

**Anti-Apartheid Movement
and the
United Nations**



**Statements
and
papers
of
Abdul S. Minty**

Edited by
E. S. Reddy

ANTI-APARTHEID MOVEMENT AND THE UNITED NATIONS

Statements, papers and letters of Abdul S. Minty, honorary secretary of the British Anti-Apartheid Movement and director of the World Campaign against Military and Nuclear Collaboration with South Africa

Edited by

E. S. Reddy

Foreword by

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FOREWORD

Nothing could be more timely than the publication at this moment of the present book. There is a great danger of too many books being written about the New South Africa that the public will become confused and even apathetic. For one thing, many of these books are written by people who have had purely journalistic experience of South Africa. Others are written deliberately to undermine the claims of the hungry world on the conscience of the affluent world. This book brings together statements, papers and letters of one of those who was born and bred in the great Asian community of Southern Africa, who has spent years of life in exile as a consequence of his commitment and who has played a major part in the struggle for liberation.

I have had the privilege of knowing Abdul S. Minty in South Africa itself during the years when I was there between 1943 and 1956, so I can truthfully say that I have known him and his work for over forty years. His contribution as Director of the World Campaign against Military and Nuclear Collaboration with South Africa, between 1979 and 1994, was unique and of overriding significance. In the early years, of course, like all those fighting apartheid, he was disregarded outside the company of activists against racism. In the last ten years and more he was invited, because of his expert knowledge, to meetings of Commonwealth Heads of Government and other vitally important meetings like those of SADCC and the European Union.

The quality which characterises Abdul for me is his total integrity, often in the face of criticism even from those deeply involved in the struggle. He has always been concerned with Truth, regardless of whether it would be comfortable for himself. As Honorary Secretary of the Anti-Apartheid Movement, his judgment has been invaluable because it has always been too easy for enthusiasts to be carried away by their own enthusiasm to the detriment of hard facts and human frailties. I have often attended gatherings such as the annual general meetings of the Anti-Apartheid Movement where resolutions were put forward which sounded splendid until Abdul spoke and pointed out the flaws in the argument. Everyone should read his campaigning strategy document entitled "Southern Africa: A New Agenda for International Solidarity", originally presented to the "International Conference: Southern Africa - Making Hope a Reality" held in London in June 1993.

We are beginning to realise the enormous cost paid by the people of Southern Africa as a result of years and years of apartheid evil. The only way in which our debt can be adequately paid is by responding to President Mandela's call for massive economic support in restructuring the whole of Southern African society. Education, health, local government and housing must be the priorities, but these priorities will cost billions. It is not enough for European governments and European businessmen to take note of President Mandela's speeches. What is needed is action. The North should be prepared to recognise that investment in Africa is a priority.

The drawing up of a new agenda for international solidarity has become the most urgent priority at this time of transition from serfdom and slavery over the past centuries and the development of democratic structures based on justice and human dignity for the future.

Trevor Huddleston CR
President, Anti-Apartheid Movement

London
October 1994

INTRODUCTION

Nelson Mandela and other leaders of South Africa have repeatedly acknowledged that the triumph of freedom in South Africa was the result of a common struggle of the South African people and the international community.

The struggle at the international level was led by an alliance of governments, non-governmental organisations and individuals committed unequivocally to support of the South African liberation movement. Through their efforts, the United Nations, the Non-aligned Movement and the Organisation of African Unity, as well as numerous trade unions, churches, and organisations of students and youth, women and other segments of the population, became actively involved. The struggle was carried on not only in chancelleries and inter-governmental forums, but in parliaments and local governments, universities and sports fields, factories and stores, especially in Western countries.

The anti-apartheid movements played a key role in mobilising the people in action to isolate the apartheid regime in South Africa and assist the liberation movement. They undertook direct action to press their governments to impose sanctions against South Africa and support United Nations action against apartheid; and fought vested interests in their countries which were deeply involved in apartheid.

Abdul Samad Minty, one of the founders of the Anti-Apartheid Movement in Britain and its honorary secretary for over three decades, was the foremost spokesman of the anti-apartheid movements and one of the architects of the international alliance against apartheid.

As Principal Secretary of the United Nations Special Committee against Apartheid since its inception in 1963 and head of the UN Centre against Apartheid, I have had the pleasure of working in constant consultation with him in promoting cooperation between the United Nations, the Organisation of African Unity, the liberation movement and the anti-apartheid movements.

When the Special Committee began its work, one of the first letters we received was from "S. Abdul" offering cooperation of the British Anti-Apartheid Movement. That movement, however, had no funds to send a representative New York to consult with the Special Committee.

Next year, in February 1964, when I visited London, Oliver Tambo, then Deputy President of the African National Congress and leader of its External Mission, arranged for me to meet Mr. Minty. Oliver greatly appreciated the work of the Anti-Apartheid Movement and valued the dedication and ability of Mr. Minty. He was anxious that there should be regular contact between the Special Committee and the movement.

In April, the Special Committee sent a delegation to the International Conference on Sanctions against South Africa, organised by the Anti-Apartheid Movement, and we were able to have further discussions.

At that time, the foremost concerns of the Anti-Apartheid Movement were the "World Campaign for the Release of South African Political Prisoners" and the campaign for sanctions against South Africa - both of which it shared with the Special Committee.

The World Campaign, headed by Jeremy Thorpe, M.P., was set up in the wake of an emergency resolution of the United Nations General Assembly on October 11, 1963, soon after Nelson Mandela and his colleagues were charged in the "Rivonia Trial". It organised world-wide appeals for the release of Nelson Mandela and other leaders, and sent numerous petitions to the United Nations.

The Anti-Apartheid Movement had also carried on a vigorous campaign for the boycott of South Africa by the public and sanctions against South Africa by governments. The boycott campaign - beginning with a consumer boycott of South African products and extending to boycott of racially selected sports teams from South Africa and boycott of South Africa by musicians, writers and playwrights - provoked wide public interest and debate on apartheid. It helped persuade the British Government which had opposed any international condemnation of apartheid to change its attitude in 1960.

A landmark in the activities of the Movement was a rally in Trafalgar Square in March 1963 at which Harold Wilson, Leader of the Opposition, called for an immediate arms embargo against South Africa. Britain imposed an arms embargo, though with qualifications, when the Labour Party came to power in October 1964, with Harold Wilson as Prime Minister.

The Special Committee appreciated the work of the Anti-Apartheid Movement as supplementing governmental action. But it was not until 1965-66, however, that we fully recognised the vital role of the anti-apartheid movements and the need for closest cooperation, indeed partnership, with them in the international campaign against apartheid.

At the United Nations, there had been almost unanimous condemnation of apartheid after the Sharpeville massacre and the great increase in African membership in 1960. From 1962 the United Nations was able to go beyond verbal condemnation and appeals to South Africa and take some action - such as the decision on an arms embargo, the setting up of a scholarship programme for South Africans and the establishment of a United Nations Trust Fund to assist the political prisoners and their families through humanitarian organisations, particularly the International Defence and Aid Fund for Southern Africa, led by Canon L. John Collins.

However, on sanctions against the South African regime, which was the principal request of the African National Congress, progress was difficult. A resolution calling on all States to terminate economic and other relations with South Africa was adopted by the General Assembly in November 1962, but none of the Western Powers and other main trading partners of South Africa supported it. They even boycotted the Special Committee set up under that resolution - the first and only time they boycotted any United Nations Committee. The Assembly resolution reflected the strong sentiment against apartheid in Africa, Asia and other regions, but had very limited economic effect on South Africa.

In 1963, with massive repression in South Africa, and the formation of the OAU, as well as the goodwill of the Kennedy Administration in the United States, it was possible to obtain a resolution by the Security Council appealing to all States to refrain from selling arms to South Africa. But the resolution was not binding; Britain and France abstained. While Britain announced an embargo in November 1964, France became the main source of arms and continued to supply sophisticated military equipment to South Africa.

A committee set up by the Security Council to study the feasibility of sanctions submitted its report in February 1965: the report was not even considered by the Security Council as it contained no proposals with sufficient support for adoption by the Council. The major Western Powers - particularly France, Britain and the United States which wielded the veto in the Security Council - opposed sanctions or other strong pressure on South Africa. Diplomatic action and representation by African and other governments could not persuade these Powers to change their attitudes and facilitate United Nations action against apartheid. There was thus a deadlock on action at the governmental level.

We realised that our only recourse was to develop public opinion and public pressure inside the Western countries. For this purpose it was essential to find ways to encourage, assist and work with the anti-apartheid movements which were already engaged in this task and had achieved some success.

This new approach was projected in the proposal by the Special Committee, endorsed by the General Assembly in 1966, for an "international campaign against apartheid under the auspices of the United Nations" involving action by governments and the public. It began to be actively pursued after the Special Committee held a session in Stockholm, London and Geneva in June 1968 for extensive consultations with the anti-apartheid movements and others. The United Nations to encourage and actively support sports, cultural and other boycotts of South Africa, launch an information campaign on apartheid and promote the activities of anti-apartheid movements and other organisations, particularly in Western countries.

The Special Committee established closest relations with the anti-apartheid movements. Leaders of those movements were no longer petitioners before the

Committee but honoured guests. They were invited to all conferences and seminars organised by the Special Committee, with full rights of participation, and were elected as officers. No United Nations committee had ever developed such intimate relations with non-governmental organisations.

Mr. Minty played an important role in developing this relationship between the anti-apartheid movements and the United Nations.

Mr. Minty was born in South Africa on October 31, 1939, and grew up in Johannesburg. He studied at the Central Indian High School which had been established by the Indian community when the apartheid regime moved the Indian secondary school from Johannesburg to the segregated Indian location of Lenasia. The CIHS had a multi-racial staff which included some of the prominent leaders of the liberation movement who were a great source of inspiration to Mr. Minty. He left for Britain in 1958 for further studies.

In London he met Father Trevor Huddleston, whom he had known in South Africa, and Canon L. John Collins, President of the Defence and Aid Fund for Southern Africa, and developed a long association with them in efforts to support the South African struggle.

On June 26, 1959, a Boycott South Africa Movement was launched in London, at the request of the African National Congress, by a small group of South Africans and British friends, at a meeting addressed by Father Huddleston and Julius Nyerere. It organised a nation-wide boycott of South African oranges, wine and other consumer products. After the Sharpeville massacre in March 1960, it changed its name to Anti-Apartheid Movement to undertake more comprehensive work on South Africa. Mr. Minty was a founder member of the Boycott Movement. On return to London from a year of studies at Leeds, he was elected honorary secretary of the Anti-Apartheid Movement in 1962 and has been annually re-elected to that post ever since.

Even as a young student, Mr. Minty was most effective in persuading people of varied backgrounds to join in anti-apartheid action and in lobbying Parliaments and other bodies. He was also efficient in developing international contacts to promote anti-apartheid movements and activities in other countries. His lobbying at the International Olympic Committee in 1963 was instrumental in securing the suspension of the racist South African Olympic Committee from the Olympic movement.

Pressed by Oliver Tambo and others, he resumed his studies at the University College, London, and obtained a B.Sc. in International Relations in 1968 and an M.Sc. in 1969. He was a Research Fellow of Richardson Institute for Conflict and Peace Research from 1969 to 1975. His study and research were closely related to his work in the Anti-Apartheid Movement.

As South Africa rapidly built up its military strength, despite the United Nations arms embargo, and began to threaten neighbouring territories, he undertook research on the defence establishment and military plans of the apartheid regime and the support it received from external sources. His study of *South Africa's Defence Strategy*, published in 1969, attracted wide attention and helped develop the campaign by the Anti-Apartheid Movement for the abrogation of the Simonstown Agreement between Britain and South Africa and the ending of all military links with South Africa.

He visited New York in May 1970 to plead for urgent action to close the many loopholes in the United Nations arms embargo against South Africa. The Special Committee and the African Group at the United Nations took action and were able to obtain a resolution by the Security Council, incorporating his suggestions, but France, Britain and the United States abstained on the resolution.

Since then the Chairmen of the Special Committee and I have constantly consulted Mr. Minty on all aspects of the campaign against apartheid. Many of the resolutions of the United Nations on apartheid were based suggestions by him and his colleagues in the Anti-Apartheid Movement.

Mr. Minty was invited to numerous conferences and seminars of the United Nations. The papers he prepared and his contributions to the discussions were always highly valued. He was an effective and persuasive speaker, always meticulous in his research, and his proposals were always sound and practical.

Mr. Minty became one of the few individuals who were invited to speak in the Security Council on several occasions; this reflected the great confidence and regard of African and other States in him.

Close association with the Special Committee, I believe, enabled Mr. Minty to establish wide contacts with leaders of governments in Africa and around the world which proved useful in developing cooperation between committed governments and anti-apartheid movements in action against collaborators with apartheid. He has been highly respected by the leaders of the southern African States, of Nigeria, Nordic countries etc. He has met several Prime Ministers of India - from Pandit Nehru to Mr. P. V. Narasimha Rao - and received full support and encouragement.

While the contribution of Mr. Minty covers all anti-apartheid activities, it was particularly significant and crucial in the efforts to impose an effective arms embargo against South Africa. This collection of his papers and speeches at United Nations meetings and conferences gives special attention to that aspect.

After fifteen years of effort by governments and anti-apartheid movements, the Security Council unanimously imposed a mandatory arms embargo against South Africa, binding on all States, on November 4, 1977. The next month it set up a

committee to study reports from governments on action they had taken and to monitor the implementation of the embargo.

The Committee, however, was unable to discharge its task effectively. Reports by governments were often evasive. The United Nations had no means to discover violations of the embargo and the secret purchases of arms by South Africa. Governments which knew of the illicit trade did not report to the United Nations, even when the sales were by their competitors.

Fortunately, Mr. Minty, the Chairman of the Special Committee (Ambassador Leslie O. Harriman of Nigeria at the time) and I had discussed all aspects of the arms embargo during a conference in Lagos in August 1977. We agreed that it would be most useful if Mr. Minty could set up a World Campaign against Military and Nuclear Collaboration with South Africa, with the support of the anti-apartheid movements, to complement our efforts at the United Nations. The World Campaign was inaugurated in 1979, with the patronage of several African Heads of State and sponsorship of leaders in the West. It had its headquarters in Oslo, with Mr. Minty as director, and received financial support from the governments of Norway and Sweden.

Since then, the World Campaign has been the main source of information to the Security Council Committee on violations of the arms embargo. Mr. Minty appeared before the Committee on several occasions to provide information and to make suggestions on strengthening the embargo. His suggestions were pursued by the Special Committee and African delegations and incorporated in resolutions of the General Assembly or the Security Council.

At the meeting of the Security Council on May 25, 1994, when the arms embargo was finally lifted, the Chairman of the Security Council Committee paid a handsome tribute to Mr. Minty for his cooperation with the Committee.

I have referred particularly to the arms embargo because of the remarkable personal contribution of Mr. Minty and because, despite its weaknesses, the embargo retarded South Africa's military build-up and saved many lives.

The work of the anti-apartheid movement, however, covered a very wide range of activities such as pressing governments to impose sanctions against South Africa, and exposing violations of the arms and oil embargoes; action to force corporations and banks to withdraw investments from South Africa and stop loans to South Africa; sports, cultural and other boycotts; demands for release of political prisoners and honours to Nelson Mandela and other leaders; assistance to the liberation movements; scholarships to South African students; and assistance to conscientious objectors seeking asylum in the West.

The movement, however, was bigger than the numerous campaigns it led. A small group of people - South African exiles and people of conscience in the West

- built the movement which encompassed millions of people who detested apartheid and were inspired by the cause of Chief Luthuli, Nelson Mandela, Oliver Tambo and other leaders of the South African liberation movement who stood firm, despite all the brutal repression, in their vision of a non-racial democratic society. More than ten thousand people in the United States, Britain, New Zealand and Australia even courted imprisonment in solidarity with the people of South Africa - in an international passive resistance movement against the external supporters of apartheid. Governments were forced to change their policies and some were even toppled when they resisted growing public sentiment against apartheid. The movement played a historic role in the 1980s when the Reagan and Thatcher administrations in the United States and Britain sought to protect the Pretoria regime when it used its military power even against children in South Africa and began to devastate neighbouring countries for their support to the liberation movement.

Without the anti-apartheid movement, international support to the South African struggle may have been confined to the Non-aligned and Communist countries. It helped to make solidarity a world-wide effort transcending ideological differences and narrow concepts of national interests. Thirty years of its determined and persistent work was crucial in persuading the racist rulers of South Africa that apartheid has no future and ensuring that the international community as a whole welcomed the birth of a non-racial democratic South Africa.

The history of the anti-apartheid movement - one of the great international people's movements of our time - has many lessons for those interested in causes which need and deserve widest support.

It is a source of great satisfaction to me that I was associated with this movement and I am grateful for the cooperation I received from it in my work at the United Nations. I must record my great appreciation to Mr. Minty for his friendship, advice and cooperation over the long years of the campaign against apartheid. I have also valued the friendship of many of his colleagues in the Movement - like Archbishop Trevor Huddleston, the late Bishop Reeves, Robert Hughes, M.P., David Steel, Mike Terry, Ethel de Keyser, David Haslam and many many others. I must confess that I was proud of the contribution of many Indians and people of Indian origin to the Anti-Apartheid Movement. I must make special mention of Kader Asmal in Ireland (now in the South African Cabinet), Vella Pillai in Britain, and Hanif Bhamjee in Wales with whom I was privileged to be associated.

I have compiled and edited this collection of some speeches, papers and letters of Mr. Minty as a contribution to the study of the work of the anti-apartheid movements and their cooperation with the United Nations - and, indeed, to the study of recent South African history. It is also, in a sense, my tribute to the Anti-Apartheid Movement in Britain which is being dissolved this month after

completion of its task; to Mr. Abdul S. Minty and his colleagues; and to the hundreds of thousands people who have marched year after year in solidarity with the great liberation movement of South Africa.

E. S. Reddy

October 1994

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**UNITED NATIONS, THE ANTI-APARTHEID MOVEMENT AND
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*Statements, papers and letters by Abdul S. Minty, honorary secretary of the
British Anti-Apartheid Movement and director, World Campaign against
Military and Nuclear Collaboration with South Africa*

Compiled and edited by E.S. Reddy in cooperation with the United Nations
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¹ UN document A/AC.115/L.271.

The "Special Committee on the Policies of Apartheid of the Republic of South Africa" was established by the United Nations General Assembly in 1962. Its name was shortened in 1971 to "Special Committee on Apartheid" and changed in 1974 to "Special Committee against Apartheid". The last title is used in all references to that Committee in this book.

² United Nations Unit on Apartheid, Notes and Documents, No. 16/71, April 1971

³ UN document S/PV.1634

⁴ United Nations Unit on Apartheid, Notes and Documents, No. 12/73, May 1973

⁵ From Olav Stokke and Carl Widstrand (eds.) *Southern Africa: The UN-OAU Conference, Oslo, 9-14 April 1973*.

⁶ UN document A/AC.115/L.389

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⁷ UN document A/AC.115/L.408

⁸ UN document A/PV.1829

⁹ United Nations Centre against Apartheid, Notes and Documents,
No. 2/76, January 1976

¹⁰ United Nations Centre against Apartheid, Notes and Documents,
No. 35/76, November 1976

¹¹ UN document S/PV.1992

¹² United Nations Centre against Apartheid, Notes and Documents,
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¹³ UN document A/AC.115/L.485

¹⁴ United Nations Centre against Apartheid, Notes and Documents,
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SOUTH AFRICA'S MILITARY AND NUCLEAR BUILD-UP

Paper submitted to the International NGO Conference for Action against Apartheid, Geneva,
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¹⁵ United Nations Centre against Apartheid, Notes and Documents,
No. 41/78, September 1978

¹⁶ UN document A/AC.115/L.520

¹⁷ United Nations Centre against Apartheid, Notes and Documents,
No. 18/83, April 1983

¹⁸ UN document S/PV.3379

**LETTER TO THE CHAIRMAN OF THE SPECIAL COMMITTEE
AGAINST APARTHEID, TRANSMITTING A STUDY OF SOUTH
AFRICA'S DEFENCE STRATEGY, OCTOBER 8, 1969¹**

We have pleasure in sending you the text of a study of South Africa's defence strategy which is to be published as a booklet by the Anti-Apartheid Movement in October 1969.

The booklet examines South Africa's rapid militarisation during the past ten years, the extent to which she has received overseas help both from private companies and Governments to build up her striking power, and the Pretoria Government's desire to become a Southern Hemispheric Power. The Simonstown Naval Agreement already provides South Africa with Britain as a military ally, but with the imminent withdrawal of the Royal Navy from the Indian Ocean, South Africa is urging major Western Powers to integrate her into the overall Western defence system. Towards this end the Republic is concentrating on establishing fresh economic and military ties with South American States. The booklet also examines South Africa's expansive role in Africa: she already claims that all political developments in southern Africa are of vital interest to her and there is the real danger that South Africa's interests in the region will begin to substantially influence the foreign policies of countries such as Britain, the United States and her other trading partners.

Our Movement has always maintained that the apartheid system constitutes a grave threat to the peace and security of the whole world. With its increased military might and claims to constitute a major regional Power with a security role far outside her own borders, South Africa has added a new dimension to its threat to the peace and security of southern Africa and the rest of the world. In view of the gravity of these developments, it becomes even more urgent to consider action to counteract the apartheid system.

In the capitals of South Africa's major trading partners, business and finance lobbies exert considerable influence over the policies of their respective governments towards the Republic. Interests of small but influential groups with a substantial stake in the apartheid system have all too easily been transformed into government interests. In view of the influence of economic factors in determining policies towards the Republic, it becomes a matter of some importance for these governments to work out a programme of active disengagement from the apartheid system. If this is not done and the present trend of growing economic links continues then we face the real danger of overseas financial and business interests coming into direct confrontation with the forces of liberation in southern Africa - with the real possibility of their governments being urged to intervene

¹ UN document A/AC.115/L.271

against those fighting for human freedom and dignity.

STATEMENT BEFORE THE SPECIAL COMMITTEE AGAINST APARTHEID, MAY 20, 1970²

I should like to express, not only on behalf of the Anti-Apartheid Movement based in London but also on behalf of our counterparts in Ireland, Sweden, Denmark, Norway and Holland, our deep thanks for the close cooperation that has existed between the Special Committee and these organisations in the various parts of Europe. I should also like to thank the Secretary-General of the United Nations for the personal interest and concern he has expressed from time to time over the situation in South Africa and, in particular, for the close cooperation that has existed between us in London and the Secretariat and the Unit on Apartheid...

Whilst it is an honour and a privilege for a representative of the Anti-Apartheid Movement to appear before your Committee and make certain representations, I do so with mixed feelings and this is partly because of the danger of developing a tendency of substituting statements and resolutions as alternatives for action over the question of southern Africa as a whole. It is, of course, true that statements and resolutions can lead to action but a major paradox of our time is that increased international condemnation of apartheid is being accompanied by a growth rather than a reduction of South Africa's economic, diplomatic and political links with the rest of the world.

Growth of South Africa's links with other countries

During the past decade South African foreign missions have increased and their personnel doubled. This represents not only a growth of links with South Africa's traditional trading partners but also the establishment of fresh diplomatic, trade and political links with countries such as Malawi, Uruguay, Colombia and Taiwan.

The United Nations has repeatedly called for a reduction and a total end of all trade with South Africa - and yet, the Pretoria regime has never before traded as much and with as many countries as it does today. South Africa's traditional trading partners have certainly increased their stake in the apartheid system. For example, during the years 1961-1967 the exports of Italy to South Africa increased by 153 per cent; those of France during this period increased by 135 per cent; those of the Federal Republic of Germany by 113 per cent; those of the United States of America by 83 per cent and those of the United Kingdom by 71 per cent. Once again South Africa's increased volume of trade is partly accounted for by the establishment and growth of new trading links with other countries. For example, Japan alone increased its exports between 1961 and 1967 by 205 per cent.

² United Nations Unit on Apartheid, Notes and Documents, No.17/70, May 1970

Let us examine the question of oil. In the early 1960s at the United Nations and elsewhere efforts were made to impose an oil embargo against the Republic of South Africa. Today, not only does South Africa receive more oil, but she has also established reserve supplies in disused mines and international corporations are busily engaged in prospecting for oil in South Africa as well as the international territory of Namibia. South Africa has certainly never been better placed to counteract an oil embargo than at the present time.

Another example that comes to mind is the communication links that South Africa retains through the airline system. Several African countries have had some effect by preventing South African airlines from operating within their countries and from landing at their airports. But again, new routes have been established between South Africa and South American countries, as well as across the Indian Ocean to Australia and New Zealand, and the traditional links now carry more flights to and from South Africa.

If we turn to the arms embargo, which many consider to be the one major advance of the international community against the Republic of South Africa, we find once again total violation of the embargo by France and other countries and also major loopholes in the operation of the embargo by those countries which consider themselves to be complying with the Security Council's resolutions of 1963 and 1964. South Africa is now more powerful than ever before.

Mr. Chairman, I have spoken frankly in this sense, not out of any feeling of despair but in the hope that if we assess the situation accurately and look back on the work of the United Nations and of Member States in relation to southern Africa, then may be that will lead us to more effective action in the future.

I have come to North America and to the United Nations to raise two very urgent issues that confront the international community with regard to southern Africa.

Lives of political detainees in danger

The first relates to the issue of political prisoners in the Republic of South Africa. Your Committee is aware of the fact that fifteen persons have been found dead whilst under detention or interrogation in the Republic of South Africa since 1963. Today there are twenty-two leaders in the Republic of South Africa who are kept in detention after the original charge failed against them, as well as the two witnesses who were brought to court and made allegations of torture. The Anti-Apartheid Movement, as well as our counterparts in the other countries that I have mentioned, have asked me to ask your Special Committee to make representations to ensure that the lives of these twenty-four persons, as well as others in detention in South Africa, are not in jeopardy today. We therefore ask that special initiatives be taken by the Secretary-General with a view to sending

an international legal authority or other eminent person to the Republic of South Africa in order to see that these men and women are alive and well. In this connection your Committee is no doubt aware that students who have been demonstrating in protest against the detention of the twenty-two African leaders have been flung into prison and that other students have had their meetings and demonstrations banned.

I hope very much that the Special Committee will respond to the statement made by the International Defence and Aid Fund for Southern Africa, at its annual conference held in London on 9 and 10 May, referring to the deaths of six people in prison in South Africa during 1969 and of fifteen people since 1963, and calling on governments and international organisations, as well as national committees all over the world to ensure that a similar fate does not befall any of the twenty-two.

With regard to the question of political prisoners, our movement welcomes the resolution of the United Nations General Assembly late last year recommending that those engaged in guerrilla combat in southern Africa should be treated as if they are prisoners of war. On this subject, we have made recommendations to your Committee when it came to London in 1968.

Increasing military collaboration with South Africa

The second urgent point to which I wish to draw your Committee's attention, Mr. Chairman, relates to the growing strength of South Africa today.

The Republic of South Africa is today the most powerful State in southern Africa. Following a decade of rapid militarisation it has emerged as the dominant regional power with its armed forces engaged in battles far outside its own borders. But in addition to becoming a regional power the Pretoria Government has ambitions to develop into a hemispheric power. Within the past few years South Africa has established naval links with countries in South America, and in 1971 Argentinian ships are once again due to take part in joint naval exercises with the South African Navy. There has been widespread speculation that South Africa and Portugal, together with Argentina and Brazil, intend to form a South Atlantic Treaty Organisation. There have also been reports suggesting that the Republic of South Africa has entered into naval arrangements with Australia and New Zealand to cover the Indian Ocean area.

A recent leak in a British newspaper suggests that the Conservative opposition party is considering a defence treaty to be established between South Africa, Britain, Portugal, Brazil and Argentina. But even more remarkable than these developments is the prospect, which we have mentioned in our publication on *South Africa's Defence Strategy*, of NATO entering into a military arrangement with South Africa.

Sir Alec Douglas-Home, ex-British Prime Minister and now Shadow Foreign Secretary, discussed with South African leaders in 1968 a plan to put the Cape Sea route under the protective wing of NATO. A number of similar proposals have found their way into recent issues of specialised military journals, some issued from NATO headquarters and others published in countries which are members of NATO.

These developments, Mr. Chairman, concern us because we believe that a move is afoot to encourage further military collaboration with the Republic of South Africa. We have already made representations to a few members of NATO, including the United States and Canada, and we hope that the Security Council will draw attention to these developments and adopt a far-reaching arms embargo resolution. In the United Kingdom, the Conservative Party will now be campaigning for the general election announced for next month. The Conservative Party has always been committed to relaxing the partial arms embargo operated by the Labour Government since 1964. But recent speeches and statements by Conservative leaders alarm us because they not only cover the relaxation of the arms embargo but envisage the extension of the Simonstown Agreement and possible arrangements with NATO to help defend South Africa's so-called interest in the Indian and Atlantic Oceans.

With your permission, Mr. Chairman, I should like to quote a statement made by the Rt. Hon. Geoffrey Rippon, Member of Parliament and Defence spokesman for the Conservative Party. He said on October 21, 1969:

"Let me make this clear. A Conservative Party will reverse the present policy on the sale of arms. A Conservative Government will make full use of the Simonstown Agreement, fulfil our obligations under it and build upon it. In accordance with our clear commitment we will join with South Africa in playing our full part together in the strategic defence of the Cape route and of the South Atlantic and Indian Oceans, not only in our own interests but in those of NATO and the whole free world."

You will understand, Mr. Chairman, why we feel a sense of urgency over this question in view of the general election. But there is not only the danger of a Conservative Government which will establish closer links with the Republic of South Africa. Earlier this year the Chief of the Western Fleet of Britain visited South Africa on what was supposed to be a normal routine visit before his retirement. We found later that he had had secret high level meetings with the Prime Minister and the Defence Minister of South Africa.

Security Council should cover loopholes in arms embargo

In view of these considerations, the Anti-Apartheid Movements, both of Britain and of the other countries that I have mentioned, feel that it is timely for the Security Council to once again consider the issue of South Africa and the arms embargo and to cover the following loopholes in the embargo.

First, we do not know how many and which Western countries supply military patents to the Republic of South Africa. But we do know that in the short period between 1964 and 1965 - only one year of the operation of the embargo - the Defence Minister of South Africa claimed that the Republic had received more than 120 military patents. We have sought assurances from certain Western governments that they do not supply military patents to South Africa and are awaiting their replies. We hope that a future Security Council resolution on the subject will cover patents because the 1963-64 resolutions do not cover this area.

Second, there is the whole question of other military information which is not covered by patents and South Africa certainly benefits by this kind of military know-how.

Third, in those areas where the arms embargo has been effective, South African arms firms have had no difficulty whatsoever in obtaining capital from Western countries for investment in the domestic armaments industry. The Security Council should demand an end to the flow of finance capital which, directly and indirectly, helps boost the armaments industry in South Africa.

Next is the problem of skilled technicians from Western countries, in particular from Britain, migrating to South Africa and taking up employment in the armaments industry. We hope that Governments will take action to discourage and prevent their nationals from participating in and supporting the arms industry in this way.

Fifth, there is the question of training South African military and police personnel in other countries. There is no doubt that in Britain South African military personnel receive training. We have sought an assurance from the State Department that the United States does not train any such personnel. Once again, we are awaiting a reply.

Sixth, in the nuclear field there is extensive cooperation between Western countries and South Africa. The Security Council resolution should demand an end to this cooperation.

Finally, with regard to the operation of the arms embargo by the Government of the United States and the United Kingdom in particular, we are aware of the fact that the embargo has been compromised by the fact that these Governments continue to supply spare parts for equipment that was already sold to South Africa prior to 1964. For example, the Shackleton aircraft in South Africa are twelve years old and the South African Government has only been able to maintain and use them because they have been assured of continued supplies of spare parts. This is true also for warships and other military equipment. The Security Council resolution which we suggest must ban the supply of spare parts because the embargo itself is made meaningless so long as this type of military equipment continues to reach the Republic of South Africa.

We are often told by Western governments that it is difficult for them to draw a precise line between equipment which can be used for military purposes and equipment which cannot. In our view, when there is doubt, the decisions by these governments should be in favour of an embargo. For example, the United States Government sanctions the sale of light aircraft to South Africa and these small aircraft can be used inside the Republic for security operations. There is also the question of electronic and radar equipment which is at present supplied to the Republic of South Africa.

We ask your Committee and the Member States of the United Nations, in particular the African group, to take initiative to ensure that the Security Council adopts an all-embracing arms embargo to cover all the points that I have raised.

OAU resolution on the arms embargo

In this connection, I should like to mention that on a recent visit to Addis Ababa I had the pleasure to meet the once Chairman of this Committee, Mr. Diallo Telli, and had discussions with him and other officials of the Organisation of African Unity. Subsequently, the 13th ordinary session of the Council of Ministers of the OAU, meeting in February-March 1970, said in its resolution on apartheid and decolonisation:

"Reaffirms that any form of military and other cooperation with these minority regimes constitutes a hostile act against all African States and their peoples."

Point 7 of that resolution states:

"Requests the African group of the United Nations to draw the attention of the Security Council to the continued violations of its decisions on the arms embargo and call for effective measures to end these violations."

It is a matter of regret for the Anti-Apartheid Movement that so much time has passed between the meeting of the OAU and any resolution coming before the Security Council. We hope that our representations will speed up the process of achieving that objective.

Mr. Chairman, we are faced, as I said earlier, with a general election in Britain next month. In the meanwhile, alliance relationships are being developed with the Republic of South Africa by other States. This issue is important and urgent and requires immediate consideration.

The Cabora Bassa Dam

Now I should like to address a few remarks with regard to the Cabora Bassa Dam which is being constructed in the Tete Province of Mozambique. This project is the outcome of South African/Portuguese collaboration and the colonial power intends to settle one million white immigrants in the region and remove 24,000 Mozambicans now living there. There are at least two grounds on which the construction of this dam should not be supported. It is a strategic dam aimed to produce cheap electrical power as well as strengthen the white regimes in southern Africa by establishing a line of defence against the advance of African liberation. Secondly, Rhodesia will become a major benefactor not only as a recipient of electrical power but also as a supplier of materials in building the dam. As a result of these considerations, action by the Swedish Government has already led to the withdrawal of one of their companies from ZAMCO, the South African-based consortium which is building the dam.

We in the Anti-Apartheid Movement are pleased to learn that the Italian Government, which had originally agreed to provide export credits worth £20 million for materials to be used in the dam, has now rescinded that decision and withdrawn from the project. We are also conducting a public campaign against Barclay's Bank DCO which is supporting one of the companies that has submitted a tender for the construction of the dam.

We hope that the Security Council will give consideration to this dam, particularly in the context of the violation of the decisions on

sanctions against Rhodesia.

Need for disengagement from South Africa

These proposals fit in with the broad policy of achieving the disengagement of Western countries from South Africa.

Whilst on the one hand international condemnation of apartheid increases, on the other hand fresh trade and investment links are established and existing links strengthened. The United Kingdom Government and the United States Government, for example, say to us that these links are important and that, therefore, they cannot take action which has been suggested both in your Committee and elsewhere. But Mr. Chairman, these links are not decreasing - they are increasing. If action against South Africa is difficult now because these links exist, with every day that passes action will become even more difficult and then there is the danger that if this trend continues, we will see intervention on the part of some of these Western powers on the side of the white regimes in southern Africa.

The sports boycott of South Africa

Mr. Chairman, your Committee will be aware of the work of the Anti-Apartheid Movement on the question of sporting links with South Africa. In 1963 (when Mr. Brutus was in detention in South Africa) I was asked to represent both the South African Non-Racial Olympic Committee, as well as the Anti-Apartheid Movement, at the Olympic conference in Baden-Baden. We secured South Africa's suspension. In the past few days we have heard that South Africa has now been totally excluded from Olympic sport. Earlier this year we organised massive demonstrations all over Britain in every city and town where the white South African rugby team played. We estimate that something like 50,000 people turned up at these demonstrations and at this moment our movement in Britain is preparing for a campaign against the imminent all-white cricket tour of Britain.

We have found that South Africa has its best friends in British sports organisations. At international sports conferences too, we have found representatives from the United Kingdom among the first to defend white South Africa. And yet, we have maintained our pressure in a country which is historically closely linked to South Africa. Whilst on the one hand we have powerful lobby groups which are very close to the Republic of South Africa and the other

white regimes in that area, we also have, on the other hand, radical forces represented by the Anti-Apartheid Movement which represents a commitment on the side of the freedom fighters in southern Africa. For example, at one demonstration in Cardiff, young people and mineworkers carried not only placards asking for an end to racialism in sport, but also the names of the twenty-two African leaders who were standing trial at the time. I mention this, Mr. Chairman, to show the keen political awareness of those who are demonstrating outside the sports grounds.

New initiatives required

The Anti-Apartheid Movement has always believed that South Africa is a threat to world peace, and in view of South Africa's militarisation and offensive strategy in Africa, and the present military posture, we feel that it constitutes an added threat to the peace and security of Africa and of the whole world.

We also believe that it is no longer appropriate to consider South Africa in isolation from the other white territories of southern Africa.

On the question of liberation of that region, our Movement is committed to supporting the struggle of the people of southern Africa. We believe that it is only they who will finally bring about their own freedom. But the world has a responsibility to help that struggle. If the conflict develops into a major racial conflict, that will not be the fault of the liberation movement which has always conducted a non-racial struggle. The international repercussions of that conflict, which will be disastrous not only for Africa but for the world, will arise not only because of the responsibility of the white people of that region who wish to maintain power, but also the responsibility of the governments of the major Western countries which help to sustain and support the regimes in southern Africa.

Mr. Chairman, we face a racial holocaust in southern Africa which will have disastrous consequences for mankind as a whole. If certain countries are afraid of the pain that effective action will inflict on them, they should think for a moment of the pain that will be inflicted on humanity as a whole if we ever reach this state of catastrophe over the southern African situation.

We hope very much that Member States of the United Nations will decide that this is a time when the whole southern African issue requires new initiatives. We hope, in particular, that there will be a speedy response to our appeals to ensure that the lives of the twenty-

two are safe and, secondly, that procedures be set in motion so that very soon, within a matter of days, the Security Council considers the whole question of the arms embargo. It is time for leadership and it is time for action and we hope that the governments of the world will respond to our request.

We, on our part, will continue to campaign in the way in which we have done for over ten years.

INTERNATIONAL BOYCOTT OF APARTHEID SPORT

With special reference to the campaigns in Britain by the Anti-Apartheid Movement

Paper prepared for the United Nations Unit on Apartheid in 1971³

The system of white supremacy in South Africa is applied in the field of sport as much as in all other walks of life. In other societies where black people have been subjected to widespread discrimination it is in the field of sport and culture that they have managed to make substantial inroads. Not so in South Africa because both the sports administrators, who control all official sport, and the Government have jointly taken measures deliberately to exclude South Africa's non-white people from participating in representative sport.

The imposition of apartheid in sport means in effect that no 'mixed' sport is permitted under the aegis of the official organisations which are accorded international recognition and bear the responsibility for selecting representative teams for international competitions. There are no open trials to permit the selection of the best sportsmen in each class from the entire sporting community. Instead, competition is limited to whites only and it is from them that national teams are selected. This situation was well-known to all the international sports bodies which granted unqualified recognition to the racist, official organisations in South Africa. Just as the South African white sports bodies are responsible for enforcing racial discrimination in domestic sport, so the international bodies which granted them membership are responsible for bestowing respectability upon such practices.

Apartheid is not only limited to the level of administration of sport and selection of participants. As spectators, the African, Coloured and Indian people are subjected to rigid racial segregation. The main sports arenas have separate entrances, seating enclosures and toilet facilities for non-whites. These are usually the worst and minimal rather than 'separate and equal'. At some arenas non-whites are banned altogether from attending sports gatherings.

Non-white sportsmen have always opposed the enforcement of racial discrimination by the official sports bodies and countless appeals were made to the all-white bodies to end apartheid in sport. Without exception, the administrators refused to relax the racial barrier and remained adamant in

³ United Nations Unit on Apartheid, Notes and Documents, No. 16/71, April 1971

maintaining the colour bar. In most cases they even refused to meet representatives of non-racial sports bodies to discuss the problem.

The only alternative left open to sportsmen who wished to replace racialist sport with open and non-racial sport was to make representations to the international bodies and point to the enforcement of apartheid by the South African member. But it was not until the mid-1950s that these initiatives were first taken. At that time white sporting bodies enjoyed international recognition in the field of athletics, boxing, wrestling, weightlifting, tennis, table tennis, soccer, rugby and cricket. The all-white South African Olympic Games Association (SAOGA) was a full member of the International Olympic Committee. White South Africans were thus able to participate in the Olympic Games as in all other international sport.

South African white teams did not, however, establish any bilateral links with non-white countries. For example, in the field of cricket, white teams from South Africa exchanged visits with teams from Australia, New Zealand and England but not with teams from the West Indies, India or Pakistan, though all these countries were members of the Imperial Cricket Conference (ICC) until 1961. There is no record of the cricketing bodies of England, New Zealand or Australia expressing concern, let alone opposition, to this extension of racialism to the international level. Since membership of the ICC is open only to Commonwealth countries, South Africa lost its membership when it left the Commonwealth in 1961. But that has made no difference in that the white members of the ICC still continue to exchange visits with racially selected teams from South Africa.

What is true of the cricketing authorities in white Commonwealth countries is also true of other sports bodies in those countries, and of most sports bodies in other white countries which have enjoyed traditional links with colour-bar sport in South Africa. The leaders of sports bodies in these countries are among the best friends of white South African sports administrators. Since representatives from these countries enjoy an undue preponderance of influence in most international sports bodies, the battle for withdrawing recognition from all-white South African bodies has been a difficult one.

International sporting involvement in apartheid

Before examining the efforts of non-white South African sportsmen to win equal opportunities and their representations to international federations which have led to the present isolation of large sections of official South African sport, it is useful to consider the implications of continuing the exchange of visits with apartheid bodies. This is not merely of historical interest because there are still a host of bodies in Western countries which ignore the existence of racialism in South African sport. They continue to visit South Africa and participate in sport conducted under rigid apartheid conditions. They see nothing wrong in inviting

all-white teams from South Africa to their own countries.

The moral position is absolutely clear. Human beings should not be willing partners in perpetuating a system of racial discrimination. Sportsmen have a special duty in this regard in that they should be first to insist that merit, and merit alone, be the criterion for selecting teams for representative sport. Indeed non-discrimination is such an essential part of true sportsmanship that many clubs and international bodies have express provisions to this effect. For example, the first fundamental principle of the Olympic Charter states: "No discrimination is allowed against any country or person on grounds of race, religion or political affiliation".

The objection to tolerating apartheid sport is not confined to a firm stand on principle only, though that is clear and should be enough for most people; this toleration in fact gives direct support to the enforcement of apartheid in South African sport. As long as the white sports leaders continue to enjoy international recognition on the basis of apartheid, why should they make any effort to eradicate racialism from the playing fields? The exchange of visits with apartheid teams serves to provide added encouragement and stimulus to racialism in sport, and impedes the efforts of those sportsmen inside South Africa who make brave efforts at promoting non-racial sport. It is ironical that sportsmen committed to the international principle of no discrimination in sport are handicapped in their efforts as a result of overseas recognition granted to apartheid bodies.

Furthermore, playing with white South African sportsmen who represent all-white bodies involves the extension of apartheid principles to overseas sport in that all visiting teams to South Africa have to be selected on the basis of apartheid: non-white players are not welcome as members of visiting teams to South Africa.

Until fairly recently very few non-white sportsmen reached international class in white overseas countries. These countries felt justified in maintaining close links with South Africa, although it had always been understood that overseas teams visiting South Africa must be all-white. They willingly accepted this pre-condition for playing sport with apartheid teams. They were well aware that all games in South Africa with touring sides are played before segregated audiences: international teams which are prepared to tour accept and reinforce apartheid in this respect also.

A real problem arose when the English cricketing authorities found it impossible to exclude a Coloured cricketer from the M.C.C. team to tour South Africa. The South African Government banned the entire team from entering the Republic. It was as a result of this development that the sporting public in Britain and other parts of the world really began to understand the full implications of continuing to exchange visits with apartheid bodies.

Finally, it is well known to the overseas bodies which maintain links with South African apartheid organisations that they refuse to play with teams from non-white countries. Yet, none of the traditional partners of apartheid sport considered it desirable to end its voluntary association with racist sport.

The international campaign against apartheid sport

It was not until the mid-1950s that the status accorded to all-white South African sports bodies by the international sports community was effectively challenged. This challenge was launched in the main by the direct victims of the system of apartheid sport, South Africa's non-white sportsmen, who took initiatives to dispute the international membership of apartheid bodies which apply racial principles to national sport. They recognised that it was not enough merely to ensure that recognition was not accorded to racial bodies; their place must be taken by non-racial sporting organisations.

In 1956, the first victory against apartheid sport was won in the field of table tennis. The International Table Tennis Federation removed the all-white South African Table Tennis Union from membership and recognised the non-racial South African Table Tennis Board as the sole controlling body in South Africa. Although the non-racial body was not able to send representatives to international competitions, because of Government action in withdrawing the passports of its players, this decision encouraged other sports organisations to take similar initiatives.

By 1955 the non-racial South African Soccer Federation had made representations to the Federation of International Football Associations (FIFA). It was pointed out that the non-racial body had more than twice the membership of the white body, the Football Association of South Africa (FASA). Because of the large number of friends of the all-white Association who held influence in FIFA, it was not until 1961 that FASA was first suspended. But this led to even more concerted efforts on the part of these friends to reinstate the offending member. The device chosen was to send a FIFA commission to investigate the situation in South Africa. Sir Stanley Rous of Britain, President of FIFA, and Mr. James McGuire of the United States constituted the mission. During their visit to South Africa in January 1963, the *Johannesburg Star* of January 9, 1963, reported Sir Stanley as having said that no provision in the FIFA constitution required its members to apply the principle of multi-racialism: if South Africa applied segregation in soccer that was its concern.

"All we are interested in is to see the controlling body of soccer in this country furthering the cause of football to the best of its ability."

The commitment of Sir Stanley Rous to keeping FASA as a full member of FIFA, despite its colour-bar, was also evident in the

lengthy correspondence between him and the British Anti-Apartheid Movement, which called for the exclusion of the racist body from international football.

The report to FIFA recommended the reinstatement of the racial body and this was done in 1963. This decision met with widespread opposition in Afro-Asian countries with the result that the suspension was reimposed at the 1964 Tokyo congress of FIFA. In retaliation the South African Government imposed banning orders, including 12-hour-a-day house arrest, on Mr. George Singh of the non-racial Soccer Federation.

This brief account of developments in the field of soccer reveals a pattern of behaviour which was repeated in other battles to eliminate racialism from sport. In most cases the most important and senior officials of international bodies worked desperately to maintain the *status quo* and retain the all-white bodies as full members. The South African racist organisations were, therefore, very well placed to receive high level advice about ways of retaining membership, as well as support for their position.

The South African Government's response is indicative of the general policy towards sportsmen who have dared to oppose racialism in sport. They are not only condemned by the apartheid sports bodies but systematically victimised by the Government authorities. To advocate open sport is to invite speedy and direct persecution. Numerous leaders of non-racial sport have had to endure severe penalties within South Africa for their determined efforts.

The fact that FASA was suspended in 1964, only a year after having been reinstated, was due not so much to any material change in the situation within South Africa as to the fact that more Afro-Asian members were present at the FIFA congress in Tokyo where the Olympic Games were held. Because of the high cost of international travel, many members from African and Asian countries are usually absent at meetings of international bodies. But on those occasions when the international federations have held meetings simultaneously with major gatherings such as the Olympic Games, attendance has been better. It is at these meetings that the majority of members are able to voice their opposition to apartheid sport, and that every manoeuvre and trick has been used by friends of white South Africa to keep it in international sport.

The pressure grows

By the end of 1956, non-white sportsmen had applied for international recognition in several other sports. The Imperial Cricket Conference received an application from representatives of non-white cricketers asking for full international recognition. The South African Weight-Lifting and Body-Building Federation wrote to the Olympic Games Governing Council asking to be admitted to the 1960 Games. There were also moves within rugby clubs to form a federation so as to apply for international recognition. Non-white sportsmen had established a South African Coordinating Committee for International Relations in Sport to coordinate their applications for international recognition.

These early developments led the Minister of the Interior, Dr. T.E. Donges, to make a Government announcement on June 27, 1956, to the effect that while the Government was most sympathetic towards and anxious to help "legitimate Non-European sporting activities", these must accord with the policy of "separate development". Whites and non-whites should organise their sporting activities separately, there should be no inter-racial competitions within the Union, mixing of races in teams should be avoided and sportsmen from other lands should respect the Union's customs as she respected theirs. Within that framework non-white sportsmen from outside would not be barred from entering South Africa to compete with non-whites.

He went on to say that the Government would prefer non-white sports organisations seeking international recognition to do so through the aegis of white associations already enjoying recognition. It would not support non-white sporting activities designed to force the country to abandon its traditional racial divisions by any process of squeezing white South Africans out of international competitions. Dr. Donges concluded by announcing that no travel facilities would be granted to people guilty of such subversive intentions.

This was the first time that the Government felt it necessary to stipulate the framework within which it expected sport to be conducted by all its citizens. Those sportsmen committed to promoting non-racial sport were given a clear warning that their efforts would be considered "subversive" and that henceforth they could expect retaliation from the Government if they persevered with their efforts.

The apartheid sports bodies, on their part, had to make some concession to the growing pressures at the international level. The formula which was adopted in most cases was to invite non-white

sporting bodies to affiliate to the existing white bodies as subservient members with either no representation at all on the governing body or token representation. Some controlling bodies also promised to send white and non-white teams for overseas tours in alternate years as an alternative to selecting national representative teams drawn from all South African sportsmen.

They succeeded in creating some division among non-white sportsmen. Some who wished to obtain the benefits of gaining official recognition with the possibility of international competition, albeit on apartheid principles, were prepared to join racial non-white organisations which in turn would affiliate as inferior members to the controlling white body. However, a large number chose to forego these benefits and remained firm in their stand against racial discrimination in sport. For example, when the 1958 Stockholm meeting of FIFA failed to recognise the non-racial Soccer Federation, the latter issued a press statement to the effect that refusal of full status by FIFA was preferable to the acceptance of a subservient associate membership through FASA. It pledged to continue its fight for international recognition.⁴

The Olympics campaign begins

The campaign to gain recognition for non-white sportsmen reached a new level in 1959 with the establishment of the South African Sports Association (SASA), with Dennis Brutus as its Secretary. At its inaugural meeting in January 1959, its patron, Alan Paton, said that the object of SASA was to secure proper recognition for non-white sportsmen and "to do this on a non-racial basis".

SASA had affiliates from a wide range of sports representing about 70,000 members. The first major campaign of the association was to secure recognition of the right of non-white sportsmen to participate in international Olympic sport. This involved making representations to the International Olympic Committee and international bodies governing specific sports. Inside South Africa, it required consolidation of national non-racial organisations and entering into negotiations with white controlling bodies. It was hoped that, faced with the prospect of international isolation, the white bodies would agree to end the enforcement of racial discrimination.

But the persistent efforts of Dennis Brutus and other officials of SASA did not produce any meaningful response on the part of the

⁴ *Rand Daily Mail*, June 7, 1958

white organisations. By the end of 1959, the South African Olympic Games Association (SAOGA), which practised apartheid, was still a member of the ICC and there were no indications that it would agree to an end to racial discrimination in sport under its control.

The SAOGA officials, however, saw the dangers inherent in the growing frustration of non-white sportsmen and the likelihood of international isolation. They devised elaborate methods to prevent mixed sport within South Africa and encouraged non-white sportsmen to join subservient non-white bodies in order to be considered for selection. This would mean that if any non-white sportsman wished to participate in international sport, he had to accept racial separation before having an opportunity for selection. Even if selected, he would have to participate internationally as an 'individual' and not as a member of the national team.

Sportsmen all over the world realise that it is only in open competition that they are able to attain high standards. It is vital to have good facilities: in South Africa non-whites usually have virtually no facilities or wholly inadequate ones. They are also from the majority section of the population that works hardest for the lowest pay and as a result have very little time for recreation and little finance to purchase equipment. They are allowed membership only in inferior sports bodies. Then, in separate trials, if they happen to record better times than white athletes, they may be permitted to participate in international sport.

These conditions make a travesty of the fundamental principles of all truly representative sport. Since trials have to be separate and along racial lines, how can the best representative be selected? For example, how is the best boxer determined between a white and a non-white contender? And even in the case of athletics, separate trials at separate times and different tracks mean competition under unequal conditions. Every athlete knows that it is by competition with others in his class that he can record better times. As if this system is not sufficiently objectionable, there is still no guarantee that even if a non-white athlete records better time than a white competitor he will be selected. The white controlling bodies cannot be trusted even to behave according to racial rules of their own making.

Black athletes left out

In 1962, a South African team had to be selected for a tournament in Lourenco Marques. By this time one of the two athletic bodies with non-white members had decided to affiliate to

the white controlling body, while the other refused to accept subservient status. The affiliated South African Amateur Athletics and Cycling Association was given an assurance that if any of its members recorded better performances than whites, then they would be selected. The white trials were held at Queenstown and special African trials were arranged for the following week at Welkom. As it turned out, two African athletes succeeded in bettering the times of white athletes. Bennet Makgamathe returned a time of 13.8 seconds faster than the best white athlete the previous week for the three miles. The other, Humphrey Khosi, ran the half-mile one-tenth of a second faster than the best white half-miler.

A few days later the president of the controlling body announced that the two African athletes would not be included in the South African team. The official reason given was that Makgamathe's time had been beaten by a white athlete at a gathering a week after the official white trials and that Khosi did not have a good enough record to deserve selection. A few weeks later it was revealed that the selectors had in fact chosen the African athletes, but that the executive committee of the white South African Amateur Athletics Union had refused to approve the decision.

Even white journalists condemned this decision, since it had been agreed at the beginning that selection would be based on timing at the two official trials. An African journalist wrote in the Johannesburg *Star* of May 12, 1962:

"The only reason that Africans could find for the exclusion of the athletes was their colour. If this was not the case, why then was the verdict of the stopwatch not upheld?"

The truth is that the white controlling bodies have always *voluntarily* practised racial discrimination. The complicated formulas proposed by white bodies to give the impression of some progress to non-racial sport is at best tokenism designed to stave off international isolation. But, even if the system of separate sport is implemented honestly, it amounts to a further refinement of apartheid rather than its elimination.

SAN-ROC formed

By 1962 it became clear to SASA that no further progress was possible by making representations to the white controlling bodies. In May a letter was sent to the IOC urging that South Africa be expelled and stating that SAOGA and the Government were guilty of practising racial discrimination and making the country unfit to

take part in the Olympic Games. A meeting of the IOC in June 1962 warned SAOGA that if the policy of racial discrimination was not changed, it would be suspended in 1963.

This decision caused considerable reaction within South Africa. White sportsmen and sports-loving public realised that unless real progress was made quickly, South Africa would be excluded from the Olympic Games. Even organisations such as the white Athletics Union, which had earlier violated its own rules by excluding African athletes, were now passing resolutions to demonstrate their fitness for international sport. At one of its meetings held in Pretoria in January 1963, the Union decided that if any non-white athletes reached the required standard of performance, they would be selected for the Olympic Games, in which case South Africa would not compete on a team basis, but on the basis of individual competition. Other controlling bodies adopted similar resolutions. (The Government had made it clear that no mixed team would be permitted to represent South Africa abroad; hence the reference to participation as individuals rather than as members of a national team.)

In August 1962 SASA announced a plan to establish a non-racial Olympic body which would seek international recognition in place of the apartheid SAOGA. The inaugural meeting of the South African Non-Racial Olympic Committee (SAN-ROC) took place in January 1963. SASA remained in existence, but the battle for Olympic recognition passed on to SAN-ROC with Dennis Brutus as its President.

The untenable case of the apartheid sports bodies

The case of the SAOGA was that the white controlling body had to obey the laws of the country which prohibited mixed sport. But this was clearly not true. Mary Draper of the South African Institute of Race Relations, in an article entitled, "Custom and policy - not law - bar mixed sport", in the Johannesburg *Star* of January 31, 1963, summarised the position in the following way:

"Sportsmen of different races may lawfully compete with one another provided (a) members of the 'wrong' race groups do not make use of club facilities, and (b) the body or person controlling a 'public' sports ground has not laid down conditions restricting its use on racial lines."

It was not illegal for teams composed of 'mixed' races to play

against each other or to hold matches between teams or individuals of different races. However, persons of one racial group may not enter club buildings in an area zoned for persons of a different colour. That is why, in 1963, the Indian golfer, Sewsunker (Papwa) Sewgolum was awarded his prize for winning the South African Open Golf competition in pouring rain outside the club-house while the white competitors celebrated inside.

In October 1962, the Natal Supreme Court ruled that it was not illegal for persons of different races to play football together. In other words, the provision excluding mixing across the colour-line did not extend to the playing fields themselves. As Mary Draper concluded in her article:

"It is true that the policy of the present Government is hostile to inter-racial sport. There is, however, a big distinction between law and policy. Laws have to be observed, and are enforceable by the courts. Compliance with policy is a matter for choice on the part of individual citizens and organisations."

An examination of South African sports history shows clearly that the official controlling bodies in each branch of sport have *voluntarily* practised racial discrimination over the years. Several of them, including the white Football Association, even had colour-bar clauses in their constitutions. In this particular case the all-white body deleted this clause in 1956 when representatives of FIFA visited South Africa, but maintained that they would continue to follow the laws and customs of South Africa.⁵

The 1963 Olympic conference

SAN-ROC had intended that its President, Dennis Brutus, and Chairman, John Harris, should represent the organisation at the meeting of the International Olympic Committee at Baden-Baden in October 1963. The SAN-ROC memorandum to the IOC stated:

"Due to the actions of the South African Government, Mr. Brutus is at present in prison after having been shot. Mr. Harris is now unable to leave South Africa as he was detained by the South African police and his passport was withdrawn."

A new element had also entered the debate by 1963. Since

⁵ *A Survey of Race Relations in South Africa, 1955-1956*

early 1962, the British Anti-Apartheid Movement had taken a keen interest in working for the elimination of apartheid sport from the Olympic Games. Its annual report for 1962-1963 stated:

"We have sent material to 118 national Olympic Committees and other sports bodies about racialism in South African sport. We are hoping that the South African Olympic Committee will be excluded from the International Olympic Committee this year. We are sending a representative to the IOC conference in Baden-Baden in October 1963."

The interest of the British Anti-Apartheid Movement was evidence of the growing international concern at the practice of racialism in sport. This concern was not limited to sportsmen alone, for persons from all walks of life supported the AAM representations.

At Baden-Baden the delegates were given lengthy documents by the white South African Olympic Games Association. It pleaded that it would need to go on practising racial discrimination inside South Africa, as well as in selecting participants for international competitions, as this was Government policy. It offered that non-whites of merit would be selected, but without any direct competition with white candidates.

Even if separate trials for athletes of different racial groups were acceptable, how would one select the best representative, if two athletes of different colour achieved the same times? The reply of SAOGA was contained in a curious annex No. 9, submitted by Dr. P. Leary of the Chamber of Mines Applied Physiology Laboratory, which stated:

"By the use of objective tests of physiological and psychological capacity we hope to help with the final assessment of material available for selection in 1964..."

"Thus should a situation arise in which two sportsmen of like ability vie for the final place available in our athletics or cycling team, this laboratory will be able to recommend which of the two performers should be selected. This will exclude the possibility of racial discrimination completely and ensure that merit alone counts."

Tests by "physiological and psychological capacity" conducted by a medical laboratory were to be used as a substitute for allowing sportsmen of different races to vie in competition with one another

for selection!

Despite the diligent efforts of the South African security police, however, evidence was sent out of South Africa by SAN-ROC, including a special message to the IOC from Dennis Brutus in prison.

The AAM representative at the Baden-Baden conference was joined by a white South African who had managed to leave the country to represent SAN-ROC. Both acted on behalf of SAN-ROC and found that senior officials of the IOC were strongly committed to keeping white South Africa in the Olympic Games despite open violation of the Olympic Charter. South Africa enjoyed extensive support among representatives of most Western countries. It was only by the coordination of the efforts of the Afro-Asian representatives, supported by the Socialist countries and one or two officials from Western Europe, that apartheid sport was excluded from the Olympic Games.

The Afro-Asian national Olympic committees made it clear that they would not feel able to participate in Olympic sport if one of the IOC members practised racial discrimination. It was this firm stand that led the IOC to adopt the following resolution:

"The National Olympic Committee of South Africa must declare formally that it understands and submits to the spirit of the Olympic Charter and particularly articles 1 and 24. It must also obtain from its Government, before December 31, 1963, modification of its policy of racial discrimination in sport and competitions on its territory, failing which the South African NOC will be forced to withdraw from the Olympic Games."

Persecution of Dennis Brutus

This was the first major victory against apartheid sport. But it had been achieved at some considerable cost. Dennis Brutus, one of the most persistent campaigners against racialism in sport, became a special target of the South African regime.

From the early days when SASA was formed he was closely watched by the security police. In 1960, when a state of emergency was declared following the Sharpeville killings, security officials raided the homes of SASA officials and took away all the documents they could find. None were returned. Dennis Brutus was placed under severe personal restriction. Banning orders served

on him prevented him from attending gatherings of more than two persons. Anything he said or wrote could not be printed, published or distributed. He was also banned from teaching and journalism, which deprived him of the means of earning a livelihood.

Despite these restrictions, Dennis Brutus still carried on his work. In 1963 he went with a few colleagues from SAN-ROC to the white Olympic Committee offices to meet Mr. Balsiger, a Swiss journalist visiting South Africa, who intended to report his findings to the IOC. The meeting was interrupted by security officers who entered the offices of the white Olympic Committee and arrested Mr. Brutus allegedly for violating the terms of his banning order by attending a gathering of more than two persons.

While awaiting trial, Dennis Brutus escheated bail and left South Africa in an effort to reach Baden-Baden for the Olympic conference. He was detained by the Portuguese security police in Mozambique and secretly handed over to the South African Government. When outside Johannesburg police headquarters, he attempted to escape in order to draw attention to his whereabouts. He feared for his life if the world at large did not know of his arrest and detention. At point-blank range a police officer shot him in the stomach in a busy Johannesburg street.

After recovering partially in the prison hospital, he was sentenced to 18 months' imprisonment for contravening the terms of his banning order. When he completed his term of imprisonment, Dennis Brutus left South Africa on an "exit permit", which prohibits his return to his country. He went to England and continued the work of SAN-ROC in exile.

At no point did any of the white sports officials or organisations protest to the Government at the victimisation of Mr. Brutus. Indeed the arrest inside the office of the white Olympic Committee did not provoke even the mildest criticism, with the result that many non-white South Africans felt that the Committee was itself involved.

The case of Dennis Brutus is just one example of Government action to intimidate and silence sportsmen who work for non-racial sport.

Developments after the Baden-Baden meeting

South Africa's friends did not rest after the adoption of the 1963 resolution. They almost succeeded in having the suspension

withdrawn and enabling South Africa to take part in the Mexico Games. It became clear that as long as South Africa remained a member of the IOC it could move from suspension to membership and *vice versa* depending on whether South Africa's friends happened to be in the majority present at any particular meeting.

Once again it was the action of the Afro-Asian countries which resulted in the Mexican organising committee not inviting South Africa rather than face a boycott from a large number of national Olympic committees. In May 1970 the IOC took the inevitable decision of expelling the white body from South Africa from the Olympic movement altogether.

Action outside international organisations

So far we have examined the battle against racial discrimination at the level of international sports organisations. But this is not the only level at which international opposition to racialism in sport has been expressed. The white Commonwealth countries and France have sports bodies which continue to exchange visits with apartheid teams. It is in these countries that individual citizens have organised national campaigns against maintaining links with white South Africa which only serve to strengthen racialism in sport.

Rugby and cricket teams from Australia, New Zealand and Britain have continued to exchange tours with white South African teams. So have rugby teams from France and Ireland.

Over the past few years opposition to these tours in Australia and New Zealand has led to the establishment of national bodies of protest which have extended their area of concern to the apartheid situation as a whole. Massive campaigns have been organised on a nation-wide basis when white South African teams have visited these countries and before their national teams have gone to South Africa to play under apartheid conditions.

In the Scandinavian countries there has been extensive opposition to holding tennis competitions with white South Africans. These events have had to take place at secret venues because of the strength of public reaction.

But it is Britain that has the closest links with apartheid sport and it is there that the most significant victory so far has been achieved by the cancellation of the 1970 all-white South African cricket tour.

Anglo-South African cricket links

The all-white South African Cricket Association (SACA) lost its membership of the Imperial Cricket Conference (ICC) when South Africa left the Commonwealth in 1961. This did not, however, produce any change in the attitude of the MCC towards racist cricket. Representations by the non-racial Cricket Board of Control were met with the advice that they develop a separate "all-coloured" cricket organisation!

For over a decade the Anti-Apartheid Movement has been campaigning for an end to British links with apartheid sports bodies. Because of the long historical links between the two countries, it was always difficult to obtain publicity via the media for information on the operation of racialism in South African sport. Many looked upon the AAM campaigns as being solely motivated at isolating South Africa on political grounds and argued that politics should not be introduced into sport. But this argument was effective only because the public did not know about the operation of racialism in sport in South Africa.

Because of the persistent efforts of the AAM to educate public opinion, more and more people learnt the facts and joined the battle against apartheid sport.

In 1960, when a South African white team toured England, the English Test cricketer, the Reverend David Sheppard, refused to play against the tourists. He said at the time:

"I do not regard cricket in South Africa as a non-political game. South Africa has never yet played against the West Indies, or against India or Pakistan. There are 20,000 non-white cricketers in South Africa. Because they are non-white, they will have no opportunity of playing in a club side, in a province side or in a Test match. I believe at this moment that cricket is touching on the most important single issue in the world. And I believe that as a cricketer and a Christian, I would be wrong to keep silent."

In 1965, when a white South African team toured England, demonstrations were held in many centres where the tourists played and the public was asked to boycott the games. The Queen was asked not to attend the Test match at Lords, particularly since, as Head of the Commonwealth, Her Majesty should not be seen to be supporting apartheid cricket. She stayed away, but this was ignored

by the press. The Prime Minister, Mr. Harold Wilson, also responded to the AAM call. This was the first time in cricketing history that the Crown and the Prime Minister had stayed away from a cricket Test match. Thousands of leaflets were distributed outside the cricket grounds as well as in shopping areas in cities which staged the matches with the apartheid team.

The D'Oliveira affair

But it was not until 1968 that the public at large had the problem of apartheid in cricket brought home to it in a dramatic way over the "D'Oliveira affair".

Basil D'Oliveira is an outstanding South African all-rounder, who could never hope to play representative cricket for his country of birth because he is Coloured. He left South Africa in 1960 and played in English county cricket; he was first selected for English Test matches in 1966.

An English cricket team was to be chosen in 1968 for a tour of South Africa and there was considerable speculation as to whether the team would be permitted to enter South Africa if Basil D'Oliveira were a member. As early as January 1967, over 200 Members of Parliament had called on the MCC to cancel its proposed 1968-1969 tour of South Africa, since South Africa's Interior Minister, Piet le Roux, had been reported as saying that the Coloured cricketer would not be allowed into the country. The MCC, however, insisted on going ahead with the tour.

When the touring party was announced at the end of the English cricketing season in 1968, Basil D'Oliveira was omitted and this provoked one of the sharpest controversies in the history of English cricket. His outstanding performance against Australia at the close of the season was more than adequate to win selection for an English touring team. Most people believed that he was dropped because the MCC did not wish to embarrass the South African authorities by selecting him. A public opinion poll published in the London *Daily Mail* of September 12, 1968 revealed that two out of every three people deplored the omission of D'Oliveira and believed that he was dropped because he was Coloured. The MCC was completely taken aback at the uproar that followed their decision.

The Anti-Apartheid Movement sought a meeting with the Minister of Sport, Mr. Dennis Howell, and saw him on 12 September. As the delegation - composed of Mr. Jeremy Thorpe,

M.P. (Leader of the Liberal Party), Bishop Ambrose Reeves (former Bishop of Johannesburg) and Mr. Abdul S. Minty (Honorary Secretary of AAM) - left the Minister's office, they were informed by waiting journalists that D'Oliveira had just been invited to join the MCC party in place of an injured player. On the following night, Premier Vorster told a Nationalist Party meeting in Bloemfontein that the MCC team was no longer welcome in South Africa. He claimed that "the team as constituted now is not the team of the MCC, but the team of the Anti-Apartheid Movement, the team of SAN-ROC, and the team of Bishop Reeves".

The MCC was left with no alternative but formally to call off the tour.

Nothing before had been so effective in getting across to the British public the full implications of exchanging sports tours with apartheid teams. Even right-wing Conservative Members of Parliament were forced to condemn both the MCC decision to omit D'Oliveira and the action of the South African Government in banning the tour. The weight of public opinion was strong enough to force several leading defenders of South Africa to condemn the two decisions.

It became clear that if the MCC proceeded with its invitation to the all-white South African Cricket Association to tour England in 1970, that tour would be actively opposed by people all over the country. But the cricketing authorities at Lords remained adamant and went ahead with their plans for the tour.

The 1969-1970 ruby tour

The British public had scarcely recovered from the D'Oliveira affair when the all-white South African ruby tour of Britain and Ireland began in 1969. This provided an opportunity to people in Britain to show their disapproval of invitations to racialist teams. The Rugby Board had ignored the many requests for the cancellation of the tour. There was no choice but to organise nationwide protests and demonstrations at every match.

The Anti-Apartheid Movement mobilised its branches, members and supporters all over the country and printed thousands of leaflets and posters for the campaign.

The Stop-the-Seventy-Tour Committee, which was established in September 1969 to protest at the forthcoming cricket tour, began by mobilising support against the rugby tour. The STST Committee

was sponsored by eight organisations, including the AAM. Mr. Peter Hain led the new Committee as its Chairman.

The first game was due to be played at Oxford, but because of the strength of opposition from all sections of the local community, including staff and students at the university, it was switched to Twickenham and the venue was only announced on the day of the match. Well over a thousand people turned up at Twickenham to protest outside the ground despite the short notice.

From then onwards the movement of protest began to develop its own momentum. The AAM organised demonstrations outside rugby grounds, while STST asked its supporters to enter the grounds and, if necessary, disrupt the game.

Virtually every match thereafter was played in an atmosphere of siege; large numbers of police had to be summoned to protect the grounds and rows of policemen encircled the playing fields to prevent demonstrators from invading them. Barbed wire fences were erected inside and outside the grounds and police dogs were brought in and held in reserve at strategic points.

Clashes between the police and demonstrators took place at several matches, the worst at Swansea where almost 150 young demonstrators claimed to have been beaten by rugby vigilantes and the police.

The national press calculated that at least 50,000 people took part in the demonstrations held at every match that was played. Police costs alone amounted to well over £ 50,000.

The white South African team could never feel at ease throughout the tour. On the field matches were interrupted; off the field demonstrators protested outside their hotels. One student almost succeeded in driving away the coach full of white South African players, as they were about to set off from their hotel for a match.

When the white team reached Dublin, they met with even more widespread opposition. Mr. Corrie Bornmann, manager of the white rugby team, admitted at the end of the tour that he had thought of calling it off as a result of the protests in Ireland. The Irish Anti-Apartheid Movement obtained massive support for its campaign against the visit of the white rugby team to their country. Large numbers of rugby fans boycotted the game, which had a very small attendance for an international match.

As a result of the new public interest, anti-apartheid groups emerged in areas where there were none before and plans were made for even greater demonstrations during the 1970 cricket tour.

The 1970 tour stopped

From January 1970 onwards individuals and organisations called on the Cricket Council to cancel their invitation for the all-white South African cricket tour due to begin on May 2.

On January 22, a deputation from the AAM, including three Members of Parliament, handed in a letter to officials of the Council and early the following month the Movement delivered a petition with over 12,000 signatures objecting to the tour. Many other organisations made similar representations.

Spontaneous action was taken by individuals and prominent leaders. The press reported on January 21 that grounds all over the country had slogans painted on walls, sightscreens, scoreboards and pitches. In Cardiff a four-inch hole was dug in the pitch.

Members of country clubs called on them not to play against the white South African team and many resigned their membership when the clubs refused. For example, the Archbishop of Wales, Dr. Glyn Simon, a cricket supporter for more than 40 years, told the Glamorgan Cricket Club that he would terminate his membership if the Club played the apartheid team.

However, on February 12, the Cricket Council approved the tour and announced drastic cuts in its duration. Originally the tour was to last for four months with 28 matches on 23 grounds. Now it was to be completed in eleven weeks with 12 matches on the eight grounds which were the easiest to protect: the barricades would go up around the grounds and each one would have an artificial pitch, in case the turf wicket was damaged by demonstrators. All the grounds were to be defended and patrolled for the next four months. At some grounds, such as Leicester, day and night patrols were carried out by police with dogs. The Council was determined that the tour would take place - even under siege conditions.

The Council proved to be insensitive to appeals from community relations organisations which felt that the tour would damage race relations in Britain. Mr. Frank Cousins, Chairman of the Community Relations Commission, wrote to the Home Secretary in February warning of the "untold damage to community relations"

that the apartheid tour would cause. The Right Reverend David Sheppard, former Test cricketer and now Bishop of Woolwich, said:

"Few, if any, members of the MCC Council live in areas of racial tension and they do not understand what deep feelings are raised by this tour of a racially selected team."

By April, opinion against the tour reached a new peak. Trade unions announced that they would support those members who felt obliged to boycott the tour and refuse to service the players. Television technicians urged the BBC to cancel its contracts for coverage of the tour. John Arlott, the world's foremost cricket commentator, informed the BBC that he would not broadcast on the matches arranged for the white South African team. Granada Television announced that it would not screen any of the play during the tour.

In May the Fair Cricket Campaign was launched by the Bishop of Woolwich with a view to drawing in even more people to support the campaign. The Bishop was elected Chairman and the two Vice-Chairmen were Sir Edward Boyle, Conservative Member of Parliament and ex-Minister, and Mr. Reginald Prentice, former Labour Minister for Overseas Development. Thus, in addition to the AAM, two other organisations - the Fair Cricket Campaign and the STST Committee - were working for the cancellation of the tour.

However, even an appeal by the Prime Minister, Mr. Harold Wilson, urging the Cricket Council to reverse its decision, had no effect on the Council members.

One other factor then entered the situation. The Commonwealth Games were due to take place in Edinburgh in July when the South African team would be touring England. The AAM made representations to most of the participants invited to the Games that they should not come to Britain at the same time as a visiting racist team from South Africa. Representations were also made to several Commonwealth Governments. On May 5, India announced that it would not attend the Edinburgh Games if the South African tour went ahead. At least 13 African countries threatened to do the same. There were also reports that participants from the West Indies would refuse to go to Edinburgh.

The Commonwealth Games were threatened with total disaster, as the majority of the Commonwealth decided to boycott them if the cricket tour went ahead. As a result, the Government was forced to call upon the Cricket Council to cancel its invitation to

the apartheid team.

The success of the campaign was due not only to the work of the various British organisations, but also to the swift action of Commonwealth countries. The STST Committee, spearheaded by Mr. Peter Hain, and the Fair Cricket Campaign, under the leadership of the Bishop of Woolwich, added fresh resources to the work of the AAM, which had been campaigning for over a decade against international collaboration with apartheid sport. SAN-ROC played an invaluable role in effectively representing the views of South Africa's non-white sportsmen.

Continue boycott of all apartheid sport

The victories against apartheid in sport have led to re-thinking among white South African sportsmen who have until recently been active supporters of racial discrimination in sport. Their reactions have been interpreted in some quarters as being a genuine change of heart. If there has been such a change, it has come about not so much because of the long years of international contact with apartheid sport, but from the threat of international isolation. Many individual white sportsmen, such as golfer Gary Player, have begun to make public pronouncements against apartheid sport, whereas only a few years ago they were open defenders of this system.

But while international isolation has forced some white sportsmen to voice their protests inside South Africa, that was never the sole purpose of the boycott campaigns. More important is the impact made on the oppressed African, Coloured and Indian people, who have been enormously encouraged by the protests and demonstrations all over the world against the system of organising sport on the basis of skin colour.

The British campaign has shown people in other parts of the world that it is possible to stop their national bodies from continuing to exchange tours with apartheid teams. Already campaigns are under way in Australia and New Zealand - two countries with long-established links with apartheid sport.

The South African Government has also learnt certain lessons in the past two years. In future it is likely to be more flexible in permitting non-white members to be part of overseas teams visiting the Republic. But that cannot justify exchanging tours with white South Africa.

The Anti-Apartheid Movement has always urged that the

outside world should boycott all apartheid sport. All links with racist bodies should be abolished until sport *inside* South Africa is conducted on the basis of merit alone and not of colour. This may not be possible until white domination itself is ended in South Africa. Until there is a non-racial society which will permit open sport, we may have to exclude South Africa from all international competitions. For it is wrong to support racialism in any form. And apartheid is not a game.

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**STATEMENT AT THE MEETING OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL,
ADDIS ABABA, FEBRUARY 2, 1972⁶**

Mr. President, I should like to greet you and thank you and the Security Council for having granted me this hearing, and particularly the three African members for sponsoring my request.

I bring greetings from the Reverend Canon L. John Collins, President of the International Defence and Aid Fund for Southern Africa, who sent me to Addis Ababa for this occasion. On behalf of Canon Collins and the British Anti-Apartheid Movement, we greet you, Mr. President, as you preside over this important series of meetings of the Security Council. We greet as well the new Secretary-General and congratulate him on his recent appointment. We greet too Ambassador Farah, your immediate predecessor, with whom we have had a long and close association through the Special Committee on Apartheid.⁷

The Security Council is meeting in Africa as a result of the initiative of the Organisation of African Unity, and we pay a warm and special tribute to His Excellency the President of Mauritania and His Excellency Mr. Diallo Telli, as well as to the Ethiopian Government and His Imperial Majesty, for having brought about this session on African soil to consider African questions.

Much has been said about the historic nature of this series of meetings, but, in addition, it also represents a great victory for Africa. Africa has ensured that all the questions concerning this continent are discussed together at a single series of meetings, and in essence they are all different aspects of one major problem.

It is for that reason that I have been sent, at some considerable expense, to Addis Ababa to add the voice of the International Defence and Aid Fund and the British Anti-Apartheid Movement to that of Africa and the liberation movements.

Anyone giving careful consideration to the background of all the items before this Council would reach the inevitable conclusion that on all those questions the policies and votes of three permanent members are identical in so far as they block all meaningful action by the Security Council to resolve the major problems of racial oppression and colonialism in Africa. The pattern is all too familiar, and the behaviour of the three permanent members has led the white regimes in Africa to defy the United Nations and flout its appeals and decisions because they have come to rely on Britain, France and the United States as their friends and allies in

⁶ UN document S/PV.1634

⁷ Abdulrahim Abby Farah of Somalis was Chairman of the Special Committee from 1969. He was President of the Security Council in January 1972.

resisting the advance of African freedom. But it is more than that. The policies of the Western Powers towards southern Africa have resulted in the permanent members themselves contravening collective decisions, and even mandatory resolutions, which they once supported and voted in favour of.

It is not, therefore, particularly surprising that in Africa and among democratic people in the West there appears to be little confidence in this supreme organ, when the majority of its permanent members ignore and violate decisions on the question of race and human dignity which was once acknowledged by Prime Minister Douglas-Home⁸ as being the greatest single threat to the peace and security of the world.

Some claim that there is a crisis of confidence in the United Nations; the crisis of confidence, however, is not so much in the United Nations as an institution but arises as a result of the totally inadequate response of this Council to the major threat to world peace and security presented by the southern African situation. It is this state of affairs that has brought into question the relevance of the Charter and the United Nations to the major problem of today's world.

We, for our part, believe that there exists a considerable potential for the advancement of African freedom within the United Nations framework. That is why today in Addis Ababa we should like to pose through you, Mr. President, a question for three of the permanent members, namely, the United States, France and our own Government, the Government of Britain: Tell us clearly, who are your allies? Portugal and South Africa or the African people?

That is the supreme question of this session; it is the Addis Ababa question to which the peoples of Africa and the world demand an answer. If this session of the Security Council does nothing else besides elicit a genuine commitment by France, Britain and the United States on the side of the African people, then this Council will have cured itself of a long paralysis and finally advanced towards discharging its solemn obligation to the world community.

As Honorary Secretary of the Anti-Apartheid Movement, which has associated organisations in Western Europe, North America, Japan, Australia, New Zealand and many other countries, I can say that we have from our inception declared ourselves on the side of the African people. We now ask the major Western Powers, and in particular Britain and its allies, to do the same.

Since the 1960 Sharpeville killings in South Africa we have demanded a total arms embargo against that country. In 1963, the founding summit conference of the Organisation of African Unity, meeting in this very hall, took the matter to the Security Council, which adopted the first resolution on the subject of the arms

⁸ Sir Alec Douglas-Home of the United Kingdom

embargo.⁹ By December 1963 the Council considered that the situation in South Africa constituted a serious disturbance of the peace.¹⁰

In 1963 and ever since, the Western Powers have effectively prevented the Security Council from recognising the situation in southern Africa and Guinea-Bissau as constituting a "threat to the peace". As a result of the special status of the three Powers, the Council has been prevented from recognising reality - the reality that there is a fighting war of differing dimensions going on in African areas under white occupation. Instead the Western Powers invite us to show realism by suggesting that the world community is impotent in challenging the white regimes in Africa. We are urged to accept the *status quo* of African oppression and this is described as a policy of realism.

Realism involves the recognition of reality, seeing the world as it is and adjusting to change. The recognition of an illusory reality, one which involves a compromise with racial discrimination and colonialism, can only bring disaster to the oppressors as well as to their appeasers, not to mention the resultant catastrophe to mankind in general. That is why the peoples of the world that cherish freedom and democracy demand that the three Powers - including our Government, that of Britain - end their present alliance with South Africa and Portugal.

I have already said that this meeting taking place in Addis Ababa is a victory for Africa. But it is a double victory in the sense that for the first time the Security Council has had to examine the whole question of southern Africa and Guinea-Bissau together with aggressive incursions by the white regimes into the territories of African States as a single question which constitutes a grave and clear threat and a breach of the peace.

I should like therefore to propose that the Security Council establish a standing committee charged with considering all the questions before this series of meetings in the context of a threat to peace and international security. That committee should be serviced by the Secretary-General and should sit in public. It should not, however, prejudice the existence and work of the two Committees which already exist at the moment.

Several speakers and representatives of liberation movements have referred to the situation in Rhodesia and we for our part are gravely concerned at the loss of life and brutal repression unleashed by the Smith regime against the African opponents of the settlement terms. But we are even more gravely concerned that because of the courageous opposition of the African people of Rhodesia to the British proposals, the Smith regime will take even more ruthless reprisals as soon as the Pearce Commission leaves Rhodesia. We have every reason to believe that

⁹ Resolution 181 (1963)

¹⁰ Resolution 182 (1963)

South Africa will also be ready to increase its intervention to suppress the African people. We are gravely concerned for the safety of the African people in Rhodesia. We are also keen to know what action the British Government intends to take in the face of overwhelming African opposition to the settlement terms.

These meetings of the Security Council in Addis Ababa should only be the beginning. They should be followed by constant and dynamic action by the Council. We would therefore venture to suggest that, immediately after them, the Council and the Secretary-General, together with high-level representatives of the Organisation of African Unity, should go to London to confront the Heath Government with its direct responsibility for the lives and safety of the people of Rhodesia. We would also venture to suggest that as soon as possible the Council should hold another series of meetings on southern Africa at the foreign minister level to take adequate international action on the basis of the foundations laid at this historic series of meetings in Addis Ababa.

There is not much time to describe the important work of the International Defence and Aid Fund on the questions of southern Africa and Guinea-Bissau, but I should like to draw attention to the testimony of Canon Collins last month to the Special Committee against Apartheid in New York as well as an article by him which appeared in yesterday's *Ethiopian Herald*. I shall be pleased to provide further information on any of the subjects on the agenda of these meetings should it be requested by the Council or by members of delegations.

We in the Defence and Aid Fund and the Anti-Apartheid Movement will carry on with our work in support of the objectives of the United Nations and the Organisation of African Unity.

When we in the Anti-Apartheid Movement in Britain urge our Government to ally itself with the African people, we do so in the firm belief that such a policy is in the best interests of the British people themselves. How can it conceivably help the people of Britain to be in alliance with the enemies of the African people? We see our role as a limited one of supporting the efforts of the oppressed African people who alone have the final responsibility and privilege to secure their own freedom.

Our duty, and we believe the responsibility of this Council, is to take meaningful action - and I mean action - against the racist and colonialist regimes in Africa and give every form of direct support to the liberation movements.

This Addis Ababa session provides the three permanent members with a unique opportunity courageously to declare themselves in alliance with the African people. However, should those Powers persist in allying themselves with South Africa and Portugal, then they will share a major responsibility for the racial holocaust which threatens to engulf us all.

There may still be time to act, but decisive action must come soon. There is not very much time.

We need an urgent answer to the supreme question which we have posed. We believe that the world has a right to demand the answer to this question: On which side are the major Powers? That answer will help to determine whether the Security Council can act to advance African freedom and human dignity. We sincerely hope that it can.

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APARTHEID: THE INTERNATIONAL ASPECTS

*Paper presented to the International Conference of Experts for the Support of Victims of Colonialism and Apartheid in Southern Africa, Oslo, April 9-14, 1973*¹¹

Almost since its inception the United Nations has been concerned with the problem of apartheid and white domination in South Africa. Over the years the subject has been discussed and debated repeatedly and numerous resolutions have been adopted on this question. Initially the resolutions concentrated on making calls and appeals to the white rulers to heed international opinion and abandon the policy of apartheid, only to be rejected by the Pretoria regime. Later, with more African States joining the United Nations, they began to demand international boycott action against the apartheid State and all its institutions, and more recently, there has been a trend towards recognising the legitimacy of the African liberation struggle and providing international political and material support for it.

The formation of the Organisation of African Unity in 1963 and its deep concern to end colonialism and racism in Africa helped to shift international policy in the direction described above. The OAU has always been committed to supporting the liberation struggle in African territories under colonial and race rule.

A major paradox of modern times is the fact that whilst United Nations resolutions against apartheid have gradually become stronger and enjoy more widespread support, it is also true that South Africa has never before enjoyed as much international trade with as many States. The links with the apartheid system have increased simultaneously with wider support for resolutions calling for an end to collaboration with that system.

It is appropriate that a joint conference of the United Nations and the OAU should consider the implications of such a development so that real progress in counteracting apartheid is measured not so much by resolutions adopted by ever-growing majorities but by action taken in support of those resolutions. This is particularly important since the international conference in Oslo takes place between the marking of the tenth anniversary of the establishment of the United Nations Special Committee on Apartheid and the celebration of the tenth anniversary of the formation of the OAU...

Apartheid and aggression

¹¹ United Nations Unit on Apartheid, Notes and Documents, No. 12/73, May 1973

The apartheid system is universally recognised as constituting the most brutal and violent form of human exploitation and suffering, unsurpassed by any other type of tyranny in the contemporary world. The facts are well known and documented by the United Nations Unit on Apartheid as well as publications issued by non-governmental organisations such as the International Defence and Aid Fund for Southern Africa and the Anti-Apartheid Movement. It is impossible for any serious study of the internal situation in South Africa to avoid reaching the conclusion that it amounts to a clear threat to international security, although the Security Council has so far desisted from advancing from its assessment several years ago that the situation amounted to a "disturbance" of the peace.

Second, on the issue of Namibia, the Pretoria regime has not only defied the United Nations but refuses to abide by decisions of the International Court of Justice and remains in control of the international territory of Namibia as an illegal occupying power.

Third, South African armed units have been operating illegally in Southern Rhodesia since 1967 in defence of the Smith regime and in clear violation of Britain's sovereignty over its colony.

Fourth, the operation of South African armed units in support of Portuguese colonial rule in Mozambique and Angola amounts to a further act of aggression, in battle against the oppressed African people fighting colonial rule.

Fifth, South Africa's rapid militarisation over the past decade and its present defence posture constitute a direct threat to the peace and security of independent African States, and force them to expend valuable resources on military defence rather than utilising them for the economic and social well-being of their people.

Finally, the incursions by South Africa's armed forces and its Air Force planes into neighbouring African States amount to direct acts of aggression against and serious provocation to these States.

Threat to the peace

On the above grounds it is abundantly clear that the policies of the South African regime as pursued within the Republic and outside its borders constitute a clear "threat to the peace, breach of the peace" and "act of aggression", in terms of Article 39 of the United Nations Charter. There is no doubt that South Africa's armed intervention in neighbouring territories in defence of the white power system in that region not only serves to increase the level of conflict in that area but also amounts to a clear and deliberate violation of fundamental principles of international law and open defiance of the United Nations and the world community. However, the prospect of any effective international action being taken under Chapter VII of the Charter is fairly remote in view of the growing support that South Africa receives from certain major Powers with the right to

veto any measures proposed before the Security Council.

Nevertheless, it is important to draw the attention of the United Nations to the reality which exists in southern Africa and in this context to revive the policy of an international programme of sanctions against South Africa. One additional ground, not mentioned above, which makes such action imperative, is the open breach by South Africa of United Nations mandatory sanctions against Southern Rhodesia, thus substantially sabotaging their effectiveness. The Security Council should urgently discuss the various proposals and reports on sanctions tabled before it, including the report of the Expert Committee issued in 1965, which has not been debated since. In view of the situation in southern Africa as a whole, it is pertinent to suggest that a programme of sanctions covering South Africa, Portugal and Southern Rhodesia should be seriously considered by the Security Council if one is to avert a major catastrophe in Africa which could lead to an international conflagration.

The means for international action exist but what is lacking is political will on the part of the major Western Powers who are permanent members of the Security Council. When the present confrontation in southern Africa results in a major conflict of global dimensions, then the Western Powers will bear the central responsibility for that disaster because they are among those Member States which block all effective international action and at the same time provide direct encouragement and support to the white power system.

Any prospect for action by the Security Council is dependent on a positive answer being given to the question posed at the Addis Ababa session of the Council in February 1972: "On which side are the major Powers?" That question has not been answered and all the evidence indicates that the Western Powers stand in close alliance with the colonial and apartheid regimes in Africa and in direct opposition to those struggling to advance the cause of African freedom and democracy.

The Security Council has been virtually paralysed by the majority of its permanent members. It is therefore inevitable that the African people should with added determination take on the responsibility of bringing about their liberation. This means that the United Nations system and other national and international bodies should be utilised far more in providing direct support for those actually engaged in the struggle. It also implies that the United Nations and the OAU should look much more towards supporting non-governmental organisations such as anti-apartheid movements, for it is they who have taken the lead over the years in organising action in support of United Nations policies. Many of them have acted with substantial and at times decisive impact in countries where the official policies of the governments have been hostile to those of the United Nations and have at times achieved a modification of those policies in consequence of the pressures exerted domestically and at an international level.

International collaboration

It is in the field of international economic relations that we find the most dramatic form of external intervention on the side of the white power system. According to the London *Times* of March 15, 1973, "70 per cent of South Africa's direct investment in 1970 came from abroad". Such investment capital is principally attracted to South Africa by the above average yield of between 12 per cent and 20 per cent, which is made possible by the super-exploitative apartheid system. Inevitably, those with a substantial stake in the preservation of that system defend South Africa internationally, and corporations and business organisations are amongst the staunchest allies of the white regimes. Since they have considerable influence over the decision-making system of Western governments, it is not surprising to find these governments taking the position that they cannot afford the cost of supporting international action aimed at counteracting apartheid.

As a result of several major campaigns against the role of international capital investment in apartheid and colonialism, conducted in recent years in Western countries, some companies have responded to the consequent exposure by announcing marginal increases in African wage rates, sometimes accompanied by other fringe benefits in order to divert public campaigns. The companies are even beginning to claim that far from being accomplices in the apartheid system, they are in fact placed in a special role to act as agents of change and should therefore be supported in their investment and trade operations in South Africa. It is a peculiar logic that claims that by investing in the oppression of millions of Africans they are somehow bringing about the liberation of the oppressed peoples. But this is not altogether unexpected from those who profit so handsomely from the system of apartheid and colonialism.

Nonetheless, these arguments are finding echoes through important public figures in Western countries who also suggest that economic links should be examined with a view to utilising them to promote peaceful changes within southern Africa and especially in the Republic. These responses have already found expression in various research and study projects being set up with the primary purpose of determining how economic links can be used to promote peaceful change. Inevitably they reject or distort the case for withdrawal and disengagement on the simple ground that it is impractical. But more important is the fact that they represent strong tendencies in favour of accepting the *status quo* and then working out tolerable options for international companies. These exercises have the effect of not only helping to legitimise the investment of foreign companies but also to create a powerful lobby suggesting that peaceful change is possible.

Indeed, it is often openly stated that these initiatives provide an alternative to supporting the armed struggle. This is a serious and dangerous development which though in its early stages is bound to receive substantial support from those

in positions of power and influence because it can easily serve to subvert the anti-apartheid lobby in Western countries and reduce the level of potential support for the liberation struggle. It therefore becomes even more important not to allow the case for disengagement to be misunderstood and misrepresented to the general public by those who are opposed to it.

The European Economic Community

British membership of the EEC produced serious problems for South African exports to the United Kingdom, but the Conservative Government managed to secure the same concessions for imports from the Republic as for those from Commonwealth countries. Thus it is only in July 1977 that South African exports to Britain will be subject to the full EEC tariff on imports.

In the meanwhile, South Africa established a special mission to the EEC in 1971 and presented several notes to the EEC in order to secure special terms for several commodities. Already, South African citrus fruits have been granted a reduction in the EEC tariff from 15 per cent to 5 per cent for a transitional period of two years. There will no doubt be other concessions to follow and since great secrecy is maintained over the actual negotiations with South Africa, it is not easy to obtain the relevant information.

But if these developments are taken together with the fact that something like "80 per cent of South Africa's outside investment derives from the enlarged EEC",¹² it is not difficult to reach the conclusion that favourable arrangements with the EEC are crucial to South Africa and are likely to be conceded unless effective pressure is organised against them. The situation has to be watched with great vigilance and more attention has to be paid to the EEC area as a major source of support for the white power system in Africa.

International arms embargo

The United Nations arms embargo against South Africa was once considered to be the most far-reaching decision of the Security Council on the question of apartheid. Certain countries like France have, from the very outset, violated the embargo and supplied South Africa with all the arms it needed; France has also collaborated on the manufacture of weapons within the Republic. Italy has to a lesser extent played the same role, and the current issue of *The Military Balance*, published in London, records an order of 40 Aermacchi AM-3C light transport aircraft for South Africa. Both the United States and Britain have relaxed even their limited embargoes. The South African military build-up has been facilitated by the readiness of Western countries to provide not only weapons but also military patents for the local manufacture of weapons within the Republic.

¹² *The Times*, London, March 15, 1973

But this is not all. Sometimes costly, elaborate and circuitous arrangements are made to circumvent the arms embargo and avoid opposition from domestic and international public opinion. For example, the United States has concluded one such arms deal which, through third party involvement, avoids a direct link with South Africa. The Cactus missile system has been developed in South Africa by the joint collaboration of two French companies and the French Government. South Africa has offered this system to certain Western countries and the United States has tested it. When this happened over a year ago, strong protests were made to the State Department about the possible purchase of this system from South Africa. It has now come about that instead of buying it from the Republic the United States has obtained the patent rights for the missile system via France and it is to be manufactured within the United States.

The Security Council has the duty to take up the question of direct violation of its decisions regarding the arms embargo. It also needs to adopt a further resolution to cover the import of arms and other military equipment and patents from South Africa, whether directly or through third parties.

Strategic importance of South Africa

The Conservative Government in Britain has in recent years suggested that British arms supplies to South Africa should be maintained because of the growing strategic importance of the Republic to Western defence and security. Whilst in Opposition, Sir Alec Douglas Home had even predicted that the Simonstown Naval Agreement would in effect become an "informal" extension of NATO, since the NATO area does not extend to South Africa. There have also been other proposals for a joint South Atlantic Treaty Organisation with South Africa, Portugal, Brazil, Argentina and Britain as its members. No such formal arrangements have so far materialised but there is growing support in Western capitals for the idea that South Africa should be enlisted as a formal ally for the defence of Western interests.

Britain has been the principal advocate of this policy but it has received support in other Western countries such as the United States. For example, last October the American-African Affairs Association published the report of a fact-finding mission to South Africa which suggested that the United States Navy should use the naval bases in Simonstown and Durban. Several academic and other institutions in the United States have held special seminars and consultations on the subject. The South African press has also indicated that the London-based Royal United Services Institute for Defence Studies has been holding consultations with military organisations in other NATO countries to convene a major symposium in 1973 to discuss a possible southern oceans military alliance with South Africa as the pivot.

Serious attempts are being made not only to integrate South Africa further into Western defence but at the same time to designate the southern African region as

one of major strategic importance to the West. The implications of such a policy are highly dangerous because it would mean that the Western Powers would inevitably be committed to maintaining stability and security in that region. Defence decisions in the modern world are made, partly for technological reasons, with long term considerations in mind, and any decision to consider South Africa as a military ally must of necessity be based on a prior judgment that the Republic will be stable and secure for at least ten years. What will happen if in the meanwhile the struggle of the African people reaches a level which is perceived as posing a serious threat to the stability and security of the apartheid State, with consequent uncertainty and instability in a region which the Western Powers have decided is one of major strategic importance?

South Africa as a regional power

Events in southern Africa during the last decade and Western policy towards them reveal clearly that the policies of certain major Powers towards the territories in that region are increasingly governed by the consideration that South African interests in the area are of paramount importance. Even the most direct form of armed intervention by South Africa in neighbouring territories has produced no sharp protests in Western capitals, let alone any effective action to counteract such aggression.

The Pretoria regime has extended and intensified its security operations beyond its own borders and claimed the role of a regional Power in the southern hemisphere as well as the sub-continent - a role which has been conceded and supported by the major Western Powers. Hence, their policies with regard to southern Rhodesia, Namibia and Portuguese colonial rule in Africa have been dictated by the need to preserve white South Africa - a policy officially described as one of "no confrontation with South Africa."

It is precisely this recognition by the Western Powers of the supremacy of South African interests in the region as a whole that has given the apartheid State greater confidence in intensifying its repression both internally and in neighbouring colonial territories. This also accounts for its growing aggressive posture towards independent African States. The Pretoria regime knows that the major Western Powers will defend South Africa from effective international action via the Security Council and therefore continues to flout world opinion.

As a result of this massive increase in economic links with Western Europe and North America, together with the growing political and military alliance relationship with outside Powers, South Africa is part of a special type of international economic and political community which responds by providing it with such substantial external support as it needs in order to preserve and defend the white power system in southern Africa as a whole.

Not only have South Africa's international economic links with its traditional

trading partners increased during the last ten years, but new ones have been established with other countries such as Argentina, Brazil, Israel, Japan and Iran. Thus the number of States with a vested interest in the maintenance of the apartheid system is steadily growing and effective action is required to counteract these trends and to win support for the United Nations policy on apartheid and colonialism in Africa.

Proposals for special action

Within the United Nations, the programmes for assistance have so far concentrated on helping the victims of colonial and race oppression. It is important to ensure that education and aid programmes are available for those in need of them, but in view of the developing situation it is vital to consider ways and means to making available international material support for those engaged in the struggle for liberation. However, it is absolutely crucial that all such programmes are only established after full consultation with the liberation movement. Unilateral projects set up without their support should be discouraged and firmly opposed.

At the level of international diplomacy there needs to be a serious and comprehensive study of the developments mentioned in this paper with a view to examining why United Nations policies are not implemented by so many Member States and what measures can be adopted to secure compliance by those States. In this respect one proposal for consideration is that the United Nations Special Committee in Apartheid (as well as the other two Committees responsible for Namibia and decolonisation) should act much more in a "watchdog" and "executive" capacity so that it becomes action-oriented: in this new role its Chairman should not only use that position but also the good offices of the Secretary-General to ensure compliance with United Nations policies by Member States.

But this action cannot succeed alone and therefore the Special Committee needs to develop closer working relations with anti-apartheid movements which have always carried the major responsibility for actively supporting United Nations policy in this area, both nationally and internationally. It is groups such as these which have consistently mobilised large sections of public opinion at home and abroad in support of the African liberation struggle and against international support for apartheid and colonialism in Africa, and are among the most reliable and dependent allies of the liberation movements, the United Nations and the OAU.

If steps along these lines are taken, then a related proposal should also be considered: that the United Nations, in cooperation with the OAU and the liberation movements, organise in 1974 a conference of anti-apartheid and other similar groups, principally from Western Europe and North America, so that

effective public action in countries which are the major collaborators with apartheid and colonialism can be discussed by those primarily engaged in organising such campaigns. The tendency to rely unduly upon "experts" who may have little or no connection with such campaigning organisations should be avoided, since it is those engaged in actual campaigns who have the necessary experience to formulate effective action.

In terms of South Africa's growing international supportive links, urgent action should be mounted to reduce the level of external capital inflow in the form of loans and investment and to stop the high level of white immigration into the Republic. Moreover, if it appears almost impossible to shift the policies of the major Western Powers through diplomatic action, it does not necessarily follow that public campaigns in those countries will be unable to influence the policies of their governments in a more favourable direction. Of course, there can be no easy or quick victories but worthwhile results can be achieved by consistent and persistent activities conducted in support of the African liberation struggle and aimed at bringing about an end to international support for the apartheid and colonial regimes.

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**STATEMENT AT THE INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE OF EXPERTS
FOR THE SUPPORT OF VICTIMS OF COLONIALISM AND
APARTHEID IN SOUTHERN AFRICA, OSLO, APRIL 10, 1973**

I think for the record it is necessary at the outset for us who come from Britain, to condemn the fact that Britain is not participating in this Conference, even as an expert. All the expertise which is available to Her Majesty's Government has been utilised in the past few years and particularly, at this moment of time, in negotiations with our direct enemies: the South African Government, whose Foreign Minister is now in London, preceding his talks with the Secretary-General; and the Portuguese Government, for the celebration of the anniversary of the Anglo-Portuguese alliance that Lord Gifford has just mentioned.

The Anti-apartheid Movement is an old organization, in the sense that we were formed in 1959 at a small meeting of some 200 people, and were addressed by President Nyerere, who was then leader of the opposition in Tanganyika. Ever since, both in Britain and in other countries, we have tried to inform people of what is happening in southern Africa, in Rhodesia, or the old Central African Federation, in South Africa, Namibia and, indeed, in the remaining colonial territories, including those British territories which were then engaged in the struggle against colonialism. Many of them are now present here and many of their leaders are today Heads of State.

Over the years, we have had no difficulties whatsoever in taking up the policy of support for the liberation movements, because we were set up in order to support the struggles of the peoples in southern Africa. That policy is the policy of the United Nations today. I hope I will be forgiven if I say a few things which may sound not very helpful or critical, but these are not addressed with any destructive intentions in mind. I do get the feeling that in fact a sense of unreality permeates at organs like these, where old statements are repeated and situations with which we are all familiar are rehashed. If all of us assembled here and all the governments which voted for all the resolutions that have been adopted are really serious, why does this problem persist? Why do we continue to confront the white regimes in southern Africa which are building up a growing alliance with the Western Powers?

While we are concentrating on resolutions, protests and other actions, they are strengthening their links and repressing people more. Therefore, I would like to plead that we pause for a minute and really think about whether we believe what we say when we say that the white regimes are our enemies because they are oppressing the peoples of Africa? Secondly, and even more important, do we believe that those three Great Powers that are not present here are also our enemies?

As I said at the Addis Ababa meetings of the Security Council last year, the question we need to pose for effective action is: on which side are the Western Powers? Are they the friends or the enemies of Africa? I feel that in our exercises, programmes, documents and proposals, we spend too much time, thought and effort to work out tolerable options for our enemies. It should not be the job of those engaged in supporting the struggles of the peoples of Africa against colonialism to work out tolerable options for the Western governments and, even for the South African government itself.

This is where I feel the sense of unreality of which I spoke. We are talking, as our comrades have reminded us, about a real war in southern Africa, one which is as real in South Africa as it is in the rest of southern Africa and the colonial territories. And yet in our proposals and our actions on South Africa we talk of how to exclude it from specific actions. This is a dangerous tendency. While it is important to act on individual issues in special ways so as to get maximum results and have flexibility, at the same time we must not give the impression to people that the South African regime is unshakable and will remain almost forever. What is happening in a great many proposals that are coming out from the United Nations and other organs is to create tolerable options based on the assumption that the South African regime is there to stay.

If we in our movements were concerned with producing tolerable options, we would not have done any work at all. We were concerned at the very outset with confronting the British Government and the Western Powers. It is that kind of confrontation that has produced the small results that we have.

I am not competent as an expert or, indeed, as an individual to advise the United Nations what it ought to do, but in terms of British people who support it, who support its policies, who stand outside sports grounds and attempt to stop arms sales to South Africa, these people request the United Nations to implement its resolutions.

It is simple, yet difficult. But if we consider the matter as being very difficult, we end up with working out proposals that tend to take away from the central urgency of the problem. So, in our view, we must show up what our enemies are and, in terms of Western countries, we must not be afraid of a confrontation with them. A confrontation will help to expose their role and is nearer to the reality of the situation that we are now facing.

There is a tendency not only to debate all the issues before us, but also to treat the issue of southern Africa, and South Africa, as a routine issue, as something we talk about year after year and don't take action upon. We must, therefore, tackle South Africa. In 1963 and 1964, the Security Council, the General Assembly and other organs, and governments talked seriously about the prospect of sanctions. We in London sponsored an International Conference on Sanctions, where we

assembled experts to discuss the matter. They came to the conclusion that what was lacking was political will. That is what is lacking now, as well.

What has the Security Council done between 1964 and 1973 to move forward? Indeed, we hear very little talk about the possibility of sanctions against South Africa, even though we know that it is South Africa's violation of the mandatory programme of sanctions against Rhodesia which has sabotaged that entire exercise. Therefore we are against the idea that in any strengthening of sanctions against Rhodesia, South Africa should somehow be given special treatment because it is a strong country in that area and should be excluded from considering action against it.

We insist that South Africa is the major enemy of the United Nations, of the Organization of African Unity and indeed, the oppressed peoples of Zimbabwe, and therefore, action should be taken against them. Not only are they breaking United Nations sanctions, but they have also committed a breach of the peace and an act of aggression in sending troops to fight the freedom fighters in Zimbabwe.

One example of the confrontation of which I spoke is the following: We have worked on many issues. The ones that are best known to the world, I should think, are the arms embargo and the campaigns against racist sports teams. The latter campaign dates back to 1959. Over recent years, as a result of public information carried out for a decade and the hard work of small groups of people, we managed to force the Labour Government in Britain to ban the South African cricket tour, against the will of Her Majesty's Government. If we had worked on the basis of producing options for the British Government, we would never have succeeded. We confronted the British Government and the sporting authorities.

The action continued in Australia, where we have been in contact with Australian and New Zealand groups for eight to ten years. We can say that as a result of public actions there, the sports tours were cancelled. Indeed, the political process brought about a new Government in power, which is more committed to the United Nations policies than the previous Government. These things, I suggest, Mr. Chairman, do not happen in isolation. Parenthetically, we have just heard a few hours ago that the New Zealand Government has banned the South African sports team from going to New Zealand.

In not trying to win quick victories by tolerable options, we succeed in actions like this. Therefore, I hope it is recognized that diplomatic action alone cannot succeed. It must operate in alliance with the internal pressures in these countries. Individual people in the major Western countries are making considerable sacrifices to fight their own governments to adopt better policies and they are doing this in support of the policies of the United Nations and of the liberation movements. If they see that the United Nations is speaking with many voices - on the one hand, some say "Boycott South Africa, don't talk to them, no dialogue is

possible", and on the other hand, the more senior representatives of the United Nations talk to representatives of that same country - the public does not understand. This is the "unreality" I mentioned earlier.

I would like to sound a kind of warning. There is no issue as great or as serious as that in southern Africa, and yet, at the same time, there is also no issue where action is somehow inversely related to the number of resolutions and discussions that are held. It seems as if the issues we discuss most are the ones in which we are most impotent. I would like to warn that the growth industry of research and experts is one we should not encourage. We should, indeed, divert our attention to growth of action against these regimes rather than research about those regimes. This diversion is a result of this studies-and-expertise approach.

What we need to do is to support those who are taking action. It is here that the credibility of the United Nations is at issue. Where research is necessary, the two criteria should be the following: firstly, do the liberation movements want this research? If we are serious in supporting those in the struggle, we must do the research they need. Secondly, is it the kind of research that can be used effectively by solidarity groups? We in Britain have no research experts, but within weeks we were able to provide information on the number of British corporations involved in South Africa - we provide the research experts with this information and they write long papers about it; meanwhile, we engage in action on the matter.

The response of these countries to the disclosure of the poor wages they were paying Africans was to increase pay. This response is aimed at subverting the anti-apartheid lobby in Britain and the rest of the world.

This is the kind of research we must not encourage at all. We must say that these companies must withdraw from South Africa and Namibia. We must avoid the danger of giving the impression that if companies are operating physically in Namibia, then we must act against them, but if they are operating in South Africa we must not. It is the same British Leyland Company in South Africa that produces the weapons that are used in Namibia to oppress the Namibian people. Therefore, we must not be restricted to territories in such a way as to not be able to see the role of the British Leyland Company in supporting the military machine of our enemies. It is this kind of more flexible thinking in terms of problems that I would like to plead for.

Finally, in my paper, I have drawn attention to the fact that, in my view and the view of the Anti-Apartheid Movement, the lines have been drawn in Africa in a way in which they have never been drawn before. The kind of military support that is being given to the South African regime and the way it is used as the pivot for policies towards the rest of Africa, anticipates an almost indefinite stability and security in South Africa. The kind of considerations that have been taken into account for a military alliance of the Western Powers and South Africa, require

that that regime remains stable for at least ten years, if not more.

The situation is far more serious than many of us feel. Today, within minutes, Nigeria, Ghana, the Sudan, Somalia can be bombed from within South African borders; what will happen? The United Nations Security Council will perhaps meet in emergency session. It will take four or five days before they even adopt a resolution that every country agrees with. Meanwhile, South Africa will have gotten away with the bombing.

It is this sense of urgency that I think exists in Africa and which we need to inject into the discussions at this Conference. And it is on that basis that we need to take action. Therefore, we plead that the United Nations, the Organization of African Unity and other organizations build up an alliance with the liberation movement first. Secondly, and just as important (although not competitive), is the need to build up an alliance with the peoples in the Western countries, because it is those people who are the best allies of the liberation movements and of the Organization of African Unity.

If the United Nations stands behind the liberation struggle in that way, then I believe we can win results. I am particularly grateful to Ambassador Ogbu,¹³ Chairman of the Special Committee on Apartheid, because we have established some working relationship already. He attended a conference of trade unionists in Britain two weeks ago. There we were planning action among trade unionists and we hope that this will be encouraged as well by other committees.

If the United Nations wishes to consult us, they can do so directly. We can communicate directly without being recognized non-governmental organizations. But attendance at too many conferences like this is too expensive for us. What I am pleading for is direct communication rather than a great deal of procedural arrangements, which may exist within the United Nations and through which we have to move before we can get action. I hope those who are experts in the United Nations will give attention to improving the procedures so that we can work together more effectively.

Resolutions of the United Nations are correct; the policy of the United Nations and the Organization of African Unity is correct. We must be consistent. We must not look for new solutions because results are not quickly achieved. Above all, we must not be diverted into working out tolerable options either for the South African regime, the Portuguese regime or the illegal Rhodesian regime or their allies, who are not present here. We can only act after we have considered who our enemies are and who our friends are. Our experience in Britain is that Britain is enemy territory and that the British Government is now engaging in an alliance with the Portuguese. Just as we managed to stop the cricket tour, I am sure that

¹³ Edwin Ogebe Ogbu of Nigeria

the peoples of Britain may act to make it almost impossible for Caetano to come to Britain.

This is not an empty threat. That is our objective. We may not succeed, but we will work for it. If we do succeed, then we would like support - political support from the United Nations and the Organization of African Unity and from other governments. It is, therefore, important to realise the urgency of the southern African situation; to believe what we say; and to concentrate on action rather than on too much research, and too many tolerable options.

**LETTER TO THE CHAIRMAN OF THE SPECIAL COMMITTEE
AGAINST APARTHEID, SEPTEMBER 9, 1974¹⁴**

We have been witnessing with growing alarm the increasing economic, political and military links between Israel and South Africa. The recent agreement to upgrade their diplomatic relations to the level of ambassadors reflects the high level of cooperation between the two countries.

The purpose of this letter is to draw the attention of the Special Committee to new forms of collaboration between Israel and South Africa to promote South African products on the British market. As you know, we are currently engaged in a national campaign against collaboration with apartheid which involves the boycott of all South African products. Recently we discovered that Israel and South Africa were planning a joint campaign to promote Jaffa and Outspan orange juice in the United Kingdom. We took the matter up immediately with the Embassy of Israel in London and their reply of August 16, 1974, is particularly alarming because of their claim that the marketing organisations of the two countries are "financing the purely commercial ventures which, to our mind, has no relevance to the political apartheid issue".

I am enclosing a copy of their letter for your information and would request that the Special Committee take this matter up urgently with the representative of Israel at the United Nations. We shall of course pursue the matter with the Embassy of Israel in London, but since our campaign against the promotion of South African products is in conformity with the policies of the United Nations it is important that the Special Committee should take this matter up in New York; any steps which can be taken by the United Nations will assist us in demanding that Israel does not proceed with the joint venture planned for the United Kingdom.

This instance of joint South African-Israeli collaboration is just one illustration of the growing links between the two countries which are contributing directly to the maintenance of apartheid and white domination in South Africa. I am enclosing a report in the current issue of *Anti-Apartheid News* which gives information about the strengthening of other ties between Israel and South Africa.

When these developments are taken together with the visit last month of General Moshe Dayan to South Africa it becomes quite clear that the growing links between South Africa and Israel are being considered so important by the two countries that they are determined to assist each other even though it involves direct violation of United Nations decisions.

¹⁴ UN document A/AC.115/L.389

We hope that it will be possible for the Special Committee to give urgent consideration to these new links.

LETTER TO THE CHAIRMAN OF THE SPECIAL COMMITTEE AGAINST APARTHEID, JUNE 3, 1975, TRANSMITTING A MEMORANDUM CONCERNING COLLABORATION OF NATO MEMBER STATES WITH SOUTH AFRICA IN THE ADVOKAAT MILITARY COMMUNICATIONS SYSTEM¹⁵

We have recently received certain documents which, taken together, reveal high-level military collaboration between South Africa and several Western Powers. The documents reveal that the NATO defence code is available to the Pretoria regime and has been utilised to code the equipment and spares of its new military communications system known as Project Advokaat. In view of the importance of this information, I am enclosing a memorandum, together with copies of the relevant documents.

This evidence adds substance to our warnings since 1969-1970 that South Africa was being steadily integrated into the over-all Western defence system despite official statements to the contrary from the major Western Powers.

It is easier to understand, in the light of this evidence, why countries like Britain and the United States of America which claim to abide by the United Nations arms embargo still feel it necessary to oppose a mandatory arms embargo.

We also have considerable evidence of South African officials concerned with defence matters visiting a number of Western countries in the recent past to discuss other military projects. We shall send you a more detailed document with further evidence very shortly.

We trust that the Special Committee will urgently take appropriate action in the light of this new evidence.

Memorandum concerning collaboration of NATO member States with South Africa in the Advokaat military communications system

The South African regime has established at Silvermine, close to the Simonstown Naval Base, the headquarters of a modern and highly advanced communications system called Project Advokaat. This system is now operational, although further work on it is still in progress.

Project Advokaat is just one of a series of projects undertaken by the Pretoria

¹⁵ UN document A/AC.115/L.408

regime to expand its defence role in the South Atlantic and Indian Oceans and promote a closer military alliance with the major Western Powers.

When Dr. C.P. Mulder, South African Minister of Information, visited France during April 1975, he said: "Our naval base at Simonstown is to have its berthing facilities doubled. And far from Simonstown we have built a sophisticated multi-million franc maritime communications headquarters that provides up-to-the-minute information on all maritime traffic from the Cape to North America, South America, the South Pole region, and India."¹⁶

Project Advokaat has a number of units on which the movements of ships and other craft are graphically represented on a map of the region covered by it - and this includes not only the ocean area mentioned by Dr. Mulder but also virtually the entire African continent.

The Pretoria regime claims that pioneer work was done in South Africa towards the development and manufacture of the communications system. However, we have been aware of the collaboration of a number of Western companies in helping to establish the system.

Documents which we have recently received expose the high level of involvement of companies in several NATO countries in developing the Advokaat system.

Even more serious is the fact that NATO and several of its members have been directly engaged in the planning and development of this system which is directly linked to NATO's interest and activity outside its defined regional area.

We also knew that the Federal Republic of Germany was directly involved in this system; it is public knowledge that certain German companies played a major role in helping to develop this system - AEC-Telefunken, Siemens and MAN.

The attached documents reveal clearly that:

(a) South Africa is now within the NATO defence code area and its military equipment and spare parts are codified and recorded in the same way as for NATO members;

(b) The United States, Britain, France, Netherlands and Denmark are all directly involved in Project Advokaat, together with arms contracting companies in these countries.

NATO has strongly denied that it has any links with South Africa, individual members of that alliance have repeatedly stated that NATO had no dealings

¹⁶ *South African Digest*, Pretoria, April 11, 1975, p.

whatsoever with South Africa and, in any case, it falls outside the NATO Treaty area. With the exception of France, all other NATO members mentioned above claim to operate an effective arms embargo against South Africa in compliance with decisions of the United Nations Security Council. The role of France, the Federal Republic of Germany, Britain and the United States may not surprise many people in view of the relationships these countries enjoy with South Africa but the revelations regarding the Netherlands and Denmark will not only shock public opinion in those countries but also raise questions about the power of the NATO alliance to undermine established national policies. The documents reveal defence relationships of these countries with South Africa and make it vital for us to examine the serious moves in Western defence circles to treat Simonstown as a NATO base. This is certainly South Africa's objective which is reflected in recent advertisements placed by its embassies in the Western press which ask: "Could an organisation like NATO have a base in Simonstown, South Africa?"

The South African regime has for long sought to secure its integration into the over-all Western defence system. Recently we have witnessed strong moves in the United States and certain other NATO countries to have closer defence ties with the apartheid regime. The solidarity of the major Western Powers with South Africa was confirmed by the use of the triple veto last year by Britain, France and the United States of America to protect the Pretoria regime from being expelled as a member of the United Nations. South Africa continues to defy the world community in the sure knowledge that it has very powerful external allies.

Last September the South African Defence Minister told the South African Parliament with regard to the Cape sea route: "It is a source of great joy to me that I am able to inform this House now that tremendous progress has been made in this sphere during the past few months. This includes purchases as well as the acquisition of licences and knowledge in respect of these matters which relate in particular to the surveillance and defence of our coast and the sea route round the Cape... it would be irresponsible to furnish any particulars of these matters. And therefore I now want to make an earnest appeal to our newspapers not to start any speculation in this regard, for speculations are the greatest evil we have to contend with."¹⁷

The attached documents reveal the need for secrecy on the part of the South African regime and all the collaborators in this system.

The documents show that the equipment section of the German Defence Ministry (*Materialanst der Bundeswehr*) was directly engaged in the development and construction of Advokaat system. They also detail the NATO codes given to equipment and spare parts originating from Britain, the United States of America, France, Denmark and the Netherlands - the individual NATO sheets refer to

¹⁷ House of Assembly Debates (Hansard), September 10, 1974, col. 2544

components which originate from those countries.¹⁸

¹⁸ The attached documents are not reproduced here.

STATEMENT AT THE MEETING OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL, JUNE 6, 1975¹⁹

I wish to thank the Security Council for this opportunity to make a statement, and in particular the delegations of the United Republic of Cameroon and the United Republic of Tanzania, for proposing a hearing. It is a privilege to address the Security Council, and in 1972, I was grateful to have had a similar opportunity in Addis Ababa, under the sponsorship of the Organisation of African Unity.

This privilege is a special one for me as a South African, and more particularly as a representative of the British Anti-Apartheid Movement, which was established in 1959 to campaign for an end to apartheid and white domination in southern Africa.

If I may say so, it is also perhaps appropriate and fitting that I should speak immediately after my friend Mr. Ivor Richard, who was an active supporter and member of the Anti-Apartheid Movement in the 1960s. Our movement has consistently supported the policies of the United Nations and OAU and, in so far as it has been within our power, we have done everything possible to alert public opinion in Britain and the world to the dangers inherent in the southern African conflict.

Since 1960, immediately after Sharpeville, where British Saracen armoured cars were used in the massacre of Africans at Sharpeville and Langa, we set about organising a world campaign for an international arms embargo, and to a certain extent we have some success to show.

I have not come to New York to tell the Security Council what to do about Namibia: that is for members of the Council and other Member States to decide on the basis of their own commitments to the people of Namibia, and of what SWAPO, the recognised and authentic representative of the Namibian people, asks of the United Nations. My purpose is to share with the Security Council our understanding of the Namibian problem and provide certain information which may assist it effectively to discharge its solemn responsibilities.

Our movement has, since its inception, been concerned with the problem of Namibia. In 1966 we held an international conference in Britain on South West Africa. That Oxford Conference, under the chairmanship of Mr. Olof Palme, the present Prime Minister of Sweden, reached the conclusion that there existed a clear moral, political and legal basis for securing South Africa's withdrawal from the international Territory, and recommended the termination of the League of Nations Mandate. It unfortunately also reached the conclusion that what was

absent, what was lacking, to assert this responsibility was political will on the part of the major Western Powers.

In October 1966, the General Assembly terminated the Mandate, called on South Africa to withdraw from the Territory, and declared that the Territory was a United Nations responsibility. Since then, the persistent refusal of the apartheid regime to relinquish its control over Namibia, and its illegal and brutal actions in that Territory have, if anything, made stronger the grounds for international action against the illegal occupying Power.

Yet we witness once again a total absence of will on the part of the major Western Powers to take any meaningful action. With the assurance of this kind of Western support South Africa's letter to the Secretary-General, which I have read carefully, seems to reveal no desire on the part of the Pretoria regime to withdraw from Namibia and hand it over to the United Nations. Worse still, in that letter the Vorster regime claims to have found, between December and now, what it calls the "true leaders" in the Territory, and it is prepared to engage in discussions with those "true leaders" to facilitate South Africa's policies of apartheid in Namibia.

Pretoria, as we know, rejects SWAPO totally. There is talk of elections to reveal SWAPO's support here in the Security Council and elsewhere; but, in our view, we should be very careful to be clear as to whom we need to convince that SWAPO is the authentic organisation of the people of Namibia. The United Nations and the Organisation of African Unity have already recognised SWAPO. So are we here to try and prove to the illegal occupying Power the authenticity of SWAPO before it concedes the rights of the United Nations over that Territory? For South Africa, if it is genuine, the question is simple: withdraw from Namibia and leave it to the United Nations to conduct the process of decolonisation. This they reject totally.

In this Council and in other organs, South Africa has been characterised as a police State, and the full force of its terrorism has been inflicted on the Namibian people as well. However, in recent years, with rapid militarisation, that police State has also become a garrison State. In recent years, the occupying Power in Namibia has been forced to respond to the resistance of the Namibian people by sending ever-increasing contingents of the army and the air force in order to preserve its control. In June 1974 the Pretoria regime announced that large contingents of the Defence Force had been dispatched for duty in Namibia. Also, for the first time, the regime openly boasted about its military bases in the occupied Territory.

The *South African Digest* of June 21, 1974, issued in Pretoria by the South African Government - a copy of which I have here and will be pleased to provide to the Permanent Members of the Security Council in particular - stated:

"The South African Army is fully operational in the Caprivi area on an effective low-intensity war footing... From strategically situated bases in the area, trained National Servicemen are regularly lifted by helicopter to selected spots for patrol duty."

In a special report in the same journal about vigilance on the border, the *Digest* describes the situation dramatically and I quote from page 8:

"The South African Air Force giant C-160 Transall Troop carrier taxied to a stop at Mpacha Air Base, Caprivi... Hundreds of splendid-looking South African soldiers were perched atop armoured vehicles and trucks. Armed to the teeth, the casual-seeming attitude of the troops belied their obvious state of instant readiness.

"It was a wonderfully reassuring sight. Here indeed were solid men at the front. To the members of the official South African press party - the first such group allowed into the anti-terrorist war zone - the message was loud and clear: South Africa's fighting border is in good hands."

The report mentions the C-160 Transall aircraft, which is a joint French-German product sold by France to South Africa, and about which representations have been made by all our movements, by OAU and indeed by President Kaunda to the leaders of those countries.

In the same journal, the *Digest*, there are several photographs. One is a clear one of a helicopter used by military patrols in Namibia. I identify it as a Super-Frelon helicopter supplied by France. Whenever the French Government has been called upon not to supply weapons to South Africa it has responded by suggesting that French weapons are not to be used for internal suppression in southern Africa, and in any case the United Nations does not have a mandatory embargo. Last year we were heartened when the newly-elected President of France told the world that France would not supply weapons for use against people who are fighting for self-determination. I know that it often takes a Government a long time to implement its policies, but one year is a long time even for the French Government. Here is clear evidence of French weapons being used in Namibia to preserve South Africa's illegal occupation. These weapons are utilised to suppress the struggle of the Namibian people for self-determination and independence. In the light of this evidence - and there is much more that we can provide from South

African sources - what has the French Government done? In the unlikely event that the Paris Government did not know of it, and in the light of this evidence that I am submitting today, what does it propose to do? I do not expect that the French Government wishes to behave dishonourably in this respect and it will, therefore, assure this Council that it will forthwith cease the supply to South Africa of all military equipment and spares for those weapons. I hope too that the French Government will, as a result of its own experience of the Pretoria regime, which has apparently violated French conditions regarding the supply of these weapons, immediately announce a complete arms embargo against South Africa and send South Africa's arms buyers, who I know are at this moment negotiating to buy more weapons at the Paris Air Show, back home to South Africa. This, in our view, is the minimum that the world and no doubt the French people expect of the Government of France, and we await the response from Paris.

Recently we have received certain documents which appear to be authentic evidence that the NATO system of codification of military equipment and spare parts now extends to South Africa. We have presented this material to the Chairman of the United Nations Special Committee against Apartheid, and it was released here in New York on June 4, 1975. The South African regime has installed a modern military communications system with headquarters not far from Simonstown, and a substation of this communications system is based in Walvis Bay in Namibia. This system, on which I have done considerable research, monitors and can establish contact with all aircraft, ships and submarines throughout the South Atlantic Ocean and the entire South Pole area and across the Indian Ocean well beyond India. Various military journals have reported that it is directly linked up to London and Washington. The documents we have show that the initial arrangements for the system were made by certain West German firms and the West German Defence Ministry. They show too that the NATO code for equipment and spares has been used for this Advokaat system. I refer to NATO form AC/125 No. 8 (Revised), which is the NATO form for the codification of spare parts. Since announcing this information a few days ago, our office has received a further document, which apparently is in the hands of the South African authorities, entitled, "NATO Codification of Equipment, Initial Exchange of Information". The number of this is described as NATO Form AC/135 No. 8 (Revised). These two forms are, therefore, complementary.

NATO has admitted in the past that it has prepared plans for operations around southern Africa, but all NATO members, as well its Secretary-General, have denied that South Africa has any links

whatsoever with NATO. We should like to know how it has then come about that South Africa, which is not a member of NATO and is far outside its treaty area, should have this codification system which is only meant for NATO members. Who provided South Africa with the code? Does this mean that the principal NATO Powers have already placed such a high degree of reliance on South Africa's defence role in the southern hemisphere that they propose to treat South Africa as if it were almost a NATO member? Are we to conclude from the advertisements placed by South African embassies in NATO capitals that it is only a matter of time before Simonstown is used as a NATO base? There have been grave developments recently where certain Western Powers have indicated publicly their desire to rely on South Africa for south Atlantic and Indian Ocean security, thereby conferring upon the apartheid regime the role of a major regional Power in that hemisphere. These developments pose very real dangers for all the States in Africa and the littoral States not only in the south Atlantic but also in the Indian Ocean. This Advokaat communications system, as I have said, has one of its substations in Walvis Bay in the occupied Territory, so that those who are using this communications system are relying on South Africa's continued occupation of that region. In this connection we wish to draw the attention of the Security Council to a letter we received from a Minister at the Foreign and Commonwealth Office in London dated April 3, 1975, which alarm us. That letter states:

"Her Majesty's Government have recognised that Walvis Bay is an integral part of the Cape Province of the Republic of South Africa and that the Caprivi Strip is part of South West Africa (Namibia). Walvis Bay was never part of the mandated Territory but was part of the Union of South Africa before the mandate was granted in 1920."

I submit that the British Government, therefore, should be pressed to explain what it understands by the need to preserve the territorial integrity of Namibia.

I have earlier referred to the militarisation of Namibia. The bases which are established in the occupied Territory are not only for the purpose of securing Pretoria's control; they are major bases equipped for attacks against African States to the north. The Johannesburg *Star* of 19 April has this quotation from Angola's Minister of the Interior, Mr. Kabangu:

"South Africa has installed near our district one of the most modern bases in Africa, in which rocket launchers have been

installed - all pointing in the direction of our country."

South Africa has thus sent its armed forces in large numbers across the border of the international Territory of Namibia, which is subject to the legal authority of the United Nations. Bases established in the occupied Territory are to facilitate attack against neighbouring States as well as the Namibian people. In our view, the illegal occupation of Namibia, the militarisation of the Territory, the establishment of major military bases there and the admission of such establishment amount to a clear breach of the peace and constitute an act of aggression as well as a threat to international peace within the meaning of the Charter.

In 1960 we were campaigning on arms in Britain, as I have said, and on March 17, 1963, the newly-elected leader of the Labour Party and then a member of the Anti-Apartheid Movement, Mr. Harold Wilson, accepted an invitation from us to join our campaign to stop the supply of weapons to South Africa. He was the main speaker at a rally that we organised in Trafalgar Square at that time, and he had this to say:

"Act now" - this was an appeal to the British Government -
"and stop this bloody traffic in the weapons of oppression."

He went on to say that there was not time for the Labour Government to get into office because the matter was supremely urgent and that Mr. Macmillan ought to act immediately.

Now I should like to know what has happened in southern Africa since 1963 to make it less of a threat to peace, to make this kind of action less urgent. I have already explained the position in Namibia. The representative of Britain spoke about the Rhodesian problem, but failed to mention under this section the supreme violation of British sovereignty over its colonial territory by the despatch of armed forces on the part of South Africa to Rhodesia. That is a clear breach of the peace. Why then no Chapter VII action on that question?

Thirdly, since 1963, the South African budget has shot up fantastically. We do not believe that the British leaders are those who support apartheid, and therefore we find it difficult to understand the difficulty they seem to have in determining that there is a threat to peace in southern Africa as a result of the military build-up and thereby asking for mandatory action with regard to the arms embargo. They already claim to implement the embargo. Indeed, when we were all at Kingston a few weeks ago the Heads of

Government of other Commonwealth countries welcomed the strict arms embargo that is supposed to be implemented by Britain and also welcomed the announcement that the Simonstown Agreement was terminated. What then is the problem?

The United States has informed us about its decision since 1963 on implementing the arms embargo. We know that that decision is not complete and that there are major violations in that embargo. But nevertheless the United Kingdom and the United States say that they apply an arms embargo, unlike France. What then is the difficulty?

The great Powers in the West seem to be saying to us throughout that their policy with regard to Namibia, their policy with regard to Rhodesia and their policy with regard to South Africa is based on what is in the interests of South Africa, and therefore they reach the conclusion that they must have no confrontation with South Africa on any of these questions, whether it be Namibia or Rhodesia or apartheid. Over the years this policy has moved them to a position whereby they come into direct confrontation with the liberation forces in their anti-liberation policies. They describe those policies as peaceful change, which in effect means only that change which the South African Government will decide on, at the rate that the South African Government decides on, at the pace that the South African Government decides on. That is the only change they accept within the limitations of what the apartheid regime can do.

We feel that there is a more dangerous situation now because of the evolving military alliance between South Africa and the major Western Powers, which will with every day that passes make the prospect of international action even more difficult in the months and the years to come. It appears to us that whenever the Security Council has before it items on southern Africa, the Western permanent members immediately begin dusting their vetoes in readiness to block any meaningful action that is proposed. The permanent members of this Council have a sacred and solemn duty to preserve international peace and security, and just because of their close economic and other relationships with South Africa they are placing those interests above any objective assessment of the situation. Therefore, when the present threat to peace leads to a major conflagration of catastrophic proportions, the responsibility for that will not only rest in Pretoria, but also in London, Paris and Washington.

We believe that since it has been resolved that responsibility for Namibia rests with the United Nations, South Africa has to end its

illegal occupation. It has refused to do so. This Council, in our view, therefore, has the clear duty to take steps to expel the occupying regime. That, we are told by people in higher positions, is impossible because the permanent members will never contemplate such action.

Meanwhile in recent years the Western Powers have claimed that their special relationship with Pretoria leads them to believe that changes are likely. That was also said at the special session of the Security Council in 1972. But we seem to be told even now that there is still a chance and that we should give South Africa yet another opportunity.

The South Africans say that they do not want a single inch of Namibia. But how is it that over all these years, with all the international pressures that have been put on South Africa, it has not seen fit to release to the United Nations one single inch of Namibia?

That is the central issue. Who controls the inches, the miles and the entire territory of Namibia? South Africa has to withdraw, and therefore the absolute minimum that needs to be done by outside Powers is to deny all military arms and equipment and end all military relationships so that the illegal occupying Power is denied the military assistance with which it is illegally occupying that Territory.

We are told about new changes, of movements in certain directions, of shifts in South African policy. But the issue is not one of ending some discriminatory policies only; it is one of ending white domination in southern Africa.

Finally, it is possible that the Security Council will once again be paralysed, and it appears so. In our view, we are not totally disheartened by this simply because we have faith in the fighting spirit and strength of SWAPO. We shall continue to support them. We shall continue to carry on the campaigns not only in Britain, but also in other parts of the world where anti-apartheid movements exist. We shall continue to support United Nations and OAU policy on this question.

But I should like to conclude by once again posing the problem on southern Africa with regard to the Western Powers with the same words with which we concluded our submission to the 1972 session of this Council. On whose side are the Western Powers? Are they on the side of Africa and the United Nations and the liberation struggle, or on the side of the racist regimes in southern Africa?

In our view, it is an answer to that question that will determine whether this Council can be effective in discharging its responsibilities with regard to southern Africa.

**STATEMENT AT THE INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE OF EXPERTS
FOR THE SUPPORT OF VICTIMS OF COLONIALISM AND
APARTHEID IN SOUTHERN AFRICA, OSLO, APRIL 10, 1973**

I think for the record it is necessary at the outset for us who come from Britain, to condemn the fact that Britain is not participating in this Conference, even as an expert. All the expertise which is available to Her Majesty's Government has been utilised in the past few years and particularly, at this moment of time, in negotiations with our direct enemies: the South African Government, whose Foreign Minister is now in London, preceding his talks with the Secretary-General; and the Portuguese Government, for the celebration of the anniversary of the Anglo-Portuguese alliance that Lord Gifford has just mentioned.

The Anti-apartheid Movement is an old organization, in the sense that we were formed in 1959 at a small meeting of some 200 people, and were addressed by President Nyerere, who was then leader of the opposition in Tanganyika. Ever since, both in Britain and in other countries, we have tried to inform people of what is happening in southern Africa, in Rhodesia, or the old Central African Federation, in South Africa, Namibia and, indeed, in the remaining colonial territories, including those British territories which were then engaged in the struggle against colonialism. Many of them are now present here and many of their leaders are today Heads of State.

Over the years, we have had no difficulties whatsoever in taking up the policy of support for the liberation movements, because we were set up in order to support the struggles of the peoples in southern Africa. That policy is the policy of the United Nations today. I hope I will be forgiven if I say a few things which may sound not very helpful or critical, but these are not addressed with any destructive intentions in mind. I do get the feeling that in fact a sense of unreality permeates at organs like these, where old statements are repeated and situations with which we are all familiar are rehashed. If all of us assembled here and all the governments which voted for all the resolutions that have been adopted are really serious, why does this problem persist? Why do we continue to confront the white regimes in southern Africa which are building up a growing alliance with the Western Powers?

While we are concentrating on resolutions, protests and other actions, they are strengthening their links and repressing people more. Therefore, I would like to plead that we pause for a minute and really think about whether we believe what we say when we say that the white regimes are our enemies because they are oppressing the peoples of Africa? Secondly, and even more important, do we believe that those three Great Powers that are not present here are also our enemies?

As I said at the Addis Ababa meetings of the Security Council last year, the question we need to pose for effective action is: on which side are the Western Powers? Are they the friends or the enemies of Africa? I feel that in our exercises, programmes, documents and proposals, we spend too much time, thought and effort to work out tolerable options for our enemies. It should not be the job of those engaged in supporting the struggles of the peoples of Africa against colonialism to work out tolerable options for the Western governments and, even for the South African government itself.

This is where I feel the sense of unreality of which I spoke. We are talking, as our comrades have reminded us, about a real war in southern Africa, one which is as real in South Africa as it is in the rest of southern Africa and the colonial territories. And yet in our proposals and our actions on South Africa we talk of how to exclude it from specific actions. This is a dangerous tendency. While it is important to act on individual issues in special ways so as to get maximum results and have flexibility, at the same time we must not give the impression to people that the South African regime is unshakable and will remain almost forever. What is happening in a great many proposals that are coming out from the United Nations and other organs is to create tolerable options based on the assumption that the South African regime is there to stay.

If we in our movements were concerned with producing tolerable options, we would not have done any work at all. We were concerned at the very outset with confronting the British Government and the Western Powers. It is that kind of confrontation that has produced the small results that we have.

I am not competent as an expert or, indeed, as an individual to advise the United Nations what it ought to do, but in terms of British people who support it, who support its policies, who stand outside sports grounds and attempt to stop arms sales to South Africa, these people request the United Nations to implement its resolutions.

It is simple, yet difficult. But if we consider the matter as being very difficult, we end up with working out proposals that tend to take away from the central urgency of the problem. So, in our view, we must show up what our enemies are and, in terms of Western countries, we must not be afraid of a confrontation with them. A confrontation will help to expose their role and is nearer to the reality of the situation that we are now facing.

There is a tendency not only to debate all the issues before us, but also to treat the issue of southern Africa, and South Africa, as a routine issue, as something we talk about year after year and don't take action upon. We must, therefore, tackle South Africa. In 1963 and 1964, the Security Council, the General Assembly and other organs, and governments talked seriously about the prospect of sanctions. We in London sponsored an International Conference on Sanctions, where we assembled experts to discuss the matter. They came to the conclusion that what

was lacking was political will. That is what is lacking now, as well.

What has the Security Council done between 1964 and 1973 to move forward? Indeed, we hear very little talk about the possibility of sanctions against South Africa, even though we know that it is South Africa's violation of the mandatory programme of sanctions against Rhodesia which has sabotaged that entire exercise. Therefore we are against the idea that in any strengthening of sanctions against Rhodesia, South Africa should somehow be given special treatment because it is a strong country in that area and should be excluded from considering action against it.

We insist that South Africa is the major enemy of the United Nations, of the Organization of African Unity and indeed, the oppressed peoples of Zimbabwe, and therefore, action should be taken against them. Not only are they breaking United Nations sanctions, but they have also committed a breach of the peace and an act of aggression in sending troops to fight the freedom fighters in Zimbabwe.

One example of the confrontation of which I spoke is the following: We have worked on many issues. The ones that are best known to the world, I should think, are the arms embargo and the campaigns against racist sports teams. The latter campaign dates back to 1959. Over recent years, as a result of public information carried out for a decade and the hard work of small groups of people, we managed to force the Labour Government in Britain to ban the South African cricket tour, against the will of Her Majesty's Government. If we had worked on the basis of producing options for the British Government, we would never have succeeded. We confronted the British Government and the sporting authorities.

The action continued in Australia, where we have been in contact with Australian and New Zealand groups for eight to ten years. We can say that as a result of public actions there, the sports tours were cancelled. Indeed, the political process brought about a new Government in power, which is more committed to the United Nations policies than the previous Government. These things, I suggest, Mr. Chairman, do not happen in isolation. Parenthetically, we have just heard a few hours ago that the New Zealand Government has banned the South African sports team from going to New Zealand.

In not trying to win quick victories by tolerable options, we succeed in actions like this. Therefore, I hope it is recognized that diplomatic action alone cannot succeed. It must operate in alliance with the internal pressures in these countries. Individual people in the major Western countries are making considerable sacrifices to fight their own governments to adopt better policies and they are doing this in support of the policies of the United Nations and of the liberation movements. If they see that the United Nations is speaking with many voices - on the one hand, some say "Boycott South Africa, don't talk to them, no dialogue is possible", and on the other hand, the more senior representatives of the United

Nations talk to representatives of that same country - the public does not understand. This is the "unreality" I mentioned earlier.

I would like to sound a kind of warning. There is no issue as great or as serious as that in southern Africa, and yet, at the same time, there is also no issue where action is somehow inversely related to the number of resolutions and discussions that are held. It seems as if the issues we discuss most are the ones in which we are most impotent. I would like to warn that the growth industry of research and experts is one we should not encourage. We should, indeed, divert our attention to growth of action against these regimes rather than research about those regimes. This diversion is a result of this studies-and-expertise approach.

What we need to do is to support those who are taking action. It is here that the credibility of the United Nations is at issue. Where research is necessary, the two criteria should be the following: firstly, do the liberation movements want this research? If we are serious in supporting those in the struggle, we must do the research they need. Secondly, is it the kind of research that can be used effectively by solidarity groups? We in Britain have no research experts, but within weeks we were able to provide information on the number of British corporations involved in South Africa - we provide the research experts with this information and they write long papers about it; meanwhile, we engage in action on the matter.

The response of these countries to the disclosure of the poor wages they were paying Africans was to increase pay. This response is aimed at subverting the anti-apartheid lobby in Britain and the rest of the world.

This is the kind of research we must not encourage at all. We must say that these companies must withdraw from South Africa and Namibia. We must avoid the danger of giving the impression that if companies are operating physically in Namibia, then we must act against them, but if they are operating in South Africa we must not. It is the same British Leyland Company in South Africa that produces the weapons that are used in Namibia to oppress the Namibian people. Therefore, we must not be restricted to territories in such a way as to not be able to see the role of the British Leyland Company in supporting the military machine of our enemies. It is this kind of more flexible thinking in terms of problems that I would like to plead for.

Finally, in my paper, I have drawn attention to the fact that, in my view and the view of the Anti-Apartheid Movement, the lines have been drawn in Africa in a way in which they have never been drawn before. The kind of military support that is being given to the South African regime and the way it is used as the pivot for policies towards the rest of Africa, anticipates an almost indefinite stability and security in South Africa. The kind of considerations that have been taken into account for a military alliance of the Western Powers and South Africa, require that that regime remains stable for at least ten years, if not more.

The situation is far more serious than many of us feel. Today, within minutes, Nigeria, Ghana, the Sudan, Somalia can be bombed from within South African borders; what will happen? The United Nations Security Council will perhaps meet in emergency session. It will take four or five days before they even adopt a resolution that every country agrees with. Meanwhile, South Africa will have gotten away with the bombing.

It is this sense of urgency that I think exists in Africa and which we need to inject into the discussions at this Conference. And it is on that basis that we need to take action. Therefore, we plead that the United Nations, the Organization of African Unity and other organizations build up an alliance with the liberation movement first. Secondly, and just as important (although not competitive), is the need to build up an alliance with the peoples in the Western countries, because it is those people who are the best allies of the liberation movements and of the Organization of African Unity.

If the United Nations stands behind the liberation struggle in that way, then I believe we can win results. I am particularly grateful to Ambassador Ogbu,²⁰ Chairman of the Special Committee on Apartheid, because we have established some working relationship already. He attended a conference of trade unionists in Britain two weeks ago. There we were planning action among trade unionists and we hope that this will be encouraged as well by other committees.

If the United Nations wishes to consult us, they can do so directly. We can communicate directly without being recognized non-governmental organizations. But attendance at too many conferences like this is too expensive for us. What I am pleading for is direct communication rather than a great deal of procedural arrangements, which may exist within the United Nations and through which we have to move before we can get action. I hope those who are experts in the United Nations will give attention to improving the procedures so that we can work together more effectively.

Resolutions of the United Nations are correct; the policy of the United Nations and the Organization of African Unity is correct. We must be consistent. We must not look for new solutions because results are not quickly achieved. Above all, we must not be diverted into working out tolerable options either for the South African regime, the Portuguese regime or the illegal Rhodesian regime or their allies, who are not present here. We can only act after we have considered who our enemies are and who our friends are. Our experience in Britain is that Britain is enemy territory and that the British Government is now engaging in an alliance with the Portuguese. Just as we managed to stop the cricket tour, I am sure that the peoples of Britain may act to make it almost impossible for Caetano to come

²⁰ Edwin Ogebe Ogbu of Nigeria

to Britain.

This is not an empty threat. That is our objective. We may not succeed, but we will work for it. If we do succeed, then we would like support - political support from the United Nations and the Organization of African Unity and from other governments. It is, therefore, important to realise the urgency of the southern African situation; to believe what we say; and to concentrate on action rather than on too much research, and too many tolerable options.

**LETTER TO THE CHAIRMAN OF THE SPECIAL COMMITTEE
AGAINST APARTHEID, SEPTEMBER 9, 1974²¹**

We have been witnessing with growing alarm the increasing economic, political and military links between Israel and South Africa. The recent agreement to upgrade their diplomatic relations to the level of ambassadors reflects the high level of cooperation between the two countries.

The purpose of this letter is to draw the attention of the Special Committee to new forms of collaboration between Israel and South Africa to promote South African products on the British market. As you know, we are currently engaged in a national campaign against collaboration with apartheid which involves the boycott of all South African products. Recently we discovered that Israel and South Africa were planning a joint campaign to promote Jaffa and Outspan orange juice in the United Kingdom. We took the matter up immediately with the Embassy of Israel in London and their reply of August 16, 1974, is particularly alarming because of their claim that the marketing organisations of the two countries are "financing the purely commercial ventures which, to our mind, has no relevance to the political apartheid issue".

I am enclosing a copy of their letter for your information and would request that the Special Committee take this matter up urgently with the representative of Israel at the United Nations. We shall of course pursue the matter with the Embassy of Israel in London, but since our campaign against the promotion of South African products is in conformity with the policies of the United Nations it is important that the Special Committee should take this matter up in New York; any steps which can be taken by the United Nations will assist us in demanding that Israel does not proceed with the joint venture planned for the United Kingdom.

This instance of joint South African-Israeli collaboration is just one illustration of the growing links between the two countries which are contributing directly to the maintenance of apartheid and white domination in South Africa. I am enclosing a report in the current issue of *Anti-Apartheid News* which gives information about the strengthening of other ties between Israel and South Africa.

When these developments are taken together with the visit last month of General Moshe Dayan to South Africa it becomes quite clear that the growing links between South Africa and Israel are being considered so important by the two countries that they are determined to assist each other even though it involves direct violation of United Nations decisions.

²¹ UN document A/AC.115/L.389

We hope that it will be possible for the Special Committee to give urgent consideration to these new links.

LETTER TO THE CHAIRMAN OF THE SPECIAL COMMITTEE AGAINST APARTHEID, JUNE 3, 1975, TRANSMITTING A MEMORANDUM CONCERNING COLLABORATION OF NATO MEMBER STATES WITH SOUTH AFRICA IN THE ADVOKAAT MILITARY COMMUNICATIONS SYSTEM²²

We have recently received certain documents which, taken together, reveal high-level military collaboration between South Africa and several Western Powers. The documents reveal that the NATO defence code is available to the Pretoria regime and has been utilised to code the equipment and spares of its new military communications system known as Project Advokaat. In view of the importance of this information, I am enclosing a memorandum, together with copies of the relevant documents.

This evidence adds substance to our warnings since 1969-1970 that South Africa was being steadily integrated into the over-all Western defence system despite official statements to the contrary from the major Western Powers.

It is easier to understand, in the light of this evidence, why countries like Britain and the United States of America which claim to abide by the United Nations arms embargo still feel it necessary to oppose a mandatory arms embargo.

We also have considerable evidence of South African officials concerned with defence matters visiting a number of Western countries in the recent past to discuss other military projects. We shall send you a more detailed document with further evidence very shortly.

We trust that the Special Committee will urgently take appropriate action in the light of this new evidence.

Memorandum concerning collaboration of NATO member States with South Africa in the Advokaat military communications system

The South African regime has established at Silvermine, close to the Simonstown Naval Base, the headquarters of a modern and highly advanced communications system called Project Advokaat. This system is now operational, although further work on it is still in progress.

Project Advokaat is just one of a series of projects undertaken by the Pretoria

regime to expand its defence role in the South Atlantic and Indian Oceans and promote a closer military alliance with the major Western Powers.

When Dr. C.P. Mulder, South African Minister of Information, visited France during April 1975, he said: "Our naval base at Simonstown is to have its berthing facilities doubled. And far from Simonstown we have built a sophisticated multi-million franc maritime communications headquarters that provides up-to-the-minute information on all maritime traffic from the Cape to North America, South America, the South Pole region, and India."²³

Project Advokaat has a number of units on which the movements of ships and other craft are graphically represented on a map of the region covered by it - and this includes not only the ocean area mentioned by Dr. Mulder but also virtually the entire African continent.

The Pretoria regime claims that pioneer work was done in South Africa towards the development and manufacture of the communications system. However, we have been aware of the collaboration of a number of Western companies in helping to establish the system.

Documents which we have recently received expose the high level of involvement of companies in several NATO countries in developing the Advokaat system.

Even more serious is the fact that NATO and several of its members have been directly engaged in the planning and development of this system which is directly linked to NATO's interest and activity outside its defined regional area.

We also knew that the Federal Republic of Germany was directly involved in this system; it is public knowledge that certain German companies played a major role in helping to develop this system - AEC-Telefunken, Siemens and MAN.

The attached documents reveal clearly that:

(a) South Africa is now within the NATO defence code area and its military equipment and spare parts are codified and recorded in the same way as for NATO members;

(b) The United States, Britain, France, Netherlands and Denmark are all directly involved in Project Advokaat, together with arms contracting companies in these countries.

NATO has strongly denied that it has any links with South Africa, individual members of that alliance have repeatedly stated that NATO had no dealings

²³ *South African Digest*, Pretoria, April 11, 1975, p.

whatsoever with South Africa and, in any case, it falls outside the NATO Treaty area. With the exception of France, all other NATO members mentioned above claim to operate an effective arms embargo against South Africa in compliance with decisions of the United Nations Security Council. The role of France, the Federal Republic of Germany, Britain and the United States may not surprise many people in view of the relationships these countries enjoy with South Africa but the revelations regarding the Netherlands and Denmark will not only shock public opinion in those countries but also raise questions about the power of the NATO alliance to undermine established national policies. The documents reveal defence relationships of these countries with South Africa and make it vital for us to examine the serious moves in Western defence circles to treat Simonstown as a NATO base. This is certainly South Africa's objective which is reflected in recent advertisements placed by its embassies in the Western press which ask: "Could an organisation like NATO have a base in Simonstown, South Africa?"

The South African regime has for long sought to secure its integration into the over-all Western defence system. Recently we have witnessed strong moves in the United States and certain other NATO countries to have closer defence ties with the apartheid regime. The solidarity of the major Western Powers with South Africa was confirmed by the use of the triple veto last year by Britain, France and the United States of America to protect the Pretoria regime from being expelled as a member of the United Nations. South Africa continues to defy the world community in the sure knowledge that it has very powerful external allies.

Last September the South African Defence Minister told the South African Parliament with regard to the Cape sea route: "It is a source of great joy to me that I am able to inform this House now that tremendous progress has been made in this sphere during the past few months. This includes purchases as well as the acquisition of licences and knowledge in respect of these matters which relate in particular to the surveillance and defence of our coast and the sea route round the Cape... it would be irresponsible to furnish any particulars of these matters. And therefore I now want to make an earnest appeal to our newspapers not to start any speculation in this regard, for speculations are the greatest evil we have to contend with."²⁴

The attached documents reveal the need for secrecy on the part of the South African regime and all the collaborators in this system.

The documents show that the equipment section of the German Defence Ministry (*Materialanst der Bundeswehr*) was directly engaged in the development and construction of Advokaat system. They also detail the NATO codes given to equipment and spare parts originating from Britain, the United States of America, France, Denmark and the Netherlands - the individual NATO sheets refer to

²⁴ House of Assembly Debates (Hansard), September 10, 1974, col. 2544

components which originate from those countries.²⁵

²⁵ The attached documents are not reproduced here.

South Africa's Defence Strategy²⁶

Introduction

During the early 1960s when the rest of the African continent was engaged in a rapid process of decolonisation, the response of the Pretoria regime to growing demands for freedom from the African, Indian and Coloured people was to intensify its repressive apartheid system. Following the Sharpeville massacre of March 1960, the African National Congress and the Pan Africanist Congress were outlawed. The system of white domination, relying on a massive police State apparatus had to move a stage further by militarising the entire white population and preparing it for war against the black people. The defence budget was increased, the police and military forces reorganised for coordinated action and the white population trained to counteract internal armed resistance. By 1962 the Pretoria regime set the country on the path to a major future confrontation.

South Africa is undoubtedly the dominant economic, political and military power in the southern African region. With sophisticated modern equipment and expensive training, it has built up a considerable striking capability in order to preserve the apartheid system and intimidate independent African States in the region. Its defence strategy is primarily aimed at preserving internal security. Until recently, it was fortunate in having around it a series of buffer territories which were allied to the Pretoria regime and thus hostile to the liberation struggle. This added to its sense of security. However, even at that time, faced with the growing number of independent African States further north, committed to support the struggle against colonialism and racism, a major aspect of its defence policy was to intimidate those countries so that they would not support the liberation movements nor consider any kind of military intervention against South Africa.

As the Pretoria regime expanded its military power, it began to develop ambitions of becoming a major regional power in Africa. Thus a defence strategy which was initially aimed at preserving internal security, could not be divorced from preserving stability in the region as a whole.

²⁶ Paper presented to the Conference on Socio-Economic Trends and Policies of Southern Africa, Dar es Salaam, under the auspices of the United Nations Institute for Development and Planning, December 1-8, 1975. United Nations Centre Against Apartheid, Notes and Documents, No. 2/76, January 1976.

Defence Budget

Year by year the South African defence budget has increased. From 44 million rand during 1960-61 it shot up to over 72 million rand during 1961-62. Today its defence budget has reached the all-time high figure of 948 million rand.²⁷ The rise in defence expenditure dramatically reflects the rapid militarisation of white South Africa during the past fifteen years.

Armed Forces

Recognising the severe setbacks suffered by Portugal in Mozambique and other colonies, the serious challenge to the Smith regime by the growing armed struggle in Zimbabwe, and the new mood of militancy among its own African population, demonstrated by the strike action of workers, the Pretoria regime decided to increase the size of its armed forces. They doubled between 1971-72 and 1972-73 from around 48,000 to over 110,000 commandos organised and trained as a Home Guard. The current figure stands at a total of 201,900 personnel with the commandos remaining at the same strength as last year.²⁸

It is important to note that the defence force has traditionally been all white and the expansion of manpower to its present high level has had the effect of withdrawing economically productive whites from their role in the economy. Consequently, an increasing emphasis has been placed on recruiting white women for the defence forces. But the growing economic loss, taken together with the increased number of white casualties suffered in the military effort in Rhodesia and Namibia, led the South African authorities during 1973 to train special groups of African, Indian and Coloured contingents for border duties.

As the cost of militarisation begins to increase for the white society, it is inevitable that they will have to rely increasingly on the black population being drawn into the defence forces. This development represents a significant break with tradition because they have always stressed the importance of maintaining an all-white military force. There is undoubtedly an inherent danger in the practice of training sections of the oppressed population for defence of the oppressor group. It is interesting that an embryonic army is also being trained for the Transkei in preparation for its "independence" in October 1976. The *Eastern Province Herald* of 14 April 1975 reported: "The basis of training for the new army will be counter-insurgency, and it will have its weapons and equipment supplied by the South African defence force." It is clear that the South African authorities anticipate using a growing proportion of the black population in the defence

²⁷ Figures from *The Military Balance*, annual publication of the International Institute for Strategic Studies, London.

²⁸ These figures for the total armed forces include the Active Reserve Force: see *The Military Balance*.

forces in the future.

In 1967 when South Africa despatched armed units into Rhodesia to help defend the Smith regime, they described it as a "police operation". The police force has a para-military wing, so the distinction is virtually meaningless. In any case, South African military personnel only need to change uniforms in order to operate as so-called para-military policemen since their training and equipment are similar. In that experience the South Africans suffered serious losses but African "policemen" were often placed in the front line and were usually among the first to die. Present developments with regard to recruiting Blacks for the military are based partly on that experience.

The United Nations Arms Embargo circumvented

The growing reliance by South Africa on military force in order to preserve its system of white domination, led to various moves at the United Nations during 1963-64 to institute an international arms embargo against the Pretoria regime. At that time the Security Council adopted resolutions calling for an international arms embargo and these were supported by Britain, the United States and other Western Powers. France has refused to apply the embargo and replaced Britain as South Africa's major external supplier of weapons. Italy is also an important supplier of aircraft and other weapons. Britain and the USA, which claim to implement the United Nations embargo, in fact supply a whole range of equipment to the South African armed forces, largely as a result of the manner in which they interpret and implement that embargo. These and other Western countries supply finance capital for investment in South Africa's domestic weapons industry which is also provided with military patents from abroad. There is also an exchange of military personnel for training and other purposes as well as provision of special assistance to South African technicians connected with its weapons industry. In addition, there is also growing evidence of secret supplies of military equipment reaching South Africa from certain Western countries, whose governments have known about and often sanctioned such transactions.²⁹

South Africa today makes a wide range of arms and ammunition and assembles and makes aircraft under licences granted by various Western countries. In addition to importing weapons from abroad, it is becoming a weapons exporter as well. Whilst the arms embargo has been a serious handicap to the Pretoria regime, it has been able to overcome some of the major difficulties as a result of enthusiastic collaboration by certain Western countries.

South Africa has highly sophisticated military equipment including modern fighters, missiles and rockets. It has developed various nerve gases and a

²⁹ For example, West German nuclear collaboration and the supply of equipment for the Advokaat system by various NATO members referred to below.

whole range of ammunition. As the feeling of insecurity increases, it responds by purchasing more and better weapons, hoping that this will be adequate to intimidate and deter Africans internally, as well as neighbouring African States in the area which may consider supporting the liberation struggle. It is constantly in search of the most modern equipment, which is highly expensive.

When one examines South Africa's internal situation and the size and scope of the military, in relation to the need to exercise control over the entire country, it is easy to see that the regime's forces can easily be overstretched by a major confrontation. This is why its senior military officers keep pointing to the fact that South Africa has a very "low security ceiling". Faced with this serious internal security problem, it becomes vital to ensure that the neighbouring territories will not support the African liberation struggle and that international pressure against South Africa will be eased. In this respect, a major consideration for the Pretoria regime is to secure firm outside allies on whom the Pretoria regime can rely for support, both during peacetime, but particularly at a time of crisis. The white regime has always considered itself to be the protector of Western interests in Africa and has tried to secure increased Western military support on the basis of its fanatic anti-communism and the so-called threat to the Cape sea-route from Soviet naval forces. Certain politicians in the West have echoed South Africa's policies and in recent years there has been growing support in Western military circles for the view that South Africa is vitally important for Western defence and security interests. This attempt to build up a firm alliance between Pretoria and the principal Western powers has had considerable political success in recent years and particularly in the United States in view of its new interest in Indian Ocean security.

The Collapse of Portuguese Colonialism and its Strategic Implications for Southern Africa

With the collapse of Portuguese colonialism, the strategic situation in southern Africa has changed dramatically. South Africa has been deprived of an important ally and has become directly vulnerable to the growing resistance in Rhodesia, Namibia and South Africa itself. With the independence of Mozambique, a buffer territory has been transformed overnight into an independent African State, firmly committed to the eradication of colonialism and racism. South Africa has had to face its first real security border with an independent State and the border has been heavily patrolled for over a year by its armed forces.

The situation with regard to Zimbabwe became even more serious - the Pretoria regime was quick to realise that it could not get involved in an open-ended war in Rhodesia with any prospect of winning. To continue to back the illegal Smith regime could not only turn Rhodesia into South Africa's Vietnam but it could also make the Pretoria regime more vulnerable to international

economic and other sanctions, and to serious internal resistance.

The South West Africa People's Organisation (SWAPO) was making considerable headway and international pressure over Namibia was also building up. It had become difficult for South Africa to rely too heavily on the Western Powers for support; they would find it increasingly difficult to defend and protect South Africa from international political pressures unless South Africa gave the impression of making some "concessions".

When the issue of South Africa's expulsion from the United Nations came up last year, the three Western permanent members in the Security Council, Britain, France and the USA, used the triple veto for the first time. Premier Vorster responded immediately by thanking the Western Powers for their action in defence of South Africa and promised some substantial change in South African foreign policy, within the next six months to a year.³⁰

Pretoria then began to take a series of initiatives with regard to Rhodesia which it described as being part of a wider policy of *detente* with Africa. It was prepared to help bring about a legal settlement in Rhodesia in such a way as not to threaten the future security of South Africa. Over Namibia it was less earnest and merely wished to give the impression of being open to negotiation whilst in fact consolidating its hold over the international Territory, by expanding its military bases and implementing its Bantustan policies.

The initiative to bring about a settlement in Rhodesia has failed and it is clear that power will not be transferred by negotiation alone and will need to be seized by the African people through armed struggle. In Namibia, SWAPO has been scoring major successes against the enemy and this has resulted in heavy South African military commitments to that region and the prospect of a major armed confrontation.

South Africa's Intervention in Angola

Faced with Angola's impending declaration of independence on 11 November, the South Africans dispatched armed units into that territory and by October 1975, admitted to it. The initial reason given was that they were there to protect the Cunene Dam and associated installations. Subsequently, on 14th October, the Defence Department in Pretoria made a statement to the effect that seven Ovambos had been killed in weekend raids from across the Angolan border.³¹ South African defence officials then began to indicate that they were following a "hot pursuit" policy, which meant that their forces would not be

³⁰ *The Guardian*, London, 6 November 1974.

³¹ *The Times*, London, 15 October 1975.

constrained by borders in pursuing guerrillas.³² Recent eyewitness and other reports confirm that South African armed forces are not only operating within Angola but directly engaged in the internal struggle for power.³³ Clearly, South Africa is determined to ensure that Angola does not have an administration which would be hostile to it and provide support to the African liberation struggle. It also wishes to take the opportunity to destroy SWAPO forces.

The Pretoria regime will need to decide very soon as to how deeply it wishes to be involved in Angola since it cannot risk leaving its base area undefended. The white regime probably has various contingency plans but there is the real danger that if faced with a stalemate, or the prospect of a long-term growing commitment without quick success, it will escalate the conflict by using more destructive weapons and resort to heavy bombing operations. It will also utilise every opportunity to enlist direct Western military support to supplement its operations in Angola, thus providing vitally needed weapons and other resources, but also serving to legitimise aggressive invasion of Angola.

Surveillance Systems of the Southern Oceans

Whilst it is true to say that the major concentration of South Africa's military effort has been in counter-insurgency training and the provision of sophisticated equipment for the army and the air force, large amounts of money have been allocated more recently to naval installations. Substantial expenditure has been devoted to expanding and improving the Simonstown naval base and other ports and the installation of sophisticated naval communication and surveillance systems.

South Africa has played on the alleged Soviet threat in the southern oceans in order to enlist the support of the principal NATO Powers so that they may increase their military dependence on South Africa, and seriously consider establishing a formal defence alliance with it. Its strategy in this respect received ready support from senior Conservative politicians in Britain who pressed strongly throughout the middle and late 1960s for closer Western defence collaboration with South Africa. The South African Defence White Paper published on 23 April 1969 pointed out:

"The considerable harbour and repair facilities at Simonstown and elsewhere in our country, as well as the modern communication and control facilities, all provided at great expense, are indispensable to Allied naval forces in the southern Atlantic and Indian Ocean areas."

³² *The Guardian*, London, 25 October 1975.

³³ *The Observer*, London, 16 November 1975.

It provided for the construction of a world-wide communication network near Westlake to enable South Africa's maritime command to keep in touch at any time with any ship or aircraft operating between South America and Australia. The White Paper also placed considerable importance on building a new tidal basin and submarine base at Simonstown.

It is significant that since the late 1960s, every set of naval exercises between the Royal Navy and the South African fleet, under the 1955 Simonstown Agreement, has been bigger than the preceding one - both Labour and Conservative Governments have increased British military collaboration with South Africa in this sphere.

Within days of the Labour Government being returned to power in October 1974, the biggest ever naval exercise between the two navies took place and provoked a major political controversy in Britain. As a result of domestic pressures, and perhaps in anticipation of using the British veto jointly with France and the USA in the Security Council some days later, the British Foreign Secretary said on 25 October 1974 that if the Simonstown Agreement was only of "marginal" military importance, and caused Britain "political embarrassment", then perhaps it ought to be terminated. As expected, the Agreement was terminated officially on 16 June 1975. However, as Parliament was informed in November 1974, this does not mean that British naval ships will stop calling at South African ports. Also, during November 1974, South Africa announced that it was embarking on an extension of the Simonstown base which will treble its capacity so that the harbour will then hold between 40 and 50 ships. The cost of the extension was estimated at about 10 million pounds. The London *Times* reported:

"The decision to go ahead with the plan has been taken in the belief that whatever the outcome of the British Government's review of the Simonstown Agreement, the base will still play an important role in the defence of the Cape sea-route, according to Government's sources."³⁴

It is highly unlikely that the South African regime will embark on expenditure amounting to millions of pounds if it is not assured that the major Western Powers will in fact utilise those naval facilities. South Africa's Navy is by no means large enough to use the facilities by itself.

³⁴ *The Times*, London, 8 November 1974.

France has increased its defence interest in the Indian and South Atlantic Ocean area and in February 1975 four of its warships called at South African ports.³⁵ But the most serious developments have been in relation to the USA.

US Involvement

With Britain's steady withdrawal from an "East of Suez" defence role, Washington has expressed concern about security in the Indian Ocean area and has negotiated for an expansion of its base facilities on the British-owned Indian Ocean island of Diego Garcia. There is also growing evidence of high level defence cooperation between the United States and South Africa.

In October 1974, a distinguished American journalist, Mr. Tad Szulc, wrote in *Esquire* magazine about a secret White House document, a National Security Council Decision Memorandum, which set out several policy options for the USA with regard to southern Africa. Policy option 2, known as "Tar Baby" was adopted by Mr. Kissinger and Mr. Nixon in 1970 to signal a policy of a "tilt" in favour of South Africa, Rhodesia and the Portuguese colonies of Angola and Mozambique. This document, in his view, "provides the rationale for the current military contingency planning for the defence of southern Africa". Mr. Szulc was referring to an earlier admission by NATO, during May 1974, to the effect that its Supreme Allied Command, Atlantic (SACLANT) based in Virginia had prepared contingency plans for military operations around southern Africa.

During 1974 several South African leaders visited Washington to discuss Indian Ocean security. In January, the Minister of Interior and Information, Dr. C. Mulder visited Washington and held talks with Vice President Ford as well as Vice-Admiral Ray Peet, a leading planner in the Pentagon. In May, Admiral Biermann, head of the South African Defence Forces, came to Washington on an apparent private visit which involved a meeting with J.W Middelndorf, the Acting Secretary for the Navy. In November, the London *Times* reported that the South African Defence Minister "confirmed that Vice-Admiral James Johnson, head of South Africa's Navy, had been invited to the United States

³⁵ *Rand Daily Mail*, Johannesburg, 26 February and 4 March 1975.

for private discussions".³⁶ The visit was subsequently cancelled.

In January 1975 six Republican Congressmen spent a fortnight in South Africa and visited the Simonstown naval base, the Silvermine communications headquarters and the Atlas Aircraft Corporation. The group was led by Congressman Robert Wilson, a member of the House Armed Services Committee, who was reported to have made statements in favour of US presence in Simonstown and relaxing the arms embargo. Upon its return, the delegation met Mr. William Middendorf, Secretary of the US Navy, who reportedly emphasised the strong need to secure Simonstown as a port for US warships.³⁷

In April 1975 a similar visit by three Democratic Congressmen took place with their itinerary also arranged by the South African regime. Two of them, Congressman John Dent and Richard Ichord were also members of the House Armed Services Committee and upon their return they undertook to work to improve relations between the USA and South Africa.³⁸

Also during April 1975, Melvyn Laird, former US Secretary of Defence, visited South Africa and stated that the USA should review its arms embargo against South Africa.³⁹

US interest in developing a closer working alliance with South Africa is directed not only at preserving the *status quo* in South Africa but also at establishing a greater presence in the Indian Ocean area so that it may be close to the Arab oil-producing region. The so-called oil crisis has already led to grave warnings by the USA of possible direct intervention to take over the oil wells in the event of another oil boycott by the Arab countries which might result in the "strangulation" of Western economies. These preoccupations together with the alleged Soviet naval threat in the Indian Ocean area form the basis of a growing *de facto* alliance between the major NATO Powers and South Africa.

The Advokaat System

³⁶ *The Times*, London, 4 November 1974.

³⁷ Washington Office on Africa, Washington, DC, "Notes on Africa", February 1975.

³⁸ *Rand Daily Mail*, Johannesburg, 19 March 1975; *Business Week*, 21 April 1975.

³⁹ *The Star*, Johannesburg, weekly edition, 5 April 1975; *Business Week*, 21 April 1975.

A major aspect of this developing Western alliance with South Africa is the construction of the Advokaat military communications system by South Africa in cooperation with several Western companies at a cost of over 15 million rand. The installation became operational in March 1973 and is claimed to be the most modern system of its kind with the ability to maintain surveillance from South Africa's coastline across the South Atlantic to South America and across the Indian Ocean to Australia and New Zealand. The headquarters of this system is at Silvermine, Westlake, which is near Cape Town and not far from the Simonstown naval base.⁴⁰ It has several sub-stations including one in Walvis Bay in Namibia, and reportedly, it is directly linked by permanent channels with "the Royal Navy in Whitehall" and "the US Navy base at San Juan in Puerto Rico".⁴¹

In June 1975, documents published by the British Anti-Apartheid Movement revealed that the Advokaat system was initiated via firms in West Germany, which cooperated with the Defence Ministry of the Federal Republic of Germany in helping to construct that system. In addition, the documents provided evidence that firms in Britain, the USA, France, Denmark and the Netherlands were involved in supplying equipment and spares for that system. Most striking of all is the fact that the NATO system of codifying equipment and spares has been made available to South Africa.

Initially, Argentina, Australia and New Zealand were directly connected with the Advokaat communication system. However, with the advent of a Labour Government, Australia appears to have refused to use the existing link between Silvermine and the Australian Navy's headquarters in Canberra. The Johannesburg *Sunday Times* reported in October 1973:

"Australia wants no help from South Africa in the vital defence task of watching what the Russian ships are doing in the Indian Ocean. A former sister in the Commonwealth and a World War II ally, Australia is now making no use of our sophisticated naval intelligence service."⁴²

Presumably it is because of this development that South African Ministers no longer speak of the Advokaat system extending to

⁴⁰ *South African Digest*, Pretoria, 16 March 1973.

⁴¹ *The Sunday Times*, Johannesburg, 21 October 1973.

⁴² *The Sunday Times*, Johannesburg, 21 October 1973.

Australia and New Zealand. When the Information Minister, Dr. C. Mulder visited France during April 1975, he said:

"And not far from Simonstown, we have built a sophisticated multi-million franc maritime communications headquarters that provides up-to-the-minute information on all maritime traffic from Cape to North Africa, South America, the South Pole region, and India."⁴³

Links with Argentina remain.

NATO Links

In the past, when members of NATO as well as its Secretary-General were asked about reports of NATO links with South Africa, they flatly denied all links, maintaining that they had no military relationship with the Pretoria regime and in any case South Africa was far outside the NATO Treaty area. When NATO officials were confronted with information about the operational planning of SACLANT for the Cape route, they responded by stating that there were no plans to cooperate with South Africa. When the British Foreign Secretary was questioned in the House of Commons on 6 November 1974 by a Labour Member of Parliament, whether the NATO study indicated possible NATO defence involvement with South Africa, Mr. Callaghan said:

"Studies have been made, but there is no commitment on the part of NATO members to engage collectively or individually in activities outside the NATO area."⁴⁴

It so happens that the Advokaat system becomes operational in the northern point of the South Atlantic, virtually where the NATO area ends at the Tropic of Cancer. Moreover, it is not limited to the Atlantic area and covers the South Pole area as well as the Indian Ocean. For the purpose of military surveillance and communications in the Southern Oceans, South Africa has virtually become the nerve-centre for Western defence.

If South Africa is providing such modern facilities at considerable financial cost what does it receive in return? It is difficult to avoid the conclusion that this high-level alliance

⁴³ *South African Digest*, Pretoria, 11 April 1975.

⁴⁴ House of Commons debates (Hansard), 6 November 1974, col. 1042.

relationship with NATO members involves a firm Western commitment to help preserve the stability of the Pretoria regime and afford it international political support. In this context it does not become absurd for the principal Western Powers to use the triple veto to prevent South Africa's expulsion from the United Nations as they did towards the end of 1974. More recently, in June 1975, during the Security Council debate on Namibia, they once again used their triple veto to block a resolution which called for a mandatory arms embargo against South Africa. Both the USA and Britain claim to implement the United Nations embargo on arms sales to South Africa, yet they resort to the veto, with France, in order to prevent the embargo becoming mandatory. This may appear difficult to understand and only becomes meaningful in the context of the growing military dependence that the major Western Powers are placing on preserving South Africa's stability and security in the southern hemisphere.

We now have authentic documentary evidence about the involvement of various NATO members in the Advokaat system and the provision of the NATO code for its equipment. It is difficult to believe that, for example, the code was provided without proper authorisation by the relevant NATO authorities or any of its members. Yet even the publication of official NATO forms with codes for equipment connected with the Advokaat system in June 1975 has brought forth further denials from Brussels that NATO is involved with South Africa. Indeed, it is now claimed in Brussels that the codification system is an "open system" and available to various "neutral States".

Public protests in several NATO countries have elicited the further information that at present eleven non-NATO members utilise the NATO codification system for spares and equipment but nothing is said as to why South Africa and its Advokaat partners were the first non-NATO countries to be provided with the codification system. On what grounds was South Africa granted the codification system? Who authorised it? Why was this information kept secret? These and other questions still remain unanswered.

Incorporation of South Africa in NATO's Area of Interest

The NATO Treaty stipulates that an attack on any member constitutes an attack against the Alliance as a whole. South Africa would welcome an arrangement which placed it in the same category so that it could feel secure in the knowledge that should

help be needed to maintain the apartheid system, assistance would be forthcoming from powerful Western nations. There is a major problem in extending the NATO area beyond its present limit and an even more serious political problem for any Western alliance to formally incorporate South Africa as a member. It is precisely for this reason that the British Foreign Secretary suggested that the Simonstown Agreement should be ended if it was a "political embarrassment" for Britain. Thus it was terminated with considerable and unusual understanding being shown by the Pretoria regime. But as the British Government says, it will not result in any hindrance to British warships calling at Simonstown and other South African ports.⁴⁵ That Agreement has not been ended to liquidate all British military relations with South Africa: in fact, Britain's reliance on South Africa's defence role has increased as a result of British naval withdrawal from the Indian Ocean area.

NATO justifies its SACLANT study by claiming that the Western alliance has to take account of the importance of the sea-route around the Cape which would need protection in times of "crisis" or during a war. The emphasis on possible NATO operations outside its Treaty area "in time of crisis" is a recent development which is primarily aimed at attributing a major strategic importance to South Africa's defence role.

In November 1975, the Chairman of the NATO Military Committee, Admiral Sir Peter Hill-Norton, suggested at a luncheon in London that three or four NATO members with "blue-water" navies, including Britain, could combine in a group outside the alliance framework to monitor what was going on in the Indian Ocean, where the Soviet naval presence allegedly represented a serious threat to the West's lines of communication. In this way, he suggested, a NATO "area of interest" could be established beyond Europe. Sir Peter said that the West's ability to defend itself was greatly weakened by the lines drawn on its maps, including one at the Tropic of Cancer. This novel approach to create a separate grouping which could presumably establish formal links with South Africa would in effect extend NATO's operations far beyond its Treaty area.⁴⁶

Earlier, at the beginning of October 1975, Lt. General Guenther Rall, West German representative on NATO's Military Committee, was forced by the Bonn Government to resign when

⁴⁵ House of Commons debates (Hansard), 17 June 1975.

⁴⁶ *The Times*, London, 6 November 1975.

the African National Congress revealed that he had travelled to South Africa the previous year under an assumed name and visited various atomic and military installations. This exposure caused considerable concern in some NATO capitals, but only a month later Sir Peter Hill-Norton felt it appropriate to call for an extension of NATO's interest to cover the Cape route. There has been no statement of disclaimer or protest by any NATO members so far, and this reflects the strength of forces committed to increasing Western military collaboration with South Africa.

Nuclear Collaboration

It has always been known that all the major Western powers have collaborated closely with South Africa in developing its nuclear technology and plants. However, secret documents published by the African National Congress at the end of September 1975 revealed high level West German involvement in building up the Pretoria regime's nuclear capability.⁴⁷ South Africa and Iran have reached an agreement under which Pretoria will sell uranium oxide worth some £340 million to Iran in exchange for financial participation in its proposed uranium enrichment plant to be constructed with West German assistance.⁴⁸

South Africa has refused to sign the Non-Proliferation Treaty and is now an incipient nuclear Power; the grave danger which this development presents to Africa and the world is obvious. Every effort needs to be made by the international community to ensure that all nuclear cooperation with South Africa is ended.

The West and South Africa

In the context of the internal conflict in South Africa it becomes inevitable that the increased military reliance placed upon South Africa by the Western Powers makes it vital for the major NATO Powers to preserve the stability and security of South Africa. Recent history bears dramatic testimony to the fact that once a region is designated as being of major strategic importance then external alliance Powers cannot tolerate any prospect of

⁴⁷ *The Nuclear Conspiracy*, pamphlet published by the African National Congress, London, September 1975.

⁴⁸ *The Times*, London, 17 October 1975.

political change in that region and become firmly committed to help preserve the *status quo*. South Africa knows this and has succeeded in drawing the major Western Powers into a close military alliance with the Pretoria regime. There are as yet no known formal military pacts but as the South African Defence Minister indicated in an interview about military relationships with NATO they are "not official, but friendly".⁴⁹

The involvement of Western Powers on the side of the *status quo* in South Africa only serves to make the internal conflict even sharper and seriously impedes the liberation struggle. At the United Nations and elsewhere the Western Powers have blocked every proposal for meaningful action under their general policy of not wanting any confrontation with South Africa. This "no confrontation with South Africa" policy has developed during the past decade into a firm "anti-liberation policy". When confronted with the failure of the white regime to abandon white domination and race rule the Western Powers reply by stating their strong commitment to "peaceful change". In effect, this policy means that the only change which they will support is what South Africa decides to initiate and implement in order to consolidate the white power system. It is a foolproof policy of preventing all international action against South Africa since the no-confrontation policy excludes non-violent measures such as economic sanctions or a mandatory arms embargo and the peaceful change thesis involves supporting only that change which the Pretoria regime feels the need to make.

Conclusion

Neither Premier Vorster nor the Western Powers are unaware of the prospect of a major violent confrontation in South Africa. The Pretoria regime's *detente* policy, announced towards the end of 1974, was based on the need, as Mr. Vorster stated, to avoid a "catastrophe" in southern Africa.

Basically, as can be seen from South Africa's defence expenditure and the role of its armed forces, the Pretoria regime faces its greatest threat from the 20 million oppressed African, Indian and Coloured people within its boundaries. The heavy militarisation is an indication of the lack of security felt by the white regime and its readiness to resort to military power if the system of white domination is seriously challenged.

⁴⁹ *The Star*, Johannesburg, weekly edition, 8 February 1975.

It is aware, however, of the need to end international pressures against apartheid, and as an insurance system, to draw the Western Powers steadily into its internal conflict by developing close military relations with them. There is now firm and growing evidence that the major Western Powers are fulfilling South Africa's needs despite their claim that they are only concerned with a potential Soviet naval threat in the southern oceans.

The dangers inherent in the rapid integration of South Africa in the overall Western defence planning and strategy are obvious. There is an urgent need to step up pressure for the ending of all military relationships with the Pretoria regime if the Western Powers are not to get even more deeply involved in the explosive racial conflict in South Africa on the side of the apartheid system with all the disastrous consequences of that engagement.

International pressure against South Africa has to be increased rather than relaxed and support for the African liberation struggle has to become a major priority for all those committed to freedom and peace. South Africa is today in a very real sense one of the greatest threats to international peace and security.

THE CASE FOR ECONOMIC DISENGAGEMENT⁵⁰

Paper presented to a seminar held in London, in February 1976, under the auspices of the Christian Concern for Southern Africa (CCSA)

...Since the establishment of the Anti-Apartheid Movement in 1959, we have worked consistently for the ending of all collaboration with South Africa. Over the years, the most difficult issue has been that of economic relations and, particularly, investment and trade since they affect basic interests of the Western world. We approach the problem by pointing out that investment from overseas essentially helps to bolster the apartheid system in South Africa and that this constitutes a direct form of collaboration with that system. Many who suggest that reforms through investment may help to erode apartheid seem to ignore the fact that the South African economy is not operating independently of its wider political structure.

Overseas investment in South Africa is attracted to that country precisely because of apartheid, and not despite it, since that system produces such high returns for investment. In past years, when we were involved in making representations to British and other companies to withdraw from South Africa, they replied by stating that it was not in their economic interests to deprive themselves of the valuable opportunities to make profits through South African operations. The companies admit that they invest in South Africa essentially for high returns.

However, in recent years, with strong anti-apartheid campaigns focusing on the exploitation of black labour in South Africa, there has emerged the claim that investment can in fact be utilised as a major instrument to produce change within the apartheid system. Now, virtually all company chairmen claim at annual meetings that their operations in South Africa will help to break down the system of apartheid. Overnight, in the face of strong anti-apartheid pressure, a large number of companies are virtually claiming to have changed their priorities from that of seeking super-profits to becoming major agents of change. However, despite this apparently rapid conversion, all of them claim that the changes have to take place within the framework of South African society and that their companies have to operate within the apartheid laws.

Overseas investment bolsters apartheid

All the evidence in recent years shows that the companies operating in South Africa are continuing to function as partners in the apartheid system and we

⁵⁰ United Nations Centre against Apartheid, Notes and Documents No. 35/76, November 1976

believe that the suggestion that they will act as major agents of change is merely a manoeuvre to try to legitimise their investments in South Africa and to facilitate the free flow of valuable capital to that country. It is important to examine in detail the precise role of overseas investment in South Africa. Each penny invested is certainly not just a single and once-for-all transaction. It sets up a pattern or structure of support which reinforces the apartheid system by a web of relationships.

Basically, as mentioned earlier, all overseas investments help to bolster apartheid. Through the payment of taxes to the South African regime, such investment enables the white power system to afford a vast machinery of coercion in order to keep the black population in submission. Overseas investors contribute directly to the vast resources expended in the police and military forces as well as in the bureaucratic procedures necessary to maintain white domination and race rule. Once capital has been invested in South Africa, it also begins to fuel trade so that there is a wider payoff. There is also the important question of technology since capital investment in South Africa takes with it modern technology which is not only restricted to civilian merchandise but is also becoming particularly significant in terms of South Africa's growing arms industry within the Republic. There is also the dramatic example of nuclear technology being transferred to South Africa from Western countries in order to assist it in developing its own nuclear programme including the possible production of nuclear weapons. The flow of capital investment from British companies to South Africa also takes with it a large number of skilled white experts, many of whom eventually settle in that country. Thus, capital investment in South Africa involves a whole set of other relationships, all helping to reinforce the apartheid system.

It is precisely because of this central role of capital in supporting the Pretoria regime that some business leaders such as Neil Wates in Britain have decided not to invest in South Africa. It would involve becoming active accomplices in the crime of apartheid. Once overseas investors already have a stake within South Africa, it is extremely difficult for them to withdraw their interest. Their stake produces good profits but faced with growing anti-apartheid sentiment in the Western world many of them are beginning to legitimise these investments by suggesting that they will become agents of reform. When challenged and exposed to the reality of the situation, they resort to claims that they will do "what little good they can" in the situation rather than "take the easy way out" by withdrawing from South Africa.

One of the most disturbing developments in the general debate about investments is the position taken by a large number of church leaders and churches: they are firmly opposed to the withdrawal of investment from South Africa and, instead, actively advocate a policy of producing reform through investment. Thus, we have seen the creation of a formidable unholy alliance between sections of the Church and those with business interests in South Africa

jointly claiming that their efforts will help to bring peaceful change for the oppressed people of South Africa.

Normally, one would expect the Church, above all, to give a moral lead, but here we find also that a large number of these churches are themselves investors in companies which derive large profits from the oppression of the black people in South Africa. The policy of the World Council of Churches is clearly in favour of withdrawal but it has also suggested that member churches holding shares in companies with investments in South Africa may wish to utilise their share of power in order to help produce changes. There are two types of actions which can be taken by shareholders. The first type is to utilise shareholder power in order to expose, challenge, attack and confront, when necessary, those companies which operate in South Africa and thereby promote a wider public awareness while, at the same time, exposing the supportive role of investment. The second type, is the case of those who prefer to participate in gentle lobbying of companies at annual meetings and to discuss questions in board rooms with a view to persuading the company leaders to make certain changes in their operations in South Africa and who are satisfied with this objective. This type of action, whose aim is different from that of the former and which does not demand a withdrawal of investments, has very little success to show for its efforts.

Those who claim to work for changes through investment point out that their efforts can lead to African workers receiving higher wages. They go on to suggest that, with pressure, African workers can also be advanced up the apartheid ladder in employment so that they may constantly improve their position. Although those who advocate this view exaggerate its importance, it is relevant to ask why they do not, at the same time, work to stop the flow of white migration to South Africa. It would seem logical that if the purpose is to provide better opportunities for African workers, then skilled white labour from abroad should not be actively recruited in order to fill vacancies created in the South African economy. We find that among the most active recruiters of white skilled labour are the overseas subsidiaries operating in South Africa. It is well known that the Pretoria regime requires a growing pool of white labour to reinforce the power relationship of the white community in relation to the majority of the oppressed people. The role of companies in drawing overseas white labour into South Africa is to reinforce the apartheid system, not only by denying skilled jobs to African workers, but, also, at the same time, by providing additional whites on the side of apartheid, many of whom are subsequently recruited for the defence forces.

As far back as 1973, the Anti-Apartheid Movement wrote to a large number of churches which were then committed to work for change through investment. We suggested to them that they ought to secure a promise from the companies, in which they had investments and were actively engaged in lobbying, that those companies would not recruit skilled white labour. This demand should be met by the companies before any further negotiations were conducted with them. To our

regret, the response from the churches was totally negative. It is clear then that those who are concerned with producing change through investment have to operate very much on the terms set by the companies investing in South Africa, which in turn claim that they have to abide by the laws and customs of the apartheid State. It is difficult to see, therefore, what kind of substantial changes can be brought about to advance African freedom through investment links. If the companies are not prepared to stop recruiting white skilled labour for South Africa, then there does not seem to be any grounds for expecting them to institute major reforms in their operations in that country.

In the growing conflict in South Africa, no sensible person now believes that one can expect any radical changes to come from the white community. Indeed, the whites are determined to defend, with total violence, the apartheid system which provides them with privilege and power. There is certainly no way in which South African society can be described as representing one based on consensus. Exclusive political power is held by the whites who constitute approximately 14 per cent of the population, leaving the rest of the so-called "non-white" people powerless. The growing confrontation in South Africa is basically a struggle for power taking various forms. In 1960, after the Sharpeville massacre, the nationalist movements were driven underground. From then onwards, the underground movements have had no option left but to conduct an armed struggle. This inevitability has also been accepted by the white regime which, since 1960, has been preparing for armed resistance from its own population. The white community today is mobilised for total war against its own people. But the armed struggle is likely to be a long one and is not the choice of the African people themselves. It is the intransigence of the white rulers that has left no option but resort to armed struggle. When African leaders speak of the armed struggle they do not mean that the struggle should only involve the use of arms - it also involves various forms of what would otherwise be described as non-violent methods.

The boycott strategy as a non-violent method of struggle

The boycott strategy as a method of counteracting apartheid was first initiated during the late 1950s. It rested on the fundamental premise that all links with South Africa serve to support the apartheid system and constitute a form of direct collaboration with white domination. In the nature of the South African conflict, external links with that country have the basic effect of supporting the side of white power directly. As South Africans, fighting the apartheid system, we consider these links to constitute a form of intervention in that conflict on the wrong side. It is our belief that, as the crisis grows in southern Africa, those with a stake in the apartheid system, including overseas investors, will stand more and more on the side of the white power system. Many of them will demand all types of increased intervention at new levels in order to maintain the stability and security of South Africa.

We do not wish international interests to operate in this form on the side of the white power system and we, therefore, ask all those with a stake in our oppression to get out of the arena of conflict and neutralise themselves in relation to the growing war. By having investments and other direct links with the South African regime, they are making the struggle much more difficult and certainly more violent than it needs to be. We say to those with interests in South Africa that if they cannot support our struggle directly, then, at least, they should withdraw their present support for the wrong side. If this is not done, then those with economic and other interests in the apartheid system will find themselves in direct confrontation with the liberation struggle.

Those who are opposed to a boycott of South Africa put forward the proposition that it is much better to build bridges with that country in order to exercise some influence over apartheid. They go on to say that one should prefer conciliation to confrontation. Of course, everyone would prefer conciliation rather than confrontation, but that is not the choice over South Africa. Here, we have a unique situation of a special form of internal conflict where there are two clear categories - the whites holding total political power as opposed to the majority black population. It is because of the nature of the internal conflict that external links, in effect, mean that they are links which operate in support of the white power system and dictated by their terms. It is precisely because these links do build bridges with the whites only that we are opposed to them. They do promote closer understanding - with the whites. They create a web of relationships - with the whites. They produce an ever growing alliance - with the whites. The relations with the oppressed people of South Africa which may be a consequence of these links are basically determined by white terms. The conditions of these relationships are set by them and the white regime will not permit any relationships which threaten to undermine its power.

In the South African context, it is precisely because bridge-building links develop a closer alliance with the apartheid system that we advocate the policy of boycott. The boycott is the most relevant and appropriate policy which can be adopted by those abroad, who wish to support the African struggle for freedom. It is a policy for disengagement from the arena of conflict.

Many of those who oppose the African liberation movements and boycotts claim that they are committed to peaceful change. No one would deny that it is far more preferable to have peaceful change than violent change. In a sense, we are all in favour of peaceful change. But we have to ask ourselves the central question as to whether peaceful change is possible in South Africa. It is also important to understand what we mean by change - what kind of change do we want in South Africa? There are those who hail the removal of particular instances of racial discrimination in relation to public parks and benches but this is not the kind of change which is meaningful to the oppressed people of that country. We want freedom and total liberation from the system of white domination.

Pitfalls of the status quo strategy

Those who advocate a policy of peaceful change in South Africa have to recognise that the kind of changes that are possible can only be those which take place within the apartheid context. They have to be at the pace and in the direction permitted by the apartheid system. It is, of course, essentially a *status quo* strategy whereby pressure may be put to help institute those changes which are acceptable to the white regime.

It is not, therefore, surprising that those Western governments which have close economic, political and military relations with the apartheid State are also firmly committed to peaceful change. Five years ago, we saw the expression of this policy by both President Nixon and Prime Minister Heath. Until then, many Western political leaders were claiming that it was not wise to interfere in South Africa's domestic policies. All of a sudden, leaders of major Western countries made special reference to the conflict in southern Africa and committed themselves to a policy of peaceful change. It is not altogether surprising that this commitment should be forthcoming precisely at a time when the armed struggle was developing in new forms in southern Africa. Certainly, the peaceful change policy of the major Western Powers is, in effect, an anti-liberation movement strategy.

Indeed, this peaceful change policy seems to involve supplying the apartheid regime with arms and is concerned with preserving the stability and security of South Africa. In addition, in recent years, there has been growing support in Western capitals for increased dependence on South Africa as a regional Power, which can be integrated further into overall Western global defence, particularly in relation to the security of the South Atlantic and Indian Oceans. This growing dependence on South Africa's defence role inevitably means that the major Western Powers need to preserve the stability and security of South Africa itself. Hence, if the internal conflict in that country raises the possibility of revolutionary change, then it is very likely that there will be very powerful tendencies in the major Western Powers to intervene further by providing more support to the Pretoria regime.

No one who has made a study of the southern African conflict can avoid the conclusion that the West is essentially on the side of the white regimes. And when we examine Western policy in relation to Rhodesia or Namibia, the inevitable conclusion reached is that policy with regard to both these territories is based primarily on what is in the interests of South Africa. If these tendencies of basing Western policy on the side of the white regimes continue, then it is likely to lead to a disastrous situation for the allies of the apartheid State.

Returning to the question of whether investments can be used to produce changes within South Africa, there are a few additional issues which need consideration. We do not understand how it can be argued that investments which

are directly assisting the arms industry in South Africa should also be left intact because they may somehow also produce internal changes. On what possible grounds can it be argued that the contribution made by such investment to South Africa's military power is a contribution in favour of the black people? Is it really being suggested that if the arms firms in South Africa pay higher wages to Africans then that is an adequate reason for encouraging investments in the domestic arms industry? If, however, that is not the case, then why is it that the reform-through-investment advocates have not called for the withdrawal of such investment by British and other firms? Or, is it being seriously suggested that by negotiating with these firms it is possible to persuade them to stop their participation in the internal arms industry? It is a matter of serious concern when church organisations, including the CCSA, do not appear to be involved in calling for an end to military collaboration with South Africa through such investment.

Even for those who wish to bring about reforms through investment, it should not be difficult to see the special role of arms industries directly assisting the oppressive system of apartheid and providing it with considerable fire-power which is being utilised to threaten neighbouring African States. Furthermore, despite the fact that the major Western Powers, including Britain, continue to supply various arms to South Africa, we do not see the reform lobby acting on this question in order to effectively stop this flow of weapons from their countries to the Pretoria regime. Perhaps, if they were more active on such fundamental questions, it would be possible to treat their case with greater credibility.

A similar problem arises with regard to the question of recruiting skilled white labour from overseas for South Africa. If the companies concerned will not give a simple assurance that they will no longer recruit skilled white labour from abroad, then how can one suggest that these companies are genuinely concerned with improving African conditions and providing them with better opportunities?

There is also the whole question of new investment in South Africa, and those who advocate reform through investment do not suggest a freeze on all future investment until they have been able to assess more accurately the behaviour of companies in South Africa. Even within the context of the reform argument, this would appear to be an important interim measure.

Finally, on what grounds does the reform-through-investment lobby refuse to call for a withdrawal of investments from Namibia? The United Nations has declared that South Africa is in illegal occupation of the international Trust Territory and even Britain now states that South Africa's occupation is against international law. Is it being suggested that investment should be permitted in Namibia as long as it is possible to try and persuade companies operating there to increase the wages of Namibian workers? Does this mean that South Africa can remain there and that the reform lobby accepts its illegal occupation? If this is not the case, then on what basis did certain British church leaders enter into negotiations with Rio Tinto Zinc Company about the conditions of its workers in its uranium industry in Namibia? On these and other questions, there seems to be

very slender evidence of any great commitment on the part of British churches to the liberation of the African people.

Political Role of Investment

Those who advocate reform through investment appear to ignore totally the political role of capital. Those with investments in South Africa, obviously, have a direct stake in the apartheid system. We have seen how the most active lobby in favour of South Africa is conducted in Western capitals by business groups with investments in that country. British companies, as well as their trade associations, put constant pressure on the Government, in order to ensure that it will not adopt policies hostile to the Pretoria regime. The vast resources of the United Kingdom-South Africa Trade Association are utilised in order to help promote South Africa's image abroad. Some business leaders and their corporate associations also make representations to Western governments to resume the sale of arms to South Africa in order to improve relations with that country. Some of them even become, overnight, experts on strategic questions and point to the so-called Soviet threat in the southern oceans which needs to be countered by relying on South Africa's defence role. Foreign policy is largely based on the perception of interests and, therefore, when a country has a large investment in South Africa, it is inevitable that that investment will produce powerful tendencies to preserve the *status quo* in South Africa.

Finally, even if certain limited changes can be brought about by retaining investment, what is the total cost involved? One has the duty to look at the total overall effect of overseas investment and not merely some changes which may come about in particular sectors. Is a slight increase in wages sufficient to compensate for all the other effects that investment also produces? For example, the fact that investment takes with it white migrants to South Africa results in a large number of them becoming active supporters of the apartheid State with relatives in Britain, who then perceive the South African conflict more and more on the basis that they have white relatives there placed on one side of the conflict. In addition, there is also the support which investment from overseas provides for the South African military and police forces both through taxation and through participation in the internal arms industry. Are these powerful supportive forces adequately compensated for by a marginal increase in black wages? The only real change that can come about in South Africa has to come about from within that country. Those who are outside have to decide basically which are the forces of change within South Africa with which they identify. This depends on the context in which one sees the conflict.

If one is preoccupied with peaceful change in a situation where the initiative has passed to the liberation movements engaged in active struggle, then it becomes essentially an anti-liberation movement posture. Hence, those committed to this view begin to play a role which is in direct confrontation with the African liberation struggle and helps to comfort the supporters of the Pretoria

regime.

As for the churches in the West, they have to answer the question as to whether they wish to continue to be collaborators and accomplices in apartheid. The alternative is to disengage from the side of the white power system. By doing so, it might be easier to see the situation more objectively and adopt policies much more relevant to the rapidly changing situation in that region.

It may be necessary to mention once again that it is the oppressed people of South Africa and the leaders of their nationalist and liberation movements which have, over the years, asked for the withdrawal of investments. There is no doubt that the appeal for a boycott comes from those within the country who are the most active in fighting apartheid. It is, of course, true that there are African leaders, including certain Bantustan leaders having to operate within the apartheid structure, who have expressed themselves in opposition to some boycotts.

Southern Africa is undergoing tremendous changes and the central question facing the people in the Western countries is what policy they are to adopt in that growing conflict. It does appear to many of us that Christian opinion in the West is more often preoccupied with the whites in South Africa than with the aspirations of the oppressed black people. They seem to be looking for changes to emerge from within the white community and, when there are no radical changes that can be expected to come from that quarter, they appear to persist in their endless search. Inevitably, it seems as if Christians in the West were not seriously concerned about the plight of the African people. It is not very helpful, in a situation where after many years of effort at peaceful action armed struggle is finally resorted to because there is no alternative, for persons outside to suggest that one should instead be patient and work for peaceful change. What is often ignored is that there is a war in southern Africa in various stages and fought in different ways.

On the question of race and southern Africa, the West has a special responsibility because so far it has stood squarely on the side of white domination. If the confrontation in southern Africa erupts into a major war, there is a real danger of a global race conflict. South Africa is heavily armed and can create havoc in Africa. Western economic, political and military support for the Pretoria regime only gives it more confidence to persist in its aggressive posture towards neighbouring African countries and, at the same time, to refuse to abandon the policy of apartheid internally. Now, with its nuclear programme, South Africa presents the single greatest threat to world peace. It, therefore, becomes the responsibility of all those who are against racism and wish to preserve peace in Africa and the world that they should actively oppose the apartheid system and refuse to collaborate with it in any form.

Those who advocate reform through economic collaboration with apartheid are unable to explain how a marginal increase in black wages will bring about the

transfer of political power to the majority population in South Africa - but that is the central problem. We reject totally the thesis which suggests that, by investing directly in our oppression, overseas investors will somehow be able to release us from the tyranny of apartheid.

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**STATEMENT AT THE MEETING OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL,
MARCH 25, 1977⁵¹**

I should like to thank the African Group and the three African members of the Security Council for having once again sponsored me to take part in the debate on South Africa. For me, as a South African and as one involved in the international campaign to end collaboration with apartheid, it is a special pleasure and honour to appear once again, for the third time, before the Council and provide it with information which may enable it to discharge its solemn responsibilities more effectively.

Mr. President, most of us who have known of your record of personal involvement in the struggle to combat racism were pleased to hear of your appointment as United States Ambassador to the United Nations, since it signifies the new importance placed by President Carter on the problem now under consideration by the Security Council.⁵² The fact that these meetings of the Council are presided over by you is also of special significance, and with these favourable portents it should not be too difficult for the Council to reach meaningful decisions which will result in the strict implementation of the international arms embargo and the cessation of all future loans to and investments in South Africa. In saying this, I do not underestimate the difficulties involved, but I am mindful of the ever threatening situation in southern Africa, which could so easily erupt into a major racial conflagration with menacing implications of a wider global confrontation. The responsibility of the international community to avert such a catastrophe has never been greater than it is today.

The international arms embargo against South Africa has been considered to be the only effective action taken so far by the United Nations to counteract apartheid. It is essentially a voluntary embargo relying on the goodwill and national discretion of Member States. Even a cursory examination of the operation of that embargo reveals its only partial implementation and the danger of a gradual erosion.

South Africa is able to obtain a wide range of military equipment directly from several countries and it continues to expand its domestic arms industry with the active and often enthusiastic cooperation of certain Western countries and their

⁵¹ UN document S/PV.1992

⁵² Andrew Young of the United States, a close colleague of the Reverend Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr., in the civil rights movement, was President of the Security Council for the month of March 1977.

arms firms. It is therefore inevitable that all those concerned at South Africa's rapid military build-up and the threat which this poses to the peace and security of Africa and the world should call for a mandatory and comprehensive arms embargo. But the growing demand for a mandatory arms embargo has been firmly resisted by the principal Western Powers, with triple vetoes being cast in the Council to block such action, thus giving encouragement to the Pretoria regime.

The international arms embargo is being evaded in a number of ways. Let me explain. Prior to the United Nations embargo decisions, the United Kingdom was South Africa's major arms supplier and close ally. Since then, successive Governments have observed the embargo in different ways, and it would be true to say that, in the main, the United Kingdom does not supply any combat equipment directly to the Pretoria regime today. The United Kingdom claims to implement the arms embargo: yet the way in which it interprets and applies it leaves gaping loopholes which permit the apartheid armed forces to obtain a wide range of British equipment.

The following are examples of this. First, the Export of Goods (Control) Order, 1970, prohibits the export of certain specified strategic items to other countries listed in a schedule, but those items may be exported without licence to any "port or destination in the Commonwealth, the Republic of Ireland, the Republic of South Africa or the United States of America". It is remarkable that South Africa should be accorded a special favoured-nation status, which is denied to most Western European countries, including members of the European Economic Community and the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation. Thus, a wide range of equipment may be and is supplied to the South African armed forces by British companies without a licence being required. In one example last year, we drew the attention of the Foreign Secretary to this gap, an action which resulted in a licence being required for the Marconi tropospheric scatter system. However, subsequently, despite the control exercised by the Government, that licence was granted and Marconi is now installing such equipment in South Africa. We are requesting that the British Government take away this favoured-nation status from South Africa.

Second, even in the case of goods which do require a licence, it is not clear which items are considered to be of military significance and covered by the embargo. For example, the tropospheric scatter system which I mentioned, ordered by the South African Armaments Board, was granted a licence last October, and Her Majesty's Government claims that this does not violate British undertakings in relation to the arms embargo. There is a whole problem here of ascertaining what those undertakings amount to, since it appears that they limit the scope of the existing embargo.

Third, there is the whole question of the supply of spare parts for equipment already sold to South Africa -- a clear violation of the embargo perpetrated in

virtue of the claim that the country is bound by honour to discharge its obligations arising out of old orders.

Fourth, an indirect method of providing South Africa with military equipment is to send it via another country. A recent example was the export of British rocket motors transported by Martin Baker Limited to France and then exported to South Africa.

Fifth, British-designed equipment is made under licence in a third country and then exported to South Africa. The most flagrant example in this area involves Rolls Royce engines made under sub-licence in Italy and then either fitted to Italian aircraft sold to South Africa or exported to South Africa to power Italian-designed Aermacchi planes which are made in South Africa.

Sixth, there is the whole question of British-designed equipment made in South Africa under licence, which also assists in building up the internal armaments industry in South Africa.

Seventh, British companies have established subsidiaries and invested in South African companies in order to make weapons there which might otherwise be prohibited for export by the embargo. Such equipment made in South Africa is supplied to the illegal Smith regime to increase its suppression of the people of Zimbabwe and to carry out attacks on neighbouring countries. For example, Racal "Transcriber" equipment made by a British subsidiary in South Africa, was captured by the Mozambique authorities following one of the attacks by Rhodesian forces against that country. All the relevant information was provided by us to the British Government, since it also involved a breach of sanctions against Rhodesia, and I have now been assured by Mr. Ted Rowlands of the Foreign Office that sanctions have in fact been broken in this case, that the equipment is of a type designed, developed and manufactured only in South Africa by Racal but that Racal there claims that it would not be a party to the supply of such equipment to Rhodesia. We find it difficult to believe that Rhodesia could receive such equipment except from South Africa.

I have spoken at length about the United Kingdom, but that is not because we feel that it is the major culprit, since the United Kingdom in fact is not now the principal supplier of arms to South Africa. That role has been taken over by France. But what is true of the United Kingdom in these cases and in the categories which I have mentioned is also equally true of the United States and the Federal Republic of Germany - all three countries claiming to observe the arms embargo. Those countries also supply a wide range of non-combat equipment under the general policy of not interfering with trade in industrial or commercial items even when such items are purchased directly by the South African military.

German firms have helped to construct the Advokaat naval communications

system based near Simonstown, but this is considered not to be a violation of the embargo.

There is also the case of the Transall military transport aircraft supplied to the South African armed forces, which is a joint French-German plane being sold to South Africa via France without the German Government vetoing its sale.

In the case of the United States, a wide range of radar and other communications equipment as well as aircraft described as civilian are sold to South Africa. The United States claims to implement the arms embargo and declares that no aircraft are supplied to the South African armed forces. How has it come about then, we wonder, that South Africa has received Merlin aircraft for its air force? The South African Air Force has received twin-engined Swearingen Merlin 4As from the United States. The August 1976 issue of the South African aviation journal *Wings* reported that the aircraft were acquired by 21 Squadron a year ago, but that Commandant Robert Blake, South African Air Force public relations officer, said it was decided not to publicise the addition until the order was completed. One of the Merlins is equipped as an ambulance aircraft and the others are secret. The exact number of Merlins supplied directly to the South African Air Force is not even known. Here is a case of equipment which directly violates the United States interpretation of its own embargo.

The two countries which are now the most blatant in their violation of the embargo are France and Italy. France has replaced Britain as South Africa's major arms supplier and there is virtually nothing needed by the apartheid regime which is prohibited by France. Sophisticated helicopters and other aircraft, including alouettes and Mirage F-1 planes are sold to South Africa, and many are now being made in that country. An examination of South Africa's military hardware bears dramatic testimony to France's role in strengthening the apartheid forces. Indeed, military collaboration between those countries is so intimate and close that South Africa funded the initial development of the Crotale missile system made in France which is now being passed on by France to other countries as if it were a wholly French product. Despite repeated appeals, France remains adamant and continues to increase its military collaboration with South Africa.

Italy is the other major violator of the arms embargo. It has supplied the Aermacchi MB326Ms and provided a licence for over 200 of them to be made in South Africa under the name Impala I. The more modern Aermacchi 326K has also been sold to South Africa, and a version of it is now being made in South Africa under the name Impala II. AM3Cs have also been sold to South Africa, and more are to be made locally under the name Bostock. The Aermacchi-Lockheed AL60C5, a United States-designed light plane produced in Italy, is being made in South Africa under the name Kudu. Those are all aircraft particularly suited to counter-insurgency operations. The Italian Government denies at the United Nations and elsewhere that it sells aircraft to South Africa or sub-licences them for manufacture in that country. In a meeting I had at the

Foreign Ministry last October, those denials were once again repeated to me. How is it possible, we wonder, that hundreds of aircraft of Italian origin should have been delivered to and should be in the hands of the South African regime - and that hundreds more should be manufactured there under licence - without the knowledge of the Italian Government?

From all this it becomes clear that the arms embargo is not being strictly implemented by several Member States and that there is need for a mandatory and all-embracing embargo.

The United Kingdom, the United States and Germany claim to adhere to the embargo, but as a result of the narrow way in which they interpret and implement that embargo there are major loopholes that need to be closed. France and Italy openly violate the embargo. Canada, which once supplied arms to South Africa, now operates perhaps the strictest embargo, having decided in 1970 to stop all sales of spare parts as well. But, in the absence of a mandatory embargo, there are other countries, such as Israel, which are embarking on arms sales to South Africa. So far, Israel has contracted to supply fast naval patrol boats equipped with Gabrielle missiles, some of which are now to be made in South Africa, and it is likely that there will be further equipment delivered to the Pretoria regime.

The need for a mandatory arms embargo thus becomes clear. But the Security Council should ensure that such an embargo will be comprehensive and cover all forms of military collaboration. There is no ban at present on the exchange of visits between South African defence officials and those of several Western countries. In 1974, a certain Mr. van Zyl, a senior South African defence official, secretly visited defence establishments and arms firms in France, the Netherlands, Germany, the United States and the United Kingdom. Following representations made by us in the United Kingdom, the Ministry of Defence stated that he had discussed procedures for placing research contracts and methods and procedures. South Africa needs to obtain considerable information on counter-insurgency techniques and operations, including surveillance techniques, and visits such as those enable them to acquire it with ease. That must be stopped.

In June 1975, when I appeared before the Council, we provided evidence which proved beyond doubt that the NATO Codification System for Spares and Equipment had been provided to South Africa. Since then, I have taken the matter up with all members of NATO, as well as with its Headquarters at Brussels. Last May, when the NATO Ministerial Council met at Oslo, we called upon NATO to withdraw the Codification System from South Africa and to cease providing it with classified or unclassified information. Several friendly countries, including Norway, Denmark, the Netherlands and Canada, responded favourably, but some of the other members of that alliance maintain that this is an open system and that they see no reason for withholding it from South Africa. Among those countries which provide information about that codification system to South Africa are the United Kingdom, the United States, France and Germany.

In May of this year, the NATO Ministerial Council is due to meet in London just prior to the Commonwealth Conference in June, and we shall repeat our appeal to the NATO Ministers. We hope that the United Nations will be able to assist us so that the stand already taken by some of the friendly countries within that alliance may be supported by other NATO members.

Another area which needs to be covered is that concerning South African nationals who leave that country in order to avoid being conscripted or serving in its armed forces. There are today a number of such persons who are beginning to reach the United Kingdom, the Netherlands and the United States. Two of them in the United Kingdom applied for political asylum last year and, to our surprise, we learned only a few weeks ago that they had been refused asylum by the British Government on the grounds that their fear of being persecuted in South Africa was not well founded. Those two persons have appealed and a number of parliamentarians have taken up their case and I hope that the British Government will not repatriate them. But, as the conflict sharpens in South Africa and more and more persons desert from the service of the apartheid forces, it is vital that Member States afford full and proper protection to such persons.

It has been claimed by the Western permanent members of the Council in the past that the situation in southern Africa does not amount to a threat to peace. I would submit that since those Powers concluded in 1960, immediately after Sharpeville, that the situation at that time did constitute a disturbance of the peace, we have now, after 16 years, come to a stage where all the objective evidence points to more than adequate grounds for determining that there is a threat to peace under Chapter VII of the Charter.

First, apartheid, a doctrine which insults the dignity and worth of dark-skinned people all over the world, is an affront to mankind as a whole, and in itself constitutes a grave threat to a world in which there are peoples of many colours.

Second, the persistent repression of the oppressed people in South Africa has created an explosive situation to which Mr. Palme referred earlier⁵³ and which is likely to lead to a major conflagration in that area.

Third, South Africa's rapid arms buildup and its threatening military posture towards neighbouring African countries reveal its true aggressive ambitions.

Fourth, South Africa has militarised Namibia, created military bases in that international Territory and refuses to end its illegal occupation. That amounts to a threat to the peace as well as an act of aggression against that Territory and the world community. And while we at the United Nations are talking about the Turnhalle agreements, the South African Government has just announced that it is going to introduce legislation to take over Walvis Bay and make it an integral part

⁵³ Olof Palme, former Prime Minister of Sweden, spoke earlier at the same meeting of the Security Council.

of the Cape province.

Fifth, South Africa sabotages United Nations mandatory sanctions against Rhodesia and provides it with military assistance, thereby perpetuating Rhodesia's threat to the peace. Indeed, it was the United Kingdom which brought the Rhodesian issue to the Security Council and asked that it be declared a threat to the peace. If South Africa does not comply with the sanctions against Rhodesia, then the Council has a clear duty to apply mandatory sanctions against the major sanctions buster.

Sixth, South Africa has attacked and invaded neighbouring African States and threatens to continue to do so.

Seventh, its defence laws now permit its armed forces to operate freely in all territories south of the equator.

Despite all this, some Powers refuse to accept that South Africa is a threat to world peace, and one wonders what else South Africa has to do before that determination is conceded.

Most of the major Western Powers claim that they do not support the African liberation struggle in southern Africa because of their commitment to peaceful change in southern Africa. Those countries are entitled to that view and indeed bear the consequences of such a policy. But what in my view is impossible to accept is a peaceful change thesis which involves supplying military weapons and technology to one side of that confrontation in southern Africa, namely the racist apartheid side. Those Western countries should not wait for mandatory arms embargo decisions in order to cease their military collaboration with apartheid. Indeed, the United States, in 1963, informed the Council that it had already decided to implement an arms embargo before such a decision was adopted by the Council. Yet it is those Western Powers which use their veto power in the Council to facilitate military collaboration with South Africa.

Now with the rapid transfer of nuclear technology and equipment to South Africa by several Western countries, it has been confirmed by Prime Minister Vorster as well as by overseas sources that South Africa has a nuclear capability, and if South Africa does not already have atomic weapons it can produce them very quickly. With its modern aircraft it has the means of delivery. We have, therefore, the prospect of an apartheid bomb in the hands of a desperate regime. Yet it is claimed that there is no threat to peace.

There is widespread international concern at the growing threat posed by South Africa, and that is why tens of thousands of British citizens have signed a petition calling for a mandatory arms embargo. We handed this petition to the new Foreign Secretary on Monday of this week when the Council began this debate. Incidentally, the Council may be pleased to hear that Mr. Owen gave us the

assurance that some of the loopholes to which I have referred under the Export of Goods (Control) Order would be looked at afresh with a view to ensuring that they would be closed. We hope indeed that this kind of action will be supported by other Western Governments as well.

In our view, a mandatory arms embargo is long overdue. The growing war situation in southern Africa requires even more decisive action if we are to avoid a catastrophe described by Vorster as being too ghastly to contemplate. He should know what he is planning. It is therefore vital that the Security Council impose mandatory sanctions against South Africa. Nothing short of that action will serve to avert the impending disaster. However, the permanent Western members continue to oppose such action. Their policies have always been based on the consideration that there must be no confrontation with South Africa. Whether we look at their policy with regard to Namibia or Rhodesia or other Territories in that region, the primary consideration seems to be that there must be no confrontation with apartheid. This no confrontation policy emanates precisely from those countries with substantial economic interests in South Africa and it is they who also argue that increased investment in apartheid will somehow bring about our freedom. We reject that contention.

It is time for the Western permanent members of the Security Council to decide which side they are on. Last year in March, the Prime Minister of Norway warned the Western world that, with regard to southern Africa, it had too often been identified with the wrong side and that it was time for it to change sides. At the opening of the NATO Ministerial Council meeting at Oslo, he gave the same warning and stated that there should be no doubt as to where the alliance members stood in the battle between the white minorities and the overwhelming black majorities in southern Africa. Yet this is a lead which is not yet being followed by most of the Western Powers. If the Western countries are on the side of freedom, they can agree to a number of initial steps to be adopted by the Council immediately.

The first would be to enforce a strict arms embargo and vote in favour of its being made mandatory by the Security Council; the second, to ban all future loans to and investments in South Africa. If those two minimal measures are supported, then one can at least hope that there will be further action on the part of the Council to take decisive measures against South Africa. But the key question is whether the political will exists to confront apartheid. This debate and the decisions taken here will give an indication to the world of the degree of change that we can expect from Western policy. South Africa is immensely encouraged when vetoes are used in the Council to protect it from international action.

Mention has already been made of the fact that today the problems of race and colour present perhaps the greatest single threat to world peace and security. The policy of the new Administration in Washington gives us considerable grounds for hope and we trust that it will be able, under your leadership, Mr. President, to

give a decisive lead to other Western Powers. We are indeed at a turning point in the affairs of southern Africa in so far as the United Nations is concerned. If no firm action in the form of the minimal steps that we have indicated is taken at this moment, then South Africa will go on feeling encouraged and interpreting opposition to mandatory action in this chamber to mean support for its policies in that region. The South African apartheid policies are bound to lead to disaster. But the greater danger is that that conflagration will extend to other territories in the region and will bring forward the prospect of a global racial confrontation. If that occurs, it will create a catastrophe of a kind from which it will take the world much longer to recover than it took from the last war. If that should happen, then the guilty elements will not be only the white rulers of South Africa.

We hope, therefore, that the expectations the world's peoples have placed in the Security Council will not be betrayed and that the Council will take decisive action to signal to the Pretoria regime that it can no longer go on ignoring debates and discussions at the United Nations and that we are seriously concerned to avert a racial disaster which looks almost inevitable in southern Africa.

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APARTHEID'S THREAT TO WORLD PEACE

*Paper presented to the World Conference for Action against Apartheid, Lagos, August 1977*⁵⁴

1. *Introduction*

The situation in southern Africa has never been more explosive: in Zimbabwe, Namibia and South Africa itself there is a state of war being fought at various levels. The white-power system has never before faced such a serious crisis and it is fighting for its very survival.

But the crisis in southern Africa also represents a serious crisis for Western policy. Southern Africa is now the major item on the world agenda. Whether it be this year's Western summit gathering in London or the subsequent Council meeting of NATO Ministers, or the Commonwealth Heads of Government meeting, or the discussions of EEC Foreign Ministers, Western political leaders are confronted by the pressing problems arising out of the southern African conflict. The traditional allies of South Africa are being compelled to re-examine their policies and work out a new strategy to protect their interests in that region.

What has brought all this about? To understand that, one has to trace the course of recent history so that the rapidly unfolding events are seen in their total perspective.

(a) *End of Portuguese colonialism*

The present crisis has in the main been brought about by the collapse of Portuguese colonialism in April 1974 and the new militant mood of the oppressed African majority in southern Africa. It is of course important to note that Portuguese colonialism was brought to an end as a result of the long and heroic struggle of the peoples of Guinea-Bissau, Angola and Mozambique, and it is they who also contributed in large measure to bringing about the liberation of the Portuguese people from dictatorship.

The liquidation of Portuguese colonialism transformed the whole southern African situation. The balance-of-power has been changed. The initiative has passed to the African people in a decisive way. The white regimes are on a desperate retreat. Virtually overnight, what were once valuable buffer territories,

⁵⁴ United Nations Centre against Apartheid, Notes and Documents, Conf.7, November 1977

serving as convenient outposts for the Pretoria regime to keep the African liberation movements at bay, have been transformed into genuine independent States firmly committed to the destruction of apartheid and colonialism in southern Africa.

In early 1974 there was confusion in Pretoria about how to deal with the changes. There was similar confusion in the major Western capitals. But that was because South Africa itself had now become highly vulnerable. The Pretoria regime, being the effective colonial power in Rhodesia and in illegal occupation of Namibia, would have to ultimately cope with the main brunt of the African liberation struggle in all three white-ruled territories: the very heart of the white-power system was seriously at risk.

With the independence of Mozambique in June 1975 South Africa was to face its first real security border with an independent African State. South African troops were promptly dispatched to the border which was heavily patrolled - more and more whites were recruited into the armed forces, the military was set on alert and there was increased tension in the area. However, FRELIMO (Liberation Movement of Mozambique) was able to consolidate its rule and South Africa was unable to destabilise Mozambique.

(b) *Threat to Angola*

The prospect of Angolan independence due in November 1975 was generally faced with an air of uncertainty. Powerful external forces were determined to subvert its independence. As early as June 6, 1975, we gave evidence to the United Nations Security Council during its debate on Namibia that South Africa was preparing bases in Namibia for attacks against Angola. In drawing attention to the rapid militarisation of Namibia we stated: "The bases which are established in the occupied Territory are not only for the purpose of securing Pretoria's control; they are major bases equipped for attacks against African States to the north." We pointed to information about rocket-launchers being installed in Namibia and directed towards Angola and gave evidence about how for over a year there had been extensive South African preparations for war across the Namibia border. In order to overcome apparent Western disbelief of these preparations we quoted from Pretoria's official publications:

"The South African Army is fully operational in the Caprivi area on an effective low-intensity war footing..."

The same journal went on to describe the border situation in dramatic language:

"The South African Air Force giant C-160 Transall Troop-carrier taxied to a stop.... Hundreds of splendid-looking South African soldiers were perched atop armoured vehicles and

trucks. Armed to the teeth, the casual-seeming attitude of the troops belied their obvious state of instant readiness. It was a wonderfully reassuring sight. Here, indeed, were solid men at the front... the message was loud and clear: South Africa's fighting border is in good hands.⁵⁵

For the first time the Pretoria regime openly boasted about its military bases and advanced preparations for war in the region. It also disclosed that among the aircraft used for these operations were the French-West German Transall transporters and French Super-Frelon helicopters.

We pointed out then that the continued illegal occupation of Namibia and the preparations to facilitate attack against neighbouring States "amount to a clear breach of the peace and constitute an act of aggression as well as a threat to international peace within the meaning of the United Nations Charter."

(c) *Western veto*

There was a resolution before the Security Council to apply a mandatory arms embargo against South Africa but the three Western Powers (the United Kingdom, France and the United States) used their veto power jointly to block such action. They claimed that the situation was not a threat to the peace and did not warrant a mandatory arms embargo.

South Africa was enormously encouraged by this act of open solidarity and Premier Vorster thanked the Western Powers publicly. However, by October 1975 the outside world began to get the first confirmed reports about South African troops having invaded Angola. The subsequent events are now well known.

(d) *South African invasion*

On February 3, 1977, the South African Defence Headquarters released an official account of its invasion of Angola. The Chairman of the United Nations Special Committee against Apartheid, Ambassador Harriman,⁵⁶ issued a statement on 24 February in which he said: "The apartheid regime has now publicly confessed that, after a series of incursions into southern Angola, it sent an officer to the UNITA headquarters as early as September 24, 1975, to plan operations against the MPLA. Eighteen instructors

⁵⁵ *South African Digest*, June 21, 1974

⁵⁶ Leslie O. Harriman of Nigeria

and military equipment were sent soon after and the South Africans accompanied UNITA forces in clashes with MPLA forces between Lobito and Nova Lisboa. In mid-October, a squadron of armoured cars and crew were sent to Silva Porto and formed a special combat group. This group participated in attacks on Pereira d'Eca, Rocardos, Joao de Almeida, Sa da Bandeira and Mocamedes between 19 and 28 October. They then advanced to Benguela and Lobito. It was only on 4 November that they observed signs of any presence of Cuban personnel, namely, instructors at an MPLA training camp near Benguela." South Africa also disclosed that it had sent a senior officer to the headquarters of FNLA in northern Angola before the FNLA offensive was launched.

It is clear now that there was high-level and intensive preparation for South African incursions and attacks against Angola months before its independence was due in November 1975. The object was to destroy the influence and authority of MPLA. At that time, despite considerable evidence, the Western Powers claimed ignorance of South African intervention in Angola and thus refused to contemplate any action to curb this aggression. It is impossible to accept that these Powers were unaware of the situation, and in any case their intelligence services would have supplied them with the relevant information. The silence and inaction of all the major Western Powers gave South Africa added encouragement to carry out its attacks against Angola.

(e) United States complicity

The official South African account and various reports coming out of Washington since have revealed another factor which is potentially the most dangerous recent development in relation to the southern African conflict, namely, the growing "Americanisation" of that confrontation. It is remarkable that there was such deep United States involvement with the South African forces in their intervention in Angola. It was for other reasons that Congress in Washington refused to vote additional funds to facilitate increased United States involvement in Angola and therefore we were saved from what would otherwise have been a much greater external intervention to destroy the MPLA Government.

All this is history but it is important recent history because the forces which operated then are still operating today. It is important to recognise that the failure of South African policy, its disastrous invasion of Angola and the subsequent retreat have had other repercussions in the major Western capitals as well as in South Africa itself. They have realised the need to be much more careful

in future but this in no way reduces the ever-present and growing threat to the peace and security of independent Africa.

(f) *Detente with apartheid*

There is also another series of events which deserves attention. In October 1974 Premier Vorster made an important policy statement in which he stated that South Africa needed time to show the world the tremendous changes that it could bring about. He asked for "six months to one year" and announced to the world that South Africa would help to 'decolonise' Rhodesia and Namibia. But he went on to warn that unless there was peaceful change in southern Africa and an acceptance of South Africa, and its role, we would face "a catastrophe, too ghastly to contemplate". South Africa desperately needed to buy time in order to adjust to the new situation and therefore gave the impression that it was open to negotiations over Namibia and would put pressure on the Smith regime to reach a "settlement" with the United Kingdom. Several African nationalist leaders were soon released in Rhodesia and various talks took place culminating eventually in the abortive Victoria Falls talks. All these talks, initiated by the United Kingdom and South Africa and supported by other Western Powers, were aimed at trying to "settle" the problem of Rhodesia but not to "solve" it - and that is the crucial difference between their objective and what the African people of Zimbabwe want.

2.The new situation

(a) *New United States and Western role*

Hitherto, southern Africa was considered to be within the United Kingdom's sphere of influence and Western policy was largely governed by what was decided in London. In the aftermath of Angola, the United States became increasingly concerned with southern African problems and Secretary of State Kissinger embarked on a series of shuttle journeys to Africa. With British membership of the EEC there had been increased involvement of certain Western European countries but the Kissinger initiatives changed all that; it is now the United States which is increasingly determining over-all Western policy towards that region.

It is important to recognise what underlying factors are responsible for bringing about these changes and shifts in Western policy and one therefore has to ask why the apparent sudden conversion of the principal allies of apartheid and colonialism in

southern Africa to help bring about African freedom in that region and why, if they are genuinely committed to African freedom, do they refuse to support the liberation movements and continue to collaborate with the apartheid system?

(i) *Armed Struggle*

In Rhodesia the African liberation fighters have intensified their operations and gained control over vast regions: the Smith regime admits to it by mentioning the "breakdown of administration" in the operational areas. Thousands of African people have been uprooted from their homes and herded into concentration camps described as 'protected villages' - anyone who dares to move outside these villages or other designated areas at unauthorised times becomes a legitimate target to be shot at, with no questions asked. Meanwhile hundreds more are killed by the Smith regime in the war against "terrorism", including the illegal execution of over 100 known Zimbabweans. The British Government agrees that these executions are illegal but abdicates its legal responsibility and doggedly refuses to declare that they amount to murder. The growing desperation of the Smith regime has also led it to carry out regular attacks against Mozambique and Botswana, with threats of such attacks against Zambia.

With regard to Namibia, SWAPO never took part in Geneva-type talks because its conditions were not met. It has instead prosecuted the liberation struggle with renewed determination despite growing repression by the illegal occupying Power in Namibia. Vast areas of the Territory have been totally militarised by Pretoria and a wide stretch of no-man's land has been cleared along the entire border with Angola as a "free-fire zone". The growing success of the liberation war is being counteracted by additional troop reinforcements, the expansion of military bases, increased reliance on electronic warfare techniques and massive retaliation against and torture of the local population. In addition there are frequent incursions against Angola and Zambia.

In South Africa itself the Soweto crisis of June 1976 and the subsequent nationwide upsurge of resistance effectively undermined Western plans for detente with South Africa so as to ease the world's pressure against apartheid. The people of South Africa demonstrated with considerable heroism, particularly on the part of the young, that their right to freedom could not be compromised simply because that country is considered to be so important to Western security and other interests.

There is no doubt that the major new element in the situation is the growing success of the armed struggle against the white-power system in southern Africa. This was acknowledged in part in the Kissinger speech in Washington, before his final mission to Africa, when he declared that the United States was committed to supporting human rights in South Africa. He also warned that the pace of events in that region was moving so fast that there was the danger that the West would lose control over the process of change.

(ii) *Peaceful change*

It became clear that the United States wanted to gain control over change in southern Africa. The major problem for the West was that the revolutionary spirit sweeping through Zimbabwe and Namibia might in the process overturn South Africa itself and that, above all, should not be permitted.

Throughout the last two decades it has become clear that whether the question was Portuguese colonialism in Africa, Rhodesia, Namibia or any other matter affecting South Africa's interests, Western policy was based on the primary consideration that South Africa's interests had to be protected and its stability and security preserved; there was to be no confrontation with Pretoria. Accordingly, after the collapse of Portuguese colonialism in April 1974 there were direct negotiations between South Africa and the United Kingdom and other Western Powers aimed at bringing about peaceful change in southern Africa which meant Rhodesia and Namibia. There was considerable talk in Western capitals about the need to bring about majority rule in Rhodesia and self-determination in Namibia since they were both colonial situations: nothing was to be done to destroy apartheid, all that could be hoped for was to persuade Pretoria to make certain changes to ameliorate apartheid and give it a better international image.

The "peaceful change" policy of the major Western Powers rests squarely on working for changes through South Africa as the major regional Power in the area. Thus for any changes to be brought about they have to be acceptable to the Pretoria regime whose cooperation and support are considered vital. Inevitably this means that only those changes will take place which the South African regime will decide upon, in the direction which it decides upon, and at the rate and pace which it considers to be convenient; in other words, all change is to be determined by what will best serve the long-term interest of the apartheid regime.

Hence the world witnessed the remarkable spectacle of the arch-

enemy of the African people, Premier Vorster, being projected as Africa's chief peacemaker and bringer of freedom to the oppressed people of Zimbabwe and Namibia. But this illusion could not be successfully sustained in the light of the Angolan adventure and the repeated failure to bring about even a settlement in Rhodesia.

It is a simple truth that no lasting solution or peace can be established in southern Africa as long as the major Western Powers base their policy on preserving the apartheid State. But it is also important to recognise that while Vorster and Smith were publicly talking about peace they were in fact preparing for, and engaging in, war.

When Vorster was being hailed in the Western media as a saviour and man of peace he was in fact preparing for attacks against Angola which were later carried out. South Africa's rapid militarisation and massive defence budgets bear dramatic testimony about its true intentions - and Vorster has warned African States about a "catastrophe, too ghastly to contemplate", should they continue to support the African liberation movements.

In the case of Rhodesia, while the Geneva talks were taking place and Smith had conceded the principle of majority rule "within two years", four new air bases were being built secretly in that country, all strategically situated for attacks against neighbouring African States and fully equipped with underground hangars and workshops. The Smith regime, with its besieged economy, could not have built these facilities so quickly. It is safe to assume South African involvement since it has been reported in the press that Rhodesia was also to be supplied with French-built Mirage fighters by the Pretoria regime.⁵⁷ If the bases were in fact built virtually overnight then there are strong grounds for suspecting a much higher level of external involvement on the part of other Powers as well in Rhodesia's preparations to widen the war.

(b) *New United States policy?*

The new Carter Administration has expressed its dissatisfaction with previous United States policy towards southern Africa and there is considerable hope in Africa and elsewhere that Washington will play a more positive role in the future. Even the relatively mild way in which it has warned South Africa about the likelihood of no further support at the United Nations, unless there are serious changes forthcoming, has created some concern in Pretoria. This,

⁵⁷ *Guardian*, London, April 28, 1977

together with other recent moves, reveals the considerable influence and power that rests in Washington over future developments in southern Africa but it is still too early to detect whether there is likely to be a major departure from the traditional Western policy of collaborating with South Africa.

It is going to become increasingly important to distinguish between resounding speeches and well-presented gestures intended to give the impression of a vigorous anti-apartheid posture and meaningful action in support of the African liberation struggle.

3. *South African strategy*

The central objective of South Africa's foreign policy is to create a detente relationship with independent African States and secure their recognition of the apartheid State. As early as August 1968, Foreign Minister Mueller explained its importance: "As the West becomes aware of our fruitful cooperation with other African States, their attitude towards us improves... our relations with the outside world are largely determined by our relations with the African States." More recently, in May 1977, Prime Minister Vorster emphasised this aspect in a speech in the Western Cape when he said that South Africa would never sell itself to the Western world until it had sold itself to Africa - then he added: "But there is a difference between selling ourselves to Africa and selling ourselves out to Africa."

He went on to explain how South Africa had over the years built up relationships with Africa, some of which had lasted, while some had broken down, but "our trade and other relationships have expanded and, even if it is not so easily visible to the world, there is good contact between us and Africa". He claimed that South Africa's right to exist in Africa was now recognised by friend and foe alike and added: "The time will come when Africa will realise that in its own interests it will have to make peace with South Africa."

This confidence is based on the assumption that in the deteriorating international economic situation South African offers of aid and technical assistance as well as food will help to attract certain African States to enter into "normal" relations with South Africa and deny support to the African liberation struggle. By this means the OAU's support for the African liberation struggle can be undermined and the future stability of the apartheid system secured by a highly sophisticated counter-insurgency policy.

But this is not all. The intention behind such aid was spelt out in greater detail in a speech by Premier Vorster in November 1968: "We have a measure of self-interest - and I do not attempt to hide this - in the development and prosperity of Africa, but it is not self-interest alone that motivates us... We have a sense of mission in respect of Africa. In addition, Providence has been very good to us in Africa and we in turn want to return to Africa something of this... This is the spirit that inspires us "and this is the spirit that will conquer Africa".

Much has changed in Africa and the world since 1968 but the need for South Africa to establish close links with African States has never been greater. One of the main reasons why the major Western Powers have become increasingly embarrassed by their collaboration with the apartheid regime has been its exposure and condemnation by the African, non-aligned and other States.

But if the policy of securing an African detente with apartheid does not work then the threat of military attacks and war is intended to secure the submission of independent Africa and if these threats do not work then massive attacks against selected States would enforce their compliance and establish South Africa's dominance. African States which support the liberation struggle would be taught a "lesson" for "playing with fire" as Vorster so often threatened and we would then face the "catastrophe, too ghastly to contemplate" about which he has warned.

(a) *Military budget*

South Africa knows only too well the destruction and havoc which it is planning in Africa. Following the Sharpeville massacre in 1960, the Pretoria regime began to rely more heavily on military power in order to preserve internal security. Over the years it began to develop wider ambitions about becoming a major regional Power and dominating neighbouring independent African States. Every year saw a sharp rise in the defence budget: from 44 million rand during 1960/61, it rose to over 72 million rand in 1961/62; by 1966/67 it reached over 250 million rand and by 1972/73 it had risen by almost 100 million rand to virtually 350 million rand, then in the light of the growing defeat of the Portuguese forces in Africa it was increased to 480 million rand for 1973/74. After the collapse of Portuguese colonialism a 10-year defence programme was compressed into five years and the defence budget for 1974/75 rose to 700 million rand and again the following year to 948 million rand. During the following year, 1976/77, defence expenditure reached the phenomenal figure of 1,407 million rand and the new Defence

White Paper estimates yet another sharp increase to 1,711 million rand for the year 1977/78.

Thus, in the period of four years since 1973/74, when the figure stood at 480 million rand it has increased each year by almost that amount so that for 1977/78 it has risen virtually four-fold to 1,711 million rand. This constitutes 19 per cent of State expenditure and is the largest single item in the budget.

(b) Military manpower shortage

After Sharpeville the apartheid regime deliberately created a war psychosis and virtually the entire white population was trained for war against its own people - housewives were organised in pistol clubs and even school children were taught target practice.

The military structure was reorganised together with that of the police force so that they could operate in an integral over-all security role. But South Africa's traditionally all-white defence forces have had to face serious pressures during the 1970s.

As a result of the Portuguese setbacks in its African colonies and the growing threat to the Smith regime, as well as increased resistance within its own borders and in Namibia, South Africa was forced to substantially expand the armed forces. In the one year between 1971/72 and 1972/73 they more than doubled from around 48,000 to over 110,000 and then increased to around 120,000 by 1974/75. The following year, 1975/76 during the Angolan incursions - they were virtually doubled and stood at a total of 201,900. The latest official figure available for 1976/77 is around 224,000.

This vast expansion of the all-white defence forces has placed serious strain on the apartheid economy which is short of white labour. Because of the growing damage to the economy and the increasing number of white casualties suffered by the forces in combat it was decided in 1978 to train special groups of African, Indian and Coloured contingents for border duties. This was a significant break from tradition because of the importance which had always been placed on keeping the armed forces all-white.

(c) Black troops

Today there are a small number of personnel drawn from the "other national groups" as the African, Indian and Coloured people are described, and Defence Minister P.W. Botha considers this to be

an important factor in the country's "total national strategy". During the last year an infantry company of Coloured soldiers, of the South African Cape Corps, were deployed in the "operational area".

The bantustans are meant to have their own armies and during the past two years an embryonic defence force and base facilities have been established in the Transkei. The same is intended for the other "homelands" when they are granted "independence". It is not surprising that the basis of training will be "counter-insurgency and it will have its weapons and equipment supplied by the South African defence force."⁵⁸

In Namibia special tribal contingents are being organised and there already exist Ovambo and Kavango battalions which are being steadily increased.

Despite these recent changes the "other national groups" still constitute a very small proportion of the total defence forces. There is still considerable anxiety within official circles about training large sections of the oppressed population in the techniques of war. In the Assembly debate about manpower shortages in April 1977 Defence Minister Botha said that he would not agree to create bigger units manned by "people of colour".

(d) *White women recruits*

However the problem remains and one attempt to solve it is to increase the number of white women receiving training. After studying the systems existing in overseas countries such as Britain, the United States, Australia and Israel, the Defence Headquarters announced in March 1977 that the number of women to be trained would be trebled at the Army Women College at George.

When the new Defence White Paper was published in March 1977 the authorities announced to the white population that South Africa is at war "whether we like it or not". But the additional intake of several hundred white women and "non-white" recruits is still inadequate to meet the pressing manpower needs of the apartheid forces.

The manpower problem is not just in terms of the total number in service but also the ratio of those in full-time service and those in part-time service - at present the former represents 16.7 per cent and the latter 83.3 per cent of the total number whereas the officially

desired ratio is 30.5 per cent and 69.5 per cent respectively. Accordingly, the White Paper explicitly states: "The full-time component cannot cope with the situation, and should already have been expanded to meet present requirements. The number of members of the Permanent Forces and the national service component must indeed be doubled.

Thus it has now been decided to extend the initial compulsory call-up period for white males from 12 months since voluntary methods of securing additional forces have failed.

If the South African armed forces are in such severe crisis at present despite its vast recent expansion then it is inevitable that further intensification of African resistance will place an even more intolerable burden on apartheid's security system.

(e) Apartheid's military strategy

When one examines the nature of South Africa's internal power structure and the fact that it rests on just over 4 million whites out of a total population of over 25 million, and compares the size and scope of the military forces to the need to exercise authority and control over the considerable area within its own boundaries, it is not difficult to reach the conclusion that its security forces would be severely stretched by a major confrontation. That is why its senior defence officials make a point of drawing the attention of the white population to the fact that South Africa has a very low "security ceiling". Once control breaks down it would be very difficult to totally regain the initiative.

(f) Growing arsenal

It is precisely because the Pretoria regime is aware of this inherent vulnerability that it concentrates on amassing a wide variety of highly sophisticated military equipment. Whenever there is a crisis and as the feeling of insecurity increases, it responds by purchasing more and better weapons in the hope that they will serve to intimidate and deter the African liberation movements as well as neighbouring African States which may support the freedom struggle.

The growing reliance on a massive and destructive weapons-capability is intended to compensate for the major weakness in terms of manpower. South Africa has therefore assembled an impressive array of military equipment including modern bombs, guns, tanks, armoured cars, missiles, jet interceptors, fighters,

bombers, reconnaissance and counter-insurgency aircraft, transporters, helicopters, submarines and fast patrol craft including corvettes.

This enormous arsenal of destructive power is intended to serve as the first line of defence but the existence of such equipment is also used to try and create a second and more reliable form of reinsurance by impressing the major Western Powers about South Africa's defence capability and developing closer military ties with them in order to draw the West further on the side of the apartheid regime. Vast sums are therefore also spent on improving naval ports and installing modern communications systems to monitor the Southern Hemisphere so that South Africa may be considered an attractive and vital Western ally in the region. Major propaganda campaigns are then initiated at huge cost to persuade Western public opinion and Governments that there is a serious Soviet naval threat in the Southern Oceans which can only be adequately countered by relying increasingly on South Africa's defence capability and possibly establishing a formal military pact with it - either by extending NATO's role to the South Atlantic or creating a new alliance for that region.

Despite the fact that South Africa's vast military build-up and its search for meaningful external military support and collaboration is primarily devoted to preserving the apartheid system, it has had relatively little difficulty in securing valuable assistance from the major Western Powers. A cursory examination of the South African military inventory reveals the nature and extent of Western collaboration - its equipment originates from countries which include the United Kingdom, the United States of America, Canada, Belgium, the Netherlands, the Federal Republic of Germany and particularly since the operation of the 1963 United Nations arms embargo, France and Italy. Military collaboration is also being developed recently with Israel.

4. The United Nations arms embargo

Following the Sharpeville massacre in March 1960, the Pretoria regime embarked on a major programme of militarisation in order to preserve the apartheid system. The traditional suppliers of arms to South Africa came under severe pressure as a result of domestic and international protests. In August 1963 the United Nations Security Council adopted a resolution which called on all States to cease forthwith the sale and shipment of arms, ammunition of all types and military vehicles to South Africa. In subsequent decisions, the

Security Council appealed to all States to comply with the provisions of the August resolution. This resolution of the United Nations has been considered to be one of its most significant actions against apartheid. But, at best the embargo has only been partially successful. It is essentially a voluntary embargo and implemented by individual member States according to their own interpretation of their responsibility - and there exists no effective monitoring system, let alone one which can secure the compliance of individual countries. The gradual erosion of the embargo and the growing threat to world peace in southern Africa have led to repeated calls in the Security Council for a mandatory and binding arms embargo but the resolutions tabled there so far have been defeated by the use of Western triple vetoes.

Prior to the arms embargo decisions of the Security Council, South Africa obtained most of its military equipment from the United Kingdom which was also its military ally through the 1955 Simonstown Naval Agreement. The United Kingdom and the United States of America were among the first to inform the Security Council of their decisions to apply an arms embargo although they imposed various qualifications on its operation at that time. Since then it is France which has replaced the United Kingdom as the major provider of arms to the apartheid regime and there is virtually nothing which the Pretoria regime has not been able to secure from that country. The case of Italy which is the other major violator of the arms embargo, is less well known.

(a) The United Kingdom, the United States and the Federal Republic of Germany

The United Kingdom, the United States and the Federal Republic of Germany all claim to adhere to the international arms embargo; yet the South African Defence Force is able to secure a wide range of equipment from these countries. This is made possible by the way in which these countries interpret and apply the embargo. In general the Pretoria regime does not any longer obtain most of its major combat equipment from these sources but it is readily supplied with radar, communications and other equipment including aircraft (sometimes described as "civilian" even though purchased by the South African Defence Force) and what is termed "dual purpose" equipment.

For example, several West German firms have helped the South African Defence Force to construct the modern Advokaat naval communications system which is based at Silvermine, near the Simonstown Naval Base. When attention has been drawn to this at

the United Nations and elsewhere Bonn has responded with the assertion that it is a "non-military project and therefore does not constitute military cooperation". On the other hand the current South African White Paper describes the vital role of its modern facilities at the Silvermine Centre from where the operational command and control of maritime forces is exercised. It also states: On account of the tremendous speed of current events it is of the utmost importance that our maritime commanders be properly acquainted with any situation that could arise anywhere in our sea areas: this enables them to make quick, but thorough, appreciations and to follow up with naval dispositions.

It is difficult to accept that the Bonn Government is totally ignorant of the role of the Advokaat system particularly since sections of its own defence establishment were directly involved in facilitating the construction of the system for which it expressly authorised the supply of the NATO Codification System for Spares and Equipment.

The United States of America also claims to implement the arms embargo and denies that it supplies aircraft to the South African forces. The August 1976 issue of the South African journal, *Wings*, reports that the South African Air Force has received an unspecified number of twin engine Swearingen Merlin 4A aircraft from the United States and that its delivery was deliberately not publicised until the order was completed. This information was included in a statement on the operation of the embargo which we made to the United Nations Security Council in March 1977. We now have information from reliable sources that the Merlins form part of number 21 Squadron which is one of the Air Transport Squadrons based at the Grootfontein base in Namibia - the major base for the "operational area". It has also recently become known to us that during May 1976 the United States authorised the export of "aircraft support equipment" valued at over \$1 million directly to the South African Air Force. This may be connected to the Merlin deal or represent another military contract.

There are also numerous examples of British violations of the international arms embargo about which detailed information was submitted to the Security Council in March 1977.

(b) *France and Italy*

As has already been mentioned the two countries which are the most blatant violators of the arms embargo are France and Italy. They not only supply a vast range of aircraft and other equipment to

the Pretoria regime but also collaborate to produce them within South Africa.

The role of Italy has not been well publicised but aircraft which it has sold to South Africa include:

- (a) The AM3Cs which are to be made locally under the name Bostock;
- (b) The Aermacchi-Lockheed AL60C5, a United States-designed light plane produced in Italy under licence, being made locally under the name Kudu.
- (c) The Aermacchi MB326M, of which over 200 have already been made locally and known as the Impala I.
- (d) The Aermacchi MB326K, a more modern version, also being made locally under the name Impala II.

These and other Italian aircraft sold to South Africa, and for which licences have been granted to Pretoria for local production, are particularly well suited for counter-insurgency operations. When the Italian Government is confronted with this information it simply denies all knowledge of the sales and licences and claims to implement the embargo fully. This denial was once again repeated in March 1977 following our disclosure at the United Nations of the same information. It is remarkable that Rome persists in repeating its claim to be implementing the arms embargo when hundreds of aircraft of Italian origin form part of the South African Air Force.

The record of France is much better known. The South African Air Force is heavily armed with a wide range of Mirage interceptors and fighters including the modern F-1 as well as Alouette 111 and Super Frelon helicopters, while the Navy has modern French Daphne and Agosta class submarines. There are also French Panhards, Crotale missile systems and a wide variety of guns and ammunition. Licences have been granted to the Pretoria regime to enable it to make much of this equipment locally, including the Mirage F-1.

Following the exposure of French military collaboration there have been several statements made in recent years by French Ministers, usually during visits to African States, announcing each

time that Paris would no longer supply certain equipment to South Africa, only to be countered by statements from Pretoria that it does not expect any change in the current level of military relations between the two countries. There is certainly no evidence so far that South Africa is being denied either particular items of military hardware or licences for the local production of such equipment.

A new feature of South Africa's collaboration with overseas countries is the rapidly developing economic and military relationship with Israel following the visit of Premier Vorster to that country. South Africa has obtained Israeli naval patrol boats equipped with Gabriel missiles and plans to make more locally under licence. The Pretoria regime is also showing considerable interest in the Kfir aircraft and it is likely that further Israeli equipment will be supplied to the South African Defence Force in the future.

(c) The role of multinationals

The Pretoria regime has been able to overcome some of the most serious effects of the international arms embargo by obtaining licences for the local production of a wide variety of military equipment. Western Governments have in the main refused to block the transfer of patents, military technology and know-how and investments by their firms which have enthusiastically set up enterprises in South Africa to satisfy the needs of the apartheid regime.

The current Defence White Paper claims that South Africa is now fully self-sufficient in respect of armaments for internal protection and that it "ensures its safety by negotiating licences for more sophisticated and expensive equipment, which, if necessary, could be put into operation in the country". The Defence Force in fact relies on over 1,000 main and sub-contractors for its internal weapons purchases and they in turn are either the subsidiaries of major Western corporations or associated with them in one form or another.

All efforts so far to restrict and stop this form of military collaboration have failed since the major Western countries claim that it is not their policy to limit "normal trade relations" with South Africa.

(i) The Marconi case

During 1976 the Anti-Apartheid Movement organised a major

campaign in the United Kingdom after it was revealed that Marconi had contracted to sell the South African Armaments Board £8 million worth of tropospheric scatter communications equipment for use in Namibia and South Africa. There was fierce controversy over the deal and strong efforts were made to get the Government to prohibit it. As a result of a series of manoeuvres by the company, in collaboration with the authorities in Pretoria and London, the export of the equipment was finally authorised.

Marconi went to unusual lengths to impress upon the workers the need to convey to the British Prime Minister the importance of this South African contract which, if jeopardised, could put in danger other deals with the Pretoria regime. It stated in a memorandum that GFC factories (of which Marconi is a part) had during the previous 12 months received orders "principally from the South African Government or its agencies to the value of £100 million and prospects are improving, provided South African confidence in UK manufacturers is not destroyed".

All this was done by Marconi to undermine the anti-apartheid campaign and it went on to claim that the contract in question would provide employment at its Chelmsford plant for 500 people for two years. There was also the likelihood of "further similar contracts to be placed by South Africa to the value of £35 million". At a time of rising unemployment in the United Kingdom, Marconi cleverly played on the fears of its workers in order to ensure that the South African Armaments Board was provided with its needs.

The Marconi memorandum which was produced in a question and answer form had one section which read as follows:

"Does Marconi's trade with South Africa affect its business with other African and Arab Governments? No. It has been suggested by the Anti-Apartheid Movement that this could be the case but it is not so. Marconi is highly regarded by its customers and is currently supplying equipment to countries like Nigeria, Egypt, Libya, Jordan, Saudi Arabia and Oman."

It so happens that the Anti-Apartheid Movement did not in fact suggest the possible damage to Marconi's trade with African and Arab countries at that time - maybe it should have done so. Nevertheless this example shows not only the arrogance and determination with which Marconi continues to serve the interests of the Pretoria regime and its armed forces but the additional claim, by implication that some of its major African and Arab customers have no objection whatsoever to this role. This is a new tactic devised by

Marconi which is likely to be utilised as effectively by other multinational corporations in the future to overcome large-scale anti-apartheid protests in their own countries when such exposures in fact threaten military deals with the Pretoria regime.

In view of the Special and important role that Marconi and its parent company, CEC, play in supplying military equipment to South Africa, both from its British factories as well as subsidiaries established within South Africa, and the display of its aggressive determination to provide the Pretoria regime with the tropospheric communications system last year it has qualified itself as a prime target for international campaigns to effectively enforce the arms embargo.

Once information such as this is more widely known it is inevitable that some of Marconi's present customers, as well as of other similar firms which collaborate closely with the South African defence establishment, will examine ways of taking action which will effectively discourage this process of collaboration with apartheid.

(ii) Transfer of Military Technology

There is also a second type of related case where the South African subsidiary of an overseas firm produces equipment which is then used by the illegal Rhodesian regime. Thus, the South African link serves to bolster the illegal Smith regime and international economic sanctions against Rhodesia are effectively undermined. One recent example of this was when Racal "Transcriber" equipment, made by a British subsidiary in South Africa, was captured by the Mozambique authorities following one of the attacks by Rhodesian forces against that country. When all the relevant information was submitted to the British Government we were informed by the Foreign and Commonwealth Office that there had certainly been a breach of sanctions and that the equipment in question was a type designed, developed and manufactured only in South Africa by Racal, but that Racal in that country claims that it would not be a party to the supply of such equipment to Rhodesia! One wonders by what means Rhodesia secures such equipment, if it is not from the manufacturer in South Africa. Racal and the British Government are silent on this question.

This illustrates the enormous degree to which leading Western companies are directly involved in helping to boost the armed power of the apartheid State and to keep the illegal Smith regime in power, with no effective action by their Governments to put an end to this

form of direct support to the racist regimes.

(iii) *Action against Companies*

It is therefore a matter of vital importance that the major Western Powers are pressed to implement a meaningful arms embargo and put an end to all forms of military collaboration with South Africa by companies based in their countries. They should place a complete ban on the transfer of patents, technology and know-how as well as investment which is used to build up the internal armaments industry. Such collaboration must be forbidden if they are to be taken seriously about their claims to be supporting an arms embargo policy towards the Pretoria and Salisbury regimes.

In the meantime those Governments which are committed to the African liberation struggle should give serious and urgent consideration to what type of unilateral and collective action must be taken against those firms which are the most blatant and persistent offenders. The non-aligned countries hold considerable potential power which can be effectively exercised by denying contracts to those firms which persist in collaborating with the South African military establishment. The matter is urgent because these firms are not only engaged in making South Africa more self-sufficient in defence equipment but are also making it possible for the Pretoria regime to export military hardware to other countries. The demand to end all overseas investments in and loans to South Africa becomes even more important when the full extent of such operations, in terms of direct support for the apartheid military effort is known. Thus an effective freeze on all future investments in South Africa will also limit the growth of internal arms production in that country.

(d) *NATO Codification System and South Africa*

In July 1975 documentary evidence was released by the Anti-Apartheid Movement which proved that the NATO codification system for spares and equipment had been provided to South Africa. Since then the matter has been taken up persistently with NATO members directly as well as during the last two NATO Ministerial Council meetings in Oslo and London respectively. The official NATO view is that the Codification System is in fact an unclassified and "open" system which can be provided to non-members at the initiative of any individual member of the Alliance. Several countries such as Norway, Denmark, the Netherlands and Canada responded favourably to our representations on this issue and stated that they do not provide South Africa with the Codification System.

Among these countries which are known to have provided information about the Codification System to the Pretoria regime are the United Kingdom, the United States of America, France and West Germany. All these countries respond by claiming that the provision of the System to the South African authorities is not of any military significance - which is also what is claimed by NATO headquarters in Brussels. But we have continued to demand that the Codification System should be withdrawn from South Africa and that its defence forces should not be provided with either classified or unclassified information.

Following the most recent representations made to the London NATO meeting on May 10, 1977, the British Foreign Secretary has now assured us that "Britain no longer supplies NATO codification data to South Africa". This is a welcome development and an important break-through but can only become more meaningful if similar action is taken by the other members of NATO which are directly involved in providing NATO codification data to South Africa. It is of vital importance that those Western Powers which enjoy close military ties with South Africa should end them and certainly not provide facilities and systems devised for NATO to benefit the South African armed forces - by doing this they drag in other members of the Alliance as well as NATO itself into the southern African conflict.

As it is, there are powerful forces in the major Western countries, particularly among the military brass, which are keen to establish a working alliance between NATO and South Africa in order to protect the Cape Sea Route and help to counteract "the growing Soviet naval threat in the Indian Ocean and the South Atlantic". Already elaborate proposals have been discussed at a high level to extend NATO's operations around southern Africa either under its own auspices or by creating a new South Atlantic pact which would be composed of certain NATO Powers and South Africa with the possibility of expanding it to include some South American countries as well.

5. Nuclear collaboration

There is a long record of Western nuclear cooperation with South Africa. The United States, France, the United Kingdom and West Germany have all played a major part in helping to develop South Africa's nuclear technology. More recently West German assistance in developing a special uranium enrichment technology, and plans for the installation of a nuclear enrichment plant, and the French

supply of nuclear reactors, have received considerable publicity. However, these countries claim that their nuclear collaboration with South Africa does not in any way make a contribution toward the Pretoria regime's establishing its own nuclear capability.

First, it is universally accepted that there is no way in which it is possible to supply nuclear technology and plant for "peaceful purposes" and ensure that it is not utilised for military ends.

Second, it is the South African Premier Vorster who disclosed last year that his country does have nuclear capability and he also pointedly drew attention to the fact that South Africa has not signed the non-proliferation treaty. It has been reported that if South Africa did not already have an atomic bomb it could produce one in two to four years and that this estimate is "the outside range".⁵⁹ South Africa certainly has the means of delivery with the modern aircraft which it has obtained from the major Western Powers.

South Africa's determination to build up a massive destructive capability has already been described and it would not shrink from producing an atomic bomb since it has the necessary technology and other resources to do so.

The growing threat of South Africa to world peace and security is dramatically and frighteningly increased with this development. Those who have collaborated with the Pretoria regime to help create an atomic Frankenstein in Africa bear a heavy responsibility.

From all this it becomes clear that what we face in southern Africa today is the biggest single threat to world peace. Yet the major Western Powers persist in their claim that the Pretoria regime does not threaten the peace. One wonders what else apartheid South Africa has to do before these Powers concede that it does constitute a grave threat to the peace and security of Africa and the world.

6. *Conclusion: Apartheid's threat to world peace*

It is useful to list the grounds upon which it can conclusively be determined that the policies of the Pretoria regime in southern Africa constitutes a grave threat to the peace within the meaning of Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter:

- (a) The apartheid system denigrates and insults the dignity and

⁵⁹ *The Washington Post*, February 1977

worth of black people not only in South Africa but all over the world and it is this expression of racism which constitutes a threat to the peace. Over thirty years ago, at Nuremburg it was solemnly declared that racism constitutes a crime against humanity. If racism then constituted a crime against humanity and a threat to world peace then apartheid today is equally a crime against humanity and presents perhaps an even greater threat to world peace.

(b) The very nature of the apartheid system with the brutal and violent imposition of white domination upon the majority population has created a highly explosive situation which is likely to erupt into a major racial confrontation with the danger of a wider war which will set aflame the continent of Africa.

(c) Rhodesia's illegal seizure of independence has been declared by the Security Council, at the request of the United Kingdom, to constitute a threat to world peace. South Africa breaks United Nations mandatory sanctions against Rhodesia and thereby "perpetuates" that threat.

(d) South Africa provides direct military support, including arms, to the illegal Smith regime not only for internal suppression but for attacks against neighbouring African States.

(e) South Africa continues to occupy Namibia illegally and has militarised the international territory in defiance of the authority of the United Nations.

(f) South Africa's rapid militarisation and aggressive posture presents a grave threat to the peace and security of Africa.

(g) South Africa's direct invasion of Angola and repeated military attacks against that country and Zambia constitute a "breach of the peace" and an "act of aggression" within Article 39 of the United Nations Charter.

(h) Over the past decade we have warned about South Africa's preparations for an apartheid atomic bomb. In 1970, at the United Nations, we again warned about South Africa's advanced nuclear capability and called for an end to all Western nuclear collaboration with Pretoria. But that continued and the major Western Powers bear the central responsibility for having helped to create an atomic Frankenstein in Africa. There is today very little doubt that South Africa has an apartheid bomb and it certainly has the means of delivery.

From this no objective person can escape the conclusion that South Africa presents the single greatest threat to world peace.

It is not just that South Africa presents a threat to world peace; we have now reached the stage where it is the military collaboration of the major Western Powers with South Africa which constitutes a threat to peace.

The Lagos Conference has the solemn responsibility and duty to adopt a programme of action to help bring about the end of the apartheid system in South Africa. Full support must be given to the African liberation struggle and all collaboration with apartheid must be ended.

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**STATEMENT AT THE MEETING OF THE SPECIAL COMMITTEE
AGAINST APARTHEID, DECEMBER 12, 1977⁶⁰**

After many years of campaigning we now have a mandatory United Nations arms embargo under Chapter VII of the Charter.⁶¹ It is an important advance from the voluntary embargo first adopted in 1963. However, as with the voluntary embargo there is the danger that it will not be implemented comprehensively or strictly - and this is made easier because the wording of Security Council resolution 418 leaves it to each Member State to interpret the meaning of what constitutes "arms and related material" and calls merely for the "review" of existing contractual and licensing arrangements with South Africa rather than forbidding them. It further decides that States "shall refrain from any cooperation with South Africa in the manufacture and development of nuclear weapons" rather than forbidding all forms of nuclear collaboration with the Pretoria regime.

The resolution has already been described as "too late and too little". However, if States do decide to implement it comprehensively and strictly it can make a major impact by weakening the South African defence establishment. But that requires committed action by States to ensure that all institutions, particularly corporations, as well as individuals falling within their jurisdiction, are made to comply strictly with the spirit and letter of the resolution.

If the present mandatory decision is applied strictly, then I am convinced that the South African defence forces can be denied any further arms and defence equipment, as well as spare parts and components which will make much of their existing weaponry inefficient and non-operational: that is, provided that nobody sabotages the embargo.

To examine some of the areas which need attention and where loopholes have

⁶⁰ UN document A/AC.115/L.485. The Special Committee transmitted this statement to the Security Council, document S/12514.

⁶¹ By resolution 418 of November 4, 1977, the Security Council decided that "all States shall cease forthwith any provision to South Africa of arms and related material of all types, including the sale or transfer of weapons and ammunition, military vehicles and equipment, para-military police equipment, and spare parts for the aforementioned, and shall cease as well the provision of all types of equipment and supplies and grants of licensing arrangements for the manufacture or maintenance of the aforementioned". It further decided that "all States shall refrain from any cooperation with South Africa in the manufacture and development of nuclear weapons".

to be closed it is useful to recount the current situation in relation to external sources of supply to and support for the South African defence establishment.

Arms Exports

South Africa's existing weapons and equipment are mainly of British, United States, West German, Italian and French origin, with France being the major recent supplier of arms.

South Africa has a wide range of sophisticated weapons which need renewal and if the arms suppliers prohibit their export it will hit South Africa quite hard. If France, Italy and other Western arms suppliers in fact cease all sales, that will have a decisive effect because South Africa cannot, despite its claims, make highly sophisticated weapons on its own.

A major question is what do Governments define as arms? Our experience is that even in the case of countries such as Britain, the United States of America and West Germany, all previously committed to the voluntary embargo, the way in which they defined "arms and military equipment" was so narrow that South Africa in fact managed to secure a wide range of equipment from these countries for its armed forces. On the many occasions when we have exposed particular deals the response has been either that the items were not "arms" or that they fell within a "grey area" and could therefore be exported. And the "grey area" is defined unilaterally and is often narrowed or broadened as deemed fit, sometimes because of a change in government, but generally toward "grey area" sales rather than prohibitions.

Thus the South African regime, for example, secured the West German Advokaat Communications system and the British Marconi troposcatter systems. Its Air Force has United States Cessna and Swearingen Merlin aircraft, and the Transall transporters made jointly by West Germany and France. We could produce a long list but our previous statements and documents give more comprehensive and detailed information.

Spares

The second area of importance is that of spares for weapons already supplied to South Africa. Despite claims by several States that they do not sell spares as a result of the voluntary embargo, the problem of definition is ever more acute in this field. Equipment is often exported ostensibly for civilian purposes when it is in fact used for the military: either the equipment is itself considered to be civilian even if ordered by the defence force, or if it is sold to a so-called civilian company in South Africa. This ensures that South Africa obtains all the spares and components it needs, as well as engines for locally assembled aircraft.

Recently, we had reason to believe that South Africa's aging Shackletons had

been renewed in Britain. Now this has been confirmed by the Pretoria regime which in its *South African Digest* of September 30, 1977, discloses that when in 1973 it was decided to recondition a 20-year-old Shackleton the spares could not be refurbished locally so that the Air Force dismantled the aircraft and shipped the spares to Britain. We do not know how many other aircraft have been renewed in this way in Britain or in other Western countries which otherwise claim to have been implementing the arms embargo. We have not so far taken up this matter with the United Kingdom Government but will do so within the next few days and inform you about their explanation.

As in the case of Shackleton, so too with other aircraft which need updated equipment and renewal. South Africa's more modern aircraft are even more dependent and therefore vulnerable to not getting spares and components from abroad. In order to keep them in operation it is vital that South Africa obtains all necessary support equipment. A strict ban on spares and components can therefore cripple most of its sophisticated weapons and security equipment; provided, of course, the countries concerned apply this provision of the Security Council resolution very strictly.

Transfer of Technology

The third area is the internal armaments industry within South Africa which has been constantly expanded since the early 1960s and about which the Security Council should be most concerned. This industry has been developed in close collaboration with many Western companies which have been only too ready to establish subsidiaries there or become associated with local firms so that their technology, know-how and skill may contribute to the South African defence effort.

Today there is virtually no major wholly South African made weapon or defence equipment: the reliance on overseas firms is substantial and in some cases total. Companies which fulfil this need include British Marconi, Plessey, Racal and Rolls Royce; German Telefunken and MAN; French Dassault and Thomson CSF; American Lockheed and Grumman; and Italian Aermacchi.

Many of these firms produce weapons and components locally under licence or patents or simply on the basis of know-how provided by their parent companies. Often expert staff from abroad are sent to South Africa to supervise production in that country and others are recruited for long-term appointments. Despite this clear breach of the embargo there has been no evidence so far of any of the major Western Powers putting an end to this transfer of technology for repression.

Britain has many such subsidiaries in South Africa and on March 22, 1977, a Government Minister was asked in Parliament if something could be done to stop these subsidiaries from undermining the embargo. The companies specifically mentioned included ICI, Plessey and Racal. The Secretary of State for Defence,

Dr. Gilbert, stated that "the Government do not have any general powers to interfere with the export of information to South Africa or to prevent firms, by whoever they are owned, from manufacturing any product in that country". He went on to say there would be serious concern if British firms were acting contrary to the spirit of Government policy. Nevertheless, this concern does not seem to make any difference to the actions of the subsidiaries which supply equipment to the South African Defence Force.

We are not aware that any of the Western Powers have stopped their firms from operating in South Africa to undermine the international arms embargo. Indeed, very recently we drew attention to Racal equipment made in South Africa by the British subsidiary being used by the Rhodesian forces in their attacks against Mozambique last year. Following our representations the British Foreign Office confirmed that the Racal equipment had been provided to Rhodesia and sanctions had been violated, but to this date no action whatsoever has been taken against Racal.

Several major international arms firms have substantial interests in South Africa and as a first step the Secretary-General of the United Nations should ask all States to provide details of all patents and licences granted by their firms to South Africa as well as the names of those firms which have subsidiaries, associate relationships and agents in South Africa. It will then be possible, in the light of this information, for us to judge the extent to which this relationship has been put to an end by the governments concerned. It is important that the governments disclose all the available information about the nature and extent of military collaboration between their firms and South Africa as a matter of urgency.

The corporations will not act in support of resolution 418 (1977) unless they become subject to substantial and severe penalties and it is therefore urgent that South Africa's trading partners enact the necessary legislation to secure compliance with the Security Council decision.

Action on this question will be the acid test of commitment to the embargo by the major Western Powers.

We are in the process of compiling a list of Western companies and subsidiaries involved in the South African defence effort and will make it available to the appropriate governments for action. We shall keep the Special Committee and the Secretary-General informed of developments because it is crucial that there is adequate supervision of this aspect by the Committee of the Security Council.⁶² Our investigations in Britain over the past fortnight reveal the large range of British companies which are apparently able to supply South Africa with many items of defence related equipment either directly or via

⁶² The Security Council established a Committee in December 1977 to monitor the arms embargo.

subsidiaries or agents in that country. After further investigation we shall take this matter up with the British Government next month and keep the United Nations informed of developments.

Civil aviation

At the Paris seminar of the Special Committee in April 1975, I drew attention to the role of so-called civilian aircraft in South Africa's military operations. At that time we reported that over 2,000 private aircraft were registered in South Africa: we believe that there are now over 3,000 such aircraft.

This expansion of civil aviation has resulted in a host of different aircraft from most Western countries being exported to South Africa almost without any control. These include Cessna, Bell, Grumman, Robin, Beech, and Piper aircraft, all with agents in South Africa. There has also been an expansion in aircraft repair and servicing, as well as training of technicians and pilots.

The aviation industry also services the South African Air Force (SAAF) in various ways and thus the industry is regarded by the Government as a semi-strategic one which needs to be encouraged. Despite foreign exchange problems the Government wants to see an increase in domestic sales of such aircraft and as an incentive exempts them from both sales tax and import duty.

South African legislation enables the authorities to utilise these aircraft for the defence effort and there are at present at least 13 Air Commando squadrons which form an integral part of the South African Defence Force, equipped with private aircraft.

This sector, of course, includes helicopters which are of obvious strategic importance to South Africa and are being imported in substantial quantities from abroad.

One South African company, Court Helicopters, has converted and rebuilt military helicopters including the Sikorsky S55's. It has even imported several ex-West German Navy/Air Force Sikorsky H34 hulls and converted them locally. These H34's were all part of the final production run which were built for the German forces in the early 1960s. The first hull, a naval version, was delivered in April 1975 and is now operating, after refurbishing in South Africa, and is registered ZS-HGL. Since this is a very recent delivery - in 1975 - there is strong reason to believe that deliveries are continuing and the Security Council should take up this matter immediately.

This is obviously a major loop-hole in the West German embargo, even though the Bonn Government claims to implement a strict arms embargo against South Africa. This loop-hole needs to be sealed. This example also shows the degree to which the South African aviation industry has expanded, as well as the ease with

which it is able to purchase ex-military equipment from the major Western Powers.

If the embargo is to be effective, then it is vital that all exports of aircraft and related equipment be banned and that no South African technicians or pilots be trained abroad.

Some related matters also need to be examined. For example, South African aerospace societies, parachute clubs and similar bodies continue to enjoy close relations with international bodies and take part in international competitions.

In 1976 the International Academy of Aviation and Space Medicine held its annual Congress in South Africa and it became known then that the Deputy Surgeon-General of the SAAF, Major Nieuwoudt, had been attached to the Royal Air Force in 1971 when he also obtained a diploma in aviation medicine. Just this one statement, of course, raises the whole question of South African military personnel being seconded to Air Forces abroad as well as the involvement of overseas Air Force and civil aviation personnel connected with aviation medicine who actively collaborate with South African establishments.

All these relationships have to be ended.

Exchange visits

This leads to the question of exchange visits and training facilities provided abroad to South African nationals associated directly or indirectly with the defence establishments. We have exposed a series of such visits to all the major Western countries by South African officials in recent years and this needs to be stopped altogether.

Our representations to several governments lead us to believe that the current policy is to consider "each case on its own merit" and continue this form of collaboration with South Africa rather than banning it totally.

There are also, Mr. Chairman, some other more remarkable visits which seem to take place despite United Nations decisions and have not so far elicited condemnation by the United Nations.

There are official visits by overseas defence staff to South Africa and the most recent example is that of Major General Andrez Rodriguez, second in command of the Paraguayan Armed Forces, who according to the *South African Digest* of October 21, 1977, arrived on a 10-day visit as guest of the SADF. All these visits have to be ended.

Defence attaches

Several countries still maintain defence attaches in their South African missions and South Africa reciprocates the practice in some cases. The Special Committee against Apartheid has details about the countries concerned. These arrangements must be ended.

Co-operation in the exchange of surveillance and other information

For several decades South Africa had been considered an integral part of the over-all Western defence system and as a result there is long-standing collaboration with certain Western Powers in the exchange of surveillance and other information. The operation of the voluntary embargo has not put an end to this relationship which has in fact expanded in a number of ways. In 1973, South Africa inaugurated its Advokaat naval communication system in Silvermine, built with West German assistance and disclosed that there existed "fixed radio communication" with Whitehall, Buenos Aires, and San Juan. This system monitors the entire South Atlantic and most of the Indian Ocean. There is no evidence that South Africa's collaboration with other Powers in this field has ended.

There is also the question of South Africa obtaining vital information via satellite surveillance of all types in the Southern Hemisphere and the Western Powers must end this form of collaboration as well.

More recently, Mr. Chairman, just before coming here, we have received documentary evidence which shows that the South African embassy in Bonn has arrangements with the Royal Air Force Communications Centre in Rheindahlen, West Germany, whereby military signals from South Africa are transmitted to the Embassy over the RAF military communications network free of charge. These arrangements were made a few years ago by the South African defence headquarters in Pretoria "with the British Ministry of Defence, London".

We have no reason to believe that this form of collaboration has ended and are taking up the matter with the British Government and will inform the United Nations about their explanation. This aspect also requires urgent action on the part of the United Nations Security Council.

NATO codification system and data

Over two years ago, we revealed that the NATO codification system for spares and equipment had been made available to South Africa by several NATO members. Since then we have been campaigning for this system to be withdrawn from South Africa both by writing to all NATO members and also by lobbying at two NATO conferences. We asked that NATO itself should take a joint decision to stop some of its members from supplying NATO data to South Africa. We have not succeeded so far.

However, the United Kingdom informed us early this year that it had decided to cease supplying NATO data to South Africa and that leaves West Germany, France and the United States of America to take a similar position. In the light of resolution 418 (1977) we hope that the Governments concerned will announce very soon not only that they have ceased supplying NATO data of this kind to South Africa but that they will also withdraw the codification system already provided to South Africa.

We also urged that the NATO Ministerial Council heed our demand that no NATO national or international staff be permitted to have contact with any South African officials. After much pressure, and following strong representations at the NATO ministerial meeting in Oslo last year, Secretary General Luns has given us the assurance that the international staff do not have contact with South African officials. Up to now, despite all our representations, we have no such assurances with regard to national staff posted at NATO headquarters.

Seminars, conferences and academic exchanges relating to the military efforts

Because of the growing war situation in South Africa, the authorities have recently placed considerable importance on strategic and defence studies.

Various seminars and conferences are organised in South Africa and South Africans participate with considerable ease at international technical, strategic and defence conferences.

International technical conferences and seminars take place in Farnborough and Paris when they organise major air shows there and these side conferences are attended by South African officials. A recent symposium organised in South Africa by the Institute for Strategic Studies of the University of Pretoria, in March-April 1977, was attended by a number of international participants including Professor Harold W. Chase of the University of Minnesota, Colonel Phillip P. Katz of Asia-Pacific Defence Forum in Washington, Professor John Erikson, Director of Defence Studies of the University of Edinburgh and Professor Jurgen Schwartz, of the Hochschule der Bundeswehr, Munich.

This is only one example of several such gatherings. Early this month a seminar was organised in London by the London-based International Institute for Strategic Studies, at which a South African gave an account about the current military situation to a private meeting.

Mr. Chairman, all these contacts of academic and military experts with South Africa should be stopped and the Governments in question need to take necessary legislative action to ensure that their nationals do not collaborate with South Africa in this way.

Much of the collaboration at this level involves governmental and semi-official

organisations which are within government control. Those which are not under governmental control should be brought under such control. The individuals who collaborate with South Africa in its military effort should be deprived of their nationality should they continue to violate the spirit of the international embargo and visit South Africa for such activities. Visa and other restrictions should be imposed on South African nationals so that some control can be exercised in those cases where South African officials visit the major Western countries.

Mercenaries and other related personnel

Mercenaries and other foreign nationals who intend to help the South African defence establishment should be stopped. As we have already seen in the case of Rhodesia, a large number of mercenaries will also be drawn in to fight on the side of South Africa in the future as the conflict escalates. Today, from the figures that I have there are at least 2,000 foreign personnel in the South African armed forces serving as permanent staff. Most of them are former Royal Navy personnel now attached to the South African Navy. It is crucial that if the weapons used to defend apartheid are to be banned then the persons who actually go out there to take up arms for the Pretoria regime should also be stopped.

Any national who goes to South Africa as a mercenary or to serve in the defence effort, in any way, should be stopped where possible and failing that, should be deprived of his or her nationality.

If there are no penalties then it will become impossible to stem the flow of more and more overseas recruits to the apartheid war. Equally, all those who evade South African military service or desert should be granted unconditional refuge and asylum wherever and whenever they seek it.

Shipping, motor, engineering, chemical and related industries

The shipping, motor, engineering and chemical industries play a central part in the South African defence efforts.

South Africa, as a matter of strategic priority, is placing high importance on developing its shipping and related industries in order to make various naval equipment locally. A number of South African firms have already made vessels for, and provide services to, the South African Navy, including the firms of James Brown and Hamar Ltd., and Dorman Long in Durban and Globe Engineering Works and Maritime Industries Ltd., in Cape Town.

These and other firms in South Africa can at the moment, with local technology and local effort, make hulls for the ships, but the engines are rather more difficult to make locally. And even in those cases where as a result of the expansion of the local motor car industry, they are able to make diesel and petrol engines for small vessels, they still need to import a number of components from

abroad. Therefore, once again if the arms embargo is applied strictly in so far as the components are concerned it could severely restrict if not halt altogether the development of the South African naval industry.

The motor car industry, as the Special Committee already knows, is directly involved in supplying the defence forces with transport and other equipment, as well as engines and components for tanks and military vehicles. They also supply the police force with vehicles and where local vehicles are not made they import them. For example, British Leyland Land Rover Kits are imported from the United Kingdom and then assembled in South Africa and supplied to the South African Police Force. These Land Rovers were used in the Soweto massacre last year and representations made to Her Majesty's Government have so far only produced the response from Prime Minister Callaghan that there is no machinery to restrict the export of this equipment. We have therefore failed so far in securing a ban on these exports which help the South African Police in its repression internally. But it is not only British products which make this direct contribution to the South African Police Force.

The area of shipping and related industries is a difficult one to control because of the extensive commercial relations with South Africa. But it is a vital and important area. South Africa's major trading partners have a responsibility to ensure that their so-called normal commercial relations do not operate in such a way as to support the South African defence establishment, and undermine the arms embargo. That is why we ask also for strong economic measures against the apartheid regime, including an end to all investments in South Africa.

Oil embargo

There is some debate in certain quarters as to whether oil is a strategic commodity. But any person with the most elementary information and certainly all South Africans know that oil forms a vital part of the South African defence and police efforts. Oil is an item of strategic and military importance to South Africa, and its police and military forces will not be able to function at all without it.

We are aware of the various proposals which have been made with regard to an oil embargo in relation to supplies reaching Rhodesia. In our view, all oil that goes to South Africa should be stopped because oil is used not only to suppress the South African people, but also to maintain South Africa's illegal occupation in Namibia and to sustain the illegal Smith regime in Salisbury.

A firm commitment on the part of Iran and other oil producing countries, and the major Western Powers where the oil companies are based, could make a decisive impact and seriously undermine the racist regimes in Pretoria and Salisbury - provided of course that there is the political will to take this kind of action.

Nuclear relations

We have, for almost a decade, been calling on the Special Committee and other international forums for the complete cessation of all nuclear collaboration with South Africa. In the early years many people did not pay much attention to the issues which we raised. Today no one doubts - even in Paris, Washington, London or Bonn - that South Africa has nuclear capability and all the evidence points to the fact that this has been made possible as a result of the assistance provided by the major Western Powers in terms of nuclear technology, equipment and material.

Resolution 418 (1977) adopted by the Security Council recently is so weak as to be almost meaningless on the subject, because it does not prohibit all nuclear collaboration with South Africa.

It is my understanding that reluctance of the Western Powers to act on this question is due to their deep involvement in the South African nuclear industry, and also to their expectations to benefit from South Africa's plans to develop enriched uranium within the Republic.

We have been recently told by the British Foreign Secretary, Dr. David Owen, that the priority for Western policy at the moment is to persuade South Africa to sign the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty. It appears that no action in this field is likely to be taken in the meanwhile. It therefore looks as if in the interim period South Africa can acquire any additional nuclear technology and equipment that it needs in order to perfect its atomic bomb. We feel that top priority should be given to stop South Africa from deploying an apartheid atomic bomb and hence all nuclear collaboration should end forthwith.

South Africa has recruited senior nuclear engineers and physicists for its Atomic Energy Board and these foreign nationals should be urged to resign their positions or be deprived of their nationality.

Up to last year, the British press carried many advertisements to recruit such personnel and we assume that many of them are now operating in South Africa.

The question of South Africa's nuclear capability is an urgent one and requires immediate action.

Arms exports by South Africa

The United Nations has in the main concentrated on an arms embargo governing exports to South Africa. We have, for several years, following our study of the growth of South Africa's internal armament industry, drawn the attention of the Special Committee as well as Member States to the fact that one

needs an embargo which also prohibits the import of arms from South Africa. So far, very little has been done in this area, although I am aware of the efforts made in the General Assembly more recently. The Security Council resolution of last month does not control South Africa's exports of armaments.

The evidence that we have so far shows that most of these exports have in the main gone to Rhodesia, but there is also growing evidence that several other countries are interested in buying South African arms and defence equipment. Indeed, in several sectors and particularly that of electronic warfare, there is already growing collaboration between South Africa and various other countries. Thus the embargo should, as we have often called for in the past, cover the import of arms and related defence equipment from South Africa, as well as the export of arms to South Africa.

Mr. Chairman, we have listed 14 areas in which immediate and urgent action is required. Security Council resolution 418 (1977), of 4 November 1977, mainly governs the first two aspects. All the others need immediate and urgent attention.

We hope, therefore, that the Special Committee will collect and publish all the available evidence, much of which we have submitted in the past, and take it up with the Security Council Committee which has just been established. But that is not enough. We need to ask the governments involved in these arms transactions for immediate explanations in the light of such evidence. There should be no delay on the part of these governments simply because a Security Council Committee has now been set up: they must not use the excuse that these discussions should only take place within that Committee. It is the responsibility of the governments concerned to tell world public opinion about these relationships and what they are doing to end them. If this is not done urgently, then we fear that the delay will be used as an opportunity, both by certain governments and certainly by the multinationals, to stockpile even more arms and equipment in South Africa in anticipation of further pressures.

Mr. Chairman, it is therefore a matter of vital importance that public campaigns on the arms embargo must go on and that the Special Committee is in a central position to encourage and sustain these campaigns.

Our commitment and record is clear. We, on our part, since 1960 - and especially from the very day of the Sharpeville massacre, March 21, 1960 - began an arms embargo campaign. We saw that the Saracen armoured cars used at Sharpeville were in fact made in Britain. Our campaigns over three years contributed to the 1963 decision of the Security Council calling for an arms embargo against South Africa.

Mr. Chairman, we are pleased to announce that we have decided to organise a World Campaign against Military and Nuclear Collaboration with South Africa. We intend to compile all the available evidence and to take up the question with

the appropriate governments where necessary. We will alert the Special Committee and the Secretary-General to what is happening and our objective is to ensure that the arms embargo is applied comprehensively and strictly.

We have already secured the support of several leading personalities for the World Campaign and we hope that the Special Committee will endorse our efforts.

From the evidence we have submitted today it is clear that the Security Council has to tighten the embargo as well as expand its operation so that the spirit of the decision is in fact carried out.

As the war has escalated in South Africa, various Governments have repeatedly claimed their commitment for peaceful change in southern Africa. It is ironic that these very governments, which appeal to the African States and to the liberation movements to work for peaceful change also happen to be the same Powers which have supplied South Africa with arms, military technology, spares, components and military personnel and facilitated other forms of military collaboration with the apartheid regime. We appeal to these countries - to Britain, the United States, the Federal Republic of Germany, France, Italy and the more recent recruit, Israel, as well as others - to apply a strict and comprehensive arms embargo and dismantle the elaborate arrangements made by their official and semi-official corporations and other institutions in order to support the South African defence efforts. If they take strict action to end this collaboration, it is possible not only to weaken the South African defence forces by denying them further modern equipment but also to cripple a great deal of its existing weaponry (by stopping supply of components and spares which they need vitally).

The South African Government claims that it is 75 per cent self-sufficient in armament. It depends very much on how you compute such figures and what you consider to be armaments. I think it would be true to say that there is no major weapon today about which even West Germany or Britain or France can claim total self-sufficiency, since the whole weapons industry is such a complicated and complex industry. There is a heavy reliance by South Africa on technology from other nations and therefore it can be put in an extremely difficult situation by a strict embargo.

We are rather anxious about the operation of the Security Council embargo although, of course, we welcome it like most members of the United Nations. Our anxiety partly arises as a result of our experience over the operation of the 1963 embargo as well as from what Dr. Owen told us in London last week when we asked whether the British Government will enact legislation in order to implement the resolution just adopted by the Security Council. He told us that Britain has in effect had a mandatory embargo already and that therefore no legislation was required.

In the light of the few examples which I have mentioned today and the other examples which we have given to your Committee in recent years, it is quite clear that there are major loopholes in the British arms embargo. If it is the view of Britain, West Germany and the United States of America that they have to do nothing more to implement the new mandatory resolution, then the decision of last month will be made virtually meaningless. The only value will probably be that Italy and France which have hitherto openly supplied arms to South Africa may stop doing so now but retaining substantial loopholes and continuing to repair and service equipment already supplied to South Africa.

The arms embargo is crucial not only to deprive South Africa of military capability but also to ensure that Rhodesia does not carry out its attacks against independent African States. The most recent attack against Mozambique by Rhodesia was carried out and made possible with the equipment supplied by South Africa and this includes very sophisticated aircraft and bombs. If South Africa is deprived of these weapons then one will make a contribution towards stopping the Rhodesian forces from attacking independent African States in the area as well.

Finally, Mr. Chairman, we put a high priority on the arms campaign and will continue our efforts as we have done for 18 years.

Our ability and resources are very limited, particularly when it comes to the question of the arms embargo, when the whole area is surrounded with secrecy and duplicity. But nevertheless we will pursue with the determination we have shown in the past years to continue to expose and challenge those governments and institutions which collaborate with South Africa. Where Governments fail to act, especially as regards companies in their own jurisdiction, we will make the names of the companies known so that the non-aligned nations and other countries can take direct action against the companies which support South Africa in the military area.

Finally, Mr. Chairman, on behalf of the Anti-Apartheid Movement, I would like to thank you personally and the Special Committee for the efforts which have been made over the years on the arms embargo, particularly for the very special efforts made by you and the African Group to bring about the Chapter VII decision just adopted by the Security Council last month. We are also extremely grateful to the Special Committee and the Centre against Apartheid for the work which they continue to do and which enables us to carry out the policy of the United Nations among the public in our own countries.

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WHAT HAVE SOUTH AFRICA'S TRADITIONAL SUPPLIERS OF ARMS DONE TO ABIDE BY THE MANDATORY ARMS EMBARGO AGAINST APARTHEID SOUTH AFRICA?

*Statement at Seminar on South Africa's Military Build-up and Nuclear Plans, London, May 30, 1978*⁶³

It is now over six months since the Security Council imposed a mandatory arms embargo against South Africa under Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter. At that time we welcomed the decision and committed ourselves to work in support of its objectives. However, in our submission to the Special Committee against Apartheid on December 12, 1977, we stated that the mandatory decision had come much too late and pointed to the inherent weakness of the decision. Indeed we called for further action by the Security Council to seal the many remaining loopholes in the embargo and make it comprehensive and all-embracing. We have studied with great care all the responses from 90 Member States as well as the Report of the Secretary-General on the implementation of resolution 418 issued last month. Most of the replies from Governments are very general and provide no real answers. In any case what the world is most interested in are the facts which we still do not have from the three Western permanent members of the Security Council as well as some of their allies such as the Federal Republic of Germany, Italy and Israel.

Arms exports

The Security Council has decided that "all States shall cease forthwith any provision to South Africa of arms and related material of all types..." Arms still reach South Africa - how? We would like to know how South Africa's traditional arms suppliers interpret the term "arms and related material of all types." We ask whether the British Government still maintains that electronic equipment such as the Marconi Troposcatter Communications System is not of military significance and whether they still supply it or are prepared to supply it to South Africa as before. To the Federal Republic of Germany, whether they still maintain that the Advokaat naval communications system is a civilian project which does not have military significance and whether they have at present any South African orders for similar equipment, and whether they would in future continue to supply such equipment to South Africa. We ask whether the United States still provides the South African regime with Cessna, Merlin and other aircraft and whether Washington still considers them to be essentially civilian craft? We want to know

⁶³ United Nations Centre against Apartheid, Notes and Documents, No. 26/78, September 1978

whether Italy has stopped providing Aermacchi and other aircraft to the South African Air Force. We must know whether France has in fact terminated the export of all "arms and related material of all types" and how it is operating the embargo. We want to know if Israel has stopped supplying South Africa with fast patrol boats and Gabriel missiles or are they still selling the boats separately from the missiles so as to claim that the boats actually deliver no armaments at the time. We also want to know whether South Africa continues to receive spares for military as well as so-called civilian equipment of the type which we have already mentioned. In short the world would like to know how South Africa's traditional military collaborators now define and interpret "arms and related material of all types" insofar as their dealings with South Africa are concerned. What have they done to stop supplying spare parts directly and what measures have they taken to ensure that intermediaries do not in fact divert equipment to South Africa? Are the penalties for such indirect offences severe enough to effectively deter the multinational corporations?

Transfer of technology

In resolution 418 the Security Council called on all States "to review... all existing contractual arrangements with and licences granted, to South Africa relating to the manufacture and maintenance of arms, ammunition of all types and military equipment and vehicles, with a view to terminating them."

The world would like to know whether and how many "contractual arrangements and licences granted" to South Africa for its domestic arms production have been terminated. What has France done so far about the licences granted for the Mirage F1-C interceptor and the F1-A ground attack aircraft? And what about the Panhard armoured cars? What has Italy done about licences granted for the Aermacchi MB326-Impala I, MB32K-Impala II, the AL6005-Kudu, Aeritalia AM3C-Bosbok? What have Britain and the USA done about the use of licences originally from their countries for aircraft engines and other components which have been redirected for South African use via Italy? What has Israel done about licences granted for constructing fast naval patrol boats in South Africa? What have Belgium and Israel done about the licensed production in South Africa of the FN-Uzi rifle?

The world and Africa would like to know what these Governments have done about these weapons being produced in South Africa - have they withdrawn all these licences? If not, why not? If it is the case that South Africa refuses to comply with the wishes of the licence granters what action are these governments taking to penalise South Africa for its violation?

What we have mentioned are the well-known cases of licences granted for internal arms production. But hundreds of such arrangements have been made over the years - in the mid-1960s the Pretoria regime claimed to have acquired over 150 licences.

What is needed, as we said in December last year, is for the relevant States to provide the Security Council with details of all transfer of patents, licences and similar arrangements made by corporations and other bodies in their own countries with South Africa so that in the light of that information we can also judge the extent to which these relationships have been ended. Nothing less will suffice.

The second aspect in this category relates to the operations of Western firms with subsidiary or associate companies in South Africa which are involved in assisting its military and defence establishment. Most of the Western Powers enjoy and encourage close economic relations with South Africa. Hundreds of overseas companies have substantial interests in the Republic, including enterprises which provide equipment and assistance to the military and police forces. We have in the past provided comprehensive lists of these companies to the United Nations. We would like to know what action the major Western Powers intend to take to put an end to the direct and indirect collaboration of their companies with the South African military.

In April this year anti-apartheid campaigners in Britain questioned the chairman of Imperial Chemical Industries who admitted to his annual meeting that its South African subsidiary, African Explosive and Chemical Industries (AECI), is manufacturing an ingredient used in CS riot control gas and went on to defend it by claiming that "the use of CS gas is a relatively safe and humane method of riot control". We know that AECI is even more deeply involved in making explosives and chemicals for the apartheid regime. We would like to know what Britain intends to do about ICI's operations in South Africa.

In March this year the South African subsidiary of the Munich-based multinational corporation, Siemens, disclosed some information which reflects the growth of operations by certain types of overseas corporations in South Africa directly involved in the defence industry. In 1967-68 Siemens had an annual turnover of 20 million rand. By 1977 this figure rose to 190 million rand making Siemens one of the fastest growing enterprises in South Africa with eight factories in the country employing 7,000 workers. The company discloses that much of its business is with the State and covers public bodies as well as defence. In this case of Siemens we should like to know what the Bonn Government is doing to stop one of its companies from providing South Africa with much of its defence needs.

Like Siemens, many corporations which once sold defence equipment from overseas to South Africa have over the years established plants in South Africa to manufacture arms and related material locally. There is so far no single case which we know of where a Western government has intervened to stop this process of direct collaboration with the Pretoria regime aimed deliberately at undermining the arms embargo.

From all this it is clear that much remains to be done. We are disappointed that the Security Council has not yet begun to compile the facts about the nature and extent of international military collaboration with South Africa. All such information should be published and the governments concerned should be asked to answer the many questions which still remain unanswered - the world has a right to know to what extent South Africa's traditional arms suppliers have in fact ended their military collaboration with the Pretoria regime.

All the loopholes in the mandatory arms embargo adopted last November, which we pointed out in December 1977, remain. It means for example that several countries have defence attaches in South Africa and South Africa has similar representatives abroad.

According to information available to us, the following countries have defence attaches in South Africa: Argentina, France, Portugal, United Kingdom, USA. And South Africa has defence attaches in Argentina, Austria, France, Federal Republic of Germany, Italy, United Kingdom and USA.

How can these countries seriously claim to have ended their military collaboration with South Africa and yet retain defence attaches?

We asked in December 1977 that all arrangements involving the stationing of defence attaches must be stopped - but that has not been done. And now we have reliable information from South Africa that during the biggest ever integrated military exercise carried out earlier this month under the code name "operation Quicksilver", the British defence attache, among others, was present. We have asked Her Majesty's Government for an urgent explanation.

There are a number of countries which do not require visas from South African passport holders who visit them: some are reciprocal arrangements such as with Ireland, Switzerland and the United Kingdom. But some Western countries extend this favour to South African passport holders unilaterally even though their citizens require visas to enter South Africa: these include Austria, Belgium, Denmark, France, Federal Republic of Germany, Greece, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Norway, Spain and Sweden. This means that South African military security personnel can enter these countries without any governmental control for contact with multinational corporations, defence centres and institutes, academic centres and other institutions with which they seek to establish cooperation. These visa-free entry privileges should be ended and all exchanges with defence and defence related personnel ended.

The Special Committee is aware of the argument that South Africa is vital to Western security because of the so-called importance of the Cape sea route. Those who advocate a closer alliance with South Africa are not abandoning their plans. In 1976 we drew attention to a suggestion made to this effect by Admiral Sir Peter Hill-Norton, then the Chairman of the NATO Military Committee, in

November 1975. Now in a new book published a few days ago Sir Hill-Norton repeats his view that, because of the strategic importance of South Africa, in terms of its mineral and other resources, the Western countries ought to establish closer relations with the Republic of South Africa.

There are many examples. We think that it is important that the Special Committee and all those concerned with operating the arms embargo look at the wider question of military collaboration with South Africa and not just at particular items of hardware that may happen to reach the Republic.

South Africa has attacked neighbouring African States with impunity and the recent attack on Angola shows how contemptuous South Africa is of world opinion. Some of the weapons supplied to South Africa in the past for so-called external defence and naval security have been used by the illegal Rhodesian forces and South African forces to attack neighbouring States. France for example told the world that its Mirage combat aircraft were not for use internally or against African States - these Mirages have now been used against African States. What is France going to do about this? The Security Council needs to ask this question and to publish a reply.

We have warned since the late 1960s about the extent of Western nuclear collaboration with South Africa and will repeat the call that all forms of nuclear collaboration with South Africa should be ended.

The Special Committee has considerable information about the violation of the arms embargo. All this material should be forwarded to the Security Council for urgent action. But the matter is urgent. South Africa is a major threat to world peace and security, and in the six months which have passed since the decision of the Security Council South Africa is busy stockpiling not only military hardware but also oil and other strategic items. We should like to suggest that the Special Committee should give serious consideration to inviting representatives of Western governments to come to this Committee and to answer the questions raised by our submissions. If they want time, we are prepared to come back in a few weeks to hear their explanations.

We have informed you of our intention to organise a World Campaign against Military and Nuclear Collaboration with South Africa - we have received the patronage of several African Heads of State and other prominent public personalities and will begin our work in a few weeks.

We thank you for inviting us to participate in this session and assure you of our determination to continue to work for the objectives of the United Nations and the Organisation of African Unity.

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SOUTH AFRICA'S MILITARY AND NUCLEAR BUILD-UP

*Paper submitted to the International NGO Conference for Action against Apartheid, Geneva, August 28-31, 1978*⁶⁴

With the collapse of Portuguese colonialism in Africa in April 1974, it became clear that the future course of events in southern Africa would seriously threaten and undermine South Africa's regional and internal security.

In the past South Africa's security rested on having a series of buffer States around its borders which protected it from serious challenge from the African liberation movement. The Pretoria regime collaborated with Portugal to maintain and defend a repressive white power system in southern Africa. South Africa refused to give up the international trust territory of Namibia to the United Nations and instead militarised that territory and consolidated its illegal occupation. When Rhodesia faced the formidable threat of international mandatory sanctions, South Africa came to its rescue and not only provided economic and financial support to the illegal regime, but also supplied it with armed manpower and military hardware. Thus, as part of South Africa's ambition to develop a regional Power role, it became the effective colonial Power over Rhodesia and the illegal occupying Power over Namibia.

With the independence of Angola and Mozambique, the Pretoria regime was faced with its long borders now being effectively transformed into security borders. At the same time the African liberation struggle made new headway in Namibia, Zimbabwe and South Africa itself. Nothing was the same now. The balance of power had shifted decisively in favour of the African liberation struggle and there was no easy way in which the Vorster regime or its allies could turn the clock back.

During the four years since April 1974, the white minority regimes of Salisbury and Pretoria have had to face a severe challenge to their white power system and have become increasingly desperate. The growing success of the African liberation movements has led to ever increasing internal repression and brutality and regular attacks against neighbouring African States such as Angola, Mozambique, Botswana and Zambia. The Vorster regime has responded to growing African demands for freedom by, in effect, declaring war against its own oppressed population, against the oppressed African peoples of Namibia and Zimbabwe and against the frontline States.

⁶⁴ United Nations Centre against Apartheid, Notes and Documents, No. 41/78, September 1978

Whilst the Pretoria regime has over the past four years expanded and strengthened its war machine, it has also at the same time engaged in a series of manoeuvres, both independently and in collusion with the illegal Smith regime, aimed at offering various "settlement" schemes for both Rhodesia and Namibia. Indeed, Vorster even initially presented himself as Africa's supreme peace-maker, offering to help "decolonise" Namibia and Rhodesia in return for an international policy of "detente" with South Africa. All the settlement proposals emanating from Pretoria and Salisbury have predictably failed because of their inherent intention to cheat the African people of genuine independence. The South African invasion of Angola with the direct involvement of the United States Administration and its CIA was unable to destroy the MPLA Government in Luanda and various attempts to destabilise Mozambique have also failed. South Africa's policy of "dialogue" and "detente" with independent Africa is in ruins.

Western policy

Just as the strategic changes in southern Africa produced a serious crisis for the Pretoria regime, they also required a fundamental re-examination of established Western policy towards that region. The most important development has been the shift in the centre of Western policy-making from the United Kingdom to the United States. The Kissinger initiatives put an end to the United Kingdom's premier role over southern Africa and its "sphere of influence" has now to be shared with Washington. The growing resultant collaboration between the two countries is reflected in the Anglo-American proposals for Rhodesia as well as the plan for Namibia emanating from the wider grouping of five Western Powers.

The major Western Powers, South Africa's traditional trading partners and allies, share the concern of the Pretoria regime to maintain the stability and security of the Republic of South Africa. Thus various Western initiatives regarding Rhodesia and Namibia are declared to be for the purpose of bringing about genuine self-determination for those territories, but in the case of South Africa there is only to be gentle pressure to encourage reforms in the apartheid system so that it becomes less embarrassing for the Western Powers to defend South Africa as an independent sovereign State.

It is of vital importance to recognise that there is no Western commitment to help destroy the apartheid system in South Africa. Thus, as over the past two decades, Western policy towards southern Africa is governed by the primary consideration that South Africa's interests must be protected and its stability and security assured. There has been serious concern in Western capitals that, if the armed struggle was allowed to continue in Zimbabwe and Namibia, then there was the real danger that the new revolutionary African spirit would also sweep aside the apartheid system in South Africa itself. It is precisely because of this fear that we have witnessed in recent years the various high level initiatives by the major Western Powers to seek a "settlement" in Rhodesia and Namibia.

Current situation

In Rhodesia there is hardly any leading African or white citizen who believes that the internal settlement is likely to succeed. The African people meet only with increasing suffering and brutality and the system of white domination is still intact despite the recruitment by the Smith regime of certain African personalities to its side. At the same time, large sections of the white population are complaining that the internal settlement has not resulted in an end to the guerrilla war and even Ian Smith is accusing his African colleagues of having failed "to deliver the goods."

It is quite clear that there can be no solution to the problem of Rhodesia without the Patriotic Front and it is this factor which has so far prevented the major Western Powers from endorsing the internal settlement. The Anglo-American plan also contains some serious defects, but it can serve as a basis upon which negotiations can begin. Meanwhile the liberation movement in Zimbabwe continues to consolidate its control over most of the country and is making fresh gains every day. It is impossible for the Salisbury regime to retain even its present limited power during the next four months without further substantial external support.

The Namibian developments appear uncertain and the initial acceptance of the Western plan by South Africa in April 1978 is now subject to various qualifications. A United Nations team went to Namibia early in August to negotiate with the Pretoria regime the process of self-determination and independence for the territory, but it is not clear whether South Africa will in fact withdraw from Namibia completely. The issue of Walvis Bay remains unresolved and it is difficult to envisage firm Western action against South Africa in the future over this dispute if they are not prepared to put such pressure now.

In one sense all the evidence indicates that the people of Zimbabwe and Namibia will not have to conduct their armed struggle for many years before they win independence. But if some of the present initiatives regarding Namibia and the proposed all-party conference for Zimbabwe do not result in an effective transfer of power to the African majority, then the armed struggle will inevitably continue. In turn, the minority regimes in Salisbury and Pretoria will become even more desperate and South Africa may well unleash a major war in Namibia or Rhodesia. This will also mean even more desperate and persistent attacks against the neighbouring African States.

South Africa's military build-up

South Africa is undoubtedly the major economic and military Power in the region. During the past two decades it has embarked on a massive military build-up and prepared its entire white population for war against its own people. With an ever growing defence budget it has established a substantial domestic

armaments industry and purchased modern defence equipment of all types from its allies abroad.

The defence budget of South Africa in 1960-61 amounted to 44 million rand and rose to 72 million rand in 1961-62. A few years later it reached over 250 million rand in 1966-67 and then rose sharply again so that by 1972-73 it stood at 350 million rand. Then, as the Portuguese forces began to suffer heavy defeat in Africa, it was increased substantially in 1973-74 to 480 million rand. But this was inadequate for the following year and it was increased to 700 million rand and again to 948 million rand for 1975-76. In 1976-77 defence expenditure reached 1,407 million rand and the figure for 1977-78 is 1,940 million rand.

Despite these enormous sums allocated for defence, they are in fact underestimates because actual defence spending is much greater and additional money is allocated from other government departments. Furthermore even these additions only reflect a partial picture because they do not take into account the finance available from defence bonds or the defence bond lottery. Also, they do not cover the millions of rand allocated for the local armaments industry, in particular for the Armament Corporation. Indeed, as the South African Defence Minister informed his Parliament in April 1977: "There are few, if any, government departments which are not concerned with one or the other aspect of national security."

All these defence preparations are primarily intended to maintain internal security since the greatest threat faced by South Africa comes from its own oppressed population. The massive security measures adopted by the Pretoria regime reflect directly the growing threat that is being posed by the African liberation struggle. Indeed, the first gunshots have begun to be fired within the Republic against its security forces. It is this development within South Africa which has made the Pretoria regime more uncertain and desperate.

Vorster's policy

There is no doubt, on the part of the Vorster regime, as to its present and future policy in relation to the African liberation struggle. It is determined to maintain its system of white domination in the Republic. Through the fraudulent bantustan system it claims to confer "independence" upon its African people, whereas in effect the African population is thereby effectively deprived of its citizenship. As Prime Minister Vorster repeatedly declared, South Africa is "the white man's country". He makes it clear that apartheid is there to stay and that all change within South Africa has to be acceptable to the Pretoria regime. The major Western Powers support this position and this is not surprising since the West has always assured South Africa that, if Pretoria helps the process of decolonisation in Rhodesia and Namibia, then that would be the best way to buy protection for South Africa and secure its future stability. But in the midst of high-level international manoeuvres at presenting Vorster as Africa's chief peace-maker and

giving him time to encourage internal change, the children of Soweto gave their answer: The African people of South Africa will not accept that they should remain in bondage for the convenience of others. After the 1976 Soweto massacre and subsequent national upsurge, it could no longer be argued even by the most cautious observer that South Africa would change peacefully and gradually to eventual freedom in the far distant future. The oppressed people of that country will not accept their bondage for that long.

The post-Soweto developments made the apartheid regime even more insecure and uncertain about the future. Its political and military leaders consulted hurriedly and worked out plans to expand the armed forces even further. Accordingly, the 1977 Defence White Paper conceded that its manpower was under strain and the defence force needed more recruits. It announced several measures to overcome the problem, including an expansion of the Permanent Force members, the extension of the compulsory call-up period of white males from 12 months to 24 months, increasing three-fold the number of white women to be trained and recruiting a large number of "non-white" volunteers for the defence effort.

The official 1976-77 figure for defence manpower was around 224,000 personnel - a considerable underestimate. Nevertheless, even this figure represents an increase of over 104,000 since 1974-75. The massive expansion of manpower has placed a severe strain on the apartheid economy which is in need of white skilled labour. But South Africa's first priority is to stand ready for a major war. In introducing the Defence White Paper in April 1977, Defence Minister Botha stated: "We are today involved in a war, whether we wish to accept it or not. The need for a total national strategy involving all citizens and State departments has already been recognised by the Government."

There is massive evidence of comprehensive preparations for a major war and apartheid's formidable armoury lends credibility to the threat made by Premier Vorster in 1974 that, if the African liberation struggle in South Africa is supported by neighbouring African States, then they will face a "catastrophe too ghastly to contemplate".

No one doubts the increasingly dangerous situation in southern Africa with the prospect of a major regional war which could easily involve external Powers with disastrous consequences for Africa and the world. The core of the problem is the determination of the Pretoria regime to perpetuate white domination and racist rule in the region. But the Pretoria regime would not have been able to carry on with its oppressive system if it did not receive the consistent and encouraging support of the major Western Powers, particularly in the field of economic and military relations.

The United Nations arms embargo

Ever since the Sharpeville massacre of 1960 the civilised world recognised the need to put an end to external military and police collaboration with the apartheid regime. The African liberation movement, independent African States and the United Nations General Assembly called for international sanctions and particularly an arms embargo. Organisations such as the British Anti-Apartheid Movement began to organise campaigns in support of an arms embargo before 1960.

After considerable international pressure United Nations Security Council adopted an arms embargo in 1963. But the manner in which that embargo was partially implemented by some Western Powers, whilst others ignored it completely, resulted in South Africa obtaining virtually all the equipment and cooperation it required to build up a formidable armoury. When these countries were confronted with evidence of their military collaboration, they responded by claiming either that the weapons were for external defence, or that they were not "designed for military use", or that they were not specifically covered by the embargo, or that they were obliged to supply "spares" because they had to honour their pledges and contracts to the apartheid regime - and when none of these were considered as adequate explanations, they pointed out that in any case the Security Council embargo was only voluntary and not mandatory.

Since 1963 the United Kingdom, the United States and the Federal Republic of Germany have supplied a wide range of equipment to the South African military authorities, claiming that that did not violate their interpretation of the embargo. In the case of France and Italy, both countries have totally ignored the embargo by supplying South Africa with all the weapons it ordered and also providing licences for aircraft and other equipment to be made in the Republic. More recently, Israel has become an enthusiastic defence collaborator with South Africa and supplied it with fast naval patrol boats as well as Gabrielle naval missiles, and some equipment is now to be made in the Republic under licence.

In November 1977 the Security Council imposed a mandatory arms embargo under Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter. This decision was adopted after many years of world-wide campaigns and diplomatic pressure, but the terms of the resolution are weak and there is no precise definition of "arms and related material" which is to be prohibited for export to South Africa. Thus, once again, individual governments have been left free to interpret the arms embargo as they see fit. We therefore face the remarkable situation that the United States claims to forbid the sale of computers to the South African defence and police authorities, whilst the United Kingdom refuses to restrict computer sales at all since they are deemed to fall within the category of "normal commercial trade" even though the purchase is made directly by the defence and police authorities. The United Kingdom firm, ICL, is a major supplier of computers to the South African Government, including its police and security forces. It has always refused to disclose details of its sales, but the Anti-Apartheid Movement revealed on August 20, 1978, that it had supplied a computer to the Atlas Aircraft Corporation

which makes aircraft and other equipment for the South African armed forces. Disclosures of this kind enable public opinion to exert pressure on the Government to block loopholes in the embargo, but it is impossible for voluntary anti-apartheid organisations to know about all such deals which are generally confidential, if not secret.

All the experience since 1963 of trying to make the arms embargo effective confirms that there is an absence of political will on the part of all major Western Powers in making the embargo work; this is a very serious allegation to make when these Powers have formally committed themselves in favour of the arms embargo.

But in addition to violations of the embargo resulting from differing interpretations and deliberate withholding of information about licences granted and orders accepted, there is also the illegal operation of groups within countries which re-route equipment for South Africa and Rhodesia. For example, Canada has one of the best records for denying arms and military equipment to South Africa compared to other Western Powers. But now we have substantial and reliable information which shows that Canadian enterprises have been re-routing military equipment to South Africa via the Port of St. John by ingeniously using St. John in Antigua to disguise its place of origin.

The fact that South Africa is able to overcome the embargo by various methods involving individuals and groups operating within the jurisdiction of the major Western governments, without any significant prosecutions so far, reveals the complicity of these Western governments and their lack of concern to monitor and enforce the embargo.

The major Western Powers bear a very heavy responsibility for having so efficiently and effectively armed the apartheid regime in Pretoria as to enable it to unleash a barbaric war against its own African people and against neighbouring independent African States.

South Africa's nuclear capability

No one today doubts whether South Africa has nuclear capability or not - the question is whether it has already developed nuclear weapons and, if so, what type and how many?

South Africa has over many years developed close nuclear cooperation with the United States of America, the United Kingdom, France and the Federal Republic of Germany. The Pretoria regime began its nuclear research during the 1950s and in the mid-1960s it confirmed reports about its capability to produce nuclear weapons. A few years later South Africa boasted about its possession of uranium enrichment technology - obviously developed as a result of close collaboration with certain Western Powers, particularly the Bonn Government.

The Western Powers which provided South Africa with nuclear expertise and technology, and continue to do so now, claim that their assistance only relates to the peaceful application of nuclear energy. However, every nuclear expert confirms that it is virtually impossible to restrict information and technology in such a way as to prevent the "peaceful" methods from being used for the development of nuclear weapons.

Considerable efforts are made by the major Western Powers to restrict the transfer of nuclear technology to various third world countries for fear of encouraging the proliferation of nuclear weapons, but no such considerations apply in the case of South Africa. It is remarkable how easily the argument is changed when it applies to the Pretoria regime.

In August 1977, on the eve of the World Conference for Action against Apartheid held in Lagos, the world heard about South Africa's preparations for a nuclear explosion at a test site in the Kalahari desert. The United States, France, the United Kingdom and the Federal Republic of Germany urged South Africa not to proceed with the explosion. South Africa did not explode a nuclear device and probably decided to postpone it to a more opportune moment.

If South Africa is in fact on the verge of exploding its own nuclear weapon, the world has a right to know how it has achieved this level of capability. Who has enabled South Africa to become a virtual nuclear power? It is obvious that it is those who provided South Africa with nuclear technology, know-how and experts who are responsible for the development of an apartheid atomic bomb.

It is also precisely because of this long-standing nuclear collaboration between South Africa and the major Western Powers that the Security Council's resolution of November 1977 is so weak. It merely decided that "all States shall refrain from any cooperation with South Africa in the manufacture and development of nuclear weapons". No State will admit that it is, in fact, cooperating with South Africa to manufacture and develop nuclear weapons. Hence, the decision of the Security Council is meaningless in so far as it applies to the development of South Africa's nuclear capability. It is significant to recall that an earlier draft resolution submitted by the African States called upon all States to "refrain from any cooperation with the South African racist regime in nuclear development" - and it was blocked by a triple Western veto in October 1977.

When the major nuclear partners of South Africa - the United Kingdom, the United States of America, France and the Federal Republic of Germany - are confronted with evidence about South Africa's nuclear capability, they respond by claiming that, in the light of South Africa's advanced capability, it would be preferable to persuade it to sign the Non-Proliferation Treaty and bring it under some international control. In the meanwhile these countries continue to supply South Africa with nuclear technology and know-how, equipment and plant, as

well as fissionable material. No wonder that South Africa is able to continue increasing its nuclear programme with the active encouragement of the Western Powers.

With the rapid military build-up in South Africa, the apartheid regime poses a grave threat to international peace and security. With its costly nuclear development and weapons capability it takes on an even more menacing posture and directly threatens independent African States with an overwhelming military superiority. Indeed, it is not merely South Africa that presents a threat to world peace. Those Western Powers who have provided the apartheid regime with the most modern and destructive armoury in Africa are ultimately responsible for fulfilling South Africa's aggressive ambitions; hence it is the policies of the major Western Powers to assist South Africa's military and nuclear build-up that constitutes a grave threat to international peace and security.

Southern Oceans

The claim has always been made in military and political circles in the major Western countries that South Africa is a vital element in the overall Western defence system. It is argued that South Africa can help to counteract the alleged growing Soviet naval threat in the Indian and South Atlantic Oceans. The policy of close military collaboration with South Africa is often presented in the context of the security of the Cape route and possible Soviet blockage of Western oil supplies around that route. Thus, according to this argument, since South Africa is a vital component of Western defence and security, it is also of primary importance that its security and stability be preserved. They also point to South Africa's large supply of valuable minerals as another reason for defending the apartheid regime.

Presumably it is because of such considerations that various Western Powers have collaborated with South Africa in developing and installing sophisticated naval communications systems, such as the West German Advokaat system based near the Simonstown naval base. It is also now known that NATO organs have given serious consideration to expanding its area of operation to cover the South Atlantic and/or to promote close relations with South Africa during the early 1970s. There is also the SACLANT study covering possible NATO operations in the South Atlantic, although various NATO members have been quick to point out that it does not involve any close relations with South Africa.

The NATO codification system for spares and equipment continues to be provided to South Africa by certain NATO members. Despite repeated representations since 1975, the NATO Council of Ministers have not yet agreed to forbid the provision of the codification system to South Africa. Because of the secret nature of military arrangements it is not known whether South Africa has access to any other NATO data or information. But there are serious grounds for deep anxiety about a possible special role assigned to South Africa for Western

defence and security in the Southern Hemisphere. If such a role has in fact been agreed for the Pretoria regime, then it would help to explain why Western policy is not committed to the destruction of the apartheid system and instead concentrates on trying to reform it.

Future

There is no doubt that liberation will ultimately come to South Africa as it will to Namibia and Zimbabwe. But the South African liberation struggle, which has been one of the most difficult on the continent, is likely to be long and protracted. The apartheid regime knows that with each day that passes it loses more and more legitimacy and political power - it tried to make up for this loss by placing more and more reliance on military power. As the liberation movement makes new advances and scores fresh victories, the Vorster regime becomes more insecure and indulges in desperate actions and manoeuvres.

Already we have seen considerable evidence of growing internal repression and external retaliation against those African States which support the liberation struggle. South Africa stands ready to unleash a major war against its own oppressed people as well as neighbouring African States even at the risk of provoking a major global confrontation.

It is crucial that the outside world stand firmly on the side of the African liberation struggle and the independent African States which are under constant threat.

The international arms embargo should be strengthened and those Governments and corporations which collaborate with South Africa should be exposed and condemned.

We need nation-wide campaigns in the collaborating countries to secure an effective arms embargo, the prohibition of all new investments and loans and the constant expansion of the international boycott so that we can reach the position when comprehensive international sanctions can be enforced against South Africa. It is important and urgent that we succeed soon so as to counteract South Africa's steady progress towards massive repression and militarisation and make a decisive contribution to the African liberation struggle and to peace and security in Africa and the world.

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**STATEMENT AT THE MEETING OF THE SPECIAL COMMITTEE
AGAINST APARTHEID, MARCH 6, 1980⁶⁵**

At a time like this, when we are witnessing historic changes in Zimbabwe, we are also very conscious of the fact that March 1980 marks twenty years after the Sharpeville massacre to which the Special Committee has drawn the attention of the international community.

We in the British Anti-Apartheid Movement are now operating in our twenty-first year and none of us, when we formed the movement in 1959, felt that the struggle would take this long. So, in a sense, if the campaign has had to be carried on for so many years and if so many of the issues that we are campaigning on today remain essentially the same as when we started twenty years ago, then it is appropriate to think back a little.

The Committee is aware of the fact that the South African liberation movement is one of the oldest on the continent of Africa. And it is as a result of the perspective of that liberation movement and indeed its own initiatives and links that we have seen, in the context of the South African struggle, the development of international solidarity in support of that struggle.

That solidarity movement started in the West a long time ago with the involvement of personalities such as Dr. W. E. B. DuBois and Paul Robeson - black leaders to whom this Committee has already paid tribute. All these black leaders started many many decades ago, acting in solidarity with the freedom-loving people of South Africa. And later we saw in Europe and in Britain leaders such as Fenner Brockway, now Lord Brockway, who, more than 90 years old, still asks the most questions in the House of Lords on African questions, and has had a record of a life-time of battle for colonial freedom.

And then later we saw after the war people like the Rev. Michael Scott, Bishop Reeves and Canon Collins, who have dedicated much of their lives to the freedom struggle in southern Africa. And through this Committee all of us who are involved in non-governmental organisations working on southern Africa would like to pay a special tribute to Canon Collins and the International Defence and Aid Fund for Southern Africa for the work that they have done - but particularly to Canon Collins who will be 75 years old this month and indeed carries on his work for the people of South Africa with the same commitment as before.

As I said earlier, the Anti-Apartheid Movement was formed in 1959; it was

⁶⁵ UN document A/AC.115/L.520

born on June 26, 1959, in response to the direct appeal of the Congress Movement and anti-apartheid leaders in South Africa who asked then that the outside world should impose boycotts and isolate South Africa. We are the oldest movement of this type, but we are also a movement which found that whilst we were started to work on South Africa, the perspective of the South Africa liberation movement was that the rest of Africa also had to be free - and that the South African struggle was linked with the rest of Africa. Though we started with South Africa we very soon extended our campaigns to working for the dismantlement of the then Central African Federation.

We were thus involved actively in campaigning for the independence of what is now Zambia and Malawi. Southern Rhodesia of course remained a major problem until only a few days ago.

We also worked more actively against Portuguese colonialism in Africa and in this struggle forged very friendly and comradely links with the leaders of the liberation movement in Angola, Mozambique and Guinea-Bissau.

We were not working in isolation but in the context in which the South African liberation movement saw itself. Thus, this year, when we mark the twentieth anniversary of Sharpeville, we in the Anti-Apartheid Movement, which was born on June 26 - "South Africa Freedom Day" - are also conscious of the fact that this year also marks the twenty-fifth anniversary of the adoption of the Freedom Charter.

We have seen in the course of our existence people like Cabral, Neto and Mondlane: great African leaders who carried on the tradition of Nkrumah and indeed of Luthuli of South Africa, in asserting that the South African struggle was linked up with the over-all struggle for freedom in the rest of the continent.

Today, we share in the joy of the people of Zimbabwe and indeed of all Africa in the victory that has come about in Zimbabwe. It is a victory because if we look back only at events during recent weeks, the way in which they were developing made many of us extremely anxious about the future. In this context we in the Anti-Apartheid Movement feel that President Nyerere was absolutely correct in drawing attention to the prevailing dangers in the process of the elections. Now, with Zimbabwe free in a sense, we still need to be extremely vigilant. The people of Zimbabwe have so decisively voted in favour of genuine independence that they are going to be subjected to all kinds of manoeuvres and efforts by the South African regime to destabilise the new administration that is being set up now in Zimbabwe. We must be extremely vigilant and warn South Africa and the enemies of Africa that if they should intervene in Zimbabwe in whatever way they calculate, in order to subvert the aspirations of the people, then the international community will act in full solidarity with the new administration in Zimbabwe.

Looking back on twenty years we see now that we are still arguing - and in the past few days I have been arguing in other United Nations forums - that perhaps one should have an arms embargo against South Africa that is effective. This was our demand 20 years ago. We are still arguing for a sports isolation of South Africa. We are still calling for an oil embargo against South Africa. We are still calling for sanctions against South Africa. And over twenty years what we have witnessed is that whilst we have been making these demands stronger and louder and getting perhaps more and more resolutions in the United Nations which have been stronger over the years, in the same period, South Africa has never enjoyed as much trade, had as many arms, as much investment and as many links as it has today with the rest of the world.

But, although South Africa may be very strong in the formal sense, of having physical power, we are also aware of the fact that the balance in the world has changed very dramatically. And this change in the international situation has been brought about of course with the independence of Africa. Essentially, it is the African States that have, at international forums and through their links with Western and other countries, made southern Africa a top priority issue.

In March 1960, just before Sharpeville, the British Prime Minister MacMillan indicated in Cape Town that we were witnessing a "wind of change" blowing across Africa and that Africa would have to change dramatically. But we have also seen that despite this assessment by the British Prime Minister in 1960, from March 1960 to March 1980 no country seems to have been working on the side of the *status quo* and the old order as much as Britain through successive governments. And today we see new dangers in British policy because we have an administration in the United Kingdom which is perhaps among the most committed since 1960 to the side of South Africa in the battle South Africa faces with the rest of the world.

In this context I want to draw the attention of your Committee to a speech made by Prime Minister Thatcher to the Foreign Policy Association in New York on December 18, 1979. After talking about the developments in Rhodesia and the elections and the initiatives in Namibia, this is what she says in the context of southern Africa:

"In this context I want to say a particular word about South Africa. There is now a real prospect that the conflicts on South Africa's borders in Rhodesia and Namibia will shortly be ended. This, combined with welcome initiatives on South African domestic policies, offers a chance to defuse a regional crisis which was potentially of the utmost gravity, and to make progress towards an ending of the isolation of South Africa in world affairs."

Mr. Chairman, we predict that Her Majesty's Government in

London will now redouble its efforts to echo South Africa's propaganda and initiatives to try and consolidate South Africa's role in the Western economic, political and strategic system because we know that in Mrs. Thatcher's cabinet are also the most fervent advocates of developing a military alliance with South Africa under the guise of the protection of the South Atlantic and the Indian Ocean area and the so-called importance of the Cape sea route. Therefore we see new dangers in the coming years because it appears as if British policy towards decolonisation in Zimbabwe and Namibia has been directed by its primary interest, to protect South Africa's security in the long term. And no doubt certain guarantees and assurances were given to Pretoria in the very process of decolonisation in Zimbabwe but unfortunately their schemes and plans have failed in this case.

So what are the new initiatives that are being thought out in Pretoria now, since their schemes have not worked? One thing is certain: they are mobilising on the military front. Indeed we in the Anti-Apartheid Movement have information about a general mobilisation order sent out to Brigade 81, which is 7,000 strong; the reserves have been called up or asked to be ready to be called up for conventional action in the area because this is an armoured brigade. We also know of course, as your Committee knows, that South Africa has established new military bases around the border of Zimbabwe and has mobilised along the entire border of Mozambique. So we have an extremely dangerous situation developing in southern Africa with South Africa prepared to act and intervene against African States, confident in the knowledge that previous attacks of that kind have not brought forth any decisive action from the United Nations and particularly from the Western countries.

At the Lagos conference in 1977, we reached the conclusion that the freedom of South Africa is linked with the freedom of Africa: and that is not just a general statement because when we now look at the military might of South Africa and its missile capability, its firing range throws an arc around the Horn of Africa. Africa, and all of Africa, is directly threatened by South Africa so long as the apartheid system prevails in Pretoria. In this context it is terribly important for the Special Committee against Apartheid also to review its position with regard to the future. Although we need to be very vigilant about Zimbabwe and need to ensure that the developments over Namibia move in a favourable direction, it is now very much the case that South Africa is the absolutely top item on the agenda. And this Special Committee must not allow the Western governments to come forth with the excuses they have been

coming forth with in recent years: that they need the support of South Africa to solve the problem of Rhodesia and therefore one must not put any pressure on South Africa. We rejected that approach totally in the past, as we do now, but now it is the responsibility of this Committee to focus more directly on the problem of South Africa.

It is also appropriate, since we are in a sense the oldest anti-apartheid movement, which had the first contact with this Committee when it was established in 1963, for us to make a few remarks about the role of this Committee. We would like to pay a special tribute to the work of the Special Committee against Apartheid and the Centre against Apartheid.

It is unique in the United Nations system to have a Committee of this kind. Indeed, it is unique internationally, in any international forum. You were the first in the United Nations system to recognise liberation movements and to allow them to participate in your work. In other forums these representatives of the peoples of southern Africa have had to go as petitioners and almost as outsiders trying to talk about their situation. And the position has been the same with the anti-apartheid and solidarity movements. Whenever any of our representatives have come to New York both informally and formally we have had the closest relationship with the Special Committee. Our first contact with the Committee was in 1964, when we organised in London an international conference to consider the question of sanctions against South Africa. When your delegation participated in that conference and came back to New York it was able to pass on the results of that conference to the United Nations.

You have recognised the primary role of the liberation movement in any discussions and formulation of plans for southern Africa and this is precisely the attitude and the policy of the anti-apartheid movements as well. So we are at one in terms of our objectives and our policy. But now you will have the responsibility to try to convince both governments and the international community that the essential test of the United Nations basically is how the United Nations Organisation responds to the hopes and wishes of oppressed people elsewhere. At a moment like this, the critical and central situation which requires attention is of course South Africa.

We have seen in the past few weeks and indeed now when the results of the elections are known in Rhodesia, that Africa is not taking vengeance against whites or against the previous enemies of Africa. They have fought in Zimbabwe a bitter war - a long war -

with tremendous sacrifices on the part of the African people. But despite all the propaganda and statements in the West and by Western leaders that somehow those who lead the liberation struggle in Africa are blood-thirsty, seek vengeance, always wish to kill, we now see the truth staring the world in its face! And it is important for us to point out to these leaders in the West that they ought to look not only at the Rhodesian experience but indeed the experience of the whole of Africa. In the whole process of liberation of Africa nowhere does one see an iota of vengeance despite the bitterness of the struggle and the severity of the repression carried out by previous rulers. So it is important to point out that the bogey is destroyed repeatedly, not only over the war against Portuguese colonialism or in Zimbabwe but with other liberation struggles on the African continent. And so too with South Africa we say that the peoples of South Africa and Namibia who wish to have their freedom want no more than what the people of Zimbabwe want. But they want nothing less either: they would like genuine self-determination and independence.

Although the general context is important, and I hope the Special Committee will also address itself to the new responsibility it faces in the situation in the 1980s, it is nevertheless important for us to carry on our work and I now turn to several specific aspects.

We are particularly pleased to see that the United Nations has decided to organise an international conference on sanctions. We not only offer our cooperation because since our inception our main objective has been to get a sanctions policy against South Africa but we would like to ask that the documentation be well prepared for this conference and, perhaps even more important, we would request that there be adequate and full consultation with various anti-apartheid organisations, certainly the liberation movements, and all other groups that are committed to the policy of the Special Committee and the United Nations. It would be a pity if we put all the resources into a conference and find that it has adopted a good position which organisations are not able to carry out later. It is important to pay some attention to the results that we want to get out of the conference not only in terms of the decisions and the documents but the implementation of the policy already adopted by the United Nations.

In the past twenty years we have also seen a steady erosion of the victories that were won earlier. For example we have, through public organisations in the West, been most effective in the area where the public can act directly and that is on the question of sport. In the 1970s we physically stopped South African sports visits to

Britain despite the fact that we were not only confronted with the South African lobby and the British Government, but also the British police force and sports administrators. But, physically, simply by the turn-out of thousands of people protesting not only in London, but in Cardiff, in Bristol, we were able to stop that tour. Later there were campaigns like that in Australia and New Zealand. We have succeeded but now, with the visit of the British Sports Council to South Africa, with the visits from France, we see an extremely sophisticated method of counteracting and undermining our sports success, so that erosion of the sports boycott is being attempted now by very powerful forces. The Special Committee needs to pay attention to that.

Secondly, we see in a whole host of areas that individuals and groups from friendly countries are beginning to establish new links with South Africa. For example: we note with shock and surprise the report in the *South African Digest* of February 8, 1980, that Colonel Aare, head of civil defence from western Denmark, has visited South Africa and has had discussions there. He says he is interested to meet people in South Africa and talk to them about their plans and see how conscious they are of the need for civil defence. We know that South Africa faces a city counter-insurgency situation and therefore it seeks to invite individuals such as Colonel Aare to South Africa both to exchange information and for its propaganda effort. We are surprised that this kind of erosion takes place from a country that is otherwise friendly on the question of apartheid.

Then, a couple of weeks ago we learnt that SAS, the Scandinavian Airline System, is now training its pilots for the Airbus in South Africa, on a simulator provided by South African Airways. I have taken the matter up with all three Governments and the response is that SAS explains that it was not able to get simulation time from the company which made the aircraft in Toulouse. It then sought some time from Lufthansa and from Eastern Airlines in the United States but found that it could not get the additional hours that it required, so it entered into an agreement with South African Airways. Subsequently, SAS has made a statement that there is nothing unusual in this because South African Airways is a member of IATA and therefore SAS has, on previous occasions, also had normal relations with South African Airways as with any other international airline system. This case is particularly serious, Mr. Chairman, because in all three countries - in Norway, Denmark and Sweden - the national trade union movements have for several years demanded an end to airline links with South Africa, and now we understand that the Social Democratic Party in Sweden

has also called for an end to these links. We in the anti-apartheid movements are surprised when we examine the city portrait that SAS provides for Johannesburg, it is filled with South African propaganda, including an invitation to tourists to visit the Transkei and other so-called tribal areas. So this particular case of SAS also shows again what we have always said: once you develop links with South Africa you end up promoting the apartheid system internationally and become a hostage to the apartheid system.

Then, whilst we are talking about not providing South Africa with oil and making the boycott more effective in terms of denying energy resources to South Africa, South African coal is being imported by various European Economic Community countries - by Italy, France and Germany, there are even reports that Ireland may import some - and, most surprising in terms of the scale of the imports and the effect on energy policy is the import of coal into Denmark, where the electricity commission has contracted until the 1980s to rely on South African coal rather than coal from other countries. So South Africa is building up a kind of strategic importance in reverse in the context of the energy crisis. And it is not only in the field of coal but also in the field of uranium. Especially in the United States, there is great interest in the technology used in the SASOL oil-from-coal project. We also know that there is interest in the South African process in the International Energy Agency in Paris, as well as the energy sections of the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) and the European Economic Community.

There are other situations which the South Africans capitalise on greatly. A few months ago a Norwegian ship was lost somewhere around South Africa and Brazil, somewhere in the ocean. The Norwegian authorities asked the South Africans to help them look for this ship. In the process not only was a Norwegian air force plane sent to South Africa but the Norwegians also requested assistance from the United States and the United States sent two Orion aircraft to South Africa. So, in a sense, overnight, the principle and spirit of the arms embargo was circumvented by air force planes from two Western countries operating in South Africa jointly with the South African system in order to rescue ships. The implications of this are serious but the propaganda value that South Africa is obtaining through this is even more serious. We get a situation now where the South African defence magazine and other publications quote Mr. Stanbo, a Norwegian shipping company owner, that it is precisely the arms embargo that has led to the loss of 20 lives which were lost on the missing ship.

In December there was a similar case with regard to a Danish ship. In this case there are also press reports that the ship was in fact carrying cargo to South Africa from the Middle East, from countries which had committed themselves to an embargo. So this situation needs to be looked at.

There are other efforts by groups such as Rotary International which, in order to try and get some kind of recognition for the Transkei, is distributing the Transkei stamps internationally. I will leave information on this for the secretariat to follow it up.

Another area which we in the British Movement have been working on for three to four years is the whole question of medical conferences. I do not know whether your Committee is aware that South Africa is paying special attention to get various medical professional groups to South Africa for international conferences, offering to pay their full costs and indeed using South African Airways to reduce the cost of transport as well. We would like the Special Committee to help us in this regard and would ask the Chairman to address a letter to the Director-General of the World Health Organisation and ask for a list of all those organisations in consultative status with WHO. Then we should address a request to those organisations and ask them who their South African counterpart is, and then look at their constitution and try and work for the exclusion of South Africa from this international network which is encouraged by the consultative status provided by WHO. We may of course need to do this with the other specialised agencies also later but our investigations so far are directed mainly at the medical field and in this regard any help that you can give us will be extremely valuable.

Last year in South Africa they called an international conference to study the effects of an atomic explosion and how they would control the effects of that on the population. They took international experts to South Africa and it is our duty, through both the Special Committee and the Anti-Apartheid Movement, to make sure that international experts do not visit South Africa to participate in such conferences and also that international bodies do not hold their conferences in South Africa.

Then there is an issue of new links that South Africa is establishing with various countries like Uruguay, Paraguay, Taiwan and South Korea. This Committee probably has information about this but we suggest that this aspect needs special attention and perhaps letters should be addressed to these countries and possibly even missions sent there to discuss with them their developing links

with South Africa.

Then, finally you are probably aware of South Africa's attempts to develop what it calls a constellation of States in southern Africa. This strategy is old - to create a dependence on South Africa by other African States and to use that in order to gain political influence, if not control, with a view to ensuring that those African States will not provide assistance to the liberation struggle in South Africa.

This is an extremely dangerous policy being encouraged by the Western countries and the Special Committee needs to draw attention to that and to publicise the facts.

In this regard we feel that Mrs. Thatcher's statement indicates very clearly the line that we are going to hear more of very soon and which some of us have heard already when we talked to Western government leaders. They are beginning to argue, in a very powerful form, that one cannot have armed struggle in South Africa, because if you pursue the armed struggle in South Africa, then the level of violence that it will provoke from the enemies of Africa - that is the apartheid regime - is so great that it will have a spill-over effect on the rest of Africa and that is something we cannot afford. And therefore, because of this danger of violence and particularly if South Africa has nuclear weapon capability, we ought to go "soft" on apartheid and we ought to work for reforms within the system.

We predict that this is the line that is going to be taken by Britain and various other Western countries in order to eliminate support for the armed struggle in South Africa by the international community. Therefore this Special Committee has to do all it can to counteract the efforts that are already being made in London and elsewhere.

Finally, you know about the work of the World Campaign which we have been doing for one year. The Special Committee was the first to encourage the establishment of the World Campaign and we simply want to report that our work is going well. In Britain, in the context of the World Campaign, the British Anti-Apartheid Movement has started a petition campaign to get signatures for the demand that there should be mandatory sanctions on all forms of nuclear collaboration with South Africa. We are also distributing the scientists' statement which was adopted at the Seminar last February (organised jointly with the Special Committee) where individual scientists committed themselves not to go to work in South Africa and assist its nuclear programme.

We are also at this moment working actively on the question of political prisoners and of course to try and ensure that the executions planned by South Africa do not take place.

In the coming weeks, months and years, we will need the guidance and support of the Special Committee. We are confident that with the record of the Special Committee it will stand firmly on the policy that has already been established in the United Nations. But under your personal guidance and commitment we are confident not only that we will develop a working alliance between the anti-apartheid movements and the Special Committee but that we will broaden the international anti-apartheid community in such a way that our solidarity measures up to the responsibilities that we all face in the future crisis that is going to confront us when we deal directly with South Africa.

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**STATEMENT AT THE MEETING OF THE SPECIAL COMMITTEE
AGAINST APARTHEID ON ITS TWENTIETH ANNIVERSARY, MARCH
31, 1983⁶⁶**

On behalf of the British Anti-Apartheid Movement and the World Campaign, we should like to thank you for inviting our Vice-Chairman, Mr. Vella Pillay, and myself to this meeting to observe the twentieth anniversary of the Special Committee. We would also like to associate ourselves with the congratulations and good wishes extended by earlier speakers to yourself, Mr. Chairman, and to Mr. Reddy on the award of the Joliot-Curie medal by the World Peace Council.⁶⁷

The British Anti-Apartheid Movement was formed in London on June 26, 1959, when very few African countries were free and in direct response to the appeal which came out of South Africa from Chief Albert Lutuli, President General of the ANC, and other leaders for a boycott of the apartheid regime. Whilst our initial campaigns were to organise a consumer boycott of South African goods, we soon took on within weeks other issues: the release of political prisoners; the exclusion of South Africa from the Commonwealth; the demand for an arms embargo; support for the African liberation movements; the sports, cultural and academic boycott; the oil embargo and many related issues, all in the context of the overall demand for mandatory economic sanctions against South Africa.

In a sense and in a very real way, we were working on these issues before the Special Committee was formed and we had won some notable successes. But after the formation of the Special Committee on November 1962 our work was made very much more effective because of the close working relationship which developed over the years between us and the Special Committee.

One of the first issues on which we collaborated was over the Rivonia trial when Nelson Mandela and his colleagues were facing death sentences. At that time we established through the Anti-Apartheid Movement the World Campaign for the Release of all South African Political Prisoners and by coordinating international action and sending representatives to Rome to see the Pope, to Western capitals to see their leaders, we were able to have enough pressure mobilised throughout the world and succeeded in saving the lives of these South

⁶⁶ United Nations Centre against Apartheid, Notes and Documents, No. 18/83, April 1983

⁶⁷ The Chairman of the Special Committee, Alhaji Yusuff Maitama-Sule of Nigeria, and the United Nations Assistant Secretary-General in charge of the Centre against Apartheid, E. S. Reddy, were awarded the Joliot-Curie Medal of the World Peace Council at this meeting of the Special Committee.

African leaders. But I am sure that as we mark the twentieth anniversary of the Special Committee against Apartheid today, we are also aware of the fact that Nelson Mandela has been imprisoned for every moment of every day of those twenty years. Twenty years is a very long time for Nelson Mandela and the people of South Africa. Twenty years is also a very long time for the Special Committee. For the Anti-Apartheid Movement which will next year be twenty-five years old, it is an even longer time.

On the basis of this experience of some twenty-five years, and twenty years working with the Special Committee, we would like to highlight a few aspects. First, on the role of the Special Committee. The very first thing that one can say is that the Special Committee has proved to be the most reliable and the most important instrument in the development of international policy and action against apartheid. There are various headings that other speakers have mentioned but I wish to draw attention just to a few which we believe were crucial in the past twenty years. Your actions with the support of the solidarity movements and public pressure in Western countries made certain that the attempt by the Pretoria regime to win recognition for bantustans was averted and that, today, none of the bantustans are recognised by any of the Western governments although we know that many of them wish to help South Africa in recognising those bantustans. We also know that at a crucial time in 1974-75, after the collapse of the Portuguese empire, coming about as a result of the liberation struggles in Portuguese territories in Africa, South Africa and its allies were able to create great international confusion even in Africa and it was the clear and forthright position of the Special Committee in exposing those manoeuvres that failed to produce the results that South Africa and its allies wished for. We know too that soon after that at the meeting of the OAU Council of Ministers in Dar es Salaam, Ambassador Edwin Ogbu, who is with us today, as Chairman of the Special Committee against Apartheid presented a paper which was crucial in uniting the OAU in counteracting this manoeuvre and recognising the South African regime as the main enemy of Africa which required all of Africa to stand four-square against it. Later in 1975 when the South African forces invaded Angola in collusion with the CIA, the Special Committee was the first and only Committee in the United Nations system to expose and condemn that aggression. Its role at that time, in defiance of pressures of Western countries, was a significant factor in helping to preserve Angola's independence.

There are many other aspects that we could refer to but because of shortage of time, we will abstain from that. However, in this context we want to commend the cooperation which the Special Committee promoted with anti-apartheid movements and solidarity groups throughout the world where you were able to overcome all the problems of protocol and other difficulties which exist in an interstate organisation like the United Nations and give us assistance for our campaigns. Secondly, we need to commend you for the way in which you have developed relationships with the liberation movements and the fact that they do participate in this Committee as if they are members of the Committee, and

thirdly, for the tremendous information work done by the Special Committee and the Centre against Apartheid.

The second aspect, Mr. Chairman, is in a sense slightly personal but no less significant. And that is that since the formation of the Special Committee with its first Chairman, Mr. Diallo Telli and later with all the successive Chairmen that we have had, and now with yourself, we have had remarkable good luck to have persons of tremendous calibre and deep commitment who have helped to advance the work on southern Africa. We know that this is the first Committee to be boycotted by the Western Powers and despite the fact that they do not serve on this Committee, the way in which the Special Committee has conducted its work has meant that they have won respect and recognition even from some of these Western Powers who did not wish this Committee well.

In 1964 the British Anti-Apartheid Movement convened in London an international conference of Governments and non-governmental organisations to further the cause of sanctions. At that conference not only did we have a delegation from the Special Committee but also for example, Mr. Emeka Anyaoku, who spoke earlier, and Mr. Haksar representing the Indian Government. That conference was called to examine all the aspects of sanctions and it reached the conclusion that sanctions were feasible, that they were practical but what they lacked was political will. From 1964 to 1983 that situation has not changed in that what they lack is political will on the part of the major Western Powers.

Secondly, partly as a result of the fact that Mr. Diallo Telli became Secretary-General of the OAU but also because of our relations with the Special Committee, we were able to establish very close working relationships with the OAU and over the twenty years the OAU, helped by the Special Committee, has also developed its own relationships with anti-apartheid movements. So we were able to build up an alliance relationship with independent African States and forces of public opinion in the collaborating countries in order to support the objectives of the OAU and the United Nations.

In this context, we are also enormously grateful for the mainstay in the United Nations system on the question of apartheid and here I speak of Mr. Reddy who, since we met in the early 1960s, has been a constant source of encouragement, support, knowledge and guidance not only to the British Anti-Apartheid Movement but to every anti-apartheid and solidarity group that has come into existence in that period.

The third aspect, Mr. Chairman, is the substantial issues that we are concerned with. The last twenty years are the most traumatic in terms of the transformation of colonial Africa into the independent States of Africa. As the transformation of colonial Africa into a continent of free, liberated and independent States developed, the Western Powers focused their policies not only on sustaining the

South African apartheid system through accelerated capital investments, trade and the provision of supplies for a massive armaments and nuclear industry but also of employing South African power to intimidate the independent African States into accepting a status of subordination and inferiority. In this critical sense South Africa has become the instrument of indirect colonialism and of fixing the African continent permanently into the strategic and geo-political sphere of the United States and other Western interests. It is this which explains the systematic Western violation of the arms embargo, the support given to the Pretoria regime in developing its nuclear-weapon capability and the policy of what is today called constructive engagement with the apartheid regime. This constructive engagement means in effect to bolster the South African regime, to confer upon it a regional Power role on the subcontinent whereby it is able to attack all independent African States within its reach without any international action forthcoming to put an end to that aggression, where it is able to occupy Namibia without suffering any international consequences, and, indeed, being provided with a military arsenal, with an air force and a missile system that puts the entire African continent within the reach of the Pretoria regime. And that is the scale of the support given to Pretoria by the Western Powers.

In earlier years when we were campaigning for an arms embargo, British, French and other Prime Ministers used to say that the provision of arms to South Africa was only for external defence. And I remember very well how in the late 1960s and early 1970s President Nyerere used to argue at Commonwealth conferences and elsewhere that Africa comes within the orbit of South Africa's external defence no matter how much the Western leaders talk about a supposed Soviet threat in the Indian and South Atlantic Oceans.

And today we see the very armaments provided to South Africa to contain so-called Soviet expansion in the southern oceans - the Buccaneer aircraft, the Mirage aircraft, the entire arsenal provided to the Pretoria regime - being used daily against Angola and all the other frontline States in the area. But the range of South Africa is not only to the immediate region as we have seen with the attack against Seychelles and its recent attack against Lesotho which does not even have a defence force. So South Africa behaves in Africa as if the entire continent is at its disposal in order for it to unleash violence on an unprecedented scale in order to intimidate and subject the entire African continent.

And as if this is not enough, we have also seen the provision of nuclear-weapon capability, the perfection of nuclear warheads, of missile systems and other forms of nuclear collaboration with the apartheid regime. And in this context I want to just spend a moment to show the relevance of the role of the ANC and the liberation struggle in South Africa because, for example, when we campaigned to stop nuclear collaboration with South Africa, we failed in that the French Government authorised the delivery of the Koeberg plant to the Pretoria regime. It was the direct action of the ANC in South Africa which was trying to impose the international arms embargo against South Africa. By acting in South

Africa in such a decisive manner the ANC now has to try and ensure that it is acting to preserve the safety and security of independent Africa and all the States in that region. So the twenty years of experience, Mr. Chairman, has also shown us that the liberation movement in Namibia and South Africa had to take on an added burden not only to fight for their own liberation, as difficult as that is, but to fight this monstrous system of apartheid with all its military and nuclear might which is presenting such an enormous threat to international peace and security. And therefore in a very real way when we destroy the apartheid system, we will have destroyed this threat, this growing threat to international peace and security. And in this context, in this added context, the liberation movement deserves the full support of the international community.

But the second experience of twenty years is that the South African regime recognises no boundaries and has attacked the front-line States and other countries in the region. And they, too, require our support and we welcome the forthcoming mission of the Special Committee to be led by Ambassador Sahnoun⁶⁸ hoping that it will come back with a programme of action with which the international anti-apartheid community can mobilise full support for the frontline States.

Thirdly, on the question of sanctions we of course have to work for the tightening of the arms embargo to ensure that the nuclear embargo is made effective as also the oil embargo. But we really have to move forward and not simply repeat old slogans. In this context the conference of the anti-apartheid movement called in Britain in March last year, with the presence and participation of the Vice-President of Nigeria, reached the conclusion that the situation has now reached a point where Africa, the non-aligned countries and all committed governments have to move forward to ensure that their relations with the Western countries become much more dependent on the policies of the Western countries in relation to southern Africa. We have had a number of actions by Nigeria, by Tanzania, by various other governments against multi-national corporations operating in South Africa but these isolated actions are not enough and there is no reason why these individual countries should bear the full burden of the retaliation. Therefore, we would like the Special Committee to begin to take initiatives to mobilise the committed governments of the world together with the anti-apartheid movements to ensure that this objective becomes a reality.

It is our belief that the potential is there. The potential for united action exists if only we could have the machinery to bring it about and we hope that the Special Committee will address itself to this problem. Secondly, and mention has already been made of it, one has to concentrate much more on mobilising public opinion in Western countries as we have been trying to do in Britain through the anti-apartheid movement. But we need to intensify these efforts elsewhere, and as Ambassador Sahnoun has emphasised, the special need to promote action in the

⁶⁸ Mohamed Sahnoun of Algeria

United States at this time. Thirdly in this context I think we also need to look anew at the methods of work that we have utilised over the past twenty years. I have said earlier that twenty years is a very long time. I also recall that twenty years ago there were not very many people who believed, in the era of the winds of change speeches and so on, that apartheid would survive for twenty years.

In the 1960s there was an optimism about freedom coming to South Africa as well. But it has taken so long because of the enormous support the Western countries have given to the apartheid regime and continue to provide today. And what we have seen is that every success, every pressure, every gain that we have made has been countered with increased support from the Western Powers for South Africa. And later on not only the traditional allies of South Africa but Israel and various Latin American countries joined this alliance system. Thus today we face this paradox where, with the largest number of resolutions we have ever had on apartheid through the United Nations, with the strongest resolutions, with the biggest majorities, we also face a situation where South Africa has never had as much investment as it has today. Indeed, South Africa has never had as many arms as it has today.

And in regard to the arms embargo which we first secured in 1963 and then got the 1977 mandatory arms embargo which was an enormous political victory - when we examine the history of this five-year embargo we see the nature of the problem we face. The Security Council Committee, which has a responsibility for exercising and administering this embargo, has not met for over two years - at precisely the time when we have, through the World Campaign and anti-apartheid organisations, been revealing arms smuggling cases stretching from Austria to Denmark, the United States, the United Kingdom, Switzerland, Spain, Portugal and Germany. The Security Council - as we were told yesterday by the Chairman of the Committee on the Arms Embargo- has had before it since 1980 a report of its own Sub-Committee with sixteen recommendations to strengthen the arms embargo. That was given in September 1980. We are now, Sir, in 1983 and in this period the Security Council has not even discussed that report.

What explains this paralysis in the United Nations? What permits the Western Powers and others to provide South Africa with all the armaments it needs while the arms embargo remains on paper in the United Nations as a sacred decision and the only decision made under Chapter VII of the Charter?

This shows the atmosphere in which we are working and when we compare this to the 1970s for example when some of us were engaged in stopping a British Prime Minister when he was trying to sell six helicopters to the apartheid regime, the entire Commonwealth was at risk. Now these arms flows continue to Pretoria with very little being at risk. There is a certain air of self-confidence and assurance on the part not only of Pretoria but of the Western Powers and the new rulers in Washington who are giving South Africa increased elbow room in order to conduct its aggression with greater self-confidence.

In this overall process, then, the alliance of the Western Powers and South Africa has reached a point where as the peoples of southern Africa challenge that monstrous apartheid system and with near successes, we face the danger of real intervention from the Western countries. This intervention is already there in the form of arms supplies, mercenaries and so on. An so as our pressures mount internally and internationally, and the regime becomes weaker in various ways, it resorts more and more to the use of war as an instrument of policy and is supported in this by the Western Powers. Thus, what we face today is the real prospect that the African continent will become a sphere of war and violence manifested through the South African regime, through its so-called regional power in the continent of Africa, through its integration into the Western defence system whereby it is now regarded as a major ally in the Indian Ocean area as well as the South Atlantic region. And it is the responsibility of all of us to avert that war and to avert that catastrophe that South Africa is determined to inflict.

Like earlier speakers we are optimistic about the future. But our optimism is not based on the progress that we have achieved through the international community, as important as that is. It is based primarily on the courage and the successes scored by the African liberation struggle in Namibia and South Africa, and secondly on the steadfastness and sacrifices being made by the people in the front-line and other States. We in the outside world often say that victory is certain and that is true. And sometimes we have said as we said yesterday that victory might come sooner than many people expect and that too is true. But I want to warn that time is neutral and we are perhaps not utilising this time as effectively as is South Africa and its allies. And therefore we must redouble our efforts and match the efforts of the people of South Africa and Namibia and of the frontline States and ensure that victory is brought forth sooner rather than later.

In conclusion I want to refer to two other aspects. One is that the twenty years of effective action that we have spoken of by the Special Committee and other groups has also somehow created a sense of insensitivity to the horrors of apartheid. And there is the danger too in the international community and particularly here in New York at the United Nations which we fail to understand when we are away working at grassroots level of how one can deal with the Namibian question as simply a routine question that seems to be involved with talks about talks about talks about talks, with missions after missions going to deal with South Africa. There was a time soon after we called the International Conference on Namibia in 1966 and presented that report to the United Nations when people in this forum were talking about expelling South Africa from Namibia.

And now we are talking to South Africa about it agreeing to leave Namibia. There is a danger too, in the debates and resolutions against apartheid that there develops a certain atmosphere of routine action with routine resolutions. We must not allow the apartheid issue to become a routine issue where everyone

confesses their abhorrence of apartheid just as every Christian confesses that he is against evil. In this sense we need action rather than statements. So we have to guard against making apartheid a routine issue because it is today an issue of supreme importance not only for the peoples of Africa but to maintain peace and security in the world.

The second point in conclusion that I wish to address myself to is that whilst we have new opportunities and we can take them and act decisively, there are also new dangers. And we must not underestimate either the opportunities or the dangers. We need to recall that in the last twenty or twenty-five years we have also seen, of course, the significant decolonisation declaration of the United Nations and that most of Africa is independent. But from the very outset in 1960 all Africa and every African realised that the core of the problem of African independence was the problem of apartheid in South Africa. And despite the fact that we have a large number of independent States, none of those States are either free or independent in the true meaning of that word because South Africa and its apartheid system continues to survive.

In order to make Africa independent, to truly decolonise the African continent, we must destroy the apartheid system and redouble our efforts. We have to take stock and we have to rededicate ourselves.

We have to realise that if we really want a celebration, then we have to work hard, use time wisely, unite all the forces available in the struggle against apartheid to ensure that independence comes to Namibia soon and that victory is achieved for the people of South Africa. So that when we celebrate inside South African borders, that will be the time for celebration not only for the South African people but for the continent of Africa and indeed for the rest of humanity. For not only would we have ended this phase of colonialism and racism, but we will also have begun the phase of cooperation among African States, to put to use all the resources which in South Africa are used today to oppress the peoples of southern Africa for the real development of independent Africa.

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**STATEMENT BEFORE THE SECURITY COUNCIL COMMITTEE
ESTABLISHED BY RESOLUTION 421 (1977) CONCERNING THE
QUESTION OF SOUTH AFRICA, APRIL 9, 1984**

I should like to thank you for once again giving me an opportunity to present certain new information and make some proposals in order to ensure that the mandatory arms embargo, adopted by Security Council resolution 418 (1977), is effectively implemented. It is a double honour for me to speak after His Excellency Ambassador Garba of Nigeria for it was at the 1977 World Conference for Action against Apartheid in Lagos, chaired by General Garba, that it was decided, upon the suggestion of the Special Committee against Apartheid, to establish the World Campaign which was formed on March 28, 1979 - some five years ago.⁶⁹

The Pretoria regime, in the midst of its recent public pronouncements about so-called peace initiatives once again reminded the world last month about its growing threat to international peace and security by increasing its (a) defence spending by 21.4 per cent, (b) police expenditure by 44 per cent, and (c) secret service allocation by 25 per cent.

At the very outset we should like to share with this Committee some new information of enormous importance for your and our future work.

The Pretoria regime has for several years claimed that it is virtually self-sufficient in the production of arms and ammunition. Most governments appear to believe this. However, the results of our research and investigation now demonstrate clearly, that it is a myth. As the regime has increased its reliance on a wide range of more and more sophisticated equipment it has simultaneously expanded its dependence on imports of foreign military components, equipment and technology. This is confirmed by a second finding that more than half of the total amount spent by ARMSCOR in acquiring military hardware is in fact spent abroad. For example, out of an annual expenditure of R1.62 billion, over R900 million is spent overseas and only about R700 million at home.

These findings dramatically demonstrate that it is much more than a coach and horses that has been driven through resolution 418 (1977). In the result, a solemn decision under Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter is being honoured more in the breach than through compliance.

⁶⁹ Major-General J.N. Garba, then Chairman of the Special Committee against Apartheid. He had chaired the Lagos Conference in 1977 when he was Commissioner for External Affairs of Nigeria.

This shows the urgent need especially for the Security Council, this Committee and all Member States, to assume and discharge their international duties faithfully, and not to leave the major burden of monitoring and enforcing the embargo to the World Campaign and anti-apartheid groups and individuals. Whilst we may try to do everything within our limited power we cannot be responsible for the serious erosion of United Nations authority and influence which inevitably comes from undermining the only mandatory decision taken so far by the Security Council against the apartheid regime.

The World Campaign has on several occasions drawn this Committee's attention to developments concerning the large-scale smuggling of arms and ammunition to South Africa from several countries by vessels managed by the Danish Trigon company. We have provided you with extensive information and the Danish Government has also supplied your Committee with official reports.

On March 28, 1984, legal proceedings against one of the accused, 39-year old Peter Gettermann, were concluded in a Copenhagen City Court when he was sentenced to 6 months suspended imprisonment and a fine of 100,000 Danish Kroner for offences involving 22 shipments of arms and ammunition, totalling 6,000 tons, between 1978 and 1980. The World Campaign was shocked at the sentence and I immediately sent a cable to the Danish Foreign Minister urging that the authorities lodge a formal appeal against the sentence "to try and secure a much stronger penalty which would be appropriate to the gravity of the offences". Our request was supported by parliamentary opposition party leaders, some of whom I had the privilege of meeting in Copenhagen on April 1, 1984, whilst on a stop-over for a press conference. On Monday, April 2, 1984, I heard from Copenhagen that the authorities had decided to lodge an official appeal against the sentence and I hope that this Committee will join the World Campaign in thanking the Danish Government for its prompt action. We should also like to express our gratitude to successive governments in Denmark with whom we have been in contact over this and other cases for the courtesy and cooperation extended to us. It should also be noted that the authorities experienced serious difficulties in conducting the Trigon investigations and much of the credit for their successful conclusion is due to exceptional investigative research conducted by newspaper and television journalists as well as individual Danish seamen and their union who all helped to expose the truth. However, the chief offender in this case, after being charged, had absconded to South Africa, taking with him in February 1983, over 5 million Danish Kroner from a secret account in a Spanish bank.

Following our request of March 28, 1984, to your Committee for this hearing, the World Campaign arranged for the Copenhagen Court indictment, including the 22 charges, to be translated into English for the use of this Committee, but I understand from the Danish Government that you have been provided with the relevant information in a recent Note. You will notice that specific details about the vessels involved, the dates of their journeys, cargo particulars, as well as the

ports of loading in Europe and unloading in South Africa, are all provided.

The World Campaign made early representations to most of the countries concerned and we have now made follow-up representations with better information. We hope that your Committee will also act urgently to ensure that the concerned governments institute immediate high-level investigations to ascertain all the facts relating to each cargo and take appropriate action against all those within their jurisdiction. A full investigation of all the Trigon cases will reveal the ways and means used by the apartheid regime and its agents to breach the embargo and important lessons can be learnt about additional measures which are necessary to enforce the embargo more strictly. We are certain that the Danish authorities will be prepared to provide all the facts to facilitate follow-up action and we urge your Committee to give these cases urgent priority. As in the past, the World Campaign will keep you informed of new developments and we look forward to your future cooperation.

Illegal Exports

I now wish to draw the attention of the Committee to a current case of considerable importance in the United Kingdom. On Monday, April 2, 1984, seven men appeared at Coventry Magistrates' Court charged with various offences involving the illegal export of arms to South Africa. Four of the men are South African nationals, employees of the apartheid regime's Armaments Corporation, ARMSCOR. One of them, Hendrix Botha, 49, is in fact a South African Colonel and is charged with the illegal export of high-pressure gas cylinders in March 1984. Three other South Africans, Stephanus de Jager, 49; Jacobus Le Grange, 38; and William Meterlerkamp, 41, were all charged with exporting magnetrons in January 1981. The magnetrons involved are apparently essential components for anti-missile radar systems producing the high-power microwaves needed to spot, identify and track fast-moving targets.

The three Englishmen charged are Michael Swann, Derek Salt and Michael Henry Gardiner who were released on bail and due to reappear in court on May 14, 1984.

On April 2, 1984, the South African Foreign Minister recalled his Ambassador in London for consultations about the case. The Ambassador has now returned to the United Kingdom.

It is the first time that senior ARMSCOR officials have been charged anywhere in the world, and when British customs officers complete their investigation in a few weeks and the trial takes place, we may well learn about further charges.

Before coming to this meeting, I have received information to the effect that at a hearing in Coventry some few hours ago, the Court has granted bail of £25,000

each for the ARMSCOR officials and this has been paid by the First Secretary at the South African Embassy who has waived his diplomatic immunity in order to provide surety. The Committee will also be interested to know that the Embassy has provided two flats in Dolphin Square, London, for the four accused and undertaken not to issue them with new travel documents. It is important to note that the customs authorities strenuously opposed bail and said that they feared the four South Africans would abscond and obstruct the course of justice if released from custody and that the goods involved amount to at least £1 million.

In contrast to this case, we would like to draw your attention to one in 1979 involving the smuggling of £2 million worth of plant equipment to make arms and ammunition. The company involved, Worcester-based Redman Heenan, was "concerned about the bad publicity which would accompany a court case" and so escaped prosecution in 1981 in return for a secret payment of penalties amounting to £193,000 to the customs authorities. One of the directors of the company then was Mr. Eldon Griffiths, MP, a former Conservative Minister for Sport who is today the paid advisor to the Police Federation and well-known for his sympathetic attitude to apartheid South Africa. Company officials had been to South Africa to visit an ammunition plant where shells, fuses and rockets were being made and one of them saw how bullets were made with his company's dies.

We have only had recent knowledge about this case and according to our records it is the only one that we know of where a settlement has been agreed by the authorities in return for not proceeding with a prosecution. We do not know if the Committee was informed about this case by the United Kingdom or what further action it took. Clearly, this Committee should establish how many other similar cases there have been and give serious consideration to the implications of such secret arrangements being made for a major breach of the arms embargo.

South African Embassy involvement

In my evidence to your Committee of September 23, 1983, I drew attention to the conviction in October 1982 of three persons in the United Kingdom on charges relating to the illegal export of rifles and machine gun spare parts to South Africa. We have since seen some of the material evidence of that case and in one letter from a South African company, Day Technical Products (Pty) Ltd, dated March 9, 1978, addressed to one of the accused, specific reference is made to the fact that to secure the illegal supplies "the customer would prefer to try and work on a system whereby the Embassy in London is not involved at all or as little as possible". Later, in suggesting arrangements for payment, it stipulates that a Bill of Lading should be "countersigned by an Embassy Official" and goes on to explain: "Merely a name with a specimen signature would be indicated and not that person's connection with the Embassy." Another document, an invoice made out to the same South African company by a British firm, Delta Engineering Co., dated February 8, 1980, for the illegal arms consignments, bears a clear South African Embassy stamp certifying payment of the items listed on March 24,

1980.

Without the advantage of these and other documents and based on more general information, the Chairman of the British Anti-Apartheid Movement, Mr. Robert Hughes MP, wrote to Her Majesty's Government about this matter on December 22, 1982. In a reply dated February 15, 1983, Mr. Cranley Onslow, Minister of State at the Foreign and Commonwealth Office, stated: "Our enquiries have revealed that, although there is no conclusive evidence of the embassy's role in the case, there are *prima facie* grounds for suspecting that the Embassy or members of its staff were involved in transactions for the supply of arms to South Africa in contravention of United Kingdom legislation". It went on to say that "any staff who may have been involved are no longer serving at their Embassy in London" and that the Embassy had been warned "that firm action will be taken whenever we had clear evidence of such misconduct."

In the light of the documents which we have subsequently seen it seems remarkable that the clear evidence of the Embassy's involvement contained both in the letter of March 9, 1978, and the officially recorded payment by the Embassy of the invoice of February 8, 1980, can be considered to amount to "no conclusive evidence" and merely "*prima facie* grounds" about the Embassy's involvement in the illegal arms deals. We wonder how many other diplomatic missions receive such mild treatment in the face of such overwhelming documentary proof.

The reason we mention this is not just because of the issues involved in this case with the London Embassy but because in the Trigon cases it was the South African Embassy in Paris that was involved. Clearly, this Committee has to give serious attention to the role of the South African diplomatic missions in contravening the laws of the host countries and inducing others to do so. This totally improper use of diplomatic mission requires the sternest possible action and as a minimum, one would at least expect that the respective military attaches be removed.

We do not need much more information to appreciate the central role of the South African Embassy in organising breaches of the mandatory arms embargo. It is because of this that the Anti-Apartheid Movement urged the United Kingdom Government in May 1983 to close down the military attache section of the Embassy but that has not been done. Instead our Movement has been provided with photographs which reveal that when celebrating South Africa's defence forces day, on July 1, 1983, among the guests present at the Embassy was Major-General G.M.G. Swindell, Assistant Chief of British Defence Intelligence, who is the third most senior officer in that section. No doubt the Pretoria regime continues to abuse its diplomatic privilege in London with impunity.

We have just ascertained that at the 4th Bristol International Conference on Remotely Piloted Vehicles, April 9-11, 1984, which opened today, representatives

from Kentron who were due to attend have not turned up. It may be that this is because Le Grange and de Jager who are now charged in Coventry are in fact also connected with Kentron. However, among the participants is the Managing Director of National Dynamics based in Pinetown, Natal, Dr. Maitland Reed, who is also a member of the Scientific Committee of the President's Council in South Africa. Your Committee may not know that National Dynamics makes the Eyrie RPV which is marketed abroad via the Federal Republic of Germany in order to disguise its South African origin. This Conference is jointly sponsored by the Royal Aeronautical Society and the University of Bristol.

This case, like so many others, shows the need for the United Kingdom to require entry visas for South African nationals so that it can at least try to prevent the entry of ARMSCOR and other officials into the country. So far, the United Kingdom has rejected our requests and is one of the few countries which continues to extend visa free entry to South Africans.

Secondly, this case once again highlights the importance of enacting measures to prohibit the importation of arms and related material from South Africa.

We have several times drawn the attention of this Committee to the supply of the Plessey AR-3D Air Defence Radar to South Africa by the United Kingdom. At least London has provided substantial replies to representations made by this Committee as well as the World Campaign, even if they are not satisfactory. We should like to refer to the notes verbale dated October 5, 1979, addressed by the Chairman of this Committee to Ireland and the United States followed by reminders dated December 11, 1979, and ask if these two governments have so far provided the Committee with any substantial comments about the involvement of enterprises within their jurisdiction in the Plessey deal. If they have not done so yet it requires urgent follow-up by this Committee.

Falklands/Malvinas Air Base

Our worst fears about the use of the Plessey AR-3D system by South Africa are now revived by the recent discovery that the Ministry of Defence has ordered two such systems for installation in the Falklands/Malvinas air base. Why does the United Kingdom decide to equip its major military base in the South Atlantic with a system that is identical to the one earlier supplied to South Africa on the grounds that it did not constitute a breach of the mandatory arms embargo? We are not the only ones who are puzzled by this and I hope that the Committee will be able to have this clarified by the United Kingdom. It is also pertinent to ask whether today, despite the earlier understanding of the United Kingdom, South Africa is in fact using the AR-3D system as part of its overall defence radar system in breach of that understanding, and if so, what action has been taken or is being contemplated. Or is the situation much more serious and does the choice of identical systems for South Africa and the British base indicate closer coordination and integration of defence arrangements between Pretoria and

London in the South Atlantic?

Last November, the World Campaign provided this Committee with details about the advanced VAX computer system which was reportedly being smuggled to the Soviet Union after having been licensed for export to South Africa by the United States. Certain items of this system were intercepted by the United States in West Germany and the remaining containers were impounded by the Swedish authorities after adopting a measure which declared illegal the importation of war material from South Africa. We wonder if the Committee has acted on our suggestion to establish how this military computer system which is apparently forbidden for export to the Soviet Union came to be licensed for delivery to South Africa despite the mandatory arms embargo. We need to know how a system that is of considerable military significance for the Soviet Union so easily becomes a non-military system for South Africa and we hope that this Committee will seek clarification from the United States.

I wish to refer to the detailed and substantial replies provided by the United States to this Committee on May 23, 1979, in response to several points which I had raised earlier. At that time, the United States pointed out that whilst spares for the C-130s were prohibited, those for the L-100s owned by Safair Aviation were not because the latter were supplied for civilian use and that "such sales require the purchaser to certify that the aircraft will not be used for police, military or para-military purposes". The Safair L-100s are now listed among the military inventory by the South African Defence Force and this is confirmed by reputable institutions such as the International Institute for Strategic Studies based in London. In addition, it was a L-100 that was used to transport the AR-3D system, which was ordered by the South African Defence Force, from the United Kingdom. The Pretoria regime is thus in clear breach of the specific certification given to the United States in the case of the L-100s and the Committee should establish what action the United States has taken against the purchaser. At the very least all spares should be prohibited for the L-100s as well and there is adequate *prima facie* evidence to suggest that spares provided for the L-100s have been and are being diverted to the C-130s which continue to remain in service despite the embargo on its spares.

When looking today at the substantial answers of the United States in its reply of May 23, 1979, it is with great regret that we notice the extensive relaxation of that embargo which has taken place since 1981. Thus, with a change of Administration the same country has reinterpreted its obligations under the mandatory embargo in such a fundamental manner that it would be true to say that the United States embargo today is in many respects much weaker than that operated by it during the 1960s - long before the mandatory embargo of 1977. That is why it is also important to establish which of the many assurances provided in May 1979 are still valid today.

On September 23, 1983, we drew the attention of the Committee to the

existence of an "Agreement relating to Mutual Defence Assistance" between the United States and South Africa based on an exchange of notes dated Washington, November 9, 1951, and registered by the United States on February 12, 1953. We should like to know if you have established the full significance of this Agreement and obtained clarification from the United States particularly in so far as it may cover the supply of military and related material to South Africa.

In relation to the question of spares for items already supplied to South Africa, we have been carrying out some further research and would like to share with you some of our information concerning the Buccaneer aircraft.

Britain authorised the purchase by South Africa of 16 Buccaneer naval aircraft, designated SMK50 (under the 1955 Simonstown Agreement), in order to "safeguard and defend the vital strategic Cape sea-route". They were delivered during 1965-66.

The SMK50s are similar to the Royal Navy's SMK2s, except that they are fitted with two additional Rolls Royce Bristol Siddeley BS605 single-chamber retractable rocket engines in the rear fuselage to improve "hot and high" take-off performance since they were to be operated from the Waterkloof Air Force Base which is almost 5000 feet above sea level.

The 16 South African Buccaneer SMK50 aircraft, references 411 to 426, were fitted with two Rolls Royce RB 168-1A Spey MK 101 turbo fans and two Rolls Royce Bristol BS605 rocket engines.

These aircraft were supplied almost 20 years ago and despite subsequent assurances by the United Kingdom that in keeping with the arms embargo no spares or components are exported to South Africa, and the fact that the Simonstown Agreement was terminated in 1975, the Buccaneers remain operational and are used regularly by the South African Air Force.

On behalf of the British Anti-Apartheid Movement, and the World Campaign, permit me to draw attention to two basic facts:

- + The Buccaneer aircraft were provided for naval surveillance and when we pointed out to Her Majesty's Government that they could and would be used against Commonwealth and other African States we were given the express assurance that this was not the understanding upon which they were authorised for export to South Africa.

- + Buccaneer aircraft have repeatedly been used in attacks against independent African States and neither London nor Pretoria dispute this.

Arising out of this, we are entitled to ask:

+ Since South Africa has clearly violated its original undertaking, what penalties have been imposed by the United Kingdom for the breach of a fundamental assurance? We need to know what kind of action has been taken so that the public can judge as to whether the penalties are adequate. If, on the other hand, no action has been taken, then we are entitled first to ask why not? And then to wonder whether any value at all can be placed on other express and solemn undertakings and assurances given by Her Majesty's Government concerning other contracts.

This matter becomes urgent and important in the context of the recent assurances given with regard to the Plessey and Marconi deals. What reliance can we honestly place upon the "understanding" upon which these radar systems have been licensed for export to South Africa?

+ How does the South African Air Force continue to fly the Buccaneers for so many years if they have not been continuously provided with spares, components and other essential items?

We have addressed this question several times to Her Majesty's Government and urged a high-level investigation to ascertain how the British arms embargo is obviously being violated. The response has always been that the Government is not aware of any violation of the embargo and would investigate if we could provide the details.

We have to ask: How can we possibly have more information than Her Majesty's Government? Is it not true that the only two air forces in the world which operate Buccaneers are Britain and South Africa? Presumably the RAF knows all that there is to know about these aircraft as do the British companies involved in its production and maintenance. In this case, there is not even a third country utilising the same aircraft and through which spares, components and engines can be rerouted to South Africa.

Is it really all that difficult to establish how South Africa obtains the spares and other vital items to keep the Buccaneers flying? Does neither Britain nor Rolls Royce really know how and where the two types of engines are serviced and who supplies South Africa with new engines? And if all this is so

difficult for Britain to establish from its own backyard, is it really beyond the capability of Britain's military attache and other representatives in South Africa to ascertain the relevant information? No one can doubt that if the United Kingdom Government attached importance to this case it could not only ascertain the relevant facts but take action to ensure that these aircraft do not continue to be operational, for not even the Pretoria regime claims that it is self-sufficient in maintaining these and other aircraft.

We hope that the Committee will give its attention not only to this aircraft but also to the Mirages, Impalas, Alouettes, Pumas, Transalls and other weapons which continue to operate despite the mandatory arms embargo.

Further cases

In my testimony of September 23, 1983, I mentioned a few cases about which we should like to provide the Committee with further information and ascertain what progress has been made so far.

With regard to the pistols which were reported to have gone to South Africa via Frankfurt, our representations to Bonn resulted in us being informed that there was no violation of the embargo and when we requested further detailed information we were informed in a reply dated February 28, 1984, that "since the investigations are not public" the Foreign Ministry was "not in a position to disclose any facts". Taken together with the letter of September 6, 1983, from Australian Airlines, where they too were unable to provide us with "any information" we are unable to make any further progress with this case.

Concerning the Red Baron case where arms were apparently routed from London to South Africa via Zurich and about which we provided detailed information to the Swiss authorities, we have heard nothing more from the Swiss Government and have reason to believe that the investigations are no longer being proceeded with. We shall contact the Swiss authorities again and will be pleased to hear what, if any information, your Committee has been able to ascertain about this case.

We are also interested to know what response you have had from Israel regarding the detailed information which we provided your Committee last September about E1 A1 Airlines waybill of May 30, 1980, and its transport of arms to South Africa via Israel.

We should also like to know what explanation the Committee has received from Israel about the Remotely Piloted Vehicle of Israeli origin owned by South Africa which was shot down in Maputo Bay on May 30, 1983, and about which we provided some details.

Your Committee will recall our concern at certain aspects of Austrian legislation governing the arms embargo and assurances given us by Dr. Erwin Land, the Austrian Foreign Minister about their intention to "further tighten the prohibitive measures already in force", which we reported to you on September 23, 1983. We have since had several consultations with the Austrian Government and although we are not able to report any specific measure being enacted so far we can assure you that the Government still has the matter under active consideration. We know that the Government shares our concern for early action and we shall be consulting with them again very soon.

Shackleton Reconnaissance Aircraft

You may be aware that South Africa announced last month its intention to finally ground its 7 Shackleton naval reconnaissance aircraft by the end of this year and to stop supplying the United Kingdom and the United States of America with information about maritime and naval traffic around Southern Africa. Pretoria claims that this is due to the arms embargo and is undoubtedly emphasising its importance to Western naval strategy in order to secure new aircraft. It would like to find quick replacements and claims to need eight Nimrods, Atlantics or Orions. We know that it tried to acquire the Nomad and it was as a result of our representations that former Australian Premier Fraser assured us that they would not be supplied to South Africa. Since it is unlikely that any of these aircraft will be provided to South Africa, it is likely to use either the HS-748 or the Israeli Arava for this purpose, or the C-130 failing which the L-100-30 which can also be converted into naval reconnaissance aircraft. South Africa has just ordered one airship from a British company and there are reports that it is considering using it for military purposes. It is vital that the Committee exercises great vigilance to ensure that the embargo is not undermined further and South Africa provided with replacements for the Shackleton aircraft.

I now turn to an issue of substantial current importance, namely, the export of arms and ammunition by South Africa. We know of South Africa's expanding internal armaments industry even if it does depend heavily on imported items. The apartheid regime is facing a serious crisis in its weapons production programme and needs to export items in order to keep its production line functioning. It

cannot afford the high cost of locally assembling and making arms, particularly after being deprived of the monopoly arms market it enjoyed in Rhodesia until April 1980 when Zimbabwe was born. During October 1982 it even exhibited some arms at the Defence Fair in Greece until our intervention with the Greek Government which resulted in their removal and expulsion. Since then we have been vigilant and South Africa has not been able to participate in any of the international arms exhibitions until last month's FIDA 84 Exhibition in Santiago, Chile, where it showed a few items.

The Committee should seek clarification from Chile.

During the past year and especially in recent months, ARMSCOR has also been buying expensive advertising space in several defence publications, including the *International Defence Review*. It claims that its weapons are "Born of Necessity. Tested under Fire".

One of the most publicised South African military weapons, the 155mm gun described as the G5, owes its origin to several countries. The Committee should seek clarification from all the governments concerned and we shall be interested to learn about the outcome.

However, it now becomes a matter of great importance to ensure that one of this Committee's 16 recommendations contained in its September 1980 report is acted upon forthwith to prohibit the importation of arms from South Africa. We are pleased to inform the Committee that the Swedish authorities adopted an Ordinance to Prohibit the Importation of Military Equipment on November 21, 1983, and we are providing you with a copy in case some other governments wish to follow this example. We hope that the other Nordic countries and the Netherlands, which was the first to voice its support for such a measure, will now adopt the necessary measures to be followed by other States. We hope that the Committee can encourage and persuade Member States to act on its recommendations even though we know that they have not been formally adopted by the Security Council. If we deny export markets for apartheid arms we can seriously undermine South Africa's internal armaments programme and make the mandatory embargo much more effective.

Nuclear Collaboration

In no area is external collaboration as grave as in the nuclear field. No one any longer doubts South Africa's nuclear weapons capability. The Report of the United Nations Group of Experts on

South Africa's Plan and Capability in the Nuclear Field, of September 9, 1980, and the World Campaign's study *South Africa's Nuclear Capability*, 1980, provide ample evidence of the danger of an apartheid bomb. Yet Western nuclear collaboration with South Africa continues unabated despite Pretoria's determined refusal to sign the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. After the adoption of the mandatory embargo in 1977, the Norwegian Government specifically called for the imposition of full-scale safeguards which would make all further nuclear collaboration conditional upon South Africa placing all its nuclear installations under international inspection. This is also reflected in recommendation XVI this Committee made in 1980. The apartheid regime refuses to do this and the fault is that of those Western Powers which continue to provide South Africa with vital nuclear technology, equipment and expertise despite its nuclear weapon ambitions.

The Pretoria regime increased its 1983 expenditure on atomic energy research by 54.9 per cent and uranium enrichment costs for 1982-83 were expected to rise by R20 million to R85 million.

The regime no longer even tries to mislead the world about its true intentions. According to an extract from the Johannesburg Home Service broadcast of the State-controlled radio on March 15, 1984, although "it is capable of producing nuclear weapons, South Africa has utilised her nuclear energy strictly for peaceful purposes". It then refers to the agreement due to be signed with Mozambique on the following day and states: "Happily therefore, the omens are good and South Africa does not feel compelled to utilise her nuclear capacity in another direction".

The nuclear threat still remains a major area needing the urgent attention of this Committee and we hope that you will find adequate time to give it due consideration.

During January and February this year I had the privilege and opportunity to visit Zambia, Zimbabwe, Mozambique and Tanzania and had consultations with Government leaders including their Heads of State and Government, among whom are Patrons of the World Campaign. I was encouraged by their support for the World Campaign and they asked us to intensify our work because, in a very real way, the more effective we are in enforcing the embargo the more we shall succeed in reducing South Africa's aggressive role in the region. The responsibility upon us all is great - but I am certain that we can all do much more - and much better - in the future.

If my memory is correct, this Committee did once decide to

examine all national legislation on the arms embargo. I do know that we have called for that on numerous occasions. That still remains an important task and we will be pleased to learn about progress made so far so that we may cooperate in this matter. There are also many other important matters to which I have drawn the attention of the Committee in the past, in order to make the embargo more effective - many of those ideas are still not acted upon.

Operation of the embargo

In reviewing the six and a half years of operation of the mandatory arms embargo and the role of this Committee we are bound to express some regret and disappointment. The mandate and resources of this Committee remain deplorably weak. The Report and 16 recommendations of the Committee submitted to the Security Council in September 1980 have still not been given serious consideration by the Council. This Committee has since then appeared to be largely paralysed and has often not even met for long periods. There was even a long period when it had no Chairman. More recently it has met at times and we are very grateful for the courtesy and cooperation extended to the World Campaign which has been granted several hearings and its written communications have been promptly acknowledged.

However, from outside it does appear as if the Committee has not been able to take any real initiatives in following up cases since September 1980 and does not seem to have even requested governments to respond to allegations brought to its attention for action. It is of course possible that confidential representations have been made but the results of any such initiatives are not publicly known. Certainly, the Committee has not produced any reports of its work since September 1980 and that is a serious setback.

We hope that some of this can be put right soon and we know that you will understand our comments as arising not so much from any wish to be critical but more due to genuine concern that the mandatory arms embargo against South Africa should not only be strictly enforced but that it should be effectively strengthened and reinforced so as to deny all forms of military and nuclear collaboration to the apartheid regime.

On behalf of the World Campaign, I should like to thank you once again for granting me this hearing and enabling me to present the Committee with certain new information. We hope that you will find it useful. As before we wish to assure you of our total support for your important work and wish to assure you of our full

cooperation.

I thank you.

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**STATEMENT AT THE MEETING OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL,
MAY 25, 1994⁷⁰**

I should like on behalf of the Anti-Apartheid Movement and the World Campaign against Military and Nuclear Collaboration with South Africa to congratulate Nigeria on its presidency of the Security Council and to thank Nigeria, as well as the Council, for the privilege and honour of addressing this historic meeting.

This is the fourth time that I have appeared before the Council. In the past it was to call for action against apartheid, but today, on Africa Day, it is to celebrate the democratic transformation of South Africa and to rejoice at the relaxation of the international arms embargo.

We wholeheartedly support the draft resolution before the Council. The statement today by the First Deputy Executive President of South Africa⁷¹ has confirmed the transformation of South Africa from a virtual international outlaw to a normal and responsible member of the world community of nations. Immediately after the 1960 Sharpeville massacre we launched through the Anti-Apartheid Movement an international campaign to stop arming apartheid. The Security Council imposed an arms embargo against apartheid during 1963-1964 and substantially strengthened it in 1970.

However, it was only after the historic UN/OAU Lagos Conference of August 1977 that the Security Council adopted the mandatory arms embargo against apartheid through resolution 418 (1977) of November 1977. That was the first-ever mandatory decision by the United Nations against a Member State. Thereafter, additional resolutions were adopted to strengthen the arms embargo - namely, resolutions 558 (1984) and 591 (1986).

It was also decided at the Lagos Conference to establish the World Campaign against Military and Nuclear Collaboration with South Africa, with the Heads of State of Nigeria and the front-line States as the founder patrons. We have over the years cooperated closely with the Security Council's "421 arms embargo Committee", and its records testify to our consistent efforts to ensure the strict and comprehensive implementation of the solemn decisions of the United Nations.

We should also state that the early warnings we gave of the development of an "apartheid bomb" were not scaremongering, but were founded on solid facts which have subsequently been confirmed.

⁷⁰ UN document S/PV.3379

⁷¹ Mr. Thabo Mbeki

In addition to trying to prevent arms being used for internal suppression in South Africa, we had to later intensify the campaign for the arms embargo in order to stop apartheid's growing war in the region. The enormous sacrifices made by the front-line States to advance the African liberation struggle involved a large number of casualties and massive destruction, certainly without precedent in modern history. Newly independent countries risked their national sovereignty and very survival in order to support the freedom struggle, and most of them, like the majority population within South Africa's borders, continue to suffer from the destructive consequences of apartheid.

Despite the loopholes and weakness in the implementation of the embargo, and various violations, we believe that the arms embargo against apartheid played a significant role in bringing about change and reducing the level of violence and human suffering in southern Africa. Of course, it was essentially the struggle of the South African people that brought about their liberation. But that struggle also became the common struggle of humanity, and therefore the cost of the transformation was relatively low. Thus, when the dawn of a new democratic South Africa broke in Pretoria on May 10, 1994, it was a victory for all the people of South Africa and the world, and we can today talk about reconciliation and begin the task of nation-building because the whole world has enormous sympathy for the new South Africa in its future plans.

At last the people of South Africa and of southern Africa as a whole have peace from apartheid and can begin the mammoth task of reconstruction and development in a framework of common security.

As we relax the arms embargo we need to thank the African States, the Non-Aligned Movement and some Western States for their long commitment to anti-apartheid action. We thank the Nordic countries, and, on behalf of the World Campaign, we particularly thank Norway and Sweden for their direct support. We thank Britain for ending the Simonstown Agreement in 1975 and the other major Western Powers which were also persuaded over the years, often through mass, nationwide campaigns, to take more effective action against apartheid. We should also like to thank the "421 arms embargo Committee" of the Council and the Special Committee against Apartheid, and their respective chairpersons, as well as the Centre against Apartheid, for their cooperation.

I must also pay tribute to the thousands of extraordinary people who assisted us, some by providing information at considerable personal risk and sacrifice, and others who acted through various anti-apartheid organisations in helping to implement the decisions of the Security Council.

South Africa has had a long struggle for freedom, and our leaders and people always kept hope alive, as did the front-line States and supporters abroad. All that has helped to produce the new reality, which is truly miraculous. The United

Nations has played a major role in this process since its inception.

But there are new tasks in the new era. South Africa will need the United Nations and the international community, and the international community and the United Nations will need South Africa.

On a personal note, as a South African who has worked in exile since 1959 to promote anti-apartheid campaigns, I should like to say what a wonderful feeling it was to vote for the first time last month in the first-ever South African democratic elections; to be granted my first South African passport in 35 years; to have had the privilege to be in Pretoria on May 10, to witness the inauguration of His Excellency President Nelson Mandela as the head of a free South Africa; and today to travel from South Africa on our national airline and participate in this meeting with our First Executive Deputy President, His Excellency Mr. Thabo Mbeki, and the Deputy Foreign Minister, His Excellency Mr. Aziz Pahad, and other members of the South African delegation. This is almost an unbelievable experience. It is truly a dream that has come true, for hope at last has become a reality. We can all agree today that the mission has been accomplished.

BLURB FOR THE BOOK

Abdul Samad Minty, one of the founders of the Anti-Apartheid Movement in Britain and its honorary secretary for over three decades, was the foremost spokesman of the anti-apartheid movements and one of the architects of the international alliance against apartheid. He played an important role in developing close relations between the anti-apartheid movements, the United Nations and the Organisation of African Unity, which greatly helped governments and peoples to confront the collaborators with apartheid and help the liberation movements.

Mr. Minty was a founder member of the Anti-Apartheid Movement in Britain and has been honorary secretary since 1962. While his contribution covers all aspects of the international campaign against apartheid, it was particularly significant and crucial in the efforts to impose an effective arms embargo against South Africa. He founded the World Campaign against Military and Nuclear Collaboration with South Africa, at the request of the United Nations and with the patronage of African Heads of State in 1979. This World Campaign, which he directed, was the main source of information and advice to the United Nations on violations of the arms embargo.

This collection of speeches, papers and letters of Mr. Minty is a contribution to the study of the work of the anti-apartheid movements and their cooperation with the United Nations - and, indeed, to the study of recent South African history. It is also a tribute to the Anti-Apartheid Movement, one of the most significant international people's movements of our time.

Mr. E. S. Reddy, former Assistant Secretary-General of the United Nations and director of its Centre against Apartheid, has written extensively on the liberation struggle in South Africa and its international aspects.

He was one of the key figures who built the international campaign against apartheid. His contribution has been widely recognized by the South African liberation movement and the anti-apartheid movements, as well as the United Nations and many governments. As Mr. Minty pointed out, Mr. Reddy "has been a constant source of encouragement, support, knowledge and guidance not only to the British Anti-Apartheid Movement but to every anti-apartheid and solidarity movement".