

GOVERNMENT CREATED POLITICAL BODIES

Bantustans

The period under review, 1975-76, saw the maturity of the South African policy of Bantustans with the Transkei making definite preparations to get over the last hurdle of Bantustan development—attainment of independence. With maturity there emerged some characteristics of the policy, some of which, although they had always been suspected by people opposed to the system, had, however, strictly remained in the back pocket of the men in the real driving seat—the South African Prime Minister, John Vorster, and his key men in the Bantu Affairs Department. Some of these characteristics have brought the whole system of ‘bantustanisation’ of the country into greater controversy than ever before.

Of these characteristics that came up foremost was the capability of the policy to declare all Africans on the Southern part of the African continent, commonly known as South Africa, foreigners who had no rights, even to a limited extent, to citizenship of the country. They could be declared citizens of some nebulous states created by the South African Parliament. The Government was putting into practical effect the story, which had always been regarded only with theoretical significance, that the 18-20 million (it is not possible to give an accurate figure) African population in South Africa was, according to South African legislation, entitled to thirteen percent of the total surface area of the country. The provisions of the new South African Status of

Transkei Act were seen by political observers as a precedent of similar provisions binding all future independent Bantustans.

In a move that was apparently intended to cajole urban Africans to take Bantustan citizenship, the South African Government announced towards the end of 1975, that Africans in the urban areas could have leasehold agreements lasting thirty years over their homes, on condition that they first accepted citizenship of a Bantustan. This was only one of a battery of regulations that would compel Africans to find it more convenient to take Bantustan citizenship. Other measures in operation were that: when the birth of an African child was registered in the common area of South Africa, it had to be identified with a Bantustan. African professional men and traders seeking facilities for their businesses in the common area had to first declare identification with a Bantustan.¹

Addressing the Swazi Territorial Authority in April 1976, the Minister of Bantu Administration, Mr M. C. Botha, said that Swazis who took Bantustan citizenship would enjoy privileges over non-Bantustanians in the common area in regard to housing, jobs and influx control. He was also reported to have said in Parliament that "Bantu persons who identify themselves with their own 'black nations' are much more welcome here in the white area than those who deny or hide their relationship with a 'black nation' of their own We must grant (them) more and more privileges". He said that preference should be given to them in available jobs, housing, having dependents with them, freedom of movement, hospitalisation, transport, schools, sport, etc.

In the past, Section 10 of the Bantu (Urban Areas) Consolidation Act No. 25 of 1945 was used to regulate the right of Africans to remain in urban areas. Qualification in terms of this Act would render such Africans entitled to all urban privileges. In this case the Minister actually said that Bantustan citizenship would be more important than Section 10.

As could have been expected, the Government plan to bantustanise all Africans in the country met with strong opposition from political movements like the BPC. It was however, more significant when it proved unpopular even with Bantustan leaders themselves, who were otherwise known to agree with government decrees without question. The Qwaqwa Chief Minister, Kenneth Mopeli, saw the move as intending to deprive urban Africans of their birth rights in urban areas. The Gazankulu Chief Minister, Hudson Ntswanisi, said: "South Africa belongs to Blacks and Whites—and therefore Blacks should not be considered as sojourners in towns and cities. They must be accepted as permanent and cannot be expelled from these areas." The chairman of the government created Soweto Urban Bantu Council, Mr T. Makhaya, said, "The people feel if they take out homeland citizenship

they will be sent back to the homelands. These are the suspicions of the people. If it comes to citizenship, we want to be South African citizens.”

This issue became a point of open conflict between the South African and Transkeian Governments, where the Transkei was refusing to accept Xhosa speaking Africans in South African metropolitan areas as Transkeian citizens. This came to a point where it appeared that after 26 October, Transkei Independence day, there would be thousands of stateless Africans in South Africa. Mr M. C. Botha, the Bantu Administration Minister, warned that if a Bantustan refused to grant citizenship to “its own people living in the Republic” after independence “the government of the Republic will be forced to consider very seriously whether people from such a homeland are welcome in our country.”²

Commenting on the minister’s statement and the whole citizenship imbroglio, a columnist in the Johannesburg weekly magazine, *The Financial Mail*, said: “Ominous words. The mind boggles at a policy which grants privileges to people born and bred in a country only if they are willing to make themselves foreigners.” The Secretary General of the Black People’s Convention, Mr Thandisizwe Mazibuko, in a statement urging rejection of Transkei independence, said that the South African Government wanted to sweep South Africa clean of all Africans who would, in terms of their language affiliations, be locked up in small dots called independent homelands. “Having declared all 18 million Africans non-citizens of South Africa in terms of the independent homelands policy, the four million Whites, who are more than the so-called Coloureds plus Indians, will claim to have majority rule in the country,” he said.

There were indications that the independence idea was progressively influencing more Bantustan leaders, as the Chief Minister of Bophuthatswana, Chief Lucas Mangope, announced plans to prepare for independence for his territory towards the end of 1975. In a surprise statement in his policy speech at the Lebowa Legislative Assembly in April 1976, the Chief Minister of Lebowa, Dr Cedric Phathudi, asked the Assembly to review their long standing objection to sovereign independence for the territory. He referred to the question of independence as “vital”³ in contrast to what he had always said in rejection of independence. A further discussion of attitudes of Bantustan leadership towards independence will follow, under the discussions of the various Bantustans.

The Bantustans themselves, however, remained under heavy fire from various angles of the Black community. In the forefront of opposition was the Black People’s Convention which, in its congress held in December 1975 issued a document describing Bantustans as bodies which “were created to divert the energy of Blacks from the

true struggle for national liberation to racialist, tribalist and divisive political undertakings which at best keep the total liberation out of the immediate attention of Blacks, and at worst serve to bolster the white racist regime of those who created them".⁴

The document pointed out that Bantustans were designed to "cheat the black man into participation in his oppression and to hoodwink the international community into accepting the racist policy of the white regime as a sincere programme designed in the interests of Blacks."⁵ Black People's Convention further dismissed the Bantustans, along with the other government institutions like the Coloured Person's Representative and the South African Indian Councils, as "built-in safety valves in the balloon of black frustration, through which the steam is let out so that the balloon should not explode in the face of the oppressor."⁶

Nevertheless, the Government went on with its programme of purchasing land through the South African Bantu Trust, to consolidate the Bantustans into closer knit units, although the Transkei was the only one which could successfully be brought down to a single unit. The Minister of Bantu Administration and Development, Mr M. C. Botha, revealed in Parliament on 20 February, 1976, that the amount of money spent by the South African Bantu Trust in acquiring land since 1 January 1949 to date totalled R201 156 174.⁷ During the 1975/76 financial year, a total of R57,6 million was spent on purchasing land.⁸

However, the future of the consolidation process was uncertain because of reported lack of funds for the continued pursuance of the scheme. In January 1976, there were reports that official sources had privately admitted that although land deals already negotiated for consolidation were trickling through to government offices, the programme would be stymied. But a report said, "Government sources are defensive about the future prospects for the consolidation programme and speculate about a possible rise in the gold price, which would make funds available again, or exports of other minerals to replace gold as an exchange earner."⁹ It appeared at the time, that the greatest threat to Bantustan consolidation programme was the possibility of the South African military involvement in Angola escalating into full-scale conflict.¹⁰ The Minister of Bantu Administration and Development further disclosed that, of the total quota of land to be purchased for African occupation in terms of the Bantu Trust and Land Act of 1936, there still remained 414 900 hectares in the Transvaal, 29 200 hectares in Natal, 7 100 hectares in the Orange Free State and 471 400 hectares in the Cape Province, to be purchased.¹¹ The total quota to be released would make up +13 percent (158 674.2 sq. km) of the total surface area of South Africa (1 220 571 sq. km).

A number of people who were sceptical of Bantustan development to independence stage believed that the Bantustans would never achieve

economic viability. There was however, a good number of those who felt that if the Government could be made aware of what could be done, it would improve the economic situation of the Bantustans. The latter lot held the view that Government would use all available means to assist the African to full economic and political independence. The chief economist of the Federated Chamber of Industries, Mr A. Hammond Tooke, speaking in Port Elizabeth in April 1976, said that a total of R26 million would have to be spent to make all the South African Bantustans economically viable by the year 2 000. He said that the figure had been based on 1974 costing.

To date, the gross national incomes of all the South African Bantustans have relied heavily on the sale of labour to metropolitan South Africa, with the wages so acquired making up to over 90 percent of the national income of almost all of them. Other economic activities with considerable contribution to the total incomes of the territories are Agriculture, Forestry and Mining. Industry, which is piloted mainly by Government backed corporations like Bantu Investment Corporation (BIC) and Xhosa Development Corporation (XDC), is painfully cropping up in the prescribed 'growth points' of all the Bantustans. In reply to a question in Parliament on the 16 February, 1976 the Minister of Bantu Administration and Development disclosed the following figures reflecting the extent of afforestation and commercial agriculture in the Bantustans: A total of 225 609 hectares of the whole land making up Bantustans was covered with indigenous forest, 94 503 hectares was covered with commercial plantations and 25 853 hectares with non-commercial woodlots, 18 392 hectares had been planted with resilient fibres, and 14 349 hectares with sugar cane. Coffee took up 379 hectares, tea 1858, macadamia nuts 12, pecan nuts 5, coconut 940, cashew nuts 24 and citrus 3 148 hectares.¹² These figures were given as at 31 December 1975.

The Minister further revealed on 19 February, that a total of three mineral prospecting leases were held by white persons operating in Bantustans, 123 by white-controlled companies and 97 by African persons or companies. Seventy white-controlled companies actually had mining leases and two African persons or companies also, but there were no white individuals who had any.¹³ It should be noted, however, that any considerably serious mining was all in the hands of Whites. These African persons or companies with prospecting or mining leases were only involved in simple matters like sand digging. The Minister told Parliament that during 1975 an amount of R246 578 had been paid to the Government-backed Bantu Mining Corporation, which received it on behalf of the South African Bantu Trust, from royalties, prospecting or other fees connected with mining and quarrying in Bantustans. R40 963 was paid to Government established corporations like BIC.

No particulars were available of revenue which could have accrued to Bantustan Governments or authorities, African tribes or individual Africans.¹⁴ The following mining or quarrying operations had been established by the Bantu Mining Corporation in the Bantustans. Crushergiyani (Gazankulu), mining of betonite, andalusite, travertine, limestone, sodalite, stone, etc., in Lebowa, Bophuthatswana, Kwa-Zulu and Kaokoland; extraction of sand in Bophuthatswana, Kwa-Zulu, Gazankulu and Lebowa. The BMC was further providing financial and technical assistance to two entrepreneurs (believed White) in Kaokoland, as well as to certain African entrepreneurs extracting sand from the Ilovo river in Kwa-Zulu.¹⁵

The following figures were given with respect to the extent of mining in the Bantustans:¹⁶

	NO. OF MINING CONCERNS	NO. OF EMPLOYEES	
		WHITES	BLACKS
Bophuthatswana	30	4 023	58 845
Gazankulu	4	7	103
Kwa-Zulu	12	10	60
Lebowa	17	460	10 293
Venda	3	39	425

Below we give the value of mineral production in Bantustans in 1974 and 1975.¹⁷

	1974	1975
Bophuthatswana	R12 931 242	R18 949 145
Gazankulu	534 007	580 410
Kwa-Zulu	687 080	1 487 513
Lebowa	19 258 032	47 215 467
Venda	16 629	14 776

The Bantu Development Minister revealed the figures in regard to amounts of money spent on the development of growth points.¹⁸ These figures are shown in the table on page 7.

The following amounts were spent at the following growth points on the erection of factories for leasing to entrepreneurs:¹⁹

Babelegi	R16 691 514	Letaba	R 1 370 299
Witsieshoek	138 281	Butterworth	10 711 841
Isithebe	5 013 145	Umtata	1 336 936
Seshego	2 411 468		

A total of 883 Whites, 146 Coloureds and 24 025 Africans were employed in manufacturing undertakings in the Bantustans.²⁰

Most development of commerce and industry in the Bantustans has always been the major responsibility of corporations like the BIC and the XDC. The first one of these was the BIC, which was established in 1959 "to promote and encourage industrial and other concerns among Bantu persons in the Bantu territories and to act as a development, financial and investment institution and to provide for other incidental matters."²¹ The XDC was established in terms of Act No. 86 of 1965, to promote the economic development of the Transkei and Ciskei specifically, as opposed to the general nature of BIC operations. In the past years there has been a further breakdown of the administrations

	<i>Central Government</i>	<i>Transkei Government</i>	<i>Bophuthatswana</i>	<i>Qwaqwa</i>	<i>Babelegi</i>	<i>Witsieshoek</i>	<i>Isithebe</i>
	R	R	R	R	R	R	R
(a) Industrial townships	—	—	1 923 525	221 730	670 096	—	3 474 929
(b) Water schemes	—	Butterworth 4 828 000	196 032	55 170	377 298	—	128 190
(c) Electricity supplies	—	Umtata 113 000	44 826	29 256	17 811	3 800	838 713
(d) Housing for key white personnel	—	—	—	—	—	42 400	—
(e) Subsidisation of (d)	1 396	—	—	—	—	—	—

	<i>BIC Letabo</i>	<i>XDC Butterworth</i>	<i>Umtata</i>	<i>Other agencies</i>	<i>Seshego</i>
	R	R	R	R	R
(a) Industrial townships	54 583	2 235 217	339 250	—	160 539
(b) Water schemes	—	243 110	58 492	—	60 289
(c) Electricity supplies	—	544 723	34 967	—	—
(d) Housing for key white personnel	—	8 135 295	5 581 387	Babe'eg 1 659 295 Isithebe 1 183 817 Seshego 481 609 Letaba 87 545	—
(e) Subsidisation of (d)	—	—	—	—	—

and work of these corporations with the effect that each one of the following Bantustans had their own corporations with some Africans included on their Boards of Directors : Bophuthatswana, Venda, Gazankulu and Qwaqwa.²² The XDC was also broken down with the subsequent formation of the Transkei Development Corporation and the Ciskei National Development Corporation.

These corporations have largely been responsible, in collaboration with the Bantustan Governments, for the invitation of industrialists and businessmen to invest in the Bantustans. While these government bodies were engaged in encouraging local South African industries to decentralise into the homelands, several sorties were made to European and American countries to attract foreign investment. The major deterrent to Bantustan investment on the part of companies considering setting up business in these areas, politics aside, has been the prospect of being forced to sell to local interests within a fixed period of 25-30 years. This limit had been introduced in consideration of the length of time that the BIC could reasonably accept responsibility for any investment through the agency system through which it would base the land from Bantustan authority and erect the buildings required by the investor. Indications were that this limit policy could generally be relaxed as the Bantustans began to experience difficulties arising from industry's cold feet about investment. The Government has in fact been encouraging them to set up their own terms for investment in their territories. The Prime Minister, Mr B. J. Vorster, had announced as early as 1974, that Bantustan authorities had to decide for themselves the conditions they were prepared to offer investors. The Chief Minister of Bophuthatswana, Chief Lucas Mangope, became the first Bantustan leader to relax the fixed period policy.

The Minister of Bantu Development gave the following figures of financial commitments of white entrepreneurs with whom contractual agreements had been concluded in regard to the establishment of industries on an agency basis at the growth points of the Bantustans:

Umtata	R 872 000	Isithebe	R 9 500 000
Butterworth	11 904 000	Seshego	3 800 000
Babelegi	35 400 000	Letaba	300 000

These figures were revealed on 16 February, 1976.

According to a news release issued in April 1976 by the Department of Statistics in Pretoria, the net national income of all nine Bantustans in South Africa had amounted to R1 552 800 000 in 1973-74 an increase of 64 percent over the previous three years. The report stated that for several reasons, meaningful comparisons between the per capita incomes for the Bantustans and those of other developing countries were not possible. "The most important reason is that there are appreciable institutional differences between the homelands and

other developing countries. It is generally accepted that income figures for countries with dissimilar economic systems are less comparable than for countries with similar economic systems".²³

Among the differences were the relationship of the Bantustans to the rest of the Republic of South Africa, "especially in the considerable assistance" granted by the central government to the Bantustan governments. This expenditure had an important influence on the economics of the Bantustans. The report said that a total amount of R239 700 000 had been transferred to all nine Bantustans in 1973-74, compared with R174 900 000 in 1970-71. The expenditure had made it possible to provide services such as education, housing and health in the Bantustans. These amounts did not include funds which the South African government gave to development corporations for investment.²⁴

In a statement issued in March, 1976, the BIC expressed hopes to increase its industrialisation programme for Bantustans from R24 million in the 1976-77 financial year to about R40 million. The programme, the statement added, had already created 14 000 jobs for Bantustan residents, and that the 1976-77 investment was expected to create 8 500 to 10 000 jobs. Speaking at an investment seminar in London, the managing director of the BIC, Dr Johannes Adendorff, urged industrialists to invest in the Bantustans because without foreign investment, South Africa would not be able to create sufficient jobs for its rising African population.

He described "profitable investment opportunities second to none", and he listed some of the incentives offered to companies investing in Bantustans. These included:

- Financial aid to 100 percent of the value of the land and buildings on the site selected in the Bantustan;
- Income tax concessions for 10 years;
- Adequate labour—the level of education among the Bantu people of South Africa is the highest on the continent, and approximately 80 percent of the population can read and write.²⁵

These advantages apart, Dr Adendorff said, there were two others in South Africa's politically stable and strong government, and guarantees by the South African government against any losses which industrialists might suffer "as a result of any other government action".

The Natal regional director of the BIC, Mr M. J. Olivier, addressing a youth congress of the South Africa Bureau for Racial Affairs in July 1975, said that the development of social snobbery among Africans was an essential prerequisite for the successful development of the Bantustans.²⁶ He said that the BIC was being criticised for establishing luxury facilities like three star hotels and beauty salons in the Bantustans, but in his view, these could be more effective stimulants to development than the building of factories. They could create a social snobbery

and stimulate an urgent desire among underdeveloped people to improve themselves without which development would simply be for the Black, and not by him.²⁷

Evidence of the snobbery which Mr Olivier had referred to was abundant among many Bantustan middle class citizens. This snobbery was reported to swallow up most of the professional people, as well as civil servants, who increasingly saw themselves as superior to the ordinary peasants because of their matriculation education. There developed in the minds of most educated people what a Transkei social worker called "bigmanship" which would "result in dangerous polarisation between the literates and the illiterates."

Transkei

Land Claims and Consolidation

Transkei, the largest of South Africa's homelands, has always persisted in its claims for more land to be ceded to it despite the assertions by the Minister of Bantu Administration and Development (BAD), Mr M. C. Botha, that nothing more than quotas outlined in the 1926 Land Act would be given to any homeland. In this long standing battle for land, the Transkei could be said to have gained a few victories. Two districts, Glen Grey and Herschel were incorporated into the territory early in the second half of 1975. The Transkei won a further victory when in November 1975, the proclamation was published in the Government Gazette that Port St. Johns, the disputed little town in the Transkei "wild coast", had been added to the zoned areas of the Transkei. However, the Chief Minister of the Transkei, declared that the Government's consolidation plan could not be considered as final "for in terms of the historical boundaries of the Transkei, Mt. Currie, Matatiele, Cedarville, Maclear and Elliot are part of the Transkei",²⁸ he said. "We hope that White South Africa has taken note of these insistent claims and should in future make a final demarcation of the Transkei boundary." The call by the Transkei leader was later backed by the Transkei Legislative Assembly when, in April 1976, it demanded that the Transkei border be extended to the Umzimkhulu river in Natal. Main towns that would be affected by the claim were Kokstad (Mount Currie), Matatiele, Harding, Port Edward, Margate and Port Shepstone.²⁹

Speaking at Lady Frere in June 1976 Chief Matanzima was quoted to have claimed Queenstown as part of the land belonging to the Transkei as well. "We shall get Queenstown and it will eventually become the

capital of the Transkei," he is reported to have said.³⁰ However, subsequent reports bore a denial of the accuracy of this claim by the Chief Minister. In his denial the Chief confirmed that he still believed that the Queenstown district should be part of the Transkei, but that he had no ambition of making Queenstown the capital. Umtata was the capital of the Transkei and would remain so. Of the areas that were declared in favour of the Transkei, Port St. Johns became an issue of great controversy as a result of a high feeling of insecurity amongst its white community. For many years, Port St. Johns' 400 Whites had struggled against the idea of the town being incorporated into the Transkei. In a statement issued in Pretoria, the Minister of Bantu Administration, Mr M. C. Botha, said that whites living in Port St. Johns would be subject to the same arrangements applicable to whites in the rest of the Transkei.³¹ These included Government guarantees to buy white-owned properties and to pay compensation to businessmen if they could prove that they had suffered loss as a result of the Transkei becoming independent.³²

As was mentioned earlier in this section, the Transkei did not consider the land consolidation issue as having been finalised. More claims could be expected even after independence. Room was left for such claims in the Transkei draft constitution which mentioned that the territory was to consist of the twenty-eight districts as well as such other land as might be added thereto. On the question of amalgamation with the Ciskei there was less activity on the part of the Transkei itself. The Ciskei side of the story is outlined in the section on Ciskei below. It would seem however that the Chief Minister of the Transkei had a better idea of how the matter would be resolved. This came out in his answer to a question on this issue in April 1976. "There may well be no Ciskei after independence. You wait and see," said the Chief.

Independence

The proposed independence for the Transkei, with effect from 26 October 1976, made the Bantustan the busiest in the country for the whole of the past year; especially in the latter part of the period under review; as the independence issue was becoming less and less remote. Preparations ranged from diplomatic offensive in the international scene to local village political campaigning; construction of roads, border posts, aircraft station, huge governmental buildings and mammoth hotels of sizes never known in the Transkei before. A small battalion which would make the nucleus of a future Transkei army was given training and its bases and barracks developed. A constitution which would form the foundation of the new state was also battered into shape. Below we make a survey of a number of the preparatory developments in the Transkei.

On 4 August 1975, the first batch of 87 recruits for the Transkei army left Umtata for training in the Republic of South Africa. The second military advisor to the Transkei Government, Brigadier Philip Pretorious, disclosed that the men would go for basic training at Ysterplaat in the Western Cape for about four months. He said the Transkei army would initially consist of an infantry battalion, composed of a ceremonial company, a rifle company, and a headquarters company. The ceremonial company would consist of a guard of honour of a hundred men, and a brass band of thirty-one. The rifle company would consist of a mounted platoon of thirty-two horsemen and an ordinary infantry platoon also of thirty-two.³³ The first campaign yielded a total of about 100 recruits altogether. However, this number dwindled to about 72. Another campaign would be embarked on by January 1976 and the last campaign was due in April.

The Chief Minister of the Transkei announced in the Transkei Legislative Assembly in April 1976, that his government would introduce conscription for a citizen force army. He said that a Defence Bill being drafted would make provision for both a permanent force and for civilian national service. All male citizens between the ages of 18 and 60 would be liable to undergo military training. The number to be called up each year and the length of their training would be determined by the Minister of Defence, said the Chief Minister indicating with his finger that he would be looking after that portfolio himself when independence came.³⁴

The military base worth +R5 million was underway, about fifteen kilometres outside Umtata and it was described as one of the most modern and practical in South Africa.³⁵ Within five kilometres from the military base a R3 500 000 international airport was to be developed. A Natal construction company (Fowler Construction) had been awarded R1,33 million contract to build the first stage of the airport, which consisted of a two kilometre permanent surface runway, a grass runway and security fencing on a 500 hectares site plus 10 kilometres on the western side of the capital. Also included in the first stage would be the airport building and the control tower. At a later stage the Transkei Government would expand the airport to accommodate 737, 707 and possibly Jumbo jets.³⁶

Two border posts at Kei river in the south and Umzimkhulu river in the north were in construction, costing a total of +R866,000. More border posts on the Western side were being considered. A programme of renovating Transkei major roads was in operation, most of them to be finished with tarmac. An international sports stadium worth about R3 million with a sheltered capacity of 50 000 as well as a swimming pool and tennis courts was to be ready for independence. While the bulk of

the money for the stadium was offered by Anglo American Corporation and the Chamber of mines, R40 000 had already come from the XDC. It was reported that the XDC money had accrued from the profits of the unpopular Jabulani beer sales. Receiving the cheque for the money Chief Matanzima said that Transkeians would be thrilled to see what the profits of Jabulani beer had done for them, and would retract opposition to the sale of the beer in the Bantustan.³⁷

New official buildings were underway as well. A twin tower government office block was built in Umtata costing about R13 670 000. A fully equipped communication centre would be established on the ground floor of the building to be available to journalists visiting the Transkei for the independence celebrations. The centre would house a telex room, a picture transmission service and a workroom, with telephones for local, trunk and overseas calls. All the operators for the telex service would be drafted from the Republic of South Africa, and the expected team of twenty men would arrive in Umtata at the beginning of October to ensure that all was in order before the date of independence.³⁸ A new Umtata post office complex at a cost of R450 000 with automatic exchange was virtually ready for use by the end of 1975. A 120 room double storey hotel for the Holiday Inn's group costing about R1,4 million was being constructed at a fast pace to meet the deadline of October 1975, on which date it is due to be completed. All the rooms had already been booked by the Transkei to accommodate dignitaries expected to visit the Umtata independence celebrations. The hotel would also have a banqueting hall to set about 200 people, several dining rooms, a restaurant seating 150 people and a swimming pool. The banquet hall would be convertible to a conference hall seating 240 people.

Five new cabinet residences were under construction at a cost of R316 800 each, in addition to the existing seven residences. An official residence of the future president of the Transkei was also under construction just outside the built-up area of Umtata. The residence, which was estimated at a cost of R1 639 000, would include the president's dwelling quarters, aide-de-camps' quarters, housekeepers' quarters, guest accommodation, living rooms including a banqueting hall, kitchens, a wine cellar, laundry, conveniences, secretarial block including two floors of offices, with additions like a basement with garages, stores, transformer and generator rooms and telephone exchange, servants quarters and guards quarters.³⁹ It was believed that the super deluxe palace of the Transkei head of state, which would feature an enormous banqueting hall with a push button controlled sliding roof, would be the most expensive and opulent private residence yet built in South Africa.

The task of preparing the Transkei for independence had to involve the development of a basic team of trained diplomatic personnel who

would undertake the job of selling and defending the sovereignty. A number of selected men were given some short term training at the South African Department of Foreign Affairs in Pretoria from July 1975. The cadets were later sent for a year's training at the South African Embassies in Washington, New York, London, Bonn and Paris. Some were trained for diplomatic posts while others were trained as information officers. The trainees included Professor Mlahleni Njisane, South Africa born former University Professor in the USA who had taken American citizenship, Mr Qaba, former official of the Ciskei Education Department, Messrs Lila and Socikwa, former Methodist priests who had left the church to work full time for the South African Bureau of State Security (BOSS) and Mr Tsepo Letlaka, former member of the Pan Africanist Congress of South Africa, who was a political exile in London until he became the first such exile to return to South Africa on the assurance of South African Premier John Vorster. Mr Vorster had guaranteed that applications from exiled Blacks to return to the country would be considered. Another cadet who joined the team a little later was Mr Ashton Dunjwa, former Urban Representative of the Ciskeian Government in Cape Town. Mr Dunjwa was also president of the South Africa African Cricket Board when he left for training. He was due to return to Transkei as the territory's senior Information Officer.

The biggest task facing Transkeian and South African Government officials during the time running up to independence, perhaps much more for Transkeian officials after independence, was that of convincing the world community to recognise the Transkei as an independent sovereign state alongside other countries in the world. In January 1976, the South African Department of Information announced a programme to launch a major publicity drive to project the Transkei to the world before and after its independence. The Secretary for Information, Dr Eschel Rhoodie, said that the Department would produce a series of publications dealing with aspects of the Transkei as well as a film of the territory during the year. The publications would be distributed in South and North America, Europe and Australia and the film would be seen in South Africa as well.⁴⁰ The Department would also invite a number of foreign journalists and television teams to South Africa during the year to report on what was going on in the Transkei before and after independence. Dr Rhoodie said that other new efforts would be made to advertise the Transkei and that it was probable that the Department would repeat its very successful series comparing the Transkei with other independent territories which had membership of the UN.

The series compared the Transkei with other countries in terms of

its history in obtaining independence, size, population, government budget and other aspects. "The idea as far as we are concerned is just to make the Transkei known to the world as it becomes independent and to show opinion formers, decision-makers, the media, businessmen and academics, what the Transkei is like," Dr Rhodie said.⁴¹ It was later revealed by the Minister of Information, Dr Connie Mulder, that an amount of R1 million would be used on the publicity programme.

In addition to the programme of inviting foreigners into the country, including some parliamentarians from Western Countries, Transkei leaders, especially the two Matanzima brothers, engaged in extensive tours abroad for the purpose of securing both diplomatic friends and foreign investments for the Transkei. Leaders of some independent African countries also had their own contributions to the Transkei diplomatic lobbying. One such leader was Ivory Coast President, Felix Houphouët Boigny, who suggested that Chief Kaizer Matanzima should visit all African leaders personally or through a closer representative to give his side of the independence issue. It was expected that the Chief Minister would send his Foreign Minister designate, Chief George Matanzima, to tour Africa as he himself was too busy preparing for independence.

The results of a Matanzima Africa tour would probably have a very significant effect on the rest of the world community. Observers all over the world, including white South Africans, were generally agreed that member states of the Organization of African Unity and their attitude to an independent Transkei would have a decisive role as regards recognition or non-recognition by the international community. In October 1975, the United Nations' General Assembly Special Political Committee passed a resolution condemning the establishment of Bantustans and called on member states not to recognise them. The resolution described the homelands policy as a technique of consolidating apartheid and perpetuating minority rule. The decision which was almost certain to be approved by the plenary body would effectively bar the accepting of any Bantustan to United Nations membership after independence. However, eight western nations abstained from voting.⁴²

However, a survey of attitudes at the United Nations revealed that diplomats, including Western, would be heavily influenced by black Africa stance. Britain's Deputy Foreign Secretary, Mr David Annals, had made it clear that Britain would not recognise the Transkei. West German Government's attitude would depend largely on the stand taken by the OAU and Germany's European Economic Community (EEC) partners. France's position remained in the dark, especially after the controversial French nuclear deal with South African regime. A West German political scientist, Dr K. Van der Ropp, addressing a symposium organised by the Foreign Affairs Association (of South Africa) in April

1976, said that West Germany would hesitate for a long time before it decided to support the economic development of the Transkei through financial contributors and the sending of experts, as the Transkei was a product of apartheid, a political order sharply condemned by West Germany. "The quality of our relations with many countries, especially in Black Africa, is threatened by our relations with Pretoria, many people in West Germany fear a further deterioration if such diplomatic recognition is given to the homelands", Dr Van der Ropp said. To be recognised as an independent state, the Transkei would first have to coin diplomatic recognition in Africa.

The Foreign Minister's conference of the OAU, which met at Port Louis in Mauritius towards the end of June 1976, gave a clear indication of black African feelings on the Transkei independence issue. A resolution was passed recommending that all member states of the OAU be bound not to recognise the Transkei as a sovereign state after independence. Meanwhile back at home tensions were building up within the black community inside South Africa. Over and above general objection to Matanzima's independence Bill for the Transkei, the situation was compounded by implications of some constitutional provisions especially in regard to the citizenship clause, which shall be dealt with below.

Inside the Transkei itself a significant development occurred when the traditional leader of the Opposition Democratic Party, Mr Knowledge Guzana, was ousted by a much younger and relatively new H. B. Ncokazi with a clear majority of 44 votes to 14. Ncokazi's ticket was hinged on strong rejection of Transkei independence, whereas while Guzana was not in favour of independence, he, however, took a compromise line and participated in the constitutional advisory committee. The new leader appealed to the nations of the world not to recognise the independence of the Transkei, because recognition would give Mr Vorster and his Transkei "puppets" a certificate of respectability they did not deserve. He appealed "on behalf of millions of black people" who would be hard hit by independence, to all people of South Africa, Black and White, who were against the segmentation of the country to throw in their lot with them to fight independence.⁴³ Mr Ncokazi, who called for a boycott of all independence celebrations, demanded a referendum in the Transkei on the independence issue. He said that the pre-independence general election that Chief Matanzima spoke of could not reflect the true feelings of the people on independence because during elections people voted for candidates and not independence. He said the majority of people were illiterate and therefore did not distinguish between individuals and policy. They were being influenced by the chiefs to vote for the Governing party. His claim on the influence of chiefs was supported by a Guzana statement which

said that the chiefs, with their control over the allocation of land, pensions and disability grants, had a stranglehold on political thinking and emasculated any tribesman of independent mind. In a paper on Transkei independence written for a book in a series of Black Viewpoint publications by Black Community Programmes, Ncokazi stated the following points as reason for the Transkei people rejecting independence:

- (i) Their forefathers and brothers died during the two World Wars defending South Africa against foreign invaders, as a result of that, their relatives are orphans and some are widows because their fathers and husbands died in the wars. They want to be compensated by granting of full human rights to all their brothers in an undivided South Africa.
- (ii) The people of the Transkei, who are so shabbily and callously ill-treated by the South African socio-political system, are the self-same people who have built the South African economy which the government boasts of abroad. They have suffered most as a result of the mine disasters that have riddled this country in the past. They now want the fruits of their labours and compensation, by granting of human rights, for their sufferings.
- (iii) They want to fight hand in hand with their black brothers for their total liberation from the thraldom of white domination and top-doggism in South Africa.
- (iv) They feel that, with the retention of the Suppression of Communism Act, Terrorism Act, Immorality Act and Proclamation R400, they will live in the shadows of death and detention without trial under the charge of Transkei rulers who are moral lepers, and they will be subjected to humiliation and ridicule among their fellow South Africans.
- (v) They feel that this independence is being imposed upon them by white racists in pursuit of a policy that has been reducing them to cringing beggars in their own country.
- (vi) They feel that only educated people will benefit from this independence. The ordinary masses who are in the lowest strata of society will continue living below the margin of subsistence.
- (vii) They feel that this will be pseudo-independence because the constitution has been drafted by the Republican Government through the instrumentality of the seconded officers.
- (viii) They also feel, and most of the civil servants agree with them, that in government service, promotion does not depend on merit. Instead only the blue-eyed boys of the seconded officers and loyal supporters and sympathisers of the ruling party are

given preference, and they feel things will be worse after independence.

- (ix) They feel that the election machinery has always been geared to favour the ruling party and the whole system undemocratic.
 - (a) Polling officers are government servants.
 - (b) Senior polling officers are senior officers of the government.
 - (c) Chief polling officers are magistrates who are white seconded officials.
 - (d) The chief electoral officer is a seconded officer in the Department of Interior. His word is final: e.g. in the Engcobo by-election in 1975 the Urban areas' votes were not included. This was ascertained by the candidates themselves who were present when counting took place. They were aware of what they had got from local votes, but to their amazement, only local results were announced, and nothing was said of urban votes. On enquiring from the Chief Electoral Officer the candidates never got satisfaction. The procedure is that, after counting all the votes for the candidates the Magistrate sends the total figure to the Chief Electoral Officer who is in the Department of Interior in Umtata. The latter adds all the votes from the Urban Areas to these figures, thereby getting the total votes for each candidate.
- (x) They feel this independence is a "Matanzima Affair" because only the Matanzima brothers are often called to Pretoria behind every body else's backs to iron out certain constitutional differences with the Republican Government.

At the same time in the broader South African situation, the voice of the Black People's Convention (BPC) through its Secretary General, Mr Thandisizwe Mazibuko, called for complete rejection of Transkeian independence. The BPC dismissed Transkei independence as a plan by the white minority to carry the Bantustan policy to its logical conclusion, to make it acceptable to the world. Mr Mazibuko, who urged Blacks not to be blackmailed into acceptance of segmentation of their country, said, "The whole Bantustan system was conceived for perpetual domination of Blacks by White supremacy, as well as to make Africans foreigners in the country of their birth." He said that for many years, South Africa had found itself criticised and isolated for its apartheid policy. "By declaring these Bantustans independent, South Africa hopes not to be questioned on its policy, as the said Africans would now be coming from independent states, thereby having no right in the common area of South Africa."⁴⁴

The National President of the Black People's Convention, Mr Kenneth Hlaku Rachidi, talking to *Black Review* in a special interview, rejected the claim that Africans resident in the Transkei had a right to voice their opinion through a referendum on whether or not the Transkei could accept independence. He said, "The Transkei is an integral part of this country South Africa. We have repeatedly explained that South Africa is one unitary indivisible state, and that the people of South Africa as a whole should decide on the destiny of any bit of this country. The twisted logic that people living in the geographical area between the Kei and the Umzimkhulu rivers, commonly known as the Transkei, could secede at the instigation of the white minority regime, implies that any day one can wake up to hear that the city of Johannesburg or Cape Town has decided to be no longer a part of South Africa but that of Holland or France." Evidently shaken by the thought of Transkei independence the President intimated that the majority of the people of South Africa, would make means to express their opinion on the matter if only for the record.

The Chief Minister of the Transkei himself rejected the call for a referendum on the grounds that the Transkei government did not have money to waste. He claimed that a referendum had already been held in the Transkei. The referendum Chief Matanzima was referring to, took the form of tribal meetings of all the Transkei tribes constituting the 132 tribal authorities in the territory, as well as meetings of Transkei associations. The question of independence was fully aired at those meetings and discussed by "people who know" who were invited to submit resolutions on independence, the Chief said.⁴⁵ The former opposition leader, Mr Knowledge Guzana, commenting on Chief Matanzima's claim, said that he had seen the results of some of the returns from the mini referendum. He said that some tribal authorities had returned a majority of 10 000 for independence—a fanciful figure, said Mr Guzana, only possible if all men, women, children and all stock (cattle, sheep, goats and horses) in the area were counted.⁴⁶

Constitutional Developments

Implications of the independence of the Transkei, constitutionally speaking, in terms of the South African homelands development plan would suggest that the Transkei was to graduate to the last phase of the programme. Phase one was the first stage where executive authority in any Bantustan would be in the hands of a non-elected executive council under the leadership of a chief executive councillor and a handful of councillors in charge of various divisions of government. When the Bantustan developed to phase two, the title councillor would be replaced by cabinet minister, under the leadership of a Chief Minister

instead of a Chief Executive Councillor. From this stage the Bantustan could leap to the third phase and take independence. The Transkei had, therefore, arrived at the friction of the programme.

A draft constitution which had been prepared by a special committee of experts in Pretoria with the sanction of the Transkei government was tabled in the 1976 session of the Transkei Legislative Assembly which opened in March. The draft constitution provided amongst other things for the Transkei being an independent republic with a non-executive president as head of state when it became independent in October. The President would be vested with a variety of powers ranging from assenting to Bills, to declaring war if the need arose. He would act on the advice of an executive made up of 15 Ministers of State. The President would be elected at a meeting of a National Assembly, an executive body consisting of 75 Chiefs and 75 elected members, which would sit as an electoral college under the Chairmanship of the Chief Justice or another judge. His term of office would be seven years and he would not be eligible for re-election unless the National Assembly decides otherwise. Judicial powers were to be vested in the Supreme Court, as well as existing lower courts, headed by a Chief Justice. Appeals against decisions by the Transkei Supreme Court would go before the Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of South Africa. Xhosa would be the official language but Sesotho, English and Afrikaans could also be used.

The most contentious clause of the draft constitution was 57(a) which provided that all persons who were citizens of the present Transkei would automatically become citizens of an independent Transkei. The amendment to the draft constitution passed by the Transkei Legislative Assembly provided that borderline cases—people whose ethnic status was open to doubt such as an offspring of a Xhosa mother and a non-Xhosa father—would be subject to consideration by some kind of ethnic classification board.

Based on the provisions of the draft constitution, the Status of the Transkei Bill was introduced by the Minister of BAD, Mr M. C. Botha, in the South African Parliament in May 1976. Clause 6 of the Constitution which dealt with citizenship became the hot issue of the day when the Minister made public his interpretation of the Clause to suggest that Transkei citizenship would automatically be conferred on all Africans of Transkei origin and those who had traceable with this origin territory, including those who permanently lived in the common area of the Republic of South Africa. The Matanzimas of the Transkei publicly opposed this interpretation and insisted that Xhosa speaking people who lived in South Africa would have an option of accepting or rejecting Transkei citizenship. The South Africa Minister, Mr John Vorster, had said on the occasion of his 60th birthday in December 1975 "As far as

we are concerned, all Black (African) people are citizens of one and other homeland. Citizens who happen to live in this country are still citizens of their countries.”⁴⁷ In terms of the provisions of the citizenship clause of the Status of Transkei Bill, the following points had emerged: All people who were already Transkei citizens would remain so. Under the 1963 Transkei Self-Government Act, Africans who were Xhosa speaking would be regarded as Transkei speaking, unless they were already citizens of other Bantustans. The definition included as Transkei citizens, any persons born outside the Transkei who were descendants of, or associated with, any of the tribes living in the Transkei. The same applied equally to children born out of marriages in South Africa between Transkei citizens as defined and Africans from any other tribes in South Africa, or from other countries. The only uncertain cases concerned third or fourth generation Africans in South Africa, whose Transkei origin or partial origin had become blurred. Outlining policy on such cases the B.A.D. Minister, Mr M. C. Botha, told Parliament that they would be resolved by a joint board, whose decisions would be final. What came out clearly then was that the whole matter had been drawn up in the premise of the official Government policy on Africans, as outlined by Mr Vorster on his birthday in 1975. The question that arose in the minds of many people concerned was whether or not the Transkei leaders were aware of the full implications of the citizenship clauses, both their own draft constitution, and that of the South African Status of Transkei Bill. Mr M. C. Botha said in Parliament: “I want to state immediately that an agreement was also reached at Cabinet level between the Transkei and the Republic in regard to the citizenship provisions.”⁴⁸ Asked about the strong denials by the Matanzima brothers of any knowledge of this deal, especially Chief George Matanzima, who was in London on his European tour, Mr Botha is reported to have said “George Matanzima is in London, and he is being given the treatment there by journalists,”⁴⁹ suggesting that the Chief was only playing politics.

The Minister insisted that there was no misunderstanding between himself and the Transkei Chief Minister on this issue. Clarifying the point, he said that he and other Government officials were having several consultative meetings with the Transkei leader. He said that Matanzima’s concern: “and he has told us about this, he told us about this recently here in Cape Town”, the people who are perhaps citizens of Lesotho, or of another homeland in the Republic and who, on the basis of their knowledge of the language or other relationship with the Transkei, could try to sneak into the Transkei in order to become citizens of the Transkei in that way.⁵⁰ What ever the true picture of the matter was, the Bill was piloted through all stages of Parliament by the Government and was to be effected from the date of the Transkei Independence

which was expected to fall on 26 October 1976. Provision was also made that the Transkei citizens who were employed in the Republic of South Africa would be welcome to continue working there and jobs would also be made available as had always been the case to those who wanted to come and work in the Republic. The Minister of Bantu Administration actually suggested, as has already been mentioned, that such citizens would get preferential treatment in regard to opportunities and privileges in the Republic.

The question of whether Whites resident in the Transkei would be eligible for Transkei citizenship or not cropped up, especially after the Port St. Johns land deals. Amongst people who were concerned about their position in the Transkei were those Whites who had preferred to remain in the territory even after independence, who otherwise wanted to be assured of their security, and those Whites who were employees of the Municipal and Bantu Township Board who sent a memorandum requesting that their positions be clarified before independence.

During the initial stages of independence negotiations with Pretoria, Chief Matanzima had publicly announced that those Whites who wished to remain in the Transkei post the independence period would be allowed to do so if they took Transkei citizenship. They would however forfeit their South African citizenship. This he justified as a measure to avoid dual allegiances. However, the Minister of BAD, Mr M. C. Botha, contradicted this assurance, saying that no White man would be allowed to take homeland citizenship. Whites in the homelands would still remain citizens of South Africa. Even the definition of a Transkei citizen does not include Whites. It deals exclusively with Africans. This point was reinforced by two Bills which were published in Parliament in the middle of May 1976. Whites were therefore not encouraged to take Transkei citizenship.

In June, on the last month of the 1976 session of the South African Parliament, two Bills, the Electoral Laws Amendment Bill affecting White South African voters in the Transkei and the Coloured Persons Representative Council Amendment Bill affecting Transkei voters of the Coloured CRC, went through Parliament. The new⁵¹ provisions brought about by the amendments to the Electoral Laws Act provided that any person (White) who might qualify as a voter and who made his home in an independent state on or after the date of independence of that State, should be registered as a voter in the electoral division in which is situated the Magistrates office in the Republic of South Africa which is the nearest to his home as the crow flies. The second section regulated the position of those voters who were already registered in electoral divisions which on the date of independence of the new states were wholly or partly situated in that state. It provided that such voters should remain registered as voters in the divisions in which

they were registered as voters on the date of independence of the state in question and that they would remain so registered until further delimitation of electoral divisions, in which case the voters would be registered with magistrates offices in electoral divisions of the Republic nearest to them as the crow flies.

The amendments to the CRC Act,⁵² suggested in the Bill referred to above, provided for Coloured people living and resident in the Transkei to be able to "retain their right of participation in the highest Coloured representative body in the Republic," by having the right to be registered as voters and to vote for the CRC of the Republic of South Africa. As in the case of the new provision for Whites in the Electoral Laws Amendment Bill, later generations of Coloured voters could have themselves registered in a South African magistrates office nearest to them as the crow flies. According to the amendments the CRC would be able to use its funds and render services in independent Bantustans which would then be outside the Republic. Another Bill entitled Second Coloured Persons Education Amendment Bill was also introduced. It provided for the Coloured Persons Representative Council and the administration of Coloured Affairs in the Republic of continue taking care of the education of Coloureds in special Coloured Schools in the Transkei as has always been the case.

A number of South African Acts were, according to Chief Minister Matanzima, to be repealed with Transkei independence. These included, the Land Act 1913, Urban Areas 1923, Native Councils Act 1920, Colour Bar Act, Native Representation Trust and Land Act 1936, Urban Areas Consolidated Act 1945, Bantu Education Act 1953, Group Areas Act, Job Reservation Act and Industrial Conciliation Act.⁵³ Although the Chief Minister had said that these Acts would be scrapped because they were enacted to protect white interests to the detriment of the Black man,⁵⁴ there was no evidence that their scrapping would benefit the Transkei to any significant extent. Most of them had either become obsolete and irrelevant or unsuitable for the conditions prevailing in the Transkei. For instance, the Land Acts of 1913 and 1936, which had formed the bases for Bantustanisation of South Africa, no longer served a purpose for the Transkei. The Bantu Education Act was only operative in the white areas of RSA and education in all Bantustans is controlled under the hand of the Education Departments of the various Bantustans. Urban Areas and Group Areas Acts do not apply in any Bantustan in South Africa. The Job Reservation Act is not operative in industries based both inside the Bantustans and the border Areas. The Industrial Conciliation Act, would perhaps be one Act that would have had a significantly advantageous effect for the people of the Transkei because it is the Act that regulates settlements of industrial disputes for White workers in the

Republic of South Africa. African workers in the Republic have always been excluded in the definition of employee for the purpose of this Act. As a result of this, they could not have legal trade unions which are provided for in the Act. Thus the scrapping of this Act in the Transkei implied that for as long as no similar alternative Act is put in operation, there would be no protection of the interest of Transkei workers inside the territory exactly as is the case in the Republic of South Africa.

It was reported that there would be a number of treaties between the two countries, South Africa and Transkei, covering the various aspects of defence and non-aggression, labour, movements of citizens between the two countries telecommunications and transport.⁵⁵ Details of the non-aggression pact, which would be the first between South Africa and a black African country, which is soon to be independent Transkei, were published in June 1976. The Prime Minister, Mr B. J. Vorster, had previously offered to sign similar pacts with all independent neighbouring states, but none was known to have taken up the offer.⁵⁶

In terms of article one of the pact, the two parties would undertake "never, for any reason whatsoever, to resort to the use of armed force against the territorial sovereignty and political independence of each other."⁵⁷ Both would undertake to strive for the solution of disputes through negotiation or other peaceful means. In terms of article two, the two parties would undertake not to allow their territory's, sea or air space to be used as a base or thoroughfare by any state, government, organisation or person for military, subversive or other hostile actions or activities. The parties would also agree to accord to each other the right of peaceful overflight of their airspace by military aircraft, as well as the right to innocent passage in their territorial sea and emergency shelter in harbours for naval vessels. The pact would be effective from the date of Transkei independence.

Economy

The economy of the Transkei is largely based on forestry and agriculture rather than commerce and mechanised industry, although a number of small industrial establishments have been cropping up in the growth points of Butterworth and Umtata. The forestry and agriculture sector, which contributes more than 35% of the gross national product, is the biggest employing sector of the Transkeian community, although most of the people are subsistence peasant farmers who are unable to make ends meet. As a result of this, a great number of them have to rely heavily on selling their labour to metropolitan South Africa to subsidise their income. Economic observers suggest that the sale of such labour in the Republic contributes nearly 70% of the Transkei gross national income.

The agricultural sector, which has been providing most employment opportunities, would inevitably offer less jobs with the improvement in agricultural methods and engagement of more scientific plans. This would leave the Transkei with little choice but to heighten the growth of industries. Reports have it that in the decade 1965-75, industrial development had generated 5630 jobs against an annual need of 26 000 jobs.⁵⁸

For the financial year 1976-77 the Transkei raised only 16% of its budget of R135,8 million from its own sources, the rest was subsidised by the South African Government. In May 1976, the Transkei Legislative Assembly approved an Exchequer and Audit Bill which provided for an appointment of an Auditor General. It also approved a General Loans Bill which would enable Transkei to raise loans locally and abroad to defray capital expenditure in respect of the physical development of the homeland. It enabled the Transkei to take up a foreign loan of R14 million to meet any shortfall in its budget. The provisions of this Loan Bill were put into operation on 30 June with the conclusion of a deal by the XDC, taking a loan of R12 million on behalf of the Transkei Government from international banks, Britain's Hill Samuel and the Dow Bank of the United States of America. The money would be made available to the Transkei Development Corporation for the funding of houses and to expand the infrastructure. The chairman of the XDC, Mr Paul Hoogendyk, described the acquisition of the loan as an historic occasion where international funds had, for the first time, been made available to an institution like the XDC to be used specifically for the development of the Transkei—the first homeland to become independent. "This is a meaningful and visual sign of confidence by foreign financial circles in the Transkei. Where some overseas political circles are in doubt over accepting the independence of the Transkei, this loan proves the opposite," said Mr Hoogendyk.⁵⁹

In terms of financial arrangements announced in the South African House of Assembly on 6 June 1976, all taxes and other monies paid to the South African Government by Transkei citizens in the Republic under the Bantu Taxation Act during the current financial year would be paid to the Transkei. Monies voted from the State Revenue fund during the current financial year for spending in and on behalf of the Transkei and not spent at the time of independence would be paid to the Transkei, plus any further amounts voted by Parliament for the Transkei.⁶⁰

With the coming independence the Transkei has been trying to interest industrialists in investing in the territory. The Government sponsored Xhosa Development Corporation has always been the midwife for economic growth and is largely in control of most industries.

It also has the greatest percentage control of private enterprise. Assets belonging to this body have, however, recently been handed over to a similar body with a new name, Transkei Development Corporation. This body, along with the Transkei leaders, has managed to secure the confidence of some industrialists. A senior executive of the newly found TDC gave assurance to industrialists, in a speech in Port Elizabeth, that those who had established factories in the Transkei would be fully compensated if their investments were nationalised after independence. Although, said the official Mr Maritz, the possibility of nationalisation was remote, "these things have happened in the past, and in such a case indemnity will be paid to the full value of industry at the time, not the value of the original investment." Mr Maritz who had been overseas with Chief George Matanzima, the Minister of Justice expected to be Minister of Foreign Affairs and Trade in the post independence cabinet, said that European investors had shown tremendous interest in the Transkei.

The Chief Minister of the Transkei, Chief Kaizer Matanzima, who had gone to Europe in July 1975, came back with a claim that he had met industrialists in six European countries. He said that Italian and West German businessmen had promised to establish textile and motor assembly plants after independence. The Chief Minister said, "All the businessmen we met were very impressed by the Transkei's potential and by its political and social climate," because "such a situation is conducive to good industrialisation."⁶¹

In September 1975 it was announced that a European textile group was to set up a R2,5 million factory in Butterworth in the Transkei as the first phase of a R12,5 million project which would ultimately employ 1 400 people.⁶² In March 1976 the deal was concluded with the Italian industrialist, Mr G. Bertrand. The Bertrand group were reported to be the biggest acrylic spinners in Europe and the fourth biggest in acetate, and they would almost fulfill South Africa's need in acetate blend fancy yarns. This would save South Africa about R1,5 million a year in foreign exchange.⁶³ The first phase of production was expected to be in full swing by January 1977.

A white Transkei entrepreneur, Mr R. E. Blom, signed a R2 million agreement with an Argentinian Company for the manufacture of motor cycles in the Transkei. The project, which would be financed over five years by the Central Bank of Argentina, would employ about 400 people within a year. Discussing the deal Mr Blom said that his agreement with the Argentinian Zanella Industries, included technical knowhow, plant, staff and training facilities and that it provided for a school to be opened next to the factory, where factory

personnel would be trained.⁶⁴ Mr Blom later announced that he was negotiating a +R40 million industry with Renault Argentina for the manufacture of utility vehicles in Butterworth, Transkei, in addition to his motorcycle factory.⁶⁵

Meanwhile the Transkei Government was making plans to bolster the timber industry in the territory. In June 1976 the Government signed a 35 year contract with a private consortium to buy all timber in the plantations near Umtata. The consortium was established by the TDC with 40% share capital, the Sappi group and the Hans Merensky with 30% each.⁶⁶ It was estimated that the revenue from the forests concerned would be increased by the activity of the consortium from R250 000 to more than R1,2 million.

An agreement to establish a R1,5 million seaweed processing plant in Butterworth was reached between the Xhosa Development Corporation and the Taurus Chemical Manufacturing Company (Pty) Ltd. of Randburg. The plant would concentrate on the conversion of a seaweed into alginic acid and its derivatives, which are essential chemicals in food processing, petroleum, pharmaceutical and textile industries. The project would be embarked upon in phases. The first phase, which had started by October 1975, would be that of research; the second phase was that of factory construction for extraction of technical alginic acid from the kelp (giant seaweed). Other future phases, which would enable the plant to produce alginic salts and other derivatives later to reprocess residues for extraction of trace element, had already been planned. Commenting on the ability of the plant, Dr E. R. Becker the company's technical consultant, said the community would provide for its total internal requirement and would be able to export to satisfy R4 million worth of the demands. It was hoped that the plant would provide jobs for 300 Blacks.⁶⁷

The Transkei Minister of Agriculture, Mr Z. M. Mabandla, introduced proposals for the construction of a R19 million water supply and hydro-electric schemes in the Transkei. These would entail building a R11,1 million dam and two hydro-electric installations in the Umtata district and R8,1 million water supply scheme in the Libode district.⁶⁸

At the end of June 1976, the Transkei Chief Minister announced the establishment of the Transkei Bank under the leadership of the Volkskas Bank (an Afrikaans bank established by the Afrikaner Broederbond in 1934,⁶⁹ The bank would start off with a share capital of R2 million at the rate of 50c a share. The Volkskas would have 50,01% shares and 49,99% would be made available to approved people and other bodies.⁷⁰ The bank would operate from the Volkskas building in Umtata.

General Issues

Deep seated differences between the traditional opposition Democratic Party of the Transkei progressively depleted the power of the party in the past couple of years, and the rift came to a head with the eventual ousting from the leadership of Mr Knowledge Guzana—the man who had stood in the last two general elections of 1968 and 1973 against Matanzima—as leader of the opposition.

The internal politics of the Democratic Party shook the party seriously at the end of 1974 when the wing that was discontented with Guzana's leadership mobilized itself to some kind of reformist group and elected Mr Bongani Hector Ncokazi as its leader. Mr Ncokazi, who was seen as a leftist in terms of Transkei politics, soon incurred the disfavour of the Transkei Government, mainly because of his virulent attacks on the policies of the government, including the quest for independence which he saw as a move which would endanger the future of Transkeians. Mr Guzana continued to lead the main body of the Democratic Party until the 1975 party Congress in December, when he was unseated by his rival Ncokazi by 44 votes to 14. The majority of Guzana's key men subsequently refused to serve under Ncokazi and remained along with Guzana, apparently undecided about their political future. Ncokazi, however, declared that he had nothing against Guzana. He called on him to remain in the party and expressed hopes that the Legislative Assembly caucus of the party would elect him to represent the party in the Assembly; and that he and the party as a whole would give Mr Guzana every support. Mr Ncokazi was himself not a sitting member of the Assembly. He was known to be opposed to such membership on the grounds that it would be a frustrating waste of time" to sit in the "pseudo-parliament", as he called it.

When the fifth session of the third Legislative Assembly opened in the middle of March 1976, Transkei Chief Minister K. D. Matanzima announced that he would not recognise the new leader of the Democratic Party, Mr Ncokazi, as the Leader of the Opposition. He declared that he still recognized Mr Guzana as the official Leader of the Opposition, whereupon Guzana formed a party called the New Democratic Party of which he became Leader. He got the support of five other members of the Democratic Party, who were sitting members of the Assembly.

The ruling Transkei National Independence Party cashed in on the disputes within the Democratic Party ranks and got a number disenchanted Democrats crossing the floor, including Paramount Chief Tutor Ndamase, son of the late founder of the Party, Paramount Chief Victor Poto of Western Pondoland. Since then two opposition parties in the Transkei, one based inside the Assembly promoting multi-racialism and protection of minority groups, opposed to Transkei independence in principle, but participating in the necessary prepar-

ations for independence; the other based outside the Assembly, propagating multi-racialism and protection of minority groups in a united South Africa, opposed to Transkei independence in principle and doing everything in its power to stop the programme.

Speaking during the debate on the no-confidence motion piloted by Mr Guzana in the Assembly, the Transkei Minister of Justice, Chief George Matanzima, called on the Legislative Assembly to express grave concern at the communistic orientation of the Democratic Party which wanted to impose a "Marxist Transkei State on the unwilling inhabitants," and of seeking to sow "chaos and confusion in the Transkei before, during, and after the independence celebrations," said the Chief referring to the Party under Ncokazi's leadership.⁷¹ He went on to say, "As I have said, there are signs and suggestions pointing to the activities of the communists in the Transkei. Hence I seek a directive from this House for dealing with such elements." This talk made many people anticipate a tough future for the Ncokazi supporters in the territory. It actually shook his remaining two followers inside the Assembly to dissociating themselves with him for his alleged communistic orientation and they chose to sit as independents. These included one of the old Democratic Party stalwarts, Thembuland Paramount Chief Sabata Dalindyabo who said: "When Mr Ncokazi was made leader of the Democratic Party we were not aware he was being called a communist and a saboteur. My Thembus do not want to be involved in revolutions or anything like that." He added "I shall stand back for the moment until the Government works this out. If they call Mr Ncokazi a communist they must arrest him and try him in court."⁷²

Ncokazi himself denied having any communist links. He said that Chief George "must not use parliamentary privilege. He must say these things outside the Assembly." He said that the Matanzima Government was making a scarecrow of him to frighten away his supporters. Paramount Chief Sabata, Dalindyabo however, later rejoined Ncokazi and went addressing several meetings inside and outside the Transkei opposing Independence. At a meeting in Guzana's parliamentary constituency he called on the people not to return Guzana to the Assembly in future elections because he had defected from the party.⁷³

At the Congress of the ruling Transkei National Independence Party which met a couple of days before the session of the Legislative Assembly in the middle of March, Party Leader, Chief Kaizer Matanzima, announced that he was to open negotiations with Pretoria for the release, before independence, of all Transkei citizens imprisoned on Robben Island. He also declared that all Transkeians in exile abroad were invited to return and could apply for passports. "The Transkeian citizens who went into exile because of fear of apprehension under the

Republican laws, may now apply for passports and visas from our Government," Chief Kaizer said.⁷⁴ He warned, however, that "loyalty to the Government of the Transkei would be expected from all;" and any "acts of disloyalty will be firmly controlled."⁷⁵ The possibility of the release of Robben Island prisoners of Transkeian origin, including men like Nelson Mandela, Walter Sisulu and Govin Mbeki, was seen by many to have the potential of boosting Matanzima's image and score some points for the emergent Transkei state in the world community. When a formal request was made to the South African Government by the Transkei cabinet, it was rejected by the Minister of Justice, Mr Kruger.

A trouble spot had been developing in the North Western part of the Transkei in the districts of Matatiele and Mount Fletcher where flares of tribalism invoked by the Government's ethnic differentiation policy threatened peace in the past year. The trouble arose out of the claim by Sotho speaking leaders of the area that if the Government's policy of separate development had to be carried to its logical conclusion, the Basotho of the area should join the Qwa-Qwa homeland which had been created for the Sotho tribe. As early as August 1975, tension between the Sotho and Xhosa speaking people in the area came into the open, with allegations that the Transkei Minister of Health, Chief Jeremiah Moshesh who is one of the Sotho leaders from the area, supported a plan to merge the area with Qwa-Qwa. Earlier in 1975, Chief Moshesh had taken a surprising step when he prosecuted a TLA member, Mr M. P. Ludidi, under Proclamation R400 for holding a meeting in his area without the necessary permission from him. Mr Ludidi (a Hlubi leader, Xhosa speaking) was the Secretary General of the ruling TNIP of which the Chief himself was a member.⁷⁶ A few months later, Mr Joe Zeka a Thembu (Xhosa speaking) and a known opponent of the Qwa-Qwa movement, was banished under Proclamation R400 from a predominantly Thembu area to a Sotho area. The Xhosa speaking leadership in the area formed what they called a Lundi Council to work for co-operation in resisting Sotho domination. One of the Council's first moves was to start a campaign for the name of the area to be changed from Maloti (the Sotho name which had always been used for the region) to Lundi. The Council encouraged Xhosa speaking people living under Sotho chiefs to break away and form their own tribal authorities.⁷⁷

Expressing the feelings of his people, one Chief from the Queen's Mercy area of Matatiele district, Chief N. Moshesh, said. "The Government has given all other tribes that live in South Africa self-rule except the Basotho living in East Griqualand. According to the policy of the Central Government, no race has to rule another race. In the case of the Basotho of East Griqualand, the policy is applied differently

Proclamation R400 is meant to silence the people of Matatiele.”⁷⁸ The Chief complained that there were five Basotho Chiefs who were being placed under Xhosa rule, and that Sesotho was not an official language in the Transkei, those who spoke it had difficulty in getting things done for them at some government offices in the Transkei.

There were reports that deputations had been sent several times to Pretoria to raise the matter with the Department of Bantu Administration, and Qwa-Qwa Government leaders had also come into the matter. In a meeting in December 1975 held at Witsieshoek the Qwa-Qwa capital, more than 60 top Basotho from all over South Africa decided to consider the feasibility of a court interdict against Transkei independence until the position of the Basotho in the territory had been resolved. The meeting, which was chaired by Qwa-Qwa's Chief Minister, Mr K. Mopeli, had representatives from the areas of Matatiele and Herschel, recently ceded from Ciskei to Transkei. The Transkei Minister of Health Chief Jeremiah Moshesh, however, denied any connection with the Qwa-Qwa move. The only time when he was reported to have shown disagreement with Chief Matanzima, was when the Chief Minister declared that “Morena Boloka”, the Sotho continuation of the black South African anthem “Nkosi Sikelel' iAfrika” was irrelevant in the Transkei, and should not be sung as part of the official anthem of the independent Transkei.

In the Transkei Legislative Assembly the Secretary General of the ruling TNIP sponsored a motion that caused a stir inside and outside the Assembly. It called on the Transkei government to make personal grants of farms which had been transferred to the Transkei in the consolidation process, to Paramount Chiefs and to other people who had “rendered faithful service in the development of their country.” The farms, Mr Ludidi said, should be settled in such a way that their economic value would not deteriorate, “But the question whether the Paramount Chiefs would farm productively, is beside the point. I am concerned that the government should recognise the role the Paramount Chiefs have played in our long and non-violent progress to independence.” It turned out, however, that weeks before the motion was put before the Assembly some two huge farms near Queenstown, which were to have formed the basis of a big Transkei Development Corporation's cattle ranching project, had been taken over by Paramount Chief Kaizer Matanzima and his brother George. It was learned that the Transkei Development Corporation had already appointed a Manager to run the cattle ranch of almost 2 000 hectares on the farms. When he arrived at the homestead at Hafton farm, he found that Chief George Matanzima had already started moving in and that the Chief Minister had also been moving livestock and furniture into the nearby Webbworth farm.⁷⁹

Ciskei

Land Claims and Consolidation

As was reported in *Black Review* 1974-75, the Ciskei Legislative Assembly decided in a special session to cede the two districts of Glen Grey and Herschel to the Transkei in return for other land which would consolidate the Ciskei into a closer knit territory. A Government Proclamation excising the two areas from the control of the Ciskei was gazetted at the beginning of November 1975. For those inhabitants of Glen Grey and Herschel who wished to remain citizens of the Ciskei, land would be purchased for their settlement elsewhere. Glen Grey inhabitants had been allocated four pieces of land in the Queenstown district. These were the farms: Pavet, portion one of the farm Newhaustead, portion one of the farm Bushby Park and another piece which would form the remainder of Bushby Park. For the inhabitants of Herschel, land was made available on Bushmans Kranz farm.

There was evidence to suggest that the Ciskei Government was not particularly pleased to lose the populations of the two ceded districts. Every effort was being made to encourage the people to move to the new areas. Mr N. J. Mkrola, who was acting Chief Minister when the Ciskei Chief Minister, Mr Lennox Sebe, had been temporarily deposed, announced in September 1975 that his cabinet would facilitate the inspection of the alternative Ciskei land by Glen Grey and Herschel householders working as migrants in the urban areas. He said 95 men working in Cape Town would be taken on a conducted tour of some of the farms and that they would travel from Cape Town by bus. Similar tours would be organised for men working in Johannesburg, Germiston, Kliptown, Sharpeville, Welkom and Bloemfontein.⁷¹ The Ciskei even named the new areas to replace Herschel and Glen Grey Ntab'ethemba (Mountain of Hope) and Izwe Leding (Land of the Covenant), respectively. However, by 1 December, the purchasing of the promised land had not yet been effected when the Transkei took control of the released areas, and the Ciskei Government still had nowhere to settle the communities that were not keen to live under the Transkei government administration. As a result many of them, mainly from the Glen Grey area, apparently in a panic move "trekked" to Sada in the neighbouring Ciskei district of Whittlesea where they occupied school buildings as refugees.

Addressing a crowd at New Brighton township in Port Elizabeth at a special dedication of two truck-loads of food, collected for distribution to families accommodated in Sada classrooms, Ciskei Chief Minister, Mr Lennox Sebe, accused the South African Government and the Minister of Bantu Administration, Mr M. C. Botha, of insulting the Ciskei

Government and its people, and of making them refugees in their land of birth.⁷² In a strong retaliatory statement, Mr Botha revealed that it had been established that in fact the so-called refugees, estimated at about 1 009 (87 families), had in fact moved at the instigation of the Ciskei Government and had been transported to Sada in Ciskei Government trucks. The Minister claimed that in terms of the agreement with the Ciskei Government, all people who wished to remain as Ciskeians had only to register their names as Ciskeian voters and that they would be moved to new areas when the necessary land had been acquired.⁷³

As a move to accommodate as many people who wanted to remain under the Ciskei government as possible, Mr L. L. Sebe said in a statement that steps were being taken by the CLA to amend the Ciskei Constitution Proclamation so as to include also some Whittlesea farms as compensation for Glen Grey and Herschel which were excised to the Transkei. Amongst those areas which declared their wish to leave Ciskei to join Transkei, was in the district of Hewu (Whittlesea) at the Zulu-Kama Tribal Authority where more than 1 500 people resolved that Hewu should secede from Ciskei to join Transkei before independence. Commenting on the secession, a spokesman for the Hewu people, Mr M. Nweba of Johannesburg, said that people had made their decision and were unlikely to reverse it.

Ciskei Legislative Assembly preferred the town of Alice, which had been zoned black in December 1975, as the capital of the Ciskei. For years Zwelitsha (a township near King William's Town) had been considered as the prospective capital of the Ciskei. The Chief Minister, Mr L. L. Sebe, said that all government departments would move to Alice. Alice was chosen for its convenience as it was totally black hence there would be no need for division into white and black areas. The town was also central and had a historical and academic background that was essential for Ciskeians. Whilst it would be impossible to develop Zwelitsha, the Chief Minister was optimistic that Alice, because of its distance from large white settlements, would be easy to develop effectively. He also revealed that the South African Government had vouched to finance the project.

The leader of the opposition, Chief J. Mabandla, who opposed the motion of Alice being the capital, said that he regarded King William's Town as the capital of the Ciskei. He suggested that the Ciskei Government should ask the South African Government to release King William's Town to Ciskei, especially because Ciskeians knew King William's Town as the administrative seat of Ciskei and that it had the greatest concentration of Blacks around it.⁷⁴

Other areas which were envisaged for Ciskei were the Cat River Valley (at present White area); Nojoli Mountain at Somerset East and the Gamtoos River as boundaries of the Ciskei.⁷⁵

Political Development

The sensational political squabbles continued to rage within the Ciskei political circles during the year under review. These occurred mainly between the ruling Ciskei National Independence Party (CNIP), the opposition Ciskei National Party (CNP) and within the CNIP itself resulting in a party split. It was during this period that quite a number of chiefs were created by the Ciskei government which resulted in the Chief Minister, Mr L. L. Sebe, himself being made a Chief. According to the Ciskei constitution every chief in the Ciskei is an ex-officio member of the Legislative Assembly. Amongst notable political developments within the Ciskei was the establishment of a new Department of Health under a cabinet minister. In a cabinet reshuffle, the former Minister of Interior, Mr L. F. Siyo, was made Minister of Health.

After the election of candidates for the Zwelitsha division had been nullified at the Grahamstown election trial, October 1975 was set as the date for by-elections. It should be remembered that according to the verdict of the trial, all the candidates who had won the 1973 elections for Zwelitsha division had to step down but could, nevertheless, stand for election again if they so wished. Therefore Mr L. L. Sebe and his colleagues had to descend from their seats in the Legislative Assembly. Immediately after leaving his position as Chief Minister, news spread that Mr L. L. Sebe would remain in the Ciskei political background as the cabinet's economic advisor. Political observers saw this move as a means to retain Mr Sebe in the cabinet with the intention of keeping him "in the thick of things until he returns to the Ciskei Legislative Assembly if and when he is re-elected."⁷⁶ In yet another bid, seen by observers as intended to gain more votes for the ruling party, the CLA resolved to ask the South African Government to have the electoral divisions amended so that the Zibula Tribal Authority in the Stutterheim district and the Released Areas 32 and 52 in the Mdantsane magisterial district could be incorporated into the soon to be contested Zwelitsha constituency. It was believed that CNIP would embark on an intensive campaign in support of their side when and if these two districts were included in the Zwelitsha division.⁷⁷ Thereby it was hoped, especially from CNIP circles, that Mr L. L. Sebe would make a victorious come-back as Chief Minister. As has been mentioned above, the CNIP officials and supporters had indulged themselves in strong campaigns for votes in favour of their men namely: Messrs L. L. Sebe, V. V. Nqezo, E. D. Nkotso, T. Sam. Nominations for the opposition CNP pointed at Mr L. S. Mtoba, who had been the leading plaintiff at the Grahamstown Supreme Court, Mr P. F. Guzana, Mr M. M. Puti and Mr T. Simandla.⁷⁸

Mr Sebe and his colleagues all won the seats with good majorities and they were restored in the CLA. At election time there was considerable enmity between supporters of the CNIP and CNP. This was evidenced by the chaos and violence that accompanied the elections, where knives, axes, electric cords, sticks, etc., were flying in the air.⁷⁹ Immediately after the Sebe team had been sworn in as CLA members at a special session of the Assembly held in November, Mr L. L. Sebe was re-elected as the Chief Minister of the Ciskei. He beat his opponent, Paramount Chief Mxolisi Sandile, by 29 to 13 votes.

It must be noted that in nominating their candidate for chief minister-ship, the opposition party had not brought forward the name of their leader, Chief Justice Mabandla. Apparently this was done as a strategy to gain more support for the party from the Rarabe tribe of which Paramount Chief Mxolisi Sandile was head, and where he was expected to have decisive support. Three new cabinet ministers were appointed by Mr Sebe when he announced his new cabinet. The new ministers were: Chief Payment Siwani of the Mdushane tribe at Tamara, King William's Town, who was appointed to the Department of Agriculture, Chief W. Z. Njokweni of Peddie for the Department of Roads and Works, and Chief L. W. Maqoma as the Minister of Justice.⁸⁰

Towards the end of 1975, splinters of division within the CNIP were observable. On the one hand was the Chief Minister L. L. Sebe and his strong CNIP members and on the other Mr S. Burns Ncamashe, his Minister of Education. By this time Mr Ncamashe had been made a chief and, therefore, an ex-officio member of the Legislative Assembly, so he could sit in parliament even as an independent member. As a result of this rift, Chief Burns Ncamashe did not comply with CNIP expectations and collaborated with the opposition CNP, especially in the Victoria East constituency election campaigns. Rumours had spread that Chief Ncamashe would resign from the ruling party to join the CNP.

Following the verdict at the Supreme Court in Grahamstown, similar intensive campaigns were embarked upon by both parties at the Victoria East division. Voting would be for two seats.

The CNIP had four candidates who were, however, divided into two groups in terms of the rift referred to above. Mr L. L. Sebe was supporting one set of candidates—the CNIP “official” ones, whilst on the other hand Chief S. Burns Ncamashe was backing the “unofficial” group. This rift was widened by the tensions in the party caused by detente launched in Victoria East by Burns-Ncamashe with the opposition party. This peace move had been initiated by chiefs who wanted to prevent violent outbreaks between supporters of the two parties. Some sections of the CNIP had severely criticized Burns Ncamashe for collaborating with opposition chiefs and apparently

harming the image of the party. This step, taken by Chief Ncamashe, was said to have deterred effective campaigning by CNIP members. Candidates for CNIP were A. Z. Lamani, W. Ximiya, A. Ndindwa, and B. Ngaba; while candidates for CNP were N. Gamanda, A. Linda, and R. Swaartbooi. However, the CNIP candidates supported by Chief L. L. Sebe won the Legislative Assembly seats with majority. The opposition party aired its dissatisfaction with the way the Victoria East by-elections had been conducted. However, these complaints were dismissed by Mr Sebe as unfounded and only an indication of frustration resulting from defeat.

Most members of the ruling party had strongly voiced their discontent with the way Chief Ncamashe was representing the CNIP. They had observed that Chief Burns Ncamashe had diverted from the CNIP route and was, therefore, disloyal to the party. Because of all these hang-ups about Chief Ncamashe it did not come as a surprise to the public when reports came that he had been expelled from the ruling party in November 1975. However, Chief Ncamashe was retained in his position as the Minister of Education. Apparently, the reason for not removing Chief Ncamashe in the first reshuffle was that the Chief Minister did not have a suitable candidate with qualifications which fitted the position of Minister of Education.

An employee of the Department of Education, Mr D. M. Jongilanga, who was an education planner, was then made a chief. This would enable him to become a member of the Legislative Assembly. Soon after Mr Jongilanga had been installed as a chief, reports came that Chief S. Burns Ncamashe had been sacked from his position as the Minister of Education and Chief Jongilanga was sworn in to take his place. It became apparent that by not initially removing Chief Ncamashe from his post, the Chief Minister was still playing for time whilst organising for a new man whom he found in the person of Chief Jongilanga. In January 1976 after his dismissal, Chief Burns Ncamashe formed his new political party called the Ciskei National Unionist Party. There had been strong speculations that Chief Ncamashe would affiliate to the CNP because of Chief Ncamashe's alliance with CNP and because of his agreement with the party on three major issues. However, Chief Ncamashe broke away and attracted some supporters of both CNIP and CNP especially from in and around Alice. He formed his new party which aimed at strengthening "solidarity of our nation" and to bolster a strong feeling of national consciousness among their compatriots. Observations were being made of strong indications that the two opposition parties might coalesce in the fight for the 1978 general election against the CNIP.⁸¹ Leaders of both parties were not opposed to coalition but there had never been any positive move towards this direction. Like all parties participating in homeland

politics, the CNUP accepted apartheid "temporarily", the central policy being based on the land issue. Chief Ncamashe said the CNUP would strive for the union and not federation of the envisaged black states of South Africa.⁸²

Subsequent to Chief Ncamashe's dismissal, the CLA gave a go-ahead to the Chief Minister of the Ciskei to request the South African Government to remove the legislation which required the State President to approve, in the event of expulsions of cabinet ministers, before they could be implemented by the Chief Minister. Speaking on the motion, Chief L. L. Sebe said that he saw no point why the Chief Minister could not dismiss cabinet ministers while he had been empowered with the responsibility of appointing them.⁸³ Attacking the motion, Chief Burns Ncamashe, who had remained in Parliament as the sole representative of the CNUP, said that the motion had not been prompted by the principle of political development but "by Mr Sebe's personal consideration". He added: "No country two years old wants a dictator."⁸⁴ Observers saw this as a safety valve which the Chief Minister earmarked to use in times of crisis or when he wanted to remove anyone privately without valid reasons. He was following a practice which was already in existence in other Bantustans like Bophuthatswana and Transkei.

In a cabinet reshuffle effected in June, the Chief Minister excluded the Minister of Interior, Mr Myataza, and in turn appointed Chief L. Maqoma, former Minister of Justice, into the portfolio. It was reported that pressure had been applied on Mr Sebe to have Mr Myataza removed so as to improve the image of the CNIP which had been blurred by *inter-alia* some of Myataza's public utterances which were seen by members of the CNIP as being unministerial. Apparently rumours of his possible removal had leaked as early as October 1975 and therefore this exclusion did not come as a surprise to Mr Myataza. Mr Myataza had attacked Mdantsane and Zwelitsha Township councils for being inept. Such utterances were severely criticized by members of the CNIP especially because they had been backed by members of the opposition.⁸⁵ In Mr Myataza's case, it appeared that the Chief Minister was using his axing powers which he had asked for from the State President earlier in the year.

During the period 1975-76, there was a continuation of an exodus of people employed in the Ciskei civil service, who for various reasons, joined the Transkei civil service. An epidemic of fear had spread amongst most people employed by the Ciskei government who were waiting for the guillotine of expulsion to fall on them. As a result of this fear most people had remained either inactive politically or secretly opposed to the system they were working for. The Ciskei Public Service Act barred Ciskei civil employees from affiliating or actively partici-

pating in politics. According to the Act, they could only attend political gatherings and only ask questions which did not throw the Ciskei Government into bad public light. Therefore, from various interviews with employees of the Ciskei Government, *Black Review* gathered that anyone who publicly criticised the ruling party, belonged to the opposition party or to any other organisation which opposed the Ciskei Government or the Homelands policy, was always viewed with suspicion, dismissed from work or transferred to remote areas of the Ciskei.

Amongst those who had resigned out of disillusion were Mr A. M. D. Dlakavu and Mr E. N. Martius who said that they had been disgusted with "petty party politics" permeating the Ciskei government employ. They both confirmed that a lot of people were planning to leave the Ciskei while others had already left. Mr Dlakavu added that the mode of operation in the Ciskei was such that if one was a civil servant, one was expected to belong to the ruling party. The usual tactic was to demote a person so that in disgust he could leave and by so doing "the Ciskei is chasing all its intelligentsia. Qualifications are not the greatest asset in the Ciskei. You have to be a government supporter."⁸⁶ An example of Ciskei employees who were transferred to remote areas of the Ciskei was Mr Simon Mlonyeni who was transferred to Sterkspruit at just about the time when Herschel was to be ceded to the Transkei. Mr Simon Mlonyeni, who had already been promoted into first grade division, at the time of the transfer, was known to be opposed to executive Bantustan politics. Instead of complying with the terms of his transfer, Mr Mlonyeni resigned from his post.

The year 1976 opened with lots of controversies between the Ciskei parties. The key issue, which widened the political squabbles in the Ciskei, was the amalgamation of the Ciskei and the Transkei. Transkei had been insisting that Ciskei and Transkei should amalgamate into one Xhosa speaking state. However, the Ciskei ruling party was categorically opposed to this proposal, viewing it as a Transkei steamroller. The two Ciskei opposition parties were keen on the merger of the two homelands. They were, therefore, fighting hard to convince the Ciskeians that amalgamation would be a step in the right direction. In a motion on amalgamation tabled by the leader of the opposition of wanting to "perpetrate tribalism under the cloak of nationalism"; Chief Jongilanga also added that since they were opposed to independence which had been forced down the Transkeian's throat, then if they accepted amalgamation with the Transkei it implied that they automatically accepted independence "without being sure where this independence was leading."⁸⁷ The former Minister of Interior, Mr B. D. Myataza, and a CNIP active member supporting Mr Jongilanga said that the opposition party only wanted to amalgamate sections of the South

African soil, which was tantamount to the divide and rule policy which they heavily criticised. Apparently the CNIP feared domination by the Transkei leadership if amalgamation was effected. They felt that Transkei did not only want amalgamation but they wanted . . . assimilation of the Ciskei into the Transkei. In heated words, the opposition leader accused the ruling party of wanting to divide Xhosas so that they could fight each other. He expressed that amalgamation of Transkei and Ciskei would inevitably result in swallowing up of so called white spots between the two Bantustans. Chief Ncamashe of the CNUP, supporting Chief Mabandla, strongly accused the ruling party of perpetrating the British colonial policy which had divided the Xhosa land into the Transkei and Ciskei. He said the existence of two separate Xhosa nations in one province was foolish and should be done away with.⁸⁸ He had called on the Ciskei government to have a referendum to weigh the feelings of Ciskeians on the amalgamation issue.⁸⁹ The amalgamation proposal had also been promoted by Pretoria in a bid to solve the Transkei citizenship problem. The South African government had wanted to simplify the definition of a Transkei citizen. According to the Transkei constitution, any person who was presently a citizen of Transkei, or anyone whose origin could be traceable to the Transkei, would automatically be regarded as a citizen of the new Transkei state. To simplify the issue, the South African government wanted to confer citizenship on any Xhosa or Sotho people who were born in or out of the Transkei who were not citizens of any other Bantustan except the Ciskei. Mr Sebe was adamant on his rejection of this merger. Speculations had it that the opposition parties, viz. CNP and CNUP, were joining forces in attempts to amalgamate the two homelands. This has resulted in yet another widening of the gap between the ruling party and the CNUP.

Another dispute catalyst in Ciskei political circles arose with the death of Paramount Chief Mxolisi Sandile of the Rarabe tribes in May 1976. His son, Maxhobayakhawuleza, was still too young to replace him, and there was a need for a regent. The Paramount Chief had been a key member of the opposition CNP, and the question of who would succeed him became a very crucial one politically. The ruling CNIP wanted to have someone from their own camp to replace him, while the opposition wished to retain their favourable position with the royalty. According to an act passed by the CLA, wives of deceased chiefs could become regents for their sons who were not yet in a position to replace their fathers. Hence at the funeral of the paramount chief, it was announced that his wife, Mrs Nolizwe Sandile would take up the reigns. The opposition CNP supported this view happily because Mrs Sandile continued to support the party.

However, the ruling CNIP were pushing for the Ciskei Cabinet Minister, Chief L. Maqoma, to fill the position as he had also been a close relative of the Paramount Chief. Dismissing Mrs Sandile's claim, the Minister of Health, Mr L. F. Siyo, said that the act had referred only to ordinary chiefs; there was clarity in regard to the case of paramount chiefs.⁹⁰ As a result of the dispute the CNIP controlled CLA decided to submit the two names of Mrs Sandile and Chief Maqoma to the State President, who, according to South African legislation, reserves the right to appoint or dismiss tribal chiefs in his capacity as the "supreme chief" of the Africans. In the meantime, the magistrate of the Zwelitsha district, within which the great place was established, issued a notice in terms of the Riotous Assemblies Act, banning all meetings at the royal kraal until the issue of succession had been resolved. At the time of going to print the State President had not yet announced his choice for the disputed throne.

The matter had already invoked strong feelings of enmity between the rival parties and was likely to aggravate the position when the State President made his decision.

Economy

The economy of the Ciskei was centred mainly around agriculture although Ciskei still depended on the Republic for most of the agricultural produce like milk, butter, etc. Large contribution to farming had been initiated by white farmers, who unlike most Africans in the Ciskei, had not been required to sell their stock. Other agricultural farms with any significant contribution were those which had been taken over from white farmers who had left the Ciskei as a result of the homeland's consolidation. The Ciskei Department of Agriculture and Forestry has therefore been striving to develop or to improve on those farms, embarking on various agricultural development programmes. These included, the establishment of agricultural colleges, like the one being built between Alice and Hogsback, sponsored by the Anglo American Group's Chairman's Fund as part of social responsibility projects, involving R1,8 million.⁹¹ This department was also offering bursaries to students who wanted to proceed with agriculture as a career. A number of bursaries were awarded to students interested in further agricultural studies. The University of Fort Hare, which is situated in Ciskei area, has always offered courses in agricultural science. According to the Ciskei Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry, twenty-six bursaries were to study for degrees in agriculture at Fort Hare. Agreements had also been made with the white University of Stellenbosch and the white Onderstepoort Research Institute attached to the University of Pretoria, for education in agriculture and veterinary science, of some two and

three Ciskeians respectively. Asked for the details of the value of the Ciskei's agricultural products, the Minister of BAD, Mr M. C. Botha, said that by 1973-74 the value was R4,681,000. This amount was expected to increase yearly.

Industry is at a low ebb in the Ciskei and therefore most Ciskeian workers exhaust their services and potential in the white-declared towns like King Williams Town, East London, Queenstown; and a large section of the male population work in far off places like Johannesburg and Cape Town as imigrant workers. The Chief Minister, Mr L. L. Sebe, has been encouraging investors, be they foreign or local, to develop the Ciskei. These industries would be sold to Ciskeian's industries or XDC after and in an agreed period. Not much was achieved from this invitation. Dimbaza and Sada were earmarked for huge industrial development but so far very few entrepreneurs had opened industries in these places. The XDC, which was engaged in the industrial development of the Ciskei, established some factories at Dimbaza including the R1 million bicycle assembly plant established jointly between XDC, Port Elizabeth steel company and a West German company. There was also a factory for spectacle cases. It was also reported by the Chief Minister that a number of industrialists had agreed to set up factories in Dimbaza in terms of the White Agency Agreement whereby White investors would establish factories and manage them for an agreed period after which they would either sell them to black entrepreneurs or, if none were in a position to handle the project, XDC would run them in trust for any Ciskeians who might be interested to take over when ready to do so. Mr Helmut Schwarte, a Paarl businessman, was interested in putting up a radiator factory which would provide job opportunities for 60 Blacks; Premastic Ciskei (Pty) Ltd., manufacturers of prestressed concrete roof shells, would establish a factory worth R400,000 providing jobs for 35 people.⁹²

With the emergence of the Umanyano Bus Service, the Ciskei bus company, wherein black businessmen could buy shares, the total disappearance of Border Passenger Transport Service occurred. XDC, which had handled the venture since Mdantsane Bus strikes in June 1975, had 51% shares while 49% would be open to those citizens who could afford. This came into full operation from November 1975. It was expected that small bus operators would, in future, be amalgamated into the new bus company.⁹³

In a move to handle its own economic development projects, Ciskei established Ciskei National Development Corporation. The CNDC would take over most projects from XDC and was geared up to concentrating on agricultural development of the Ciskei and to providing financial and other help to Ciskei business. This body employed 1 000 Ciskeians and 100 Whites. The first board of directors for the CNDC

became: Miss E. N. Mzazi, Rev P. Ncaca, Rev N. Haya and Mr C. Ngxiki. The manager of the XDC, Mr Meisenhall, became the chairman of the CNDC Board. This move was a completion of the process of breaking down the XDC, where the Transkei Development Corporation and the CNDC were established separately to take over XDC activities in the respective areas of Transkei and Ciskei.

General Issues

Amongst the mentionable developments in the Ciskei was the emergence of the so-called Sebe's "soldiers" also known as "green berets" named after their uniform of khaki suits and green berets. These men came from all over the Ciskei to volunteer their services not only to the ruling Party but the aim of protecting the Chief Minister. Having settled in Zwelitsha with their families, they pitched tent at the Zwelitsha flats which were still under construction. On completion of the flats, they were then evicted from the flats and thereafter they were congregated at Zwelitsha hall for some time until they were transferred to some prefabricated wooden houses which had been used as a school, for temporary occupation. These soldiers, untrained, were loyal CNIP supporters and had a duty to protect CNIP hierarchy.

The beginning of 1976 saw the launching of the Ciskei Information Service almost similar to the South African information service of the Department of Information. This division would be under the Department of the Chief Minister and Finance. Various information officers would be planted in different regions of the Ciskei to collect any information which might be useful for the Ciskei Information Service. Heading this Division was Zwelitsha-based Mr V. V. V. Hoyana as principal information officer. The Ciskei Government intensified its campaign to have more Ciskeians as registered citizens of the homeland. People opposed to carrying the citizenship certificates had some privileges closed for them. For instance, the Ciskei Government service required that applicants for jobs be registered citizens, before they could be legible for employment or promotion. The Ciskei Public Service Commission had released a circular which demanded that citizenship cards be priorities before employment could be effected. It read: "As the machinery to obtain citizenship has been in existence for some time now and all the Government officers are fully aware of the fact that the Public Service Act requires that a person had to be a citizen to be appointed permanently, the Cabinet has ruled that unless a public servant has submitted proof that he is a Ciskeian citizen or that he has applied for such citizenship he will not be appointed in a permanent post capacity or be promoted."⁹⁴ This condition was applicable to all Ciskei employees (notable Africans) including those employed by the Education Department, like teachers. This move was seen by observers

as undiplomatic because most people were sceptical about the validity of the whole system of Bantustans and others who were totally opposed to the policy but were still working in the Ciskei, were likely to leave their jobs rather than bind themselves to Ciskei citizenship. This was yet another cause for a remarkable "great trek" of most qualified personnel from the Ciskei to seek new pastures elsewhere.⁹⁵ This question of citizenship also raised a furore in the Ciskei Legislative Assembly when some members from the ruling and opposition parties felt that registration as a voter was enough identification with the Ciskei. One CNIP member went further to say that these citizenship certificates were meant to deprive urban Blacks of their legitimate rights in urban areas. Opposition leader, Chief Mabandla, said in support of this rejection: "Any law that discriminates is dirty. Citizenship certificates will cause the people in the urban areas to lose their rights and be forced to stay in one particular area."⁹⁶ Observers saw such utterances as self-contradictory coming from people who were deeply involved in the apartheid structure yet attacking the policy from within. Unless a person was in possession of citizenship certificates, he would struggle to get a place to live in. By barring him from getting a house in any Ciskei township or getting a site, the Ciskei Government was tightening the rope of citizenship around anyone concerned. In desperation people were likely to take these certificates for the sake of getting houses to live in.

Since the establishment of Ciskei Department of Health, the Ciskei had made approaches to various hospitals within the Ciskei area to take over the administration thereof. Plans to take over the mission hospitals of St. Matthews (Kieskammahoek) and Lovedale (Alice) were still unconcluded. However, agreements had been made between Ciskei officials and the administration of Mount Coke Methodist hospital near King William's Town. The Ciskei Government was due to take over by August 1976. In a typical Ciskei pattern, a list of names of people regarded as undesirable to the Ciskei Government had already been submitted to Mount Coke Superintendent, Dr R. S. McDaide. It was believed that most of those people included in the list were either members or supporters of the opposition parties. Mr Mtoba's name, a leading CNP member and Sebe opponent who was employed as a senior clerk at Mount Coke, was reported to be in the list. The Ciskei government recommended that these be excluded from Mount Coke staff even before the take-over.⁹⁷ The Ciskei government also assumed complete control of the new Mdantsane hospital.

The Ciskei was planning to construct a R200 million port at Hamburg. Hamburg had not yet been incorporated into the Ciskei. If consolidation proposals succeeded, the Ciskei Government would then proceed with its plans. The port would serve the interests of the Ciskei especially

economically. It was expected that the harbour would attract industrialists, hoteliers and businessmen to open businesses there.⁹⁸

Late in 1975, the Ciskei Department of Roads and Works arranged for the training of 12 men, for a start, as traffic officers. These men would be posted to various parts of the Ciskei.⁹⁹ By the middle of 1976 these men had completed their course and had commenced duties as traffic officers.

Kwa-Zulu

Land Claims and Consolidation

Land consolidation in Kwa-Zulu has always been a rather controversial issue especially after the 1973 declaration by the Deputy Minister of Bantu Development that consolidation of Kwa-Zulu would take at least twelve years.

At present Kwa-Zulu is composed of 48 separate pieces or units which shall, according to standing proposals, be consolidated into ten units including the Makatini plains, the Nongoma territory, the Tugela Northern Natal unit, the Southern Natal coastal strip, Mpendle-Pietermaritzburg and Reservation No. 10 in the vicinity of Richards Bay. Kwa-Zulu presently covers an area of three million hectares, and the homeland has always voiced dissatisfaction with the amount of land allotted to it. Chief Gatsha Buthelezi feels that the proposals by SA Government of land reserved for the territory "would not improve the economic base of Kwa-Zulu." He said, at a congress of the Chamber of Commerce at Sani Pass, that these proposals of land distribution and consolidation of the homeland had no bearing on what the Zulus wanted, but rather they were, "the enforcement of the White Government's plans for consolidation into pieces which do not make a single Zulu heart leap." No negotiations had been entered into between the White SA Government and the "powerless Blacks" on the consolidation issue.¹⁰⁰ However, Chief Buthelezi added that despite the fact that Kwa-Zulu regarded consolidation plans as inadequate, they should not spend all their time expressing this. He said, "We realise that if we allow ourselves to shed only tears of self-pity, we may drown in these tears without getting anywhere near our liberation."¹⁰¹

Consolidation proposals for Kwa-Zulu included parts of the South Coast area, leaving a narrow strip a few kilometres wide between Hibberdene and Port Edward, which would remain "white", most of the land North and South of the Tugela river excluding Richards Bay, which the Central Government refused to part with.¹⁰² Richards Bay was

earmarked by Government for development as a harbour likely to come in handy especially with the recent deterioration of relations with Mozambique. The town and harbour would be unfolded as an industrial area providing work opportunities for Kwa-Zulu citizens, a holiday resort, mining area tourist attraction and an agricultural highlight.

Apparently neither Whites nor Blacks were happy about this land distribution. On the issue of Richards Bay, the Chief Minister of Kwa-Zulu, Chief Gatsha Buthelezi stressed that historically the area belonged to the Zulu people and should thus be incorporated into Kwa-Zulu.¹⁰³

The SA Government on the other hand was adamant that Richards Bay would not be handed over to Kwa-Zulu mainly because it would be made available for development by SA itself. Commenting on possible future relations between Kwa-Zulu and SA Governments on Richards Bay, Leon Kok, reporter of the *South African Financial Gazette*, said "Richards Bay may yet constitute a confrontation between the South African and Kwa-Zulu Governments. Once Kwa-Zulu is independent, this could escalate." He added, "Whatever the merits Kwa-Zulu authorities will be a formidable force to contend with in the future of Richards Bay. The South African Government and White employers cannot do without Zulu labour while theoretically, it is supposed to be sourced from Kwa-Zulu townships."¹⁰⁴

Other instances where the Zulus aired their dissatisfaction with the land allotment were around Durban black townships like Kwa-Mashu which had not yet been incorporated into the homeland.

On the other hand, Whites living either in areas which had been included into Kwa-Zulu, or those who lived in the immediate vicinity of Kwa-Zulu areas felt concerned about their security for the present and after Kwa-Zulu gained independence. Farmers in the South Coast came out strongly attacking the government consolidation plans. They expressed fears that the South Coast, to be surrounded by black land—would become "a serious Port St. Johns." Mr George Alison, a South Coast farmer, expressing these fears said that the South African Government should be big enough to admit that it had made a mistake with the South Coast.¹⁰⁵

Another South Coast farmer, Mr L. du Plessis, said, "Nationalists were bluffing themselves if they believed that the Government's consolidation plan would work. It would result in White areas being cut off from the rest of South Africa and would lead to endless problems."¹⁰⁶ At an annual congress of the white Natal Agricultural Union held in Durban in September 1975, the then Deputy Minister of Bantu Administration and Development, Mr Punt Janson, gave some assurance to the "concerned" Whites that consolidation would only be completed

in at least ten years time. He was saying this to farmers living on farms sharing a common boundary with Kwa-Zulu, Lesotho and Swaziland. These farmers were reporting a deteriorating situation of stock theft and cases of clashes with Blacks over cattle being grazed in their (White) farms. Mr Janson recommended that the system of fencing farms be implemented "to avoid serious clashes."¹⁰⁷

Constitutional and Political Developments

Kwa-Zulu had resolved not to go for elections using the South African passbooks but rather to use Kwa-Zulu citizenship certificates and that at least the minimum of two million citizens need to take out the certificates. By October 1975 just over 750 000 certificates had been issued. Disclosing the figure in a speech to the Kwa-Zulu Legislative Assembly, the Commissioner General to the Zulu ethnic unit, Mr P. H. Torlage, said that to reach the two million mark, "pressure in some form," would have to be "brought to bear on citizens to apply for certificates."¹⁰⁸

Much as the registered citizens were not yet half the two million target, signs of preparation for the general elections could be observed during the October 1975 session of the Kwa-Zulu Legislative Assembly. The significant feature was the introduction, by the Councillor for Community Affairs, Mr Walter Khanye, of a motion reorganising Kwa-Zulu's electoral divisions with talk of an election as soon as a date could be settled with the SA Government. However, the motion, which was seconded by Chief Buthelezi, the Kwa-Zulu Chief Executive Councillor, sought to entrench the use of citizenship certificates as a means of voter identification.¹⁰⁹

A cabinet decision in April 1976 mandated Chief Buthelezi to inform Commissioner General Torlage, of a decision to have elections before 31 December 1977. This would enable Kwa-Zulu to move into the second stage of development bringing it to par with the other self-governing Bantustans like Lebowa, Bophutha-Tswana, etc. The Minister of Bantu Administration, Mr M. C. Botha, had made the general election issue a condition for the development of Kwa-Zulu into the last phase before a decision on independence could be considered. Meanwhile, developments and events in the Bantustan over the past couple of years have served to indicate what constitutional direction Kwa-Zulu was likely to assume in the future. The only Bantustan to have a single paramount chief recognised as a monarch for the whole territory, Kwa-Zulu has gone through thick and thin to evolve a special overseer non-executive role for the king.

In March 1975, as had been predicted by several observers during 1974-75, Inkatha ka-Zulu, as revived and reorganised gradually since

1972, was launched as a "National Cultural Liberation Movement" with the following aims:

- (a) To foster the spirit of unity among the people of Kwa-Zulu throughout Southern Africa, and between them and all their African brothers in Southern Africa, and to keep alive and foster the traditions of the people;
- (b) To help promote and encourage the development of the people of KwaZulu, spiritually, economically, educationally and politically;
- (c) To establish contact and liaise with other cultural groups in Southern Africa with a view to the establishment of a common society;
- (d) To stamp out all forms of corruption, exploitation of man by man and intimidation;
- (e) To ensure acceptance of the principles of equal opportunity and treatment for all people in all walks of life;
- (f) To co-operate with any movement or organisation for the improvement of the conditions of the people and to ensure the most efficient production and equitable distribution of the wealth of the nation in the best interests of the people;
- (g) To abolish all forms of discrimination and segregation based on tribe, clan, sex, colour or creed;
- (h) To promote and support worthy indigenous customs and cultures;
- (i) To protect, encourage and promote trade, commerce, industry, agriculture and conservation of natural resources by all means in the interests of the people and encourage all citizens to participate in all sectors of the economy;
- (j) To give effect to the principles approved from time to time by the appropriate organs of the Movement;
- (k) To ensure observance of the fundamental freedoms and human rights;
- (l) To inculcate and foster a vigorous consciousness of patriotism and a strong sense of national unity based on a common and individual loyalty and devotion to our land;
- (m) To co-operate locally and internationally with all progressive African and other national movements and political parties which work for the complete eradication of all forms of colonialism, racialism, neocolonialism, imperialism and discrimination and to strive for the attainment of African unity; and
- (n) To carry on any other activities which in the opinion of the Movement are conducive to the attainment of the aims and objectives of the National Movement and to do such things as are incidental to the attainment of the above objectives.

Observing the contents of sections (a) and (b) of the aims given above as extracted from the Constitution of the Movement, one could make out that Inkatha was launched to unite citizens of KwaZulu under a single leadership. However, as time went on there emerged more talk, particularly from Inkatha public officers, of the movement being a national organisation geared for the total emancipation of the South African black community as a whole. A number of people expressed views in disagreement with the idea in that because Inkatha had been established under the banner of an apartheid organ it could not qualify for a national unity movement which should ideally owe no allegiance to ethnicism. Articulating this view in a Heroes' Day speech, an exponent of the Black Consciousness Movement and member of the Black People's Convention, Mr Madikwe Manthata, warned that the new image of Inkatha, as recently portrayed, might herald an air of "Zulu imperialism" which would bring about tribal flare-ups. In a subsequent interview with *Black Review* Manthata pointed out that even the leadership structure of Inkatha, which was said to be geared to cater and represent the entire black population, was actually planned under "a Zulu tribal mental framework."

Supporting his statement Manthata quoted extracts from Chapter Three of the Inkatha constitution which read as follows:¹¹⁰

"Ungonyama, the king of the Zulu people and his successors, shall be the Patron-in-chief of the Movement, and likewise all Chiefs and Deputy-Chiefs shall be the Patrons of the Movement in their respective regions, areas or wards". Citing the section which gives qualifications for election into the office of the President of the Movement he quoted:

"A member of the Movement shall not be qualified to be a candidate for the office of the President unless he is a citizen of Kwa-Zulu constitution and qualified for election to the office of Chief Minister".

And further safety measurements which read:

"If a person elected as President of the Movement is not elected as Chief Minister of Kwa-Zulu, he shall continue to be the President of the Movement until another person elected as President of the Movement at the General Conference and such other person shall then be the sole candidate for election to the office of Chief Minister of Kwa-Zulu".

No person shall be eligible for election as a member of the Central Committee unless he:

- is a Kwa-Zulu citizen;
- is literate and conversant with languages of Kwa-Zulu;
- and is a registered voter for the purpose of the (Kwa-Zulu Legislative Assembly elections.

When *Black Review* put the question to the Witwatersrand Kwa-Zulu Urban Representative, Mr Gibson Thula, he clarified the position

and said that the Zulu people had always been interested in national unity and opposed to apartheid and that they accepted the Kwa-Zulu Bantustan platform because the SA Government left them with no choice; and that they were now using Kwa-Zulu as a springboard to foster unity of all black people in a way that avoided confrontation with the Government and further hardships for the community.

Mr Thula, describing the outlook of Inkatha, explained that Inkatha was not itself a political party but a political liberation movement to which political parties, cultural and other community organisations could be affiliated. This would offer a battleground for rival political parties to compete for domination of Inkatha. He saw this measure as a safety-valve to avoid unnecessary party quibbling in the Legislative Assembly which could retard progress. However, the national council of Inkatha, in a one day session at Nongoma in January 1976, passed a unanimous resolution rejecting the formation of political parties in Kwa-Zulu. The council noted that the Zulus were still bound in chains and that their primary goal was to free the "nation" of these chains. On this there could be no argument. "Therefore we can see no reason for the formation of political parties in Kwa-Zulu."

This resolution, viewed with the background of Mr Thula's explanation of Inkatha's attitude to political parties, could be interpreted to mean that, much as Kwa-Zulu political parties would ideally be welcome as affiliates in the movement, formation of such parties at this stage would not be tolerated.¹¹¹

Economy

The economy of Kwa-Zulu has seen no substantial improvements during the period under review. Outside income from community, social and personal service by public administration, education, health and other services, the main contribution to the gross domestic product has been that of agriculture and related industries. It has been reported that only 12,1% of Kwa-Zulu is being utilised for Kwa-Zulu while the territory has a total of 18,7% of arable land. Whereas plant production offers the largest contribution to agricultural produce beef farming takes the lead in the contribution made by stock farming. Most national agricultural income comes from the Government sponsored projects like those of the Bantu Investment Corporation (BIC), mainly because most of the Kwa-Zulu population is only engaged in subsistence farming.

As at March 1975, there were nine working mines in Kwa-Zulu with a black labour force of 307. The key minerals mined were dolerite and kaolin. For the period from April 1975 to March 1976 the Bantu Mining Corporation (BMC) was spending more than 90% of its total Kwa-Zulu expenditure on prospecting for other mineral deposits

chiefly copper, nickel and coal. By August 1975 there were reports of a scramble by small S.A. mining companies for a deal for rights to mine coal deposits discovered in the territory. According to geological surveys by the South African Fuel Research Institute there could be deposits as high as 200 tons of anthracite coal in the area.¹¹²

By and large the Kwa-Zulu population had to either work outside the territory as migrant workers or as regular commuters. Earnings from such people constituted 97,8% and 98,3% of the gross national income in 1970 and 1973 respectively. These figures represented a growing dependency of the Kwa-Zulu community on the South African industries for employment. This state of affairs is a result of the traditional South African industrial planning where the 'native reserves' served as a labour reservoir. Supporting this view Kwa-Zulu Chief Minister Chief, Gatsha Buthelezi, said, "Black people who should have developed these areas have for more than a century been drawn to the metropolitan areas of South Africa to accelerate development there."¹¹³

Chief Buthelezi has made endless calls and appeals to industrialists at home and abroad to invest in Kwa-Zulu in the course of what he called trying to right the "intentional and calculated" by-passing of "native reserves" in the past.¹¹⁴ Besides the few other private business concerns in the territory the economy has always been dominated by the Bantu Investment Corporation.

Outlining his economic policy Chief Gatsha said that he advocated "the African brand of socialism which is not exclusive of a reasonable measure of free enterprise." He said just as socialist Tanzania still entered into partnerships with capitalist countries, he saw no reason why Kwa-Zulu should not have partnership with white concerns on a 50-50 basis.¹¹⁵ In pursuance of this policy, the Chief proposed tri-partite deals involving the public corporation operating in Kwa-Zulu, the white establishment concerned and private shareholders forming a third party. This arrangement was to be put into practice with regard to chain stores involving Checkers, which was to set up supermarkets in various African townships under Kwa-Zulu administration. African traders in these townships objected strongly to this proposal because they felt that it would strangle the small businessmen. However, the Kwa-Zulu administration would not allow traders to "dictate development policy."

Other package deals involving the Kwa-Zulu government included the following:

—The Trans-Tugela Transport Company which was forced to sell to Kwa-Zulu Holdings (a Kwa-Zulu Government backed company) when bus boycotts over fare increases bled the company to huge losses.¹¹⁶

—An agreement in principle with the Holiday Inn group to build a multi-racial hotel of international standard at Ulundi, the new Kwa-

Zulu capital, on a 50-50 basis. The Bantu Investment Corporation was to make the second partner with the Holiday Inns on behalf of the Kwa-Zulu Government.¹¹⁷

—A five year plan to develop a R7 million plant to make detergent raw materials to be put up in Kwa-Zulu was announced in January 1976 by the managing director of Chemical Holdings, Mr John Jotson. The plant would be built on an eight hectare site at Isithebe which, together with the building, was to be leased from the Kwa-Zulu Government for an initial 35 year period at a low rental.¹¹⁸ In addition a R6 000 loan had been obtained from the BIC, besides the usual decentralisation incentives for which the Company would qualify. The three raw materials to be produced were dodecyle-benzine-sulphuric-acid, sodium-layryl-ether-sulphate and sodium-layryle sulphate. A special company, Akulu Chemicals, had been formed to handle this venture, with joint ownership by Chemical Holdings and Akzo Chemic (Akzo is a Dutch company providing the technology).

Lebowa

Land Claims and Consolidation

Lebowa, a Transvaal Bantustan covering an area 2,2 million¹¹⁹ hectares in 14 separate pieces, is one of those Bantustans which have rejected the idea of independence before complete consolidation of the land apportioned to them. While the Government has prepared proposals finally reducing the number of Lebowa separate pieces to six,¹²⁰ the people of Lebowa are believed not to be satisfied with the proposals. Interviewed by *Black Review*, the former Minister of Interior in Lebowa and a Leader of the Lebowa People's Party, Mr Collins Ramusi, said "If the white man wants to have a consolidated Lebowa, he must be prepared to cede to Lebowa almost all Transvaal soil". Mr Ramusi said this expressing a belief that most of the Transvaal province of South Africa traditionally belonged to the Pedi tribe which makes up the Lebowa population. However, in the interest of healthy brotherly relations Lebowa was prepared to accommodate the presence of other groups living in the Transvaal namely, the Tsonga of Gazankulu, the Venda of Vendaland, the Whites of South Africa and the Tswana of Bophutha-Tswana. In recognition of this, steps towards a United Transvaal were taken by Lebowa in the quest for amalgamation with the other neighbouring Bantustans like Gazankulu and Vendaland. According to Mr Ramusi, these amalgamation moves collapsed because the leaders involved turned out to be working at cross purposes.

The dissatisfaction factor over Lebowa land consolidation proposals has been largely responsible for the Bantustan refusing to consider independence. Projecting this view to *Black Review*, Lebowa's Collins Ramusi went further and said "actually Lebowa never wanted to exclude itself from the rest of the country. Lebowa believes in freedom as South Africans not as Lebowa citizens." Talking on the same issue, the Chief Minister of Lebowa, Dr Cedric Phatudi, warned tribal chiefs not to be enticed into accepting the idea of independence.¹²¹ Addressing a crowd at Huma Township, Stilfontein, Dr Phatudi said he did not see how so many homelands could be independent when they occupied only 13% of the land and yet the population ratio was 5:1 to that of those who occupied 87% of the land. "We in Lebowa cannot be bluffed by the deceptive idea of independence of the homeland. We shall not agree to it." said the Chief Minister. He added, "The Government speaks in glorious terms of independence and separate development and yet the more we get involved in the system the more we get frustrated when we see it is unworkable."¹²²

Constitutional and Political Developments

During the period under review there has been no change in the constitutional status of Lebowa. According to usual development stages of South African Bantustans, Lebowa was ready to accept independence which would introduce new constitutional developments. A new Ministry of Health, which is usually the last before independence status can be assumed, came into effect in April 1976. The 1976 session of the Lebowa Legislative Assembly, which opened at the end of March, started off in confusion with the only political party, the Lebowa People's Party, coming with two elected leaders each claiming to be head of the Party. The trouble started in December 1975 when the Party president, Dr Cedric Phatudi, was ousted¹²³ as leader by a Congress of the Party attended by about 300 delegates. The former Interior Minister and deputy leader of the party, Mr Collins Ramusi, was elected to replace Dr Phatudi who was not present at the Congress on the grounds that he had not authorised it.¹²⁴

Relations between Mr Ramusi and Dr Phatudi became sour towards the middle of 1975 apparently through differences over the Bantu Investment Corporation. There had been a misunderstanding between Lebowa Government and the BIC over some project undertaken by the latter without the approval of the former¹²⁵ and before this issue was resolved Dr Phatudi accompanied the BIC Manager, Dr J. Adendorff, to attend Investment Seminars in London and Amsterdam. Mr Ramusi publicly expressed disquietude over what he called "co-operating closely with Dr Adendorff in view of the unresolved quarrel with BIC".¹²⁶

On his return from Europe the Chief Minister asked Mr Ramusi to resign from the Cabinet. Mr Ramusi refused to comply, while in the interim, the Chief Minister sought and acquired powers to expel Ministers from his cabinet if he so wished. However, a delegation from the Lebowa People's Party warned Dr Phatudi not to use the powers against Mr Ramusi.¹²⁷ The axe came through after a three hour cabinet meeting on the 25 July when Dr Phatudi gave Mr Ramusi a letter of dismissal.¹²⁸

Subsequently reports filtered from Lebowa that at least three cabinet ministers were unhappy about Mr Ramusi's expulsion and were in favour of a special congress of the ruling party to resolve the dispute.¹²⁹ This call was supported by Party Secretary General, Mr C. L. Mothiba. Further reports alleged that the Chief Minister was under day and night police guard in fear of possible repercussions.¹³⁰

Over the next few months Dr Phatudi refused to call a Congress to discuss the issue, whereupon Mr Ramusi, in his capacity as chairman and deputy leader of the party, called a congress which ousted the Chief Minister from the ruling party leading position.¹³¹ When the Lebowa Legislative Assembly opened at the end of March 1976, most members showed no particular preference for any of the two leaders. *Black Review* established from interviews with several Lebowa members of Assembly that moves were being made to reunite the two gentlemen.

Economy

In Lebowa, as is the case in other Bantustans as well, the Bantu Investment Corporation has been responsible for most industrial developments as well as the running of key commercial enterprises. During 1975 the Lebowa Government sought to establish the Lebowa Development Corporation to take over BIC assets and liabilities in the territory.¹³²

Although, according to Mr Ramusi, Bantu Administration and Development Minister, Mr M. C. Botha, had agreed to the formation of the LDC headed by six white and eight black directors, Pretoria did not readily move on the idea.¹³³

No mention was made of a Development Corporation for Lebowa when Bantu Administration and Development Minister, M. C. Botha, in reply to a question in Parliament on 23 March 1976, enumerated the Development Corporations that had already been established by his Department for some Bantustans.¹³⁴

Bophuthatswana

Land Claims and Consolidation

The question of consolidation of land allotted to Bophuthatswana, which has always been regarded as of priority to the independence issue itself, remained unsolved by 1976. Chief Mangope's view had always been that Bantustans needed to be given more land than had been envisaged in the 1936 Land Act. As late as February 1976 he was quoted to say: "We have insufficient land in Bophuthatswana and even that is in pieces. We reject the 1936 Land Act as a basis for apportioning land because the present position was not taken into account and we were not even consulted."¹³⁵ He added however, that Mr Vorster had said that even after independence negotiations would remain open on the land issue.

Discussing the implications of independence for consolidation in an article, which appeared on a project publication, the director and the senior researcher of the African Institute of South Africa, Dr J. H. Moolman and Dr P. S. Hattingh, said that the completion of the 1936 (consolidation) phase could not be seen as the end of the process of forming (released) areas and that a new phase, probably on a new basis in which Whites and Tswana could hold joint consultation, was foreseeable. They said "Whites and Tswana leaders will have to reach an agreement on further territorial adjustments with a view to the efficient functioning of Bophuthatswana as an independent state. Even another state, Botswana, of which the population is also Tswana can become involved in this matter because Bophuthatswana is situated on its border."¹³⁶

Dr Moolman and Dr Hattingh pointed out that the Bantu Land Act of 1913 was the first attempt to arrange occupation of land by Blacks and resulted in a total of 53 fragmented units covering 1,2 million hectares being established for Tswanas. In 1936 an increase in land allocated to Blacks was recommended and the number of Tswana units was reduced to 36. The consolidation process further reduced this number to 18 units and eight in 1972. The final proposals for Bophuthatswana were made known in 1973 and reduced the number of land units to six. These proposals have, however, not yet been accepted by the South African Parliament.¹³⁷

Independence Plans

The campaign for Bophuthatswana citizens to seek independence for the Bantustan, as launched by Chief Minister, Lucas Mangope, came into the open in various stages as the unexpected move began to crystallize late in 1975. Chief Mangope first called a meeting of more

than 80 Tswana chiefs and at least 160 Tswana headmen who passed a resolution mandating him to press for independence.¹³⁸ The meeting came only a few days before the annual conference of the ruling Bophuthatswana Democratic Party which gave him a similar mandate.¹³⁹ This led to a special legislative assembly session which met late in November and passed a motion calling on the Cabinet to start negotiations for independence.¹⁴⁰ Chief Mangope, referring to possible non-recognition of his independent Bantustan by the international community, urged citizens of Bophuthatswana to adopt a soft, calm and non-militant attitude. He expressed his belief that a spirit of goodwill, mutual co-existence and trust between the Tswanas and the Whites of South Africa should continue after independence as it would be necessary for Whites to continue to help them.

At the special session in which the independence question was debated, Chief Mangope had next to him the first Bantustan leader to opt for independence, Chief Kaizer Matanzima of the Transkei, whose presence observers saw as a moral booster for Chief Mangope. The Transkei leader had already come out in open support of the Bophuthatswana move in a statement when he took issue with those who queried the decision of any Bantustan to move into the final stages of apartheid (separate development) and negotiate for independence.¹⁴¹

In February 1976, Chief Mangope met the South African Prime Minister, Mr John Vorster, for independence talks. An official communique after the meeting revealed that joint committees had been appointed to determine an independence date as soon as possible. In the statement Mr Vorster reiterated that it was his policy to grant independence to any Bantustan that sought it. In terms of their agreement the Bophuthatswana Cabinet would be responsible for drafting an independence constitution to be approved by the Bophuthatswana Legislative Assembly; but a working committee as well as a cabinet committee consisting of representatives from both sides would work out the details.¹⁴²

The Chief Minister of Gazankulu, Professor Ntsanwisi, reacting to the Bophuthatswana independence steps and strongly criticising Chief Mangope: said "I am not going to give away my birth-right of being a South African by opting for independence, because it would cause me to lose what I am striving for."¹⁴³

Including Chief Matanzima in his attack Professor H. Ntsanwisi added, "We had agreed at a summit meeting at Umtata that any homeland wishing to become independent should consult the others, but so far those who have decided on independence have not taken us into their confidence."¹⁴⁴

In Bophuthatswana itself rejection of independence came mainly from opposition parties. A meeting of more than 500 delegates organised

by the opposition Seoposengwe and the Bophuthatswana National Parties, led by chiefs Tidimane Pilane and Hammond Maseloane respectively, unanimously opposed the move. Attacking Chief Mangope, Chief Maseloane said that he was a puppet used by Pretoria to sell the birthright of his own people. "What we need today is more black unity and solidarity and not fragmentation into backyards, said to be independent, yet nothing more than backyards of South Africa," he declared. He added, "Events today show that if war should be declared on South Africa, both Black and White will have to stand together to defend the country but we cannot defend a country we know we do not belong to."¹⁴⁵

Chiefs belonging to opposition parties were the only ones who did not vote in favour of independence at Mangope's 1975 meeting of chiefs and headmen which gave him the initial go ahead.

Economy

Because of the climatic factors prevailing in Bophuthatswana, the bulk of the land ($\pm 93,4\%$) is used largely for pastoral farming and for other non-agricultural activities with only about $6,6\%$ of arable land.

Beef farming makes by far the greatest contribution to stock farming. Revenue producing agriculture is largely dominated by the Bantu Investment Corporation which rents land either from a tribe in Bophuthatswana or from the South African Bantu Trust with permission from the Bophuthatswana Government. It is common practice for the Bophuthatswana Department of Agriculture to commission the BIC to run some Government agricultural projects. The declared intention on the part of the BIC is to sell its business undertakings, including agricultural projects, to local African entrepreneurs after a certain pre-determined period of time, or to make the shares of the companies available for black ownership.

In so far as mining is concerned Bophuthatswana has got a higher potential than the rest of the Bantustans. During the period between April 1975 and March 1976 the Bantu Mining Corporation spent large amounts of money on further prospecting and exploration with promising results. Presently there are 25 mines in operation in the territory, yielding deposits of platinum, granite, limestone, asbestos and manganese. These mines employ 61 023 people, the majority of whom are non-Tswanas.

Outside basic subsistence farming the people of Bophuthatswana do not have much opportunities to generate income. In 1970 income earned outside Bophuthatswana constituted $97,7\%$ of the gross national income. The Bophuthatswana Government, in conjunction with the South African Government, continued to invite both local and foreign industrialists to set up industries in the territory. These

efforts have included trade visits by Chief Minister Lucas Mangope and BIC officials to countries abroad. One such event was in October 1975 when Chief Mangope visited New Zealand to seek investments and trade links for his homeland. However, Chief Mangope was snubbed by the New Zealand Government.¹⁴⁶

In a further bid to attract foreigners to invest in Bophuthatswana, Chief Mangope announced in November 1975 that his Government was to waive restrictions with regard to investments by foreign based industrialists. The restrictions prevented localisation of foreign industries until 25 years after the original date of investment. He further declared that he wished to emphasise that his government "disassociates itself from claims for majority black shareholding or even minimum shareholding as a prerequisite for the establishment of industry on a permanent basis, as this will generate anxiety of interference and future takeovers." "In fact", he continued, "my government guarantees free enterprise after Bophuthatswana's independence on the basis of an intergrated economy."¹⁴⁷

According to information published in the *Economic Revue* by the semi-official Bureau for Economic Research re-Bantu Development known as Benbo, a survey in 1972 indicated that less than 14% of the income earned by the Bophuthatswana population was actually spent in Bophuthatswana. In an attempt to block this vast leakage of purchasing power, the Bophuthatswana Government has been investigating possibilities of establishing chain stores in the Bantustan.

General Issues

The two opposition parties in Bophuthatswana, the Seoposengwe and the Bophuthatswana National Parties which were both opposed to Chief Mangope's independence moves, joined forces in February 1976 and merged into a united Seoposengwe National Party. By March indications of disagreement over the question of leadership arose. Chief Maseloane, former leader of Bophuthatswana National Party, had been elected leader of the new party and Chief Tidimane Pilane, former leader of the Seoposengwe Party, deputy leader. Within the first month of the merger Chief Pilane resigned as deputy leader because of dissatisfaction with the election of Chief Maseloane as leader. "I chose Chief M. K. Molete as leader of the new party but things were done in such a hurry that I hardly had time to put forward this suggestion," the Chief complained and added that if the leadership changed he could reconsider his resignation.¹⁴⁸

Meanwhile Chief Pilane indicated that he would consider any offer made to him by Mangope to join the ruling party, and in turn the Chief Minister said he would welcome Chief Pilane into his ruling

party. Even at this stage though, Chief Pilane still reiterated his total opposition to the moves towards independence taken by Chief Mangope. He said, "Homelands who seek independence, including Bophuthatswana are committing national suicide." Calling for a referendum to be held among the Tswana people to decide on the independence question, he warned that the South African Government was creating a dangerous situation by dividing Blacks into ethnic groups and forcing them into mini-states. "I do not think Chief Mangope has the support of the majority of the Tswanas for his independence moves", he concluded.

The Bophuthatswana Legislative Assembly Recess Committee recommended Dinokana, a place 30 kilometres west of Zeerust along the Botswana border, as the site for the capital of Bophuthatswana. The Mafeking Town Council was disappointed with the recommendation because many Mafeking businessmen who were dependent on Tswana customers had nursed hopes that a site near Mafeking (the present provisional administrative headquarters) would be chosen.

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