

John Dube and the Ambiguities of Nationalism

In August 1933 Solomon ka Dinuzulu died. A year of mourning was followed, as is customary among the Zulu, by a great ceremony of purification and cleansing, the *Ihlambo* ceremony. One of South Africa's first anthropologists, Mrs A. W. Hoernle,¹ present at the ceremony by government invitation, recorded her impressions in enthusiastic terms:

From every clan, from every chieftainship, from all large districts acknowledging the paramountcy of the Zulu chief, there came representatives to take part in this lifting of the Mnyama [the blackness and gloom that engulfs the nation for the year after the king's death]. . . . Men from Pietersburg, Johannesburg and other parts of the Transvaal, men from every corner of Zululand and right away down to the centre of Natal were there, many of them having spent their last sixpence to take part in the gathering of the clans to renew their fealty to their leaders. . . . Early in the morning of Monday August 28th, this vast gathering from eight to ten thousand men dipped their spears or their guns in 'white' medicines which are thought to prevent any accidents during the course of the hunt with which the *Ihlambo* begins and which is the first great combined action in which men take part to shake off their lethargy and, at the same time, be welded once again into a united body of representatives from every branch of the Zulu people.²


There had been no such gathering, no such spectacle, since the death of Mpande, Solomon's great-grandfather, in 1872. Clearly



S. John Langalibalele Dube
(from T. D. Mveli Skota, ed. and comp.,
The African Yearly Register Johannesburg, n.d., c.1931, p.144).



6. *The Ohlange Institute, John Dube's Christian Industrial School*
(From Mveli Skota, *The African Yearly Register*, p.406).



7. *The amakholwa community at Edendale Training Institution, c.1900. It includes two members of the Msimang family and Simeon Kambula (top row, standing from left to right, 2nd, 12th and 18th) and Stephen Mini (2nd row seated, 3rd from the left), all mentioned in the text (Natal Archives, Pietermaritzburg).*

overcome by the "emotional character" of the ceremony, "the sacred religious feelings," the "orderliness and the discipline of the hour-long procedures," and "the most impressive laments . . . in the music of any people,"³ Mrs Hoernle failed to remark on some of its more mundane, but at the same time equally noteworthy, features. The contrast in official attitude with what had followed Dinuzulu's death could not have been more complete. On that occasion, the Natal authorities would dearly have liked to prevent the entire ceremony; it was only the intervention of the Union Native Affairs Department that allowed a small purification ceremony to take place — amidst much foreboding. When, despite its express prohibition, Solomon held a ritual hunt following the ceremony, as we have seen, it was taken as yet further evidence of the machinations of the royal family to conjure up the support and recognition of their position that was seen as so dangerous by the local settler populace. In 1934, the proceedings were filmed in colour by African Film Productions, Ltd., in the presence of the newly appointed chief native commissioner, as well as of representatives of the sugar industry and Chamber of Mines.⁴ Among the key speakers was John L. Dube.⁵

Eulogized by B. W. Vilakazi on his death in 1946 as "the incarnation of the spirit of his age,"⁶ Dube was *the* spokesman of the *kholwa* (i.e. African Christian) community. Born in Natal in 1871, the son of the Reverend James Dube, one of the first ordained pastors of the American Zulu mission, he was educated at Inanda and Amanzimtoti Theological School (later Adams College) before accompanying the missionary, W. C. Wilcox, to the United States of America in 1887. There he worked his way through Oberlin College over five years, while supporting himself in a variety of jobs and lecturing on the need for industrial education in Natal. After a brief spell back in Natal, he returned to the United States between 1896–1899 for further training and to collect money from American philanthropists for a Zulu industrial school along the lines of the

famous Tuskegee Institute established by Booker. T. Washington in Alabama.

In 1901 Dube established his school in the Inanda district, and a couple of years later started the Zulu-English newspaper, *Ilanga lase Natal*. A founding member of the Natal Native Congress in 1901, he was present in 1909 at the meetings of African opponents to the Act of Union, and in 1912 was invited to become the first president of the South African Native Congress (later to become the African National Congress). Though, as we shall see, he was ousted from the presidency in 1917, he continued in a prominent position in the Natal branch of Congress, running it virtually as an independent fief, until his death in 1946. Initially Dube's school at Ohlange (the first purely African-founded and African-run industrial school) and his position as newspaper editor and politician had led white Natalians to regard him as a provocation and a challenge, "a pronounced Ethiopian who ought to be watched";⁷ by the time of Solomon's funeral he was established as the revered elder statesman, representative of "responsible native opinion."⁸

Dube's oration at Solomon's funeral was typically double-edged and didactic. After a brief explanation of the ceremonies they were witnessing — presumably for the benefit of the white observers, but perhaps also for younger western-educated blacks, whom he feared were losing knowledge of their traditions and culture — Dube pointedly reminded the white man of his "burden": "I think the white race has a tremendous responsibility to lead us on the right lines. But that leadership must come from the experience of give and take. We have a lot to learn from the white man and he has a lot to learn from us." He concluded, even more pointedly, with "an earnest appeal to the Government to give our chief a status that will place him on a firm foundation to undertake the responsibility of care of his people. . . . We want the head of the Zulu nation to be a Paramount Chief who is so recognised by the Government."⁹

For those familiar with the relationship between Christian and

non-Christian Africans in nineteenth-century South Africa, or with recent sociological denunciations of the Christian mission converts as at best "alienated from their roots" and at worst "decultured" or psychologically enslaved,¹⁰ or with the conventional wisdom that John Dube was the Booker T. Washington of South Africa,¹¹ this demand would seem to require some explanation. Dube's position is at least as puzzling as that of the South African state. In the first chapter we looked at the ambiguities in the relationship between Solomon ka Dinuzulu and the segregationist South African state, which had, on the one hand, to come to terms with a chief "whose descent is such as to command the involuntary respect of the Zulu people"¹² and, on the other, to avoid alienating the local administration and the bulk of white settlers. This chapter deals with the equally paradoxical relationship to Solomon of Natal's Christian African intelligentsia, essentially the more prosperous landowners and peasants as well as the clergy, clerks, interpreters, and teachers, who came to be among the monarchy's most fervent supporters.

In the nineteenth century, as Norman Etherington has shown, the initial converts to Christianity were largely the despised, the disparaged, and the disaffected, drawn to the mission stations by the prospects of land and security. By far the largest category was homeless refugees, the product of the Shakan wars, which ravaged southeast Africa in the nineteenth century in the wake of the rise of the Zulu kingdom.¹³ John Dube's father, James, for example, fled as a child with his mother to Daniel Lindley's mission after his father, the Qadi chief, Dube, was killed by Zulu regiments in 1837. As Dube himself put it before an American audience in 1897: "My grandfather was a powerful Zulu chief. He was a reformer and did not agree with Chaka, the leading Zulu king who believed that the only way to have power was always to be on the warpath. . . . I think it was better than being a king, to be a Christian, because Christianity is the greatest civiliser in the world."¹⁴

Etherington describes well the tense relationship between African society and the new communities of Christians that were, in Natal, established on mission reserve land especially set aside by the colonial state. For many, the mission station marked a fundamental alteration in lifestyle in the aftermath of the early nineteenth-century upheavals. Many of their traditions referred to the anarchy of that period, to the arbitrary quality of authoritarian chiefly rule, to warfare, refugees, hunger. On their stations, the missionaries set out "consciously and actively to promote economic differentiation and the formation of social classes, and the mission stations provided auspiciously positioned vantage points or pioneer columns in this process."¹⁵ Christianity went along with new forms of agricultural production for the market, a transformed ideology towards accumulation, and a readiness to accept the education being proffered by the missionary. The gulf between mid-Victorian norms of mission Christianity and the demands of the Zulu kingdom was particularly deep; until after the Zulu War of 1879, according to Etherington, quite simply "Christianity and Zulu citizenship were mutually exclusive."¹⁶

In many ways, the converts on the mission stations who responded with such alacrity to the growth of colonial markets, and who saw in education a way into the privileges of colonial society, seemed to the mid-Victorian visitor to embody the ideal of the independent yeoman farmer. As an Anglican clergyman writing of a mission settlement in Natal in 1874 enthused: "There is not a village in England corresponding to Springvale where every man lives under his vine and fig tree."¹⁷ Some of the American Zulu mission settlements and the Wesleyan Methodist stations at Edendale and its various offshoots were far wealthier. By 1864 there were about 600 inhabitants at Edendale with forty-eight upright houses, twenty-two ploughs, fourteen wagons worth ninety pounds each, and twenty spans of oxen of the same value.¹⁸

To take but a couple of examples: The Reverend Daniel

Msimang, one of the early followers of the Reverend Alison (who had founded the Edendale mission with a group of converts he gathered together in the Orange Free State and brought on an epic journey back to Natal via Swaziland), had two houses on eighty-nine acres at Edendale and large blocks of shares in the syndicate from Edendale that had bought up land at Driefontein and Kleinfontein in the 1860s. His movable property included 2 ploughs, 2 wagons, 36 oxen, 260 goats, and 20 cows.¹⁹ His son, Joel, born at Edendale in 1854, was also a wealthy man. Although he lost 700 head of cattle during the rinderpest epidemic, which decimated cattle herds all over southern Africa in 1896-97 and increased the dependence on wage-labor of most Africans in Natal, he was nonetheless able to apply for permission to purchase two farms in 1916 and to offer to pay for one outright at a cost of £3000, while putting down a mortgage of £4000 on the second.²⁰ Nor was the Msimang family alone. John Dube's father, although an ordained minister, earned "all but a fraction of his income" from trade and transport riding and his not insubstantial landholdings.²¹ As Dube himself put it: "The day my father came into that country [Natal], the good missionary Mr. Lindley, taught him to use a plough, and he became as rich as any white man there."²² This wealth provided the almost legendary thirty gold sovereigns that enabled the young John to sail for the United States of America in 1887.²³

For the prosperous peasantry settled on the Protestant mission stations of the Cape and Natal, as for the petty bourgeoisie that derived from it and that in the last third of the nineteenth century was forged out of "a diverse set of regionally and ethnically defined local groupings" into a self-conscious and coherent national bourgeoisie in the new cities of Kimberley and Johannesburg, the mid-Victorian "code-words" *progress* and *improvement* had a material reality.²⁴ It was out of the mid-Victorian vision of a "progressive world order," based on the virtues of free labor, secure property rights linked to a free market in land and individual tenure, equality before the law,

and some notion of "no taxation without representation"²⁵ that African Christians in the nineteenth century constructed their world.

The South African sociologist, Ben Magubane, is right, of course, to stress that

the conquest of Africans was not a momentary act of violence which stunned their ancestors and then ended. The physical strength directed against African societies was only the beginning of a process in which the initial act of conquest was buttressed and institutionalised by ideological activities. British hegemony . . . was to saturate the society and its values to the extent that they would become common sense for the people under its sway. It was to be enshrined in a set of meanings and values which would be confirmed by practice.²⁶

We have already seen some of these processes at work in the way in which the South African state attempted in the 1920s and 1930s to make use of the Zulu royal family. We must be careful, however, there as here, not to oversimplify. In neither case was the hegemonic ideology simply the invention or imposition of the imperial or colonial ruling class: to be successful it had to pick up, transform and manipulate real elements in the experience of the dominated classes. For this new class of property-owning and aspiring *kholwa*, the moral imperatives of the nineteenth-century bourgeois liberalism and the attack on "traditionalism" both resonated with their own interests and experience and provided a language of resistance. This occurred in much the same way as Eugene Genovese has suggested that when slave revolts became revolutionary and "raise[d] the banner of abolition, they did so within the context of the bourgeois-democratic revolutionary wave, with bourgeois property relations."²⁷

On the mission stations in Natal, American Board converts, Anglicans, and Methodists were ardent exponents of the Protestant work ethic and the virtues of private property and

individual land tenure, because they had grown as a class out of precisely these institutions. Nor were the outward signs of petty bourgeois class identification lacking. The description by F. R. Statham of a dinner given to the Africans of Driefontein who had fought on the British side during the Anglo-Zulu War of 1879 is doubly revealing, both of the extent to which the *kholwa* identified with the imperial order on whose side they were prepared to fight, and of the social texture of their lives.

At the native tables the rule of alteration is strictly observed, no two men or women sitting together. At the upper end of the centre table sits young Simeon Kambule, with his future bride beside him . . . with a really pretty mouth and expression, and with her hair done in immense frizette at the back of her head. She is dressed in a pink and white striped muslim, less pretentious than the satins around her, and all the time keeps jealous guard over Simeon's sealskin cap, nursing it on her knee. Opposite Simeon is John Zulu . . . something of a dandy in his way; his black velveteen waistcoat is irreproachable, so also is his white waistcoat, while the crimson sash over his left shoulder is secured by a triple gold ring on his right hip.²⁸

A not dissimilar flavor emerges from the description by the American Board secretary C. H. Patton of his visit to the Christian settlement at Groutville and its chief, Martin Luthuli, uncle of the famous Nobel Peace Prize winner Albert Luthuli. The congregation was "not only civilised but educated and prosperous," and the chief "was garbed like a city gentleman, long black coat, starched shirt and all the paraphernalia of civilisation with not a detail omitted, even to the necktie pin. He was a Christian and a highly prosperous man, being the owner of a sugar plantation."²⁹

Martin Luthuli, Simeon Kambule (who in 1917 owned 796 acres of land), and the Msimangs were part of a small group of wealthier African landowners in Natal by the turn of the century, and the nucleus of John Dube's constituency. If in the

early 1900s there were only some 1,500 individual landowners, with about 102,000 acres between them,³⁰ the first decade of the century also saw the formation of a considerable number of land syndicates, along the lines established by Edendale and Driefontein in the mid-nineteenth century. According to a representative of the Klip River Agricultural Society in 1917: "Natives will go to [land] sales and buy in such a way that no Europeans will be able to buy. . . . Two hundred may find the money, but only one need buy the farm."³¹

As usual the spokesman for white farming interests exaggerated. The amount of additional land acquired between 1905 and 1916 amounted to little more than 70,000 morgen (147,812 acres), while over the next ten years the operation of the 1913 Lands Act made further land acquisition difficult, if not impossible, and the amount of African-owned land actually dropped.³² Nevertheless, in 1928 a not unsympathetic farmer wrote to the *Natal Witness*:

The Native Land Act is the only thing which stands between the European landowners of Natal . . . and the wholesale acquisition in future by natives of lands all over the country. . . . Those who argue that the native can never compete with the white man buying land are deliberately shutting their eyes to what is already taking place. . . . Few people realise the awakening that has taken place among the natives during the last ten years or so. They are fencing their gardens, are using planters and cultivators for their crops, planting fruit trees, building better houses, growing vegetables for the market and in a hundred different directions showing evidence of the rapid germination of a spirit of uplift, which of course is all to the good.³³

Some of the land being purchased in these years after 1913 (in the areas released under the Act) was bought by syndicates organized by chiefs for communal occupation, the only form of resistance to and protection from outright proletarianization for themselves and their followers: however, the *kholwa*

purchasers, even those who formed syndicates, saw this land as a basis for accumulation. In the inimitable words of the Natal Local Native Lands Committee of 1917, "Generally, native purchasers of land are progressive and have aspirations far beyond those of the ordinary native."³⁴

The larger landowners were no longer simply peasants employing family labor. Many, like Martin Luthuli, were cane-growers, employing either labor-tenants or wage-labor. Thus, Luthuli, for example, hired what he was pleased to describe as "30 or 40 boys . . . at the same rate of wage paid by Europeans"³⁵ as *togt*, or daily-paid, casual labor, a process that increased as more of these landowners went over to sugar production in the twenties and thirties.³⁶

By the beginning of the twentieth century most of the larger landowners, together with other members of the African *kholwa* elite, were involved in a network of political organizations, vigilance associations, and welfare societies. The most important were the Natal Native Congress and the Exempted Natives Society, which attempted to improve the status of those Africans who, while legally entitled to be exempted from the operations of customary law under the provisions of Law 28 of 1865, still found that this exemption was a prolonged and difficult process and that even if they were exempted their children were not. The Natal Native Congress was founded at the turn of the century to broaden the appeal of political organizations beyond the mere 2000 Africans who had gained exemption certificates. Its major goals were the acquisition of the franchise on the same terms as whites and freehold land tenure.³⁷ According to the American Board missionary F. B. Bridgman, "They contended that these two principles were fundamental to any real solution of the racial question."³⁸ Bridgman was talking of a meeting between African representatives and the prime minister of Natal over the latter's proposed "reform" of legislation affecting Africans. He added, "The perfectly courteous but unwavering manner in which the natives adhered to principles they considered vital

commands our admiration."³⁹ These two principles remained the focal point of Congress politics until the 1940s, and in some measure beyond.

The middle-class basis of the Natal Native Congress, which was later incorporated into the South African Native National Congress, was made clear in its constitution of 1915. The "objects of congress" it proclaimed, were

to plead for and make representations for the welfare of the brown people of Natal and Zululand, and to help the Government to inquire into matters detrimental to the well-being of the brown people under the Constitution of the Union of South Africa. To assist the brown people and advise them on commercial undertakings, to seek and learn trades, including mental education and positions suitable for educated persons.

The Congress shall be subject to all rules and regulations which govern all meetings of the civilised educated peoples. . . .

The head offices at Pietermaritzburg shall seek work for the Natives and notify the branches of available situations[. It] will charge 1/- each person for whom it has obtained some work. . . . The Committee of Works shall find for natives and girls places where they may learn trades; shall devise ways and schemes for Natives to establish business undertakings for their benefits, and hunt for better plans to form Native Trading Companies.⁴⁰

All this is remarkably similar to John Dube's own conception of his task at the Christian African Industrial School he established at Ohlange, and to the various schemes he engaged in to promote African business ventures, which are usually attributed to the influence of Booker T. Washington over his political and educational philosophies. Indeed as a program the constitution undoubtedly drew on the teachings of Washington, who played such an important role in spreading ideas of racial self-help and the virtues of commercial activity throughout the black diaspora. The convergence may have been the result of

Dube's personal intervention in Natal Congress Affairs or may have arisen out of the broader influences of missionary ideology in Natal, especially that of the American Board of Missions, which, through its contacts in the United States and especially with the Phelps Stokes Foundation and its director Thomas Jesse Jones, was closely in tune with developments at the more conservative black schools at Tuskegee and Hampton. For our purposes here the roots of the convergence are immaterial. What is striking is the apparent contrast between these eminently respectable and decorous Victorian Christians (one of the many African terms for the group was *Amarespectables*) — anxious to stake their claim in the burgeoning capitalist economy of South Africa, acquire freehold land, start business ventures, and lend a helping hand to employers by setting up a "Committee of Works" — and Dube's advocacy of the recognition of the Zulu monarchy at a ceremony in which 8,000 Zulu dipped their spears in "white medicine."

Dube himself melodramatically and rhetorically pointed out the contrast in his "Address to the Chiefs and People of the South African Native Congress," presented in absentia on his appointment as president in 1912:

Upward! Into the higher places of civilization and Christianity — not backward into the slump of darkness nor downward into the abyss of the antiquated tribal system. Our salvation is not there, but in preparing ourselves for an honoured place amongst the nations.⁴¹

Nor is this an isolated example, although only one more quotation must suffice. In a speech in 1913 attacking government plans to segregate Africans through the Lands Act, he remarked,

The system of tribal segregation may have suited very well a period when barbarism and darkness reigned supreme, and

nothing was required beyond those doubtful blessings, but it had the fatal defect of being essentially opposed to all enlightenment and Christianity, of utterly lacking what nowadays is our supreme requirement — the power and means of raising the native people out of the slough of ignorance, idleness, poverty [and] superstition — in a word of utter uselessness as citizens or even servants in a civilised land. The times have changed and manners must change with them.⁴²

As late as 1959, the Reverend Zaccheus Mahabane, also a past president of the African National Congress (ANC) was still exhorting African Christians to overcome “ignorance, superstition, vice, degradation, barbarism, savagism, psychic unconsciousness, intellectual insensibility and mental unawareness.”⁴³ The “acculturation” if not “deculturation” seems complete. No wonder then that Ben Magubane has roundly declared, “The supremacy of the Whites, their values and civilisation was only won when the cultural and value system of the defeated Africans was reduced to nothing, and when the Africans themselves loudly admitted the cultural hegemony of their conquerors.”⁴⁴

The reality, however, was never quite so simple. Beneath the superficial appearance of acculturation, the contrast between the mid-Victorian vision of progress and improvement on the one hand and subordination on the other led to profound tensions and ambiguities. As Phil Corrigan has reminded us, “We have to avoid reading back into history the total acceptance on the part of the apparently vanquished of the ideals and ends of their victors. . . . We should never assume a total commitment to the status quo from this appearance of acceptance.”⁴⁵ In Natal-Zululand in particular, recent history, daily experience, and popular consciousness ensured a more complex reality. R. V. Selope Thema described yet another prominent member of the *kholwa* community, Pixley ka Isaka Seme, who was president of the ANC in 1930, a close colleague of Dube’s, and married to Solomon’s sister: “The founder was born in Natal of a Christian

family. But like an African boy of the nineteenth century, he grew up in an environment which was neither African nor European: at home he was under the influence of Christian parents and American missionaries, but outside on the hills, in the valleys and the banks of the river of his beautiful country, he came into contact with the ancient life of his people and learnt about the deeds of his warrior kings.”⁴⁶

Even at the Cape, where bourgeois liberal ideology had had its triumph as a strategy of incorporating blacks into the colonial order (through, for example, the Cape’s nonracial franchise and its insistence on equality before the law — though the unequal nature of the law was rarely questioned), it had little white popular support. As Stanley Trapido has remarked, Cape liberalism “depended for its legitimacy on its associations with the programmes of incorporation which the governing classes evolved in nineteenth century Britain.” At the Cape, liberalism was accepted and developed because there were local structural conditions that facilitated it — essentially the interest Cape merchants, missionaries, and colonial officials had in the creation and incorporation of an independent and stable black peasantry and artisan class. Undoubtedly at the Cape, concession and incorporation were intended to defuse discontent.⁴⁷ Liberalism was meant to facilitate the creation of a nineteenth-century colonial order in which Africans would become, to quote the leading advocate of the abolition of slavery and the fostering of legitimate commerce, “some scores of millions of customers who may be taught to grow the raw material which we [i.e. the British] require and who buy the manufactured goods which we produce.”⁴⁸

Cape liberalism acted powerfully to reconcile African Christians to this order and provided them with a language of resistance when the colonial state failed to live up to the norms set by imperial ideology. This is very clear in Dube’s attack on the principle of segregation in the second decade of the century and his constant appeal to “England’s duty”⁴⁹ and the “white

man's burden," but it can already be heard in the language of Tiyo Soga, one of the first black South Africans to be trained overseas and the first Xhosa missionary, a man as outstanding in the nineteenth century Cape as Dube was in twentieth-century Natal. As early as the 1860s on the Cape eastern frontier, Soga strove to reconcile his belief in the civilizing mission of empire with his experience of its immediate rapacity.

In his recent biography of Soga, Donovan Williams has described some of the tensions as Soga was torn between his enthusiasm for the history and traditions of his people, and his admiration for progress, Christianity, and "civilization," which he identified with imperial expansion:

Basically . . . Tiyo Soga wanted to preserve Black territorial and cultural integrity. British conquest was legitimate because it was a vehicle for civilisation ordained by God for the salvation and elevation of the blacks. Black society should be purged of all that was obnoxious to Christian morality, but not at the expense of intrinsic institutions and values which gave it cohesion and security . . . [or undermined] black dignity.⁵⁰

Williams finds this aspect of Soga's life "fascinating, provocative and troublesome," and explains it in terms of his "intercalary role" as the "mediator between cultures." He argues that Soga's nationalism and pan-Africanism (Williams goes so far as to call Soga the father of black nationalism in South Africa) thus can be seen "paradoxically" to have their roots in the fact that he was "a man of two worlds."⁵¹ Yet the dilemmas arising out of this situation were painful; the cruelties and constraints of the precolonial African social order were not imagined, however much they may have been matched by the ruthlessness and exploitation of colonial rule, while "civilization" brought expanded opportunities and real advantages that could not be scorned. The very access to print through the literacy and English language brought by the missionaries made the new "imagined political community" implied by nationalism a possibility.⁵²

Christian Africans recognized both the meaningfulness of European "progress" and the fearful price that had to be paid. It was surely this tension that led to "the complex interplay between the poles of rejection and co-operation"⁵³ that characterized the politics and ideology of John Dube and the Christian African community of which he was the most outstanding representative in Natal. The interplay became even more marked in the last quarter of the nineteenth century, as mineral discoveries began to transform South Africa's political economy. Paradoxically, Kimberley, which gave educated Africans their greatest opportunity, was also the harbinger of their marginalization.

By the time the African elite was so enthusiastically improving itself, the mid-Victorian faith in the prescriptive power of "civilization" was waning. As the forces of production expanded in South Africa and made the mid-Victorian vision possible in a dramatically new way, both imperialists and Cape liberals retreated from the vision. This was not simply because, as Benedict Anderson has put it, "the expansion of the colonial state . . . invited 'natives' into schools and offices" while the expansion of "colonial capitalism . . . excluded them from boardrooms" and left them "lonely bilingual intelligentsias unattached to sturdy local bourgeoisies."⁵⁴ It was also because the demands of monopoly capital, first on the diamond fields of Kimberley, then in the gold mines of the Witwatersrand, for vast quantities of unskilled, cheap labor, and the speed with which that labor had to be conjured up, conquered, and coerced left little room in the long run for an enfranchised black peasantry and artisan class.⁵⁵ At the same time, the African elite was rendered more vulnerable by the growing insecurity that underpinned late nineteenth-century imperial expansion, and by the parallel changes in ideology increasingly shaped by social Darwinism, "Anglo-Saxon race pride," and notions of national efficiency on the one hand, together with the rise of Afrikaner nationalism and the consolidation of settler society in South Africa on the other.

In Natal, in any case, there had been little material basis for the development of a settler liberalism from the outset, despite the fact that its colonists were drawn almost entirely from Victorian Britain (unlike the Cape, where about half the white population was of Dutch or Afrikaans descent). As we have seen, in Natal the resilience of African society and the weakness of the colonial state (together with the unwillingness of the British to foot the bill) had led almost from the start to a set of policies dependent on conserving and manipulating aspects of the African precapitalist social order. The outspoken adherence of the ruling stratum in nineteenth-century Natal to an ideology of segregation was by no means shared by the struggling settlers. Indeed, the latter would have far preferred the outright expropriation of Africans in place of the setting aside of special reserves or locations, and the outright coercion of African labor in place of what was termed "squatting" — the ability of Africans to live as rent-paying tenants on Crown or other white-owned land. At the same time their hostility to the Christian African peasantry and landowners, some of whom were decidedly more successful than their white counterparts, made it far more difficult for Natal *kholwa* to model themselves on an idealized perception of imperial middle-class society in the way that the African intelligentsia in Kimberley with their South African Improvement Society, the Come Again Lawn Tennis Club, and their Eccentric Cricket Club were able to do.⁵⁶

I do not wish to exaggerate the degree of identification of the African intelligentsia with mid-Victorian manners even at the Cape, nor to suggest a lack of racism there. Nevertheless, the combination in Natal of a dominant ideology of segregation together with virulent British settler racism, only partially modified by a more liberal missionary ethos, made for significant differences. As early as 1860 there was an assertion of the validity of certain African customs such as *lobola* (bridewealth) and polygyny by black Christians in Natal, which confronted the total condemnation of the American Board missionaries and

the colonial legal system.⁵⁷ Equally there was a recognition of the need to create links with surrounding "tribal" society.⁵⁸ And while members of the Wesleyan Methodist settlements at Driefontein and Edendale fought on the British side during the Anglo-Zulu War, and some even took up arms against the "rebels" in 1906, it is noticeable that this was not true on either occasion of converts of the American Board. Perhaps the governor of Natal in 1906, Sir Henry McCallum, was rightly suspicious of American pastors who, after all, "could not be expected to advocate the principle of honouring the King as much as that of fearing God."⁵⁹

More significant than the suspect loyalty of American Board missionaries, however, was the increasing recognition by the turn of the century, that despite their increased education and prosperity (and the latter was by no means any longer a foregone conclusion) the *kholwa* were up against increased rather than diminished obstacles in their aspirations for acceptance as part of the colonial bourgeoisie, and in their quest for accumulation. Thus, from the late nineteenth century, the *kholwa* peasantry of Natal came under increasing pressure, as Natal's agriculture underwent dramatic transformations in response to the newly opened markets on the Rand.⁶⁰ And while some of the peasants, particularly along the line of rail, and some of the older established families were certainly able to take advantage of the new markets for a time, the increase in the white population (300 percent between 1890 and 1936),⁶¹ the transfer of power to a white settler government in 1893, and the rise in land prices made it difficult for newcomers to compete. Drought, rinderpest (cattle disease), locusts and war all undermined the position of the peasantry in the 1890s and 1900s. Even the wealthy landowners were becoming aware that they would need to seek a larger constituency to help protect the gains they had made so far, if not to expand them. And this meant forging links with the wider African community.

It would be foolish to reduce this simply to material self-

interest. For many the great crisis of commitment came with the Bambatha or Poll Tax Rebellion of 1906. In general the *kholwa* community did not participate in the uprising. Although some were swift to declare their loyalty to the colonists and condemn the "rebels,"⁶² for the majority white firepower was a potent deterrent: the *kholwa* were unlikely to have shared the popular belief that if they carried out the appropriate ritual the white man's bullets would turn to water — a view prevalent among the "rebels" in Natal, as it had been in the Maji-Maji rising in German East Africa in 1905. Nor, however, did the Christian Africans respond to the Natal government's call for loyal levies with their earlier alacrity. Their incipient nationalism can be seen in the response of an American Zulu mission congregation to a white missionary's sermon based on what he had seen. It caused an uproar in his congregation, and a bitter correspondence in the columns of Dube's newspaper, *Ilange lase Natal*. Discussion with some of the leading landowners revealed that the missionary "had failed to correctly estimate the depth of feeling on the part of people who, though not in sympathy with the rebels could not hear a recital of its events from the lips of a white man without feeling that he was gloating over the success of his own race."⁶³ It was indeed in the year after the uprising that links between Dube and Dinuzulu, Solomon's father, were consistently forged — although there were rumours even before 1906 that Dube was in league with the ex-king and agitating for his reinstatement. With the arrest and second trial of Dinuzulu his case was taken up and reported with passion in the columns of *Ilange lase Natal*.

For the landowners of Natal and the black South African petty bourgeoisie more generally, however, the unification of white South Africa in 1910 was the first spur to more unified black action and led to the formation in 1912 of the South African Native National Congress, with John Dube as its first president. In this pan-South African political arena, the black elite saw their way forward through an inclusive, liberal-democratic

nationalism. This was itself in part a challenge to the exclusive nationalism being forged by the Afrikaner petty bourgeoisie at this time, as they began to recover from the body-blows of the South African War and to mobilize against the imperial domination of South Africa's political economy. Moreover, the Union excluded African representation in the institutions of state, with the exception of the continued, qualified, non-racial franchise in the Cape. If, however, it was opposition to the Act of Union that led to the formation of the Congress, it was the 1913 Native Lands Act, to which I have already alluded, that almost immediately gave it a cause that could mobilize support far beyond the confines of its initial constituency.

The outcome of what Stanley Trapido has dubbed the "alliance of maize and gold," the 1913 Native Lands Act was designed to achieve several purposes simultaneously. Through limiting the amount of land available for African ownership to what were known as the "scheduled areas" (i.e. the existing reserves and African-owned land — some 8 percent of the total land in South Africa, increased to about 13 percent by the Native Lands and Trust Act of 1936), the Act aimed at eliminating the competition to white agriculture from African peasant production, while ensuring an exodus of workers to white-owned farms and mines, whose families could still support themselves in the rural areas (see Tables 1, 2 and 3). Outside of the scheduled areas Africans could neither purchase nor hire nor sharecrop land without the express permission of the governor-general. Thus the Act not only definitively limited the amount of land available for African purchase in the future, but it also transformed various forms of rent-paying, purchase and sharecropping arrangements into labor-tenancy and gave the landlords powerful leverage over their tenants by bringing them all under the Masters and Servants Act.⁶⁴

Although it represented a key moment in the capitalization of South African agriculture, the Lands Act was not initially welcomed by poorer white farmers who still found accumulation

Table 1. Morgen of Land Occupied by Africans in Natal and Zululand

Class of Land	1916	1926
Rural locations (reserves)	2,897,120	3,633,210
African-owned land	176,834	131,612
Crown lands	340,802	807,133
Mission lands	152,507	146,168
White-owned lands occupied exclusively by Africans	1,012,139	290,256

Note: 1 morgen = 2,116 acres.

Table 2. Numbers of Africans on Various Classes of Land in Natal and Zululand

Class of Land	1916	1936
Reserves	479,822	693,000
Mission reserves	44,535	74,000
African-owned lands	39,250	81,000*
Crown lands	37,070	46,000
White farms	443,451	622,000
Urban areas	37,954	128,000

* Plus 10,000 on tribally purchased land.

Table 3. Total Population in Natal and Zululand

Date	White	African	Asian
<i>Natal</i>			
1890s	46,000 (1891)	503,208 (1894)	35,411 (1894)
<i>Natal and Zululand</i>			
1904	97,109	904,041	100,918
1911	98,582	951,808	141,568*
1921	136,887	1,193,804	141,600
1936	190,549	1,553,629	183,661

* In 1911 "Coloureds" (people of mixed white and African or Asian descent) were exceptionally included.

easier through rentier and sharecropping activities.⁶⁵ In Natal there was a howl of outrage from the white farmers, who alleged that their development was being threatened with "strangulation" and "asphyxiation" by the Act.⁶⁶ Not only did they object to government interference with their rentier and sharecropping activities, which had, in any case, been transformed in Natal since the 1890s by the capitalization of agriculture; more importantly they were appalled by the suggestion of the Beaumont Commission appointed under the Act that a further 3,800,000 acres (nearly one million morgen) be added to the existing 5,900,000 acres of reserve land in Zululand and Natal. The local committee appointed to revise Beaumont's findings promptly stripped this down by three quarters despite the fact that the vast bulk of land set aside for Africans was unsuited to white (and, he might have added, black) occupation, being very "malarial, sandy and badly watered."⁶⁷ The mood in white Natal was well summed up by Dr. A. W. Roberts before a Select Committee on Land in 1927: "The actual resolution taken all over Natal was that there should not be a single inch given to the natives over and above the scheduled areas."⁶⁸

Despite their hostility to the Lands Act, white landowners were not opposed to making use of those provisions of the Act that suited their interests. While little further land was in fact acquired to relieve the congestion in the already overcrowded reserves, they were not averse to using the Act to evict those tenants who would not accept the new labor terms, or, if they preferred to maintain rent tenancies, to disguise these payments as "dipping fees" (i.e. fees demanded in exchange for dipping African-owned cattle in disinfectant against East Coast fever). By the 1920s, the Lands Act, in itself part of the process of transformation of Natal's agrarian social relations, had accelerated the growth of a considerable landless and increasingly radicalized peasantry (see below). By limiting the amount of land available for African purchase, the Lands Act seemed to the *kholwa* a mortal wound. As the Reverend Kumalo remarked

before the 1917 Natal Local Native Lands Committee: "The proposed Bill will operate very harshly. . . . We have money but we are restricted from buying it [land]."⁶⁹ Chief Mbekhwe, one of the Trustees of the Methodist syndicate at Matiwane's Kop, added, "We see that the design is to deprive us of those lands we have bought with our own exertions . . . and to place us upon land upon which we cannot possibly subsist. Yet some years ago it was constantly dinned into our ears that we were lazy people who did not appreciate the advantage of buying land nor cultivating it, but now that we have awakened to its advantage we are to be restricted."⁷⁰

The multi-faceted nature of the Act enabled the African landowners and intelligentsia to present their class interest as the general interest, to speak on behalf of the whole African community, and with passion, although even at the time their claims did not go uncontested.⁷¹ For Sol Plaatje, the newly appointed secretary of the South African Native National Congress, the 1913 Lands Act turned "the native into a pariah in the land of his birth."⁷² Dube, who, like Plaatje, toured the countryside to record the impact of the Act, was no less scathing in his denunciation:

The tales of misery caused to hundreds of my compatriots by the recent Native Lands Act . . . compel me to force myself on the public notice. It is only a man with a heart of stone who could hear and see what I hear and see, and yet remain callous and unmoved. It would break your hearts did you but know, as I know, the cruel and undeserved afflictions wrought by the harsh enactment on numberless aged, poor and tender children of this, my and their only native land. Forth from the ashes of their burnt out kraals, kicked away like dogs by Christian people from their humble hearths from the dear old scenes where their fathers were born and they grew up in simple peace, bearing malice to none and envying neither European nor Indian the wealth and plenty they can amass for themselves from this their land, these unfortunate outcasts pass homeless, unwanted, silently suffering along

the highways and byways of the land, seeking in vain the most unprofitable waste whereon to build their hovel and rest and live, victims of an unknown civilisation that has all too suddenly overtaken and overwhelmed them.⁷³

Paradoxically, it was the 1913 Lands Act, which Dube was attacking with such vigor (and surely with an eye on the imperial humanitarian lobby whose tone he so faithfully captures), that both lent plausibility to the *kholwa* claim to speak on behalf of all Africans and undermined, then fractured, the unity of the *kholwa* community itself and led to the displacement of Dube from the presidency of Congress. For if the 1913 Lands Act unified the African opposition in the short term, in the medium term its effects were to increase the differentiation between long-established *kholwa* landowners and the evicted peasantry, who were pushed into the towns, into the reserves — and also onto the lands of black landowners. Although the amount of land privately owned by Africans actually decreased between 1916 and 1926, the number of people on it increased from 39,000 to 81,000.⁷⁴

While the small number of more successful African farmers (an increasing number of whom began sugar cultivation in the mid-1920s)⁷⁵ allowed labor-tenants onto their land, those less able to compete with capitalist agriculture, because of lack of credit and technology and poorer access to the market, turned to landlordism. Increasingly, the *kholwa* landowners became rentiers, allowing the evicted to settle on their lands in exchange for a money-rent, now earned not through petty commodity production but through wage-labor in the towns and mines. As a result, the interwar years saw the acceleration of a process that changed the once flourishing mission settlements and syndicate lands into rural slums. By 1933 the Wesleyan Methodist settlement at Edendale, which we described in its mid-nineteenth-century heyday with 450 inhabitants, now had 5,000. In 1938 the Thornton Committee on Health described Edendale in terms very different from those of

the glowing travellers' reports of the nineteenth century:

The sanitary conditions at Edendale were deplorable in the extreme. . . . The dwellings consist for the most part of ill-lit and very badly ventilated wattle and daub structures, often without sanitary conveniences. When the latter are provided, they are mostly insanitary and badly sited. It is, therefore, not surprising that epidemics have occurred at Edendale in the past and conditions are such that further outbreaks are expected at any time.⁷⁶

Edendale, which acted increasingly as a commuter suburb for the city of Pietermaritzburg, was perhaps hit particularly hard; nevertheless a widespread picture of faction-ridden, impoverish- ed, and divided communities emerges from the state and mission records of the interwar years, with serious tensions between landlords and their tenants, and landlords and the rural landless. As one Mpofo Ogle remarked before the 1917 Local Lands Committee, Africans who have bought land "are hated by those who have no land. . . . There are a large number of natives who are without fields owing to the greed of others in demanding a larger amount of land than they are entitled to."⁷⁷

Dube himself put the point equally clearly before a missionary conference in Johannesburg in 1925, when he remarked that "the prosperity of the native Christians rouses jealousy among the other members of the tribe and the chief himself. A cry is raised that the Kholwas are using up all the land . . . [and] cattle have nowhere to graze."⁷⁸ Initially, through Dube's activities and those of the South African Native National Congress, it seemed as though these contradictions could be contained. In 1917, however, Dube was ousted from the presidency of the national organization, ostensibly because of his acquiescence in "the principle of segregation so far as it can be fairly and practically carried out,"⁷⁹ but in fact probably because by then part of the national organization, especially on the Rand, was becoming rather more radical than its Natal leader.⁸⁰ Be that as it may, it is in Dube's need to look once again for a more local

constituency, at a time of increased state emphasis on the ideology of segregation and of rising tension within African society in Natal, that part of the answer to our conundrum of his funeral oration may be sought.

Dube severed his ties with the SANNC's national executive in 1917 as the result of his being ousted from the national presidency. Over the next thirty years the Congress movement in Natal was bedeviled by factions, with an official branch still adhering to the national organization and a more conservative Natal Native Congress, which was dominated by Dube and probably represented the larger landowners. It was only after the death of Dube in 1946 that George Champion, through adroit political maneuvering, brought the two Natal organizations together again and more fully into the orbit of the national organization. Tensions remained, indeed, until the election of Albert Luthuli, first as president of the provincial Congress and then as national president.⁸¹

After 1917, forced to mobilize his own constituency, Dube seems to have turned increasingly to the Zulu royal family, and to the rich history and ritual it provided for ethnic nationalism. The recent memories of conquest and the dramatic quality of the Zulu past and royal symbolism provided a ready source of material for an indigenous "refurbishing of traditionalism," which was reinforced by the state's efforts in the same direction. At the same time, Dube continued to believe in progress through education and accumulation, and to preach the virtues of thrift and industry. A founder in the early thirties of the Bantu Business League (one of many similar organizations designed to assist small African businessmen), Dube was clearly engaged in a number of entrepreneurial schemes as well as in sugar-planting.⁸² This may have lain behind George Champion's description of his old enemy in 1937: "Mr Dube is a business man and a politician. His capitalistic views do not agree with those of the masses."⁸³ The characterization was not so much unfair as somewhat hypocritical, given Champion's almost

identical class position; his rhetoric, as we shall see, was much more populist. Both Dube and Champion, however, had to find a larger constituency; both turned to the Zulu royal family as part of the strategy for doing so.

As Tom Nairn has put it in an important article on nationalism entitled "The Modern Janus," elites on the periphery have "had to contest the concrete form in which . . . progress had taken them by the throat, even as they set out to progress by themselves."⁸⁴ To defend and expand their opportunities they had in turn to mobilize their own society and consciously create a "militant inter-class community rendered strongly (if mystically) aware of its own separate identity vis-à-vis the outside forces of domination":

Mobilisation had to be in terms of what was there; and the whole point of the dilemma was that there was nothing there. . . . All that there *was* was the people and the peculiarities of the region: its inherited *ethos*, speech, folklore, and so on. Nationalism works through differentiae like those because it has to. It is not necessarily democratic in outlook, but it *is* invariably populist.⁸⁵

In the South African case this mobilization was rendered difficult because of the double defense that had to be mounted — against metropolitan imperialism and the more immediate threat of settler encroachment. Moreover, the most virulently hostile of the settlers had seized these very weapons for their own defense against the imperialist thrust in their creation of Afrikaner nationalism. An appeal to imperial and nineteenth-century liberal norms was the logical response for those who had witnessed the rapacity of colonial encroachment on African lands, the ferocity with which Afrikaner commandoes threatened to end the franchise of the black communities during the Anglo-Boer War, or the savagery with which Natal had put down the Bambatha Rebellion.

The problem was that this language of resistance could hardly mobilize a mass movement — especially by the 1920s when the many appeals by the nationalist elite for imperial intervention had manifestly failed to deliver the goods. The result was a discourse in which Dube appealed to several different audiences simultaneously. On the whole, American scholars have heard the voice of Booker T. Washington, British liberals that of Victorian liberalism.⁸⁶ The Zulu ethnic nationalism directed at his home constituency has been relatively unexplored by historians, but was a crucial part of Dube's rhetoric. And as the state itself came to support its variant of ethnicity in terms of Hertzog's segregationist policies,⁸⁷ this gave Dube and his confreres further impetus and leverage.

The links between Dube and the Zulu royal family were of course not initiated simply in response to the increasing segregationism of the state. As we have seen he had already been roused by the fate of Dinuzulu after the Bambatha Rebellion. Present at Dinuzulu's funeral, Dube had acted informally as an adviser to the young Solomon in the years that followed. Nevertheless, it was only after 1918 or 1919 that those looser connections began to take political shape, in the meetings between the members of the Zulu royal family and their immediate circle and the Natal *kholwa*, who were largely led by Dube. Thus, according to the missionary L. H. Oscroft, the Zulu National Council or *Inkatha* (precursor of the National Cultural Liberation Movement founded in 1975 by Chief Gatsha Buthelezi) owed its origins in 1922 – 1923 to both the deliberate resuscitation by the Zulu royal family of traditional forms and the active collaboration in the process of "educated natives from outside."⁸⁸ The first *Inkatha* was closely associated with the raising of a Zulu National Fund, which was alleged to have £3,000 banked in Vryheid in 1923 and was used to pay off debts of the Zulu royal family (which were considerable); the intention was also to use the funds "for the benefit of the Zulu nation from time to time."⁸⁹

At a 500-strong meeting of *Inkatha* in 1924 the matters discussed included the building of a national church, which the royal family wished to be called the "Chaka Zulu's Church" (though *kholwa* opposition led to a change in name to the Zulu National Church); the Zulu National Fund, the resolution of divisions within the Zulu royal family, which went back to Cetshwayo's day; and opposition to the introduction of the council system on the Transkei model into Zululand because the meeting maintained that "the present means of government through Solomon and the chiefs should not be interfered with."⁹⁰ According to Osofrot once again, "the real object" of *Inkatha* was "to unite all black races . . . they consider that the native is victimised in many ways and receives unfair and unjust treatment from the white man; that this will continue as long as the natives are divided; that the native people will never be strong until there is unity among them. They are casting around for a rallying point — a central figure — and that figure would seem to be Solomon."⁹¹

For the *kholwa* landowners and petty bourgeoisie the royal family could perform functions that the subordinate chiefs recognized by the Natal administration could not (despite the linkages between the chiefs and the royal family). The royal family could play a role in pan-Zulu nationalism and also a self-consciously modernizing role. The position of the king was likened to that of the king of England as a constitutional monarch — perhaps not surprisingly given *kholwa* ideological formation and the enormous strength in nineteenth-century South Africa of the myth of "The Great White Queen" as the symbol of imperial hegemony. Nor should one forget the powerful missionary symbolism of "Christ the King." By 1928 Wheelwright, the chief native commissioner, could remark with alarm on the extent to which African political organizations were courting Solomon's favor, notwithstanding the fact that "the emergence of strong democratic political bodies among the Native people would tend to undermine the comparative

autonomy of the Chiefs which he represents." To Wheelwright's dismay, business letters, political circulars, and postcards were all being circulated with Solomon's photograph inscribed "King of the Zulu."⁹²

Solomon was not slow to encourage their belief that he could become a model constitutional monarch, as he advocated increased educational and industrial opportunities for his people, while pleading for the continuance of the "Zulu tribal system," and extolling "the traditional merits of his race, the virtue of our women and the honesty of our people."⁹³ The 1932 Native Economic Commission elicited a surprising degree of support among the educated elite for the Zulu paramountcy and the tribal system, even if this was hedged about somewhat. Thus within the specifically Natal-Zululand political arena, the elements of popular consciousness associated with the monarchy were now being woven into a new, essentially conservative ideology in which the king became "the pivot of Zulu cultural life."⁹⁴ This was most explicit in the foundation in 1935 of the Zulu Society by the Natal Bantu Teachers' Association, for the promotion of "Zulu cultural identity." It had as one of its chief roles lobbying the government to recognize the Zulu paramountcy.⁹⁵ It should come as no surprise that John Dube was first president and that the regent, Mshiyeni, who followed Solomon, was its honorary patron.

Nor were these ideological roles the only ones the Zulu royal family could play. Above all, it can be argued that with the sharpening of class conflict in Natal and also in the Zulu countryside in the 1920s and the rise of the Industrial and Commercial Workers' Union (ICU), which we discuss in the next chapter, the Zulu royal family and the traditionalism it represented constituted a bulwark against radical change, as much for the wealthier African landowners and the chiefs as for the ideologues of segregation. This indeed was recognized by Solomon in a bitter attack on Champion and the ICU in August 1927. Commenting in *Ilanga lase Natal*, Dube took the opportunity of

the English translation to make his message even more explicit:

The organisation would be a good thing in industrial centres if the ideal aimed at was the amelioration of conditions under which Natives labour, and to secure those means by co-operation of both Natives and Europeans. But he [Solomon] regards the leaders as very dangerous. . . . The ICU are exploiting poor Native workers. . . . The leaders are irresponsible, they do not understand the relation of capital to labour, the need for investment. . . . What workers are they looking for in the native areas and reserves? Are any of the leaders engaged in business employing a number of people for farming and paying 8 shillings a day for their workers? How about that for men of Groutville, Amanzimtoti and Ifafa! Are they prepared to pay their employee that wage? How long can they raise cane at a profit if they pay such wages?⁹⁶

By 1930, there is evidence that Solomon's hostility to the ICU had considerably abated, and he and Champion appear to have established a cordial relationship, though it was masked on Solomon's side by his usual deference to the officials who looked with dismay on the accord.⁹⁷ That twist to the story must be explored in the next chapter, however. Here I would like to end with a reflection on the following remarks by John Foster in his *Class Struggle and the Industrial Revolution*:

The patterns of culture that define any group's identity are not arbitrary but concrete, based upon historically determined levels of consumption. And the job of maintaining and defending this identity is clearly integral to the structure of any particular grouping. It cannot be imposed from outside. To maintain itself in a technologically changing society, a sub-group has to accept and reject. And within most it is possible to identify two distinct groupings (or "poles") of leaders, one trying to open it up to developments in society at large (and especially to the rapidly changing occupational and cultural demands put upon it); the other — mediating at a more intense level — defending its

traditional identity and particularly the objective rights and standards used to define it against others.⁹⁸

Foster is of course writing about early nineteenth-century England, where the "poles" did perhaps remain apart. In the periphery, as Nairn suggests, acceptance and rejection go hand in hand. For Dube, and for others like him, the central ambiguity of nationalism was rendered even more equivocal by his need to simultaneously espouse nineteenth-century liberal and missionary norms against settler nationalism on the one hand, and to call on the masses while defending his own position against the masses on the other. Some of these ambiguities are neatly encapsulated in the invitation extended by John Dube to the governor-general (still widely regarded as the representative of imperial rather than settler hegemony) to unveil a monument at Stanger to commemorate Shaka, "who is looked upon as the founder of the Zulu nation and power."⁹⁹