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**Class Struggle and
African Unity~10 years
of the OAU**



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THE AFRICAN COMMUNIST

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EDITORIAL NOTES



DECADE OF DETENTION & DEATH

This year sees the 10th anniversary of the arrests at Rivonia on July 11, 1963, of Nelson Mandela and other top leaders of the national liberation movement of our country, most of whom were later sentenced to life imprisonment for “sabotage”. It also marks the 10th anniversary of the General Laws Amendment Act, better known as the 90-day No-Trial Detention Act, which came into operation on May 1st, 1963. The two events, of course, are intimately interconnected.

The main purpose of the 90-day law was to give the South African police a weapon to break down the resistance of political prisoners far from the prying eyes of press, public or even relatives. The Security Police were made all-powerful. No court was entitled to intervene. No detainee could ask to see his lawyer, or make his plight known to the outside world.

We know now that the main weapon used by the police to break down their victims was torture – both physical and psychological. Detainees were held in solitary confinement and hammered and hammered until they broke down. Within three weeks of the gazetting of the 90-Day law 27 people had disappeared into the torture chambers of the Security Police. By September 1963 the first known deaths of detainees were recorded – to date there have been at least 20. Many others become mentally deranged and had to be treated in mental hospitals.

Police head torturer Swanepoel called detention without trial “a mighty weapon”, and there is no denying the damage that weapon has caused in the ranks of the freedom fighters. It led to the staging of a succession of political trials, in which evidence was given by a handful of stooges and informers against their erstwhile comrades – perjured evidence in many cases – resulting in the death sentence and execution for some, life-long imprisonment for others.

The Rivonia trial was one of many political trials which the authorities were able to stage during the last decade thanks to the legalisation of torture by the South African regime. There were other “sabotage” and “terrorist” trials and more life sentences in later years. There were trials last year and there are more trials this year – testimony to the fact that the ghastly torture methods of the police have been unable to break the determination of the people to resist apartheid and carry on the fight for a better life for all in South Africa, a life without colour bars and oppression, a life with equal rights and opportunities for all.

Meanwhile, however, many of South Africa’s greatest sons and daughters lie rotting in the Republic’s maximum security jails – on Robben Island, Nelson Mandela, Walter Sisulu, Govan Mbeki, Ahmed Kathrada, Raymond Mhlaba, Elias Motsoaledi, Andrew Mlangeni, Wilton Mkwayi; in Pretoria Bram Fischer and Dennis Goldberg, all serving life sentences which the Government has made clear means

they are to remain in jail for the rest of their natural lives. An additional 400 political prisoners are serving long sentences of up to 20 years – and once again the Government has made it clear they will get no remission and must serve the full term. Almost invariably those who have completed their sentences have found on release that they are either banished to the so-called “resettlement camps” in the Reserves, or placed under strict house arrest.

It has been a decade of mass detentions and death in South Africa which has outraged the whole world, and drawn protests from the United Nations, the Organisation of African Unity, and prominent organisations and public figures in many countries. In South Africa itself a remarkable campaign was waged, on the occasion of Bram Fischer’s 65th birthday in April to secure an amnesty for him on the grounds of his age and ill-health. While some of those who came forward limited themselves to an appeal for his release on compassionate grounds, many others widened their appeal to include all political prisoners.

Shameful was the approach of the United Party, which, through its shadow Minister of Justice Mr Michael Mitchell, opposed Bram Fischer’s release on the grounds that his crime was “more heinous” than rape or murder. The Nationalists justified themselves by pointing out that they were not singling out politicals for unique punishment as prisoners convicted of stock theft and immorality also did not qualify for remission!

To their credit, many prominent figures, including some in the UP, strongly criticised Mitchell and the UP leadership for their reactionary stand on this issue. Witwatersrand University law professor John Dugard said: “Mr Mitchell’s statement shows a total lack of understanding of the distinction between the political and non-political offender. Whereas ordinary criminal acts are essentially anti-social and committed for dishonourable ends, this is not so in the case of a political offender.” Afrikaans writer Jan Rabie said: “I would support a call for amnesty for all political prisoners. They should at least have the same rights as other prisoners. As things stand, people imprisoned for their moral ideals are treated worse than other prisoners.”

Author Uys Krige, surgeon Christian Barnard, Labour Party leader

Sonny Leon, Chief Gatsha Buthelezi and many other prominent figures took a similar line. They were backed editorially by the "Rand Daily Mail" and some other English-language papers.

Yet to all these appeals the Vorster Government turned a deaf ear and latest news indicates that the conditions of political prisoners have deteriorated. A court case earlier this year which resulted in a judge ordering that prisoner Kader Hassim be released from solitary confinement revealed that all 43 politicals on Robben Island who are classified as Grade D – the lowest category – had been deprived of all reading material, permission to study, letters, sports facilities and other "privileges" because they had presented a petition on their grievances to the prison authorities.

In South Africa the Prisons Act prevents anybody from disclosing anything that happens in a prison, and the press has learnt the lesson of the Gandar case and says nothing. The right of appeal to the courts is strictly limited and in the case of all no-trial detainees simply non-existent. The only real protection for the political prisoner is public opinion at home and abroad.

We call on all progressive-minded people in South Africa and the whole world to come to the aid of these men and women in our jails, suffering for no other reason than that they tried to build a better future for their children. No one in South Africa, no one in the outside world, can feel free while men like Mandela and Fischer are in chains. No one can remain indifferent to their plight.

The world must renew with the utmost vigour its demand for the release of all political prisoners in South Africa; and, pending their release, that all discriminatory penalties against political prisoners should be withdrawn. On this tenth anniversary of the Rivonia arrests, let every reader pledge to initiate some action on behalf of South Africa's political prisoners. Let no one rest until our comrades are free.

WHITE SUPREMACISTS STAND TOGETHER

In February 1972 Vorster appointed a Parliamentary Select Committee to investigate four organisations: NUSAS, the Institute of Race Relations, the Christian Institute and the University Christian Movement. At the time all four organisations plus the United Party called instead for the appointment of a judicial commission, saying a Select Committee with a built-in Nationalist majority could not be objective. The motion

was passed in the House of Assembly by 86 votes to 43, with the UP and Mrs Suzman voting against.

The only common link between the four organisations was that they were multi-racial foci of opposition to the Government's apartheid policies. The UCM dissolved itself on July 12, 1972, under fire both from the Government on its right wing and from Black consciousness elements on the left. "We no longer believe that multi-racialism is a viable strategy to bring about change", stated the resolution of dissolution adopted unanimously by the UCM delegates who attended the dissolution conference.

The first report of the Schlebusch Commission (named after its Nationalist MP chairman) was presented to the Assembly on February 27, 1973. It dealt with NUSAS. While NUSAS should not be banned, said the commission, action should be taken against those of its leaders who were dragging the organisation on the road to revolution, and whose sentiments were the same as those of the banned Communist Party. The Commission also suggested the establishment of a permanent security commission to continue its work – a sort of un-South African Affairs Committee which would have appealed to the late U.S. Senator McCarthy.

The report was unanimous, the four United Party members who served on the commission voting with the Nationalist majority. Vorster immediately announced the banning of 8 NUSAS leaders under the Suppression of Communism Act. Independently, he placed 8 leaders of the black South African Students' Organisation (SASO) under house arrest, even though in their case he had not even bothered to order any inquiry.

The bannings of the NUSAS officials led to an enormous outcry on the English-language campuses, with staff, students and top business leaders appearing on common platforms. Strangely enough, the more drastic punishments meted out to the SASO leaders were hardly mentioned, and it became apparent that the whole episode had merely deepened the divisions between English and Afrikaans-speaking Whites and that the basic issues of political and civil rights in South Africa, affecting the whole population and not only the privileged Whites, were largely ignored.

Typical was the comment of "Rand Daily Mail" assistant editor Allister Sparks on March 24: "As an English-speaking South African I found Mr Vorster's statement (calling on English university heads to discipline their students) so offensive that it made my blood boil. Here was the insufferable arrogance of the new Afrikaner Nationalist imperialism at its worst... What bloody cheek!" Sparks gave no indication that his blood boiled at what the Government was doing to the blacks.

However, the United Party's complicity with the Nationalists in the work of the commission has created havoc in the ranks of the anti-government forces. The United Party itself has been split from top to bottom, and at the time of writing controversy still rages over whether the UP should withdraw from the commission and keep its hands clean in future, as it has been strongly advised to do by the "Cape Times", "Rand Daily Mail" and other papers. As for the other organisations under investigation, the Christian Institute and the former leaders of the UCM have decided to refuse to give evidence, while the Institute of Race Relations at first chose the course of compliance, but later, after a special meeting of the Institute's Council, changed its mind and decided not to co-operate with the Commission.

Once again, the Nationalist Government has restored its supremacy in White politics by beating the anti-communist drum, and all the signs indicate that the UP is trying to reach a consensus with the Nationalists on the issue of "security". The work of the Schlebusch commission must be seen against the background of recent developments in the whole of Southern Africa – the stepped-up guerrilla campaign in Rhodesia, Mozambique and Caprivi, the unrest in Namibia, the massive strike wave in South Africa itself. The very ground is shaking under the feet of the White supremacists, and fears have been expressed both by Nat. and UP leaders and their press that, now that the Vietnam fighting no longer occupies the centre of the stage, Southern Africa will become the focus of world attention. It is no coincidence that Dr Diederichs' Budget this year showed a record allocation of R447 million for the army, plus R119 for the police, including R9 million for security services.

Desperate attempts are being made on all sides to plug the Rhodesia gap, with the United States, Britain, South Africa and Portugal all

pressuring Smith to reach a settlement. The imperialists are terrified that failure to reach a settlement now will lead to the collapse of the Rhodesian front, bringing South Africa face to face with disaster. In the first week of May, Police Minister Muller warned that South Africa could become another Vietnam, and former Cabinet Minister Gerdener urged his countrymen to regard the Zambesi as their northern border.

It is in this atmosphere that Schlebusch himself commented: "I see considerable progress on the road to a complete two-party policy with regard to internal security". The reaction to his commission once again underlines the reality that the so-called opposition in the White Parliament stands, as it has always done, four-square behind white supremacy.

BLACK AGENTS OF CAPITALISM

The enormous strike wave which has swept over Southern Africa in the last two years has not only brought in its train substantial wage increases for many sections of Black workers (even though most of them are still living below the breadline), but has greatly increased the confidence of the Black workers in their ability to act effectively to bring about change in South Africa. According to a statement by Labour Minister Viljoen in the House of Assembly in April, there were 160 strikes by Black workers between January 1 and March 31 this year, affecting 146 establishments and involving over 61,000 workers. This is certainly a gross underestimate. The "Financial Mail" estimated that 100,000 Black workers were on strike in the Durban area alone during January, and there were strikes in every major centre in South Africa from the middle of 1972 onwards. Nevertheless, the official figures show that more Black workers went on strike in those three months than in the previous decade – again according to the official figures. The very fact that not a single Black worker has been prosecuted for striking illegally is in itself testimony to the strength of the working-class movement and its latent revolutionary potential.

Certainly, the speed with which the bosses hastened to settle showed they were in no doubt about the need to damp down the smouldering fires of revolt. And this has been followed by the hullabaloo overseas about the starvation wages paid by U.S., British, and other foreign firms to their black workers in South Africa. No one

should be deceived by the investigations which are now being officially sponsored by foreign governments. They are not primarily concerned with the fate of the Black workers. What worries them is the spectre of revolution which would at a stroke deprive them of their main source of super-profits. If these official investigations lead to any improvements in the conditions of Black workers in South Africa, it is merely because the bosses hope by throwing a few more crumbs to the masses to be able to continue to exploit them in the future.

The real issue which should be debated is: what right has foreign capital to involve itself in South Africa in the first place? The United Nations, the organisation of African Unity, and the real leaders of the Black peoples of South Africa have called for the total isolation of South Africa in every sphere – political, economic, diplomatic, sporting – as a means of aiding the liberation movement in its struggle to destroy the system of apartheid root and branch. The millions of pounds of foreign capital which have flowed into South Africa in the last ten years, at a rate faster than ever before, constitute one of the main props of apartheid, and have undoubtedly saved the South African economy from collapse. The foreign capitalists use this very argument to justify their presence in our country, claiming that they provide jobs for workers who would otherwise starve. Our reply to this is that the workers are starving because this is the way capitalism works. Foreign capital is bolstering the South African ruling class at the expense of the masses, and far from softening the antagonisms of apartheid, is only enabling the whole wretched system of exploitation to continue. Foreign and South African capitalists are united in their determination to keep alive the goose that lays the golden eggs, even if it means the perpetuation of the apartheid system.

In trying to liberate our people from the stranglehold of national and international capitalism, we are waging a life and death struggle, not playing games. It is time to ask some of those who now claim to speak in the name of the African people which side they are on. When freedom fighters are fighting and dying to liberate South Africa, what right have Chief Lucas Mangope and some of his colleagues to print advertisements in glossy business magazines inviting the capitalists to invest in their Bantustans, and specifically mentioning the availability of cheap labour as one of the attractions? What right have chiefs Buthelezi and Matanzima to oppose the call for the removal of foreign

capital from South Africa, thus undermining the work of the international solidarity movement in every corner of the world?

Some of these Bantustan leaders, like Chief Buthelezi, openly acknowledge that they are prisoners in the Bantustan set-up, but claim to be doing what they can from within the system to achieve the emancipation and advancement of their people. We surely do not need to remind Chief Buthelezi that he was not freely elected to his present post, but like all the other Bantustan leaders was placed there by the Nationalist Government for a purpose.

If Chief Buthelezi or any of his supporters have any doubts about this, let them read the article from Washington by Ken Owen published in the "Star" on February 8, 1973.

"Under the umbrella of 'communications', the US Government has brought a parade of African and Coloured leaders to the United States", writes Owen. "What ensues is quite amusing.

"The African American Institute, whose leading members are at pains to endorse the legitimacy of violence while questioning its efficiency, snaps up the task of organising their tours.... Having captured the latest Black South African, the AAI steers him into the company of Black nationalists, professional South African exiles like Mrs Jennifer Davis and Mr Joel Carlson, and here and there a fading member of the ANC or the PAC".

At public or private meetings, hostile questions are thrown at these men who are "working within the system" to bring about change, as they claim. "None has been so skilful at dealing with the pressures as Chief Buthelezi"

Questions are framed to trap him but:

"Chief Buthelezi spots every trap. He refuses to condemn Black African countries for lukewarm support, he rejects the notion that moderate American Blacks like Roy Wilkins should be condemned for visiting South Africa. He suggests a modification of the campaign to force US businesses to withdraw summarily from South Africa. When Mrs Butcher asks pointblank what American Negroes can do to help him, he does not pander to romanticism or appeal to violence. At the top of his list he puts not bombs but education. When he is challenged for rejecting violence, he is sharp and impatient...

"At the end, the professional diplomat is awed with the sheer skill of the performance. Even the radicals, having got nothing for their cause, are admiring. The official custodians of President Nixon's

policies on South Africa at the State Department could ask for no more.

“Chief Buthelezi is the most effective weapon they have yet found against their critics on the left who are trying to steer the United States in the wake of the United Nations on Southern African questions...

“And, considering the service Chief Buthelezi has rendered in undercutting the bombs-and-boycott School, perhaps South Africans should be at least as pleased with him”.

Chief Buthelezi may, as he claims, be trying to outplay the Government at the game of diplomacy and brinkmanship which they call Bantustan, but he must appreciate that because he is not the banker, this is a game he can never win. Ken Owen finds it all “amusing”—the spectacle of a Black leader allowing himself to be used to further the aims of Vorster and Nixon. We find it tragic — as tragic as the spectacle of Black policemen with guns in their hands fighting (and some of them dying) in Caprivi and Rhodesia to “save” Southern Africa for White Supremacy.

The independence of many Black states in Africa has been threatened by the activities of White mercenaries. Let us make it quite plain here and now that we will not allow the freedom of South Africa for which we are struggling to be removed from our grasp through the actions of Black mercenaries.



A CABLE FROM HANOI

Dear comrades,

We are very happy to receive your warm congratulations upon the Vietnamese People's victory in the signing of the agreement on ending war and restoring peace in Vietnam.

Our people's victory has been closely linked with the precious sympathy, support and help of brother socialist countries, brother parties and world progressive people. Rejoicing over this victory, we once more express our sincere thanks to the South African Communist Party, working class and people for the constant support and help under various forms they have given to the Vietnamese people's struggle against United States aggression, for national salvation.

We firmly believe that the South African Communist Party and people will continue to support and help the Vietnamese people in their struggle for the correct and thorough implementation of the Paris agreement on Vietnam and in national reconstruction.

May the solidarity and friendship between our two parties and our two peoples be consolidated and develop day by day.

Central Committee
Vietnam Workers' Party

Class Struggle & African Unity — 10 years of the OAU

by MOLEFE MINI

This year one of the most significant events in the political calendar of the African continent is the celebration of the 10th anniversary of the foundation of the Organisation of African Unity.

Thirty African Heads of States and Governments (1) met in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, from May 22, 1963, to May 26th. In approving the Charter of African Unity during that conference, they established the OAU. In the ten years of its existence, the OAU has secured its place as an important force in international politics.

It is inevitable therefore that the peoples of Africa and the world will take the opportunity of the OAU's tenth anniversary to assess the situation in Africa today and to focus attention on Africa's contemporary place among the international community of nations.

For us it is perhaps appropriate that we begin with the opening speech by Haile Selassie I at that conference, ten years ago. He said:

“Africa is today in mid-course, in transition from the Africa of Yesterday to the Africa of Tomorrow . . . Africa's victory, although proclaimed, is not yet total, and areas of resistance still remain. Today we name as our first great task the final liberation of those Africans still dominated by foreign exploitation and control . . . The task on which we have embarked — the

making of Africa – will not wait . . . But while we agree that the ultimate destiny of this continent lies in political union, we must, at the same time, recognise that the obstacles to be overcome in its achievement are numerous and formidable. Africa's peoples did not emerge into liberty in uniform conditions.”

He continued:

“Africans maintain different political systems; our economies are diverse; our social orders are rooted in different cultures and traditions. Further, no clear consensus exists on the ‘how’ and the ‘what’ of this union. Is it to be federal, confederal or unitary? Is the sovereignty of individual states to be reduced, and if so, by how much and in what areas. On these and other questions there is no agreement; and if we wait for agreed answers, generations hence matters will be little advanced, while the debate still rages . . . We should therefore not be concerned that complete union is not attained from one day to the next . . . We have before us the examples of the USA and the USSR. We must remember how long they required to achieve this union . . .”

The central question which history had posed for the representatives of the independent peoples of Africa at the founding conference of the OAU was – whither Africa?

Almost instinctively the whole continent opted for African unity. But it still had to answer the questions – unity among whom, of what forces and for what? Though apparently raising questions of organisational form, Emperor Haile Selassie's statement that “no clear consensus exists on the ‘how’ and the ‘what’ of this union”, was nonetheless an expression of the essential quandary facing the peoples of independent Africa – after political independence, whither Africa?

Concerned seemingly with formal questions, Leopold Senghor of Senegal argued that: “If we do not want to fail, we shall do well to meditate on the European and American examples.(2). We must be prudent, advancing step by step and by stages.”

It was that great African patriot, Kwame Nkrumah of Ghana, who sounded the word of warning and attempted openly to state issues of substance.

Opposing the “step by step and by stages” approach, he said it “takes no account of the impact of external pressures.”

“Nor does it take cognisance of the danger that delay can deepen our isolation and exclusiveness; that it can enlarge our differences and set us

drifting further apart into the net of neo-colonialism . . . No independent African state by itself has a chance to follow an independent course of economic development. Many of us who have tried to do this have been almost ruined or have had to return to the fold of the former colonial rulers. . . Unless we can establish great industrial complexes in Africa – which we can only do in a united Africa – we must leave our peasantry to the mercy of foreign cash crop markets and face the same unrest which overthrew the colonialists.”

Tafawa Balewa of Nigeria characterised the two trends thus:

“Some of us have suggested that African unity should be achieved by political fusion of the different states in Africa; some of us feel that African unity could be achieved by taking practical steps in economic, educational, scientific and cultural co-operation and by trying first to get Africans to understand themselves before embarking on the more complicated and more difficult arrangement of political union.”

The insistent urge for the unity of the whole African movement for national liberation against a common enemy continually found expression in a variety of inter-African and All-African organisations.

In 1958 the All-African People’s Conference took place in Accra, drawing together 50 (3) mass organisations united by the one objective of winning national liberation and independence for their own countries and for the peoples of Africa as a whole.

Among the most important of these were the Casablanca Group, which generally adopted radical positions (4), and the “Inter-African and Malagasy Organisation”, popularly known as the Monrovia Group, which generally adopted “conservative” positions.(5)

The mass organisations also split into two groupings, as happened in the trade union movement. Two international centres emerged with the formation of the All-African Trade Union Federation (AATUF) and the African Trade Union Confederation (ATUC). (6 & 7).

The 1963 conference breached the formal organisational division among the independent states of Africa. The Charter that was adopted, itself largely based on a Charter drawn up by a conference of the Monrovia Group which met in Lagos in 1962, stated the general political positions on which agreement could be reached.

The delegations, on behalf of their peoples, stated that they were:

“conscious of our responsibility to harness the material and human resources of our continent for the total advancement of our peoples in all

spheres of human endeavour: (and were) determined to safeguard and consolidate the hard-won independence as well as the sovereignty and territorial integrity of our states, and to fight against neo-colonialism in all its forms. . .”

They reaffirmed their “absolute dedication to the total emancipation of the African territories which are still dependent”, with Sekou Toure calling for the issuing of an ultimatum to the colonisers” after which our armed forces must intervene,” Ben Bella stated that “a blood bank for the people of Angola and South Africa is more important than an African development bank”, Nkrumah called for the establishment of a “liberation bureau for African freedom fighters.”

The independent states, further, declared their adherence to the “policies of non-alignment”.

Africa, then, rejected Nkrumah’s call for the formation of a Union of African States on the basis of common, consistently anti-imperialist positions and resolved to set up the Organisation of African Unity to work for African unity, “advancing step by step and by stages.” (8)

For its part, the South African Communist Party had stated in its Programme, adopted in 1962, that:

“A powerful urge towards closer ties and solidarity exists among all African people to maintain and consolidate independence, overcome their grave social and economic problems, develop the resources of the continent and raise their living standards. . . This movement is progressive and anti-imperialist in character, reflecting the essential unity of the African revolution . . . Provided all the African countries follow non-capitalist forms of development, the achievement of a united Africa will become practical and desirable.”

The last ten years have confirmed the correctness of these far-sighted Marxist positions. Yet the high hopes with which the working people of the African continent greeted the collapse of colonialism over the greater part of Africa and the achievement of unity have had to be tempered by life itself.

In the main, the strength of united Africa has not been able to extricate the continent from its “grave social and economic problems” and has not managed significantly to “raise (the people’s) living standards.” Tens of millions of African people still suffer brutal colonial and racist oppression despite heroic struggles and wars of liberation that the colonised peoples themselves have been waging for

longer or shorter periods and despite earlier victories of the African and Afro-Asian solidarity movement.⁹

Even at the time when millions of African people were re-entering history as subjects rather than objects of policy, and particularly so at that time, it was “necessary constantly to explain and expose among the broadest masses of the toilers of all countries, and particularly of the backward countries, the deception systematically practised by the imperialists in creating, under the guise of politically independent states, states that are wholly dependent upon them economically, financially and militarily.” (Lenin: Draft Theses on the National and Colonial Question, June 1920).

The ten years since the formation of the OAU have been marked by the search of the peoples of Africa for a content with which to infuse the “politically independent states” – a content which would satisfy the material and spiritual aspirations of the masses of the African people and place Africa among the front ranks of the world’s continents which stand for peace, freedom and social progress.

ECONOMIC LINKS WITH IMPERIALISM

Independent politically, Africa remained still an economic appendage of world imperialism, carrying with her the attendant features of mass poverty and backwardness.

Her economy was characterised by the co-existence of the leading imperialist-dominated commodity sector and the subsidiary communal, simple reproduction (tribal subsistence) sector. In between these also existed feudal or semi-feudal formations as well as a stronger or weaker locally-controlled capitalist sector.

To break out of her backwardness, Africa needed to adopt a whole series of radical measures.

It has been correctly pointed out that “the imperialists want to keep Africa within the sphere of the world capitalist division of labour, prevent it from choosing the socialist road, preserve it as a raw-materials appendage to the developed capitalist states. If they have their way, all the difficult and painful problems tormenting the continent will be aggravated.”¹⁰

But Africa achieved independence in “an epoch of the general crisis

of capitalism and the downfall of the capitalist system, an epoch of struggle between the two world systems, an epoch of democratic and national revolutions, an epoch of social revolution of the working class and the victory of the socialist social system.”¹¹

Independent Africa was therefore re-born in conditions in which she had the possibilities to choose between two different paths of development — the one, a capitalist, imperialist-oriented path, the other, a non-capitalist, socialist-oriented path of development.

The realisation of these possibilities into one choice or the other naturally therefore depended on the relative strengths of the two tendencies within the national liberation movement — the one, anti-colonial and bourgeois-democratic and the other, anti-imperialist and revolutionary-democratic.

The “paramount contradiction of colonial times” (12), that between the colonial powers and the colonised peoples, united into the one political struggle for independence different classes and strata throughout the African continent.

Thus emerged the phenomenon of mass national (13) parties, uniting under one leadership the national and petty bourgeoisie, the working class, the peasants, the intelligentsia and even some feudal sections. Where more than one party existed, united fronts were formed or the weaker parties in fact supported or followed the lead of the stronger.

But the victory of the anti-colonial revolution posed for these mass parties and the independent peoples the question, what to do next. Thus began the struggle within these countries for the victory of one path of development over the other.

Already, at quite an early stage, what lay in store for the peoples of Africa began to emerge.

THE SUDAN

As far back as 1958, two years after independence, General Abboud seized power in the Sudan by coup d’etat.

The Sudanese communists characterised the coup as a counter-revolutionary move hatched by the allied forces of US imperialism and local reaction (headed by the Umma Party of big landowners) who decided “to hold state power by military dictatorship because they

could no longer hold it by parliamentary means.”¹⁴

Reaction could not hold power by parliamentary means because its attempt to “trade Sudanese independence for American ‘aid’ . . .” was being foiled by the masses under the leadership of especially the Communist Party. In October, the Sudanese working class launched the biggest strike action ever, followed by demonstrations which spread throughout the country, against ratification of the US Aid Treaty. The Umma Party itself began experiencing a crisis within its ranks and deputies began talking about removing the government at the parliamentary session due to open on November 17th.

But on that day Abboud seized power. He immediately illegalised all political parties and began persecuting especially the Communist Party and the left forces. He banned the trade union movement as well as other mass movements such as the Youth Union and the Women’s Union. Patriots were killed and hundreds detained under martial law, including the communists Abdel Khalek Mahgoub and El Shafie Ahmed El Sheik.¹⁵

The masses of the people had thus resolutely come out for a genuinely independent, anti-imperialist path of development. Unwilling to adopt this path, for their own selfish interests, and yet unable to solve the problems facing the people through their policy of keeping the Sudan an appendage of imperialism, the big landowners and the compradore bourgeoisie decided to abolish their bourgeois democracy and rule by terror. It was left to the communists, then, to champion the restoration of the bourgeois democratic constitution and the guarantee of the independence of the Sudan.

The national army remained an instrument in the hands of local reaction and international imperialism, though as early as March 1969 mutinies broke out. Despite the fact that the army contained among its ranks strongly anti-imperialist and anti-Abboud sentiments, as reflected in the series of mutinies, yet at the beginning these progressive sections were not able effectively to organise themselves against the centre of reactionary power in the army, the colonially-trained senior officer corps.

Nonetheless it had been shown that the army is not above society but also reflects the struggles of social classes and strata.

In the Sudan the forces and paths of development ranged against each other thus become polarised at an early stage, thanks to relatively

advanced social differentiation in the Sudan, the relatively high level of class consciousness of the Sudanese working class and the maturity and popularity of its vanguard Communist Party.

IN MOROCCO

A similar process of deepening differentiation of the national liberation movement could also be observed in Morocco. Whereas in their post-war struggles for independence from French colonialism, culminating in Morocco's independence in 1956, the entire Moroccan people had been united behind the patriotic King Mohamed V, by 1965 the people had to resort to semi-insurrectionary struggles, while the government could only ensure its continuation by declaring a state of emergency.

The general elections to the first Moroccan House of Representatives on May 17, 1963 resulted in a defeat for the pro-government FDIC. Although it emerged as the single largest party with 34 per cent of the popular vote, the combined vote of the major opposition parties, the party of the national bourgeoisie, Istiqlal and the revolutionary-democratic Union National des Forces Populaires (UNFP) was 52 per cent. 7 out of 9 government ministers were defeated.

Two months later, on July 16th, the majority of the leadership of the UNFP as well as 21 of its newly-elected deputies were arrested on charges of plotting against the internal security of the state. The Communist Party was again banned. The government sought to impose an unpopular constitution. And hence the semi-insurrectionary struggles of 1965.

On May Day, 1966, Ben Seddiq of the Moroccan Labour Union called for a united front of the popular political parties which would jointly express the anti-feudal and anti-imperialist interests of the working class, the peasantry, the petty and national bourgeoisie.

Thus again lines were being drawn, between these forces on the one hand and the reactionary alliance of the feudalists and landed bourgeoisie on the other. The latter, who had held power since independence, had failed to solve any of the problems facing the people, but had rather entrenched the dominant positions of particularly French monopoly capital, and further secured Morocco as an appendage of world imperialism.

Further south, in the Congo Brazzaville, the president abbe, Fulbert Youlou, abandoned by French president de Gaulle who, telephoned by Youlou at his home at Colombey-les-deux-Eglises, refused to order French troops to take direct action to support the continuation of Youlou's government in office, was forced to resign on August 15th, 1963 and was held in military custody at the "Camp Fulbert Youlou".

Youlou was brought down by the mass actions of the working class and the working people whose demands included the release of political prisoners, higher wages, the abandonment of the scheme to declare a one-party state and the removal of the corrupt government.¹⁶

Thus again the masses of the people declared themselves against the path of subservience to imperialism, against the formation of a "bureaucratic bourgeoisie", for an independent Congo in whose building the masses of the people would play a role as a conscious and purposive force for a meaningful independence which the Youlou government had failed to achieve.

The victory of the heroic people of Algeria over French imperialism also saw the rapid emergence, within the FLN, of a struggle essentially between the bourgeois democratic, pro-imperialist trend, represented by Ben Khedda and the revolutionary-democratic, anti-imperialist trend represented by Ben Bella.

It was only after an intense struggle for the allegiance of the workers, peasants, the armed forces and the intelligentsia, quite often involving armed clashes, that Ben Bella became president of Algeria on September 15, 1963, more than a year after independence in July of the previous year. (Ben Bella had however been head of government before this date, succeeding Ben Khedda and Ferhat Abbas).

Thus Ben Bella took office under a constitution which explicitly recognised that the second stage of the revolution in Algeria required "the building of a popular and socialist democracy. . . (and) a struggle for the disappearance of all traces of colonialism."¹⁷

To carry out these tasks, the constitution legislated for the "exercise of power by the people, of whom the fellahs (peasants), the working masses and the revolutionary intellectuals are the vanguard."

In Togo, the openly anti-democratic government of Sylvanus Olympio was removed by coup d'etat on January 13th, 1963 and Olympio himself was killed.

The Paris "Le Monde" described the Olympio government as representing "a small class of planters and relatively wealthy businessmen", and commented that "the Togolese intellectual elite – one of the largest in Black Africa both in numbers and quality – thus found itself one of the least utilised."

This government of planters and businessmen had tried to secure its positions by illegalising all other political groupings, leaving the field solely to Olympio's "Comite de l'Unite Togolais."

Feeling secure in its monopoly of power, the government made no attempt to accommodate any interests other than its own and those of imperialism. Though sparked off by the government's refusal to meet army demands for better pay, pensions for ex-servicemen etc., the 1963 coup yet reflected the deep-seated contradictions between the interests of the ruling classes in Togo and those of the masses of the people.

It is of some importance to note here the response of the rest of independent Africa to this coup. Concerned to discourage assassination as a method of political struggle and interested in "maintaining stability and constitutionality", independent Africa met the coup with a massive diplomatic response, with most countries denouncing the coup and 16 Foreign Ministers of the Monrovia Group meeting in Lagos from January 24 to discuss the issue. As we have said, four months later, at the foundation of the OAU, the civilian government of Grunitsky was still out in the cold.¹⁸

Yet this demonstration of African unity could not stem the tide of "instability and disrespect for constitutions" essentially because this unity could not reverse the process of deepening social differentiation among the peoples of the continent and hence the growing struggles among the various classes and strata within each country.

The few examples we have cited serve to focus attention on the open manifestations of these struggles. Throughout the continent, in Ghana, Mali, Kenya, Tanzania, Sierra Leone, Zaire, Egypt and Lesotho, the old anti-colonial alliance has been breaking up and the new social order has been trying to break through.

POLITICAL STRUGGLE

An intense ideological and political struggle for the victory of progressive ideas and the implementation of genuinely anti-imperialist

programmes, both within the OAU and within each country has been raging.

Conscious of the great importance of the role of politics and ideology, ¹⁹ the imperialists, while relinquishing their direct colonial rule over the greater part of Africa, did not intend to abandon their ideological and political hold over the peoples of Africa.

The essential content of imperialist ideology has been and remains anti-communism. Aware that the very word "capitalist" had become anathema to the African peoples who had just thrown off the yoke of the colonialism of the capitalist "west", the imperialists knew that they had to fight a complex struggle.

They would, among other things, have to utilise the fact that they had assiduously tried to quarantine Africa from the ideas of scientific socialism, gamble on the reality that virtually the entire African intelligentsia had been trained at bourgeois universities and institutes and mobilise their resources and expertise to corrupt or buy over the selfish and weaker elements and turn them into their local mouthpiece.

But, as we have said, the African revolution occurred in the epoch of the collapse of capitalism and the triumph of socialism, being at once a consequence of this decisive trend and a contribution to its further triumph.

Despite all its efforts, imperialism failed in its attempts completely to cut Africa off from the victorious march of the socialist perspective.

Increasingly, the peoples of Africa are adopting this as the only perspective which offers them an authentic way out of the "difficult and painful problems tormenting the continent . . ."

The 1964 "Algiers Charter" of the Algerian FLN remains one of the outstanding documents drawn up by the African people themselves, pointing the way forward in the concrete conditions of our continent.²⁰

The Algiers Charter set out particularly to define the content of the second stage of the African revolution, the relationship of class forces during this stage, the nature of the state and the ideology, composition and role of political parties.

Stating that "the struggle for the consolidation of independence and the struggle for the triumph of the socialist option are indissolubly linked", the Charter clearly marked out for the Algerian people a second stage that would not only be anti-imperialist but anti-capitalist

as well, proceeding "as quickly as possible to economic liberation," and raising the standards of living of the working people.

It saw that Africa and Algeria needed to break out of the sphere of the world capitalist division of labour and set up independent national economies. Steps in this direction would include the nationalisation of imperialist property; the liquidation of "special" and historical financial and commercial links which further entrench imperialist domination of Africa; the building up of economic relations with the world community of socialist nations.

It further recognised that Africa and Algeria needed to carry through democratic agrarian reforms. Such reforms would abolish feudal relations in the countryside, expropriate the great landed estates, transform the mono-crop nature of the commercial sector through a policy of diversification and guide the largely peasant nations of Africa out of subsistence farming, raising levels of productivity, the level of development of productive forces and encourage the formation of production co-operatives.

The basis for the industrialisation of Africa had to be laid, with the state paying attention to the control of capital outflows; attacking centres of local capital which were acting in collusion with imperialism or its local agents or were seeking to replace the expelled foreign bourgeoisie; mobilising internal sources of capital accumulation, reducing the quantity of imperialist 'aid' to a minimum and using accumulated funds for genuine development through the agency of scientifically-founded development plans. A decisive role would be played by the state sector in whose management the working people would play an active part.

In the execution of these central tasks of the second stage, the Algiers Charter pointed to the danger posed by a section of the Algerian bourgeoisie which had formed part of the union of all patriotic forces interested in liberating the country, but which, at the second stage seek to take possession of part of the "national heritage which was saved by the sacrifices of the peasants and workers."

It visualised an alliance of workers, peasants, the patriotic bourgeoisie and intelligentsia to carry the revolution through. It simultaneously called for vigilance against the resurgence of capitalism in the key sectors of the Algerian economy.

Such an alliance would exercise power through an essentially

“producers’ state” which would reflect mainly the “dictatorship of the poor, the fellahs and the workers.” The Charter pointed out that “immediately following independence, the state structure and its human components formed in part. . . one of the legacies of colonialism, of which objectively they expressed the ideas and methods. This heritage kept alive habits and manners of administration which make the state apparatus act as a brake on the realisation of the aims of the revolution.”

The Charter called for the complete transformation of the state administration, for “this is the bureaucratic sector where the interests, customs and methods threatened by the revolution will endeavour to hide themselves.”

In his report to the Algiers Congress, Ben Bella pointed out that the new society “needs a mainspring, the mainspring of one party only, one party which is fully aware of the needs of the working masses . . .”²¹

On this fundamental question, the Charter stated that “the union of all forces which was an indispensable instrument of the armed struggle should be considered in the light of the objectives and perspectives of the socialist revolution. Such a union has had its day. To keep it could only result in confusion and unhealthy compromise.”

Regarding its social composition, the Charter said that “scrupulous care (had to be taken) to see that the social composition of the party is based on the producers and the urban and rural workers.”

Conscious of the danger that such a party “which may express the aspirations of the masses at first but then evolves independently of them” might end up “sooner or later, either in the dictatorship of the petty bourgeoisie or in the establishment of a bureaucratic class using the (party) machinery to further its own interest, or again in a regime of personal dictatorship making the party into a mere organ of the political police”, the Charter called for the closest links between the party and the toiling masses.

It said:

“Armed resistance to French imperialism has made (the masses) aware of their strength and of their ability to resolve their problems themselves. . . The history of our people teaches us the importance of democracy. The party must always, without exception, put its trust in the masses.”

Algeria had thus firmly put herself in the van of African progress, her

Charter based not only on Marxist-Leninist ideology but also on a concrete generalisation of African experience to date.

REVOLUTIONARY PERSPECTIVES

That the time for the ideas contained in the Charter to take root throughout the continent had come, was evident from the revolutionary ideology and practice that were emerging in a number of African countries. Life itself was confirming the correctness of the Marxist-Leninist thesis that the victory of the national liberation movement “radically undermines the positions of capitalism by converting the colonies and dependent countries from reserves of imperialism into reserves of the proletarian revolution.”²²

In Ghana, Nkrumah warned that in the struggle to “liquidate the remnants of colonialism and imperialism” the people of Ghana would find that they had “brought into focus the contradictions in (their) society.”²³

As part of the process designed to transform the Convention People’s Party, the programme adopted in 1962 stated that the Party’s ideology is based on scientific socialism, a cadre institute was set up at Winneba and the paper “The Spark” was started.

In an editorial this paper stated:

“The truth must always be borne in mind that a party made up mostly of white-collar workers, civil servants and middle-class intellectuals will certainly not attain the national goal of socialism. . . Therefore, much as we gladly welcome intellectuals and middle class elements, who make the grade, into the fold of the one national party, the bulk of the membership must be made up of workers, peasants and the revolutionary youths. This objective we can achieve only through a careful regulation of admission into the party. . . (Further) Maxism applied to the African situation . . . will equip every party member to deal with problems in a scientific way, in a creative and correct way.”

In his 1966 May Day speech, Abdul Gamal Nasser asked his audience of industrial workers at Mehalla el Kobra: “The man who gathers a million pounds, two, three, ten or twenty million, how did he get all this money?”

The answer!

“It is either through theft or through exploitation. By theft I mean commission. He builds a block of flats and gets commission; he concludes a transaction and takes a commission. . .

“The second, this is taking the result of the sweat of the people, the workers. He pays one quarter of a pound to a worker who deserves one pound, thus taking the three-quarters of the pound himself. This is what we meant when we referred to the exploitation of the worker. Hence the process is one involving a theft and exploitation. We saw this taking place in our society when we used to be a feudalist and capitalist society. Today we are witnessing a socialist transformation in our society, where all means of production are in the hands of the working people.”

The 1962 Charter for National Action had declared that Egypt had chosen the road of scientific socialism. The realisation of the importance of class differentiation and the role of classes, among certainly a section of the Egyptian leadership, could be discerned from a statement made by Nasser in 1961.

He said:

“I believe there was one defect in the National Union (predecessor of the Arab Socialist Union): we gave reactionary forces an opportunity to infiltrate into the National Union and control its leading position. We had good intentions in this: we wished to resolve class struggle through peaceful means, and establish a sort of peaceful co-existence of classes within the Framework of national unity.”

In the period after the June '67 war, while Nasser was still alive, the statutes of the ASU were re-cast and stipulated that the majority of the membership of the Union, the National Assembly and other leading national organs should be drawn from the working class and the peasantry.

Similar processes had emerged in Guinea, Congo Brazzaville and Mali.

In 1964, the Congress of the (Mali) Sudanese Union decided to set up a Party School, with the help of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, whose syllabus would take account of “the specific historical, economic, cultural and social features of the Mali Republic, Africa and the world, the history and principles of the Party, and the principles of

scientific socialism, without the knowledge of which no leader can effectively solve the problems of building socialism in our country.”

Meanwhile, in the Sudan, the October '64 revolution removed the Abboud military junta. For the first time in the history of the Sudan, “the new, socialist forces were able to take part in state organs, and a government of a new type was formed; it contained representatives of the Communist Party and the People’s Democratic Party.”²⁴

Naturally this process of the revolutionary transformation of Africa’s political parties has not been confined to ruling parties only.

The split in Morocco’s Istiqlal since Morocco’s independence, resulting in the birth of the UNFP reflected exactly such a process. Equally the formation of the Kenya People’s Union reflected the people’s realisation that the call for national unity was in fact a call for national acquiescence to the rapacious rule of the alliance of local and foreign capital.

As its policy statement said:

“The KPU condemns the government’s and KANU’s capitalist policies. It is opposed to the creation of a small class of rich people while the masses live in poverty. It will pursue truly socialist policies to benefit the wananchi (citizens). It will share out the nation’s wealth more equitably among the people, extend national control over the means of production and break the foreigners’ grip on the economy.”

In countries as distant from each other as the Cameroon and Madagascar, the revolutionary socialist orientation has found national champions in the Cameroon People’s Union (UPC) and important sections of the Independence Congress Party of Madagascar (AKFM).

In countries where the African people are still striving to carry out the first stage of the national democratic revolution, the national liberation movement is increasingly adopting consistently anti-imperialist, revolutionary-democratic positions and strengthening its bonds with particularly the socialist countries.

MARXIST PARTIES

A crucial position in Africa’s striving to chart an independent

revolutionary and popular path is occupied by Africa's handful of Marxist-Leninist Parties.²⁵

Reserved for the harshest persecution that local and international reaction can mete out, Africa's communists have not only refused to abandon the red banner of proletarian revolution, but have in the last ten years also contributed immeasurably to the advancement of the genuine people's interests, both within their countries and throughout the continent.

Having accumulated invaluable experience in actual struggle, with their popularity among the continent's working people greatly enhanced, Africa's communists are today faced with the possibility of successfully carrying out their vanguard tasks, especially in the conditions in which the masses of the people are increasingly realising the bankruptcy of the capitalist path of development and the anti-popular role of the representatives of this path in Africa.

Yet it is true that this great revolutionary continental upsurge has in part been stopped or reversed, however temporarily, and in part has its capabilities to move further forward greatly limited.

It is the task of all genuinely revolutionary forces in Africa and the world to understand why this has happened, and not merely for the sake of understanding, for it remains our task to change the world.

The consistently anti-imperialist trend has suffered great reverses through the dismissal of the Nkrumah, Keita and Ben Bella governments by coup d'etat.

Elsewhere, in countries such as the Sudan, Kenya and Egypt the forces of reaction have managed to suppress to a greater or lesser extent the genuinely revolutionary forces, have seriously threatened their organisational continuity and have sought to evict them from national political life, from the government and from leading positions in the mass organisations.

In Africa today there is virtually no legal Communist or Marxist-Leninist Party. The high-water mark of the anti-communist witch-hunt was reached in the Sudan in 1971 when Numeiry butchered the best sons of the working people of the Sudan and Africa while inciting the reactionary forces to unbridled lawlessness by exhorting the people to hunt down and exterminate all communists.

Leonid Brezhnev, General Secretary of the CPSU has pointed out that:

“In a number of countries of the former colonial world, as a result of inadequate organisation or of passive attitudes by the progressive forces, power was seized, after the proclamation of political independence, by reactionary elements closely linked up with imperialism. Some of these countries are ruled by military dictatorships. . . The imperialist states use the territories of many of these countries for their aggressive purposes, notably for military bases. The conditions of struggle for communists and their allies in these countries are in many respects similar to the conditions of the colonial period.”²⁶

Whence this organisational unpreparedness and passivity of Africa’s progressive forces?

Africa has great need for communists and Communist Parties. In the African situation in which “The process of internal social division is deepening. . . (in which) the working people are ever more actively demanding far-reaching reforms capable of providing answers to burning fundamental problems. . . (in which) on the other hand, the top crust of the national bourgeoisie, guided by its class interests, resists social progress and the pursuit of any consistent anti-imperialist line. . . (and in which) an increasingly acute class struggle is unfolding on this basis”, – in this situation, Africa has great need of communists and Communist Parties.²⁷

Yet it is particularly on the African continent, especially in relation to the rest of the world’s continents, that the paucity of Communist Parties is most pronounced, thanks to the active policy of the colonialists of thwarting the emergence of proletarian socialism on the continent and thanks to the weakness of the working class.

As Larbi Bouhali of Algeria has remarked: “We are convinced in the need for a broad and powerful anti-imperialist front, but this cannot be active and strong without a party equipped with the working class ideology. In any case, no ‘front’ can substitute for such a party.”²⁸

In addition to the fact of non-existence of Communist Parties, it is by and large true that where working class parties have existed, they have not had sufficient strength and authority among the masses of the working people to be able, in practice, to win vanguard positions in the anti-imperialist front.

Ten years ago Africa’s working class was estimated at 15 million. Undoubtedly its numbers have since increased, particularly in the

countries which are actively pursuing a policy of the independent reconstruction of their economies. For example Egypt today has nine million industrial and urban workers.²⁹

Other countries such as Zambia, Zaire, Ghana, Kenya and Senegal also have, in the African conditions, relatively large concentrations of workers. This however is not to gainsay their numerical weakness.

This fact is compounded by certain qualitative features which militate against the consolidation of proletarian unity and solidarity and ultimately against the consistent pursuit by the workers themselves of a genuinely proletarian line — against the maturation of their consciousness as a class.

One such feature is the chronic unemployment which “keeps wages down, tends to prevent strikes, fosters parasitic tendencies and helps to swell the lumpen-proletariat.” (30), and contributes to instability in the composition of the working class through the incidence of a high turnover rate.

Further, large numbers of workers are still of rural origin, owing partly to the fact that the colonialists encouraged migrant labour, and partly to the relative lateness of the emergence of industry and hence the industrial proletariat.

This means that the customs and habits of pre-capitalist formations are still a factor which the working class has to contend with, nurtured as they are by the fact that the little islands of industrialisation are, in any case, still surrounded by the sea of such formations, encouraging the continuation of clan relationships, tribal divisions and traditional systems of authority.

We must not however seek to exaggerate the importance of any of these features. The very role which the working class played in the anti-colonial struggles points to the achievement, even then, of a certain level of class solidarity. Furthermore, events in the past decade throughout the continent have confirmed the Marxist-Leninist proposition that the working class is the most consistently revolutionary class in our epoch.

The new situation of political independence also raises new problems for the working class in as much as local reactionary circles also seek to revive those tendencies among the working class which serve to divide it and weaken its class consciousness.

It is in these conditions that the Communist Parties have to work

to weld the working class into a cohesive political force, without which there can be no strong working class party and without which the national democratic revolution will consistently be faced with betrayal by the bourgeois and petty bourgeois elements.

It however remains true that the working class cannot impose a genuinely popular stamp on the national democratic revolution nor successfully defend any popular gains on its own.

THE PEASANTRY

Its natural ally is the peasantry. Indeed “the central question of the revolutionary process in Africa and Asia today is that of the attitude of the peasantry, which make up the majority of the population.”³¹

By and large the peasant masses of Africa, who contribute 80 per cent or more of the total population, remain merely objects of policy, not participating as a conscious force in the solution of the theoretical and practical problems besetting the continent.³²

A striking example of this was given by the late Mahgoub³³ when he pointed out that in the Sudanese revolution of October '64, “which took the form of a general political strike, the population of the developed regions, a minority of the population of the country, was able to overthrow the reactionary power and install a new, progressive government.”

The bourgeois and other parasitic elements are interested in the continuation of this situation in as much as it permits them to monopolise political power while, jointly with international monopoly capital, drawing economic tribute from the countryside, and in as much as it ensures them the availability of an “elemental force” which they can mobilise for their own defence when need arises, speculating on its village ignorance and prejudices.³⁴

In Nigeria, only a few years ago, in a struggle which was essentially between the Northern feudalists and the Ibo bourgeoisie, the feudal elements in the North unleashed the Northern peasant and semi-peasant masses on Ibo people in the North, misdirecting the anger of the people against their continued poverty and backwardness away from the feudalists themselves who were the local centre of reaction and agents of British imperialism which sought to keep Nigeria and her Hausa-Fulani North backward.

The working class cannot afford this situation. Complex though the issue is, the working class has need to win over the peasants to its side as a conscious force and, in struggle, to realise the strategic goal of a worker-peasant alliance.

Class differentiation in the African countryside faces us with a complex picture of the co-existence and interrelationship of different formations. For the Marxist-Leninists of Africa this presents a great challenge correctly to identify those rural classes and strata which are objectively in favour of the consistently anti-imperialist line and to formulate and pursue such tactical directions as would actually rouse the people in the countryside into actual struggle.

Adel Ghomein³⁵ identifies seven classes and strata in the West African countryside. These are the feudal landlords, capitalist landlords, the clergy, the rich peasantry, the middle landowners, the poor peasantry and the agricultural workers.

Elsewhere in Africa rural stratification may not be as variegated as this. But everywhere “the rural people are not a homogeneous group, but have sharp differentiations with the small peasants and the agricultural labourers being the natural allies of the proletariat, and the large landowners forming an exploiting class.”³⁶

The Charter of the defunct National Revolutionary Movement of the Congo identified the following classes and strata in the Congolese countryside: feudal landowners, colonial landowners, landowners from among the clergy, rich peasants, middle peasants, poor peasants and the agricultural proletariat. In Kenya land reform under the Kenyatta government has left the peasants – who sacrificed 200,000 in their uprising for land and freedom – landless, while it has encouraged the emergence of an exploiting local landlord class. In Uganda, and particularly in Buganda, large landowners exist who not only exploit labour but also draw a tithe from other sections of the population through rent. Class stratification is also taking place in Tanzania while in Malawi, Banda actively encourages his ministers to own land and farm it as capitalist landowners. An intense struggle is in progress in Egypt to implement the agrarian reform in favour of landless and poor peasantry.³⁷

The fact of the matter, however, is that the majority of the rural population, taking the continent as a whole, still lives and works in village communes. Further, in many countries, there is no “land hunger.”

Therefore very little direct, open class confrontation takes place. Yet a contradiction exists between the deep-felt aspiration of the peasant masses for a better life and their actual conditions of existence in which “because of the mode of distribution, there are no stimuli to increase output per man, to accumulate the means needed for further production, or to modernise production.”³⁸

The state of national democracy needs must come to the aid of the peasant masses. Theories about “self reliance” in the transformation of the countryside are therefore, at best, one-sided from both the political and the technical (means of production) points of view.

This attests to the profound truth of Leonid Brezhnev’s statement that “In present-day conditions, the problem of relations between the working class and the peasantry in the former colonial countries is largely of an international nature.”³⁹

Within the African countries themselves, it is only the worker-peasant alliance that can consistently represent the interests of the peasant masses, save them from a worsening poverty and properly utilise their traditions of collectivism to build up new productive forces and new social relations in the countryside.

Internationally, it is only this alliance which can firmly secure the peasant countries of Africa to the world anti-imperialist front and consistently consolidate the ties between these countries and the world socialist community as a necessary condition for the victory of the national democratic revolution.

Conscious of the importance of this worker-peasant alliance and the necessity for its leadership by the proletarian vanguard party, Africa’s Marxist-Leninists have spared no effort in fighting to strengthen their parties.

IS A COMMUNIST PARTY NECESSARY?

In the complex conditions of the African continent, some of which we have touched on, especially with regard to the relatively weak class base of the Communist Party and the fact that Africa is not yet at the stage of the socialist revolution, there has naturally been extensive ideological activity to solve the question of the role of the working class and its vanguard party, at this stage of the revolution.

ABC of OAU



Emperor Haile Selassie
(Ethiopia)

Chairman of
first conference



The Organisation of
African Unity was created
May 26 1963



Secretary General:
Nzo Ekangaki
(Cameroon)

In November 1966 the Six
Specialised Commissions
were regrouped into three
commissions

1. Economic and Social
2. Educational, Cultural,
Scientific and Health
3. Defence

41 Member States

227

Heads of Government
meet once a year in
different capitals
Foreign Ministers twice
a year.

In Egypt, the Party dissolved itself, "terminated its independent organisational existence" after concluding that in view of "the different ideological schools of Egyptian socialists, and (in order to lay the foundations of unity among) the broad social forces on which the Party depends, the political organisation which is called for at this stage is not a Communist Party . . ." ⁴⁰. On the other hand, the Senegalese Independence Party "proclaimed itself to be a Marxist-Leninist party solely of the working class . . ." ⁴¹

But perhaps the most representative positions have been those stated by Diop ⁴² and the Sudanese Communist Party ⁴³ respectively.

Diop writes:

"The building of a revolutionary party in Senegal is bound up with the matter of political alliances, primarily the alliance of the working class and other revolutionary forces . . .

"From the organisational standpoint, there is no particular reason to consider it impossible for the working class to unite politically with other social strata, including sections of the bourgeoisie. This is a matter of conditions and political timeliness. The establishment of a single party does not preclude the inclusion in it of different social strata, nor overt or covert class struggle within its ranks. Nor does it exclude the possibility of one or another class detaching itself in order to form its own class organisation when the conditions are favourable for this or should the need for it arise. In a word, in practice such a party functions as a united front."

Diop concludes: "Hence in a society such as that of Senegal to see the issue of whether there should be only one party or several parties as some kind of dilemma would be a wrong way of seeing things."

What is at issue here is the question whether the vanguard working class party, at this stage, as a working class party in the composition of the majority of its membership and leadership as well as in its ideological positions, is capable of both an independent existence and decisive influence over "the broad social forces on which the Party depends" — the component forces of the national democratic revolution.

At its fourth conference in 1970, the Sudanese CP solved the question thus:

"The National Democratic Front is a standing and obligatory tactic of the national democratic revolution. It is, in effect, the expression of alliance among the social forces of the revolution . . .

“The one-party system, even if it were the CP itself, does not provide the appropriate form for the alliance of the democratic stage, because, strictly speaking, any party should necessarily have a unity of ideology of a particular class. No party can tolerate or harbour heterogeneous ideologies or factions . . . Adoption of any one party to play this role would only result in the scattering of the forces of the revolution, and consequently, failure to implement the tasks of the stage fully and precisely. The National Democratic Front, therefore, constitutes the organisational and political alliance of the working class, peasantry, revolutionary intellectuals, national bourgeoisie, revolutionary officers and soldiers – an alliance based on a national democratic programme expressing the common interest and commitment of these classes. In order that this alliance should stand on a firm basis, the independence of its various components must be safeguarded.”

The impending bourgeois-democratic revolution presented much the same problems for the Russian Bolsheviks. Their solutions are of interest to Africa’s communists.

Lenin (44) said:

“The ultimate political outcome of the revolution may prove to be that, despite the formal ‘independence’ of Social-Democracy, despite its complete organisational individuality as a separate party, it will in fact not be independent, it will not be able to place the imprint of its proletarian independence on the course of events; it will prove so weak that, on the whole and in the last analysis, its ‘dissolution’ in bourgeois democracy will nevertheless be a historical fact. . .

“In a word, to avoid finding itself with its hands tied in the struggle against the inconsistent bourgeois democracy the proletariat must be class conscious and strong enough to rouse the peasantry to pursue the line of consistent proletarian democracy. . . Only the proletariat can be a consistent fighter for democracy. It can become a victorious fighter for democracy only if the peasant masses join its revolutionary struggle. If the proletariat is not strong enough for this, the bourgeoisie will be at the head of the democratic revolution and will impart an inconsistent and self-seeking nature to it. Nothing but a revolutionary-democratic dictatorship of the proletariat and the peasantry can prevent this.”

We stand with the majority of Africa’s communists, for the independent existence of the vanguard proletarian party. But at the same time we do not assume that such a party and the class it represents have an “a priori prerogative” to head the national democratic front. On the contrary, “we are not in the least inclined to be unreasonably

optimistic on that score.”

Such a party has to win its leadership of the national democratic front on the basis of its own strength, founded on its popularity among the proletarian and peasant masses and on the basis of its ability to educate these classes in struggle sufficiently for them to be conscious of their own interests for a consistently democratic, anti-imperialist national revolution.

The inconsistencies and reverses of the African revolution have arisen “as a result of inadequate organisation or passive attitudes by the progressive forces. . .”

In countries which adopted a progressive stance, power basically passed into the hands of the most democratic sections of the petty and national bourgeoisie, whom communists quite correctly supported against the sections tending to seek an accommodation with imperialism.

But this has not meant that these most democratic sections have therefore been rendered immune from the inconsistencies which emanate from their class positions and from committing such mistakes as have rendered them vulnerable to a concerted rightist attack, as the history of the last ten years of the African revolution show.

In the two cases where Communist Parties existed, in Algeria and Sudan, because power basically passed into the hands of the one or two component forces of the national democratic front, the independent existence of the Party was soon threatened. We have already mentioned the ban on the Algerian Communist Party imposed by Ben Bella in November 1962.

The fact of the coup in 1965 painfully demonstrated the rashness of this step. But thanks to their political maturity, the working people of Algeria were able in the main to rebuff the pressures put on the Boumedienne government by rightist elements completely to reverse the positions enunciated in the Algiers Charter.

The same however cannot be said of the Sudan. Although communists were included in the government that came out of the May '69 revolution, yet Sudan's communists recognised the actuality of the situation that:

“An important feature of the events in Sudan is that the change occurred not after the democratic front or its basic part had been fully constituted, but on the way to this goal. Favourable conditions have arisen for com-

pleting the establishment of the front, because power now belongs to one of its constituent classes.”⁴⁵

But already by 1970, this class, distrustful of the independent proletarian-peasant power, had begun to side with local reaction, drawing a representative of the Umma Party into the Revolutionary Council while Numeiry arrested the CP General Secretary Mahgoub in November 1970 and, following on his February 1971 statement that “there is no more justification for the existence of the Sudanese CP”, began to suppress the Party as a whole. Numeiry of course was to carry out his treacherous coup de grace in the bloody days from July 21, 1971 onwards.

Again the revolution was betrayed and the high hopes of the people frustrated. It is becoming ever clearer to the Sudanese and the African working people that the guarantee of their future lies in their own strength organised under the guidance of their own party.

EGYPT'S EXAMPLE

But the Egyptian experience has proved that the petty and national bourgeoisie, supported by the working peasantry and the working class are capable of pushing the national democratic revolution further along the path of fundamentally restructuring society.

The Egyptian revolution which began in 1952, objectively took the national democratic revolution forward by destroying the positions of international monopoly capital in Egypt, carrying out an anti-feudal revolution, undermining the positions of the Egyptian big bourgeoisie, carrying out a programme of industrialisation and bearing the brunt of the struggle against Zionism.

Interested in the victory of this struggle were the middle bourgeoisie in both town and country, the petty bourgeoisie, the workers and the peasantry.

Naturally, the alliance of international monopoly capital, the feudalists and the Egyptian big bourgeoisie ganged together to defeat the revolution. The revolution was saved by the fact that the Free Officers' Movement which took power had also taken over the command of the armed forces and thus destroyed one of the main bases from

which reaction could have launched the counter-revolution and the fact that the revolution was still benefitting large sections of the bourgeoisie.

But already signs are emerging pointing towards the limits beyond which the rulers of Egypt as representatives of bourgeois democracy, cannot go.

For some time, ignoring at the moment all its inconsistencies, this trend has been finding it difficult to reverse the process which was resulting in the strengthening of the positions of the national bourgeoisie at the expense of the continuation of the revolution in a direction that would benefit the people.

The death of Nasser opened the way for the anti-socialist elements in Egyptian society to raise their heads more forcefully. Taking advantage of the fact that the working class, though numerically strong, yet lacks its own party and is unable both to bring its own massed strength to bear and systematically to draw the peasant masses on to its side, the national bourgeoisie has launched a determined effort to swing Egypt round to a consistently pro-capitalist path of development.

Some of the open examples of the relative success of this pressure are the return of some nationalised property to its original owners; the imprisonment and confinement of leading figures like Ali Sabry, Mohamed Fayek and other representatives of the consistently anti-capitalist trend in Egypt; the encouragement of the ultra-right Moslem Brotherhood to re-constitute its clandestine units for the purpose of maintaining surveillance and spying on progressive Egyptians; the strengthening of ties with Khadafi's Libya and the direct participation in the counter-revolution in Sudan in 1971; and the attempts during 1972 to undermine the anti-imperialist unity of the Soviet and Egyptian people.

In the other progressive countries of Africa, the popular forces have suffered defeat largely because they failed to prepare, organise and activate the class forces that are objectively interested in a thoroughly victorious democratic revolution; because they underestimated the strength of the counter-revolution while over-estimating their own; because they lacked the ideological tools which would help them solve correctly the more complex problems which the second stage of the national democratic revolution presents. The same can of course be said of the progressive forces even in those countries in which they form the opposition.

LINKS WITH THE MASSES

The ease with which the counter-revolution succeeded in Ghana and Mali and the passivity of the masses of the people in the face of an assault against what were objectively their best representatives, brought to the surface the weakness of the links between the Party and the masses.⁴⁶

The warning contained in the Algiers Charter that the party could “evolve independently of the people” and in the process degenerate, had come to fruition. Composed of various classes and ideological trends, these parties failed to ensure the conscious participation of the masses of the working people and became largely instruments in the hands of the petty and bureaucratic bourgeoisie, opportunists and careerists. When the army came out of barracks with the purpose of confronting with guns the genuinely anti-imperialist and increasingly socialist trend in these parties, the petty and bureaucratic bourgeoisie, the opportunists and careerists reneged, withdrew their support from the party and the party collapsed. The party’s belief in its popularity among the people proved a serious over-estimation.

Again contrary to the warning given in the Algiers Charter, the progressive forces underestimated the strength of the neo-colonialist, counter-revolutionary forces, which, in addition to the “party of national unity”, occupied important positions in the army and state machinery, and were continually raising their strength through the expansion of the bureaucratic bourgeoisie and the intervention of international monopoly capital aiming at creating or strengthening a compradore bourgeoisie.

The revolutionary forces under-estimated the hold that bourgeois ideology had over particularly the intelligentsia. They failed sufficiently to understand the willingness with which bourgeois democracy was prepared to abandon democracy and utilise all means and methods, including assassination, in order to perpetuate its rule. Further, as Nkrumah had said they took “no account of the impact of external pressures.”

Anti-democratic coups kept occurring with increasing frequency, aiming to overthrow the consistently anti-imperialist trend before it could consolidate itself, as in Ghana and Mali; aiming to save bourgeois reaction from defeat by the aroused masses as in the Sudan and

Zaire; and aiming to prevent the maturation of political crises which the pro-imperialist civilian regimes would not be able to solve, as in the CAR, Dahomey and Upper Volta.

Coups d'etat are, as Tigani Babiker points out:

“continuations of the class struggles or the struggles between imperialism and revolution. In coming to power the army gives weight to one or the other side. In this respect the army cannot be merely an instrument in the struggle, but becomes itself part of it, thus tearing down the traditional artificial wall separating it from the social and political transformations in society. The theory of the neutrality of the armed forces, consistently propagated by the exploiting classes, is thus forcefully refuted.”⁴⁸

Behind that theory of neutrality the counter-revolution had hidden its representatives among especially the officer corps. The progressive forces, on the other hand, failed to remove these elements and failed to take the struggle into the army to win over especially the junior officers and the soldiers to the side of the revolution.

COUNTER-REVOLUTIONARY TACTICS

In its determination to smash the forces of progress, reaction has shown itself perfectly capable of resorting even to assassination. Africa's patriotic forces have lost by this means such outstanding leaders as Felix Moumie of Cameroon, Patrice Lumumba and Pierre Mulele of Zaire, Pio Pinto of Kenya, Ben Barka of Morocco, Maghoub, El Shafie and Joseph Garang of the Sudan, Mondlane of Mozambique and Cabral of Guine Bissau.

Already at independence the progressives were faced with “a state structure and its human components (which was) . . . one of the legacies of colonialism.” Everywhere this bureaucracy saw itself as the natural replacement material for the European civil servants, taking over their positions, their salaries and their “ideas and methods”.

Moreover the civil service experiences a rapid expansion, some justified by the heightened activity of the state in trying to improve the conditions of life of the people and some representing a scramble for a share of the funds accumulated through the state budget. The Ivory Coast civil service accounts for “one half of one per cent of the country's population but eats up a staggering 58 per cent of the total budget in

salaries! In Dahomey, civil servants consume even more – 64.9 per cent.”⁴⁹

Add to this the sections that are more properly described as the bureaucratic bourgeoisie and in some cases the rudimentary national bourgeoisie that emerges as a result of state grants, loans and contracts, even though it may be non-parasitic in the sense that it repays its loans and does not rely on open or disguised theft or underhand dealing, and it becomes clear that the immediate post-independence period anyway sees a remarkable quantitative increase in the forces that stand against a fundamental restructuring of the society in favour of the popular masses.

These forces managed for a long time to hide their anti-national character and by demagogically acclaiming their allegiance to the path of genuine independence, led the progressive forces to overestimate their strength among these strata.

The advance of the progressive forces – the most advanced elements among these – towards a consistently scientific view of society proved a slow, halting and eclectic affair, enabling bourgeois ideology to hold its own and to act as a material force in contributing towards the success of the counter-revolution.

BOURGEOIS IDEOLOGY

Bourgeois ideology has aimed particularly to hide class differentiation in the African countries and to camouflage the fact of the domination of these countries by the bourgeois and petty bourgeois elements and international monopoly capital. It has also aimed to cut off the peoples of Africa from the socialist countries and the international working class movement as a whole, by instilling in them anti-communist ideas.

Speculating on the deep-seated desire of all the African people to assert their humanity and to win their national liberation, after centuries of contact with Europe during which Europe's ruling classes treated all the African people as objects of wealth, to an extent that black Africa became synonymous with all that was slavish and mindless in human history, bourgeois ideology has continued to strive to turn the African's rejection of his inferiority into a doctrine of class unity

under the guise of African exceptionalism.

Nkrumah himself started off as an exponent of the doctrine of the 'classless' "African personality". But Nkrumah already had before him the example of that outstanding African-American and internationalist, W.E.B. DuBois, who died in Accra on August 27, 1963. DuBois had moved from the demand for trusteeship of the African countries at the Versailles Peace Conference in 1918, to the rejection of the trusteeship proposed by "Smuts and the white legislatures in Africa" at the founding conference of the UN, against which, as he wrote in 1947 "upsurges the movement of black union delegates working in co-operation with the labour delegates of Russia, Great Britain and the US in order to build a new world which includes Black Africa." Proceeding from there, DuBois, as this journal said in an obituary note, "set a bold and courageous example by joining that brave, hounded and persecuted organisation, the CP of the USA." ⁵⁰

Through study, experience and practice Nkrumah himself, as we have seen, was ultimately coming closer to the positions that W.E.B. DuBois had reached through much the same process.

Yet despite the discredit that it suffered, the doctrine of African exceptionalism, of "Negritude", continues to find its exponents, the most consistent and able of whom is undoubtedly Senegal's Leopold Senghor.

Nkrumah summarised some of Senghor's ideas in the following passage:⁵¹

Senghor "proposes that we consider the Negro-African as he faces the Other: God, man, animal, tree or pebble, natural or social phenomenon. In contrast to the classic European (who acquires knowledge by the 'Hellenic' method, i.e. reason), the Negro-African does not draw a line between himself and the object . . . nor does he merely look at it and analyse it. After holding it at a distance, after scanning it without analysing it, he takes it vibrant in his hands, careful not to kill or fix it. He touches it, feels it, smells it. The Negro-African is like one of those Third Day Worms, a pure field of sensations. . . . (The Negro-African) abandons his personality to become identified with the Other . . . He lives a common life with the Other; he lives in a symbiosis."

Hidden behind these pseudo-mystical notions is the counter-posing of the "European experience" to the "Negro-African experience",

intended to justify the assertion that the “analytical socialism” of Europe stands, almost as a matter of natural law, in contradiction to the “sensational mode of existence of Negro-Africa.” Between the African feudal landowner or capitalist and the African share-cropper or worker there is no conflict, only a symbiosis.

The place of such theories in the struggles of the working people of Africa for emancipation from capital, both local and foreign, is quite obvious.

These theories have been reinforced by ideas that Africa had a “basis for socialism” in the tribal communes that are a marked feature of Tropical Africa. By and large these ideas enjoyed the support of genuinely patriotic elements who, recognising the victories of the socialist system, and appalled by the bloody history of the capitalist mode of production, wished for their peoples and countries a less painful path of development out of their backwardness. As Nasser once said in 1959:

“The National Union is the means through which we can realise a socialist, democratic, co-operative society . . . We can also achieve our development without a civil war, without killing, not by class war, but by love and brotherhood.”

Naturally, bourgeois ideology unhesitatingly sought to fashion these sentiments in its own mould, seeking out and emphasising those parts which perpetuate the doctrine of African exceptionalism and serve to detach Africa from particularly the socialist countries.

Bourgeois ideology of course also counter-poses to the socialist revolution, “the democratic model.” Much of the ideological offensive by Africa’s patriotic forces against such “Westminster” and other “models” also suffered from the inability of these forces to penetrate beyond the superficial. Phrases such as “Africa cannot afford the luxury of opposition parties” and “the need for national unity” advanced by the genuinely patriotic forces were seized on by the neo-colonialists to impose acquiescence to their rule.

But through experience in struggle the people are coming closer to genuinely revolutionary positions. In the Sudan, in the words of Abbe! Khalek Mahgoub,

“The new forces were unable to retain their hold on the power won in the 1964 revolution because, among other things, many of them, especially the revolutionary democrats, did not have a clear idea of the new democratic road. They were influenced by the liberal democratic slogans advanced by the counter-revolution, which helped it to come to power through Western-type parliamentarism. The new forces saw from their own experience, especially after the reaction dissolved the Communist Party and expelled communist deputies from the parliament, that the reactionary forces do not tolerate democracy and distort even its liberal forms.”⁵²

Sudan’s communists state that the “development of the Sudanese revolution should be based on a new democracy.” Africa’s revolution should also be based on a new democracy.

THE NEW DEMOCRACY

Already portents of the new democracy are beginning to break through. The coups d’etat which have taken place in the Congo and Somalia have placed in power revolutionary army officers, who, in spite of the unabated counter-revolutionary offensive, in spite of reverses, have, as member of the Somali Supreme Revolutionary Council, Ali Mattan Hashi, put it, chosen “the only road guaranteeing socio-economic progress – the road envisaged by scientific socialism. The people readily supported this option recommended by Marx and Lenin and tested in practice by millions of people. The venal capitalist system could not end the people’s political and socio-economic lag. It will never be able to make people set on working on its own soil in conditions fit for man swerve from the road of progress.”

In Madagascar, the united forces of the proletariat, peasants, youth and students, bringing together the island’s nationalities and supported by the army, have overthrown the predatory neo-colonialist Tsiranana regime, thrown out South African imperialism “in a Jacobin manner” and are seeking to terminate the neo-colonialist “special” military and economic relations with imperialist France.

Africa’s Marxist-Leninists are faced with the vital task of helping to form and strengthen the genuinely progressive forces throughout the continent. The propagation of communist ideas, not only to one’s own working people but also to the African working people as a whole,

remains an important task. This journal, now in its 15th year of continuous publication, has become a truly African weapon of struggle for progress and genuine liberation.

Africa's Marxist-Leninists are also faced with the task of consolidating their links with the revolutionary democrats for the further advance of the struggle. The 1966 Cairo seminar, which drew together communists and revolutionary-democrats was a fitting successor to the All-African Peoples' Conference in the new conditions of the heightened struggle for the revolutionary transformation of the Continent.

Africa is entering a period of sharpening internal conflicts, of struggles to defend and consolidate revolutionary gains in those countries which have chosen the path of progress and for the victory of this path in those countries which are still gripped in the tight hold of imperialist domination.

NOTES

- 1 The Heads of States and Governments present were: Haile Selassie (Ethiopia), Prince Mohamed Rida (Libya for King Idris), King Mwembutsa IV (Burundi), Ahmed Ben Bella (Algeria), Ahmadou Ahidjo (Cameroon), David Dacko (CAR), Francois Tobalbaye (Chad), Fulbert Youlou (Congo), Hubert Maga (Dahomey), Leon M'ba (Gabon), Kwame Nkrumah (Ghana), Sekou Toure (Guinea), Felix Houphouet-Boigny (Ivory Coast), William Tubman (Liberia), Philibert Tsiranana (Madagascar), Modibo Keita (Mali), Mokhtar Ould Daddah (Mauretania), Hamani Diori (Niger), Tafawa Balewa (Nigeria), Leopold Senghor (Senegal), Abdullah Osman (Somalia), Ibrahim Abboud (Sudan), Milton Margai (Sierra Leone), Julius Nyerere (Tanganyika), Habib Bourguiba (Tunisia), Abdel Nasser (UAR), Milton Obote (Uganda), Maurice Yameogo (Upper Volta), Joseph Kasavubu (Zaire). Rwanda was represented by her Foreign Minister.

King Hassan II of Morocco was absent because his presence, as he said, would signify acceptance of the separation of Mauretania from Morocco. Ali Yata, leader of the Moroccan marxist-leninists stated: "By creating in 1960 the puppet Islamic Republic of Mauretania, the neo-colonialists tore away from Morocco one of its oldest regions, the cradle of the Moroccan state, the state of the Almoravids . . . (with the intention of seizing her) rich iron and copper ore deposits . . ."

Togo, on the other hand, was not represented because independent Africa was still battling to solve the question of whether they should recognise the government of Grunitsky which had been foisted on the people of Togo through one of the first coups in independent Africa south of the Sahara.

- 2 Presumably referring to the EEC and the OAS respectively.
- 3 The conference drew together 200 representatives of political, trade union, student and other organisations. All the governing parties of independent Africa were represented with the exception of Sudan which was ruled by the Abboud military junta. The conference called for African unity, for maximum assistance to the struggles of the dependent peoples of Africa, for the breaking of diplomatic relations with South Africa, the recognition of the Algerian government-in-exile, for the formation of an "African Legion" of volunteers "ready to protect the freedom of the African peoples".
- 4 Ghana, Guinea, Mali, Morocco, UAR and the Algerian Provisional Government belonged to this group. On some of the main issues of the day, Algeria and the Congo (Zaire), the group came out in total support of the Algerian FLN and Patrice Lumumba and his government, respectively.
- 5 19 countries attended this group's meeting at the beginning of 1962, being the countries of ex-French West Africa, Ethiopia, Liberia, Nigeria, Sierra Leone, Somalia, Togo, Zaire. Tunisia withdrew from this group when it refused to recognise the Algerian Provisional Government, while supporting the Kasavubu government. On being asked why they did not join the Monrovia majority, Nkrumah said "this majority is false and does not reflect the force and strength of the African masses."
- 6 Formed in 1961 by 35 trade union centres from 33 countries, the AATUF adopted strongly anti-imperialist positions and for its pains got condemned by the yellow ICFTU as "a fictitious body which has never been regularly constituted and has no claim to be representative."
- 7 Formed in Dakar in 1962, the ATUC drew together 41 trade union centres, many of them foundation members of the AATUF, 21 being affiliated to the ICFTU, 12 to the International Confederation of Christian Trade Unions and 8 non-affiliated. Among its aims it stated that it wanted to create "a distinctive African Socialist System", establish democratic political regimes and "fight until victory is achieved over both the capitalist system and the communist system."
- 8 In his opening address, Haile Selassie had urged the adoption of some of these steps, including the establishment of (i) machinery to co-ordinate inter-African economic development, to improve inter-African communications, to settle inter-state disputes, (ii) an African Development Bank, an African University, a common security and defence system. These suggestions, together with a decision to set up a "Liberation Bureau" for the total decolonisation of Africa, were, in the main, accepted.
- 9 Responding to the call of the South African liberation movement for the isolation of South Africa, the African and Asian members of the Commonwealth successfully fought for her exclusion in 1961 when Nyerere stated in the British "Observer", to "vote South Africa in is to vote us out."

In the same year, the changed balance of forces within the UN resulted in the adoption by the 15th General Assembly of the "Declaration on Granting Independence to the Colonial Countries and Peoples", which,

- though originally moved by the Soviet delegation, led by the late Nikita Khrushchev, was, in its final form, moved by the Afro-Asian countries.
- 10 A. Sobolev: *Africa, National and Social Revolution*, Prague, 1967. (Henceforth referred to as 'Cairo 1966').
- 11 W. Ulbricht: speech at the International Meeting of Communist and Workers' Parties, Moscow, 1969. (Henceforth referred to as 'Moscow 1969').
- 12 Idrissa Diarra: Cairo, 1966.
- 13 There existed even international parties of this type such as the French West African Rassemblement Democratique Africain (RDA).
- 14 E. Iphraim: "African Communist" (AC), No.8, January, 1962.
- 15 Both murdered in the counter-revolution of July 1971 and respectively General Secretary of the Sudanese Communist Party and General Secretary of the General Federation of Trade Unions.
- 16 The trade union and army-backed government of Massemba-Debat which took over declared on its second day in office that it would take swift action "against the monstrous privileges which men in the public service have built up in particularly shameful and immodest forms." At the time Youlou for one was building himself a palace modelled on Versailles and was flying in the building materials from Europe.
- 17 The question of remaining "traces of colonialism" was particularly in the forefront in Algeria and perhaps more sharply than elsewhere, owing to the provisions of the "Evian Agreements" which secured Algeria's independence, while providing a guarantee for important French economic and military interests within the context of this independence. Therefore the post-independence struggle against the Evian Agreements became one of the most important points of difference between the Ben Khedda and the Ben Bella groups. The attitude of the Ben Bella group towards these agreements was patently clear in a statement he made after the expropriation of a large and famous wine-growing estate near Algiers owned by a certain Borgeaud, described as "a wealthy landowner and industrialist and former senator." On the occasion Ben Bella said: "We are told that taking over Borgeaud's land is contrary to the Evian Agreements. Well, if we are breaking the Evian Agreements by this decision, so much the worse for the Evian Agreements."
- 18 Ghana, on the other hand, while disclaiming any hand in the coup, recognised the new government, being concerned particularly to avoid the situation which had existed in Olympio's time when the one country had harboured political refugees from the other country.
- 19 Sobolev, op.cit. points out that: "In any revolutionary movement, politics, i.e. the subjective factor, imparts a vital impulse to the struggle. In the African revolution the role of politics is extremely great and it is constantly growing in breadth and even more so in depth. Politics influence to an ever growing extent the most essential aspects of the social relationships."
- 20 See Henri Alleg: *African Communist*, No.21, April-June, 1965.

- 21 The Algerian Communist Party was banned in November 1962. Ben Bella explained in the Assembly that he was not anti-communist, but insisted that the Party's existence was incompatible with the policy of a single political front approved by the CNRA in Tripoli that year. Never dissolved, after the 1965 coup and having won over some of the most advanced sections in the FLN, the Party was reconstituted as the Socialist Vanguard Party of Algeria.
- 22 J. Stalin, *Foundations of Leninism*, New York, 1939.
- 23 See Jack Woddis: *African Communist*, No.21, April-June, 1965.
- 24 Omar Moustafa: Cairo, 1966.
- 25 These are the Tunisian Communist Party, Socialist Vanguard Party of Algeria, Moroccan Party of Liberation and Socialism, Sudanese Communist Party, Nigerian Farmers' and Workers' Party, Senegalese Party of African Independence, Communist Party of Lesotho, South African Communist Party and Reunion Communist Party. (Among these could possibly be included the Congolese Party of Labour.)
- 26 L. Brezhnev: Moscow, 1969.
- 27 *ibid.*
- 28 Larbi Bouhali: Moscow 1969.
- 29 H. Rashid: *African Communist*, No.44, First Quarter, 1971.
- 30 Majhemout Diop: Cairo 1966.
- 31 L. Brezhnev, *op.cit.* He continued to say that: "The peasants in that part of the world are a mighty revolutionary force, but in most cases they are an elemental force, with all the ensuing vacillations and ideological and political contradictions. Nor could it have been otherwise for the time being, because the great majority still lives in conditions of monstrous poverty, denial of rights and surviving feudal and sometimes even pre-feudal relations."
- 32 The countries still fighting for liberation as well as the independent countries pursuing a progressive line, such as Algeria, Tanzania and Congo, stand out as exceptions within this general situation. On the other hand, the decision of the Zambian government, announced in last year's "white paper" on "One-party participatory democracy", to restrict membership of the Central Committee of the sole party, UNIP, as well as the National Assembly, to Zambians who are "literate and conversant with the official language", which is English, is an open admission of what is fact in the greater part of Africa, i.e. the exclusion of the illiterate peasant masses from leading national political positions.
- 33 Mahgoub: Moscow, 1969
- 34 M. Kamel, Cairo, 1966, makes the point that: "A reactionary coup d'état depends on a handful of armed men. They seize the radio station, the presidential residence, the airport, the ministries, the headquarters of the governing party. All these places are concentrated in the capital. If the government has 'shrunk' from a countrywide presence . . . a gang of adventurers could capture power without difficulty, for the national-liberation regime has cut the arteries connecting it with the countryside.

- But if the revolution had extended to cover the whole country, organising and mobilising the peasants, it would be unassailable. Any coup which captured the capital would find itself surrounded, an island in a sea of hostility.”
- 35 Cairo, 1966.
- 36 Speech of the South African Communist Party representative at the Scientific Conference, Berlin, 1970, marking the 150th Anniversary of the birth of Engels.
- 37 The Egyptian bourgeoisie have fought against the implementation of the progressive agrarian reform all along the line. For instance the Fiky family was subjected to sequestration in 1961. Yet by 1966 it had accumulated six times as much land and other property as it had five years before. With the collusion of the Agrarian Reform administration in its province, it was buying state-farm produce at low cost and reselling at high prices in semi-monopoly conditions. At a certain stage it was discovered that capitalist farmers accounted for 75 per cent of the outstanding debt to the State Bank of Cooperative and Agricultural Credit, while they constituted 2.51 per cent of all debtors. These farmers also owned 80 per cent of all tractors while the cooperatives owned 8 per cent. A new state body to implement the reform was appointed, headed by Field-Marshal Amer. Exposed as one of the leading representatives of the counter-revolutionary alliance of bourgeois, feudalist and petty-bourgeois forces which had seized leading positions and constituted themselves into centres of reaction in the ASU, the government, the army and state machinery, Amer committed suicide after the June '67 war.
- 38 Sobolev: op.cit.
- 39 *ibid.*
- 40 Fuad Mursi, Cairo, 1966.
- 41 M. Diop, op.cit.
- 42 *ibid.*
- 43 See African Communist, No.45, Second Quarter, 1971.
- 44 All the passages, unless otherwise stated, are extracted from Lenin's "Two Tactics of Social Democracy in the Democratic Revolution", Selected Works, Vol.I, Moscow, 1967.
- 45 Mahgoub, op.cit.
- 46 The success of Kenyatta's tactic, which amounted to removing the leadership of the KPU through imprisonment, was based on the assessment, which proved largely correct, that the KPU had not yet struck deep enough organisational and political roots among the masses of the working people.
- 47 Cairo, 1966.
- 48 Demonstrating that there is nothing peculiarly African about this, large sections of the French army, and particularly its officer corps, exposed their class face on the African continent when the OAS was formed in Algeria in pursuit of an "Algerie francaise". At his trial in 1963, one of the leaders of the OAS, General Salan said: "I need not excuse myself for having defended the whole free world . . . I need not excuse myself for

having refused to allow communism to instal itself an hour's journey from Marseilles and bring Paris within reach of its short-range rockets. I need not excuse myself for having defended the wealth which young pioneers have discovered for France in the Sahara, giving her independence in the petroleum market."

- 49 African Communist, No.44, First Quarter, 1961.
- 50 African Communist, No.15, Fourth Quarter, 1963.
- 51 Cairo, 1966.
- 52 *ibid.*



Anglo-Portuguese Alliance & Africa

By **Blanqui Teixeira**

(Member of the Central Committee of the
Portuguese Communist Party.)

When on 16th June 1373, King Dom Fernando of Portugal and Edward III of England signed a treaty which basically was a ratification of the Treaty of Tagilde (10th July 1372), it is difficult to believe they could have dreamed that six centuries later that act would be commemorated.

The treaty of Tagilde had been arranged between the Portuguese King and the Duke of Lancaster (son of Edward III). They pledged themselves to fight “for ever on land and sea against Dom Henrique who now calls himself King of Castille, and against Don Pedro, King of Aragon” adding that the two signatories would never make peace with their enemies without mutual consent. But the aim of Dom Fernando, when he accepted the arrival of English troops in Portugal, was not so much to defend himself against the enemy from outside as against the enemy from within, that is, the bourgeois revolution which was building up inside the country. It is not surprising, therefore, that even at the beginning of the alliance, the people of Portugal felt the need to fight against the presence of the English, who oppressed and humiliated them.

The history of the alliance must be viewed, however, as consisting of two clearly different stages.

In the 14th century Portugal was a country in full expansion, highly developed for the time and occupying an important place in Europe. For the next two centuries the "alliance" favoured the growing interests of the ruling classes of the two countries. It also influenced the trade exchanges and even the cultural relations between Portugal and England.

Later, various factors made Portugal lose much of her greatness. The economy of the country had been made too dependent on speculation-based international trade. And the adventurous policy of national betrayal and sell-out followed by the Portuguese ruling class led to the eventual domination of Portugal by the King of Spain for 60 years, from 1580-1640. Even at this time, the policy of England in relation to her "ally" became a dominant factor in the gradual decline of Portugal.

The history of the "alliance" becomes the history of the exploitation of the weaker by the stronger partner; the history of the shameless interference of England in the affairs of Portugal. It also becomes the history of the struggle of the oppressed people against the oppressor.

When Portugal recovered her independence from the king of Spain, new treaties were signed with England; with Charles I (1642), with Cromwell (1654) and with the new king Charles II (1660). All these treaties have one thing in common, they were aimed at securing the privileges of the English in Portugal.¹ In 1661, by a new treaty, the Portuguese princess who married Charles II gave to England, as her dowry, Tangiers, Bombay, Galle in Sri Lanka (Ceylon), plus an enormous sum in gold. From then onwards, Portuguese subjection took on the character of real subservience.

In 1703, the Methuen Treaty forced Portugal to accept "cloth and other wool manufactures from Great-Britain" in exchange for the preferential treatment given by England to Portuguese wines. With the surrender of her internal market to English manufacturers, Portugal became unable to take advantage of the main role that the textile industry played at the time. Enormous and constant negative trade

balances with Great Britain, and the British monopoly in the shipping of these goods, characterised and helped to tighten the grip of England on the economy of her "ally" during the XVIII century.

Dictatorship

In the XIX century, at the time of the Napoleonic invasions, England once again took advantage of the difficulties of Portugal in order to take control of the markets of Brazil, until then a Portuguese colony. Furthermore, while the king of Portugal remained in Brazil, an English general, Beresford, became the governor of Portugal, having set up a ferocious dictatorship against the people and all patriots.²

In 1820 the Portuguese liberal revolutionaries expelled Beresford. But the contradictions of the alliance continued. For example, one may quote the intervention of the English ambassador in Lisbon in the 4th November 1836 coup against the recently formed Government of the 'Progressive' liberal party; also the disgraceful intervention of the English naval forces against the same liberal wing, which deprived it of victory in the 1847 Patuleia civil and popular war. And in 1890, when Portuguese expansion in Africa clashed with an English drive in that continent, England sent an ultimatum to Portugal. This was more than a clash between two imperialisms, one stronger than the other. What was most resented in Portugal was the arrogant way in which the British Government treated the Portuguese representatives and the lack of national pride which was shown by the latter. As a result of this, a strong popular movement, aimed against Britain and the Portuguese Government, arose in the country and led to the first Republican revolution of 31st January 1891 which was defeated.³

After the victory of the Republic in 1910, it was the "alliance" that was going to be used as a pretext for the entry of Portugal into World War I, in order to serve the imperialist aims of both Great Britain and of the Portuguese ruling class.

Under fascism, the dictator Salazar was more inclined to ally himself with the German Nazis and the Italian Fascists. He aided Franco in Spain and assisted Hitler's Germany in World War II.⁴ In 1943 the turn of events forced Salazar to change direction and the "alliance" was evoked once again to obtain the granting of military bases to England.⁵

At the end of the war, Portuguese fascism once more became a

faithful “ally” of the United Kingdom, although it gradually accepted, in the words of the dictator himself, the predominance and the international political direction of the U.S.A. On the other hand, successive British governments, either Labour or Conservative, never cease to support their “ally” the fascist government, because this is the government that can best serve the interests of British imperialism.

THE “ALLIANCE” AND THE IMPERIALIST DOMINATION OF PORTUGAL

The economic domination of imperialism in Portugal is based on the control of wealth and of essential economic sectors. The consequence of this is a total submission of the economy of the country and of its general policy towards foreign interests. *Because of the “alliance”, Great Britain is the imperialist power that has been the longest established in the Portuguese economy.*

Although in some economic aspects the British interests in Portugal now come second to those of the United States and even of West Germany, British capital is to be found in practically all Portuguese economic activities, either through firms – some very old – which are entirely British, or through links, some quite recent, with Portuguese economic concerns.

The richest mines of wolfram and other minerals; the best kaolin deposits; the Lisbon public transport; international communications; important branches of the chemical industry; large factories of electric and electronic products; powerful concerns for the transport of oil and its by-products; the textile and clothing industry; the food industry; the motor-car assembly lines; ceramics; paper and cellulose industry; cork manufacturing; the building industry; wealthy Port-wine firms; many commercial enterprises chiefly for foreign trade; real estate and tourism; insurance companies; banks and so on – all these belong to English firms or have been penetrated by British capital.

In view of the absence of official data and the secrecy with which the great monopolies and capitalists surround their dealings, it is not easy to have full knowledge of all foreign capital investments in Portugal. But the “Banco de fomento Nacional” (Portuguese Bank of National Development) mentions that 600 big Portuguese firms are, in a major or large porportion, owned by foreign capital. The Portuguese

and German Chamber of Commerce and Industry (“Camara de Comercio e Industria Luso-Alema”) states that by the end of 1970 there were in Portugal 373 limited companies, with a total capital of 16,100 million escudos (£264 million), strongly dominated by foreign interests. These figures correspond, respectively, to approximately 20% of the total capital of limited companies in Portugal and to nearly one third of their total capital. This is probably an under-estimation of the foreign investments.

According to the Bank of Portugal, direct foreign investments in the country have reached, in the period 1969-1971, the value of 3,165 million escudos (£52 million), having risen in the three successive years from 761 million (£12 million) to 826 million (£13 million), and thereafter to 1,578 million escudos (£26 million). In 1971 the increase in these investments was double that of 1969. England had a share of 421 million escudos (£7 million) in the period 1969-1971, i.e. 13.3% of the total. Her participation decreased from 22.3% in 1969 to 11.5% in 1970 and to 9.9% in 1971. These percentages may, however, mean very little, because it is becoming more difficult to define the origin of investments, given the increasing role of the multinational enterprises.

The clear rise in foreign investments is a direct consequence of the extraordinary facilities given by the fascist government for the entry and investment of foreign capital. The same facilities are granted for profits made by foreign investments to leave Portugal. Profits are very large in view of the very high rate of surplus value which is drawn from the Portuguese working class, owing to the political and social conditions prevailing in the country.

The great external capitalist loans obtained abroad by the fascists are also an increasing factor of economic dependence. In the period of 1969-1971, foreign loans to private enterprises (over and above the part which was considered to be direct investment) reached 4,888 million escudos (£81 million):- 1,098 million escudos (£18 million) in 1969, 1,373 million (£22 million) in 1970 and 2,417 million (£40 million) in 1971. The external loans contracted by the State reached 2,899 million escudos (£48 million) in the same period, at a more or less constant yearly rate. Although it is certainly important, the contribution of British capital to these loans is not known.⁶

Another aspect of the economic dependence of Portugal is her constantly negative foreign trade balance. Excluding trade with the

colonies, the negative balance reached in 1970 and 1971 respectively, 17,704 million escudos (£292 million) and 20,877 million escudos (£342 million). In the first of those years Portuguese exports covered only 53.7% of the imports and in 1971 only 52.7%.

Great Britain, who had been for so long the first importer and exporter in relation to the Portuguese market, ceded the first place to West Germany nearly twenty years ago as far as imports into Portugal are concerned. Excluding trade with the colonies, 15.6% of all Portuguese imports came, in 1971, from the United Kingdom and 28.9% of Portuguese exports went there. Yet the usual negative balance of Portugal in her trade relations with England continues to persist. Furthermore, while in 1971 the price of one ton exported to the U.K. was worth nearly 9,300 escudos, (£153) the price of the imported ton from the United Kingdom was worth over 16,000 escudos (£262).

These are some of the aspects which define the economic domination of imperialism in Portugal, and, in particular, of British imperialism, and which are easier to show in a quantitative form. This domination involves also the dependence of the Portuguese economy on the more advanced technology of these countries and their markets. And this situation has only worsened with the participation of Portugal first in the EFTA, a direct instrument of British imperialism, and now with the agreement signed with the Common Market countries.

But this domination takes many other forms, because it leads to an intensified exploitation of the Portuguese working people, uses the Portuguese market in the most profitable way and exploits the wealth of Portugal to its own advantage. It has contributed in sending Portugal down the scale to the last place among European countries; it exerts its influence directly on all the country's policies; it occupies many military bases and takes over large areas of Portuguese territory and commands arrogantly in Portugal, hurting Portuguese national pride and the patriotic feelings of the Portuguese people.

Without this foreign domination the Portuguese monopolies could not keep themselves in power. This is the reason why the *policy of Caetano's government at a time when it sees itself more isolated inside the country because of the struggle of the Portuguese people, and also more politically isolated in the international arena because of an evolution of world politics which is unfavourable to its designs – is characterised by a greater effort to come much closer to the stronger imperialist powers.* Therefore, Caetano's government opens a wider door

to foreign investments, grants new bases, gives up portions of the national territory, subjects the country even more to imperialist domination, behaving as its most subservient lackey. This is the way in which it tries to keep itself in power and keep the country under the fascist regime – a terrorist dictatorship of the industrial monopolies associated with foreign imperialism and with the big landlords.

THE ALLIANCE AND THE PORTUGUESE COLONIES

Portugal is at one and the same time a colonised and a colonialist country. These two characteristics are closely interwoven. It is because Portugal is dependent on imperialism that she can still maintain today, under her power, vast colonial territories in Africa, where approximately 15 million African people are living.

All the great Portuguese economic concerns have important interests there. The foreign imperialists, who dominate Portugal, also extend their domination to the Portuguese colonies. Indeed that domination is very old. Some of today's most important colonial enterprises date at least from the beginning of the century and were set up mainly with British capital. The "alliance" has also played an important role here.

An intensification of foreign investments in the Portuguese colonies was evident, however, after the people took up arms against their oppressors.

This can be accounted for in various ways. Firstly, the possibility of making superprofits in a very short time owing to the ample facilities given by the Portuguese colonialists and in view of the conditions of exploitation of the African workers. Secondly, because the imperialists believe that they can delay the victory of those peoples, for some time to come, and that until then they can continue to hoard huge profits. Thirdly, because they hope that even after the victory of the liberation movements, their economic presence will not be forced to withdraw but will only be obliged to adapt itself to a new system of exploitation – neocolonialism.

The description, in this colonial sphere, of the domination of great wealth and of economic sectors, of the constant increase of investments and loans, as well as of the level of trade exchanges, together with the analysis of economic relations, provides ample proof of the growing subordination of the Portuguese colonies to international monopolist capital. We shall quote only a few examples:-

The Mining Company of Lobito (Companhia Mineira do Lobito), owner of the extremely rich iron ore deposits of Cassinga, has recently increased the output of its mines by hundreds of thousands of tons to over 6 million tons, and this in a period of two or three years. This is sheer haste and robbery of the natural riches of Angola.

Concerning oil, another great Angolan wealth, which exists also in Mozambique and Guine-Bissau, there is also an obvious run to get as much of it as quickly as possible. A month ago, the fascist and Portuguese colonialists announced that there are eight oil companies operating in the Portuguese colonies and twenty more applications were being considered for the same purpose. Although oil extraction was only started a short time ago, a 7 million ton output is being forecast for the current year.

Thousands of millions of escudos are being invested in the building of a great dam — Cabora Bassa — aimed at using the waters of the Zambesi river in Mozambique. The objectives of this enterprise are many but they are all directed against the interests of the Africans, especially of the peoples of Southern Africa. The implementation of a series of hydraulic schemes in the Cunene river in Angola has a similar purpose.

In this exploitation of the riches of the Portuguese colonies, the capital involved is English, American, West German, French, Japanese, South African and so on. It must be borne in mind that under the South African label a great deal of English capital is concealed.

How easy it is, therefore, to understand that these imperialist forces, so deeply engaged in the exploitation of the Portuguese colonies, are indeed those who assist the colonialist government not only financially and diplomatically, but also with the weapons used against the African patriots. However, many of the NATO countries may insist that the arms supplied to Portugal are not for use in the colonies, yet those assertions are belied by countless numbers of statements giving a detailed description of the weapons used and of their origin, showing the close links between NATO and the Portuguese colonial wars.

What better way, in fact, would the imperialists have for dominating and exploiting so many colonial peoples, than just such a situation where they can take advantage of a colonialist country — Portugal (which is colonized by themselves) — in order to wage a military colonial campaign for their own convenience and resort to the worst atrocities against those who raise the banner of independence?

In this collusion of Portuguese fascists and colonialists together with British imperialists and others, *the Anglo-Portuguese "alliance" is a link between the most reactionary forces of both countries, which also influences their policies in the Portuguese colonies.* And not only in the Portuguese colonies.

Indeed, would it be possible for the Portuguese fascists and colonialists to interfere shamelessly in the internal politics of Zaire — by supporting the secession of Katanga in 1966 — or in Nigeria — when they gave substantial aid to the secession of Biafra in 1968 — were it not for the direct and indirect support given to them by British and other imperialists?

And would they have been able to launch an invasion of the Republic of Guinea in November 1970, or make open provocations against Senegal, Zambia, Congo (Brazzaville), Tanzania and others, were it not for such support? And would they otherwise have been in a position to resort to the vile assassination of the leaders of the liberation movements, such as Eduardo Mondlane in 1969, and of Amilcar Cabral at the beginning of this year? Furthermore, would the Portuguese fascist and colonialist government be in a position to openly support the illegal regime in Rhodesia and strengthen its ties with the racist government of South Africa, aiming at the establishment of a true alliance of hatred and oppression against the peoples of Southern Africa, were it not for the agreement and support of the British imperialists and others?

It is obvious that without the support of the foreign imperialists the Portuguese domination of the colonies could not continue. This is the reason why *the policy of the Caetano government — which is heroically opposed by the liberation movements of Guine-Bissau, Angola and Mozambique fast gaining world-wide respect and acceptance; which has to face up to the growing resistance of the Portuguese people towards colonial warfare and colonialism; which is making itself the target for severe condemnation throughout the world — reveals as one of its main features a growing submission to its imperialist bosses.* It is in this way that the Caetano government intends to maintain the inhuman exploitation and the terrorist oppression in the colonies.

THE REVOLUTIONARY STRUGGLE IN PORTUGAL AND THE "ALLIANCE"

There is amongst the Portuguese people a long-standing tradition of opposition to English domination of the country and many have been the protests and the struggles against it. But today the necessity of liberating themselves from imperialist domination is becoming even clearer to them. In Portugal the struggle for democracy, the struggle against colonialism and the struggle against imperialism are all closely linked.

The Programme of the Portuguese Communist Party which was approved by its Sixth Clandestine Congress in September 1965, when it refers to the objectives of the democratic and national revolution, states quite clearly:-

"The conquest of the true independence of Portugal and the establishment of a really democratic regime require the liberation of the country from imperialist domination."

And it also says:

"A democratic regime is only viable in Portugal and the true independence of Portugal can only be secured, if there is also secured for the peoples of the Portuguese colonies the right to immediate and complete self-determination and independence."

At present the struggle of the working class is growing in Portugal both in the factories and even in the fascist trade-unions ("sindicatos"). The protests of the small farmers and peasants and other labouring classes are also growing. The students and various intellectual sectors are also fighting intensely. The democratic movement in Portugal is winning the conditions for its action, strengthening its organisations, uniting the most diverse political sections, initiating actions against repression and for the establishment of democratic liberties, through a number of actions which expose fascism, educating and mobilizing the masses of the people for the anti-fascist struggle.

An intense agitation, large demonstrations, massive refusals to take part in the colonial wars, direct action against the military apparatus, have all created inside Portugal a large political movement against colonialism, which has broken the prohibitions and restraints that

fascism wanted to impose. This movement will strengthen itself, insofar as the democratic struggle grows, and will in turn influence it. Today the condemnation of colonialism and the demands for the independence for the peoples of the colonies, which the communists have always defended, have also the backing of other democratic forces and of new sections of the population.

The action against imperialism in Portugal takes different forms. It appears in the struggle of the workers against capitalist exploitation, which takes place in foreign firms. It shows itself in constant agitation and propaganda against the subjection of the Portuguese economy and policies to the interests of the great foreign powers. It is voiced in the protests against the granting of military bases to foreign countries and the subservience to those countries. It is alive in multiple acts of solidarity with the peoples of Vietnam, the whole of Indo-China and other nations also involved in the struggle against imperialism. It still expresses itself when there are initiatives for the establishment of relations between Portugal and the socialist countries. Action against imperialism is influenced by the struggle for democracy and by the struggle against colonialism and, in turn, also spurs them on.

All these forms of political activity and their interaction give specific characteristics to the revolutionary struggle in Portugal. Portuguese communists and the Portuguese working class do not spare themselves any efforts, and they put themselves, in all sectors, in the front line of the Portuguese people's struggle. Aiming at a new society, the socialist society, they fight tirelessly for democracy and for the overthrow of fascism. They uncompromisingly attack colonialism and the colonial wars, giving their full international solidarity to the peoples of the Portuguese colonies. And, joining hands with all the democratic and revolutionary forces of the world, they are contributing with their determination and action to the struggle against imperialism. Under the conditions operating in Portugal they suffer the brutal and cold repression of a long-standing fascism which enjoys the support of the most reactionary international powers.

It is in this context that one can understand the reasons for the interest of the Portuguese and British Governments in commemorating the old "alliance", for centuries an instrument of the English domination of Portugal and of the Portuguese.

It is in this context that one can understand the opposition of the

Portuguese people against that commemoration, against the Anglo-Portuguese “alliance”, against the domination of English imperialism.

In the struggle against imperialism, against colonialism and fascism, the Portuguese workers, the popular and democratic masses of Portugal count on the support of the workers and the peoples of the whole world.

FOOTNOTES:

- 1) In the XVI century the English had already a dominant position in the Port-wine trade.
- 2) In 1817 all those implicated in a conspiracy against the English rule in Portugal were hanged. The sentence was executed before it was made public. The corpse of the alleged leader of the plot, General Gomes Freire was burnt and his ashes thrown into the sea.
- 3) It is worth noting that it was in this atmosphere that the present Portuguese national anthem was composed. The anthem is a call to the Portuguese to take up arms against those who oppress and humiliate the motherland. It became the national anthem only under the Republic of 1910. The Portuguese fascist government has never dared to repudiate the anthem, which continues to be sung in all anti-fascist demonstrations.
- 4) At that time anyone in Portugal who listened to the BBC on the radio and wore the badge of the RAF was harassed by the Police.
- 5) The military base of Lages in the Azores islands was later granted to the U.S.A. Besides this and other bases which belong to NATO, there is still at present a French base in the Azores and another one on the mainland belonging to West Germany.
- 6) In 1967 an enormous loan of £51 million (nearly 4,000 million escudos at the exchange rate at the time) was granted by the merchant bank Lazard Bros. (London) to “Siderurgia Nacional”, the only steel-producing enterprise in Portugal.

ABOUT THE AUTHOR

Fernando Blanqui Teixeira was born in Coimbra (Portugal) in 1922.

He took part in the student struggles while studying at the Lisbon University Engineering Institute and became a member of the clandestine Portuguese Communist Party. After graduating as a chemical engineer, the needs of the political work, plus police repression, made him join the clandestine struggle inside Portugal in 1950 as a full-time political worker. He eventually became a member of the Central Committee of the Party.

Blanqui Teixeira was arrested by the Portuguese secret police (PIDE) in 1957 and badly tortured but never betrayed his comrades. After over one year in jail he made an audacious escape from the hands of the police and rejoined the clandestine struggle in Portugal. He was re-arrested in May 1963, savagely tortured, and after another refusal to betray his comrades, sentenced to 10 years in jail.

He was kept in the notorious Peniche fortress prison until September 1971 when he was released after a national and international campaign to save his life.

He has already rejoined the ranks of the clandestine Portuguese Communist Party and again taken up his post in its Central Committee.

AFRICA ON THE NEW ROAD

Copies of Pyotr Manchka's booklet "Africa on the New Road" are obtainable from Inkululeko Publications, 39 Goodge Street, London W.1. at 15p each including postage. (See page 106.)

GOVAN MBEKI

A Real People's Leader

by Yatshe Landado

It is now an accepted fact that it is the oppressed and exploited people, the masses themselves, who carry out a revolution – be it a political, economical, military or social one. At the same time it is also true that the leaders of these masses in revolution, have from time immemorial ever inspired and magnetised all peoples including the youth.

The youth of the revolution learn from their leaders just as much as a child learns from his parents about school, about life. Just think of that deep-rooted umbilical cord, that revolutionary bond between the oppressed, exploited nationals and V.I. Lenin, Uncle Ho, Fidel!

This relationship comes about because people's leaders always personify not only the sufferings of the people but also especially that unquestionable capability to chart and lead the revolutionary way out of misery. They are symbols of people's experience learnt in struggle, constant revolutionary devotion and vigilance for the cause of the oppressed masses, unwavering courage, and above all supreme sacrifice in the name of the revolution, in the name of the people.

From this basis develops that positive revolutionary loyalty of the masses to the leader. This can develop on the one hand to mass heroic action, but on the other hand, if it goes on unchecked, if the primacy of

the oppressed masses and their party leadership is reduced to a secondary position, to personality cult and all its ugly consequences.

But, given normal conditions, and without minimising the supreme role of the masses themselves, such a leader is so vital for any revolution that the question of the success and defence of a revolution can sometimes hinge on the presence or absence of such a leader.

For their guidance the people will always need and find the best amongst themselves as their leader.


Many of us who had just become members of the Youth League at Fort Hare heard of legendary people's heroes like Nelson Mandela, "Gov" (Govan Mbeki) etc., and anxiously waited to see or meet one of them.

Take the case of Govan Mbeki. Even our great "guns" in the academic circles and the National Liberation Movement, like Prof. Z.K. Matthews, had talked with very high esteem of this "Gov". This itself was quite a surprise and challenge to our varsity ego, a revolution in our ways of thinking for the most high we ever knew and revered in the academic field to talk about another great "gun", about "the only one among us who could express this well". Could this be true? This led to a lot of questions we could not immediately answer.

For long periods the disciplined masses of our underground organization were, for security reasons, unable to embrace their leader who had been for a long time detained for his activities in the people's struggle. But finally, one New Brighton Sunday morning – it happened. A tallish, clean, grey-trousered and light-green-jacketted figure carrying a "Holy Bible" (as he was to call it later) came walking up Mendi Road. The people stopped, even children followed him with their eyes as he turned left towards the late Tshume's place. It was still and the people's leader passed on.

THE MEETING

A few days later, we were told that he would like to see us. And immediately we were reminded about discipline, including "not to come a minute earlier or later than the set time". And so at long last here we were with this people's intellectual, that unchallenged A.N.C. theoretician especially on rural economy and its practical politics, strategy and tactics. After a brief affecting introductory fatherly sunbeam smile we went on to the business of the day. (Something novel to me was that in



Govan Mbeki

addition to us Fort Hare university students were high school students from Lovedale or Healdtown and also young workers with whom the leader shared obvious deeper ties and trust and to whom he paid particular attention all the time).

The business of the day was a talk, a lecture on imperialist South Africa – the first time in my life I had listened to such an analysis, so different from the ordinary mass anti-imperialist slogans. It was my first chance to hear a class analysis of the socio-economic situation in our country or of the world as a whole. Not a single university in our country, not even Fort Hare, gives such a revolutionary insight into these questions. Not even our best national lecturers had such a radical outlook. They could not give us what they did not have. And so it came about that the outside university became not only the seat of real, practical politics but also the school, the source and basis of our theory. The academic university had failed us.

There we were, feeling so privileged to be in that badly lit, specially arranged small bedroom used as one of those camouflaged temporary underground leader's bases. The man was comfortably sitting on a sofa, Eastern style, and "giving" a precise approach to the subject with particular emphasis on the role of Afrikaner capital in the whole organism of South African imperialism and State monopoly capitalism.

By way of conclusion Gov told us that it is not enough to hate the enemy although that is the beginning of political consciousness and a *sine qua non* for any revolution. In order to win and defend the struggle against the enemy it is absolutely necessary, he said, to know and fight him in all his walks of life, to know what he eats, the source of what he feeds on, with whom he feeds and who guards and with what he guards whilst the master feeds on. He told us to strive to know our enemy's strength and his weakness in order to be able to hit him hard at his most vulnerable point and at his most vulnerable moment, to know and destroy all internal and international class allies of our enemy. This in itself, the leader said, basically elevates our struggle from an ordinary national liberation level to that of the internationalist anti-imperialist, anti-colonialist, anti-neocolonialist organizations.

Having also analysed the main forces and potential allies of our revolution within the country, Gov said that internationally our allies are workers' and poor peasants' parties and the revolutionary intellectuals. He told us to start a campaign of political self-education, to have a deep-rooted scientific knowledge of classes, and finally to apply a class approach to all socio-economic problems that arise. We had to learn to ask ourselves at all times: which class interests does this or that serve?

When time was up, we crept in twos into that dark chilly and windy night. We were quiet for a couple of yards so that nothing of the

precious knowledge we had just learnt might evaporate into thin air. Was it a dream? No. So that was the “Gov” Prof. Z.K. Mathews and our undergraduates had been talking about almost every day. So modest, yet knowing so much! We were to learn more.

Later on we were in the midst of our routine intensive organisational work when some of us had to drop it in order to prepare and attend an annual NUSAS conference in Durban. We were to report back on a particular date, time and place even before the end of the conference in order to continue from where we left off in our main task, the organisational task. It was amazing with what interest and concern our leader listened to our report about the weeping-at-conference liberals who are strongly opposed to violence in a violence state, rabid anti-communists who many of us felt were wasting our precious time by marking time.

We were to be even more surprised by his almost unparalleled respect for our late President General, Chief Albert Lutuli, whom some of our young ultras regarded as one of those good nationalist leaders who belong to the past. We were to learn from Gov, however, that the relationships of different class forces within our national liberation front were never before in such revolutionary working harmony as during the presidency of Lutuli. The witch-hunt was such a thing of the past that the President would not even make a final decision on vital national issues without prior consultation with the topmost leader of the working class – the most oppressed, exploited and most revolutionary force within our country – and that is Moses Kotane.

THE LESSON WE LEARNT

This was another revolution in our minds leading us to conclude without being told that one of our tasks is also to rally all progressive forces, be they liberals, communists or nationalists in various walks of life – all for the final onslaught of the enemy. Each and everyone of us had, has to strive for the unity of all our revolutionary forces.

One of us was not only a relative but stayed with a notorious special branch man. This made us so uncomfortable that one day we had to bring this security risk question to Gov’s attention. We found out that he knew the personal life and problems of each and every one of us. Because of the trust he had in a comrade, this was no risk to him. This vigilant trust he had in comrades won him greater trust and respect from

potential grave dangers that can be caused by lateness or being too early to meet somebody in the underground situation we are in. Ridiculous? No.

The security of the organisation was to him above all else. No matter what happened, no matter what tortures, the organisation had to be saved. For this reason we had at all costs to specialise in all that we did. In this way it became easier to locate and mend any leakage before the worst came.

You would meet him in town, in the location or anywhere and it would be as though he never saw you. And you would find nobody in the "New Age" offices where he worked except the official inmates. You could be there only if you had to, and out again in no time. A newcomer or an enemy might think that all is over, that the A.N.C. does not exist. But there you were, you would see and feel that mighty movement standing silently on June 26th (A.N.C. Freedom Day)! *All* households in all African locations are in darkness, only flickering candles on, and the people are outside burning effigies of their oppressors. It smells; and the enemy soldiers are provokingly rumbling Saracens. And somewhere in a dark house along Ferguson Road, the great Vuyisile Mini is leading a song of struggle. And somewhere down in Boast Village our commander, Raymond Mhlaba is sitting down alone, tense and waiting for something.

It was strict observance of the same maximum security that we never knew of any connection between Gov and the military operations of the National High Command until that fateful Rivonia night.

Preparations to go back to Fort Hare. The last words of the leader were that, in order to develop our young and delicate minds we have to read and re-read, but make sure that it is the right books; share opinions and experiences with comrades and be combatants of the people.

Within a short space of time, in the holidays, we had to learn so much.

Gov is only one of those revolutionary giants, one of our teachers, one of our parents that Vorster is now torturing or condemning to rot in his jails.

Our task is clearer than ever – to seize political power in the country through armed struggle, and thereby liberate every revolutionary. Our task at the same time also desperately cries out for international support from all progressive mankind.

Deteriorating Israeli position in Africa

by Emile Touma

After attending the meeting of the Socialist International in Paris, and visiting the Pope and Italian leaders in Rome, the Israeli Prime Minister Golda Meir hopped to a rustic Geneva suburb and met Ivory Coast President Felix Houphouet Boigny for a marathon meeting of three and a half hours.

Writing on the following day (18.1.73) the Jerusalem Post remarked: "The meeting appears to mark an offensive by Israel to shore up its diminishing popularity among the African states, five of which broke off diplomatic relations with Jerusalem recently."

Earlier the Israeli press on 8.1.73 revealed that the cabinet will hold a special session to discuss "the position of Israel in Africa."

This expressed the anxiety of the Israeli ruling circles over their deteriorating position in the young continent.

Within the first week of the New Year 1973, Congo (Brazzaville), Niger and Mali broke their diplomatic relations with Israel and joined Chad which did so at the end of November and Uganda which took the initiative in March of the same year.

At first the Israeli official spokesmen tried to gloat over Uganda's step by harsh and critical comments on General Amin's regime, and explained off his action by Libya's credits and Israel's refusal to supply him with Phantoms to wage war. But the chain reaction in Africa forced the media to start a general reappraisal of Israel's position in Africa.

Public opinion in Israel found it difficult to understand the factors at play behind this development; especially when Israeli Foreign Office officials declared that there was no reason or explanation in the

bilateral relations between Jerusalem and Brazzaville which could account for the move of the Congo Government. (The Press, 1.1.73.)

They repeated this in a press briefing on 4.1.73 saying that there had been nothing in the relations between Israel and Niger to justify the latter's break of diplomatic relations.

Under the circumstances the Jerusalem Post of 7.1.73 could be excused when it wrote editorially that it is possible to understand Uganda's step but one cannot find reasons for the action of the others and "when no reason for the break is revealed that the public feels at a loss."

But since then there has been an avalanche of explanations. Besides Libya's credits, the pressure of the Moslem populations, the Arab diplomatic offensive and Israeli shortcomings the London Times 17.1.73 asserted that Israelis suspect that French diplomacy is behind these developments, since the last four defections have all been from French speaking Africa.

Naturally, after the early repercussions of the "African shock" faded away, Israeli officials tried to belittle the significance of five countries in Africa and emphasized that Israel's original success in establishing such wide relations with so many African countries (still standing at 27) was a great achievement. (In a symposium on the subject of Africa held by "Davar" with ex-Ambassador U. Lobrani, military commentator H. Herzog and D. Golan Manager First International Bank of Israel, 19.1.)

However, there are those who conceive the African development in the general context of Israel's international position and therefore consider it grave and dangerous. It emphasises the fact that Israel has diplomatic relations with half the states in the world only. (Ibid).

ISRAEL'S OBJECTIVES IN AFRICA

It is possible to understand the implication and significance of this latest turn of events if one remembers the objectives and hopes of the Israeli ruling circles and "their principles" at the beginning of their "African adventure"!

Netanel Lorch, an earlier head of the African desk at the Israeli

Foreign Office explained about a decade ago why Africa was important to Israel by stressing that it has a third of the United Nations seats and can block a resolution. He added that Israel needs trade markets and raw material (diamonds and wood) and therefore Africa is important. (The journal of Educational Sociology N.Y. vol. 36, April 1963, No. 8, p.397.)

Others have repeated this theme in this way or the other and Noam Shepherd of the New Statesman wrote (August 1964) that in the new post-colonial world Israel "could not afford to number her friends among the Western powers alone."

The Arab Israeli conflict was a decisive factor in the Israeli African policy, and the campaign of the Israeli ruling circles to establish many-sided relations with the emerging independent African states was an attempt to "leap frog" over the Arab blockade.

However, there were other motivations in the policy of the Israeli ruling circles.

Michael Brecher in his book "The New States in Asia" writes when noting other unstated Israeli objectives:

"One is the desire to serve as a bridge between the former colonial powers of the West and former dependent territories. The possession of Western skills, without the stigma of colonialism fits Israel for a big role of channelling aid from the West which might be suspected if granted directly".

In other words, Israel was to act as agent for the neocolonialist principals sitting in Washington, London, Paris and Bonn.

In order to carry out this task the Israeli ruling circles had to become the spearhead of anti-Sovietism and anti-communism. Implying these efforts, Dr R. Elston, one time correspondent of "Times" in Israel, wrote:

"The new, unstable sovereign states can become entangled in 'strings'. One string leads to another and in time become yet another rope for the big powers to play at tug of war in which all too often the communist powers win. . . and that oddly enough is where Israel comes". ("Time and Tide", 3.9.1960).

The Israel Economist acknowledged this idea when commenting on Israeli policy in Africa and its success noted that "the Western powers are quite naturally anxious to ensure that the whole African continent does not swing sharply leftward into the communist camp." (July 1962, p. 120).

It was no accident that Israeli emissaries in Africa and their counterparts who lectured to Africans in Israel concentrated on dispelling Soviet and communist “illusions” (sic) and disproving the validity of the socialist path (!) and ascertaining that Israel is the best example to follow because it faces the same problems of all developing nations!

It is well known that Israeli officials laid the ground for the future relations with many African countries before their emergence as independent states. This was done under the patronage, and with the assistance, of the imperialist powers.

Israeli great success in such countries came because in such countries the old imperialists had managed to groom their old collaborators into the leaders of the new states.

Moreover the Israelis spent lavishly in Africa, and the VERED scandal, which exploded on the political stage in Israel in October-November 1972, revealed that the Israeli official operators sometimes use bribes to achieve certain ends. (The whole exposure was the subject of a non-confidence motion in the Israeli Parliament – Knesset early November, 1972).

In the light of the huge losses (reaching about 90 million Israeli Liras or about \$20 million) of the Vered company, which is the Israeli economic arm in hydraulic-operating in Asia and Africa, the observer can understand the calm of the Israeli ruling circles. They seem sure that the principal can bear the financial burden.

At any rate, according to Leopold Laufer, author of “Israel and the Developing Countries”, “Israel’s achievements in having more than half its efforts (in third world countries) financed from non-Israeli sources is probably unique in the tangled history of post-war technical assistance operations” (p.52).

CAUSES OF ISRAELI SETBACKS

A number of local and foreign observers have noted that Arab activity, whether financial or political, was responsible for the serious setback of Israel in Africa.

But this does not explain why Arab diplomacy was securing its successes now.

The statements of the African countries which broke relations with Israel are self-evident and expressive.

Thus, the Government of Congo (Brazzaville) in its statement severing its relations formally condemned "the imperialist and expansionist policy of Israel."

Niger did the same in different terms and demanded a just solution for the Middle East conflict "which would primarily take account of the rights of the Palestinian people and of our solidarity with our brother people of Egypt" (A.P. 2.2.1972.)

The President of Mali said in this connection:

"The Israelis must learn that until they change their imperialist and neocolonialist ambitions of . . . sabotaging the economies of African countries they will be chased away completely from the African continent." (Jewish Chronicle, 12.1.73).

The Mali Foreign Minister announcing the break added a basic element when he accused the Israeli occupation with founding villages in the occupied areas, forcibly expelling the residents and exploiting the population.

Coming less than a month after the resolution of the UN General Assembly on the Middle East (8.12.72) the African states which broke their relations with Israel seem to endorse this resolution and respond to its behests.

This resolution, reiterated the General Assembly's support to the Security Council Resolution 242, condemned Israel's attempts to change the physical and demographic character of the occupied areas and called upon all the states not only to abstain from recognising these changes, but to refrain from giving Israel any help, capable of being construed as support to its policy of creating *faits accomplis* there.

After a certain measure of silence on this score, Israeli and foreign circles are admitting that Israeli aggressive annexationist policy is responsible for the African moves which can herald a more extensive deterioration of Israel's position in Africa.

Writing with this in mind Al Hamishmar wrote "One thing Israel should do is to present her aspirations for peace in stronger and more convincing light (!) since this is the issue on which the Arab states are attempting to undermine Israel's relations with Africa." (7.1.73).

Dr Susan Aurela Gitelson, lecturer on international relations and African studies at the Hebrew University recognises that African states

are “concerned” with the substantive issue of the territories occupied in the six day war (Israeli June 1967 aggression – E.T.). Their own internal difficulties with separatist movements and their interstate boundary disputes, have led them to emphasize the importance of territorial integrity, which is also included prominently in the Organization of African Unity Charter.

In 1967, however, only Guinea actually broke off relations with Israel on these grounds. As time has passed more African states and the OAU as a whole have become increasingly adamant on this issue.” (Jerusalem Post, 12.1.73).

Thus it is clear that the perpetuation of the Israeli occupation of the Arab territories seized in the June war and the policy of annexation expressed in the establishment of colonial settlement there, are liable to accelerate the estrangement between Israel and Africa.

Moreover Israel identification with imperialism generally and with U.S. imperialism particularly is deepening and gaining in content. This is becoming more pronounced, as the U.S. comes forward more brazenly as the champion of Israel. It was significant that the U.S. for the first time since the June war used its veto power in the Security Council in September 1972 to save Israel from a resolution condemning its savage raids against refugee camps in Lebanon and Syria.

The British “Guardian” could not escape the fact – when commenting on Israel-African relations – that the African states which suffered under imperialism were shocked by Israel’s continued occupation of Arab territories. At the same time the close relations between the U.S. and Israel arouses their suspicions. (19.1.73).

“OFFICIAL” SOLUTIONS

The Israeli ruling circles while reappraising their position in Africa are formulating new guidelines.

They understand the importance of this question. As David Golan said in “Davar’s” symposium, the relations of Israel and the African states were a “great political asset of the first rank in Israel’s relations with the United States, England and France.” (19.1.73.).

He also said – in way of emphasis – that our strongest friends (meaning the U.S.) and also those in Europe are tired of standing alone. That is why every country (that stands with Israel – E.T.) in Asia and Africa is important.

However, not one Israeli official or supporter of the official policy reached the logical conclusions.

On the contrary, Abiezer Chelouche, a bank manager who was once involved in activities in Africa, discounted the only way capable of improving Israel's image in Africa. He said in an interview with Israel Neuman of Ha'aretz: "I eliminate from all possibilities Israeli evacuation to the green line (the Israeli lines before the June war) as a means to prevent the break of relations" with countries of Africa.

This means that Israeli ruling circles will continue their aggressive annexationist policy in collusion with U.S. imperialism.

In fact, "Ma'ariv" (17.1.73) suggests that Israel should aim at helping the countries of Africa to advance in the direction of a liberal economy (read: capitalism – E.T.).

It added Israel must integrate in the system of the states of the "Free World" (led by imperialism – E.T.) which has to exert every effort so that the Africans do not become passive instruments in the play for influence (!) between the Soviet Union and China (!) with the aid of the Arabs.

But the difficulty of the Israeli ruling circles lies in the fact that Israeli policy is becoming an anachronism in Africa. The fight against imperialism, neo-colonialism and local reaction is growing and becoming dominant. Israel's close collusion with U.S. imperialism, with the racist regime of South Africa and Rhodesia arouses the indignation of the peoples of Africa.

Under the circumstances it is no longer a question of this African country's relation with Israel or that. The Israeli setbacks in Africa are an expression of the growing isolation of Israel in the world.

The only way out, therefore, is a radical change of policy, in the direction of peace. Israel can only find its way back to these countries of Africa who broke diplomatic relations with it and prevent further deteriorations of its standing, if it conforms with UN Resolutions which lay down the foundations of a just peace in the Middle East based on Israeli evacuation of the occupied Arab territories and respect for the rights of all the peoples and states in the region, including the Israeli and Palestine Arab peoples.

EGYPT Crisis of the Revolution

by Ibrahim Abdel Halim

No revolution since the immortal October Revolution in 1917 has stirred so much interest, created so many problems and led to such significant consequences as the revolution which took place in Egypt on July 23, 1952. Of course, the two revolutions are vastly different in their scope and significance. The October Revolution of 1917, from its inception under the leadership of the great Bolshevik Party of Lenin, had an immeasurable world and human content. It is enough to say that all humanity was in its debt because it established a system which irreversibly abolished the exploitation of man by man and placed authority in the hands of the working class.

Without the victory of the October Revolution and the glorious historical role played by the Soviet Communist Party and the Soviet peoples, who are still providing the rare example of internationalist solidarity; without the consistent and principled stand of the successive Soviet governments in the fight against imperialism and in support of the oppressed peoples struggling for self-determination and the right to a way of life worthy of 20th Century man — without this vital aid and backing it would not have been possible for the national liberation movements to realise the victories they have achieved.

This was made especially clear during the years following the Second World War which put an end to the isolation and blockade imposed on

the Soviet Union as the world's first socialist state.

During the years between the two world wars the imperialist countries used every method, including physical violence and distortion of the truth, as well as persecution of communists and friends of the Soviet Union in the capitalist and colonised countries, to prevent the consequences of the October Revolution from spreading to other countries, and to hinder the new Soviet authority from carrying out its international obligations. This policy of the imperialists failed completely because the forces which remained struggling for national liberation and social change in the interests of the workers, peasants and the other exploited masses in the colonial countries realised day by day that they were not alone in their struggle and that the Soviet Union was backing their just struggle with all its might and potentialities.

The communist parties and the working class in these countries played a glorious role in this transformation in the world scene. After the second world war, in which it played a decisive and historical role in defeating fascism, the Soviet Union was no longer the only socialist country. The socialist camp emerged, comprising several countries, at the head of which stood the Soviet Union.

On the other hand, the imperialist countries betrayed their war-time promises to liberate their colonies. Further pressure from the peoples of these colonies for national liberation was met by brutal repression of workers' organizations and the national liberation movements. The result was that the colonial peoples lost all confidence in the imperialist countries, especially America, which had tried to present itself to them as a new hope. The national liberation movements also lost confidence in their own traditional leaderships, composed of an alliance of the feudalists and the bourgeoisie, which remained hoping for a compromise with the imperialist countries, and also tried to prevent unity between the national liberation movements and their natural allies, the socialist camp, headed by the Soviet Union, and the communist and workers' parties in the Socialist and capitalist countries.

ROLE OF THE WORKING CLASS

Thus after the second world war conditions changed radically with the emergence of a new leadership of the national liberation movements in which the working class played a decisive role. In Egypt, for example, there came into being the National Committee for Workers and

Students, which raised the slogan of armed struggle against the occupation troops. The National Committee totally opposed the imperialist military pacts (the Middle East Pact) and all attempts to conclude a treaty between Egypt and Britain (the Sidky-Bevin draft agreement) and worked for the overthrow of the hostile government based on the alliance between feudalism, the monarchy and colonialism.

This new leadership, firmly rooted in the masses, sustained scores of victims on February 21, 1946, which afterwards became the World Day for the Struggle against Imperialism. Through its experiences it confirmed the new course taken by the national liberation movement since that time, which regarded the backing and support of the Soviet Union and the Socialist camp as one of the main factors guaranteeing the victory of the struggle of the people.

Before the outbreak of the revolution of July 1952, which took the form of a military coup carried out by the Free Officers, there were several factors preventing the establishment of a national democratic front which should have assumed the task of overthrowing the existing power. At this time the ruling class had reached the highest degree of weakness and stood in antagonistic contradiction to the working class and the revolutionary masses who have not ceased their national struggle since that date.

These were the conditions under which the July Revolution took place in Egypt:

The traditional bourgeois parties, including the Wafd, which was influential among the masses, refused to give the national revolution a socialist content and to receive support from the socialist camp. Consequently, they opposed the formation of a front of the national and progressive forces, including the communists. Another factor was that, while the conditions were ripe for overthrowing the existing authority, there was no leading party of the working class to constitute a national democratic government in collaboration with the progressive forces which existed in the trade union movement and in all the bourgeois parties.

NASSER'S VIEW

These factors impelled the Free Officers' organization in Egypt to seize power, and the revolution which they brought about in consequence stirred up all manner of controversies, problems and other conflicts. It is

enough to reveal the connection between the revolution of October 1971 and that of July 1952 in Egypt to mention that Gamal Abdel Nasser, the leader of the 1952 Revolution, expressed on more than one occasion his full realisation and deep conviction that had it not been for the October Revolution and the big role played by the Soviet Union against the imperialist forces and in support of the national liberation movement, it would not have been possible for the colonized countries and anti-imperialist forces, including the July 23 Revolution in Egypt, to realise the tremendous successes which changed the map of the world, and of the Arab, African, Asian and Latin American world in particular.

No one now denies the historical role played by the July Revolution during the 20 years that have since ensued. It remained fighting continuous battles against British imperialism, in the beginning, and ultimately against all the colonial forces, particularly American imperialism, after the evacuation of the British troops. The most recent of these battles is the aggression launched by Israel, which American imperialism is using as a military, racial and reactionary instrument to continue plundering the wealth of the Arab peoples, primarily oil which is of vital importance for the American and West European monopolies.

From its inception the July Revolution was firm in its opposition to colonialism in all its forms, and also with the forces allied against colonialism at home, foremost of which was the Monarchy, which stood at the head of the feudalism which placed the big Egyptian foreign landlords in possession of most of the cultivated land in Egypt, leaving the majority of farmers landless and jobless. Most of the landlords had their own prisons inside their palaces in which they put any agricultural labourer who asked for his rights. The police authorities were directly under the control of the feudal lords and were used to enforce the most horrible exploitation of the peasants.

LAND REFORM

The July Revolution was supported by only one Communist organization, namely, the Democratic Movement for National Liberation. All the other Egyptian and Arab Communist organizations and parties condemned it as a military coup hostile to the masses and supported by American imperialism. Two months after its victory, however, the new authority announced land reform, which was frankly opposed by the

landlords and the traditional parties, including the Wafd, as well as by the big bourgeoisie.

Since that time, the struggle of the revolution against imperialism has been connected with the struggle against feudalism and the big bourgeoisie. Without any clear ideological stand, the leadership of the July revolution set about solving the tasks of the national democratic revolution. They had vague conceptions of democracy and social change and were without either a defined programme or a mass organization which was able to mobilise and organise the national and progressive forces and classes in the task of safeguarding the revolution and frustrating the designs of the imperialists and the exploiting classes in Egypt.

These factors resulted in the transformation of the non-antagonistic contradictions between the revolutionary government and the national and progressive forces, organised in communist and national organizations and trade unions, into antagonistic contradictions culminating in repressive measures against the Egyptian communists and trade union leaders. These constituted the negative aspects and points of weakness of the revolution from the very beginning.

The struggle against these negative aspects which is being waged with great courage and sacrifice by the revolutionary forces in Egypt, including the Egyptian labour movement, aims at realising democracy in the democratic revolutionary concept, and protecting the major social changes which took place in our country and were reflected in the lives of millions of workers and peasants. It also aims at confirming the non-capitalist way of development in Egypt and consolidating relations with the socialist camp, headed by the Soviet Union.

SOVIET HELP

It was the help given by the Soviet Union and the other socialist countries which made possible the strengthening of the public sector in the economy, the development of national industry and the construction of the Aswan High Dam. Aid given by the Soviet Union also helped build up heavy industry which is the foundation for the transformation of the national democratic revolution into the socialist revolution.

The July revolution remains an anti-imperialist force joining the communist and workers' parties in the common struggle against imperialism. The changes which took place in the map of the Arab world and

Africa during the past 20 years are clear. The July revolution played a major role in realising these changes. The influence of the July revolution extended to the Latin American countries. The leaders of the Communist parties in Peru, Chile and the other Latin American countries frequently mention the positive influence of the July Revolution on the national movement in their countries.

We stand in need of further analysis of the July 23 revolution after the death of Nasser and his succession by Sadat. The 1967 defeat and Israeli occupation of Egyptian Sinai and other Arab lands exposed the negative aspects of the July revolution. Nasser failed to confront these negative aspects by calling on the Egyptian working class and peasants, who have a real interest in defending the revolution and constitute the main force in the struggle against imperialism.

SADAT'S TASK

The main problem facing the July revolution is to get rid of those elements in its leadership which are opposed to its progressive line. This is the main task facing Sadat, who announced to the people that he would continue the progressive line of the revolution.

More than ever, the anti-imperialist forces must pay more attention to the problems of the Egyptian revolution. They must learn the lessons of the previous years. They are also required, more than ever, to support the struggle of the Egyptian people against imperialism which has continued since the end of the Second World War. This struggle played a leading role in bringing about the changes which took place in the interest of the anti-imperialist forces.

The progressive forces in Egypt, whether in the government and the political organisation or in the labour movement and the students' organisations must solve the problem of uniting in a political organisation representing the progressive line of the July revolution, expressed in the National Charter, the March 30 statement, the National Action Programme, the Constitution, and friendship with the socialist camp, especially the Soviet Union. This is the main solution for the negative aspects of the revolution, the only way to combat right-wing and reactionary activities and the continuous imperialist attacks. This is the only way to create the conditions suitable for fighting the battle against American imperialism and Israel, in all its political, social and military

dimensions.

This is a very complicated and difficult task, which will tax all the resources and commitment of the progressive forces in Egypt and the Arab communist parties and progressive forces.



Are White Students a Revolutionary Force?

by a South African Student

The "African Communist" has in the past few years published a number of articles and letters assessing the actions and potential of Black and White students in South Africa. I would like to take up some of the points made with respect to the white student group and examine them in the light of recent events. The first most obvious thing that needs to be said is that the main revolutionary thrust in South Africa has always, and will in the future, come not from students (whether Black or White) but from the organized Black masses and especially from the Black working class. White students as a whole are physically isolated from this revolutionary vanguard both by their personal class background and also by the rigid apartheid laws. The role that they can play in the national liberation movement can only be assessed in terms of this real limitation.

DIVERSIONARY ROLE

In the most immediate sense White students are making a small contribution to the struggle by tying down a considerable number of security branch agents, informers and the financial resources of the fascist forces on the five English-speaking (and also to some extent on the Afrikaans-speaking) university campuses. This diversionary role is

of course often the unintended result of naive or even self-interested White campus politics. And so, although Joe Kumalo (in a letter published in the African Communist No. 46) is perfectly correct in querying "how genuine" many of the participants at White student demonstrations are, we should not forget that irrespective of their genuineness (i.e. of the ideological maturity and commitment) of white students is an important question even with the limitations of a purely diversionary role. In the absence of any ideological seriousness the diversionary activity might well dry-up when it could be most useful — as the armed struggle grows.

I believe that Kumalo is right in assuming that the majority of White students at large demonstrations are not "genuine" — in the sense that they are acting out of a variety of rather shabby motives — guilt, patronage, a desire to be with-it, etc. But ideological commitment is not something static. The very fact that these students are on a demonstration exposes them very often for the first time to some of the realities of South African politics, to police brutality and therefore to possible radicalization (provided of course that this exposure is coupled with correct ideological training). I must point out, incidentally, that Kumalo's letter was written before the unprecedented baton charges by police on White students in Cape Town and Johannesburg and also before the recent bannings and house-arrest orders served on NUSAS leaders which I think might account for his doubting just how much of an exposure White student demonstrations represent.

RADICALIZATION

I do not believe that the recent police brutality against White students is simply accidental; it reflects an alarm at the signs of a growing radicalization within the White student group. While, then, I agree to some extent with Kumalo's estimation of the mass of White student demonstrators, I do not agree with him that this estimation necessarily precludes the possibility of a significant and simultaneous radicalization in certain *sectors* of the White student group. When Kumalo asks whether White students have become radicalized in the past few years he looks largely at NUSAS and concludes that they have not. In this respect I think that one must be careful to distinguish the nature of NUSAS. Whatever its pretensions (tactical or otherwise)

NUSAS is not a homogeneous political body. NUSAS claims to represent all students on the 5 English-speaking White campuses in South Africa. This claim is the prerequisite for its obtaining the bulk of its financial support which comes from the reactionary University Councils at these universities. On the other hand the leadership within NUSAS, elected by NUSAS activists rather than by all fee-paying members (i.e. all students on these 5 campuses) has in recent years tended to be markedly to the left of the mass of White students. Certain left-wing students see in NUSAS the possibility of influencing White campuses on a national scale and these students have frequently occupied leading roles in NUSAS. Their more or less radical lines have been tolerated and even sometimes promoted by the University Councils and by the body of active NUSAS members (largely liberals, or opportunists and in most cases both) for the purposes of overseas consumption. Until recently this tolerated contradiction also permitted the illusion in certain quarters that NUSAS could speak on behalf of Black students. The contradictions within NUSAS are obviously the source of great weaknesses (especially when they have not been correctly appreciated by left-wing NUSAS leaders) but they have also permitted a certain radicalization within pockets of NUSAS.

Because of their class origins and because problems like graduate unemployment, for instance, do not confront them on any sizeable scale (unlike their North American and West European counterparts) the radicalization process of White students in South Africa has not been a mass phenomenon. Certainly for the moment and quite possibly in the long run the majority of white students are and will remain conservative – and any mass, legal effectively white union like NUSAS will inevitably reflect much of this general conservatism.

In order, then, to decide whether there has been a radicalization process amongst English-speaking white students, I suggest that one cannot look at NUSAS en bloc. I believe that there has been a marked radicalization of sectors of white students either entirely outside or within certain *sectors* of NUSAS since at least about 1968. As indications of this radicalization one could mention (besides the fairly widely publicized demonstrations in 1972 for the democratization of the education system):

- 1) The formation of a Wages Commission at first in Durban and now on a national scale to campaign at a number of levels for higher Black wages. Action has included the use of pamphlets to workers

informing them of the possibilities of organization for wage claims. This step makes a break with sterile and usually irrelevant campus-confined politics.

2) The growth of semi-legal literature on some campuses. Articles in certain student journals have included information on the history and aims of the liberation movements in Southern Africa. Various student journals have been banned in recent years after distribution.

3) Reports of the appearance of ANC slogans on at least one White Campus.

Of course one must not overestimate the numbers of white radical students. Their numbers might grow but they will possibly always be in the minority at least in the near future. Their significance lies much more in the fact that they represent a *real* division within the White camp. The fact that all male White students receive or have received military training is, for instance, one aspect where the importance of such a division is apparent.

Incidentally, in his letter Joe Kumalo advances (p 123) as an argument to prove that the "overwhelming number" of White students in South Africa have accepted the status quo as sacred the fact that "the great majority of them have undergone or are about to undergo military training to defend fascism against the so-called terrorists." The majority of White students it is true do accept the status quo but Kumalo has chosen from precisely the one area where there is a fairly widespread malaise amongst white students. Citizen force training is compulsory and not voluntary for all White males. For students the training interrupts careers and university studies for a year, university holidays are taken up by 3-week training camps, the ideological and general political indoctrination which accompanies the training is of such a distasteful standard that even fairly conservative students are repelled. This resentment is in the majority of cases apolitical and purely selfish. The short haircut is more irksome than lessons on how to beat-up unarmed people ("riot"-control exercises). But this military training in certain cases marks the *beginning* of at least a limited radicalization of young White students. I believe that the fact that many students who go on demonstrations are also during their holidays being compelled to receive armed training is a headache for the fascists and not for the liberation movement as Kumalo's letter seems to suggest. It is not altogether impossible that the Witwatersrand students who attacked and

drove off pro-Government Rand Afrikaanse Universiteit's students in March this year were putting into practice their riot-control lessons.

DIVERSIONARY ROLE

In an article on the 1972 SASO and White Student demonstrations (Sechaba, August 1972 p5), the following fairly commonly held thesis is put forward. "As was shown in the growth of opposition by White students: it is only a united Black opposition which will force the Whites to come out of their laager." Alexander Sibekho in an article in the African Communist (No. 51) makes the same point: "It is precisely the militancy of the Black students that has succeeded in radicalising a section of White students."

Insofar as these comments imply that the South African revolution will be made, and can *only* be made, by the Black masses, that White students can contribute to this process in a tributary fashion, and that whether their contribution continues to materialize or not will not alter the outcome of the struggle in the *long run*, I agree without hesitation. But I do not believe that it is accurate to say that there is and will always be an easy cause and effect, chronological relationship between Black mass (and student) protest and White student protest. This argument leads to a myth of White student spontaneism.

The physical isolation of White students from the working masses not only limits the numbers of students involved in the radicalization process but also necessarily implies that this process has been in the past and will continue to be the result largely of patient ideological training within the White campuses themselves. It is for this reason that I disagree that the radicalization of a sector of White students is, or could ever be, the direct and mechanical result of Black student action. I think that a careful study of press reports on White student action and even those relating to the June 1972 demonstrations where the Black student strike at first sight seems to be the most evident cause, will show that this mechanical interpretation does not altogether hold. Of course the action in Cape Town and in Johannesburg followed in the wake of the SASO strikes and used as their central slogan solidarity with the striking Black students. But at Cape Town, where the series of white student demonstrations began, the actual mass

demonstrations only started the day after a small group of 50 radical White students in the face of official NUSAS and SRC apathy handed out pamphlets in central Cape Town under a banner of "Unite to Resist". According to The "Cape Argus" (June 1, 1972) the pamphlets expressed solidarity "with all oppressed South Africans – students and workers – in calling for the right to determine their own future", and concluded: "We call for an end to exploitation and racialism. We will continue to fight for a free and just South Africa". According to the same report this group was arrested by the police and temporarily held after they had marched to the houses of Parliament.

It seems unlikely that these students had been miraculously radicalized in the previous two weeks by the SASO strike. Moreover, I do not believe that this action can be seen in isolation from the general signs of radicalization which I have mentioned and which had been apparent for several years on the Cape Town campus as elsewhere.

It was only the day after these 50 students had been arrested temporarily that the NUSAS and SRC leadership in Cape Town called for a public demonstration at St. George's Cathedral, and it was only then that the White students came out in sizeable numbers – moved as much, regrettably but in fact, by the arrest of White students as they were by the SASO strikes. It was only after, but immediately after, the resulting baton charges on White Students in Cape Town, that the White students in Johannesburg came out in turn in open demonstration.

I believe, then, that there has been a significant, if limited, radicalization of sectors of White students and also that it is these very sectors that must play a key role, because of their position, in the spreading of this radicalization. These White radical students in turn however are not always clearly aware of their own political and potential responsibilities. It is an awareness which can be promoted, I believe, by strategically directed ideological training.

S.K.C.

Ivan Potekhin

A Great Africanist

by L. Rytov

This year the life of Ivan I. Potekhin, first Director of the Africa Institute of the Academy of Sciences of the U.S.S.R., is being widely commemorated in the Soviet Union.

Comrade Potekhin had many contacts with South African Communists, and in the following pages, two of them, comrades J.B. Marks and Moses M. Kotane, chairman and general secretary respectively of the South African Communist Party, assess the influence of Potekhin on the revolutionary movement in Africa, and discuss their reminiscences about him. This was comrade Marks' last interview, taken two weeks before his death in Moscow on August 1, 1922.

The interviews of Marks and Kotane are to be incorporated in a book which is to be published in connection with Potekhin's work.

"I consider I. I. Potekhin to be my teacher", John Marks said. "I first met him in 1934 when I entered the Communist University of the Peoples of the East (CUPE). There were four of us at the University who came from faraway South Africa, among us Mofutsanyana (he studied under the assumed name Greenwood) and Nickin (Hilton). We were students and Potekhin was our professor. He delivered lectures on Russian History and British Colonial Policy in South Africa, and conducted seminars on current politics.

"As I remember Potekhin now, he was a vigorous young scholar, a born hard-working teacher, who never missed a chance to learn himself while teaching us. We helped him to develop his knowledge of English. We sometimes spent evenings at his place talking together over

a cup of tea. He occupied a very small room together with his wife and his child in the same building where CUPE was located.

“In 1936, I left for South Africa and since then I never had an opportunity of seeing him again. In 1957, when I came to Accra I found out that Potekhin had left Ghana by the time I arrived. Then I hoped to see him in Moscow, but when I came to the Soviet Union, he was seriously ill.

“Though I did not manage to meet him again, I kept a constant eye on his works. I highly appreciate his contributions to African studies and among other things his works on the complex problems of South Africa. Potekhin’s articles in which he investigated the class structure of African society were very helpful to South African Communists. Potekhin was the first scholar who developed a Marxist approach to the study of the problems of class formation in Africa.

“He studied the Bantu-speaking peoples of South Africa and wrote a number of books and articles on the history and the ethnography of the South African peoples, as well as on the national problem in South Africa. In his early work “The Role of British Imperialism in South Africa”, Potekhin showed a profound understanding of the complexity of South African problems in particular with reference to Afrikaner nationalism.

“He worked on the history of the African National Congress, the Industrial and Commercial Workers’ Union (ICU) founded by Kadalie, and attached great importance to the development of the trade union movement in South Africa. Potekhin emphasized the revisionist tendencies within the leadership of white trade unions which became especially strong after the suppression of the Rand revolt in 1922, and which endangered the whole working class movement in South Africa and the white workers’ movement in particular. White workers enjoyed a privileged position as compared to the African proletariat and, by reserving these privileges for them the bourgeoisie split the working class movement. As a result, the majority of white workers became a workers’ aristocracy, the appendage of the ruling class that helped it to oppress the Africans who were deprived of basic civil rights. Potekhin believed that the status of the white worker should be considered from two angles, namely that he is exploited by the capitalist on the one hand and that he himself helps the latter to exploit the Africans on the other.



The tombstone upon Potekhin's grave was unveiled recently at Novodevichye Cemetery in Moscow. J.B. Marks was buried at the same cemetery.

“Potekhin put forward the idea that in order to overcome the split within the South African working class it is necessary to establish strong African trade unions. I remember him saying: ‘A day will come when white workers will join the black workers, but not before the blacks have created a very strong organization’. Potekhin also took an interest in the activities of the Communist Party of South Africa, paying great attention to its struggle for working class unity against attempts to split it on racial lines.

“It is the duty of all scholars”, comrade Marks concluded, “to recognize the scientific contribution of the first Director of the Africa Institute of the USSR Academy of Sciences. I should like to stress how helpful his works have been to us South African Communists in our day-to-day struggles for the future of the nation. The books and articles written by my late teacher have been and remain of scientific and political importance.”

KOTANE'S VIEW

Comrade Kotane shared Marks' assessment of Potekhin's activities and added that he would like to stress especially Potekhin's great interest in studying Africa, its past and present.

“Therefore I can say”, Moses Kotane went on, “that he was dedicated to Africa, to its progress. As I know him he always took a keen interest in Africa, and lived constantly thinking of Africa and devoted his whole life to Africa.

“I had known him since 1933. Our first meeting was accidental, but after that we used to be in touch. In 1933 I studied at the Lenin School, which was in Vorovsky street. Zusmanowich, Sik and others were our professors and then came Potekhin. I came to know him well both as a man and a talented young scholar. Afterwards I met him many times in Moscow, in Africa and at the Africa Institute where he was Director.

“We used to have long and very interesting talks and each time he revealed deep understanding of the most complex problems of South Africa. His great scientific contribution consists in the fact that he was one of the first scientists who approached these problems from the Marxist standpoint at a time when bourgeois science dominated in African studies. The creation of a group on African studies in Moscow and the subsequent foundation of the Africa Institute marked the

appearance of the Soviet Marxist school of Africanists. Potekhin has also made a great scientific contribution to that development.

“I was happy to find out”, M. Kotane said at the close of the conversation, “that a collection of works dedicated to his memory is being prepared at your Institute. Potekhin’s untimely death is a great loss not only to Soviet science, but also the whole of Africa whose devoted friend he always was. When he died we lost a fighter and a hard-working scholar.”

Our conversation was over. Saying good-bye to the research associates of the Africa Institute, John Marks told us about one more episode of his acquaintance with Ivan Izosimovich. During a summer vacation a group of students from CUPE visited the Donbass, the Dnieper Power Station, the Crimea. Potekhin accompanied them. In the Donbass the students wanted to see how coal was being mined. Potekhin went down into the mine with them. For Marks that excursion was particularly interesting, as before his visit to the Soviet Union he had observed the conditions under which South African miners worked.

“Even now, although 40 years have passed, I can vividly bring to memory the young and cheerful Potekhin, dressed in the miner’s uniform, and remember us making our way along the maze underground. It was not difficult for me to see that the conditions in which Russian miners worked way back then were much better than those in my land. Any reminiscences about my meetings with Potekhin arouse only kind feelings in me.”

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BOOK REVIEWS

THE CURSE OF MIGRATORY LABOUR

"Migrant Labour in South Africa" by Francis Wilson, published by the South African Council of Churches and SPROCAS, Johannesburg.

Dr. Francis Wilson, senior lecturer in economics in the University of Cape Town, has followed up his important book "Labour in the South African Gold Mines 1911-1969" with an equally important study of "Migrant Labour in South Africa".

Produced in the form of a report to the South African Council of Churches, it is published by the Council in conjunction with SPROCAS (Study Project on Christianity in Apartheid Society) and printed by a SPROCAS team of technical workers in Johannesburg.

Dr. Wilson has tackled his task with enormous thoroughness, not only reading widely on migratory labour both in South African and in other countries in Africa and overseas, but also personally examining the conditions of migrant workers in all the main centres of South Africa and in the homelands between December 1971 and June 1972. The result is a fully-documented study of a problem which is central to South African society.

“Oscillating migration”, says Wilson in his preface, “occurs when men’s homes are so far from their work that they cannot commute daily and can see their families only weekly, monthly, yearly or even less frequently. Migrant labourers thus include both seasonal farm workers and people in jobs for which there is little fluctuation in demand. Most countries employ some seasonal migrants, particularly in agriculture: South Africa is unusual in the number of migrant workers in other sectors of the economy”.

Dr Wilson was left with four abiding impressions. The first was the sheer extent of the migrant labour system, and the speed with which it is expanding in most branches of the South African economy as a result of the South African Government’s policy of Bantustans and “separate development”. The second was the almost total ignorance of the White population about what is happening to the Blacks in the townships and rural areas. The third was the uneasiness of the minority of Whites who do know what is going on – the officials who have to administer the system, mainly officials of the non-European or Bantu Affairs Departments in the different cities. Many of them are aware that they are trying to enforce laws which are unjust and unworkable. One official burst out, after several hours of discussion: “The migrant system! I hate it! I loathe it!”

Dr. Wilson’s fourth impression was of “the acute urgency of the situation. I cannot convey adequately the sense of hurt rage of black South Africans at what is being done to them. Anybody who believes that blacks are contented with the migrant labour system in South Africa is living in a fool’s paradise”.

Dr. Wilson estimates that 50 per cent of all Africans legally working in the “White” areas of South Africa are oscillating migrants.

Most people know that the South African mining industry has from its inception been based on migratory labour, today more so than ever. By law the gold mines were until 1969 allowed to provide family housing for not more than 3% of the black labour force excluding “foreign natives”. But as the proportion of South Africans was not more than one-third of the total – the remainder coming from neighbouring countries, mainly Lesotho, Mozambique and Malawi – this meant that effectively only 1% of the black labour force on the mines was eligible for family housing. The position of even this 1% became almost untenable with the issuing of an instruction in 1970 that children might no longer stay in the married quarters.

“The compounds which house the other 99% of the labour force vary from the old pre-first World War buildings with rooms housing 50 or more men living like sardines in double-decker concrete bunks to modern hostels housing between 12 and 20 men in dormitories that compare not unfavourably with those of a white boarding school . . . In some compounds the beds have concrete sides and tops as well so that men can only enter them by crawling in at one end.”

Migratory labour is also firmly entrenched in agriculture, though because of the absence of adequate statistics it is difficult to determine the exact proportion. Pay and conditions vary considerably, but at the lower end of the scale are almost insupportably bad.

INDUSTRY

With the growth of industry in South Africa, the African presence in the towns has grown steadily throughout this century, but as a direct consequence of the pass laws and influx control, so has the proportion of migratory labour. Of Johannesburg's total African population of 716,000 in June 1971, the overall male/female ratio is 1.06 to 1. “However, if we look more closely at these statistics we find that of the 212,000 men between the ages of 20 and 59, only 51 per cent (108,000 including lodgers) are housed on a family basis. And of the 185,000 women in the same age-group, the proportion housed on a family basis is under two-thirds (64.7%) . . . One half of the black men working in Johannesburg do so on a migratory basis and of these migrants, only a small proportion, less than 10%, work on the gold mines”.

Wilson describes conditions in Dube hostel, housing over 6,000 migrants, only 5% of whom were contract labourers, the other 95 per cent staying indefinitely, irrespective of their marital status. “The overall impression of Dube hostel” says Wilson, “is one of men — predominantly urbanised and ‘detribalised’ — living their working lives in spartan barrack conditions on a basis that can only be described, in the words of a Sabra journal, as ‘tydelik permanent’ ” (temporarily permanent).

The figures for Johannesburg do not include Alexandra Township, where the Government is eliminating family dwellings and building massive, concentration-camp style hostels to house 60,000 men and women on a single basis only. Dr. Wilson also supplies details of

developments in the other main urban centres which follow a similar pattern, demonstrating the Government's determination to base economic development more and more on the use of migratory labour. If the wages and conditions of migratory workers in the towns are bad, those of their families left behind in the homelands are infinitely worse. The KwaZulu leader Chief Gatsha Buthelezi has described the Bantustans as "cesspools of poverty, ignorance and disease". He should know, as the population of KwaZulu rose by no less than 79% between 1960 and 1970, largely as a result of the Government's policy of "repatriating" the "surplus appendages" (i.e. the unemployed, old men, women and children) from the "White" towns and farms to bleak dormitory towns and re-settlement camps in the homelands where often neither land nor jobs are available.

HOMELANDS

Dr. Wilson also shows that "16 years after the Tomlinson Report and the implementation of the Bantustan policy, economic development in the Transkei had been totally insufficient to absorb the natural population increase, let alone to enable the Transkei to reduce the number of citizens who have to go to work elsewhere to earn a living . . . Of the economically active men whose homes and families are in the Transkei over half (53%) were during 1971 recruited for work in some other part of the South African economy, generally far from home. Moreover, of the men actually in wage employment at least 6 out of every 7 were oscillating migrants earning their living in the mines, cities, and white farms of the Republic".

One by one Dr. Wilson examines the Government's arguments in favour of migratory labour, and one by one he demolishes them with an impressive array of facts. He shows that migratory labour is economically expensive, hinders industrial and rural development, causes an inequitable distribution of income and creates unemployment. It destroys family life, causes illegitimacy, bigamy, prostitution and homosexuality. It degrades men and breeds corruption. It leads to drunkenness and violence and brings the law into disrepute. It spreads venereal disease, tuberculosis, beriberi and the diseases of malnutrition. It is cruel and inhuman and generates hatred amongst its victims.

Dr. Wilson also brings out another consequence of migratory labour which is not always appreciated – and that is that migratory labour is a danger not only to the South African people but also to the other African countries from whom the migrants are drawn.

“The total number of foreign black migrants at work in the economies of Rhodesia and South Africa in 1972 is estimated to be of the order of 840,000 of whom the vast majority are drawn from Malawi (33%), Mozambique (26%), and Lesotho (25%). The remainder come from Botswana (7%), Zambia (5%) and Swaziland (4%). Approximately three-quarters of these migrants (some 600,000 people) work in South Africa, where the mining industry alone absorbs 296,000 – approximately half of these foreign migrants. They constitute no less than 78% of the black labour force employed in the gold mining industry and the coal mines of the Transvaal . . . ”

Taking the case of Lesotho, which has about 200,000 of its citizens working as migrant labourers in South Africa, Wilson shows that the total earnings of these Lesotho migrants are substantially higher than Lesotho's gross domestic product. In 1965/66 Lesotho's gross domestic product at market prices was R40 million; whilst the total earnings of Lesotho migrants was R43 million. Not all this money is sent home, but remittances by migrants amounted to 20% of Lesotho's national income.

FOREIGN NATIVES

Summing up the situation with regard to non-South African migrants, Wilson says:

“We may conclude that their presence in South Africa has long been a vital factor in the development of the economy. The mutual dependence between South Africa and these areas varies from country to country but the former High Commission territories together with Mozambique and Malawi have strong links with South Africa which will not easily be broken without substantial economic damage being inflicted particularly on the countries from which the oscillating migrants come. The system has operated for so long and involved such a large proportion of the economically active population that the economies of these five countries have, with the possible exception of Swaziland, grown in such a manner that they will, for the foreseeable future, be part and parcel of the single economy of South Africa”.

Central to Dr. Wilson's argument is the thesis that the economic colour bar and migratory labour mutually reinforce one another. "So long as South Africa continues to pursue the twin goals of Separate Development and economic growth – so long will the system of migratory labour remain a central feature of the economy. Far from withering away, it will continue to expand. And its maintenance will depend increasingly not on the balance of economic pressures but on the force of law". Between 1948, when the Nationalists came to power, and 1962 the number of convictions under the pass laws more than doubled from 176,000 to 385,000. By 1968 the number of prosecutions under the pass laws had risen to 694,000.

Dr. Wilson concludes his book by discussing the rival theories for ending migratory labour canvassed by the White political parties: 1. separate development based on the development of the Bantustans as advocated by the Nationalist Party; and 2. the acceptance of the permanent urbanization of the African worker as envisaged in one form or another by the Fagan Commission, the United and Progressive Parties and various brands of liberals. He convincingly shows that the Nationalist alternative simply doesn't work – decentralization and border industries on the one hand do not reduce the need for migratory labour and on the other hinder the economic development of the homelands.

Wilson therefore opts for integration, and suggests various ways in which the African influx into the towns could be controlled so as not to cause disruption and conflict.

THE SYSTEM

It is here that the shortcomings of Wilson's analysis are glaringly exposed. Nowhere does he challenge the existence of the capitalist system which has flourished on the basis of cheap migratory labour. Nowhere does he even show awareness of the relationship between profits and pass laws. The changes which he envisages presuppose the continuation of the present basic relationship of employers and employees to the means of production, even though his book is one of the most damning indictments of the workings of capitalism which has yet been published in South Africa.

His last question to the reader is: "Unless action is taken now does the evidence not suggest that the consequences of the migrant system will ravage South Africa?" The answer of the oppressed black masses of South Africa is: the migrant system, which is the weapon the ruling class have used to control and exploit our labour, has already ravaged South Africa. The reforms Wilson advocates will not end our exploitation at the hands of the Chamber of Mines, the farmers and industrialists; they will merely alter the form of exploitation which will be imposed on us by the white racists who rule our country at the point of the gun. Minor tinkering with the capitalist system is not enough. The whole edifice must be destroyed, and a new social and economic system built on the basis set out in the Freedom Charter adopted at the Congress of the People at Kliptown in 1955. The South African Communist Party would add that this is but the first step on the road to socialism which is the only system capable of ending for ever the exploitation of man by man.

One last point to note is that Wilson addresses his whole appeal to whites only. "Whites still have the opportunity to take steps to ease this socio-economic transition for the welfare of all", he says in support of his scheme of reforms. But today the dynamic impetus for change in South Africa is coming from the blacks. As time passes, what the whites want will become more and more irrelevant unless they show, not through their words but through their actions, that they are prepared to work and fight for a society without any divisions based on class or colour.

Z. Nkosi

AN AFRICAN REVOLUTIONARY'S HANDBOOK

Africa on the New Road, by Pyotr Manchka. Novosti Press Agency Publishing House, Moscow, 1972.

This hard-hitting Soviet publication is a valuable addition to the literature of the African Revolution. Its 180-odd pages are packed with hard facts and useful information, but this is no academic treatise. Its author, Pyotr Manchka, well known for many years to African

fighters for freedom, makes no claim to impartiality. He is an ardent Communist, a firm upholder of our cause and of Soviet-African friendship. He writes not as an onlooker but as a participant in Africa's struggle against imperialism and colonialism; for national independence and social progress.

The starting point of the book is the triumphant march of the African revolution and the collapse of the system of colonial slavery under the impact of the national liberation movement, which is 'second in importance only to the emergence of the world socialist system.' The sweeping advance of the African independence movement is summed up: 'when the United Nations Organisation was founded in 1945 its 51 member states included only four formally independent African states. Today, Africa has 41 national states,' all of which belong to the O.A.U. and the U.N. 'This has tipped the balance of forces in the world against imperialism.'

However, the degree of independence secured by the African states varies. Manchka divides them into three groups: (i) those (such as Egypt, Algeria, Tanzania) whose people have chosen the non-capitalist way towards socialism; (ii) those (like Gabon, Liberia and Malawi) whose governments have opted for capitalism and whose economies are dominated by foreign monopolies; add (iii) those (in which the author includes Kenya, Senegal, Ruanda and Burundi) which 'remain undecided' and are characterised by a struggle between anti-imperialist and pro-capitalist forces.

Special emphasis is laid on the remaining areas of colonialism and racialism, particularly the Portuguese colonies, South Africa, Zimbabwe and Namibia.

In his description of the African countries the author pays careful attention to the role of the various classes and social strata in the struggle against external imperialism and colonialism and internal reaction, feudalism, tribalism and other reactionary tendencies. In the following section of the book he presents a lucid survey of those forces which stand in the forefront of the revolutionary process, in the first place the Communist and revolutionary democratic parties of Africa. In addition to the Marxist-Leninist Parties of South Africa, Nigeria, Senegal, Algeria, Morocco, Sudan, Reunion, Lesotho and Tunisia – all of which have to operate in varying degrees of illegality – the author provides his readers with a brief survey of the history, policies and

activities of the authentic liberation movements of Southern Africa and the Portuguese colonies.

South African readers in particular will appreciate the generous allocation of his limited space Comrade Manchka has devoted to the situation in our country, to the history and policy of our Communist Party and the allied liberation movement centred in the African National Congress, and the high estimation in which the author holds the S.A.C.P. and its programme. "All basic provisions of the Programme are based on the principles of Marxism-Leninism and the documents of international meetings of Communist and Workers' Parties.' This journal, too, receives high praise: '*The African Communist*. . . is performing its noble task of spreading Marxist-Leninist ideas not only in South Africa but also throughout the entire continent.'

Attention is drawn to the disruptive activities of the Maoists and various 'pro-Peking dissentient organisations' in various parts of Africa.

A brief concluding section reiterates the firm, consistent and determined policy of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, from Lenin's time up to the present, to support and assist all African and other oppressed peoples who fight imperialism, and to build firm friendly ties with the Communist and revolutionary democratic parties of Africa. 'The Soviet Union has always supported and will continue to support the people fighting for their freedom from exploitation and national oppression.'

Regrettably a few mistakes (perhaps the result of over-hasty translation) have been allowed to make their way into the English version of this text. The late W.H. Andrews is reported as having been elected secretary of the 'Congress of Non-European Trade Unions' in 1925 (it was the South African Trade Union Congress and in no sense 'non-European.') And the Congress Alliance is misleadingly rendered as a 'Union of Congresses'. Perhaps these slips will be ironed out in a new edition.

Indeed it is very much hoped that there will be more editions, for Pyotr Manchka whose deep feeling and respect for our people shines through this booklet, has produced a true African Revolutionary's Handbook which deserves the widest circulation all over the Continent.

A. Lerumo

A FEIT WITHOUT FACT

“Urban Revolt in South Africa 1960-64”, by Jack Feit, Northern University Press, 1971.

In the late 1960s an ambitious young student at Witwatersrand University knocked together a thesis about the African National Congress based on the evidence produced at the Treason Trial. Whether it was his covert racism, his biased reliance on police and prosecution allegations in that famous trial where even a South African court was obliged ultimately to throw out the charge of treason – whatever the reason, his thesis was rejected by the University.

Undeterred, he submitted a modified version to the even more establishment-oriented University of South Africa. There his supervisors had the good political sense to realise that whatever the academic limitations of the work, its message was a comforting one for white supremacists, and that virtue covered a multitude of sins.

Inspired by this success, the young Edward Feit got his work published by a very respectable English publisher, the Oxford University Press, who kindly put its meagre 73 pages out in cheap paperback form to be more widely available, under the interesting title: *“South Africa – The Dynamics of the African National Congress”*. With a book behind him, there was no stopping the new expert in the study of the South African opposition. Another book followed, posts in American universities, and now a third book: *“Urban Revolt in South Africa 1960-64”*.

It comes as no surprise to anybody familiar with Feit’s previous work to find that once again he has based himself largely on evidence in court-cases – this time, of course, not the evidence of activities of a public, legal mass movement such as entertained the court for over 4 years in the Treason Trial, but the evidence of secret, underground organizations, adduced by physically and morally broken renegades, or by men on trial for their lives, many of whom have now spent ten years or more in prison, and some of whom were executed for their part in the liberation struggle.

The naive reader might welcome the first book to deal mainly with the organisational problems of the formation of Umkonto we Sizwe, the relationships between MK, the Communist Party and the ANC, and

the discussions and procedures whereby a legal mass movement, driven into illegality, adapted to the new situation, went over to armed struggle, and developed from limited sabotage towards guerilla combat. It was a fascinating and exciting period in the liberation struggle in South Africa, rich in heroic struggle, rich in lessons for the future, a period when the masses were on the move, and the ground trembled with the shock waves of great and rapid change. Surely practically anything serious written about this period must be of the greatest interest to any member or supporter of the liberation movement?

Interest – maybe. Value . . . Who can find value in the stream of lies, calumny, filth and distortion that are reproduced in this book? Basically, this is nothing more than an academic version of the cheap efforts we have seen in the past by journalists and renegades like Bruno Mtolo, or spies like Gerard Ludi, to vilify the revolutionary movement, set the CP against the ANC, the leaders against the rank-and-file, the military against the political, and to bury the people's heroes under a pile of racist and reactionary propaganda. So warped is the source material that Feit relies on, that only those who actually participated in the events he describes would be able to sort out fact from half-truth, error, and distortion,

Back in 1962, Feit ended his first book with these words:

“Whatever the future may hold for it, the African National Congress is at present a spent force in South Africa. Its downfall seems complete.”

Unabashed by that monumental miscalculation, Mr Feit has now produced a detailed and substantial book (some 350 pages) about the same ANC during the very years when its ‘downfall’ was supposed to have been ‘complete’. It becomes clear that he is not in the least worried by his own inconsistencies, because his main purpose is to make his own, academic contribution to the political destruction of the South African Communist Party and the African National Congress. Fortunately, what the South African government with all its resources has repeatedly failed to achieve, Mr. Feit is even less likely to get away with.

A.T.

A CONFUSED TROTSKYITE INTELLECTUAL

Sudafrika vor der Revolution? by Franz J. T. Lee, Fischer Taschenbuch Verlag, Frankfurt am Main, 1973.

One of the chief tasks of the South African liberatory movement headed by the African National Congress has been the consistent endeavour to expose apartheid and to elaborate the policy, tactics and strategy of our own movement. Franz Lee's book does not belong to this kind of literature.

Who is Franz Lee? Born at Ficksburg in 1938, Franz Lee is a young South African who, because of the "extreme poverty of my parents" had to work on white farms to finance his education up to matric. In 1962 he obtained a West German scholarship to read philosophy and politics and in 1970 defended his doctoral dissertation on the influence of Trotskyism (and of course its opposite "Stalinism", that is the Communist Party of South Africa) in the national liberation movement of South Africa.

The book under review is an "improved" version of his thesis. His academic tutors included Ernst Bloch, a renegade who "escaped" from the German Democratic Republic in the fifties to become one of the "modern Marxists" who are hopelessly trying to convince the world about what Marx "really meant".

Lee was unable to get a democratic education either in South Africa or West Germany. What is worse, perhaps even tragic, is that in neither country did he come into contact with the democratic and revolutionary organisations, which are the carriers of the progressive and liberating ideas. A convinced Trotzkyist, Lee received his political baptism in this faith in Cape Town under the influence of Tabata, Neville Alexander and other preachers of this religion.

The book is supposed to serve "as a guide and a medium for the revolutionary socialist influence on the national liberation movement in South Africa and Namibia" (p. 17). But how does Lee think he will achieve this when he smears, slanders and throws dirt at the ANC, SACP, Soviet Union and the international communist movement? He writes for instance that in the 20's the Party was affiliated to the Comintern "and after Lenin's death it gradually became an instrument of the Soviet foreign policy. . ." (p. 90). These slanders are repeated

with an obstinacy worth of being put to better use.

Lee's book, which is nothing but propaganda for the Non-European Unity Movement, is not a very valuable contribution to historical knowledge of our movement. For an author who claims to give an historical analysis Franz Lee shows a remarkably poor sense of historicity and chronology. He seems to be completely ignorant of what is known as class-analysis. For instance, he talks of "boer feudal lords" although there is no historical evidence of the existence of feudalism as a socio-economic formation at any stage of South African history. This lack of a class-approach leads him to the absurd conclusion: ". . . in South Africa racial division is identical with class division" (p. 161/162). Lee could easily overcome his confusion by consulting Lenin on the definition of a class but the problem is that Lee hardly has a good word for Lenin who "built socialism in one country".

It is very strange that Lee does to some extent deal with Trotskyism in its international context but does not even mention the activities of the South African "Stalinists" — to use his phrase — in the Comintern and the international working-class movement. These were heroes like D.I. Jones, S. P. Bunting, Bill Andrews, Rebecca Bunting, J. La Guma, A. Nzula, Josie Mpama and to this list we may add J. Gumede. The omission by Lee of the activities of these South African revolutionaries — black and white — in the international working-class movement is probably due to his limited knowledge of the history of the Comintern.

Of course, Lee is doubly wrong when he writes that Gumede and La Guma joined the Party after 1928*. The fact is that La Guma was a Party member as early as 1925, while Gumede never joined the Party.

Lee's book is full of cliches, innuendos and cheap anti-communist slurs. It is not only superficial and ill-conceptualised but also an undigested, pretentious product of an incompetent beginner, neither systematic nor scholarly, revealing a confused and naive amateurism. The contradictions in the book are not just "mistakes" or "shortcomings" but a characteristic feature of the petty bourgeois intellectual who, though strongly anti-apartheid (at least in words) shivers at the thought of being "Overrun" by the black workers. The Trotzkyists, "now Left" or "uncommitted Left" and "modern marxists" find themselves on the horns of a dilemma.

Lee's book lacks even the normal human feeling for his "country-

men". He ridicules the people's martyrs, those sons and daughters of South Africa who laid down their lives in Wankie and other battles in Zimbabwe for the liberation of our people. Lee calls them "suicide commandoes" and lies:

"Within a month all the 500 guerillas were killed or arrested during the collision" (p. 163). Franz Lee, the University graduate, reluctant to identify himself body and soul with the masses and their struggles, decides to involve himself in intellectual acrobatics.

After reading Lee's book I could not escape the feeling that I had been listening for hours to a Saturday-afternoon-location-street-corner-gossip. So low can West German "scientific" research go and so dehumanising are its effects on the uncritical and politically-unschooled student like Dr. Franz John Tennyson Lee!

* p. 81 Footnote 41.

F. MELI



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THE LIBERATION OF ANGOLA

"In the Eye of the Storm: Angola's People", by Basil Davidson
(Longman £3.95).

The Agostinho Neto trail, like the Ho Chi Minh trail, is a logistics route that supplies a guerrilla army and a liberated population. It stretches over 2,000 miles from Dar Es Salaam, through the vastness of Tanzania, across the far-flung eastern and western sectors of Zambia, and into the remote eastern bushlands of Angola – up to eight weeks march from the frontier – where the vital supplies reach their final destination on the backs of porters.

"Soon enough", states Dr Neto, President of the Peoples' Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA), "we shall be able to motor them . . . In the end we'll need aircraft". Basil Davidson, who journeyed 300 miles into eastern Angola to write his book, adds: "Even in 1970 it is a forecast which sounds no longer quite unreal." Prospects are, as the guerrillas press westwards, that Dr Neto's trail will soon stretch across Africa, from the Indian to the Atlantic oceans!

The struggle to free Angola from Portuguese colonialism and the grip of imperialism is a bitter and bloody one. The MPLA's successes are even more impressive when viewed against the misfortunes of the early 1960's, when Angola's tragedy was being proclaimed in the gutter press of the West, and the hopes of her patriots were being drowned in a sea of confusion and blood. Most of the facts of this struggle have been largely concealed or distorted, and Basil Davidson's book provides an invaluable insight into Angola's people and history, and the building of the MPLA as the genuine spearhead of liberation and national unity. The manner in which the MPLA has overcome tremendous difficulties and disadvantages, not to mention tragic setbacks, and yet succeeded in building a national movement and launching an armed struggle that has taken firm root among the people, is worthy of special attention and study.

BIRTH OF THE MPLA

The task of building a revolutionary, national unity, is the central problem. Angola is a huge country, twice the size of France, with a

population of six million, 300,000 of whom are whites. The African population is composed of dozens of different ethnic and tribal groups, cruelly exploited and organised in an economy directed by whites, and pressed into a state of deprivation by the colonial barriers and constraints. In its founding manifesto, in 1956, the MPLA declared:

“Portuguese colonialism will not fall without a fight, and this is why Angola’s people can liberate themselves only by revolutionary struggle. This struggle can be won only by a united front of all Angola’s anti-imperialist forces, irrespective of their colour, social situation, religious beliefs or individual preferences: it can be won only by a great movement of liberation.”

The necessary vanguard capable of calling this national movement into being had begun to emerge in the immediate post-war years, as it did elsewhere in Africa, when the deadly stranglehold of colonialism was beginning to weaken. The MPLA grew out of clandestine discussion groups and cultural circles centred in Luanda (as in Lourenco Marques and Bissau) and Lisbon (where the future leaders of MPLA, PAIGC and FRELIMO were to share common experiences and knowledge). Among the founders of MPLA were Dr Neto, who had already undergone a spell of imprisonment in Lisbon for his active participation with the Portuguese left; Amilcar Cabral, who was working in Angola at the time; and Deolinda de Almeida, who founded the MPLA’s women’s organisation. That the leadership was an educated group – largely *assimilados* – was not surprising, since, in Davidson’s words, “only they could break through the barriers of silence imposed by Portuguese colonialism and measure the general plight”. The militants found an audience among the “*petit bourgeois*” *assimilados* who were pushed to them by a lack of reform, by discrimination and repression; but they above all sought to reach the masses, upon whose active support everything would depend. They went into Luanda’s slums, crowded with the people of the bush, and conducted clandestine literacy classes. Activists were recruited and sent back to organise in the villages. Leaflets were circulated urging the people to learn and to prepare for an open struggle against oppression. Marxist ideas were an important strand in the developing theory.

PORTUGUESE RESPONSE

Portuguese Colonialism, panic-stricken at the retreat of the other colonial powers, reacted to the first stirrings of national reawakening in her colonies in the most brutally repressive way. Events in these colonies all followed a strikingly similar pattern where stiffening repression and discrimination, and the rising temperature of protest, fused to form an explosion. Already in 1953, 1,000 plantation workers had been slain on the island of Sao Thome. August 1959 saw the massacre of the Bissau dockworkers — 50 killed and over 100 wounded. The end of 1960 saw the butchering of 1,000 villagers in Northern Mozambique. In Angola the Portuguese, petrified at the convulsions taking place in the neighbouring Belgian Congo, hunted down their opponents and swept them into the prisons, where heavy sentences, beatings, torture and executions were the order of the day. In June 1960, when Dr Neto was arrested in Luanda, the people from his birthplace demonstrated in protest and were consequently shot down; 30 were killed and 200 were injured. The next day troops returned to neighbouring villages and shot more people. This was only the beginning of the story. In January 1961 over 1,000 villagers in the central plateau were killed by troops when plantation workers revolted. These were the troop reinforcements to whom the Portuguese Defence Minister was to declare that they were “not going to fight against human beings but against savages and wild beasts.” In February 1961 Luanda’s African population, outraged at Portuguese brutality, stormed out of the slums and attacked the central prison in an attempt to release the political prisoners. A number of policemen were killed and in a bloodlust for revenge Luanda whites, aided by the police, invaded the slums and began killing Africans. Whilst the corpses mounted, and the unfortunates in the gaols were being butchered, eyewitnesses saw Africans being hurled off the tops of high buildings.

Lacking in the experience of clandestine politics the MPLA leadership was all but wiped out, and the survivors could only watch from exile as Luanda erupted. The result of Portuguese repression was the same in Angola, Bissau and Mozambique: it aroused the hatred of the indigenous people, and showed that peaceful resistance was futile.

UPA TREACHERY

Even before Luanda, the MPLA had been prodded to embark on violent action by, among others, some leaders of the Algerian FLN, who were ready to support the Angolan cause. But the MPLA exiles held back, believing that the time was premature and that they needed more time for political preparation. Accordingly, crucial external backing was switched to a very different Angolan movement, Roberto Holden's UPA (Union of the Peoples of Angola), which was based in the Congo. As Frantz Fanon, highly influential within FLN circles, is said to have explained: "I know Holden is inferior to the MPLA men. But Holden is ready to begin, and they are not. And I am convinced that what is necessary is to begin, and that an Angolan revolutionary movement will be forged in the ensuing struggle." It is worth punctuating Fanon's judgement with Davidson's own comment: "It was the Guevarist line applied to Africa, and it proved terribly mistaken."

The UPA, despite its name, was essentially a separatist organisation, basing itself on the Kongo people of northern Angola, and inculcating a loyalty to the conservative traditions of the old Kongo hierarchy. Holden is the nephew of a leading Kongo king-maker, and the initial aim was the restoration of Kongo sovereignty. Finding this idea rejected as a tribal anachronism in the rest of Africa, Holden attempted to project his movement in a more modern light, but, despite the trappings, it has remained, in Davidson's judgement, "a pressure-group designed to induce the Portuguese to admit reforms, and capable of operating only within the range of Kongo cultural loyalties." Its record and that of its successor – GRAE (Holden's Revolutionary Government in Exile) – certainly bears out this view.

In March 1961, one month after the Luanda uprising, Holden was ready to begin; albeit hastily and seeking to act in a startling way. An uprising was launched in northern Angola, led by UPA men who had crossed the border from the Congo. Thousands of Kongo farmers and contract workers participated in the revolt, and such was the fury of their onslaught that Portuguese authority almost disappeared. But there were no clear ideas nor plans of development, and no efforts to build guerrilla bases for a war which could only be a protracted one. The enterprise degenerated into a confusion of messianic dreams and revenge, with European non-combatants, as well as educated Africans

and mulattos – who were regarded as Portuguese agents – being hunted down and killed. It took the Portuguese several months to re-establish control, unleashing as they did a reign of terror which accounted for 30,000 dead and hundreds of thousands of Africans fleeing to the Congo. Portuguese rage was particularly directed at any African of education; the assimilado community was decimated.

An even uglier side to the tragedy was the murder of MPLA fighters by UPA men. As the dust was settling, Holden's chief of staff resigned and issued a statement in which he charged:

“In all aspects the armed struggle unleashed in the north of Angola is a real fratricidal struggle. A figure approaching 8,000 Angolans were savagely massacred by tribalist elements of UPA. . . This inhuman massacre effected by Angolans against Angolans is born of blind tribalism which presents itself in four aspects: religious, linguistic, ethnic and ideological . . . [Among those thus killed] we must distinguish the case of Commander Thomas Ferreira and his squad of 21 men sent into the interior by the MPLA . . . [they] were captured by UPA militants and barbarously hanged.”

CONGO SETBACK

Events in the Congo, too, were running against the MPLA. After the foul murder of Patrice Lumumba and the sordid triumph of neo-colonialism, the atmosphere in Kinshasa (where Angolan exiles were gathering) became distinctly hostile towards the MPLA, which was regarded as too radical. In contrast Holden and his friends were viewed as “good Kongo nationalists” and received the enthusiastic support of the Adoula-Mobutu grouping and their American backers. Holden, enjoying plenty of Western press publicity and patronage, also managed to gain the support of numerous African states as well as official recognition from the OAU (this was only withdrawn in July 1971). The MPLA could not have been in more difficult straits. Inside the Congo they were harassed and suppressed. The border was closed to them and they could not send reinforcements to their units in the south. Their Kinshasa offices were raided, their work amongst the refugees prohibited, their members hounded by the police and thrown into gaol where some, like the brilliant Deolinda de Almeida, were later to perish tragically from the most brutal treatment.

Then, late in 1963, when favourable political changes occurred in

neighbouring Brazzaville, the remnants of the MPLA leadership slipped across the river to a more reliable sanctuary. They had been joined by Dr Neto, who had succeeded in escaping from Portuguese captivity.

A CHANCE TO GROW

From Brazzaville the MPLA survivors set about the task of rebuilding their organisation. The overriding concern was to re-establish the movement within Angola. Only those with real courage and conviction remained and they started afresh with a conference in January 1964, which analysed mistakes, drew on experience and launched a new programme of work in a systematic way.

Efforts to find common ground with GRAE were constantly spurned by Holden, and with northern Angola's border barred to them the MPLA activists had to find other ways of access to the people. They therefore initially centred their guerrilla activity inside the tiny Cabinda enclave, which abuts on the Congo/Brazzaville Republic and is virtually cut off from the rest of Angola; lying, as it does, on the northern side of the river Congo. The value of the Cabinda base was that it provided the MPLA guerrillas with a "live" training ground; and experience gained there was to prove of great value later.

The independence of Zambia in October 1964 came to the MPLA's aid; for Zambia's leaders were African patriots and eastern Angola was opened up for liberation. These eastern lands would not only provide an internal base but also a route to the centre and west; above all they would give the movement its chance to grow.

With the opening up of the eastern front in 1965 the MPLA advanced from a position of weakness to a position of strength. It was clear from the disasters of 1961 that a rising without correct political preparation and organisation of supplies — especially arms — could only play into Portuguese hands. The need for at least a minimal network of political co-operation with the people, and the steady — if small — flow of military supplies (it was only the visible presence of arms, and not the promise, that impressed the villagers), were found to be essential factors for the successful launching of the armed struggle. Moving from political preparation, ready for a war of long duration, the MPLA launched its first actions.

PEOPLE'S WAR

The MPLA is conducting a true people's war, with the mobilisation of the active support of the population. Progress by January 1968 enabled the MPLA to transfer its leadership from Brazzaville into the interior of Angola. Political growth by 1971 has seen the "solid implantation inside the country" called for by the militants' conference of 1964.

Basil Davidson found an intimate relationship between the movement and the people. There are 5,000 freedom fighters in the eastern and central districts and a further 2,000 in the north-west, tying down 55,000 Portuguese troops. The cadre element have received their training in the Soviet Union.

The war is chiefly a battle to control the population. The Portuguese concentrate on the terror bombing of villages in liberated areas, following the pattern of the Americans in Vietnam, and herd people into strategic hamlets. The guerrillas harass the Portuguese convoys and camps, demolish their lines of communication, and prevent the Portuguese from filling the hamlets. They liberate the people, supply them with arms, and form self-defence units. When the Portuguese launch their seek-and-destroy missions, with their NATO helicopters and bombers, the villagers and the guerrilla units melt into the forests; in the end the side wins which has freedom of movement on the ground.

The MPLA has emerged as a movement with a multi-ethnic composition, embodying the aspirations of the early 1960's. In the liberated zones the structure of a new Angola is rising; in the committees, schools, villages and fighting units, the old barriers and divisions are being broken down; men and women are struggling together as equals; the mulatto classification has vanished; racism and tribalism are fought against as ideas of the enemy. According to Dr Neto:

"If there exists in some of our combatants the idea of a war against the white man, it is necessary that it be immediately substituted by the idea of a war against colonialism and imperialism; a war against oppression, for the liberty and for the dignity of all men in the world . . . We must, therefore, look for a political line that will save us from racialism and tribalism, and from the mistakes that were committed in those countries where independence came earlier and by other means."

TOWARDS TOMORROW

As in Mozambique and Bissau, the process that began in Angola as a struggle for independence from Portuguese Colonialism is deepening into a genuine, anti-imperialist revolution, and with the MPLA (as with FRELIMO and PAIGC) rests the possibility of effecting major socio-political transformations in the future. The revolutionary perspective of the MPLA is not only to kick out the Portuguese but also to build a really independent Angola.

Davidson develops a most interesting thesis on the question of reformism (which is neo-colonialism's strategy) or revolution, that is facing independent Africa and the national liberation movements. Whether in those countries still under colonial rule, or in the newly independent states, the central problem is one of the mobilisation of the masses and their creative involvement in the-historic tasks. It is on this that the progress of Africa depends.

The MPLA managed to survive and grow because it came to rely on the participation of the people. The movement succeeded in uniting the people who now regard it as their own. As a veteran guerrilla, Petrov ("they gave me that name in Bulgaria because they couldn't pronounce my real name"), declared to Davidson: "We are building this unity. We have become a national movement. There's nothing now to compare with the difficulties of 1961 when we began."

The rest is not plain sailing. The Portuguese, faced by imminent defeat, are coming with their reformist offerings, and, where these are contemptuously rejected, resort to assassinations and attempts to subvert their adversaries. In the wings stand the likes of Roberto Holden, his "government" in a state of demoralisation and decay, "waiting to profit from a victory that others would have won." The Portuguese, according to Neto, are trying to find someone who will pose as a nationalist inside the country.

The experience of the MPLA and other revolutionary movements has shown that only they can succeed, no matter the odds, whilst separatist, reformist movements are bound to fail. As Davidson points out: "The liberation movements in the Portuguese colonies, remote and relatively unimportant as they may appear at first sight, acquire [in their example] their full meaning and historical stature. They have [had] to seek the revolutionary alternative in its most direct and difficult form."

The grave of Portuguese Colonialism is being dug in her African possessions. This is a process that poses chilling implications for the racists of Southern Africa, and for the imperialists. For this reason all African patriots must regard the struggle of the MPLA, FRELIMO and PAIGC as their own!

Alexander Sibeko

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RACISM AND IMPERIALISM

Racism and Human Survival – Lessons of Nazi Germany for Today's World, by Claude Lightfoot, International Publishers, New York, 1973.

The author, a black American revolutionary and a leading member of the Communist Party of the USA attempts in this book to prove that it is not biological but environmental factors which determine human attitudes. Like all good Marxists, he combines theory and practice, by using as his test cases the Socialist German Democratic Republic and the Capitalist Federal Republic of Germany. As the author says:

To work for a program to combat racist ideology, one must look into its economic and political background. One must know who benefits from it and why. This is fundamental to an understanding of the conditions required to overcome it. (p.45).

In Part I of the book the author demolishes the liberal-bourgeois notions of the rise of fascism and racism in Germany during the nineteen thirties. He correctly and clearly demonstrates that "Hitler was not representative of every German; he was representative of all that was rotten in the social system of capitalism." (p.24).

Lightfoot then analyses the various factors which made it possible for Hitler's Nationalist Socialist Party to come into power with the aid and assistance of local monopolies and International imperialism, especially US imperialism.

During this time the forces of socialism and progress were also a powerful force in Germany. But as Lightfoot shows, in the clash between the two social systems, capitalism and socialism, in 1933 (moreover, at a time of crisis for modern capitalism), the Social Democratic Party considered its alliance with the military and the bourgeoisie more important than an alliance with the communists. Does this not remind one about the activities of some sections of the British Labour Party on purely British issues and on International questions such as the sale of arms to South Africa, the sell-out of the African people in Zimbabwe and Namibia and their equivocations in Vietnam?

In Part II Lightfoot looks at the development of the GDR and how a new people have arisen under the leadership of the Socialist Unity

Party from the ashes of racism and fascism – an economic, political, educational and cultural advancement which occurred in the face of tremendous opposition from the Bonn Government and their imperialist allies. There is also an interesting account of the foreign policies of the GDR in relation to Vietnam and Africa. Of course, as revolutionaries and militants of the National Liberation movement we are fully aware of the unselfish and disinterested aid given to our struggle by the people and government of the GDR. Similar assistance is also given to the other liberation movements fighting in southern Africa. As an eye-witness of a Portuguese attack on the fighting forces of FRELIMO reports:

I found many such examples of the solidarity of the GDR with the fighting population of Mozambique – ranging from clothing and aluminium utensils to woollen blankets and tents. Samora Machel told me: 'The GDR is helping us morally, politically and materially, as well. We value this here in the liberated areas, especially. We look upon the GDR not only as a friend but as our direct ally.' (p.168).

Unfortunately, Lightfoot does not analyse in depth the growing relationship between Independent Africa and the GDR. As he points out there are already eleven African states which have recognised the GDR in spite of the threats and bullying tactics of the Bonn Government.

In Part III, the author contrasts the GDR with the policies, practices and ideology of the Bonn Government and the major institutions in West Germany. Lightfoot points out that even today in West Germany:

In most textbooks now in use, Nazi crimes are not recounted at all and, if discussed, are played down until the picture is entirely false. The loss of the war is explained away in order to save the prestige of the military. The failure to win the war is attributed to bad preparation, and even bad luck! Such is the nature of the educational system. (p.196).

The author also gives a vivid account of some of West Germany's activities and intrigues in Africa. For example, not many of our own people are aware of the complicity and active participation of the Bonn Government in the aggression against Guinea in November 1970 by Portuguese mercenaries which was aimed at overthrowing the progressive government of Sekou Toure.

However, it is a pity that Lightfoot does not bring out very clearly the close collaboration of the Bonn Government with the white minority regime in our country. For his economic, political and military collaboration is also between neo-Fascist elements in West Germany and their counterparts in our country.

This book must be read by all anti-racist and anti-fascist militants and revolutionaries. For it not only demonstrates how fascism can grow, but also how it can and must be fought whenever and wherever it rears its ugly head.

In the final analysis, the lesson, as Lightfoot so correctly says, is:

A contrast between the roles of the two German states in the struggle against or for racism also demonstrates that racism is not hereditary, but is a by-product of a bad environment. If you change the environment, then you get one result. If you fail to do so things remain the same. In this connection, the basic difference is the environment capitalism engenders and the type created by socialism. Thus, the final solution to free the world from racist ideology and from imperialist wars is to build a socialist society. But even short of socialism, advanced progressive-minded people can make substantial progress against racism and imperialism. A good example is the growing differences between the people in West Germany and the ruling circles. (p.233).

A.T.

LASTING IMPRESSIONS

In the Fog of the Seasons' End, by Alex la Guma, Heinemann Educational Books, Price £1.75.

A new book by Alex la Guma is something to be eagerly anticipated. From the appearance of *A Walk in the Night*, his first book, in 1964, it has been apparent that this author has a very unusual range of qualities. He has a wonderful sense of visual things. Places, especially poor and dingy places, instantly spring to vivid life when he describes them. He has a deep humanity – a mixture of compassion, affection and respect for all those who suffer at the hands of the brutal and the insensitive. And against these latter he is kindled to a fine flame of rage. Finally, few writers express in their books such a deep sense of political commitment, without preaching or speechifying.

All these qualities are to be found in Alex la Guma's newest novel, *In the Fog of the Seasons' End*. This book has an ambitious subject – the underground struggle in South Africa. It has two heroes: one is the coloured man, Beukes, engaged in the distribution of illegal leaflets, and other political tasks, who has to leave his much-loved wife and child in order to do this secret work. The book ends with him having narrowly escaped capture by the police, seeing off three freedom fighters who are leaving for military training outside the country. The other hero is the African, Elias, who heroically refuses to talk to the Special Branch, and is eventually tortured to death – a profoundly harrowing and powerful piece of writing, this.

These two characters move against a background of marvellously observed places and people of the Cape. Alex la Guma has an almost Dickensian gift of creating an impression of a person through his habits and mannerisms – Tommy who is obsessed with old popular songs, and lives in a kind of dream world created by them, but is still prepared to shelter Beukes in his one room, is a fine example of this. There is also a vivid description of a Sharpeville-like shooting, and the various people who innocently come to their deaths in it: this scene is built up with wonderful care and patience.

If there are criticisms to be made of Alex la Guma, they centre round the fact that, in this novel as in his other books, what remain with the reader are impressions – extraordinarily vivid and lasting impressions – rather than the overall sense of a structure, of a whole, which one gets from a book which truly succeeds as a novel.

Sometimes I wish that Alex la Guma would write, like Gorki and like Ezekiel Mphahlele (whose first non-fiction book, about his childhood in a Johannesburg township was more successful than his subsequent fiction) an autobiography in which he could use his wonderful gifts for creating a flow of minor characters and small events without having to attempt the novel form which perhaps is not ideally suited to his gifts. But this is mere speculation. What is certain is that *In the Fog of the Seasons' End* is politically inspiring, emotionally satisfying and extremely well written.

Diana Wood