cause the oscillation of labour. Two of them drive labour from the rural sec-

tors (Bantustans and white-owned farms) to the urban areas. The one force constitutes a rural push due to rural poverty and the other an urban pull based on job and income opportunities. The other two forces drive labour back to the rural sectors. The one force is an urban push which results from cost-savings by employing temporary single migrant labourers and socio-political reasons. The other is a rural pull because the migrant labourer has to render services in order to provide for his present and future social security. The arguments are powerful and are based on careful economic analysis. The underlying causes for the existence, growth and decline over time of these four forces are also well-substantiated.

In addition to that, these two chapters also demolish the whole separate development policy. Not only does Dr. Wilson provide facts to show that, if anything, the policy is working in reverse gear, that is increased economic integration is taking place, but he also hits on a fundamental contradiction of government policy. It is pursuing two directly opposing policies at present; a high economic growth rate on the one hand and separate development on the other. The pursuance of a high rate of economic growth has, as a direct result, increased demand for labour which draws labour from the Bantustans into the common economy in ever increasing numbers. Yet the stated policy of separate development is aimed at reducing - ultimately to halt and then to reverse - the flow of african labour to the cities.

Alternative Policy.

The alternative which Dr. Wilson suggests to the separate development policy for ending migrant labour is the acceptance of workers of all races in the cities as permanent, coupled with the right of workers to have their families with them at their place of work. Once the government takes this step Dr. Wilson outlines briefly the requirements to implement this decision. It involves the setting of a target date by which pass laws will be eliminated and a crash programme for building family accommodation. Dr. Wilson considers this plan to be feasible and within the limits of the country's resources.

Somehow this is the weakest point in an excellent book because Dr. Wilson's alternative begs the question. The real question is how to move the government and the white electorate to accept the permanence of african workers in the cities. Once that major step is achieved the argument is then only a matter of how best to phase out migrant labour.

Unfortunately Dr. Wilson does not suggest how the change in basic attitudes is to come about. Yet it may be that a solution to this is contained in his book. The answer possibly lies in first of all being clear about the relationship between cause and effect because migrant labour is both the cause and effect of african poverty in South Africa. It is important to realise that there exists

a two way relationship; on the one hand migrant labour causes rural poverty, urban low wages, unskilled jobs and the absence of bargaining power. On the other hand it is just as true that these factors plus rural over-population and unemployment cause migrant labour. As Dr. Wilson himself declares; "there is a symbiotic relationship between the colour-bar and migrant labour; for the existence of the colour-bar reinforces the pattern of oscillating migration whose existence, in turn, reduces the cost of the colour-bar". (p.156)

New Strategy.

A strategy for the elimination of migrant labour could therefore be to remove the causes of migrant labour so that it is no longer economically advantageous to the whites to make use of oscillating migrant labour. The economic causes of migrant labour are clearly set out in the economic analysis of the system. The major causes are the over-population, low productivity and poverty of the homelands; the industrial colour-bar, the low wages and the virtual total absence of social services for african workers in the industrial sectors; the political aim of whites to maintain white rule and prosperity which imply the denial of civil rights to urban africans and keeping their numbers in the cities down to a minimum; and the lack of bargaining power of migrant labourers both at their place of recruitment and at their place of work.

Such a strategy would therefore involve different people and groups at different places, all of which are working towards the common goal of eliminating migrant labour. Employers can promote migrants to do skilled and managerial jobs, undertake their training and provide adequate fringe benefits and social services; housewives can pay living wages to domestic servants; 'watchdog organisations' like the church and students, can put pressure on the government, private and public employers, and make whites aware of the evils of the migrant labour system; trade unions (White, Coloured and Asian) can devise means of promoting the economic advancement of migrant workers; and homeland leaders can consider ways in which they can provide their migrant labourers with bargaining power at their places of recruitment and work.

In spite of the criticisms levelled above Dr. Wilson has provided a vitally necessary study of migrant labour and made a major contribution towards the elimination of migrant labour which Professor Hobart Houghton has described as "an evil cancer at the heart of our whole society." (f)

f D. Hobart Houghton; "The South African Economy", p.95.

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