

BA 320.53205 AFR  
66 5.83/106

66

NO. 66 Third Quarter 1976

**THE AFRICAN COMMUNIST**

*Published quarterly in the interests of  
African solidarity, and as a forum for  
Marxist-Leninist thought throughout  
our Continent, by the  
South African Communist Party*

**No. 66 Third Quarter 1976**

## CONTENTS

### 5 EDITORIAL NOTES

*No Compromise in South Africa; Release S.A. Political Prisoners; The South Africa – Israel Axis; New U.S. Party Journal.*

*J. Villiers*

### 19 TRANSKEI "INDEPENDENCE" FRAUD

*The Transkei Bantustan is to get its "independence" from South Africa on October 26, 1976. The author shows that this "decolonisation" represents fraud and theft against the African people.*

*A Special Correspondent*

### 41 THE FINAL BATTLE FOR ZIMBABWE

*An analysis of the forces, both human and material, at work in the struggle to liberate Zimbabwe from the clutches of the Smith regime and its imperialist allies.*

*Dr Yusuf Dadoo*

### 48 AN IMPRESSIVE DEMONSTRATION OF COMMUNIST UNITY

*A report on the 25th Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union written by the national chairman of the South African Communist Party who headed the SACP delegation to the congress.*

### 57 NEW PERSPECTIVES FOR LIBERATION

*Message of the South African Communist Party to the 25th congress of the CPSU.*


*Ahmed Azad*

### 60 NO ROOM FOR ANTI-SOVIETISM IN AFRICA

*Anti-Communism and anti-Sovietism are weapons of the imperialists and reactionaries in the struggle to hold back the liberation movements in Africa, and curb the African peoples' drive towards political and economic independence.*

- Jean-Pierre Gombe*
- 69 RADICALISING THE REVOLUTION IN CONGO**  
*A member of the Special Revolutionary Staff of the Central Committee of the Congolese Party of Labour discusses problems which have arisen in the revolutionary process and the steps taken to overcome them.*
- 73 AFRICA: NOTES AND COMMENTS**  
*French Colonialism – The Struggle for its Final Liquidation; Senegal: Prospects for Change.*
- Ben Molapo*
- 82 ON THE NATIONAL QUESTION**  
*A correspondent demonstrates that an understanding of the national question is essential for the successful prosecution of the liberation struggle.*
- 94 BOOK REVIEWS**  
*Moshoeshoe – Chief of the Sotho by Peter Sanders;*  
*The Nationalists in Opposition 1934-1948 by Newell M. Stultz;*  
*Workers Without Weapons – The South African Congress of Trade Unions and the Organisation of African Workers by Edward Feit; Change in Contemporary South Africa edited by Leonard Thompson and Jeffrey Butler.*
- 105 LETTERS TO THE EDITOR**  
*From Vernet Mbatha and Idris Cox.*





## **NO COMPROMISE IN SOUTH AFRICA**

All the signs in southern Africa continue to point to the revolutionary policy outlined in the programme of the South African Communist Party as the only road to national independence and majority rule for the oppressed peoples of the sub-continent, paving the way to the ultimate achievement of socialism. It is necessary to re-emphasise this perspective because of the intensified attempts of the white supremacists and their imperialist allies to propose compromises and various types of concession as an alternative to struggle. In South Africa Vorster offers his Bantustans as an alternative to the Freedom Charter, and Matanzima maintains that this is the way forward for the African people. Addressing a so-called "foreign affairs conference" held in

Umtata last April, he decried "armed struggle, rivers of blood, genocide and resulting famine (which) seem all too often to constitute entry qualifications for today's community of nations", and asked plaintively: "If freedom is gained peacefully, is it less meritorious?" Nor has there been any pronounced shortage of careerists and opportunists who are prepared to take advantage of the Bantustan offer and attempt to make life comfortable for themselves, basing their hope of security not on the support of the people but on the strength of the South African police and military and their counterparts in the Bantustans who will be operating the self-same battery of security laws as apply in South Africa itself.

We print in this issue of *The African Communist* an article on Transkei "independence" which makes it clear that October 26 will not be Freedom Day for the people of the Transkei, but merely the date on which one gang of oppressors and exploiters will take office as the satraps of another. In fact, far from obtaining freedom, the majority of Africans "of Transkeian origin", who live and work in so-called "white" South Africa, will become people without a country, denied citizenship both by South Africa and the Transkei. Certainly, the Vorster regime regards the implementation of Bantustan as essential, not for the promotion of African aspirations, but for the consolidation of white hegemony not merely in South Africa itself but over the whole sub-continent. It is not without reason that the *Financial Mail* commented in its April 23 issue on "the grim reality of South Africa's legislative programme: that not one of the 87 Bills presented to Parliament so far this session reflects government's professed commitment to move away from race discrimination". On February 6, Minister of Justice Kruger, who is the father of the most repressive of the new Bills, admitted openly: "I say that the established rights of the whites must be guaranteed. These may well be discriminatory rights".

To guarantee these rights, the Government is embarking both legislatively and administratively on a wholesale programme of intensified repression. Two new evil laws destined to reach the statute book by the time these words appear in print are the Promotion of State Security Bill, which greatly widens police powers of arrest and detention without trial by allowing them to proceed against anybody who threatens "the security of the state or the maintenance of public order"; and the Bill establishing a Parliamentary Commission on Internal Security, South Africa's counterpart of the McCarthyite un-American Activities Committee which masterminded the devastating witch-hunt in the US at the time of the Korean War.

What these laws signify is that the Government is proposing to do



nothing to avoid the destructive storms which lie ahead, but is batten-  
ing down the hatches in preparation for action. The rivers of blood,  
genocide and what have you of which Matanzima warned, if they come,  
will clearly be the responsibility of a government which has shown that  
it is not prepared to make any meaningful concessions to the oppressed  
black majority of the population, certainly not to concede their  
demand for equal citizenship rights and opportunities, or any redistri-  
bution of power and privilege. "What we have we hold", say the racist  
exploiters.

Another factor compelling the oppressed black majority to take the  
road of struggle is the capitulation of the parliamentary opposition.  
The United Party, shedding members to the left and right, is more and  
more showing itself incapable even of producing verbiage to conceal its  
lack of a credible alternative to apartheid. The Progressive Party still has  
verbal facility, but rejects majority rule on the basis of one man one  
vote and thus leaves decision-making firmly in white hands despite all  
its proposed reforms. In any case, it has no chance of breaking out of  
the electoral straitjacket in which it is forced to function by the colour-  
bar constitution, no chance of ever coming into power by the free  
choice of an all-white electorate.

One may well wonder why the Vorster Government needs new  
weapons in its security armoury when it is already doing so much  
damage with those it already has. A report published by the Christian  
Institute last May stated that more than 200 people had been detained  
under the no-trial laws for a total of 61.8 years in the period since the  
beginning of 1974. These figures are probably an underestimate because  
the Government steadfastly refuses to give figures of the number of  
people detained under the Terrorism Act. The report states:

"An estimated 61.8 years (about 22,566 days) have been  
'borrowed' by the Government of South Africa from 217 people since  
the beginning of 1974. No compensation is given, no explanation  
offered, and no guarantee that the State will not 'take' more of their  
time during the years that lie ahead".

The report points out that of the 217 people detained only 39 were  
charged under the Terrorism Act and 7 under the Suppression of  
Communism Act. And of the 39 charged with terrorism, who spent a  
total of at least 10 years in solitary confinement before being charged,  
only seven had been sentenced. And what of the torture to which the  
detainees are subjected? And the 23 people who have died at the hands  
of the security police while under interrogation?

Now all this machinery of repression is to be intensified, all forms of  
meaningful dissent and opposition crushed as the Government prepares

for the coming struggle. In the face of this ruthless Government offensive, what real alternative is there to the policy which has been outlined in the Communist Party Programme, or the ANC's Strategy and Tactics adopted at the Morogoro conference? Only surrender, submission, compromise, defeat without struggle, an endless perspective of servility. Matanzima, for all his boasted "independence", will continue to take his orders from Pretoria, and those ex-members of the liberation movement who join his entourage, far from achieving even a limited sphere of power, will be showing themselves content to play the role of servants to a servant.

If this is the prospect before South Africa, what of Namibia and Zimbabwe? Basically, the same holds true. Vorster has claimed that South Africa is, through the Windhoek constitutional conference, allowing the people of Namibia to decide their own future, but because the conference delegates are handpicked on an ethnic basis and SWAPO is excluded, the whole issue is predetermined. In any case, Vorster assured the last Nationalist Party congress in Namibia that South Africa would never let the whites down in Namibia, and the leader of the Nationalist Party in Namibia, Mr A.H. du Plessis told the Youth Conference of the Nationalist Party at Swakopmund last April that whatever the outcome of the Windhoek talks, one thing was certain and that was that "we would not accept anything that was not acceptable to the white community". Black majority rule on the basis of one man one vote is certainly unacceptable to Namibian whites, and this is the explanation for the heavy concentration of South African police and military forces in the territory and the growing list of casualties among the ranks of the racist military and their collaborators.

As for Zimbabwe, Premier Smith has stated unequivocally that black majority rule is "out" for at least 1,000 years, and the prospect of a settlement has in consequence disappeared. The inclusion of seven state-appointed and paid chiefs in the government apparatus will do nothing to convince the African people that their interests are now adequately catered for. As the *Rand Daily Mail* commented on April 29: "By taking Africans into his Cabinet, Mr Smith acknowledges publicly that *something* must be done for black political aspirations. Unfortunately, he also emphasises that he is not doing it . . . The outside world is not going to be impressed. How could it be by Whites nominating the Africans who will talk for Africans?"

It is true that international pressure is being put on the Smith regime to reach some sort of accommodation with the liberation movement, and Dr Kissinger used the occasion of his first visit to Africa to proclaim his "undying support" for majority rule. Vorster, too, wants to



see peace in Rhodesia. But both Kissinger and Vorster want a settlement — even one involving the sacrifice of the Smith regime — for the wrong reasons: not because they want justice for the black majority, but because they want to douse the flames of the liberation struggle before they have engulfed the whole sub-continent. Smith was quite correct when he accused the American and British Governments of being prepared to sacrifice the whites of Rhodesia to buy time for themselves. The same holds true for Vorster, though Smith tactfully refrained from saying so, being still totally dependent on South Africa for his economic survival.

The very tactics being adopted by the imperialists in relation to Southern Africa emphasise the vital importance of South Africa itself in their calculations, and expose the fallacy of the domino theory in relation to the liberation of the whole area. The fall of Mozambique and Angola and the threatened collapse of Rhodesia do not portend the inevitable destruction of apartheid. On the contrary, what is being witnessed is a desperate attempt by the racists and imperialists to strengthen the apartheid regime and minimise the pressures against it so that their enormous and profitable investments, privileges and profits can be maintained indefinitely. Nor should we forget the strategic factor so frequently stressed by Vorster — that South Africa is the West's most reliable bastion in Africa against the "threat of international communism". The fact that, despite all the proclaimed arms embargoes, South Africa continues to receive military supplies, both covert and open, from most Western armouries makes plain the enormous importance of their vested interest in apartheid, and their determination to protect it.

The liberation movement cannot allow itself to be diverted from its task by Bantustan frauds or minor abatements of petty apartheid vexations, neither of which will in any way alter the essential relationship between white and black, the oppressors and the oppressed, the exploiters and the exploited in South Africa. The fact that the burden of liberation is heavy does not mean that it must not be shouldered, that the necessary exertions and sacrifices must not be made in the cause of freedom. On the contrary, the greater the challenge by authority, the greater must be the response from the people and their organisations. Remember Vietnam and Angola! This is not the time for defeatism and compromise from any section of the liberation movement, but for a renewed onslaught on the enemy. The liberation organisations, the African National Congress, the Communist Party and their allies must be strengthened, new recruits must be sought, methods of organisation and work improved. Relations with our allies abroad, especially in

Africa and the international communist movement, must be strengthened. The people and their leaders must have the vision and ideological clarity to see beyond present danger to future victory, to realise, in Engel's phrase, that freedom is the recognition of necessity — and the necessity now is to stand firm and fight, to accept the inevitability of struggle against the insatiable monster of apartheid which will not cease to devour its victims simply because they have surrendered instead of resisting to the last. The very viciousness of the enemy is essentially a sign of his inner weakness, not of his moral strength. The future belongs to the people, but since it will not be given to them it must be taken by force.

**FORWARD TO PEOPLE'S POWER!**

---

### **FREE S.A. POLITICAL PRISONERS!**

The shameful cat-and-mouse game played by the South African Government and the Matanzima clique in the Transkei over the fate of political prisoners "of Transkeian origin" had to be brought to a speedy end by Minister of Justice Kruger because it gave rise to a wider demand for a general amnesty for all political prisoners.

There is no doubt that thoughts of the political prisoners are constantly in the minds of millions of their followers, black and white, not only in South Africa but also abroad, and they enjoy a reputation and esteem far beyond that attainable by any Bantustan leader. This is not merely because men like Mandela, Sisulu, Mbeki, Kathrada, Goldberg and their colleagues are men of outstanding personal character, but mainly because they stood and still stand for a principle which is in direct contrast with the divisive chauvinism and tribalism of the Vorster government and its Bantustan satellites — the principle of the brotherhood of man, of a united South Africa based on equal rights and opportunities for all irrespective of race, creed, or colour, the principle which has been so nobly enshrined in the various clauses of the Freedom Charter adopted at the Congress of the People in 1955.

The passage of the years since the sentencing of Mandela and his colleagues in the mid-sixties has done nothing to dim the lustre of their achievements while they were free men, or to diminish the yearning of the masses for the achievement of their goals — the abolition of the pass laws and other measures of race discrimination and the building of a new South Africa based on freedom, democracy and justice. On the contrary, the recent sweep of events in Southern Africa has raised popular enthusiasm for the Congress cause to new heights. A Bantustan politician like Buthelezi has been forced, in order to retain his credibi-



lity, to condemn more outspokenly than ever before the whole Bantustan fraud and to demand majority rule in a united South Africa, and has attempted to capture the imagination of his audiences in the urban townships by dressing himself in the colours of the ANC. ANC slogans and songs are to be heard everywhere, at meetings, in court rooms; the Congress salute is brandished in the faces of the security police at every public confrontation. The underground literature of the ANC is securing ever-wider circulation.

It was in a bid to cash in on this mood that Matanzima first formulated his request for the release of political prisoners, and that the Transkeian Commissioner-General and the Minister of Justice at first appeared to be prepared to consider it. The request from Matanzima in the first place put him on the side of the angels. Even if it was turned down, he could play the patriot who had tried to get what the people were demanding — the release of their leaders. Secondly, the mere fact that he was apparently prepared to incur the anger of the Government by making the request would help to foster the illusion that a Bantustan leader could exert independent pressure on the Government, would wield real power after the Transkei achieved “independence” on October 26.

It may even be that the Government for a moment toyed with the idea of winning international recognition for the Transkei by freeing those political prisoners who could be regarded as of Transkeian origin. But, of course, there would have to be conditions. Mandela and company would have to accept Transkeian citizenship and with it the whole Bantustan concept. The price of release would be the renunciation of South African citizenship and its substitution by tribalism. More, the Minister may have hoped that the promise of liberty and the hope of a Government job (which had been enough to lure back PAC's Letlaka from exile and undermine the opposition of goodness knows how many other opportunists) might split the ranks of the prisoners and especially the ANC. What would be the reaction of non-Xhosa politicals, for example, if their “Transkeian” colleagues were released and they remained behind? Vorster and Kruger may have hoped that skilful manipulation of the prisoners' natural wish for liberty might lead to an unimaginable access of enthusiasm for the whole Bantustan concept and the Government's policy of separate development. For our part we have no doubt whatsoever that the political prisoners would have rejected such overtures with contempt. As Mrs. Winnie Mandela said of the whole release proposal: “It was a futile exercise which would not have been acceptable to Nelson. He was elected by the people as a national leader, not a tribal one. He did not participate in the discussions on his

fate and had he been released under conditions restricting him to the Transkei, I am sure he would have gone back to jail of his own accord". And Walter Sisulu's daughter Lindiwe said: "I am confident my father would not have accepted conditions restricting him to the Transkei. He regarded himself as a South African."

Nor can we believe that Matanzima seriously wishes to secure the freedom of Mandela and his colleagues. If, as Mrs. Mandela says, they were elected by the people as national leaders, it is equally true that Matanzima has never been elected by the people to any post anywhere. He owes his position in the Transkei Legislative Assembly to his chieftaincy, which he owes in turn to the Government. Assuming Mandela, Sisulu and Mbeki were free and willing to campaign in the Transkei, Matanzima's ignominious rule would come to an abrupt end.

As for the Government, it was undoubtedly put out by the upsurge in the demand for the release of political prisoners which was unleashed by its manoeuvre. This demand was voiced not only by leaders of all sections of the black community, but by Progressive-Reform Party leaders and other sections of white opinion, including Afrikaner academics, not to mention the unceasing demand from the OAU, the UN and other anti-apartheid circles abroad.

All South African democrats, freedom-loving people everywhere, must demand that the Government and its Transkei stooges should cease forthwith their outrageous gamesmanship at the expense of the political prisoners. We demand the release of all political prisoners in South Africa, irrespective of ethnic origin or skin colour, and with no strings or conditions attached. The whole South African people have a right to the invaluable services which these high-minded and patriotic men and women can render to their country. To continue to let them rot behind bars is an insult to all humanity, a stain on the conscience of mankind which must be removed as soon as possible.

---

### **THE SOUTH AFRICA – ISRAEL AXIS**

South African Premier Vorster's visit to Israel last April has resulted in the formalisation of the Israel-South Africa axis – an alliance as dangerous to democracy and world peace as its forebear, the Hitler-Mussolini axis of the 1930s. Indeed, the agreement which was reached between the two governments has few precedents in the modern world, and signifies a degree of interdependence and a promise of future co-operation which bodes ill for the peoples of Africa and the Middle East.

After his meetings with Israeli Premier Rabin, Vorster announced: "We have decided to establish a ministerial joint committee comprising



Ministers of South Africa and Israel. Committees will meet at least once a year and will make an overall review of the situation of the economic relations between the two countries and will discuss ways and means to expand the economic co-operation and trade between the two countries."

The discussions would encompass the encouragement of investment, the development of trade, scientific and industrial co-operation, and "joint utilisation of South African raw material and Israeli manpower in joint projects"

Vorster denied that he had gone to Israel to buy arms, or that there were any plans or negotiations for a military supply relationship between the two countries. But this denial can be regarded as purely for propaganda purposes. In any case, after the shameful record of the South African and Israeli governments in their international relations, who can believe anything their leaders say in public?

At the banquet at the Hilton Hotel in Jerusalem at the end of his visit, both Vorster and Rabin said they were mobilising all their energies to achieve the only thing they wanted – peace. After the blatant Israeli aggression against Egypt in 1967 and the conquest of huge areas of Egyptian territory, after South Africa's blatant invasion and attempted domination of Angola, who can be taken in by these hypocritical protestations? Yes, both Israel and South Africa do want a certain type of peace – the peace which follows conquest, the peace which means the acceptance of subjection by the oppressed peoples of South Africa and the Middle East, the peace which means an absence of opposition to their minority rule.

Another cynical falsehood came from Vorster's lips when he thanked Rabin for inviting him to Israel. He had come to Israel, said Vorster, "with the blessing of all the peoples of my country, of all the political parties, of the whites, of the blacks and Coloureds." To any South African this claim is so patently false as scarcely to need refutation. The premier national organisation of the African people, the African National Congress, as well as the S.A. Communist Party have been outlawed, their leaders jailed, banned or exiled. An unknown number of people of all races are detained without trial under the Terrorism Act, and at least one detainee, Joseph Mdluli, has died at the hands of the security police, bringing the total number of deaths of detainees since the 90-day Act was first introduced to 23. A rash of trials under the Terrorism and Suppression of Communism Acts is taking place designed to illegalise the propagation of black consciousness and even the organisation of campaigns for the release of political prisoners.

Yet Vorster can still talk of his visit to Israel having the blessing of all parties of all races. What a monstrous falsehood to be propagated in the holy city by a man who in the same breath said he had grown up with the Bible and that it had been a lifetime's ambition to visit Jerusalem. It is doubtful if his visit to Israel has the approval even of his own party, which is steeped in anti-semitism and at one stage excluded Jews from membership. Even the United Party's Dr. Gideon Jacobs questioned the value of Vorster's mission, asking: "What real, tangible contact is there with 8,000 kilometres and 250 million hostile Africans and Arabs between us?" And at the very moment Vorster was in Israel, Chief T.J. Mothapo, a former Minister of Works and now an opposition leader in the Lebowa Bantustan, said that "if Mr. Vorster wanted peace, love and security for South Africa he should start in the Republic and not in Israel, the Ivory Coast or other foreign countries."

Everybody knows that Vorster during the war equated Christian Nationalism with Nazism and Fascism, and was interned by the Smuts Government because of his pro-Nazi activities as an Ossewa Brandwag "general". Had Vorster been a German during the war, he would have made a very efficient commandant of an SS battalion or an extermination camp. Maybe he would have ended up on the list of war criminals upon whom the judgment of humanity was pronounced at the Nuremberg trial. Yet this man, accompanied not by the blessings but by the hatred of the majority of his people, was feted in Tel Aviv and Jerusalem, taken to Sharm-al-Sheikh to see the extent of the Israeli conquest in 1967, and on a tour of a jet fighter factory. (Of what interest, incidentally, could a display of Israel's military prowess and capacity have been to a man who claimed defence matters were never discussed, and that there is no military supply relationship between the two countries?)

The Vorster-Rabin junketing and the agreement which has been reached between the two countries is an act of defiance and aggression directed against the Arab and African peoples, their independence and their liberation movements. During the last year both Israel and South Africa have been condemned by the United Nations. Zionism has been branded as a doctrine of racial prejudice and discrimination similar to apartheid, and South Africa has been condemned for her aggression in Angola, not to mention her continued illegal occupation of Namibia and her continued practice of the detestable policy of apartheid.

The fact that Israel and South Africa can openly consort in this way and announce their agreement is a measure of their isolation from and contempt for the peoples who surround them. It is hatred of communism and a determination to uphold the interests of Western im-



perialism which binds the two countries together. Behind their specious claim to be defending "Western civilisation" lies their wish to dominate their African and Arab neighbours, restrict their independence and limit their opportunities for development. Both ceaselessly proclaim they have no aggressive intention, but both have been guilty of acts of aggression to promote their policies and enlarge their empires.

Vorster and his lackey press have claimed the visit to Israel to be the greatest diplomatic triumph of his career. If it is so, it is only at the expense of his much-vaunted policy of "detente" in Africa which was so shattered by the Angola debacle that he felt he had nothing to lose by visiting Israel. Both Israel and South Africa find themselves increasingly isolated politically as a result of their detestable policies, and it is as international outlaws that they find one another's company congenial and necessary. Both also feel the need to strengthen the links between them, because both have had experience of Western double-talk and betrayal.

Vorster invaded Angola after receiving what he regarded as reliable assurances of Western support for his attempt to capture Luanda. But when his racist army received a shattering defeat, he found himself abandoned by the Americans, who pretended they were not involved. Remembering Vietnam, the South African racists have made up their minds that never again can they place any reliance on American policies. The Israelis are similarly suspicious of their American masters. The Johannesburg "Star", commenting on Vorster's visit to Israel, said on April 9: "Israel has become disenchanted with the idea of playing to international popularity requirements after being 'kicked in the teeth' by some it had considered its friends up to the 1973 October war."

"Relations between South Africa and Israel have never been better", said Vorster during his stay in Jerusalem. Today there is the closest political, military and economic co-operation between them. Eight years ago, Israel's trade with South Africa amounted to less than R3 million a year. Today, Israel exports goods worth almost R40 million to South Africa, from whom she in turn imports goods worth R60 million a year. Israel imports South African steel, sugar and hides, and is seeking coal supplies — a prospect greatly facilitated by the opening on April 1st this year of the new port at Richards Bay on the north coast of Natal. (In fact Richards Bay is part of the KwaZulu Bantustan, but the South African Government has simply declared it "white" and will keep all the benefits for itself.)

From Israel South Africa imports a large range of goods including textiles and fashionware, electronic equipment, fertilisers. And there

has been regular military consultation and co-ordination, and a secret supply of weaponry and know-how, in relation to both conventional and guerrilla warfare. Quoting South African and American press reports, a report of the UN Committee on Apartheid stated in September last year: "General Meir Amit, former head of Israel's intelligence services and present chairman of Koor Industries (a state corporation and one of Israel's largest industrial organisations), was reported to have disclosed during a recent visit to South Africa that senior Israeli military officers visit South Africa regularly to lecture South African officers on modern warfare and counter-insurgency techniques. Although declining to give details, General Amit stated that the South African Defence Force was benefiting from Israel's experience and know-how in the field of military electronics manufacture."

With Israel now reported to be in possession of atomic weapons, and South Africa certainly capable of nuclear production, owning a substantial portion of the world's reserves of uranium and the developer of a new method of uranium enrichment, there is no reason whatsoever to suppose co-operation between the two countries does not extend also to the sphere of atomic weapons. The very vehemence of the denials by both countries merely reinforces the belief that it is true.

During the Vorster-Rabin exchanges, both referred to the similarities between their positions at opposite ends of the African continent; both emphasised that they were under threat and needed to stand together in mutual defence. There are other similarities between them. Both have governments which discriminate against blacks – in the case of Israel even against black Jews. Tens of thousands of South African whites have emigrated to Israel, and many of Israel's top politicians and military leaders are South African-born. Israel has even toyed with the idea of "solving the Arab problem" by establishing Arab Bantustans, South African-style, on the west bank of the Jordan and in other areas. Both countries are promoting investment in one another's economies.

There was a time after the Sharpeville massacre in South Africa in 1960 when Israel, trying to win friends in Africa, officially turned against South Africa, and even voted against her at the United Nations. But when Israel lost her African friends after the 1967 and 1973 wars, she drew closer to South Africa. South Africa opened a consulate general in Israel in 1971, and in November 1975 raised her mission to embassy status. During and after the 1973 Arab-Israeli war, the South African Zionist community (with the assistance of quite a number of gentiles) raised more than R50 million to assist Israel – the largest sum of its kind ever collected in South Africa. The Government normally forbids the export of capital from the Republic, but lifted the embargo



to enable the money to be sent to Israel. After the United States, South Africa is Israel's largest foreign benefactor.

Despite their recent reverses, both Israel and South Africa are still trying to promote a policy of "detente" with African states in a bid to help defend the interests of imperialism, oppose the spread of "communism" and crush national liberation movements. Not surprisingly, it is precisely the same African countries who have shown themselves susceptible to the South African advances that are also friendly to Israel.

The Israel-South Africa axis, backed by atomic weapons, is an obvious threat to the peace of the world, a menace to the independence and progress of the peoples of the Middle East and Africa. Israel and South Africa are not only bastions of Western imperialism, but imperialist powers in their own right. Progressive forces throughout the world must unite to resist their growing pressures, for no Arab or African country can be free while racism and zionism are allowed free rein.

---

### **NEW U.S. PARTY JOURNAL**

The Communist Party of the United States, under the auspices of its Black Liberation Commission, has launched a new publication *Black Liberation Journal*, the first issue of which Vol. 1, No. 1, Winter 1976 has just reached us. The main aim of the *Journal* is to stress the inter-relationship of the struggle for black liberation to the fight for world peace, the liberation struggles of the African, Asian, Latin American and Caribbean peoples, and against world imperialism.

The first issue, 46 quarto pages long, attractively laid out and enlivened by piquant drawings and cartoons, with poems by Langston Hughes, is devoted mainly to the movements for national liberation in southern Africa and, as the editorial states, "especially to the heroic liberation struggle being waged by the men and women of the People's Republic of Angola." The material on Angola by various contributors effectively exposes the vile partnership which was set up by the US imperialists, the Chinese Maoists and the South African racists to crush the independence of the newly liberated peoples of Angola, and analyses the world-shaking significance of the successful defence of the People's Republic by the forces of MPLA and its allies.

The *Journal* also contains a feature in memory of Paul Robeson, an article on Black Liberation and the Bicentennial of American independence by William Patterson and other topical items. The main burden of the editorial is devoted to an appeal for world-wide help for the Reverend Ben Chavis and the Wilmington 10 of North Carolina, free-

dom fighters who have been sentenced to serve 282 years in prison for defending a church in Wilmington's black community from a four-day armed siege in 1971 by the Ku Klux Klan and other racist fanatics. The attack on Chavis and the Wilmington 10 is a brazen attempt by the white racists to behead the black liberation movement, says the editorial. "In the immediate situation, the lives of Reverend Chavis and the 10 are in danger. The notorious prison system of North Carolina, the biggest in the United States, is specially brutal toward proven fighters for freedom."

Pending the hearing of their appeal, letters demanding the safety of Chavis and the 10 should be sent to the office of Governor James Holshouser at the State Capitol in Raleigh.

In an article welcoming the appearance of the first issue of *Black Liberation Journal*, Henry Winston, the National Chairman of the CPUSA, says the journal will "throw the searchlight of Marxism-Leninism on the class, national and racial oppression of black people in the United States."

Winston calls for new initiatives in the struggle to oust from the UN the representatives of Vorster's South Africa and suggests guidelines to unite millions in support of sanctions against South Africa:

1. No economic, political or military relations whatsoever with the Vorster regime.
2. Congress shall tax all profits made in South Africa at maximum rates.
3. No insurance for investments in South Africa.
4. No credits for business with South Africa.
5. The State Department should denounce all existing investment, trade and commercial treaties with South Africa and the President shall remove most favoured nation treatment from South African goods.
6. The immediate withdrawal of South Africa's sugar quota.

Such efforts, says Winston, will not only strengthen the fight of all democratic anti-fascist and anti-imperialist forces in South Africa, but will also strengthen the anti-imperialist forces throughout the world, and specifically the forces fighting for full equality in the United States itself.

Clearly *Black Liberation Journal* is going to be of immense benefit to freedom fighters in South Africa and the United States. We welcome its appearance and wish it every success in all its endeavours.

# **TRANSKEI “INDEPENDENCE” FRAUD**

by J. Villiers

**“We are being offered the freedom of a fowl run”**  
*Paramount Chief Sabata Dalindyebo a few years ago.*

**“We want freedom, not independence”**  
*Democratic Party delegate Mr. M. Xuma in July 1974.*

Apartheid's biggest showpiece, the Transkei, is being prepared for its 'independence'. With a growing fanfare of extravagant propaganda, Pretoria is setting the stage for the unveiling of its first Bantustan. Early in March this year, the all-white parliament voted a special allocation of nearly half a million rand just for publicising this new monument to the racist dreams of its architect, Dr. Verwoerd, and his Nazi successor Vorster. Not a day passes now without more announcements and revelations about the infant state which is about to be born.

But just as the embryo was conceived in sin and strife, so will the 'birth' be an abortion of pain and discord. The oppressed people not only of the Transkei but of the whole of South Africa have always said 'NO' to this unwanted creature which has been forced on them by the



racist regime. They said 'NO' in the 1950s to the Nationalist Government's notorious Bantu Authorities scheme which brought oppression and hardship to a new level in the reserves. They said 'NO' again in the 1960s to the further implementation of this policy, even taking up arms to resist the brutal aggression of the authorities and their handful of black collaborators. And today, with the foundations of white domination still trembling from the hammer blows of the victorious liberation struggles in Angola and Mozambique, the African and other oppressed peoples of South Africa are even more determined to reject any substitute for the transfer of power into their own hands in the country as a whole.

So today we can predict with complete confidence: the Transkei will fail. Whether we see it primarily as a plot to divide the African people, or as a ruse to fool international opinion, or both of these things, or just as a desperate attempt to buy more time for the doomed system of white supremacy, the 'independence' of the Transkei will fail. The people of the Transkei remain and will continue to remain part and parcel of the African people as a whole, united with it not only by a common vision of a liberated country in which the people shall govern and whose wealth the people shall control, but also by their continuing participation in the productive activity, in the economic life of the whole, to which their labour has made the principal contribution from the very beginning.

But none of this means that the liberation movement as a whole, or its friends in Africa and the wider world, can ignore the 'independence' of the Transkei. When the enemy invests so much effort into creating a weapon against the liberation struggle, it would be the height of folly to pay no attention to this new weapon, to fail to assess the dangers which it poses, and to be unprepared to deal with the new obstacles being devised to make more difficult the people's path to freedom.

Whenever the imperialists have resorted to partition as a means of frustrating the liberation struggles of peoples in the colonial and semi-colonial countries the result has always been bloodshed and dangerous division. In the 1940s the British imperialists foisted on to the peoples of India the partition between Pakistan and India, and laid the foundations for conflict not only between India and Pakistan but also between the Bangladeshi nation and the reactionary regime of (West) Pakistan: in the ensuing wars hundreds of thousands if not millions of persons have died, and the advance of the national liberation movement in the entire region towards the solution of the basic economic and social problems of all the peoples has accordingly been retarded. It was the US imperialists, taking over from French colonialism the role of the





*The Matanzima Government is asking for the boundaries of the Transkei to be extended up to Port Shepstone in Natal and to include the areas of Kokstad and Matatiele known as East Griqualand which are still under the administration of the Cape.*

policeman of South-East Asia, who sought to stem the flood of liberation in that part of the world by maintaining the partition of Vietnam and creating a series of puppet regimes in South Vietnam. The terrible destruction and suffering wrought by these policies have been borne heroically by the Vietnamese people, who paid a high price to defeat the aggression and reactionary manoeuvres of imperialism. And in Korea too the partition of the country resulting from the intervention of US imperialism still stands as a major obstacle to the unity and progress of the Korean people as a whole.

In Ireland today, the bitter fruits of the partition of that unhappy country by British imperialism in 1921 are still being reaped by the working people not only in the 6 counties of Northern Ireland, but in the country as a whole. And of course in Africa there can scarcely be a single country which has not experienced the trials and tribulations of 'divide and rule' policies, whether in the colonial period, or in the process of decolonisation, or in the subsequent struggle to build a united nation and an independent national economy. The secession of Katanga from the Congo in 1960 was an imperialist manoeuvre fostered by the most reactionary circles in Belgium and supported by the racists and colonists in Central and Southern Africa. More recently in the Angolan crisis the aim of partitioning Angola into two or three parts was a secondary strategic aim of the South African and US aggressors if they could not succeed in their main aim of destroying outright the liberation movement headed by the MPLA. From its inception the Organisation of African Unity has firmly and consistently opposed any attempt to partition member states because it has been built on the recognition that for the success and progress of national liberation struggles *unity* is the indispensable condition, and division is the main tool of reaction.

Against this background we can turn to a closer look at the 'independence' of the Transkei, and examine the significance of this new attempt at partition in a colonial-type situation.

### **Who wants 'independence' for the Transkei?**

The apartheid regime wants to persuade the world that it was Chief Kaiser Matanzima and the people of the Transkei who asked for 'independence'. If people can be persuaded to believe that lie, then they will be ready to believe that it must have been the South African government which graciously agreed to grant what was asked for, and the conclusion will be inevitable: that Vorster, contrary to general impression, is prepared to accede to African aspirations. What are the facts?

'Independence' for the Transkei is only the latest stage, the final out-

come and logical result of a policy whose real authors, far from being the people of the Transkei, are in fact the leaders of the Nationalist Party. It is true of course that the practice of maintaining 'native reserves' as sources of cheap labour for white farmers, mine-owners and factories goes back a century before the Nationalist Party took power in 1948. *That* aspect of the Bantustans is deeply rooted in the way in which colonial rule, white settlement and capitalism developed in South Africa. But while that aspect needs to be understood, and we shall return to it, it must be realised that the Nationalist Party added something different to the traditional policy, namely the linking in a new way of the reserves with the question of African political rights. Before 1948, all the major white political parties were in agreement that Africans should not have political rights in South Africa as a whole. But it was the apologists of Afrikaner nationalism who devised a clear "alternative" as part of their programme for total apartheid. In the 1942 draft republican constitution, which became a sort of Bible of Nationalist orthodoxy, Article IX spelled out the aim:

"To each of such segregated race groups of Coloured subjects of the Republic, self-government will be granted within their own territory under the central management of the general government of the country, in accordance with the fitness of the group for the carrying out of such self-government for which they will have to be systematically trained." (Section 2)

As soon as it came to power, the Nationalist Party began to implement this arrogantly racist policy. The abolition of the old advisory Natives Representative Council and of the 4 white senators 'representing' African interests in the whites-only parliament was the first step. It indicated clearly that as far as the Nationalist Party was concerned, there was no common African interest, no nation such as the African National Congress set out to build and defend from its inception in 1912, and no possibility of African rights in respect of the central government. At the same time, and in the same measure (the Bantu Authorities Act of 1951) the Nationalists launched a programme of retribalising the African people, making a select handful of tribal 'authorities' the new warders of the tribal prisons which the reserves were to become. Far from being requested, this measure was bitterly resisted by the people in all parts of the country.

In April 1955 the United Transkeian Territories General Council — the Bunga — voted unanimously to accept the Bantu Authorities system in the Transkei. This has often been claimed by apartheid propagandists as 'proof' of the government's claim that it was only doing what the people asked of it. We must examine the decision and see



what it really meant. If the Bunga had been an organ of popular power, then the decision would support the claims made for it. But the Bunga was nothing of the sort. It was only partly elected, and that part was indirect, i.e. members were voted in not by the people as such but by the (partly elected) district councils set up throughout the area in the last decade or so of the 19th century. The local council system was devised by the British colonialists as a substitute for the independent and authentic forms of government which the peoples of the region had enjoyed until they were conquered and their territories annexed. Thus historically the very basis of the council system of which the Bunga was the apex was alien domination. The fact that the chiefs and headmen were incorporated into this system and played a major part in it right up to the time when the Bunga took that decision in 1955 and thereby – in effect – abolished itself, no more makes the resulting governmental system authentic, indigenous or ( what is more to the point ) *democratic* than was indirect rule anywhere that it was practised in the whole of the British empire. True enough, the Bunga now and again voiced the wider dissatisfactions and political aspirations of the African people, but it did not do so consistently, nor could it, in view of its role as an instrument of white domination. Factors which contributed to its downfall were its built-in bias towards the chieftainship, its irrelevance for the growing working class and urban African population, and its impotence in the face of the white government's monopoly of state power.

These points bear consideration today, 21 years later, because in all major respects the 'government' of the 'independent' Transkei will carry the same key features as the system out of which it has grown. Far from being an organ of popular power, it can only be an instrument of continued white domination. So we should not be surprised at the 'request' for independence, any more than the 1955 decision by the Bunga was accidental or improbable. When the puppet opens its mouth to speak, what else can it say other than what the puppeteer makes it say?

The next step in the evolution of the policy was the Promotion of Bantu Self-government Act of 1959. By then, of course, Verwoerd was at the helm, and this key extension of the Bantustan policy bears the stamp of his evil genius. The preamble to the Act spells out the aim:

"Whereas the Bantu peoples of the Union of South Africa do not constitute a homogeneous people, but form separate national units on the basis of language and culture:

And whereas it is desirable for the welfare and progress of the said peoples to afford recognition to the various national units and to

provide for their gradual development within their own areas to self-governing units on the basis of Bantu systems of government:

And whereas it is therefore expedient to develop and extend the Bantu system of government for which provision has been made in the Bantu Authorities Act 1951 . . .

And whereas the development of self-government is stimulated by the grant to territorial authorities of control over the land in their areas, and it is therefore expedient to provide for the ultimate assignment to territorial authorities of certain rights and powers . . .”  
etc. etc.

Again, the keynote is: there is no African nation. Indeed the Act represented a declaration of war against African nationalism. The fact that it did so not in the language of tribalism overtly (although that was clearly the intention) but in the language of the self-determination of nations, testifies to the anti-colonial temper of the times, and above all to the new strength and assertiveness of the revolutionary national-democratic movement in South Africa itself, spearheaded by the ANC. For by 1959 the ANC, standing at the head of an unprecedentedly wide and solid united front for democracy and national liberation, was raising the demand for majority rule with a forcefulness and insistence which compelled the authorities to take it into account. Yet they could only react within the terms of their own policy and class interests, with a programme whose very essence was the denial of democratic rights and the repression of the power of the people – a programme that was couched in its opposite, the garb of national self-determination.

Herein also lies a wider implication of the Transkei's 'independence'. It would not be mooted, would probably never have been conceived, but for the rising tide of liberation. The enemy does not act in isolation, but frames his policies in response to the pressure of the oppressed masses. The dialectical development of society is thus clearly revealed in a policy which pays lip-service to the idea of self-determination, and which has evolved as a consequence not merely of the racist blue-print of its designers but also as an indirect consequence of the struggle for self-determination of the African and other oppressed peoples of South Africa.

### **The Next Step – 1961 to 1963**

In 1961 a member of the Transkeian Territorial Authority (TTA) moved a resolution requesting the South African government to “declare the Transkei Territories as a whole a self-governing state under the control of the Bantu people”. The resolution led to the appointment of



a Recess Committee which worked under the thumb of Bantu Affairs Department officials, was given a constitution to discuss allegedly drafted by Matanzima himself, and not allowed to consider alternative proposals for 'a multi-racial parliament'. Despite growing unhappiness about the whole thing even in some chiefly circles, and a shadowy awareness among the people at large that something sinister was afoot, it was possible for the TTA to approve the recess committee's report and by January 1963 the new constitution had shifted from the drawing board to the plane of the white parliament in Cape Town where it was duly turned into law.

The significance of these events lay more in their context than in themselves. First of all, none of this would have been possible without the 1959 legislation by which the racist regime had prepared for such developments. Secondly, between the 1959 Act and the 1963 constitution lay the most turbulent upheaval in South Africa's history – two aspects of which are particularly relevant when considering the genesis of the Transkei 'state'. The first of these was the banning of the ANC in 1960 which, together with the State of Emergency and the mass arrest of thousands of activists drove the whole liberation movement underground and on to the defensive. Although the National Convention and the May 3-day stay-at-home campaign of the following year were widely effective, the initiative was beginning to pass into the enemy's hands, and in 1963/64 the movement was dealt many severe blows under the notorious 90-day and 180-day detention laws. The advance to armed struggle could not be sustained at that time, and the retreat into exile was begun – a process that was difficult, costly, but essential for the survival of the liberation movement.

This was the general political context in which the Transkei's 1963 constitution was foisted upon the people. But the same period had witnessed an armed insurrection in the Transkei itself of a scale and a militance which made it a uniquely significant episode in the glorious history of the liberation struggle. That uprising too was put down with great brutality and by overwhelming force. But though it failed in its objectives, it served notice on the oppressors that they could not stand still – they must refine and develop the means of repression.

The main legal instrument of repression then introduced was Proclamation 400 of 1960 which gave to the tribal authorities in the Transkei draconian powers to control meetings, banish individuals and detain people indefinitely without trial. According to official figures, in the first two months of the new law (Dec. '60-Jan. '61) alone, 361 persons were detained. No figures seem to be available for 1961 and 1962, but in 1963 alone 592 persons in the Transkei were detained

under this proclamation, and in the following 11 years (1964-74 inclusive) a further 509 persons were detained. Many of these were held for months on end; very few were ever tried; few of those tried were ever convicted. One of the men detained in 1963, to get him out of the way during the first election campaign in the Transkei in that year, was Leonard Mdingi. He was arrested in March this year under the Terrorism Act – this time in Natal. At the time of writing he was still in detention.

Some detainees are known to have died. The full indictment of Vorster's thugs and Matanzima's henchmen for their crimes under Proclamation 400 will only be drawn up when the people take power and can uncover the truth fully. Suffice it to point out that Matanzima is an unabashed supporter of repression by such means, and has declared his intention of arriving at the 'independence' stage with this 16-year old emergency legislation still in force and in use. And not only Proclamation 400 but also the Suppression of Communism Act and Terrorism Act.

These facts are important, and testify to the anti-popular, anti-democratic regime created by the racists in the Transkei, which is now about to be rewarded for its faithful compliance with the intentions of its white overlords. But the equally important fact must not be lost sight of, namely that the further promotion of the whole Bantustan scheme through the 1963 Transkei Constitution was only possible because it was accompanied by this vicious nation-wide and local repression of the people's struggle. And this proves even more decisively how blatant is the lie that the Bantustan programme in general, and its Transkeian front-runner in particular, are the outcome of the African people's "requests" to the apartheid regime and its considered response to them.

Before moving on to assess the 1963 Transkei constitution let us pause to consider briefly the significance of the 1960/61 uprising in Pondoland and some other parts of the Transkei. Its failure may be likened to that of the Moscow uprising in the first Russian revolution of 1905-7. Few people would now argue about either heroic effort that because it failed it should not have been undertaken at all. Quite the contrary. The need was to fight it more skilfully, with more modern weapons and better understanding of military strategy and tactics. (The acquisition of a better technical preparation for armed struggle is one of the gains the liberation movement has begun to make in the intervening years since then.) An even more important point to make is that, perhaps inevitably in the circumstances, but certainly fatally, the uprising in the Transkei was too little connected to the organised libera-



tion struggles going on in other parts of the country, and completely unconnected with the potential sources of support available in the outside world. The underlying significance of this is that *the struggle against the whole Bantustan policy, against the local puppets of the Pretoria regime, cannot successfully be conducted in isolation, within the Bantustans themselves.* No 'solution' to the 'independence' of the Transkei can be found within the Transkei itself; it will be found in the *national* liberation struggle throughout the country as a whole (which will of course be fought, is being fought, in the Bantustans too) as part and parcel of – and consciously linked with – the successful liberation struggles in other parts of Africa and in close alliance with the revolutionary forces on a world scale led by the socialist countries. This is already, and has for a long time been, the strategy of the ANC, but the point needs to be emphasised now because of the danger that, by focusing everybody's attention on the Transkei as such, the enemy can divert us from the wider national and international context in which the struggle against the 'independence' of the Transkei takes place.

The 1963 Transkei Constitution Act created a legislature with a composition and powers that would not be taken seriously anywhere in the world as evidence of progress towards self-government. It established a pattern that has remained for 13 years, and been applied in all the other Bantustans, and which is only now, on the eve of 'independence' to be altered, namely, that the elected members of the Legislative Assembly are in a minority. This pattern is further testimony to the anti-democratic character of the Bantustan administrations. By building into these dummy bodies a guaranteed pro-government majority of its own appointed and salaried nominees, the Pretoria regime has amply shown how sure it is that any genuinely democratic exercise of popular opinion would repudiate all that it stands for. The extraordinary thing is, that from all accounts it appears that Matanzima has been even more hostile to any extension of the elected element than his masters. Initially, Verwoerd compelled him to accept 45 elected seats (out of a total of 109) – more than Matanzima wanted; and this year, Pretoria has insisted upon opening the door to parity of the elected and nominated members in the Transkei Assembly (75 chiefs and 75 elected). Even this cautious token gesture in the direction of democratic principles, although it in no way threatens his control, has reportedly been resisted by Matanzima. But, in reality, there is nothing surprising about this. The slave turned slave-driver is notoriously more cruel and repressive than the slave-owner, and that is usually because his power is derived, secondary, borrowed from above, and he seeks to mask this fact and compensate for it by excessive zeal with the whip.



The powers of the Transkei administration under the 1963 Act were very narrow. All aspects of security except the control of police stations were retained by Pretoria, as was the control of all main aspects of economic life. Only 5 departments were created for the Transkeians to "gain practice" in the art of self-government, apartheid-style; education, public works, agriculture and forestry, justice and the interior. Ten years later, in 1973, health was added as a sixth 'ministry'. Finance fell under the chief minister, who in any case has from the beginning ruled the whole motley collection with scant regard for the forms of bourgeois democracy and the conventions of cabinet collectivity appropriate to Westminster-type parliaments. (The Westminster model is not relevant in fact, because it rests upon a wholly elected (lower) chamber where rule-making power formally resides). But the reality of power in a Westminster-type government has existed in the Transkei, namely that effective decision-making power lies not in the legislative sphere, but with the civil servants who make policy, frame legislation, interpret and implement policy, and run the whole thing behind a curtain of secrecy. And in the Transkei the top civil servants have been whites – Pretoria's servants, located in all the key positions, because the racists have never trusted their own stooges sufficiently to risk a real devolution of power to them.

The notorious Hans Abraham, the former Commissioner-General, was only the most visible, the most senior of these white officials who in reality have been running the Transkei for all these years. He performed a useful function for the racists by being so obnoxious, arrogant and hateful – it made him the target for hostility, an ever-present butt for Matanzima's well-publicised little clashes with Pretoria, while the hundreds of other Hans Abrahams got on quietly with their work.

In 1963 there were no fewer than 455 of them. Nine years later, in 1972, there were still 314 of them. So much for the myth of "self-government"

It was only in 1975 – 12 years after the 1963 constitution was supposed to have introduced "self-government" – that for the first time an African became head of one of the departments of the Transkei government. (It was the Education Department, where few whites had ever been involved at lower levels anyway, and therefore "Africanisation" could proceed more quickly than in other departments, unhampered by the golden rule of the South African racist regime: that no white shall ever be placed in a position of subordination to a black.) Most of the old and new ministries will continue to be headed by white officials seconded from Pretoria even after the Transkei gets its nominal independence. Most important of all, from Vorster's point of view, the

Transkeian Bureau of State Security is to comprise all the pre-independence members of BOSS, who will be seconded on loan to the Transkei. Thus the ultimate boss of the Transkei will be, not Matanzima, but South Africa's Bureau of State Security!

### **“Self-government” – 1963 to 1976**

It is worthwhile examining the 13 years of Transkeian self-government because the new state's basic features will have been shaped by the preparatory period since 1963. We have touched on the repressive, anti-popular character of the administration in the Transkei, and shown its origins in the use by the Nationalist government of the traditional chiefs as instruments of domination – a policy so unpopular that it brought most parts of the region into open rebellion in the early 1960s. In the ensuing period, the spirit of rebellion has remained strong, although the possibility of throwing off the brutal and corrupt rule of Pretoria's puppets has not existed. In April 1972, for example, Mr. O. Mpondo, then deputy leader of the Democratic Party, in a speech calling for the repeal of the State of Emergency which had operated for 9 years, pointed out that a wave of dissatisfaction and resentment was sweeping the territory; he compared the Transkei to a volcano which would one day erupt. Frequent eruptions of discontent and militant defiance of the authorities have been a feature of the Transkei's schools throughout the past decade, and many hundreds of young blacks have been arrested, fined and expelled from various institutions. (It is worth recalling in this context that, according to the 1970 census figures, 763,800 of the 1.6 million Xhosas living in the Transkei, i.e. no less than 46.5%, are under the age of 15).

It is because the spirit of rebellion is very much alive, and looking for ways to organise and express itself, that Matanzima has armed himself with such sweeping powers of repression. He has declared his total opposition to Communists, “terrorists”, SASO, trade unionism, etc., and – feeble though the opposition to him in the Legislative Assembly has always been – he has nevertheless indicated his hope that even that will wither away and leave him in sole and undisputed sway. Under Section I of the Second Bantu Laws Amendment Act No. 71 of 1974, Matanzima can assume extensive powers to ban African organisations, prohibit individuals from belonging to them, stop the publication of any speech or writing by an African etc. etc. In short, not only will the Transkei enter its independence with all the main terror laws of the white regime in operation (Suppression of Communism Act, Terrorism Act), but it will also be able to operate its own version of these same laws.



Matanzima has amply proved that he is not slow to use such methods. One could fill a book with instances of the repression he has used since 1963. Typical was the granting in 1974 of special powers to the Minister of Health to demolish the hut of any person living in his area, and to move tribesmen without notice from one area to another – without liability for compensation. The “crimes” for which these reprisals may be invoked include boycotting a meeting called by the chief, and failing to show proper respect to him. Matanzima has imprisoned and banished opponents, isolated and excluded possible rivals, and bullied even the moderate dissenters. The point of emphasising this is to show that the methods of Matanzima are inevitably the same as those of his white masters, because his policies are the same and his regime is just a creature, an extension of theirs. ‘Independence’ will not qualitatively alter this fact.

We have seen, too, how self-government Transkei-style has meant the continued rule of white administrators, and how this is also going to continue after ‘independence’. This, however, is only one of many strings that Mr. Vorster can pull. Another important string is government finance. In 1972/3 the Transkeian ‘government’ raised only R9.1 million or 32.3% of its total revenue from its own resources (taxation, fines, rents, liquor profits and a few forestry and agricultural schemes). R28.1 million was provided by the South African government (not including the salaries of the seconded white officials). With the subsequent decentralisation of services previously provided by the central government, the actual financial commitments of the Transkeian administration have grown considerably within the past 3-4 years. But there is little scope for increasing the amount of revenue from local resources because this depends basically on two factors: income levels, and the general level of commercial activity. Since both these are very low, income from local resources is virtually static. So the additional needs of the administration have to be supplied by Pretoria. The figures for 1974/75 vividly demonstrate this trend (which is common to all the Bantustans): government income from local sources was the same as two years previously, R9.1 million, but the allocation from central government was R64 million; thus the proportion of government revenue derived locally had fallen to 14.2%. The prospect is therefore not of growing independence for the Transkei in the sphere of government revenue, but of growing dependence on the South African government.

It is easy to show that the vast majority of functions of any ordinary government have to this day not been handed over to the Transkei, and that the range of ministries in which ‘self-government’ is supposed to

have been practised since 1963 is very restricted. Even more revealing of the nature of this self-government is what has been going on within those ministries. The largest, Education, has faithfully continued to implement the Verwoerdian policy of 'Bantu education' in all its major aspects, with the consequent disenchantment of the youth which we have already mentioned. (The only exception has been in respect of mother tongue education, which is too unpopular even for the Bantustan authorities to get away with). The Interior ministry is a hot-bed of corruption and bribery. Responsible, amongst other things, for the payment of old age and disability pensions, the granting of licences and the imposition of various levies, this ministry has become notorious for the immorality of many of its officials. A typical observation was by a Mr. Kutu, member of the legislative assembly, in 1974: "Many old and sickly people in the Transkei receive no benefits. Sometimes old people will tell you they did not have the money to bribe the officials who decide their eligibility for a pension." Even Matanzima himself, announcing recent changes in the way in which pensions are to be administered, has admitted that such practices are widespread.

Particularly illuminating is the sphere of local government, i.e. the administration of towns. Although the towns in the territory are all small and entail very little 'government' all the main ones were until very recently dominated by whites, in the sense that whites owned most of the key sites, the main businesses etc., and in some cases ran all the main services. So for the first 7 years of "self-government" the towns were excluded from the sphere of nominal African control, and continued to be run by the Cape Administration. Then in 1970 the Bantu Affairs Minister established an (all-white) Transkeian Townships Board (TTB) to take over the towns, and the following year the revolutionary proposal was unveiled that 19 out of the 26 towns would in future be supervised by African advisory committees under the TTB. (Unfortunately, the major towns – Umtata, Butterworth, Matatiele, Port St. Johns etc. – remained either partly or wholly zoned for whites, and were therefore excluded from the new scheme). So outright white control remained wherever white interests were present, and elsewhere, African puppets were created to mask the ultimate domination of the white regime.

In a recent interview with *Drum* (8.3.76) Mr. Joseph Kobo, a member of the Dalindyebo regional authority, described how town and village management had deteriorated since the introduction of the new system. Street lighting has broken down; grass grows and cattle graze in the main streets; goods delivered by railway buses to trading depots (which used to be stored in the depots when they were owned by indi-



vidual white entrepreneurs) are now dumped in the open (since the Xhosa Development Corporation took control of the trading stores), where they deteriorate rapidly. Kobo said:

"You go to the local magistrate and he tells you that this has got nothing to do with him. All in all the TTB is failing in its duty to educate the new black village management boards about the running of a town. There are some guys who are called mayors of these towns. But in front of his house you find that the grass is growing unchecked, the street has become a donga and animals are grazing anywhere. *All the guy is concerned about is that he is a Mayor.*"

### **The Men Who Want To Be Mayor**

The creation of a petty officialdom is the only 'achievement' of 13 years of 'self-government' in the Transkei. Just how extensive is this new class emerges from some very revealing employment statistics relating to mid-1969 disclosed by the Minister of Bantu Affairs in parliament the following year. There were then 42,400 Africans in employment in the Transkei (i.e. wage or salary earners, but not including subsistence farming). Of these, 14,216 were directly employed by government departments, another 1,708 were employed by local authorities, and 2,135 were employed by public corporations. If we add to these the 1,270 employed by semi-governmental organisations, and the 1,282 employed by the railways, we find that 20,611 people – or nearly half those in paid employment in the Transkei – were directly or indirectly employed by the state. Although reliable figures are hard to come by, it appears that the number of African civil servants in the Transkei (excluding executive level) grew from 1,991 in 1963 to 4,068 in 1973, and it can be safely assumed that this figure has grown considerably since then.

An example of this growth is the Transkeian police. According to Matanzima at a recent police parade, in 1963 "the Transkei police started with 100 members at magistrates' offices and were involved in clerical and land matters. We had no police stations under our control." Today there are 750 Transkei police, controlling 36 police stations, a mobile unit and a stock-theft unit. (*Rand Daily Mail* 26th February, 1976).

The latest available figure for Transkei civil servants is 5,121 at the end of 1974. If this figure is comparable with those cited in the text, it represents a 20 per cent increase in the size of the Public Service in the space of a year! "Independence" is going to vastly increase the number of such jobs available, and the status attaching to them. And this, without doubt, is the major danger to the liberation movement posed by developments in the Transkei.

With "independence", for the first time in South Africa's history, a small but significant group of Africans will be proclaiming that they have achieved their freedom and independence, that they are no longer subject to white minority rule and 'baasskap', and that they achieved this not by confronting the white authorities, but by co-operating with them. For the first time, black collaborators with white supremacy will have something concrete to show for their gains: position, status, authority, and money. It will not matter to them that they owe their position not to their own and their people's struggles, but to their personal ambition, and reckless disregard for the unity of the African people as a whole in the struggle to further *their* interests. It will not matter to these vain and selfish careerists that the status they enjoy will be confined to their own circles, and will not impress the workers and the mass of the people generally. It will not matter to such opportunists that their authority rests ultimately on the power and the sanction of their real controllers, the racist regime.

"The men who want to be Mayor" have always existed in South Africa. But the Bantustan programme gives them a unique opportunity to realise their ambitions. And as the South African Communist Party has strongly warned, a new feature of the crisis of imperialism and apartheid in South Africa is that the racists can no longer rule on their own. (See Central Committee statement: "Defeat Vorster and his collaborators" in *African Communist* No. 64 p. 22.) They desperately need black allies, whose main purpose is to confuse and divide the oppressed in their struggle for total liberation. It is in this context that the defection of some former Congressites assumes significance. Some militants will rejoice at the departure from the ranks of the liberation movement of men who have demonstrated that personal advancement is more important to them than the cause of their people; some may argue that the movement can only grow stronger by ridding itself of such elements who appear to support the Freedom Charter but actually have no faith in the programme of the ANC or the strength of the masses to realise it. There is much force in these views. Yet ultimately it is no cause to rejoice when the enemy succeeds in attracting to his side the ambitious, the irresolute, the spineless ones amongst the oppressed people. We are not speaking here of the tribalists and long-standing quislings like Matanzima and Mangope. No, the new element is the handful of former participants in the liberation struggle who have now turned into renegades: and, in addition, the ordinary petit-bourgeois elements in all the Bantustans who get drawn into the machinery of government and help to form this new class, this bureaucratic bourgeoisie, which is going to start coming into its own with the 'independ-



dence' of the Transkei. Whatever their motives, all these black collaborators with racist oppression end up in the same camp, and while not escaping their own oppression (whatever illusions they may harbour about that), they will inevitably become oppressors themselves — enemies of the people who can expect to suffer the same fate as any other enemy of the people.

This development challenges the liberation movement to consolidate its unity, to redouble its efforts to expose the Bantustans as the fraud they are, to develop wider resistance to the policy in the Bantustans themselves and in the country as a whole, to strengthen the links between the struggles of the people in the Bantustans and the struggles of the people in the cities, to thwart in the international sphere the energetic attempts being made by the South African government to project the Transkei as a genuinely independent state.

### **The Economy of an Independent Fowl Run**

When Chief Sabata Dalindyebo once described the Transkei as a fowl run it was an apt phrase. The territory is and has been for many years pock-marked with dongas and ravines, dry and denuded patches, ravaged by erosion and the effects of overcrowding, and in general is a tragically run-down and depressed shadow of the beautiful and fertile land it once was. Calculations based on the 1970 census reveal that the average population density then was 1.22 people per square mile, and if all the Transkeian Xhosas were somehow to be cleared out of white South Africa and squashed into their nominal 'homeland', the density would be 212 per square mile. This means that although the Transkei is a predominantly rural area, it is in fact far more densely populated than so-called white South Africa — the 87% of our country which the racists arrogantly claim as their own — in which the population density for all races is only 35 per square mile (and that includes all the major cities and hundreds of towns!)

The basic notion of the Bantustan policy is to give Africans political rights (albeit largely illusory) in the reserves, while maintaining the supply of cheap black labour to the white economy. Verwoerd called this 'separation in the political sphere' but he and all other apologists for the Bantustans have stressed that this will not mean separation in the economic sphere. In other words, the white bourgeoisie's monopoly of the control of the means of production in all spheres (mining, industry, agriculture, finance etc.) will not be qualified or undermined in any way by the Bantustan system.

Against this reactionary and exploitative policy the liberation movement has long argued that the ending of racial discrimination is not pos-

sible without control of the commanding heights of the economy passing into the hands of the people as a whole — as well as political power. This idea is clearly spelled out in the Freedom Charter, and it is based on the recognition of the reality that political power divorced from economic power is ultimately a hollow fiction. But this is precisely what the Bantustan apologists are offering, and what some short-sighted collaborators are falling for.

Some simple facts confirm that the destiny of the Transkei, as of all other Bantustans, can only be to act as reservoirs of cheap labour for the white economy. Even the 1970 census figures, which were carefully arranged to promote the whole Bantustan policy, indicated that only 55% of the total number of Transkeian Xhosas were actually living in the territory. And if the high rate of migration from the Transkei to all parts of South Africa is taken into account, the proportion of Transkeian Xhosas actually living permanently in the Transkei is probably less than a third. (Of course, the tribal blue-print devised by the racists is responsible for such ridiculous terms as 'Transkeian Xhosas', as distinct from 'Ciskeian Xhosas', and regardless of the actual ethnic differences among all the people lumped together as 'Xhosas', and of their common identity with the African people as a whole).

What economic benefits will the Transkei's 'independence' bring to all the Transkeian Xhosas living outside the Transkei? The answer is obvious: none at all. They will simply pass from one form of servitude (non-citizens of white South Africa) to another (citizens of a pseudo-state). On the much-publicised issue of the citizenship status of the non-resident Transkeians, not only has Matanzima deliberately lied and misrepresented the actual position, but he has cravenly fallen in with the demands of his white bosses — as indeed he has on every other aspect leading up to the Transkei's independence. Press sensationalism about such matters aside, the only thing likely to change is that those who now carry ordinary passes will in future carry Transkeian 'passports' which will serve the same function as passes. In short, there is little of political substance to the whole citizenship issue, and to some extent it is a diversion from the basic fact that the majority of the people who are supposed to be getting their 'independence' in October have no economic future — no jobs — inside their nominal homeland, and will remain an integral part of the economy of South Africa as a whole.

The 257,000 Transkeian citizens working in white South Africa are estimated to earn about R115 million a year. (This compares with a total of about 47,500 wage-earners in the Transkei itself). It is only by adding those earnings into the income actually generated in the



Transkei itself that the racist statisticians are able to produce the figure of an annual per capita income for the Transkei of R175, (as compared with the level set by the UN as warranting top priority for development aid, namely R143 a year). This little trick is repeated in respect of the Transkei's gross domestic product (R131 million or R70 per head) and gross national income (R390 million). Besides obscuring the cruel poverty that prevails in the territory, these figures are designed to provide a wholly false basis for comparison with independent African states. If Matanzima proceeds with plans mooted last year to impose a compulsory 30% deferment of the pay of Transkeian migrant workers, it will mean that Xhosa-speaking workers in the urban areas will be forced to subsidise the economy of a country where they do not live; the fruits of 'independence' could be bitter indeed!

What are the economic prospects for the 1.7 million people living in the Transkei? As we have seen, nearly half of them are under 15, and a further 16.6% are over 45. Of the population between the ages of 15 and 44 inclusive, 68.3% are women. Estimates of the number of people coming on to the labour market every year range from 17,000 to 20,000. (Yet the total employment in manufacturing industry in 1974 was only 4,050.) Thus every 2-3 years, more Transkeian citizens enter the labour market than the total number of Transkeians in paid employment within the territory. In the ten years of its existence the Xhosa Development Corporation only claims to have created 16,000 new jobs (less than one year's potential new employees) — and even that claim might not stand up to examination because so much of the activity of the XDC has been to re-allocate control of existing businesses rather than to create new ones.

In 1972 (the latest available figures), the total value of agricultural output of the Transkei was only R8.1 million, comprising R7.6 million crop production and R0.5 million pastoral production. These figures mean that the value of agricultural production was only a mere R5 per head of the actual population living in the territory. No wonder, then, as even the XDC, which issues a stream of propaganda about the economic 'progress' of the Transkei, has been forced to admit, that the territory has to import 90% of its food. For an 'independent' country which is primarily agricultural, this is nothing short of a disaster situation.

As for industry, the position would be laughable, were it not tragic. Total industrial production in 1970 reached a value of only R4.4 million, and although several new enterprises have been opened up since then, including some foreign controlled ones, the scale of industrial production is still ludicrously small — as the employment figures in manu-

facturing (quoted above) clearly indicate. What is more, wage rates in these few industries, as in the border industries, are 25-50% lower than for comparable work in the factories of 'white South Africa'. Of course, it is precisely this increased rate of exploitation which attracts some small labour-intensive manufacturing concerns to a backwater like the Transkei, because it compensates them for the disadvantages of the region's remoteness, lack of nearby raw materials, non-existent ancillary service industries, and higher transport costs for the finished product.

The truth is that, far from having any prospect of economic self-sufficiency within the next generation or two, the Transkei's economy is becoming more deeply enmeshed with, more reliant on, more subservient to, the dominating forces in the economy of white South Africa. Whereas in 1960 migrant labour contributed less than half of the Transkei's national income, by 1970 it was contributing almost 70%. (It is interesting to note that these figures were published by a pro-apartheid institution which set out to paint a rosy picture of the Transkei's economic future – Survey by the Bureau for Economic Research into Bantu Development (BENBO), *Rand Daily Mail* 3rd March 1976.) The growing subservience of the Transkei's economy emerges clearly from an examination of the role of the Xhosa Development Corporation (XDC). Set up in 1966 to perform the same function for the Transkei and the Ciskei as the Bantu Investment Corporation performs for the other Bantustans, it has concentrated its attention on the Transkei, with insidious results.

The XDC is a state corporation, established by the South African government, and representing an extension of the power of state capital, which in South Africa has emerged as a particularly marked feature of the development of state-monopoly capitalism. While it is, in a loose manner of speaking, white capital, it must be distinguished from white private capital, with which state capital competes to some degree. The XDC has established a stranglehold on wholesale and retail trade in the Transkei. By 1974, 525 retail trading stations previously owned by whites had been bought up by official corporations, it was disclosed in Parliament (27th August '74); it is a safe bet that most of these were taken over by the XDC, since more than a year before that, in March 1973, it was already controlling 144 trading stations previously owned by whites, and had already sold another 350 trading stations to Africans. This is not the usual case of 'Africanising' commerce. Nearly all Africans who purchase enterprises from the XDC have to borrow money from it in order to do so. This means that small African entrepreneurs are encouraged to emerge, but only on the terms dictated by



the XDC, which sets prices, fixes the interest on loans, and ruthlessly exploits its enormously superior financial power. By now, virtually all the white traders in the Transkei have been bought out; needless to say, few complaints have been heard about the terms they got. (Typical of the XDC's discrimination in favour of the departing whites was the deal it did in March 1973, when it sold 155 second-hand tractors to whites at 30-50% of their cost price four years previously. The machines had been available for use by Africans – until they lost them through this deal.)

The XDC by no means confines itself to trade. By 1973 it had bought up 18 garages, several bottle stores, at least eight blocks of flats in Umtata (let to white officials or XDC employees at sub-market rates!) and several hotels. By now the XDC probably has a near-monopoly position in the hotel trade in the Transkei, and the only sector it has not got a grip on is road transport. In addition the XDC has encouraged a number of white-owned businesses to enter the Transkei on an 'agency' basis (for a maximum period of 25 years), and has made a large number of loans to Africans for hire-purchase purposes, housing, and the expansion of existing businesses. Described as a 'development' corporation, it has actually done very little developing (16,000 new jobs in ten years, and barely half of these industrial jobs), but a great deal of taking over and exploiting. By 1974 it was employing 4,400 Africans, but there was not a single black person on its Board, and all the top personnel were whites.

The XDC merits attention because it is the prototype for similar undertakings in all the Bantustans. It represents three important processes which are bound to sharpen considerably the class and national conflicts in the rural areas:

- a) the enlargement of the scope and power of South African state capital, and its supplanting of white private capital in the Bantustans;
- b) the promotion of small-scale African proprietorship in the Bantustans to an unprecedented degree; and
- c) the chaining of this new petty bourgeois class to the machinery of government and administration in the Bantustans, with the intention of exploiting its economic dependence to secure its political servility.

As can be seen from the figures already quoted, the numbers involved (if one combines those employed by XDC with those financially dependent on it) are considerable, relative to the size of the economically active population in the Transkei. The formation of this new group represents a different process – economic rather than political – of building up the bureaucratic bourgeoisie, but one no less significant than that already referred to above. In neither case are all the indi-

viduals involved *willing* collaborators with the authorities. Many an African employee in the ranks of the police or the teachers or the Public Works department can find no alternative employment; and many a small businessman has no option but to turn to the XDC. So the process of the formation of this new class in the Bantustans has a strong element of compulsion in it, not to mention exploitation. Thus although this process is dangerous for the liberation struggle, it is full of contradictions; indeed, insofar as the new bureaucratic bourgeoisie is a conscripted class, it is an unreliable ally of white domination, and this is one of several reasons why the policy is ultimately doomed to fail.

### **Conclusion**

The Transkei – three separate fragments of land, comprising no more than a third of the area of a small country like Cuba, and forming an integral part of the economy and polity of South Africa – will be pushed into ‘independence’ on 26 October. But on account of its origins, its purpose, its real rulers, as well as its nominal rulers, it will be a racist state no less vile and destructive than the apartheid regime from which it has emerged. Let the black mask on the face of this new monster fool nobody: it is a creature of white racism, colonialism and apartheid. Independent Africa will not tolerate this symbol of racial oppression, and at the diplomatic level the Transkei is headed for a diplomatic limbo where it will exist without recognition. Only the few major imperialist allies of Vorster’s regime will lend encouragement to the venture, and even they will find it difficult to give the new state the full and open backing Pretoria wants for it. Meanwhile, in the Transkei itself, the cocks will crow in their fowl run; but their days will be short, and they will end up as sacrifices for the feast of liberation.



# **FINAL BATTLE FOR ZIMBABWE**

**By A Special Correspondent**

The spotlight of world attention has now been turned upon the struggle for the liberation of Zimbabwe. Events first within Mozambique, and then Angola, have brought it home to increasing numbers of people that victory for the African majority is inevitable. Even within the circles of international capital there is a growing awareness of this threat to their stake in the wealth of the white-ruled sub-continent.

But the Smith regime remains totally intransigent. What is more, it has stepped up its oppression of the African majority, put the country on a war footing, and seems prepared to go to genocidal lengths to protect the privileged position of the white settlers.

Because attention is frequently focussed upon day-to-day events, and the underlying situation is often obscured, it is worth recounting the forms which political repression assumes under the settler regime. The similarities with Rhodesia's southern neighbour are too obvious to need emphasising in this context.

At least 800 African nationalists are at present detained without trial, and the number is steadily increasing; a further 500 opponents of the regime are in prison. Since UDI in 1965, 60 Africans have been

illegally executed. Since April 1975, it has been impossible to get further information about illegal executions, as not even the next of kin are informed.

A considerable proportion of the African population lives in the concentration camps which the regime has set up under the euphemistic titles of "protected villages" and "consolidated villages". The regime admits to herding 200,000 people into these camps – the real number is certainly much greater, and may be as high as one million. They are under armed guard and strict curfew, and are (in the case of the protected villages) surrounded by high fences. At first the regime put forward the pretence that the villages were "designed to protect civilians from terrorist atrocities" and to "promote economic and community development". But they have increasingly had to admit the real purpose of the villages – to forcibly separate the freedom fighters from the local population, in much the same way as American imperialism used the concept of the "strategic hamlet" in its Vietnamese war.

In addition, the security forces have introduced a "free-fire zone", which extends for between one and five kilometres along the country's extensive borders with Mozambique, Zambia and Botswana. Africans caught in this zone are shot on sight.

Another important aspect of the operations of the security forces is the use of the chiefs, hired and fired by the regime, and utilised by it to impose a reign of terror upon the rural population. The chiefs have been given the power of summary punishment under the Emergency Powers Regulations and, if they exceed these powers they, like the security forces, are covered by the Indemnity and Compensation Act. This protects them from legal proceedings arising from acts committed "in good faith for the purpose of or in connection with the suppression of terrorism." One of the recent beneficiaries of the Act was Chief Jeremiah Chirau who, according to the Catholic Committee for Peace and Justice, had two African nationalists living in his kraal handcuffed so that he could beat them up at leisure. It is worth pointing out that Chief Chirau was one of the Africans recently appointed by Smith to his ministry.

The increased activity carried out by the security forces has been reflected in the Rhodesian budget. 20 per cent of this is now devoted to "defence", and expenditure on that item is up by nearly a third when compared with 1975. The Rhodesians have a regular army of 3,500, with 10,000 Territorials and 35,000 Reserves. In addition, the Rhodesian Air Force has 1,200 men; and the British South Africa Police (whose estimates also took a sharp rise in this year's budget) 8,000.



# RHODESIA: THE BREAK-DOWN

## POPULATION

Africans\* \_\_\_\_\_ 5,220,000

Europeans \_\_\_\_\_ 249,000

Coloureds \_\_\_\_\_ 16,900

Asians \_\_\_\_\_ 9,300

\*Two thirds live in rural areas



Under Land Tenure Act (1969) division of land is:

	million acres
 National land	6.0
 European areas	45.0
<b>African areas</b>	
 Tribal Trust land	39.9
 Special 'Purchase' land	3.7

• All towns are in European areas

• Much of best agricultural land is European

### **Use of African Troops**

A crucial factor, politically and militarily, is the presence of African troops within the regime's forces. The present ratio in the army is three blacks to every two whites, but the army has announced plans to recruit more Africans, and to commission African officers. Already some of the protected villages are being left from time to time under the charge of African warrant officers. The reliance of the regime upon African forces, which is likely to increase, must be a source of acute anxiety for them. For, as the struggle intensifies, so the prospect of wholesale defections and mutinies must loom ever larger.

The limits to the mobilisation of whites are beginning to show themselves. The increase in conscription has led to a flood of emigrants in the late teens and early twenties. It is only the inflow of Portuguese colonists from Mozambique and Angola that has enabled the numbers of the white settlers to remain approximately the same. In order to utilise this latter group of Portuguese settlers, courses in English have been started in the army. But the clear shortage of white manpower makes the recruitment of mercenaries from the capitalist countries a priority. Rhodesian agents are active in Britain, America, Australia and South Africa recruiting mercenaries to fight in the front-line against the liberation movement, at a salary of £100 a week.

In protecting its reserves of white manpower, the regime is particularly anxious to forestall a mass exodus from the country. In order to do this, it finds it increasingly necessary to restrict the flow of information, particularly about the success of the freedom fighters. Shortly after the successful action at Nuanetsi, which resulted in the cutting of the road link with South Africa, and the explosion which caused the closure of the rail link via Rutenga, the regime announced a new form of censoring the press and broadcasting. A system of "D" Notices will prohibit the publication of pieces of information to be specified from time to time by the National Security Committee. The notices cannot be questioned in the courts – neither can the fact that they have been issued be publicised. The areas which a "D" Notice may cover include "defence, public safety, order, the economic interests of the state . . . and other allied matters". The reason given for the introduction of this new form of censorship is that the "government considers a measure of control is necessary in this respect in view of the intense psychological pressures to which Rhodesia is being subjected."

The naming of the proclamations as "D" Notices is an attempt to confuse them with the British device of the same name. Whatever the demerits of the British procedure, it is at least voluntary, whereas the Rhodesian version lays down five years imprisonment in the case of



defiance by the editors (who are in any event sympathetically inclined to white rule).

Censorship, like the other, more acute forms of repression in which the Rhodesian state is engaged, is a symptom of the crisis in which white rule finds itself. As that crisis has deepened, beginning with UDI, the regime has increasingly thrown itself upon the resources of South Africa in a relationship which, despite some contradictions, has been generally seen to be of mutual benefit to the two white minorities, at the expense of the mass of the people.

### **South African Investment**

At the time of UDI, the amount of South African investment in the Rhodesian economy was estimated at £100 million. Since then, it has become several times larger, although exact figures are of course impossible to obtain due to the economic clampdown. But it would appear that South African capital is dominant in tobacco, beverages, chemicals, mining (apart from gold), food manufacture, paper and publishing; and also possibly in the fields of distribution and tourism.

This investment, and the high rate of profit which it yields, is not the only advantage which South African capital has reaped as a result of the post-UDI relationship. Increasingly South Africa has become responsible for Rhodesia's trade, either on her own account, or acting as a middleman for some third party. This has been accentuated by the closure of the border with Mozambique, through which about 80 per cent of Rhodesia's trade had at one time been conducted. This, together with the earlier closure of the Zambian border, means that great reliance is now placed on the rail routes via Botswana; and through Rutenga – Beit Bridge. The latter link, in fact has been much stressed in the regime's propaganda, as it provides a direct channel to the white south. Roger Hawkins, Minister of Transport, has said "it will be able to carry, if required, all our import and export requirements for the next ten years." So the action of the liberation movement in cutting that link must have been a shattering blow to settler morale.

In addition to the economic relationship between South Africa and Rhodesia, there is the military backing which Vorster gives to Smith. The myth has been invented by the South African government, and assiduously spread by the bourgeois media in the West, that South Africa has withdrawn its troops from Rhodesia, in line with its commitment under the Lusaka Manifesto of December 1974. But a number of instances since then have made it clear that South African troops are still involved in joint actions with the Rhodesian security forces.

In addition, there is the role played by South Africa in the supply of

weapons to the illegal regime. Rhodesian equipment would have been obsolete long ago, had it not been for this source of supply. The most notorious case was the Jordanian deal, exposed in July 1974, under which Jordan sold British Hawker Hunter planes, Tigercat missile systems and Centurion tanks to Rhodesia, using a South African company as an intermediary. During 1975, South Africa sold a number of French Alouette helicopters, and British Puma helicopters; and was also involved in the sale of trainer aircraft from New Zealand. The former British mercenary, Tom McCarthy, who served with the Rhodesian security forces, has revealed that South African crews and technicians were sent up to Salisbury with four squadrons of Mirage aircraft in November 1975. Such consignments, he said, are put down by the South African authorities as "crashed in the operational area", and written off. He has also stated that while he was in Rhodesia, explanatory leaflets on the mechanism and use of Israeli-made machine guns were distributed to the troops, presumably in anticipation of a new arms delivery. Armaments manufactured in Britain, France, Italy, Belgium, West Germany and NATO were being used by Smith's forces, he said.

Although South Africa provides the dominant immediate means of survival for the Smith regime – which makes Vorster's hypocrisy in posing as a peacemaker breathtaking – British imperialism must bear a heavy burden of guilt for the continued oppression of the people of Zimbabwe.

### **British Equivocation**

The British government, a month before UDI, announced that it would not use force against the Rhodesian government, come what may. This declaration was, of course, related to the investment stake which British capital held in Rhodesia, amounting at that time to £200 million. After UDI, sanctions were applied hesitantly and in a half-hearted fashion, and were limited in any event to Rhodesia, South Africa and (at that stage) Portugal having no action taken against them, despite the flagrant manner in which they breached the sanctions orders.

On three occasions, the British government made determined attempts to sell out the African people: the Tiger proposals of 1966, the Fearless proposals of 1968, and the Home proposals of 1971, which led to the rejection by the African people of the terms adjudicated by the Pearce Commission. Under none of these sets of proposals would majority rule have been reached before the turn of the century! Perhaps most disgraceful, however, has been the behaviour of the British government over the execution of African freedom fighters by the



illegal regime. Despite repeated representations, they have refused to reprieve the men concerned, or to warn the regime that their action will render them liable, in due course, to trial for murder.

It should be noted that imperialist interest in the area is not confined to Britain. American Secretary of State Kissinger's visit to Africa earlier this year will be a subject of concern to progressives. Its immediate cause was the victory of MPLA in Angola, after the US government had given its assent to the abortive South African military adventure. But the lip-service paid to African aspirations by Kissinger was a cover for the more fundamental policy objectives of American imperialism. In particular, South Africa's role in the region was encouraged by Kissinger, who said that if South Africa promoted a rapid settlement, it would be positively viewed. In addition, he made a threat of American intervention if there was fighting among the African nationalists, with the Soviet Union backing one side. In other words, Kissinger was anxious to keep open an alternative strategy of promoting disunity, and claiming this as an excuse for intervention.

It is clear from all these factors, that the struggle of the people of Zimbabwe cannot be seen in isolation. It is bound up with the worldwide struggle between imperialism and the forces fighting for national liberation and socialism. In particular, it is closely linked to the struggle of the oppressed majority in South Africa to achieve their freedom. The inevitable growing involvement of the South African ruling class, overtly or covertly, in the war in Zimbabwe, will open up new opportunities for the resistance within South Africa itself. In the longer term, also, the victory over the abhorrent system of white supremacy which continues to dominate Southern Africa will strike a massive body blow to imperialism, and will redound to the profound benefit of the peoples of the world as a whole.

# **An impressive demonstration of communist unity**

by Dr Yusuf Dadoo

To attend the 25th congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union held in the Kremlin Palace of Congresses from February 24 to March 5, 1976, was a privilege and a source of inspiration for me and indeed for all the foreign delegates. This was the congress of the party of Lenin which had successfully carried through the great revolution of 1917, which had broken the capitalist and imperialist domination hitherto prevailing throughout the world, set up the first workers' state and laid the foundations for the development of a socialist society in the Soviet Union; the party which had broken the back of fascism and Nazism in the second world war, which had opened the road to national liberation for millions of people groaning under the burdens of colonialism, and which stands at the head of the world progressive forces fighting to eliminate the last vestiges of imperialism, monopolistic capitalism and racism, end the exploitation of man by man. In this epoch of transition from capitalism to socialism, this is the Party which leads the way towards a new world order of peace and prosperity of all peoples based on common ownership of the means of production and distribution.

The CPSU has seen its membership grow over the years, leaders have



come and gone, but throughout all these decades, facing and overcoming one crisis and challenge after another, guided by the principles of Marxism-Leninism, this great party has maintained its vision and perspective, has earned the love and respect of the Soviet people and progressive people everywhere who have been the beneficiaries of its struggle and sacrifice.

In the reactionary press of the capitalist world we read little except of the errors and mistakes of the Soviet Union and the CPSU as the monopolists strive to retard the progress of the world's peoples on the road to socialism. The greater the victories of the Soviet Union and the socialist world, the greater the triumph for the principles of Marxism-Leninism, the more intense becomes the counter-pressure and propaganda of the bourgeois world, desperate to save the last bastions of profit and privilege from destruction. The Solzhenitsyns and Sakharovs who call for the destruction of Soviet power and bemoan the loss of Vietnam and Angola by the "free" world are honoured with Nobel prizes, the scribblings of every anti-Soviet hack dignified with the name of literature. Of the strivings, sacrifices and truly magnificent achievements of the Soviet people who have literally built a new world with their bare hands we hear little or nothing. The peoples of the capitalist world groaning under the burdens of inflation and unemployment, their economies ailing or in ruins, must not be allowed to believe that the socialist alternative is successful, that the crisis of capitalism can be cured by eliminating the motive of private profit and substituting that of collective ownership and planned endeavour.

Even the reports of the 25th congress of the CPSU which were published in the capitalist press were designed to conceal the significance of the occasion. Every attempt was made to enlarge on points of difference or controversy, to find them even where they did not exist, while the far more impressive positive achievements of the Soviet people and their party congress were dismissed as insignificant or uninteresting.

### **Participants in Change**

As comrade Leonid Brezhnev, general secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, said in presenting the report of the Central Committee to the congress:

"The world is changing before our very eyes, and changing for the

better. Our people, our Party have not been passive onlookers of these changes. No, we have been active participants in them. The labour of the Soviet people, who are building communism, and the activity of the CPSU and the Soviet state on the international scene are contributing palpably to the cause of social progress. Are we not entitled to take pride in this and feel deep gratification over the impact of our ideas, the effectiveness of our policy and the constructive energy of our people?"

In striking contrast with the capitalist world, where the stop-go process of economic development based on speculation and greed is leading not only to economic collapse, the impoverishment of peoples and declining living standards but also to the steady erosion of hope for the future, most strikingly in the breasts of the profiteers themselves – in striking contrast to all this is the confidence of the Soviet people and the CPSU as living standards mount with each five-year plan. "During the past 15 years per capita real incomes have approximately doubled, while the total volume of material benefits and services has increased approximately 2.4 times", reported comrade Brezhnev. What capitalist country can match this achievement? And in what capitalist country can the people face the future with the confidence that this steady improvement in living standards will continue?

The perspective placed before the 25th congress covered not only the next five-year plan, but the whole period up to 1990. "From the estimates that have already been made", said comrade Brezhnev, "it follows that in 1976-1990 the country will have roughly double the material and financial resources it had in the preceding fifteen years." During the next five years alone it is planned to increase the wages of factory and office workers by 16-18 per cent, and the incomes of the collective farmers by 24-27 per cent. The benefits and allowances received by the population from the social consumption funds are to grow by 28 to 30 per cent. Over 31,000 million roubles are to be allocated for the development of the food, light and services industries – 6,000 million roubles more than in the previous five years. Industrial output is to grow by nearly 197,000 million roubles to a total of over 720,000 million roubles and the national income is to reach 457,000 million roubles, an increase of 96,000 million roubles.

What capitalist finance minister can realistically estimate, let alone plan, what the national income of his country will be in five years' time? It does not rest in his hands, but in those of speculators and profiteers whose concern is not the common good but their own private profit.



## **Productivity and Quality**

Nor is Soviet planning concerned only with quantity. In the current five-year period alone 11,000 million roubles are being allocated for environmental protection. Furthermore, the demand has gone out from the conference that the implementation of the production targets must be accompanied by an improvement in efficiency and quality. In fact, increased production can only be achieved by increased efficiency.

“We interpret the problem of quality in very broad terms”, said the report. “It covers all aspects of economic work. High quality means a saving of labour and material resources, a growth of export potentialities and, in the long run, better and fuller satisfaction of society’s requirements. That is why better quality of output must be the aim of the entire mechanism of planning and management, the entire system of material and moral encouragement, and the efforts of engineers and designers and the skill of workers. It must receive the unremitting attention of Party organisations, the trade unions and the Komsomol.

“In the Tenth Five-Year Plan the line towards efficiency is expressed by the fact that greater labour productivity must ensure approximately 90 per cent of the increment in industrial output and the entire increment in agricultural production and in construction. By and large, this is to account for 85-90 per cent of the increase of the national income as against 80 per cent in the preceding five-year period . . . .

“All this raises many questions. Enormous work has to be done. Essentially, it is necessary to achieve deep-going qualitative changes in the economy’s structure and technical level and radically change its very make-up. This is what the Party’s guideline for promoting efficiency means in practice.”

The report noted that the development of the socialist countries, their greater might and the greater beneficial effect of their international policy – “this is now the main direction in mankind’s social progress. Socialism’s power of attraction has become still greater against the background of the crisis that has erupted in the capitalist countries”.

In keeping with the times, capitalism has made an attempt to regulate its economy. “This made it possible to stimulate economic growth but, as the Communists foresaw, it could not remove the contradictions of capitalism. The sharp cutback in production and the growing unemployment in most of the capitalist countries intertwine with such serious convulsions of the capitalist world economy as the monetary, energy and raw materials crises. Inflation has made the crisis processes especially acute. . . . Inter-imperialist rivalries and discord in the Common Market and NATO have grown sharper. . . .

"Now everyone can see that one of the main myths created by reformists and bourgeois ideologists has collapsed – the myth that present day capitalism is able to avert crises. . . . . The politico-ideological crisis of bourgeois society is more acute. It afflicts the institutions of power and bourgeois political parties, and undermines elementary ethical standards. Corruption is increasingly open, even in the top echelons of the state machinery. The decline of the intellectual culture continues, and the crime rate is rising.

"It is farthest from the Communists' minds to predict an 'automatic collapse' of capitalism. It still has considerable reserves. Yet the developments of recent years forcefully confirm that capitalism is a society without a future".

But it is precisely people with no future who turn to crime as a way of life. The report warns:

"The recent experience of the revolutionary movement provides graphic evidence that imperialism will stop at nothing, discarding all semblance of any kind of democracy, if a serious threat arises to the domination of monopoly capital and its political agents. It is prepared to trample upon the sovereignty of states and upon all legality, to say nothing of humanism. Slander, duping the public, economic blockade, sabotage, the creation of hunger and dislocation, bribes and threats, terrorism, assassination of political leaders, and fascist-style pogroms – such is the armoury of present-day counter-revolution, which always operates in conjunction with internationalist imperialist reaction."

The Chilean tragedy "is a lesson in vigilance against present-day fascism and the intrigues of foreign reaction, and a call for greater international solidarity with all those who take the road of freedom and progress."

### **Communist Unity**

If one thing stood out from the 25th congress, it was the stress laid on the need to strengthen the solidarity of the international communist movement to defend the right of peoples to peace and social progress. At a time when divisive tendencies are becoming apparent in some quarters, the congress issued a call for unity. The report said:

"The Chilean tragedy has by no means invalidated the communist thesis about the possibility of different ways of revolution, including the peaceful way, if the necessary conditions for it exist. But it has been a forceful reminder that a revolution must know how to defend itself."

The CPSU is the oldest and most experienced Communist Party in the world, and it has successfully defended the 1917 revolution and the



hopes of oppressed peoples everywhere with the lives of millions of its members. Its views on the question of how the working class is to seize and hold power, how counter-revolution can be defeated nationally deserve to be listened to with respect, for the survival of humanity has depended on them in the past *and still does, because imperialism is no paper tiger.*

Our Soviet comrades are more flexible on this issue than their critics suppose, though they refuse any surrender on basic principles. "Communists of different countries follow each other's work with interest and understandable attention", said the Central Committee's report. "Differences of opinion and approach to some questions may arise among them from time to time. Hostile propaganda has repeatedly sensationalised this. But Marxist-Leninists approach such questions from internationalist positions, concerned about strengthening the unity of the whole movement, and discuss the emerging problems in a true comradely spirit in the framework of the immutable standards of equality and respect for the independence of each party..

"Certainly there can be no question of compromise on matters of principle, of reconciliation with views and actions contrary to the communist ideology. This is ruled out. Doubly so, because both Right and ultra-Left revisionism is by no means idle, and struggle for the Marxist-Leninist principles of the communist movement and against attempts to distort or undermine them is still the common task of all. . . . a concession to opportunism may sometimes yield a temporary advantage, but will ultimately do damage to the Party.

"We should like to lay special emphasis on the importance of proletarian internationalism in our time. It is one of the main principles of Marxism-Leninism. Unfortunately, some have begun to interpret it in such a way that, in effect, little is left of internationalism. There are even some people who openly suggest renouncing internationalism. In their opinion the internationalism substantiated and promoted by Marx and Lenin is outmoded. But as we see it, to renounce proletarian internationalism is to deprive Communist Parties and the working-class movement in general of a mighty and tested weapon. It would work in favour of the class enemy who, by the way, actively co-ordinates its anti-communist activities on an international scale."

### **Role of China**

The policy followed by the present government of China, the report noted, was openly directed against the majority of the socialist states and the international communist movement. "More, it merges directly with the position of the world's most extreme reaction — from the

militarists and enemies of detente in the Western countries to the racists of South Africa and the fascist rulers of Chile. This policy is not only entirely alien to socialist principles and ideals, but has also, in effect, become an important aid to imperialism in its struggle against socialism."

For these and other reasons the Soviet Party considers defence of proletarian internationalism to be the "sacred duty" of every Marxist-Leninist, and the report declared that the Party was in favour of the convening of a new world conference of communist and workers' parties. Comrade Brezhnev noted that some bourgeois leaders considered the principle of proletarian internationalism to be in conflict with the policy of detente initiated and pursued by the Soviet Union with such striking success in recent years.

"This is either outright naivety or more likely a deliberate befuddling of minds. It could not be clearer, after all, that detente and peaceful co-existence have to do with interstate relations. This means above all that disputes and conflicts between countries are not to be settled by war, by the use or threat of force."

After setting out the lines on which the struggle for detente should be advanced, the report added: "Detente does not in the slightest abolish, nor can it abolish or alter, the laws of class struggle. No one should expect that because of the detente Communists will reconcile themselves with capitalist exploitation or that monopolists will become followers of the revolution. . . We make no secret of the fact that we see detente as the way to create more favourable conditions for peaceful socialist and communist construction. This only confirms that socialism and peace are indissoluble."

### **National Liberation**

The congress made a point of stressing its solidarity with national liberation movements everywhere. Comrade Brezhnev said in his report:

"Having gathered at our Congress, we Soviet Communists send militant greetings and wishes of success to our comrades and like-minded people abroad. And first and foremost we address our word of solidarity to Communists fighting in difficult underground conditions. We salute all fighters for the working people's cause, all those who expose their lives to danger each day and, defying all trials, remain faithful to their ideals and duty.

"Hundreds, even thousands, of freedom fighters are held in prisons and concentration camps in Chile, Uruguay, Paraguay, Indonesia, Brazil, Guatemala, Haiti, South Africa and other countries. Many Communists have laid down their lives for the revolutionary cause."



We South African Communists were particularly moved by the statement issued by the Congress demanding freedom for the prisoners of imperialism and reaction throughout the world. The section on Africa read:

“Outstanding personalities of the national liberation movement of Africa – Amilcar Cabral, general secretary of the PAIGC, and Eduardo Mondlane, President of Frelimo – have lost their lives at the hands of imperialist agents.

“The racist regime rule over the peoples of the South African Republic, Namibia and Zimbabwe is a challenge to the conscience of all mankind. Inhuman treatment from jailers caused the death of Bram Fischer, a distinguished humanist and an unbending fighter against racism and social injustice. Many leaders of the Communist Party of South Africa, the oldest Communist Party on the African continent, are kept in prison in appalling conditions. Disgrace upon the racists and their henchmen! Release all participants in the national liberation movement in the south of Africa.”

The congress also acclaimed the victories of the peoples of the former Portuguese colonies in Africa, and noted that much had been done to strengthen friendly ties with the independent states of Africa. In his report comrade Brezhnev said:

“Our Party supports and will continue to support peoples fighting for their freedom. In so doing, the Soviet Union does not look for advantages, does not hunt for concessions, does not seek political domination, and is not after military bases. We act as we are bid by our revolutionary conscience, our communist convictions.”

In the CPSU all freedom fighters have a powerful ally. The Party now has nearly 16 million members, of whom 41.6 per cent are workers, 13.9 per cent collective farmers, nearly 20 per cent intellectuals in the technical fields, and over 24 per cent workers in science, literature, the arts, education, public health, management and the military fields.

Commenting on the party's composition, comrade Brezhnev said:

“Under developed socialism, when the Communist Party has become a party of the whole people, it has in no sense lost its class character. The CPSU has been and remains a party of the working class.” We delegates were impressed by the broad character of the representation at the congress. Here were not only the top leaders of the country, but also men and women drawn from every sphere of life, including workers who had come from the factory or the collective farm to make their contribution.

The 25th congress of the CPSU was a truly impressive demonstration

of the spirit of great enthusiasm and steadfast unity of all communists and the entire Soviet people behind the policy, programme and leadership of the party. A striking feature was the warm-hearted manner in which all the delegates who participated in the discussions stressed the qualities of the general secretary of the CPSU – in Leninist style of leadership, in steadfast dedication to work and his constant concern for the interests of the people.

Events in honour of the congress were held in all parts of the Soviet Union, and some of the fraternal delegates travelled to many centres to meet the activists of the party and to deliver their messages of solidarity to the Soviet people at assemblies which were held to mark the occasion.

There were 106 fraternal delegations from a total of 96 countries – members of communist and workers' parties and national liberation movements, including personalities like Cuba's Fidel Castro and Somalia's Siad Barre. From Africa came, in addition to ourselves, representatives of the leading parties in Guinea, Algeria, Somalia, Congo, Tanzania, Mozambique, Angola, Guine-Bissau as well as organisations like the African National Congress, SWAPO, ZAPU, the Nigerian Farmers' and Workers' Party, the PAI of Senegal, the Communist Parties of Morocco, Tunisia and others. Seldom has the authority and prestige of the Soviet Union been displayed on such a scale.

The 25th congress of the CPSU was yet another significant event in the life and struggle of mankind for peace, national independence, social justice and socialism.

**Long Live the Party of Lenin – the CPSU!**  
**Long Live Proletarian Internationalism!**  
**Long Live the International Communist Movement!**  
**Long Live Communism!**



# **New perspectives for Liberation**

*Message of the South African Communist Party to the 25th Congress  
of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union.*

Delivered by Dr. Y.M. DADOO  
National Chairman of the SACP

Dear Comrades,

On behalf of the Central Committee of the South African Communist Party and all South African Communists, we salute the 25th Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union and greet with warm affection the assembled delegates and, through them, the whole Soviet people. We listened with rapt attention to the report given to Congress by the General Secretary of the CPSU, comrade Leonid Brezhnev, and welcome it as being of immense value and of paramount importance for all peoples fighting for freedom, democracy and justice and for social progress.

This jubilee Congress marks yet another milestone in the life of a Party with a record, unequalled in history, of advancing mankind's struggle against the tyranny of exploitation and for a life of peace and plenty.

In many fields of struggle for social progress, the period since your

last Congress has seen significant advances. The process of detente has grown and gained new momentum.

The policy of detente is inseparable from the struggles of the oppressed for freedom and national liberation. A lasting peace and the elimination of all possibilities of world or regional armed struggles can only be finally achieved when all peoples are rid of the burden of imperialist domination. This is why the glorious victories in the recent period by the peoples of Vietnam, Mozambique, Cambodia, Laos, Guinea-Bissau and Angola are historic blows for world peace as well as for national liberation. The role which your Party played in each of these victories is in the best tradition of proletarian internationalism. It underlines once again the now historic reality that imperialism no longer has a monopoly of power and that those struggling for liberation are now doing so with fraternal support of a strong and powerful socialist world.

Your great advances in socialist construction and your more recent strides since the 24th Congress in the direction of creating a communist society provide both moral inspiration and material backing for those still living under the tyranny of capitalism, imperialism, neo-colonialism and racialism.

### **New Heights**

In contrast to the continuing decline of the economic, social and moral institutions of the capitalist world, the Soviet Union and the rest of the Socialist world are conquering new heights of economic and social achievements and are making inexorable advances towards higher forms of democracy. Unable to match the socialist achievements in deeds, the capitalist establishments rely more and more on trying to discredit the socialist world and in particular the Soviet Union by slander and vicious anti-Soviet propaganda.

In this type of deception they are tragically joined by the Maoist clique which no longer even pretends to hide its collaboration with imperialism and the world's most extreme reaction against the interests of the Socialist community of nations, the international working class movement and those forces in Asia, Latin America and Africa still struggling for freedom and independence. The catalogue of Maoist betrayal of every principle of liberation solidarity and communist internationalism grows daily. There is not an area of policy, whether it be the strengthening of imperialist militarism, the encouragement of traitors to the cause of liberation struggles, the support of the most reactionary and right-wing politicians of the western alliance, the embrace of the torturers' regime in Chile — which does not find favour



with the Peking government. The people of Africa will never forget its criminal intervention in Angola on the side of Vorster racist forces, the CIA and the local representatives of imperialism – Holden Roberto and Jonas Savimbi.

### **Liberation Prospects**

In Southern Africa the defeat of Portuguese colonialism and the events which followed, have opened up new and exciting possibilities for all the liberation forces. The political and physical conditions which have emerged for the pursuit of the struggle to destroy racism and foreign rule, are more favourable now than ever before in history. The perspective of a Zimbabwe under majority rule and a Namibia which is free and independent is immediately attainable.

In imperialism's most important citadel – South Africa itself – the situation has become progressively less favourable for the survival of racist supremacy. Vorster is no longer cushioned by states hostile to the liberation forces. The victory of our brother fighters in former Portuguese colonies has demonstrated to the mass of our people the urgency and feasibility of striking successfully at the racist regime. There can be no compromise with racism and imperialist domination. Our Party in alliance with the African National Congress which is heading the liberation struggle in South Africa will pursue with relentless and grim determination the struggle to rid our country of white supremacy and win people's power.

Your Party, the CPSU, the Communist Party of Cuba and the socialist world as a whole have proved once again that in the fire of struggle you stand unselfishly on the side of freedom and independence and that proletarian internationalism remains a vital instrument of mankind's drive for peace, national liberation and socialism. It is in this spirit that we believe that it is now more than ever vital for the convocation of a world assembly of communist and workers' parties.

Dear comrades, the proceedings and decisions of your 25th Congress will, we have no doubt, become the launching pad for still greater advances on the road to communism – for further improvement in the living and cultural standards of the Soviet people, for the strengthening of the socialist community of nations, for the consolidation of the unity of the international Communist movement, for strengthening the bonds of friendship between the socialist countries and the national liberation and working class forces everywhere, for peace, national independence and socialism.

**Long live the CPSU!**

# **No room for anti-Sovietism in Africa**

**by Ahmed Azad**

During the past decade the ideological struggle between the forces of socialism and those of capitalism has emerged as one of the most crucial battlefields in the international class struggle. In this struggle anti-communism and anti-Sovietism are the central themes of bourgeois ideologues throughout the world. The science of Marxism-Leninism – in particular one of its fundamental tenets proletarian internationalism, the role and place of the world socialist system and the international communist movement – is deliberately slandered and falsified. Violently opposed to the growing unity and might of the socialist community, the world communist movement and national liberation, the imperialists seek to drive a wedge between the three component parts of the world revolutionary process. In South Africa the SACP and the ANC are banned and communists and non-communists have been hounded, tortured, imprisoned and murdered in the name of anti-communism.

More recently the heroic and victorious struggle of the people of Angola under the leadership of the MPLA and with the full support of progressive mankind brought forth a raging torrent of anti-Soviet and anti-communist abuse in the capitalist countries. In the vain hope of



blackmailing the Soviet Union, leading politicians, military brass and bourgeois ideologues in the capitalist world are busily trotting out statements typical of the cold war and threatening to put in jeopardy the policy of detente and peaceful co-existence. Since this hysterical campaign is at the present moment largely concerned with events in Africa, especially Southern Africa, it is appropriate to examine the relations between the Soviet Union and Africa and the principles underlying and guiding Soviet foreign policy in relation to independent Africa and those countries still under racist and colonialist domination.

Following the Great October Socialist Revolution, oppressed peoples throughout the world found in the Soviet Union a tower of strength in their struggles for national and social liberation. Even at a time when the young Soviet state was the victim of foreign imperialist interventions and the activities of local counter-revolutionary groups, it gave its fullest support to the anti-colonial and anti-imperialist struggles in Mongolia, Turkey, China and other countries. But owing to objective difficulties arising from the fact that it was the only socialist country, this support was limited. It was after the second world war and the emergence of the world socialist community that the path was opened up for the closest co-operation between the socialist countries, world working class movements and national liberation movements. This irresistible force enabled the liberation movements to destroy in a relatively short period of time colonial domination in most parts of Africa and Asia. Throughout this period the Soviet Union gave unstinting political, material and diplomatic support to the liberation movements. In Africa we are aware of the great role played by the Soviet Union in the fifties and sixties at the United Nations despite the stranglehold exercised at that time by the United States over that organisation. The exhilarating influence of the Soviet Union was clearly demonstrated during the British, French and Israeli aggression against Egypt in 1956. With the backing of the Soviet Union, Egypt compelled the imperialist and Zionist aggressors to withdraw in ignominy.

In the period after decolonisation the existence of the world socialist system made it possible for the newly independent countries to break away from total dependence on the former colonial masters. The Soviet Union and the other socialist countries overcame the giant political and economic barriers erected by the colonial powers and began to develop links at all levels with independent Africa especially states following an anti-imperialist course. As comrade Brezhnev pointed out in the Report of the CPSU Central Committee to the XXVth Congress:

"It is an immutable principle of our Leninist foreign policy to respect the sacred right of every people, every country, to choose its

own way of development. But we do not conceal our views. In the developing countries, as everywhere else, we are on the side of the forces of progress, democracy and national independence, and regard them as friends and comrades in struggle. Our Party supports and will continue to support peoples fighting for their freedom. In so doing, the Soviet Union does not look for advantages, does not hunt for concessions, does not seek political domination, and is not after military bases. We act as we are bid by our revolutionary conscience, our communist convictions. . . . From the rostrum of our Congress we again emphasise that the Soviet Union fully supports the legitimate aspirations of the young states, their determination to put an end to all imperialist exploitation, and to take full charge of their own national wealth.”<sup>1</sup>

The imperialist world with the support of local reactionary forces seeks to keep the African countries in neo-colonial bondage in order to reap super-profits from the exploitation of the considerable raw materials, power and human resources in Africa. But they are unable to act with impunity as the existence of the world socialist system offers the African countries an honest, reliable and disinterested alternative source of supply. No longer has independent Africa to rely exclusively on the capitalist countries for machinery, equipment, manufactured goods, military supplies, loans, credits and technical assistance.

### **Practical Aid**

In Tropical Africa 50% of Soviet credits are directed to the building and development of basic industries and power plants, 12% for geological surveys and 11% for agricultural development.<sup>2</sup> In 1973 the socialist countries advanced to African countries credits exceeding 3,000 million roubles – half of it contributed by the Soviet Union – on a long term basis at very low interest. Unlike credit and aid from the imperialist world the socialist countries attach no political strings. Indeed arrangements are so designed that the recipient countries only begin repayment after the completion of the plant or project so as to enable them to repay part of the credit with the goods produced in those plants or projects.

An examination of the multi-sided economic links between the Soviet Union and Africa shows that more than 75% of the total volume of Soviet aid is directed to building the industrial base of these countries to enable them to have genuinely independent national economies. Thus a lot of attention is paid to the creation of large industrial and agricultural enterprises. At present with Soviet assistance 170 industrial and 70 agricultural enterprises have been completed or are being built in Africa. Other socialist countries are making similar contributions – approxi-



mately 50 projects have been or are in the process of being built by Bulgaria, 90 by Czechoslovakia, and Hungary is participating in the building of more than 70 industrial enterprises. In Egypt alone over the last few years 173 economic, social and cultural projects were built with Soviet assistance.

Co-operation between some African states and the socialist countries in the development of power industries, new branches of industry and in the building of manufacturing enterprises is gradually developing. Let us recall that after the imperialist powers and monopoly financial institutions had contemptuously refused to finance and help build the Aswan hydroelectric power complex in Egypt the Soviet Union came to the rescue. This complex, and the Volta-hydroelectric complex in Ghana built also with Soviet assistance, have enabled Egypt and Ghana respectively to farm and irrigate large areas and to develop the agricultural and energy potential of the two countries.

Guinea with Soviet assistance has built a cannery, saw-mill, meat-packing plant, cold-storage plant, stone-crushing plant and a bauxite producing combine with an annual output of 2,500,000 tons. Somalia has built with Soviet assistance a meatpacking plant, fish cannery, and creamery; and is at present building a 2.3 kilometre dam on the River Giuba, as well as a hydropower station and a canal that will irrigate 8,300 hectares of new land. In this field Poland is assisting in the building of a sugar refinery and textile mills in Ghana, Nigeria and Ethiopia; Rumania is assisting in the development of a large timber complex in the People's Republic of the Congo and the German Democratic Republic is also assisting in various projects.

The Soviet Union and the other socialist countries have trained local skilled personnel in diverse scientific and technical fields. Schools, colleges and hospitals are built in Africa, skilled manpower is trained locally and specialists from the socialist countries are serving in a number of African countries. Moreover thousands of African students are receiving higher education at various institutes in the socialist countries.

With Mozambique and Guinea Bissau new forms of political, economic and cultural relations are being developed. Fearful of this, the imperialist powers have started to attack Mozambique and Guinea Bissau with the aim of driving a wedge between them and the socialist countries. But the most hysterical outburst of anti-communism and anti-Sovietism was directed at Angola and the MPLA. Having for so long aided and abetted Portuguese colonialism and being a party to the crimes committed by the fascist Portuguese troops the imperialist world launched a vicious campaign against the legitimate and justifiable militant and fraternal assistance given by Cuba and the Soviet Union to the MPLA.

A political and diplomatic offensive was undertaken to discredit the Soviet Union, Cuba and the MPLA. The US imperialists in their arrogance went so far as to send threatening letters to those African countries which supported the MPLA. For example the US threatened to cut off its rice supplies to Guinea if it continued its principled support for the total liberation of Africa. Of course these threatening notes were fittingly rebuffed. Then Kissinger, a supporter of the white minority regimes in Southern Africa, threatened to take retaliatory action against Cuba for its militant, consistent and principled support for the liberation movements. Kissinger and Ford may froth at the mouth about Cuban support but millions of Africans deeply appreciate and understand the disinterested and vital role played by Cuba at the invitation of the MPLA.

### **S.A. Hysteria**

In South Africa the anti-communist hysteria was most evident. The racist regime claimed that their aggression against Angola was designed to "safeguard" the interests of the so-called "free world" against the "imperialist ambitions" of the Soviet Union and Cuba. South African Members of Parliament in the all-white racist House of Assembly are falling over each other in their desire to demonstrate that South Africa has to play an increasingly important role in "defending Africa against Communism." Anti-communism is also used in an attempt to justify the ruthless Defence Amendment Bill which permits the South African army to commit military aggression anywhere in the world.

The arrogant and vainglorious White South African army, saturated by racial prejudice and attitudes, had assumed that no "backward", "ignorant" black people would be able to defeat them. However the sharp and victorious counter-offensive of the MPLA soldiers and their Cuban allies using sophisticated equipment and advanced military tactics rudely shattered the myth of white superiority. Thus, unwilling to admit defeat inflicted by black people, they have resorted to the most bellicose anti-Soviet, anti-Cuban and anti-communist propaganda.

Racist South Africa, which constitutes a grave threat to peace in Africa, calculated on dividing independent Africa and the South African liberation movements on the basis of anti-communism and the bogey of a "Red Menace." But this exercise is doomed to failure. Nevertheless we have to be ever vigilant to counter the manoeuvres and intrigues of South Africa and the imperialist world. This was shown during the Security Council debate in April when the imperialist powers with the connivance of Maoist China attempted to equate the militant internationalist solidarity displayed by Cuba and the Soviet Union to-



wards Angola with the military aggression of South Africa. That they failed was mainly due to the principled stand taken by most of the Afro-Asian states together with the socialist countries.

Unfortunately however there are still a minority of African leaders who have succumbed to the anti-communist, anti-Soviet propaganda. It is to be hoped that sooner rather than later they will realise the folly of their positions, and refuse to be a party to the ideological offensive of the imperialist world which takes the form of anti-communism and anti-Sovietism.

### **The Soviet Union and Liberation Movements**

The defeat of imperialist US aggression in Cuba and Indo-China, the resistance of the Arab peoples, especially that of the Palestine Liberation Organisation against Zionist expansionism and aggression, was made possible by the political, economic, military and diplomatic assistance of the socialist countries and in particular by the Soviet Union. The leaders of the heroic peoples of Cuba, Vietnam, Laos and leading spokesmen of the PLO have publicly expressed their gratitude to the Soviet Union for its continuous and unstinted support.

We in Africa knew from our own bitter experience that without the support of the Soviet Union it would not have been possible to defeat Portuguese colonialism backed by NATO and to bring closer the final liquidation of racist and colonial rule in South Africa and Rhodesia. Our liberation movements have been armed, fed and clothed by the socialist countries. This assistance is not new. Throughout the period of the liberation struggle – the dark days as well as the bright ones – the Soviet Union has remained a faithful friend and ally.

The imperialist powers, sensing the collapse of their neo-colonial bulwark in Africa, are feverishly issuing "dire warnings" to the Soviet Union and Cuba to steer clear of the impending clash in Southern Africa. In a well-orchestrated campaign initiated by the US authorities the British government, which has consistently refused to take any substantial measures to remove the illegal Smith regime in Rhodesia, is now with a lot of fan-fare "warning" the Soviet Union to keep clear of this area. It is the height of arrogance for a government which has by its support ensured the continuation of White minority rule in Southern Africa to now "insist" that the Soviet Union, Cuba and the other socialist countries "keep out" of the conflict in Southern Africa as it could lead to a "bloodbath".

Whether the imperialist powers like it or not, the conflict in Southern Africa will be resolved not by the machinations and manoeuvres of the white minority regimes and their international backers

but by the revolutionary struggles of the peoples concerned. As Marxist-Leninists we hold as a fundamental truth the axiom that revolutions cannot be exported and that revolutionary transformations cannot be imposed; but *neither can they be halted*. Of course the decisive contribution in the struggle for national liberation in Southern Africa will be made by the oppressed peoples themselves, led by their genuine national liberation and working class organisations. But we reserve the right to request and to receive any kind of assistance from our friends and allies.

Since its formation the SACP has had the closest fraternal links and relations with the CPSU. The Soviet Union has not only imposed economic and political sanctions on racist South Africa but has also supplied the liberation movement with the wherewithal to conduct its armed revolutionary struggle. At no time has the Soviet Union ever attempted to intervene in the internal affairs of our movement or to impose conditions and restrictions on its vital material assistance. It is not the so-called "Soviet intervention" that threatens our independence but the interference of the imperialist powers. Let us state unequivocally that those who by their actions give succour to our enemy and benefit from the super-exploitation of our working people have no right to advise us on our relations with the Soviet Union and the other socialist countries.

### **Proletarian Internationalism**

For communists, proletarian internationalism is the cornerstone of Marxism-Leninism and it is therefore not surprising that imperialist propaganda is designed to turn it into a kind of bogey. The ideologues of imperialism are now paying special attention to the apparent contradiction between the national struggle and internationalism.

But there is no such contradiction; communists are at one and the same time patriots and internationalists. Whilst each Communist Party is responsible in fulfilling its revolutionary tasks to its working class and people, it is also at the same time responsible to the international working class. Internationalism is no abstract concept but arises from the objective conditions of the life of the workers and peasants which propels them to combine their forces in order to resist on an international scale the attempts of the imperialists to hold back social and national liberation.

The world socialist system has emerged as the most decisive force in the anti-imperialist, anti-monopoly struggle. Its existence, growing might and ever-deepening unity are the guarantee for the victorious triumph of the struggle to end forever the exploitation of men by men. Today the international Communist and Workers' Movement, in spite



of the divergencies which have appeared in some sectors, remains the most organised, dynamic and vital force linking together millions of communists throughout the world in the common struggle for the defeat of imperialism and the creation of a better world. Now more than ever we need to strengthen the unity and cohesiveness of the world socialist system, the world communist movement and the forces of national liberation. Guided by these principles the CPSU's foreign policy has a profound class, internationalist character.

This was vividly expressed and demonstrated at the 25th Congress of the CPSU. More than 100 foreign delegates participated at the Congress. The Soviet delegates listened with great interest and responded enthusiastically to the speeches of the invited guests and unanimously acclaimed the internationalist position of the CPSU as outlined in comrade Brezhnev's report. As the report emphasises, "to renounce proletarian internationalism is to deprive communist parties and the working class movement in general of a mighty and tested weapon. It would work in favour of the class enemy who, by the way, actively co-ordinates its anti-communist activities on an international scale. We Soviet Communists consider defence of proletarian internationalism the sacred duty of every Marxist-Leninist."<sup>3</sup> Congress also adopted a proposal to erect a monument in Moscow to the heroes of the international communist and working class movement who sacrificed their lives as a symbol of the CPSU's unfailing loyalty to the great cause of proletarian internationalism.

During the Congress delegates from Africa representing revolutionary democratic states, national liberation movements and Communist Parties all expressed their deep appreciation of the efforts made by the Soviet Union to enhance the prospects for world peace and its militant, internationalist solidarity with the revolutionary and democratic forces in Africa. Francisco Mendes, Head of the Government of the Republic of Guinea Bissau, expressed the deeply-felt sentiments of the African delegates when he said: "The long years of grim war against Portuguese colonialist domination enabled us to appreciate the Soviet peoples' lofty feelings of internationalism. And today having embarked upon the development of our country, we have, in the person of the Soviet people and their Communist Party, loyal allies whose solidarity is more important than ever in building the new life and promoting peace and progress on our planet."<sup>4</sup>

It is vital to remember that the global anti-communist, anti-Soviet offensive of the imperialist world is not only aimed at communists but at all democratic and progressive forces. Thus the struggle to combat these reactionary views is the duty of all democratic and peace-loving

peoples. This includes the struggle against right and left wing revisionism and opportunism, especially the Maoist variant which seeks to pit the developing countries against the Soviet Union and to split the unity of the anti-imperialist forces.

To bring about fundamental socio-economic transformations in Africa – as life itself demonstrates in the revolutionary democratic states in Africa – requires ever-growing co-operation and links with the socialist countries especially the Soviet Union. The illusion that there is some third way suspended between the capitalist world and the socialist world only drives those countries further into the grip of world imperialism and international monopolies.

It is precisely the disinterested practical assistance of the socialist world, especially the Soviet Union, which has enabled some African countries to break away from dependence on the world capitalist system. Above all, it must be emphasised that the Soviet Union exports no capital to Africa, owns no factories, exploits no workers, does not own one single inch of African soil and has no military bases in Africa.

At a time when the world capitalist system is in the throes of a deep general crisis and the balance of forces has shifted in favour of the struggle for independence, peace and democracy, it is necessary to rebuff the monstrous lies of the imperialist world which take the form of anti-communism and anti-Sovietism and to bring about the closest possible unity of the three component parts of the world revolutionary process.

#### Notes:

1. L.I. Brezhnev, *Report of the CPSU Central Committee and the Immediate Tasks of the Party in Home and Foreign Policy*, Moscow, 1976, pp. 21-22.
2. These figures and the information about the CMEA countries' co-operation with Africa are taken from *International Affairs* (Moscow) May, 1975, pp. 137-8.
3. L.I. Brezhnev, *op. cit.* pp. 53-54.
4. *Pravda*, 1 March 1976.



# **Radicalising the Congo revolution**

**by Jean-Pierre Gombe**

Member of the Special Revolutionary Staff,  
Central Committee, Congolese Party of Labour

Our country is going through a radicalisation period, i.e., through a process of deepening the revolution in every sphere. To properly understand why this was necessary, we have to look back a bit.

The August 1963 popular demonstrations resulted not merely in a change of government – they started a concerted struggle to build a socialist society. Our Marxist-Leninist Party, the CPL, was formed in the course of this struggle.

Subsequent events, however, revealed a wide gap between Party theory and practice. There was a deceleration of the revolution, the revolutionary machine was not working at top speed; more, it was being braked.

The situation was little short of alarming, and it was critically, and self-critically, examined in the Central Committee statement of December 12, 1975. The CC formulated a programme of energetic measures fundamentally to improve the position and speed up the revolutionary process. That, essentially, is the purpose of our radicalisation policy,

and it is being pursued in the name of the revolution, for the triumph of socialism in the People's Republic of the Congo.

Begun by decision of the emergency CC plenum of December 5-12, 1975, the radicalisation movement should accelerate implementation of the directives of the Second CPL Congress (December 1974) on effectuating the National-Liberation Programme, in particular the three-year social and economic development plan. The main goal, the CC statement said, is "to secure a qualitative change in the situation, link theory to practice, mobilise the Congolese people for a vigorous struggle for socialist-oriented national liberation". We are now preparing for the third, special Party congress and the problems it will examine are being discussed throughout the country.

The radicalisation process extends to politics, the economy, culture and social relations. We consider it especially important to introduce revolutionary order in the political structure, the national economy and on the ideological front.

### **Ideological Unity**

There can be no united action without ideological unity, but until recently the Party leadership lacked cohesion and dynamism and the lower Party organisations, action ability.

In many cases contact between the Party leadership and membership, between the Party and the masses, was disrupted. As a result, the trade unions, youth, women's and other mass organisations did not always correctly understand their tasks, notably the need to educate and mobilise the masses to carry out the National-Liberation Programme.

Hence, our priority political aim is to restore the Party's dynamism. It must be closer to the masses, or more correctly, closer to real life. Of course it is important to issue directives, but the main thing is concrete, practical work.

Discrediting the Party's fundamental principles by one's conduct is inadmissible. We must therefore apply more strict criteria in admitting new members and pay more attention to their ideological training.

As for the economy, we shall continue to concentrate on building up the state sector. Made up basically of enterprises nationalised after August 1963, it now extends to every aspect of economic life, but has not been properly managed. The situation was abnormal: instead of playing a vanguard role in the battle for economic liberation and higher output, many state-owned enterprises were a drag on the national exchequer. Their grossly inflated staffs lacked adequate political and professional competence. That is why the Party decided to take con-



crete measures fundamentally to improve operation of the state sector, boost production, put its enterprises on a paying basis with no government subsidies. Then they will really be helping to solve our main problems and the state sector will become the basis in our fight against imperialism and for economic liberation.

In the cultural field, we have long been working for spiritual decolonisation and to bring our national cultural heritage within the reach of the people. But here too not everything was done correctly, purposefully and with the necessary speed. The Party leadership has cast aside all doubt and hesitation in pursuing its revolutionary policy on culture. Its decisions in this field must fully coincide with our socialist orientation.

### **People's Reaction**

How have the people reacted to the radicalisation programme? The workers, peasants, all working people are convinced that the 1963 revolution was performed in their interests. And inasmuch as the radicalisation programme carries the revolution further, strengthens its positions, gives it a new impulse, it is only natural that the people should support the measures we have introduced. Evidence of this are the numerous letters of support the Central Committee has received since its December statement.

However, ours is a heterogeneous society, with widely different levels of consciousness. Obviously, these measures are bound to affect the interests of definite groups and will encounter their resistance. But the revolution must continue. Revolution is not "made" in drawing rooms. Inevitably there come periods of abrupt change and sharp upheavals that affect the egoistic interests of some groups, first of all bourgeois elements who fear losing their privileges, or do not stand to gain from the new policy.

For example, if some trade union leader comes out against radicalisation, that does not mean that he has the support of the working class. In many cases such a leader is simply an "office-holding bourgeois", and for him radicalisation might mean loss of the privileges he now enjoys. Consequently, his attitude to the new policy differs from that of the worker in the factory or the peasant in the field. When you explain to them what the radicalisation is all about, you can be sure of a positive response.

There are not many who reject radicalisation or do not appreciate the need for it. But we should not overlook the fact that there are such people. Nor should we overlook the designs and plots of foreign reaction, the imperialist-engineered economic sabotage.

Though the people as a whole enthusiastically accept radicalisation, not everyone understands it in the same way. The Party knows that not all groups of the population – workers, peasants, intellectuals, students, soldiers – have an equal share in the radicalisation movement. That is why the Party is doing so much to explain the new policy and show the masses that it is being carried out in their interests. We are going straight to the masses, frankly discussing and clearly explaining the true meaning of one or another measure and of the radicalisation movement as a whole. In Congolese conditions this is a much more important and effective method than relying entirely on the mass media.

The radicalisation movement is still young, but we have already come up against certain difficulties.

First, the Party's propaganda of the new policy has to reckon with the counter-propaganda of its opponents. And their tactic is to distort the very meaning of radicalisation and sow doubt and confusion among the people. In surmounting this difficulty, the Party is helped by its direct contacts with the people, by its work in the factories and offices, in the fields and on the streets. And the people understand us and support us.

There are also difficulties of a psychological character. The removal of one or another shortcoming in the economy often entails sacrificing something. And it is not easy to convince people voluntarily to give up what they already have. Not everyone realises that the present state of the economy calls for restrictive measures.

The radicalisation movement is, in a way, a test of the people's political understanding. Naturally, there are difficulties, but these cannot deter a revolutionary.

We are inspired by the knowledge that the Congolese Party of Labour has embarked on a course hitherto unknown in Africa, and we know that other African countries will judge our experiment by its results.

Our radicalisation movement is a clear example of self-criticism, that inalienable feature of the Marxist-Leninist party. Those who attended the 25th Congress of Lenin's Party or followed its proceedings, could convince themselves of this. The Congolese Party of Labour does not confine itself to acknowledging its mistakes, but calls on the masses actively to participate in correcting them. That, we feel, is the earnest of the movement's success.



# **AFRICA: Notes and Comments**

## **FRENCH COLONIALISM – THE STRUGGLE FOR ITS FINAL LIQUIDATION**

Recently the struggle for the independence of the French territory of the Afars and Issas (TAI), formerly known as French Somaliland, has emerged as a major issue in the struggle for the total liberation of Africa from the yoke of colonial rule and domination. Since 1888, France, using both naked force and the tactics of divide and rule, has occupied this country of about 9,000 square kilometres on the East Coast of Africa, sharing boundaries with Ethiopia and Somalia and a strategic outlet to the Red Sea. In 1973 the French estimate of the population was about 200,000, with 82,000 Afars and 62,000 Issas. However, this estimate is challenged by various sources which point out that the Issas are in the majority and that the French deliberately excluded thousands of Issas from their estimates in order to boost the population figures of the Afars. From the inception of colonial rule, France has sought to continue its domination by favouring certain sections of the Afars.

During the 60's, the liberation movement demanded independence, and in order to forestall the independence movement, de Gaulle undertook a much-heralded visit to Djibouti in 1966. The visit was met by militant, non-violent, anti-colonial mass demonstrations which were ruthlessly quelled by the notorious French Foreign Legion. Seven

people were killed and scores wounded. Nevertheless, this militant anti-colonial demonstration compelled de Gaulle to hold a referendum. The referendum was a farce, with thousands of French soldiers sent to Djibouti to ensure by force of arms the implementation of naked ballot-rigging and fraudulent practice. Since the vast majority of Issas were deprived of the vote, it was not surprising that Ali Aref Bourham, an Afar, and for long a spokesman of the French colonial regime, was 'elected' Prime Minister. Ever since the fraudulent and rigged referendum, the Issas have been discriminated against in every walk of life, and the country re-named the Territory of the Afars and Issas.

For ten years, France has ruled through their local instrument, Ali Aref, by a mixture of force, thuggery, corruption and the policy of divide and rule. Moreover, after the referendum, the colonialists built a 20-mile electrified fence around the town of Djibouti. The area around the perimeter of the fence was mined, thus turning Djibouti into a kind of concentration camp guarded by over 5,000 French Foreign Legionnaires. That this was primarily designed to prevent Issas from entering Djibouti was clearly demonstrated in the 'elections' held in November, 1973. Once again, Issas voters were illegally disqualified or forcibly prevented from voting, thus ensuring a 'victory' for Ali Aref.

Recently the French authorities increased their military strength — both personnel and equipment — and also the reign of terror against the Issas and the main opposition forces. Decreeing that those who do not have an official pass are foreigners — this means 138,000 out of an estimated population of 150,000 — in Djibouti, the French, like the South African racists, wish by the stroke of a pen to declare the indigenous people illegal immigrants. As in South Africa, the so-called 'foreigner' has no right to work or go to school, has no legal right to be in the city and cannot vote. With a ferocity matched only in South Africa, the French occupied troops have intensified the policy of forcibly deporting 'foreigners' to the Somali border, Ethiopian border or to areas such as Bali Bali which is a dumping ground on the outskirts of the electrified fence which surrounds Djibouti.

There are three main political organisations in the country. Ali Aref's National Unity Party (NUP), which was previously called the Union and Progress within the French whole; the African Popular Independence League (LPAI) with support amongst both the Afars and Issas; and the Front for the Liberation of the Somali Coast (FLCS).

The French colonialists have only 'negotiated' with Aref's party since the NUP does not seek total independence and wants a continued French military presence and bases. It is clear that without the protec-



tion of their colonial masters, the NUP would be defeated in an open and fair election. On the other hand, the LPAI has consistently fought for the genuine independence of the country and the total withdrawal of all French military troops and bases. It is the more popular party and the thuggery and fraudulence of colonial rule and intrigues have prevented them from assuming power. Although it is a legal party, it is continuously harassed, its meetings are forcibly broken up and its members and supporters intimidated by threats of massacres. LPAI members are also continually arrested and recently two of its leading officials were illegally arrested. This clearly exposes the French claim that it is prepared to grant independence to this country on the basis of the wishes of the inhabitants.

The FLCS also enjoys popular support and has for some time been engaged in guerilla activities. Recently it came into prominence when some of its members kidnapped 30 children of French servicemen. The callousness and complete disregard for the lives of the children on the part of the French troops was demonstrated when they attacked the bus in which the children were held and killed four of the guerillas. Without condoning individual acts of terrorism such as that undertaken by members of the FLCS, we must nevertheless condemn the barbarous aggression of the French troops which was also directed at Somalia.

### **Strategic Importance**

France's refusal to negotiate with the genuine national liberation movements arises from the fact that Djibouti is strategically located at the mouth of the Red Sea and the Suez Canal. Over the years of colonial rule, Djibouti became France's third largest port after Marseilles and Le Havre. Moreover, the re-opening of the Suez Canal and the intensification of the liberation struggle in that region have increased the strategic value of Djibouti. French military intentions are to some extent linked with US imperialist policy in the Indian Ocean. In defiance of the wishes of the peoples of Africa and Asia for the demilitarisation of the Indian Ocean, which would reduce the threat of imperialist blackmail and aggression, the US ruling circles are proceeding with their plans to build a military base in Diego Garcia and the French want to retain their bases in Djibouti. The US, French and British imperialist presence in this area poses a direct threat to the security, stability and further strengthening of the revolutionary democratic governments in Somalia and South Yemen. Indeed, under the pretext and the spurious claim that the Soviet Union has military and naval bases in Somalia, the imperialist powers, in particular the US, have intensified their aggressive activities in the Indian Ocean.

The overthrow of the feudal regime of Haile Selassie in Ethiopia has opened up the possibilities of real progressive changes in that country. Thus the imperialist powers, seeking to stem the tide of revolutionary transformation in this part of Africa and the Middle East, are determined to create an area of tension from which they can foment interstate conflicts. In these imperialist manoeuvres the rabid anti-communist feudal regime of Saudi-Arabia and the notorious fascist-like regime in Iran have been assigned a secondary but no less dangerous role.

That the French government seeks to retain some forms of colonial possession in Africa is also shown by its intransigent attitude to the independence of the Comoro Islands. Here through their local hirelings and agents the French are attempting to separate Mayotte from the other islands. Under the pretext of a so-called referendum similar to the one in the TAI the colonialists are offering the island of Mayotte a "special relationship" with France. This is not because the colonialists are interested in the welfare of the people of Mayotte, but due to their desire to retain a foothold on these islands to serve their imperialist needs and interests.

Over the past few years the OAU, the UN and all progressive forces have demanded the withdrawal of the French military troops and bases and supported the right of self-determination for the people of the TAI.

Owing to the increasing popularity and strength of the LPAI and international pressures, Ali Aref is now making suitable noises about getting independence sometime this year. But he has not changed his political standpoint and still seeks a neo-colonial relationship with France and the continued occupation of the territory by French troops. The LPAI is the strongest party and has support amongst the Afars and Issas. No amount of French colonial brutality can weaken the desire of the vast majority of the people for complete and total independence.

It is imperative that all progressive forces should intensify the struggle for the final liquidation of the French colonial possessions in the TAI, Comoro Islands and in the island of Reunion, for the Indian Ocean to be declared a Zone of Peace, and for the withdrawal of imperialist military troops and bases.

(On May 18, 1976, an official of an OAU commission said in Cairo that France will hold a referendum on independence for the Afars and Issas territory at the end of the year. — Ed.)



## **SENEGAL: PROSPECTS OF CHANGE**

Recently as a result of the people's struggle in Senegal and the advances of the world-wide democratic movement, opportunities have been opened up of restoring and extending social liberties in that country.

The African Independence Party, a component and active member of the International Communist Movement, was banned by Senghor in 1960. Ever since the AIP has been fighting illegally for genuine national independence and democracy. However, up to 1974 Senegal was governed by the arbitrary monopoly rule of Senghor's Progressive Union of Senegal (PUS).

In spite of the banning of the AIP and other mass democratic organisations, mass struggles ebbed and flowed from 1968-1973. In these mass struggles the workers, both in the public and private sector, and some sections of the intellectuals, especially those in the progressive teachers' and engineers' union, played a prominent role. Even the national bourgeoisie from July 1968 demanded radical action against the interests of French imperialism. They pointed out that whilst the Senegalese were getting poorer and poorer, the foreigners were becoming richer and richer, due to the fact that more than 80% of the modern sector is in the hands of foreigners mainly French capitalists, and that foreign banks discriminated against the local businessmen.

Senghor, realising that he was becoming isolated, began to manoeuvre. He succeeded to some extent in splitting the ranks of the national bourgeoisie and isolating the more progressive elements, partly due to the fact that the national bourgeoisie is very dependent on the State.

In 1970 Senghor claimed that he was prepared to accept the legalisation of the AIP. But the AIP did not publicly reply until last year\* because Senghor, whilst claiming his willingness to legalise the AIP, banned the progressive workers', students' and youth organisations under the pretext that they were manoeuvred by the Party.

But due to mass pressures, Senghor, in 1973, once more emphasised willingness to move Senegal from "African democracy" to a "formal democracy" of a European type. Thus, following discussions with Senegalese intellectuals in Mogadishu in 1974, he gave Abdoulaye Wad the right to establish an opposition Party – the Democratic Party of Senegal. However, the leaders called it a "contribution opposition

---

\*This was done through a statement of the Fourth Plenum of the Central Committee of the AIP published in November, 1975.



party" and Senghor was allowed to attend the meetings of its Political Bureau. In the towns, the workers and intellectuals treated this party with great caution and reserve. However, in 1975 this party expanded its influence in some rural areas, due to the frustrations of some sections of the national bourgeoisie and the deep discontent of the peasantry which suffered gravely as a result of the agrarian policy of the regime, the drought in 1974-75 and fluctuations of world market prices.

The AIP positively appreciated the existence of Wad's party, as some of its demands on democratisation of political and social life and the need to change the economic policies were consistent with those of the AIP. But the AIP have important reservations about their concrete approach to the political struggle and their evaluation of Senghor as head



of state. The AIP considers Senghor mainly responsible for the political and economic crisis in the country. Senghor took no significant steps against French monopolists and is intensifying his anti-national policy by promoting in Dakar a free international zone for multi-national companies. This means that they will receive special privileges whilst economic relations with the socialist countries are still insignificant.

During 1972 Senghor made many statements that he was going to democratise political life and legalise the Communist Party. Wad's opposition party called for the legalisation of the AIP and denounced any attempt by the government to create a so-called puppet Communist Party. Following the mass actions and the new positive changes, the AIP replied to Senghor for the first time in November 1975.

In its statement, the AIP, after pointing out its role in the political life of the country and its continued fight for legalisation, stated: "To rule out all ambiguity, the AIP specifies that its legalisation would not mean renunciation of the struggle for the genuine liberation of Senegal from imperialist domination, for solving the problems of the working people of town and country and, in the final analysis, for building a socialist society . . . . There is said to be a danger of rapid growth of the number of parties and the spread of anarchism. We consider that the people of Senegal have attained a high degree of political maturity. It is for them to decide on the number of parties by independent choice, without bureaucratic decrees. Senegal's problem is not the 'danger' of excessive democracy, but the lack of democracy."

Following a statement in 1976, Senghor has now changed the constitution in order to legalise the existence of three parties. These parties are supposed to represent three main trends —

1. Socialist Democracy (Senghor's own party)
2. Liberal Democratic Party (Wad's party)
3. A Marxist-Leninist or Communist Party

The Wad opposition party vehemently disagrees with this classification as it regards itself as a Socialist Labour Party.

Senghor has also taken this step because he seeks to become a member of the Socialist International and to actively promote sections of the Socialist International in Africa. Three years ago his application was turned down, as the Socialist International said that they were opposed to one-party states and were in favour of pluralism. Thus after announcing his new-found democracy he was accepted as a full member of the Socialist International.

The present changes in the constitution have some exceedingly dangerous provisions for the development of political and social life in

Senegal. Senghor alleges that since Africans are "unstable people" no party shall be allowed to change its stated ideology. This is designed to prevent the formation of any kind of a united front against his anti-national policies. Senghor himself will interpret who is a social democrat and so forth and thus retain the right to ban any party. In practice this means that if Wad's party and the AIP agree on some common objective, Senghor will declare that illegal, since in his view both parties have departed from their ideological standpoint.

The AIP categorically rejects the three-party system as completely anti-democratic and is continuing to wage a struggle for genuine democratic freedoms, freedom for all political parties, for a national democratic Front offering a patriotic and class alternative. To achieve this, there has to be genuine freedom and pluralism of trade unions, with the workers fully entitled to decide the substance and form of their unions and having the right to strike.

In Senegal the only recognised trade union centre was fully integrated into the ruling party. But after Wad's opposition party called for the formation of their own trade union, Senghor's party decreed that the National Confederation of Senegalese Workers should alter its constitutional ties with the ruling party. This will be changed at the coming congresses of the PUS and the trade unions so that the union will be affiliated to the ruling party, thus moving from internal to external integration.

Previously only members of the PUS could be leaders of the NCSW, and these so-called leaders with few exceptions were members of the government, ambassadors or Members of Parliament, all coming from the bureaucratic strata. Nevertheless workers have organised and participated in many deep-going strikes and there is deep division within the various trade unions. These divisions surfaced at last Congress of the NCSW at which factions confronted each other, accused each other of corruption and so forth. The AIP is for a genuine working-class mass movement, for a united independent trade union movement, in conformity with the interests of workers and the trade union traditions of Senegal.

Throughout the imperialist aggression against Angola Senghor supported UNITA. Even afterwards he stubbornly refused to recognise MPLA and claimed that he would do so when all "foreign" troops had left Angola. As was to be expected, Senghor was violently opposed to the fraternal material assistance of the Soviet Union and Cuba to Angola. Of course in criticising "foreign" intervention, he conveniently forgets that there are still 2,000 French troops stationed in Dakar without whose support Senghor's position would be considerably weaker.



It is worth recalling that when the progressive government was overthrown in Gabon in 1963, the French troops came from Senegal. The presence of French troops in Senegal also poses a threat to the revolutionary democratic government in Guinea.

Senghor attempts to justify his dialogue with racist South Africa by demagogically claiming that this is consistent with OAU policy. He claims that he is interested in a dialogue of the people of South Africa and in order to facilitate this he asked Vorster to free all political prisoners. In addition he asked Vorster to permit a delegation of Senegalese jurists to enquire into the opinion of different communities. Up to now Vorster has not replied to Senghor's letters.

Senghor's position on Angola and racist South Africa is consistent with the conservative and at times reactionary policies he follows in Senegal.

But the ferment of resistance, especially that of the AIP, has compelled Senghor to make certain concessions. It is therefore possible that within the next few months he will declare the AIP a legal organisation under his system of controlled democracy. The AIP in rejecting the limited and controlled form of democracy, will, in the finest traditions of communist and workers' parties, continue to fight relentlessly for the best interests of the working people of Senegal, for genuine national independence, anti-imperialist policies and for the creation of a socialist society.

# ON THE NATIONAL QUESTION

by Ben Molapo

I would like to welcome the recent publication in the *African Communist* (first quarter 1976) of a letter that first appeared in *Mayibuye* on the nationality question in South Africa. It is hardly surprising, given the nature of our struggle, that this particular question has for a long time occupied a central place in discussion and debate. When in 1954 the journal *Forward* organized a seminar on the problem of the nation it noted that we in the liberation movement in South Africa will be liable "to commit errors as long as we do not have a clear conception of the essence of the nation." That was over twenty years ago, but the remark remains relevant.

In this article I want to review some of the difficulties that have occurred in the discussion of this issue. It is by no means a simple issue, one is immediately struck by the great variety of ways in which the term "nation" is applied in the South African context. Of course the ideological high-priests of the apartheid regime have their own outlook on the topic, but even in the writings of those who are within our movement, or who are sympathetic to it, we find much variety. South Africa has been referred to as one nation, as two nations and as many



nations. In the same issue of *African Communist* (referred to above) at least two of these views are implicitly or explicitly adopted by different writers. To make matters more complicated there has also been disagreement about the historical moment at which this nation, or these nations, came, or will come, into being. In each case different factors tend of course to be emphasized. To begin with it will be useful, I think, to look at a sample of the different views proposed over the last twenty years.

### **The One Nation Thesis.**

This view is explicitly advanced by J. Villiers for instance – “In South Africa we already have a nation, one people united by their economic interdependence, but divided by the racist policies of the apartheid regime.”<sup>1</sup> Thus, although there are indubitably great rifts within South African society, it forms essentially (and already) according to Villiers, a single nation. Villiers’ reasons for advancing the one nation thesis emerge clearly from the quotation. South Africa is one nation because, whatever the social divisions within it, it comprises a single economic formation. This is, characteristically, the main motivation for advancing the one nation formula. Insofar as there is a “second economy” within South Africa (i.e. the subsistence peasant agriculture in the reserves) it must be seen, it can be argued, as an essential component of a single social formation. This “second economy” subsidizes the migrant labour force and in this way forms a cog within an overall formation dominated by the capitalist mode of production. These views seem reasonable enough – but is a single social formation a sufficient indication of the existence of a single nation? One of the great drawbacks of the one nation thesis has been its tendency to obscure the *colonial* nature of our society. The views of J. Adams, one of the participants in an extended debate running through several issues of *Marxism Today* on the formation of nations in South Africa and sub-Saharan Africa, indicate some of the potential, political shortcomings of the one nation formula.

“Quite clearly a nation exists in South Africa, not Afrikaans, nor English but South African, composed of people who use Afrikaans and English cultures.”<sup>2</sup>

And what of the other peoples in South Africa? They are all being drawn into the single nation we are told. From this Adams concludes:

“It is not surprising that there is little demand for secession and self-determination – indeed the label ‘national liberation movement’ is a complete misnomer – for in a single national state the demand is for equal democratic rights.”<sup>3</sup>

Adams mistakenly equates the unpopularity among the African people of the cause of territorial secession with the very different aspirations for the right to self-determination for a single African nation within the whole of South Africa. There is also a false equation of state with nation; the presence of a single state within South Africa is wrongly assumed to confirm the one nation thesis. This assumption together with its mistaken political conclusions occurs, as the *Mayibuye* letter points out, in *Mayibuye* no. 6.

"We do not ask for self determination. That slogan however progressive it may sound, is counter-revolutionary in the specific historical and social conditions of South Africa . . . . because South Africa is an independent, self-governing state, and not a colony of a far-away imperialism."

That there is a relatively independent state power in South Africa is hardly to be contested, but nobody in our national movement believes for a moment that they are fighting for *this* state's right to self-determination. What we are fighting for is the right of the African people to their own state power with sovereignty over every inch of South African territory. This state power will only be forged with the revolutionary destruction of the existing colonial state apparatus.

The great disadvantage of the one nation thesis is, then, that it obscures the colonial nature of our society and in consequence the national character of our liberation struggle. It is this flaw that the two nations thesis is deliberately designed to counter.

### **The Two Nations Thesis**

This view holds essentially that South Africa is a colonial situation of a special type in which two nations, an oppressing nation and an oppressed nation, live side by side within the same territory. This is a thesis that is alluded to, for instance, by Toussaint in the same issue of *African Communist*,<sup>4</sup> and it receives its fullest outline in the SACP programme. The immediate political advantages of this thesis over the former thesis for an understanding of the goals of our national liberation movement are apparent. (Although of course the colonial character of our society needs to be *demonstrated*; it is not sufficient simply to describe it as being composed of two nations.) The two nations thesis is, in my view, the correct one, but it is not always clear what is meant by "nation" in this context. Both the oppressing nation and the oppressed nation fail to meet the general conditions stipulated by Stalin's classical definition of the nation, a definition that continues to enjoy wide currency in Marxist writings. Is it in fact possible to speak of a nation within which there is significant cultural and linguistic diver-



sity? Those who have thought not have often applied the many nations thesis to South Africa.

### **The Many Nations Thesis**

In the traditional national movements in Europe that arose in the 18th and 19th Centuries the boundaries of the nation tended to be constituted around a community sharing a common language and culture. On the basis of this principle, a process that was at once one of fusion and disintegration set in. Old feudal empires like Austria-Hungary are broken down while in other instances small feudal states were fused as in Germany. As a consequence of this experience, a single language and culture have often been regarded as the essential indicators of a nation. Transposed to the South African context, this view results in the immediate multiplication of nations. According to the apartheid ideologists, who make much of ethnic diversity when it suits their purposes (they somewhat inconsistently brush over the cultural and linguistic differences within the 'white European' nation, for instance), there are as many as eleven nations in South Africa. But others, like Lionel Forman, with better intentions, have also argued that it is at least possible that in a future South Africa there will be several different nations.

'A single African nation in South Africa is likely to develop before a single South African nation does. And similarly it seems likely that Zulu, Basotho and other nations will develop before they merge into a single African nation in South Africa.'<sup>5</sup>

It must be pointed out, in fairness to Forman, that he is speculating about possible political arrangements in a future South Africa *after* the destruction of the white colonial power. He is therefore not directly denying the importance of a singly African nationalist movement in the present. Nevertheless, the argument remains largely speculative and seriously underestimates the unifying forces at work among the African people, not least their struggle against a common enemy. As Amilcar Cabral has said, 'national liberation is necessarily an act of culture.' The dynamic of a revolutionary national struggle involves not just a political alliance of the colonised peoples but a 'veritable forced march on the road of cultural progress' and cultural unity.<sup>6</sup>

How then are we to begin to define what exactly we mean by the term, 'nation'? This is a crucial question bound up amongst other things with the democratic principle of self-determination. When, for instance, is a demand for self-determination legitimate and when is it 'tribalist' or sectionalist? Can we meaningfully speak of a Transkei Xhosa nation? We cannot simply deny this on the grounds that the

Xhosa people are a tribe and not a nation. The Xhosa people might well not be a nation but nor are they, strictly speaking, a tribe as Potekhin has pointed out.<sup>7</sup> If our allegation of 'tribalism' is to be politically relevant and more than just formal, we need to provide the term 'nation' with an objective content.

The *Mayibuye* comrade has suggested international law as a criterion for the existence or non-existence of a nation:

'The principle of national 'self-determination' does not apply to them (the 'tribes' in South Africa) – after all, they are not a subject of international law.'<sup>8</sup>

This is one possible argument, but it is again purely formal. If the Transkei were recognised by the UN this year (admittedly, this is unlikely), would we wish to argue that it had thereby become a nation?

### **Stalin's Definition of the Nation**

Stalin's definition of the nation<sup>9</sup> continues to serve at least as a starting point for a great many contemporary attempts at a scientific approach to the question. According to Stalin, a nation is 'a historically evolved, stable community of (i) language, (ii) territory, (iii) economic life, and (iv) psychological make-up manifested in a community of culture.'

There are thus four essential components according to Stalin, all of which, as he specifies, must be present before we can speak meaningfully of a nation. Whatever the shortcomings of this definition (and its should be noted that not a single major concept of historical materialism is directly employed in the definition), there are at least two important acquisitions:

(a) In the first place, it is asserted that the nation is an objective reality and not just an ideological concoction. This latter view is one that has frequently been adopted by bourgeois theoreticians. 'Like all great forces in human life,' writes A.J. Toynbee on nationality, 'it is nothing material or mechanical, but a subjective psychological feeling in living people.' Stalin's definition clearly refuses this reduction of nations and nationalities to simple feelings – a reduction characteristic of O. Bauer, one of the prime targets of Stalin's text.

(b) In the second place, Stalin portrays the nation as an *historical* reality, as the product of a process, and not as some timeless free-floating entity. The nation in other words has not survived from some mystical prehistory as many racist and also utopian Africanist brands of nationalism have argued.

But what are we to make of Stalin's definition and its application to the South African context? If we accept it at face value, it clearly un-



dermines somewhat the two nations thesis. The oppressed nation is linguistically divided – to be sure this division need not be quite as overrated as it sometimes is, but it would be demagogic and politically dangerous to deny differences where they exist. There is a single territory in which the oppressed nation is in the great majority; there is certainly an important degree of cultural unity, although again there is also some diversity. What of the economic component? Undoubtedly, the great majority of African people participate in a single, advanced economic community in South Africa, but is it really at present a national *African* economic community?

As for the oppressor nation, it is divided broadly along linguistic and to some extent along cultural lines into English and Afrikaans-speakers. It is true that these differences are being partially eroded. What does Stalin mean by 'a community of territory'? Does he mean a territory of one's own, or at least a territory in which the community is the significant majority? There have been different opinions on the issue. Forman has argued that a common territory must mean a territory of one's own and hence neither the Afrikaners nor the Whites as a whole are a nation. John McGarth on the other hand has taken the opposite view.<sup>10</sup> These difficulties inherent in deciding what is meant by a community of territory would also seem to hold for the economic component of Stalin's definition.

### **Problems of Definition**

But before we become embroiled in these issues, we should perhaps examine the terms of the debate itself, for Stalin's definition requires closer scrutiny. As things stand, we are simply presented with a list of essential characteristics, but the definition is entirely mechanical. Any historical necessity in the interconnection between these components is not demonstrated or clarified. Each is accorded an apparent equality, and there is no dialectical determination running through them. Chesneaux in an extremely useful article<sup>11</sup> has suggested, however, that on closer consideration of the facts, it is clear that the different components must be attributed unequal mobility. Language and culture are more or less slowly evolving factors: territory likewise is the product of a slow formation or the fortuitous outcome of shifting political and military events.

'The element of discontinuity, the decisive component, is the national economic community. It is here that the threshold lies from which the nation acquires all its cohesion.'

Chesneaux, following Stalin, stipulates that by a national economic community, a post-feudal economy is meant. The national form of

social organisation might emerge with the development of a capitalist home market (e.g., England, France, etc.) or it might take shape with the development of a socialist economy as in Uzbekistan, for instance, where the pre-capitalist economy was broken down and replaced directly with a socialist system permitting the emergence of national democratic reforms for the first time.

Certain theorists have attacked the view that it is only with a capitalist or socialist economy that a nation as such can be formed. It has been suggested that in China, Vietnam and Egypt, for instance, extensive and relatively stable *national* communities were established before the introduction of a capitalist market by the colonial or semi-colonial powers. The debate surrounding this question is closely linked to that other thorny issue – the ‘Asian mode of production.’ It is clear that in ancient times, there were indeed relatively cohesive communities in parts of Asia and Africa before the advent of modern colonialism, but the degree of cohesion was nonetheless qualitatively less than in most modern societies. While the state in the ‘Asian mode of production’ did indeed perform certain ‘national’ tasks (like the maintenance of extensive irrigation canals or the collection of rice taxation), the great majority of the population was still tied down in village production. Thus, although there were certain national realities, these were no more than a superstructure; the great bulk of production never broke out of the narrow confines of the village, and no genuine national market existed. It is more accurate to classify these communities as proto-nations (or *narodnosts*). It is only a post-feudal economy that can break down expropriation and eviction of a part of the agricultural population not only set free for industrial capital the labourers, their means of subsistence, and material for labour; it also created the home market.’), and with this breaking down, the other components – language, culture, and territory – begin themselves to acquire greater national coherence.

What is meant by a national language is not just a widely-spoken language but a language that appropriates a range of social functions.<sup>12</sup>

In the pre-capitalist era, social formations tend to be characterised by internal linguistic diversity. Eighteenth Century Mongolia has often been cited as an extreme example of the kind of diversity that can occur: Kalka was the language spoken in everyday life, Manchu was the administrative language, Tibetan the religious language, classical Mongol the written language and Chinese the language of commerce.

‘In order that a communal language should become a national language’ writes Chesneaux, ‘it must simultaneously appropriate all, or at least the greater part of these diverse social functions.’ In feudal West-



ern Europe, it was Latin and not the various popular languages that was used for religious and other cultural purposes, and even the popular languages were considerably less homogeneous and more fragmented into regional dialects than they are at present.

Without a national language, a national culture is not possible. As for the territorial component, even in those communities where a national market develops within the broad framework of a traditional geographical area (and this has not, of course, been the general experience of sub-Saharan African countries), there is a distinct, qualitative difference in the post-feudal situation. In the capitalist epoch, frontiers are fixed with greater precision for administrative purposes (taxation, military service, forced labour) and for the functioning of a modern economy (customs duties, monetary circulation and the delimitation of petroleum rights, etc.).

It is, then, the formation of a post-feudal economic community that marks the decisive step in nation formation (which is not to say that all post-feudal social formations are nations). Chesneaux's indications are invaluable, for they place at the centre of the national problem something that does not feature explicitly in Stalin's definition — the class struggle itself. For the development of a post-feudal economy is always the result of the class struggle.

### **Lenin's Approach to the Nation**

In his writings on the national issue, we find Lenin applying the term 'nation' indifferently to societies that seem broadly to meet Stalin's requirements (Britain, France, Germany, etc.), to multi-ethnic and multi-lingual societies (India), as well as to such national groups as the Alsacians<sup>13</sup>. This is not to say that for Lenin the term has no specific meaning at all. The issue is always dealt with in the context of the class struggle and the potential role of the national form of social organisation, a transitory historical form, in securing certain democratic reforms, or 'national tasks' as Lenin calls them. The nation is treated as a social formation involving an alliance of classes which, through the exercise of state power, are able to carry through these democratic reforms (note: the alliance is, of course, always dominated by one or another of the classes or fractions of a class). These reforms are closely associated with the development of a post-feudal mode of production and the struggle against colonial and imperialist domination. The democratic reforms normally include some extension of the franchise and wider popular control of the organs of economic and cultural power. The nation is then essentially viewed by Lenin as an alliance of classes, an alliance that provides the framework susceptible of sustain-

ing specific historical, democratic advances.

Although the national form of social organisation is closely connected to democratic advances, this does not mean that, for Lenin, it cannot also, and simultaneously, provide the foundation for the oppression of other peoples or nations, and it can be the breeding ground for all kinds of chauvinism. Nor must it be imagined that these democratic reforms are necessarily irreversible or that with the shifting nature of the class struggle and changes in production some of the allied classes or fractions of these classes will find themselves increasingly excluded from the nation. The emergence in recent times of the nationality problem in most advanced capitalist countries, an emergence linked to the monopoly stage of capitalism, is an indication of this.

Lenin's approach is not, however, as irreconcilable with the general indications provided by Stalin (if we accept Chesneaux's important precisions) as might at first appear.

The national class alliance is only possible under certain circumstances. In order to carry through 'national tasks', the classes involved in the alliance must occupy a specific territory, and for this reason, Stalin was correct in attacking Otto Bauer who argued that the territorially dispersed Jewish communities of the early 20th Century were a nation. But there is no reason why these classes should be the sole, or even the most numerous occupants, in order to carry through these reforms on their own behalf. In order to install a capitalist or socialist economy and in order to defeat locally the forces of colonialism and imperialism, the national alliance must possess potential economic viability. For this reason, it is useful to distinguish between minority groups (e.g., the Coloured and Indian communities in South Africa) and nations (or proto-nations) as such. As to the other factors, whether it is language, or a common oppressor, or racial similarity, or a common religion, or a combination of these or some others that provides an added initial catalyst to the alliance is, to some extent, a matter of indifference for Lenin when speaking of the nation in general. However, with the consolidation of a national market or the development of socialist production and the local defeat of colonialism and imperialism, national culture and language will be greatly consolidated.

It may be that it is preferable to reserve the term 'nation' as such for a fully-developed national community that satisfies all four components rather than for a community that is advancing along the lines of national organisation. In this case the two nations thesis in South Africa while designating the general character of the class struggle in South Africa needs slight adjustment, for neither of the nations is complete in the fullest sense.



## Class Struggle

Whether one accepts this refinement or not, however, the centring of the national question on the class struggle and the formation of an economic community confirms the general approach of the two nations thesis in South Africa. While the white nation (or proto-nation) has not achieved (and may not achieve) a single national language and homogeneous culture, the white alliance based on certain cultural and racial criteria has been more important objectively than English/Afrikaans differences. These differences have been subordinated to white national supremacy. This oppressor nation, characterised by an alliance of classes (the farming, mining, financial and industrial bourgeoisie, parts of the petit-bourgeoisie and a fraction of the working class) have through the control of state power carried through the normal democratic reforms *within* the confines of the white nation. Through the exercise of this state power, they have also been able to achieve a significant degree of economic independence from the formerly hegemonic colonial power (Britain). In this connection, the heavy taxation of the gold mining industry, which was largely foreign-owned, in order to generate capital for the financing of local manufacturing industries, has been of particular importance.

This white national framework has long since performed its national democratic tasks, and from a democratic point of view, it has become an anachronism – which is not to say that it is therefore about to wither away of its own accord. Further meaningful democratic advance in South Africa can only be achieved within the framework of another national entity, the African South African nation. This nation already exists, at least partially, in the objective alliance between the great majority of the proletariat, the peasantry and fractions of the petit-bourgeoisie who are all subjected to the same national oppression. The possibility of this nation, or proto-nation, carrying through 'national tasks' is to some extent the unintended but dialectical product of the oppressor nation itself and of its predecessor the British colonial power. Although historically it has turned out to be the colonial powers that have, with no credit to themselves, laid many of the foundations with which the African nation of South Africa will achieve its 'national tasks,' it should not be imagined that this had to be so. Potekhin has pointed out that with the Zulu peoples under Shaka, there was a very definite tendency towards the development of nationhood, and he suggests that it is possible to speak of a Zulu proto-nation in existence for a few decades from the 1830's<sup>14</sup>. It is even likely, he says, that had this process continued, an Nguni nation along the East coast of

Southern Africa would have emerged. But colonial conquest and the development of a broader South African economy have changed all this. McGarth is quite mistaken in his argument on this score. 'Potekhin,' according to McGarth, 'says that several of the African peoples in South Africa (e.g., the Zulus and Xhosa) had already reached the 'narodnost' stage at the beginning of the present century (in fact, Potekhin places this stage much further back!!). Almost sixty years of intensive political, social and economic development have taken place since then, and it might very well be that some of these African peoples have already reached the stage where they may be considered as nations.'<sup>15</sup>

What McGarth forgets here is that the sixty years of development that he refers to has precisely been the crucial factor in undermining the possibility of a Zulu or a Xhosa nation coming into being. History is not a neat evolution and not every proto-nation is guaranteed to become a nation.

Colonial oppression has laid the foundations of a unified national market; it has brought together, through roads and a rail network, through taxation, through the amassing of a single work force, millions of formerly-divided peoples. Of course, the white colonial power also does its best to wriggle against the current of its own history. It does its best to maintain divisions, to stir up factional animosity and ethnic rivalries, but it cannot afford to be too successful in this policy either. It needs divisions in the ranks of our people in order to stay in power; but also it needs continually to unite our people in order to maintain production, for without production, it also cannot stay in power. This is one of the inextricable contradictions within which the White nation finds itself today; it is a contradiction that guarantees its ultimate defeat.

1. *African Communist*, 1st Quarter, 1976, p. 89.
2. J. Adams, "On the Development of Nations in South Africa," *Marxism Today*, April, 1959, p. 221.
3. *ibid.*
4. See his reference to "the oppressed nation", *African Communist*, 1st Quarter, 1976, p. 72.
5. L. Forman, "The Development of Nations in South Africa," *Marxism Today*, April 1959, p. 115.
6. A. Cabral, "National Liberation and Culture", *Transition*, no. 45, 1974.
7. I. Potekhin, *African Problems*, 1968.
8. *African Communist*, 1st Quarter, 1976.
9. J. Stalin, *Marxism and the National Question*.



10. L. Forman and J. McGarth, "On the formation of nations in South Africa", *Marxism Today*, August 1959.
11. J. Chesneaux, "Le processus de formation des nations en Afrique et en Asie", *La Pensee*, no. 119, February 1965.
12. A. Haudricourt, "Note sur la formation de langues nationales a propos de l'Asie du Sud-est", *Tiers-Monde*, October-December 1961, pp. 479-485.
13. Lenin, *Selected Works*, vol. 5.
14. Potekhin, *op. cit.*
15. Mc Garth, *op. cit.*

(Further contributions to this important discussion are invited from readers. – Editor.)

# BOOK REVIEWS

## MOSHOESHOE 1 – RULER, STATESMAN AND AFRICAN PATRIOT

*MOSHOESHOE – Chief of the Sotho* by Peter Sanders;  
Heinemann – £8.60 - 350 pp.

Struggling against the tide of history, Southern African racists never cease to promote the outmoded – and thus parodied – institution of chieftaincy in the Canutian hope of turning the waves back and perpetuating white rule. They look back to the era before industrialisation and the emergence of a single South African economic market, when the indigenous people of our land thought of themselves as solely Sotho, Zulu, Xhosa or Tswana or even as members of far smaller units. Nostalgically they dream of the days when our people were disunited; when they could play off one chief against another, enrol the assistance of one tribe to fight another; when resistance was fragmented and the consciousness of being 'African' had not yet dawned. Nevertheless, resistance to colonial conquest and the dispossession of our land was fiercely and heroically contested, and the British and Boer invaders had the greatest difficulty in subjugating our people. Our enemies' overwhelming technological superiority in arms and resources, and the his-



torical divisions then existing amongst our people, were cardinal factors in facilitating the bloody triumph of colonisation. It is these two factors that racism and imperialism seek to maintain to this day.

Because of the structure and social organisation of those tribal societies, resistance to external invasion was necessarily led by chiefs. The names of Hintsa, Makanda, Shaka, Dingaan, Cetshwayo, Mzilikazi, Sekhukhuni and Moshoeshe are venerated by our people. In the history books of the racists, they are denigrated and abused, projected as obscure and irrational tyrants whose impact on history has been minimal. This is because the racists and imperialists seek to suppress our historical achievements and destroy our cultural heritage as a means of maintaining their domination.

In this respect, Peter Sanders' study of Moshoeshe I, founder of Lesotho, is to be welcomed, for despite fundamental limitations, it is a serious and scholarly work, meticulously researched with a wealth of valuable material and information that does much to overcome the crude weight of racist mythology and obscurantism.

Moshoeshe (1786 - 1870) was one of the great rulers of Africa, and the history of 19th Century Southern Africa pivots around his nation-building efforts to quite an extraordinary degree. He was one of the most astute generals and statesmen of his day; an outstanding leader and organiser of his people who popularly referred to him as 'Moshoa oa lethaba' — 'the man who knows how to handle public affairs.' His genius is all the more remarkable for the small size and weakness of his country *vis-a-vis* the strength of his colonial opponents. He was a wily and formidable foe of colonial conquest and the unrelenting attempts to dispossess his people of their land by the unholy alliance of Briton and Boer. He was an outstanding visionary whose efforts to build a united front of African resistance against the European invaders is an inspiration to the national liberation process of our day.

### **Servant of His People**

Of course, in paying such glowing tribute to the achievements and qualities of Moshoeshe, one is mindful of the fact that great men alone do not make history — that the masses are the true creators of history. Fortunately the author — who is by no means a Marxist, but a former colonial officer in Lesotho whose work on Moshoeshe gained him an Oxford doctorate — does not seek to project his subject as a 'free agent' acting over the heads of his passive followers. Indeed, in the preface to his book, he sets out his aim as follows:

In the past historical interest in Moshoeshe has concentrated on his reactions to European pressures, and the politics of his chieftdom have

been largely neglected. The vital connections between these two areas have never been fully explored, and the obvious truth that one cannot hope to understand any individual unless one first understands the society into which he is born has generally been overlooked. In this volume, I seek to make good these deficiencies.'

Certainly Moshoeshe understood the relation of his position to that of his people. 'My body belongs to you and a chief is a servant of the people' he declared at a great *pitso* in 1841; and he meant it. He was always aware that he was chief 'by grace of the people' and that his actions and decisions were limited by the general will of his followers. He won a reputation for justice and generosity and never maintained his authority by force. The author shows that he treated his people 'with consideration and respect' and gives some interesting glimpses of the role of the *pitso* – the tribal general assembly where all important decisions were arrived at.

### **The Centre of Agitation**

Moshoeshe's life falls into two distinctive periods, which the author traces in detail. The first involves his rise to power and the formation of the Sotho nation; the second involves his struggle to defend and retain as much of his land as possible against the British and Boers and culminates in the declaration of the Sotho as British subjects in 1868. In the process, huge chunks of Lesotho were swallowed up by the Free State Boers, aided and abetted by the British. All of the most fertile land west of the Caledon River and much more besides was lost in this way. However, as the author points out, one vital consequence flowed from the founding of Moshoeshe's chiefdom – 'resistance to white invasion was that much more effective.'

It is in the realm of this resistance that the author's research proves most interesting. As a result of his bitter disputes and conflicts with the colonialists, Moshoeshe came to realise that the fundamental conflict of the time – that over land – 'was being fought out not merely between Sotho and Boers on the High Veld, but between black and white on every frontier in South Africa.' Among Africans outside Lesotho, Moshoeshe enjoyed a splendid reputation as the man who had held his own against the Boer and British forces and had defeated them both on occasions. He was in close communication with chiefs as far north as the Zambesi and as far south as the Kei, including Mpande of the Zulus, Faku of the Mpondo and the Sotho chiefs who lived beyond the Vaal. He sent horses to Cetshwayo and men to teach the Zulus how to ride and shoot in the manner of the Sotho. The British saw him 'at the centre of a network of influence throughout



South Africa' and that arch-imperialist Shepstone expressed himself anxious to extend British control to Lesotho because it had always been 'the centre of all native political agitation' and 'the key to all South African politics as far as natives are concerned.' Of the British, Moshoeshe said: 'One must respect and fear them . . . it seems to us that little tribes like ours can no more defeat them than swallow the ocean.' Moshoeshe had no illusions about the British imperialists who shamefully betrayed their treaties with him when it suited them to do so. He skilfully maintained his kingdom in the precarious area between British and Boer threats to his independence and in the end accepted the 'protection' of the Queen's government only when his chieftdom was on the point of collapse.

At the height of Moshoeshe's power, Lesotho was a powerful and stable nation whose inhabitants enjoyed a great degree of prosperity. By 1865, Moshoeshe had 150,000 followers and the Free Staters procured from the Sotho about 300,000 bushels of grain annually. By 1868, at the end of a bitter three-year war with the Free State, the best land had been lost as a result of a treaty concluded between the British and the Boers. Suffering and starvation were widespread and countless dispossessed Sotho went to work in the fields of the Free State, Natal and the Cape Colony. In order to survive and regain some of his land, Moshoeshe had sacrificed his independence. 'Take the country and do what you like with it, we are all dead,' he told the British after the country had been virtually mapped out in the shape it has today.

Yet the formal independence of Lesotho today is a testament to Moshoeshe's foresight and statesmanship. Of all the leading chiefs of his time, he was the only one to maintain his chieftdom. His consciousness of himself as an African, of the need for unity of all the black people, and the heroic resistance he organised to colonial invasion and rapaciousness has profoundly enriched our cultural and historical heritage. That today half the able-bodied men of the country work in the Republic of South Africa, that the land is eroded and the people cannot feed themselves is a searing reminder that Lesotho will only attain its true freedom and independence with the liberation of all the people of South Africa.

Sanders has sifted through an impressive amount of primary source material and communicates his findings in an interesting and readable way. All his sources are clearly identified, and the book carries with it the full scholarly apparatus of references, footnotes, bibliography, etc. which makes it a valuable contribution to the historiography of the period. On the debit side, the book has all the failings of a positivist approach to history that so dominates the bourgeois conception of the

social sciences. The work is heavily geared to a description of facts at the expense of meaningful explanation. There is no reference to the pattern and forces of history. There is only a frail attempt to analyse the facts in order to discover the underlying processes at work in society. Whilst the author makes some effort in this regard in relation to Moshoeshoe's role in his own society, the most serious and unforgivable defect in the book is the absence of any serious study of the policy and objectives of British imperialism. This astonishing omission – whilst achieving doctorates at Oxford – is like serving up a pie with the meat and stuffing left out.

Alexander Sibeko

### WHITE UNITY AND BLACK LIBERATION

*The Nationalists in Opposition 1934 - 1948* by Newell M. Stultz, published by Human and Rosseau, R4. 95.

This is an expanded and revised version of the author's doctoral thesis presented to Boston University in the early sixties. For the most part, the book covers familiar territory, though here and there Dr. Stultz is able to quote a 'confidential source' for some fresh information relating to decision-making in the Nationalist Party hierarchy. Briefly, the author's purpose has been to examine the bases of Afrikaner nationalism and the ways in which it manifested itself during the period under review. In particular, he has sought to explain the 'surprise' victory of the Nationalist Party in the 1948 elections following a war in which the policies for which the Party appeared to stand had been decisively defeated.

Dr. Stultz's conclusion seems to be that it was not the policy of apartheid which won the elections for the Nationalist Party in 1948, but the resurgence of Afrikaner unity which had been fractured by the Hertzog-Smuts Fusion of 1933-34. Since he thinks the success of the Fusion experiment in bringing the whites together was of greater importance for the future of South Africa than the need in 1939 for immediate South African entry into the war against Hitler, he regards Smuts' forcing of the issue as a fatal mistake. It reunited Hertzog and Malan (temporarily) and behind them consolidated the ranks of the Afrikaner people whose numerical superiority and national consciousness, once the war was out of the way, swept the Nationalist Party into power in 1948 and paved the way for the ensuing years of Afrikaner domination



of South Africa's political life. Dr. Stultz feels that General Smuts ought to have followed his life-long practice of 'letting things develop' until a consensus for war could have been found.

Dr. Stultz is right in arguing that race prejudice and discrimination are not the monopoly of the Nationalist Party and cites the policies and manifestos of the Nationalist and United Parties in 1948 as evidence that they were not all that far apart. But this very argument undermines his own case that Fusion and the 'development of a united South African white nation through the processes of compromise and conciliation' was or would have been good for the country. He himself admits that the 'promise of Fusion extended only to relations between the two white groups and not at all to non-whites,' and there is no evidence at all that white unity of the Fusion type was or is a necessary pre-requisite for good relations between black and white. It was a Fusion government which deprived the Africans of their common roll franchise in the Cape, and was well on the way to implementing a whole series of further restrictions on the rights of whites as well as blacks had not the war intervened.

This brings us to the second objection to his thesis, and that is that there is also no evidence that South African neutrality in the war against Hitler would have led white thinking progressively to the point where a consensus for war would have been found. He cites the American experience as an example, but America was brought into the war not by consensus but by Pearl Harbour. If South Africa's Pearl Harbour had never happened, one would be left with the argument that white unity in a world dominated by Hitler would have been preferable to what actually happened – which even Dr. Stultz must admit would have been an unacceptable and unprofitable sacrifice of principle to expediency.

Finally, to a black South African, Dr. Stultz's whole thesis is intolerably academic. Whether it was the apartheid policy or Afrikaner nationalism which guaranteed Malan his 1948 victory is of little significance when the outcome for the blacks is the same. A pass is a pass, even if you call it a reference book.

Z. K.

## ACADEMIC BIAS AND BOGUS OBJECTIVITY

*Workers without Weapons – The South African Congress of Trade Unions and the Organisation of African Workers* by Edward Feit, published by Archon Books, U.S.A., 1975. Price \$12.50.

This book purports to fill a gap in the literature on South African labour history and does, at first sight, appear to be a factual, reasonably full and well-documented account of SACTU's formation and history.

Dr. Feit is a prolific writer on South Africa. Born in Austria, he spent 35 years in South Africa before going to the United States. From the many books on South Africa he has published there, however, it is clear that he is no friend of the liberation movement. He has shown a marked bias towards the present South African regime and a preoccupation with issues of security and counter-insurgency.

Feit's long association with the Hoover Institute must account for his access in this book to impressive documentation. His failure to acknowledge this association here is consistent with his efforts to maintain an appearance of objectivity.

Feit sets out to prove that SACTU failed and that this failure was inevitable. And he reaches the conclusion that SACTU was doomed, not so much by government harassment and objective difficulties as by the weakness and inefficiency of its leaders, internal disputes and financial constraints. He evidently spent considerable time unearthing the evidence and describes at length incidents to illustrate these shortcomings, blowing them up out of all proportion to their importance when seen in the context of the difficult objective conditions under which SACTU was operating. Yet Feit practically ignores the constant arrests and bannings of trade unionists and the victimisation of workers which was taking place. His complete failure to grasp the essence of the problems facing those trying to organise African workers is illustrated in the following paragraph:

'It seems that the Security Police do pay close attention if an organiser or a secretary clearly creates the impression that the union is possibly illegal, and that the secretary is in some kind of difficulty. It erodes worker willingness to engage in action and lowers their morale. There is of course not much African unions and their organisers can do about this.'

Missing from this book is the kind of backdrop which is essential if SACTU's role, its successes and failures, are to be fairly evaluated. Feit criticises SACTU in one breath for 'instigating strikes' without justification, and in another breath for engaging in 'futile correspondence.'



One is left with the distinct impression that he has set out not merely to study the failure of an organisation, as he claims, but to do all he can to discredit that organisation – a somewhat dubious objective for a professed academic.

On the other hand, Feit goes to some lengths to explain and justify the policies of TUCSA with respect to African workers. He describes Lucy Mvubelo, for example, as in many ways typifying 'the best of African trade union leaders,' when in fact she is a notorious government collaborator. He discerns 'a firm belief among employers and white labour leaders that African unions are bound to come and bound sooner or later to be effective.' This, of course, without the militant tradition of SACTU.

Feit returns to his favourite theme of counter-insurgency when he attempts to prove that after 1960 SACTU abandoned its task of organising trade unions and instead became a substitute for the banned African National Congress, and a recruiting field for the underground movement. This he sees as their final mistake, thereby laying themselves open to the government repression which made it virtually impossible for SACTU to operate in South Africa. His evidence for this outrageous claim comes from Bruno Mtolo and other sell-outs and State witnesses in the trials of Mandela, Sisulu, Bram Fischer and many others. He seems deliberately to ignore the fact that militant trade unionists continue to be harassed by the South African government even since SACTU was suppressed and that it is the organisation of black workers which the government has reason to fear, not the worn-out myth of 'Reds under the Beds.'

M.O.T.

### THE SOCIOLOGY OF REVOLUTION

*Change in Contemporary South Africa*, edited by Leonard Thompson and Jeffrey Butler, University of California Press.

The starting point for this book was a conference held in the United States from April 7 to 12, 1974 – a whole fortnight before the Portuguese revolution which was to transform the face of Southern Africa. The book comprises papers read at the conference – 'radically revised,' the editors assure us, and 'in some cases virtually rewritten.'

The main purpose of the re-writing was probably to take account of the changes brought about by the liberation of Portugal's African ter-

ritories, for the book would otherwise have been hopelessly dated. But since the editors' note informing readers of these changes is dated December, 1974, it can be seen that inevitably the book has still been overtaken by events. Anybody who contemplates the possibilities of change in white-dominated Southern Africa today must take into consideration the events in Angola between August, 1975 and April, 1976, the intervention and repulse of regular South African military units, the collapse of the Smith-Nkomo settlement talks, the intensification of guerrilla warfare in Zimbabwe and Namibia.

Due to no fault of their own, none of the authors was able to foresee the scope of change which was to occur after their book had gone to press. Or is it due to no fault of their own? One contributor, Heribert Adam, whose previous book *Modernising Racial Discrimination* revealed his deep-rooted respect for the ability of the Nationalist Government to contain the projected black revolution, contributes yet another doom-laden piece to this book in which he prides himself on his ability as a social scientist to 'take full account of a complex, contradictory reality' as distinct from the 'wishful thinking' indulged in by political activists. He is neatly answered by Albie Sachs, who remarks in his essay: 'All revolutions are impossible to the social scientist until they happen; then they become inevitable.'

It was Karl Marx who said: 'Philosophers have in the past interpreted the world in various ways. The point, however, is to change it.' Most of the social scientists in this book do explain things in various ways, and some of their explanations are valuable for anyone trying to understand the South African situation. Nevertheless, in the light of what has happened, the book as a whole has a staid and static air about it. The conference participants were facing a situation in which many of them may have desired change, but most of them saw little chance of it. In fact, almost all of them were displaying a characteristic which bourgeois philosophers usually blame on Marxism — the elimination of the element of the human will.

How do sociologists measure the determination of the members of MPLA and Frelimo to fight and die for freedom, and compare it with the determination of the Portuguese to fight and die for colonialism? How do sociologists measure the transformation which has been brought about in the minds of millions of people in southern Africa, black as well as white, as a result of the events in Angola and Mozambique? One wonders what sort of a study of politics has been made by some of the contributors to this book. Do they really understand what Marxism is all about? Do they know the meaning of the unity and solidarity of the international communist movement? Do they understand



the reasons why national liberation movements everywhere can always rely on the support of the international communist movement? After Vietnam and Angola, do they now accept that Marxism is the lever which enables the irresistible mass force to shift the apparently immovable object?

Sociologists who want to see true social science being applied in practice should read again John Reed's immortal *Ten Days that Shook the World* and see how Lenin and his comrades were able to assess from day to day, almost from hour to hour, the shifting balance of forces in a revolutionary situation and decide the precise moment to strike. It was the accuracy of their assessments, rooted in the mass character and actions of the Bolshevik Party, which made the October Revolution possible. Likewise, it was the accurate analysis of the situation in Angola and in the world at large in October-November, 1975 which enabled the forces of progress to triumph over those of reaction. The MPLA and its socialist allies had done their political and logistical homework; South Africa and the CIA, despite all the facts placed at their disposal by their spies and sociologists, had gone hopelessly astray.

We should not look to the contributors to this book, therefore, for political guidance. After all, they are not revolutionaries, and it was not their intention to tell us what to do. They do not even share a common outlook. Nevertheless, between them they have mulled over a mass of information, and many of their findings will repay study.

Thus, the UCT economist Francis Wilson, after a study of migrant labour, concludes 'that the impact of economic growth by itself will not lead to a withering away of the system (of migratory labour), but will serve to entrench it more firmly as the centrepiece of the apartheid structure. . . .' (p. 183). After surveying black experience in recent strikes and relating it to the mobility of labour, he also argues that 'the net result of the creation of independent Bantustans may well be to weaken still further the political bargaining power of black South Africans' (p. 193), largely because 'there is, for the foreseeable future, no possibility whatever of the majority of their citizens earning their living except by migrating to the Republic' (p. 197).

Wilson also shows (p. 195) that foreign investment helps to entrench apartheid, and the greater the investment and the profits, the greater the foreign support for the maintenance of the apartheid system. Conversely in his essay on 'The Impact of External Opposition on South African Politics,' University of Lancaster lecturer, Sam C. Nolutshungu, stresses the vital importance of international action against apartheid South Africa, not merely because of its hampering of the machinery of racist government, but perhaps more importantly through the influence

it exerts on the development of political consciousness and confidence amongst the black oppressed in South Africa itself. The collaboration between the Western powers and South Africa, says Nolutshungu, may make the notion irresistible 'that from the point of view of the liberation of Africa, the Western powers may themselves have to be regarded as appropriate objects of revolutionary transformation' (p. 398). Vorster's detente is designed to weaken not only the anti-apartheid movement but the anti-imperialist movement everywhere.

P. M.

## **MOZAMBIQUE REVOLUTION**

Frelimo English-language quarterly. Independence issue now available:

price (incl. postage) – 50 pence – annual sub: £2.00.

## **PEOPLE'S POWER** in Mozambique and Guinea-Bissau

New bi-monthly series of reports, major speeches and policy statements, news etc.:

Sample copy – 50 pence – annual sub: £2.50.

Both publications available from:

**Mozambique and Guine Information Centre  
12 Little Newport Street  
London WC2AH 7JJ  
England**



# Letters to the Editor

## THE REVOLUTIONARY SITUATION IS FAST MATURING

**From Vernet Mbatha**

Urgent tasks face our revolutionary movement and in order to solve these tasks successfully, a consistent Marxist-Leninist approach needs to be adopted.

In South Africa today a revolutionary situation is fast maturing and the question we have to address to ourselves as revolutionaries is 'What at present are we doing to exploit the favourable conditions which are arising?'

Lenin brilliantly formulated the conditions necessary to achieve social revolution. He said objective conditions were necessary. By these he meant signs of profound crisis in the old system. Lenin defined the signs, or symptoms, as follows: (1) a crisis amongst the 'upper classes', a crisis in the policy of the ruling classes, when it is impossible for them to maintain their rule without any change, (2) the suffering and want of the oppressed classes have grown more acute than usual, (3) as a consequence of the above causes, there is a considerable increase in the activity of the masses, who uncomplaining-

ly allow themselves to be robbed in 'peacetime', but in turbulent times are drawn by all circumstances into independent historic action.

From reading reports about South Africa, one can hardly escape realising the revolutionary fervour, generated amongst the exploited and oppressed masses, by victories of Frelimo in Mozambique and the crushing defeat minted out by the MPLA of Angola, to the South African racist aggressors. These victories have created a crisis within the apartheid structure, this is not withstanding the economic crisis that has gripped South Africa and the rest of the World Capitalist Economy. The low wages our people receive are below subsistence levels, the current rate of inflation is making life even more unliveable for our people.

The victory that the World Socialist System has won over imperialism is emphasised in the 'Helsinki Agreement.'

The imperialist powers have themselves lately realised that things cannot continue in the same old manner in Southern Africa and are therefore bringing pressures to bear on South Africa to change its policies of apartheid. But, comrades, we must not fall into the trap of believing that with the end of apartheid our problems will be solved — the problem that is facing South Africa and indeed the whole capitalist world is the problem of Capitalism that is the exploitation of man by man.

Leninism teaches that a revolutionary situation may be brought about by various causes: economic shocks, failures of government policy, such as a collapse of a military adventure, national or racial conflicts, leading to a sharp aggravation of social contradictions, etc. In a number of cases revolutionary situations grow out of wars (e.g., the revolutions of 1905 and 1917 in Russia), although war is by no means an obligatory condition of the revolutionary situation.

The guerrilla preparations in Namibia and Zimbabwe are bound to aggravate the crisis of apartheid further. What we need to do is intensify our efforts to launch guerrilla war within our country in order to bring these conditions to a head. These preparations should be coordinated with mass demonstrations such as political and economic strikes, etc.

As the government intensifies its militarization programme further contradictions will come into play; e.g., shortage of skilled white personnel who will be mobilised. Ultimately, the government and monopolies will enlist more black workers into the army and economy. This will create further opportunities for the revolutionary movement to exploit.

We have been so far discussing some of the objective conditions



necessary for social revolution. There are however other factors such as subjective conditions. Lenin described these as: (1) revolutionary consciousness of the masses, the readiness and determination to carry through the struggle to the end, (2) organisation of the masses and their vanguard (the A.N.C. and C.P.) which makes it possible to concentrate all forces capable of fighting for victory of revolution, and to act together and not in scattered groups, (3) leadership of the masses by a party or parties sufficiently experienced and trained in battle and capable of evolving a correct strategy and tactics of struggle and putting it into practice.

The unity of objective and subjective conditions make social revolution successful. This law of social revolution has been confirmed as Lenin noted, by all revolutions and particularly by the three Russian revolutions of the 20th Century.

Although the objective conditions play a decisive role in history, the subjective factor may, under certain circumstances, determine the fate of the revolution. The subjective factor acquires this role whenever and wherever objective conditions for revolution have sufficiently matured. If the objective conditions for accomplishing historical tasks have not matured, no efforts on the part of the progressive forces can lead to the transformation of society. But if the objective conditions are present, the results of social transformation depend on the subjective factor.

Therefore, comrades, it is obvious that the subjective factor for the revolutionary situation needs to be worked for with the courage and dedication it demands. The call must go out to all the revolutionary working class, youth, students, intellectuals, professionals and peasants to prepare for the day of reckoning!

**Victory is Certain!  
Amandla Ngawethu!  
Maatla ke A Rona!  
Power to the People!**

---

## **PAUL ROBESON AND THE WORKING CLASS**

**From Idris Cox, London**

In the tribute to Paul Robeson "A Great Friend of Africa" you explain that from 1927 to 1939 (12 years) his home was London. Robeson himself pointed out this was where he "discovered" Africa, and came to consider himself as an African. From personal knowledge I know that

from then onwards he became a keen student of African culture and languages.

However, it seems to me that you give scant attention to his close relations with the working class, and progressive political movements and leaders during his 12 years in Britain. Not only did he visit many working class homes. He spent a considerable time in the South Wales mining valleys, sang in a mammoth musical festival in Mountain Ash, and was the principal actor in the film "Proud Valley" which was a searchlight upon the life of the miners, their struggle against poverty and unemployment, and their hunger marches to London. It surprises me greatly there was no mention of this. The miners' union in South Wales has not forgotten their close contact with Robeson.

Robeson also had many direct political contacts in Britain, with the organised Labour movement, with the *Daily Worker*, forerunner of the *Morning Star*, and on close terms of friendship with the Communist Party and individual Communist leaders, and especially Ben Bradley, who spent some years in an Indian prison, arising from his struggle against British imperialism an anti-imperialist cause to which Robeson himself was so devoted.

Nor does your issue No. 65 emphasise the impact which the struggle against fascism in Spain made on Robeson, who spoke and sang at a mammoth rally in solidarity at the Earls' Court Stadium. It deepened his hatred of fascism and racism, inspired him to give his utmost in solidarity events (cultural and otherwise) in Britain in support of the Spanish people. Even within the space given it seems to me these aspects could have been stressed.

**Listen to the  
VOICE OF THE AFRICAN NATIONAL CONGRESS AND  
UMKHONTO WE SIZWE**

**Radio Tanzania – External Service (Dar es Salaam)**

**on 15435 Khz                      19 meter band**

**10 p.m. South African time**

**Sundays, Mondays  
Wednesdays, Fridays**



Also available from

**Inkululeko Publications**  
**39 Goodge Street**  
**London W1.**

*Moses Kotane: South African Revolutionary*

by Brian Bunting. Price: South Africa R5.00, Africa £1.50,  
Britain £3.00, All other countries \$8.00 (US).

*50 Fighting Years: The South African Communist Party 1921-1971*

by A. Lerumo. Price: North America \$4.00, All other countries £1.25.

*The Road to South African Freedom: Programme of the SACP*  
(Hard cover only) Price 50p.

*International Meeting of Communist & Workers Parties, Moscow 1969.*  
Price £1.00 (\$3.00).

## **LABOUR MONTHLY**

*Founded 1921*

**a Marxist commentary on political events in the cause of national liberation and socialism.**

**30 pence monthly – £1.80 half-yearly subscription – £3.60 yearly.**

**(Students: £3.30 yearly – £1.70 half-yearly.)**

**– all post free (surface mail) from –**

**DEPARTMENT AC  
134 Ballards Lane  
London N3 2PD  
England**



**Be informed by keeping in tune with-**

**Radio  
Berlin  
International**  
The Voice  
of the German  
Democratic  
Republic



**Keeps you up to date on:**

Life and developments in the Socialist German state and the socialist community.  
Mankind's struggle for – Peace, National Liberation, Social Liberation.  
Get to know the standpoint of the socialist German state by listening to  
Radio Berlin International.

You can receive us in:—

**Africa**

in English, French, Swahili on the following metre bands: 49, 25, 19, 16 and 13.

**Middle East**

in Arabic on the following metre bands: 49, 30, 25, 19, 16 and 13.

**South East Asia**

in English and Hindi on the following metre bands: 25, 19, 16 and 13.

**IMPORTANT:** Please note that our frequencies are changed in March, May, September and November. The details are announced at the end of our programmes.

GDR, 116 Berlin