From: The South African Communist Party In Exile 1963 - 1990
The Party, as an organisation, underwent a number of changes during the exile period, some of which were revisited after the unbanning in 1990. To begin with, the leadership structure of the Party was unstable throughout the exile period for a number of reasons. Leading figures in the Party before the exile period, besides Kotane and Marks, included Rusty Bernstein and Michael Harmel. In exile, however, Bernstein's prominence at the leadership level dropped, and Harmel, while continuing to be central, especially within the Secretariat, was transferred to Prague to represent the Party on the board of the World Marxist Review, and died in June 1974. Therefore, with the hospitalisation of both Kotane and Marks in 1970, and the death of the latter in August 1972, the leadership of the Party had to rely mainly on Slovo and Dadoo. While Kotane died in May 1978, he was however not in a position to effectively execute his responsibilities as the general secretary between at least 1970 and 1978.
Similarly, Mabhida, in taking over the general secretaryship from Kotane in 1979, moved the Party to new heights, but the Party was soon to be deprived of his services after the 6* Congress in 1984. After having spent some two years in and out of hospital, Mabhida died in March 1986; his position was only filled, at least practically, at the 7th Congress three years later. Therefore, in effect, the Party was, at least practically, without a general secretary between around 1970 and 1978 and between around 1984 and 1986. The business of running and leading the Party during these periods was in the hands of those who were central in the Secretariat and, in the 1980s, in the PB.
Of all these exile Party leaders, with the exception of Bernstein, only Slovo survived until the unbanning in 1990. Slovo played a critical role in building the external mission, by steering the setting up of the Secretariat in London, playing a leading role in attempts to resuscitate the underground inside the country, and occupying a key role in Party-ANC relations. However, Slovo only became chairperson following the death of Dadoo and the general secretary at the 7th Congress, contenting himself during most of the exile period with confining his leadership role to serving the Party in the Secretariat and the PB. All in all, Slovo's role during the exile period remains a complex area that will require detailed research, especially on how he managed to gain promiÂnence from 1963, to the extent of overshadowing Party leaders who were more senior than him such as Bernstein, Harmel and even Kotane and Marks.
The exile period also produced a new leadership for the Party, especially from the 1970s, notably Mac Maharaj, Chris Hani, Josiah Jele and John Nkadimeng, and with the co-option of the youth in the 1980s, January "Che" Masilela.
The substance of the membership of the Party also underwent both quantitative and qualitative changes during the exile period. As the membership increased, first in the mid-1970s and again in the 1980s, more and more youth joined the Party. With the unbanning in 1990, the Party experienced a more dramatic growth in membership, this time the ranks of the organisation being swelled by people many of whom had little or no exile experience.
As to relations with the ANC, these were not a one-way traffic whereby the latter was nothing but a pawn of the Party. There is no doubt that the Party, especially with its September 1981 resolution on working in "fraternal" organisations, was serious and systematic about its determination to influence the direction of the ANC, as exemplified, for example, by the Lusaka Regional Committee circular to its units of 23 April 1986:
The ANC Department of Political Education is to start its work soon. Units must ensure that all members take active part in the work of this organ - attend the discussions, make effective Party input into the whole programme and assist whenever necessary. We consider this work very essential in that it is one important forum for Party ideological work within the liberation movement, for our education and establishing which among NLM [national liberation movement] cadres have the potential to become Party members.1
The reason why the Party wanted to influence the direction of the ANC was not because of a conspiratorial, Soviet agenda as some have suggested, but because, unlike its counterparts in other parts of Africa, the SACP was informed by a conviction that its socialist ideal could be achieved through the attainment of the national democratic order. The Party was also convinced that its Marxist ideology was superior, and that its Leninist organisational principles and practices promoted high political standards and instilled in its cadres a special form of discipline. Admittedly, however, the SACP in exile organised itself as a conspiratorial group within the ANC and the whole liberation movement, not only because of its position on working in "fraternal" organisations, but also due to the fact that its members were not supposed to disclose their Party membership, and nor were Party CC members themselves known to other alliance partners.
Thus the relationship between the ANC and SACP was more dynamic than what some have argued. The ANC, for its part, and largely thanks to the leadership of Tambo, was also conscious in its effort to ensure that it was not controlled by the Party - that it remained independent as a nationalist movement. At the same time, however, the two organisations did in fact influence each other in a number of areas, especially on matters pertaining to ideology, strategies and tactics, and organisational practice. This contradictory, mutual pull in the relationship between the two organisations contributed to the ups and downs that the relationship in question experienced during the exile period. A careful and patient reading of the ANC archives should help in drawing a picture of how this dynamic relationship evolved and developed in exile.
The question to ask is whether there was continuity or discontinuity between the SACP of the period 1953-63 and that of the exile years? At the leadership level, the emergence of Slovo as a central figure was a factor. Ideologically, the Colonialism of a Special Type thesis was developed further, especially with regard to elements pertaining to the relationship between the Party and the ANC. So was the theory of armed struggle, as the Party shifted from the detonator and the rural-based guerilla warfare theory to "people's war". Organisationally, districts gave way to regions, and working underground was mastered in exile, including what the Lusaka Region termed a "conspiratorial characteristic in our style of work". Finally, in terms of membership, the Party in exile had to do with members located in artificial environments such as army camps, and even those who were in places such as London considered themselves to be refugees. For that matter, the primary purpose of Party work was directed towards "home".
Following the unbanning of the ANC and SACP, a more important challenge faced the Party at the ideological level. At one level, how was the struggle for socialism to be executed during the 1990-94 transition, and, at another level, what and how should socialism be constructed in the 21st century especially in the light of the collapse of the Soviet Union and other former socialist countries? These questions were to persist after the first democratic elections in April 1994, and stand at the heart of the substance of the role of the Party in the post-1994 transition, and the relationship between the Party and the ANC as both a liberation movement and a governing party. The Party, like its communist counterparts in some post-colonial African countries, is faced with the difficulty of having to survive as a socialist force within an alliance that is led by a nationalist movement.