

The African Communist

NUMBER 28 FIRST QUARTER 1967

REPORT ON THE CAIRO SEMINAR



PRICE

Southern Africa: 10 cents. Elsewhere in Africa: 1s. All other countries, 1s. 6d., or equivalent in local currency

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THE AFRICAN COMMUNIST

*Published quarterly in the interests of
African solidarity, and as a forum for
Marxist-Leninist thought throughout
our Continent, by the
South African Communist Party*

No. 28 First Quarter 1967

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History was made in Cairo last October when the journals World Marxist Review and Al Talia (Vanguard) jointly convened an exchange of views among leading African statesmen and theoreticians on burning problems of the African Revolution. Our report outlines the themes dealt with, summarises the opening papers and highlights some of the points made in this stimulating discussion.

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Thousands of South Africa's finest sons and daughters are suffering in the hellish jails of the Vorster regime because of their part in the fight for freedom. Some of the political prisoners, like Nelson Mandela, Walter Sisulu and Bram Fischer have become internationally famous personalities. In this article, the writer pays tribute to others who may not be so well known to readers outside South Africa.

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Editorial Notes:

'Confrontation' in Southern Africa

THE OFFICIAL BRITISH account of the Wilson-Smith negotiations (*Rhodesia—Documents Relating to Proposals for a Settlement—1966*; Cmnd. 3171) makes well-nigh incredible reading. Here were two Europeans, neither with any mandate from the people affected, purporting to draw up 'Independence Constitution' under which 4 million Africans are to be governed in an African country. That Wilson should have met Smith at all—the man he himself had branded as a rebel and a traitor—and for such a purpose—was in itself an ignoble surrender. That the two of them should have actually agreed on a draft 'Constitution' acceptable to Smith and his racist colleagues was still worse.

The Constitution which emerged from H.M.S. *Tiger* is permeated through and through with the spirit of arrogant white chauvinism. It provided for a Legislature of two houses; the Assembly and the Senate. The Assembly would be composed of sixty-seven members. Thirty-three of these would be elected by voters on the 'A' roll. To qualify for this roll a voter would have to possess educational and property qualifications which are unattainable for most Africans—so it is guaranteed that there would be a big majority of white settlers on this roll. As if this were not enough there would be a further seventeen

'Reserved European seats'. (We don't know how Mr. Wilson would propose to justify 'European seats' in an African Parliament!) There would be only seventeen seats for which Africans could vote—the 'B' roll, open to Africans over thirty years of age (why so old, Mr. Wilson?) who 'satisfy citizenship and residence qualifications'. That is seventeen out of sixty-seven seats for 4 million Africans; fifty seats for 250,000 white settlers, most of them fairly recent arrivals. The Senate would be even more blatantly racialistic; twelve 'European' seats; eight 'African' and six Chiefs—the Chiefs being in effect government appointees.

That such an unsavoury document should be acceptable to Smith and his gang—self-incriminated racialists and believers in apartheid—is hardly surprising. That it should have been negotiated by Harold Wilson strips him and his colleagues naked of their pretences to socialism, democracy and freedom from race prejudice. Had the '*Tiger* paper' been accepted by the bitter-ender fascists in Salisbury it would have wrecked the 'Commonwealth'—and a good riddance too. As it is it is a standing record of the depths to which bourgeois ideology and finance-capitalism have dragged the British Labour Party leadership.

The *Tiger* agreement virtually handed over on a plate to Smith and the settlers all they had demanded—'legal' independence under white minority rule. They would have been 'recognised' by Britain, the United States and their NATO allies; trade and investments would have boomed; fear of African advancement would have been allayed by constitutional provisions postponing majority rule for a generation. Their rejection of this handsome offer seems inexplicable. Even their best friends—for example *Die Burger*, pro-Government Cape Town daily—query the wisdom of persisting with Rhodesian 'independence'—an 'empty shell'.

But this 'inexplicable' stubbornness becomes more understandable when one considers the two factors which no doubt weigh most heavily with the desperate adventurers and gamblers who proclaim themselves the 'government' of Rhodesia. Firstly, they understand better than anyone how perilously narrow is the basis of support in the country for their regime of terror; how dangerously little in the way of apparent retreat or concessions would suffice to topple their police state in ruins and bring about the triumph of Zimbabwe democracy. Secondly, their whole experience before and after 'U.D.I.' has convinced them that Britain and the 'West' have far too great and profitable a stake in the maintenance of white supremacy, cheap labour and super-profits in Southern Africa to risk a serious showdown. Wilson told Smith that if—after returning to formal legality under a new

constitution—there was a second illegal declaration of independence, his November 1966 undertaking not to use force ‘would no longer apply’. Smith answered that ‘this statement did not influence him and his colleagues. He believed these threats to be of no consequence’. (Op. cit. p. 55.)

For exactly the same reason, the gangsters in Salisbury remain totally unmoved by threats of further ‘sanctions’ by the United Nations or anyone else. They are quite confident that such sanctions, mandatory or otherwise, and whether or not they include oil, will as in the past be openly ignored by their suppliers, and in the first place by the Republic of South Africa; events have proved their confidence to be fully justified. Forced by African and world opinion to raise the question of sanctions against the illegal Salisbury regime at the United Nations, the British representatives were placed in the ignominious position of battling tooth and nail to see that the Republic should be allowed to defy such sanctions without penalty—in other words, to ensure that they would be completely ineffective. The very Labour men who, not long ago, when they were in opposition, were supporting sanctions against apartheid South Africa, were flagrantly and publicly using every possible manoeuvre to see that in no circumstances should there be any ‘confrontation’ with the apartheid regime. Inevitably, the United Nations decision has proved as utterly toothless as the Smith gang anticipated. The French Government has blatantly ignored the United Nations by agreeing to a barter deal which will absorb half the Rhodesian tobacco crop. The United States Government is equally keen to protect apartheid South Africa—and for the same reasons. As the London *Observer* (December 11th, 1966) correctly points out. ‘President Johnson will come under tremendous pressure from American business circles if the sanctions war against Rhodesia spreads south’. The paper trains the spotlight on ‘one of L.B.J.’s close friends’, Charles Engelhardt ‘who is enormously rich, enormously committed in South Africa and enormously generous to the Democratic Party’. Engelhardt is chairman of Rand Mines and a director of the £204 million Anglo-American Corporation of South Africa. The *Observer* quotes him as saying ‘there are not many countries where it is safe to invest, and South Africa is about the best of the lot’. Other Americans too—such as General Motors, Ford and the Chase Manhattan Bank also have very substantial stakes in the maintenance of white supremacy, ‘stability’ and big profits in the Republic.

If the phoney Rhodesia crisis has done nothing else, it has proved once again that the oppressed peoples of Southern Africa cannot look for help from the imperialists, who have sold their interests over and over again—the latest instance being the unhappy fate of Lesotho

under the rule of Vorster's boy Jonathan, imposed against the will both of the majority of the Basotho and their traditional head of state, Moshoeshoe II, with the aid of a British-imposed constitution.

THE REAL CONFRONTATION

By this, we do not mean that the peoples of the Portuguese colonies and the apartheid-enslaved South should not continue, as they have done for many years, to appeal to the *peoples* of the entire world, including those of the imperialist countries, for solidarity and aid in their noble struggle against these hateful racialist regimes, which threaten world peace and mock the United Nations Charter. We do mean that every appeal to the principles of human rights and dignity will fall on deaf ears unless and until these unjust and unlawful regimes are faced with a true confrontation—the confrontation with their victims, the great majorities of oppressed peoples, denied every legal means of opposition and left with no recourse but to hit back with arms against the continuous violence which subjects them.

There are many signs that the national liberation movements of all these areas are fully alive to this truth, and that we are already witnessing, at the opening of 1967, the beginning of a new wave of armed struggle which, however long it takes, and whatever the present formal balance of armed forces, must end with the victory of African freedom from Cape to Cairo.

The most intensive fighting, thus far, is taking place in the 'Portuguese' territories of Angola, Mozambique and Guinea, where more than 520,000 of Salazar's troops are already in the field and more are on the way. In December, 1966, the Portuguese Government announced plans for further stepping up its defences in Southern Africa. Women are to be used extensively in the armed services for the first time; the length of military training, including service on the African battlefield, has been extended from two to between three and four years; no Portuguese youth liable for military service will be allowed to emigrate until he has completed his training. The drain on the Portuguese exchequer is crippling, with little prospect of reward from increasing exploitation of the territories so long as the war situation remains. The Portuguese economy is suffering both from inflation and a shortage of manpower.

Some areas of 'Portuguese' Africa have already been permanently liberated, especially in Guinea, where a new social order is being constructed by the national liberation movement in the freed territory. In portions of Angola and Mozambique the Portuguese are no longer in control in the sense that civil administration has completely broken down, and the Portuguese writ runs back and forth together with

their soldiers. Desertions from the army are on the increase, and the Tanzanian authorities have recently been compelled to deport Portuguese refugees to countries other than Portugal because the refugees were unwilling to return to their home country.

Portugal's African war may well prove to be the graveyard of the Salazar regime. In the course of their struggle, the African people are helping to liberate, not only themselves, but also the oppressed masses of Portugal itself. The Portuguese Government attempts to win support by a belated and miserable programme of 'reforms' at home and abroad, but popular discontent is unappeased and the tide of resistance is still running steadily, with every sign of growing into an unmanageable flood.

Guerilla activity has in the last year or so spread to the remaining territories of Southern Africa—Rhodesia, South Africa and South West Africa. Strict censorship in these countries has prevented all the details from becoming known to the world at large, and more particularly to the population at home, but enough has filtered through to make it apparent that the boast of Smith and Vorster that they preside over peaceful and contented communities is blatantly untrue.

A recent report from a Lusaka correspondent of the London *Observer* in December 1966 said guerilla activity by the national liberatory organisations in Rhodesia 'is significant, and it shows signs of increasing'. The report said that 'since April more than 100 Rhodesian nationalists had been killed or captured, and units of the Rhodesian army are now permanently tied down patrolling the tough terrain along the 440-mile border with Zambia'. Vehicles travelling south to Salisbury from the Zambian border have to proceed in convoy, and the police are ceaselessly active in the white farming areas. Internal resistance in the form of sabotage, bombings of cafés, etc. in the towns, arson against factories and buses, attacks on white farmers' crops and livestock, testify to the considerable organised support which the guerillas enjoy among the local population. Moreover, despite the lying claims of the Smith communiqués, the morale of the guerillas is high and the quality of their leadership of high order. Death sentences meted out by Smith's judges have been met with brave defiance by spokesmen for the accused. Clearly the guerillas do not in any way feel they are fighting a losing battle. They believe the fight they have started can and will be won, and they are prepared to make any necessary sacrifice to ensure the success of their cause.

Most significant of all is that guerilla activity has now spread to the heartland of White Supremacy—South Africa itself, together with its colony, South West Africa, now held by force in defiance of the United Nations order terminating the mandate. As long ago as last

October the South African Commissioner of Police, General Keevy, told the press in Cape Town that fifty-six 'trained terrorists' had been caught in South Africa and South West Africa in the last two years. General Keevy said he had no reason to believe that the attacks would cease, and the police were constantly on patrol in border areas. He had no doubt, he said, that 'the Communists' would continue with their plans to subvert South Africa, and the police had to be ready for anything. All 'terrorists' so far captured, he said, were 'local born', well-trained in the techniques of sabotage and terrorism, and armed with modern Russian and Chinese weapons.

Since that time a number of fresh attacks have been launched by guerillas in South West Africa, some damage has been done to white farms and at least one white farmer shot and injured, while an African headman appointed by and presumably carrying out the policy of the South African Government was killed. Police reinforcements have been thrown into Ovamboland, and General Keevy visited the area himself to inspect operations on the spot. What exactly has been going on is unclear, because a heavy security blanket has been thrown over the area, but again reports filtering through indicate that the police are using helicopters, tracker dogs, local commandos and even bushmen trackers to hunt down guerilla parties, but that the guerillas are managing to fight and survive thanks to support from the local population.

A significant feature of these operations in South West Africa is that they have alarmed the Vorster government sufficiently to compel the extension to South West Africa of all the apparatus of the Suppression of Communism Act, including the death penalty for sabotage or preparations for guerilla warfare. During the 1966 session of the South African Parliament the law was extended to provide for fourteen-day detention without trial of suspected 'terrorists'. A more sinister amendment provided that anyone leaving the country without proper documents in future would be assumed to have done so for the purposes of guerilla training, and would thus automatically be liable for the death penalty unless he could prove to the contrary. A number of guerillas arrested in South West Africa have already been kept for months under the 180-day detention-without-trial clause, while three leaders of the South West Africa People's Organisation in Windhoek have also been detained under this clause. It can be assumed that all have been subjected to torture in an all-out bid to smash this new and most dangerous form of resistance to apartheid aggression.

1967 opened for the Republic of South Africa with the announcement by President Swart—on the eve of his retirement from a long and infamous political career—that conscription for military training

would be extended to make it compulsory for 'all male citizens' (the word 'citizen' automatically excludes non-whites) and the period of training prolonged. This follows some wild boasting that the government would defy the United Nations decision ordering it to quit South West Africa, that it was prepared to take on the whole world to hold on to its illegally annexed territory, and was confident of the ability of its army to defeat any United Nations invading force 'before breakfast'. Such boasts are made with confidence simply because Vorster and his co-conspirators are sure their friends in the imperialist countries which dominate the United Nations will see to it that there never are realistic measures to establish independence and self-determination for South West, or do anything else practical to endanger the apartheid regime.

When it comes to the impending confrontation with the masses of oppressed people, however, spearheaded by determined, trained and armed freedom-fighters, it is a very different matter. Here is the fatal weakness of the racist regime, and they know it. That is why White Southern Africa is in a state of chronic crisis and instability, feverishly preparing for war, ruled by terror, arbitrary mass detentions, torture and murder.

Unconquerable Vietnam

THE UNITED STATES of America, the world's biggest and most powerful imperialist state, is conducting a war of extermination—the most savage in human history, not excluding Hitler's war—against the relatively small and economically undeveloped nation of Vietnam. There are at the time of writing over 400,000 American troops in the area, together with the troops of the puppet Ky regime and those of United States satellites such as Australia, New Zealand and South Korea, comprising an army of more than one million men, backed up by the most terrible weapons advanced technology can devise. Daily, on the villages of the South and the industries and populated areas of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam, in the north, American aircraft are dropping a higher tonnage of bombs and explosives than those dropped by both sides in Europe at the height of the Second World War.

In this most atrocious of campaigns of planned mass murder, Johnson and the other American war criminals have not hesitated to make use of methods of indiscriminate destruction long outlawed and condemned by international conventions, including the use of

poisonous chemicals and gases against civilians and their food supplies, they have dropped napalm and phosphorus bombs to burn people alive, they have tortured prisoners and herded countless peasant families into concentration camps after burning their villages to the ground. In the words of the American scientist, Professor Rosebury:

We have sprayed their ricefields with plant poisons, and destroyed their food stores. We have burnt their homes and destroyed their villages, towns and cities as wantonly as our means permit short of nuclear war. We have tortured and killed both prisoners and civilians and there is evidence that we have burned hospitals.

Under the inspired leadership of the National Liberation Front in the South and President Ho Chi Minh and the government of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam in the North, the unconquerable Vietnamese have maintained unflagging resistance. They will never surrender or become the colonial slaves of the United States or any other imperialists.

Africans throughout our continent regard the Vietnamese people with admiration, confidence and love. They are our brothers. Like all victims of imperialism we know that they are fighting not only for their own freedom and future, but ours as well.

An Insulting Statement

FOLLOWING THE RECENT Seminar in Cairo, of which we are glad to publish an extensive report in this issue, a statement was issued by the Pan-Africanist Congress and several other Southern African exile splinter-groups, slandering the Seminar and insulting all who participated in the most unmeasured terms. From the type of language used it is obvious that they merely appended their signatures to a document prepared elsewhere, for it is full of the hackneyed formulas and swear-words used as a substitute for argument by the Mao-ist faction which is today wreaking such tragic damage in China itself and throughout the Communist and anti-imperialist movement. The character of this foolish and disgraceful statement is ample proof, if any were needed, of the wisdom of excluding these provocators from the seminar.

Had they been allowed to participate, the high and serious tone of the exchanges would inevitably have been lowered by the introduction of the kind of abuse and phrasemongering which have so sadly disfigured innumerable international gatherings of the peace, youth, women's, trade union and other movements during the past few years.

Fifty Years of Workers' Rule

THIS YEAR, 1967, will see the fiftieth anniversary of the great Socialist Revolution in Russia of November 7th, 1917, an event which decisively changed the entire course of human history.

There were not many, in 1917, who really appreciated that the Russian Socialist Revolution was an event of a completely different type from all the great historical events of the nineteenth century which had overthrown feudalism, to replace it by capitalism. For the first time the masses of workers and peasants had taken the destinies of a great country, occupying a sixth of the earth's land surface, into their own strong hands. They proposed, under the brilliant leadership of Vladimir Lenin and his comrades, followers of Karl Marx, not only to institute formal democracy, but to dispossess the capitalists and landlords and advance into the then unknown territory of a new stage of history—Socialism.

Their experiences and their success has already changed the shape of the world, has profoundly affected the future of all peoples and will continue to do so in the future.

No one in Africa or anywhere else can understand our world and its problems without studying the background and consequences of the Russian Socialist Revolution.

In view of the importance of this anniversary, it is our intention to devote as much space in coming issues as possible to reviewing the implications of the Great October Socialist Revolution, and in particular its significance for Africa and the fight for national liberation in the South of our Continent.

NATIONAL AND SOCIAL
REVOLUTION
CAIRO
OCTOBER 1966



A. Sobolev, Gisela Rabesahala (Madagascar), Loutfi El Kholi, on the Presidium at the Seminar.

AFRICA: NATIONAL AND SOCIAL REVOLUTION

A Report on the Cairo Seminar

Contemporary African reality, the problems Africa now faces, and the strong, vigorous currents flowing in Africa demand in the first place a clear vision; a vision able both to take in the whole picture and to estimate correctly its component parts; so as to gain renewed strength and ensure an uninterrupted revolutionary struggle on African soil.

(From the message of President Nasser to the Seminar.)

AT THE INVITATION of the two journals *Al Talia* and *Problems of Peace and Socialism* about seventy leaders of African revolutionary and democratic thought, representing twenty-five parties and national liberation organisations in various parts of the continent, came to Cairo at the end of last October to take part in the Seminar: *Africa—National and Social Revolution*.

The character of the two convening journals was in itself an earnest of the exceptionally militant, anti-imperialist content which might have been expected from such a Seminar. It also symbolised the unity of all genuinely revolutionary forces, both Communist and non-Communist, which the severity and complexity of Africa's fight for true independence demands. *Al Talia* (Vanguard) is the monthly theoretical journal of the ruling Arab Socialist Union, published by the authoritative daily *Al Ahram*. *Problems of Peace and Socialism* (the English version appears as *World Marxist Review*) is the international journal of the Marxist-Leninist Parties. Though its headquarters are in Prague, its Editorial Board and editorial personnel include representatives of Communist and Workers' Parties in all the Continents, and it is published in eighteen languages.

The purpose of the gathering was to hold a serious, scientific discussion on the most burning problems of our continent—the struggle to liberate the whole of Africa from imperialism, colonialism and racialism; to safeguard and fortify independence; to advance our peoples on the path to social progress and emancipation. The enthusiastic response from all quarters showed how timely and necessary such a discussion was felt to be. Naturally, physical and practical considerations made a comprehensive and all-embracing gathering, covering every country, impossible. In some cases travel and other difficulties prevented those who were invited and keen on coming from doing so—for example, of the delegation of three from Oginga Odinga's Kenya People's Union, only one, Mr. Kimani Waiyaki, was allowed to come, and he was delayed until the seminar was in its closing stages. Nevertheless, the seminar was a unique occasion bringing together from all over the continent and for the first time in such a discussion, the most militant and advanced forces of the African Revolution.

Leading statesmen from revolutionary Parties governing independent African countries heading for socialism played a prominent part. Present were the delegations of the Arab Socialist Union (U.A.R.), the Guinea Democratic Party, the Sudanese Union (Mali), the National Liberation Front (Algeria) and the Tanganyika African People's Union (T.A.N.U.). But there were also revolutionaries with fresh reports from guerilla battlefields and harsh underground struggles—P.A.I.G.C. from 'Portuguese' Guinea; M.P.L.A. from Angola, F.R.E.L.I.M.O. from Mozambique, the African National Congress of South Africa, Zimbabwe African People's Union, South West Africa People's Organisation. A number of African Marxist-Leninist Parties were represented: the Communist Parties of Morocco, Sudan, South Africa and Lesotho, the African Independence Party (P.A.I.) of Senegal. And

there were also a number of African revolutionary-democratic organisations and leaders—from Ben Barka's U.N.F.P. (National Union of Popular Forces) of Morocco, the Sudan People's Democratic Party, and representatives from Congo (Kinshasa), Somalia, Niger, Cameroun, Eritrea and Malagasy.

A message of welcome and good wishes from President Gamal Abdel Nasser was read to the Seminar (he was on a state visit to India at the time) and warmly applauded, as was a message from Ghana's Kwame Nkrumah, sent from Bamako. From various regions of Africa greetings were expressed: from the West by Idrissa Madeira, Political Secretary of the Sudanese Union of Mali; from the East by T.A.N.U. leader and Parliamentarian F. U. Masha; from Southern Africa by J. B. Marks of the A.N.C.

The Seminar then got under way with five days of intensive discussion. It was opened with two remarkable reports: *Anti-imperialist Struggle in Africa at the Present Stage*, delivered by Loutfi El Kholi, Editor-in-Chief of *Al Talia*, and *Some Problems of Social Progress in Africa* by Dr. Alexander Sobolev, Executive Secretary of *World Marxist Review*.

Over sixty written papers, in addition to a great many spontaneous interventions, were considered by the Seminar in the following sessions. The Agenda covered the following themes:

- Neo-colonialism in Africa,
- Imperialist capital investments in Africa,
- Methods of imperialist penetration into African countries,
- Analysis of reasons for and character of various military coups,
- Defence and strengthening of progressive regimes in liberated countries,
- Need for unity of revolutionary forces in Africa,
- Liberation movements of colonial countries in Africa,
- Struggle against racist regimes,
- The African Revolution as an integral part of the world revolutionary process,
- Analysis of the class structure in African societies and the role of various social forces,
- Democratisation of political life as the condition for progressive development,
- Problems of creating revolutionary vanguards and unity of patriotic forces,
- Agrarian problems,
- Planning and sources of accumulation,
- Tasks and perspectives of inter-African economic co-operation,
- Importance of co-operation between African countries and socialist states.

Clearly, to report such a rich and wide-ranging exchange of views and information in detail would require not an article, or even a series of articles, but a book. Indeed it is greatly hoped that such a book will be prepared by the sponsors of the Seminar; it would be a treasure-house for all African revolutionaries and patriots. The present

article cannot hope to do more than to summarise some of the striking ideas that emerged, to recapture something of the tone and atmosphere of the Seminar. The reader will have observed that many of the themes of the agenda overlap to a greater or lesser extent, and broadly speaking are embraced also by the opening papers. Without attempting in any way to be comprehensive, we shall then traverse in outline the opening papers, pausing to note some of the other contributions that amplify points made in them—or in some instances, of course, may differ with them. For the papers were all independently drawn up, and while the broad coincidence of views on all main issues was truly remarkable, it would have been unbelievable had there been no points of difference! But one of the most inspiring features of the event as a whole was the complete absence of any tendencies to score debating-points; these were serious revolutionaries, earnestly and in a true scientific spirit seeking the truth.

THE FIGHT AGAINST IMPERIALISM

LOUTFI EL KHOLI'S REPORT

In his opening report on Africa's fight against imperialism, LOUTFI EL KHOLI began by emphasising that the African Revolution was intrinsically and inseparably connected with the world historical and revolutionary process. Indeed, our revolution was directed to break down Africa's isolation, to demolish 'that iron curtain tightly constructed around the African people in the last years of the nineteenth century by the imperialists'. Through revolutionary struggles, 'Africa has opened her doors and windows on to the world'. 'Her contemporary revolution has become part and parcel of the world revolution . . . against imperialism, old and new, against its military, monopolistic and racialistic bases . . . against under-development, national disintegration and exploitation.'

The African revolution is a part of the orbit of history, aimed at ending feudalistic methods, capitalism and war. 'It aims at establishing free communities with a developed national economy, using the most up-to-date means of modern technology and placing them at the beginning of the path of socialism—man's greatest achievement in social thinking.' Any attempt to separate our revolution from progressive world developments and socialist trends was wrong, unreal, unhistorical and harmful to the interests and struggles of the African peoples. Indeed, such a separation was in essence 'a reactionary and imperialistic plan', aimed to substitute reformist trends for revolu-

tionary, to replace colonialism with neo-colonialism, utopian for scientific socialism.

In addition from this global framework, the African revolutionary struggle was closely integrated with those of Asia and Latin America, against the same enemies and pursuing the same goals. 'The common man in Africa does not need special intelligence to realise that the American aggression, for example, in Vietnam is the very same aggression from which he suffers.' This identity of interests was reflected in the Bandung and other Afro-Asian Conferences, and in the Tri-Continental Conference in Cuba in 1966.

Africa as a whole was the battlefield of especially acute struggles. Loutfi El Kholi considered that the Asian peoples had, on the whole, basically succeeded in containing the imperialist powers to 'rather limited positions and bases'. And this contention was not affected by the American aggression in Vietnam, which because of the heroic resistance of the people and the world-wide support they enjoyed, was bound to fail and collapse 'and lead the imperialist presence in Asia as a whole to the brink of total collapse in the very near future'. In Latin America, 'despite the rise of Cuba as a liberated and socialist country and her endurance', and also despite the emergence of a number of resistance movements against puppet regimes, the struggle had 'not yet reached the stage of decisiveness that we observe in Africa'. Moreover, unlike Latin America which was more or less the exclusive preserve of the United States as overlord, 'Africa is fully open to all the classical imperialist powers in addition to the U.S.A. . . . This leads to bloody competition for political, economic and military influence in the continent and ends in instability even for conservative and puppet regimes'. Loutfi illustrated his point by referring to the latest military coups in the Congo (Kinshasa), Dahomey, Upper Volta, Central Africa and Nigeria, within a period of less than three months.

This aspect of the 1966 coups was brought out in more detail by other contributors. Tigani El-Taib, Sudanese Communist and a member of the *World Marxist Review* delegation, declared: 'In the Central African Republic, Dahomey and Upper Volta it was a clear case of pro-imperialist military dictatorships replacing pro-imperialist civilian regimes. The army came to power as a more reliable agent of French imperialism to protect its interests against those of rival powers.' But he adds that 'regardless of the intentions of their initiators, these coups manifest the mounting discontent of the mass of the people'. Though they 'reveal a lamentable lack of revolutionary organisation and leadership' and also an alarming degree of imperialist influence in the bureaucracy and especially within the armed forces,

'reactionary army take-overs cannot change the objective conditions which give rise to political crises. . . . They change the forms of the struggle but not its content'.

To return to the opening paper:

The 'area of exploitation' for the imperialist monopolies has diminished greatly since the October Revolution of 1917 in Russia. More countries have joined the group of socialist states. Former colonies, in the course of national liberation, have increasingly gained control over their own resources. Many of them have entered into commercial and economic relations with the socialist states, whose productivity has grown rapidly, now reaching 30 per cent of world production.

These factors have impelled the imperialists to concentrate ever more intensely on exploitation of the vast resources of Africa, with its cheap labour, fertile land, vast forests and abundant mineral wealth. The paper estimates that Africa has 98 per cent of the world's diamonds, 50 of gold, 70 of cobalt, 40 of chrome, 30 of manganese, 35 of raw phosphate and 24 of copper, 'in addition to iron, coal, oil and gas in huge quantities and at economic prices'.

THE FEROCITY OF THE BATTLE

'Consequently', the paper declares, 'our continent has become in reality the field for the main direct and acute collision and confrontation between national revolutionary forces and imperialist powers in the contemporary world.

This may explain the ferocity of the battle in Africa, its complexities, its variety of methods and weapons. For we at the same time face both neo- and old imperialism. We are also confronted with puppet, conservative, racist regimes, military bases and occupation at one and the same time. We face the horrors of the policy of racial discrimination; the recruiting of white mercenaries against national and progressive governments; economic pressures and exportation of counter-revolution; blockage by pacts and military bases and conditioned aid and forced treaties.

We also face missionaries hiding behind religious banners and destroying the people's moral integrity and national heritage; we face them side by side with collective aggression by imperialist states—in spite of secondary differences between them—sometimes under the guise of the United Nations. The tragedy of the Congo (Leopoldville) is a clear example. We face, moreover, genocide of tribes, kindling of hatred in countries to prevent national unity. We also face imperialist intrigues to instigate border wars. This at the same time explains the great diversity of means, methods and paths of struggle of the people of the general revolutionary front in Africa.

The African Revolution was advancing at a time of great world changes—the advances and victories of national liberation; the growing extent and might of the socialist camp; the great advances of science and technology; the increasing importance of moral forces expressed

by the United Nations and world opinion—which had been recognised and endorsed in the U.A.R.'s revolutionary National Charter. But Africa itself remained a poverty-stricken area. Ninety per cent of Africans were living on agriculture; although the continent accounts for one-seventh of world raw material production, her industrial production does not exceed one-fiftieth of the world output, accounting for less than 14 per cent of national income. Average yearly income was 90 dollars compared with 3,000 dollars in the U.S. And things were getting worse because of imperialist domination of world markets and world trade, resulting in steady impoverishment of Africa for the benefit of the monopolies. Raw material prices were continually being depressed, while those of industrial products, machines and equipment were going up and up. Between 1951 and 1961 raw material prices (excluding petrol) fell by 33.1 per cent; prices of industrial products rose 3.5 per cent, of machines and equipment 31.5 per cent.

Thus the African revolution acutely faces the reality of under-development in a world changing and developing at a ratio never equalled before. In her efforts to develop her national economies and her resources at the ratio of the age Africa finds herself before a historic choice between two paths: that of conventional capitalism or of anti-capitalist development leading to socialism.

The choice of the socialist path, Loutfi El Kholi said, was 'inevitable'. Whatever resistance and pressures, socialist development was quicker and better able to preserve income rates. It met the demands of the peoples 'for so long crushed, vanquished and exploited'. Capitalism was not only too slow, but lacked support. The bourgeoisie of today lacked the revolutionary spirit of its predecessors in earlier times, due to the maturity of the class struggle locally and internationally. Socialism had strong powers of attraction not only for the working class but also for intermediate classes. Thus, in Africa, the national liberation revolution was merging into the social revolution 'with its socialist horizon'.

MAIN RAGING BATTLEFIELD

Africa today, Loutfi El Kholi continued, is 'the main raging battlefield' of the struggle between revolutionary and imperialist forces. For both it is a life and death battle. Any degree of independence for any African state is under threat so long as the whole continent has not been purged of colonialism and neo-colonialism.

Although the battle differed in its level and methods, reflecting circumstances of both sides in each area, unity of the revolutionary forces was growing—faced with growing co-ordination and collective aggression by the imperialists. In the course of the struggle, conditions

were bringing about the merging of the national liberation and the social revolutions; the African revolution has become part of the 'progressive human revolution against imperialism, under-development, exploitation of man, and war'.

The paper briefly traced the tide of independence that swept the continent from 1950 with three nominally independent African-governed states, to 1966 with thirty-nine states having achieved independence. Yet independence had not meant liberation from imperialist exploitation. On the contrary, it had meant increased exploitation through restricted aid, and the methods of neo-colonialism, to rob the continent of its wealth and drain its labour powers. Investments had reached the amount of 22,000 million dollars, yielding profits of 2,000 million yearly. Imperialism controlled the world markets and dominated African trade, forcing down raw material prices and inflating those of industrial products and machinery, thus making 'fabulous profits' and preventing accumulation for African development. U.S. investment had leaped up from 287 million dollars in 1950 to 1,700 million in 1964; U.S. exports to Africa had gone from 494 to 916 million dollars in the same period, and corresponding imports from 362 million to 1,211 million.

Imperialists were extending aggressive military bases in our continent, and America—with naval and air bases in Morocco, Lybia, Tunisia, Liberia and Ethiopia, more rapidly than the others. The U.S. had begun brazen intervention against national liberation movements in Africa, reaching its climax in the Congo, besides planning reactionary coups and 'exporting counter-revolution'.

These events needed to be seen against their historical background—the capturing and transport, under frightful conditions of tens of millions of slaves—depriving Africa of whole generations of the strongest, most energetic young men and women—thus not only stopping development of African communities but also pushing them towards deterioration and fanning tribal conflicts so as to get African agents for the slave trade. The imperialists had also fanned regional divisions of all kinds—especially between the North and the rest of the continent—which still left heritages which threatened African unity. Imperialism had preserved the most backward political, economic and social patterns, stifled education and opposed economic development other than foreign-owned mines and plantations. Wherever climatic conditions were suitable, white settlement had been instituted as in South Africa, Rhodesia, Kenya and Algeria, reflecting the racist nature of imperialist policy.

Western imperialists did not regard Africans as human beings but rather as animals fit for export to foreign labour markets. The after-

math of this hateful racist outlook is reflected today in apartheid in South Africa and Rhodesia. It remains . . . the background of neo-colonialist policy.

NEO-COLONIALISM AND IMPERIALIST AID

The essence of neo-colonialism is to maintain the superficial aspect of political independence while securing actual subordination to imperialism, especially economically. This is ensured by a large number of methods, economic, political, military and ideological; methods based on economic links, special relations, loans and investments. There would be links between an African country and 'a specific zone of influence', a customs union of a 'common market' dominated by imperialism. In most West and Central African states the monetary systems are linked with France and subordinated to the 'Bank of Western Africa' and the 'Bank of Central Africa'. 'The Monetary Council that issues the East African Shilling is dominated by the British'. A huge number of African states are still in either the sterling or the franc zone. 'Commonwealth preference' directs their foreign trade, and many are tied to the European Common Market without being allowed any share in its decisions and administration.

In the 'British Commonwealth' group, the British, U.S. and West German share of imports usually are more than half. In the former French colonies, however, the French share (1963) varied from 33 per cent (Togo) to 74 per cent (Malagasy). The neo-colonialists claim that the African states benefit from these arrangements because they pay higher prices for African products, especially agricultural, than prevailing rates on the world markets. But—and here's the catch—the same imperialist states also fix the world market rates! Most African countries suffer a balance-of-payments deficit which they can't cover without going back to the imperialists for 'aid' and loans. 'Aid' is also sought for deficits in state budgets, and for military 'assistance' to equip and train African armed forces.

Of course, this need for 'aid' arises, in the first place, from the activities of imperialism, which hampered African development, and rigged prices, and still acts to depress prices of African-produced materials. This is not merely the working out of some natural economic law favouring industrial against agricultural products. Egyptian cotton, better in quality and in shorter supply than American, fell in price by 30 per cent in the decade 1955-1965, but the American price fell only 12 per cent. The core of the question is in the relationship of exploitation forced on developing countries by inequitable trade, as a result of which African countries lose more than double what they receive in 'aid'.

This 'aid' has a 'stupefying' effect, African countries which depend on it cannot make any real effort to develop their economies and redress the balance of payment. This is obvious in cases where foreign aid is needed to cover budget deficits. 'Would a government that depends on foreign help to pay the salaries of the civil service seriously be called independent?' And the 'military aid' is really to brainwash African military trainees to do the dirty job, formerly carried out by imperial armies, of suppressing national liberation movements.

The attitude of the International Bank towards the Aswan High Dam project proves that technical aid offered by international bodies followed the 'Western' line. Most experts and specialised agents of the United Nations are people who fled from the socialist countries because of their hatred for the socialist system, and incompetent ex-colonial civil servants accustomed to high salaries. An accurate description of imperialist 'aid' was given by a French Minister answering some Members of Parliament who objected to the amounts of grants to former French colonies. The Minister assured them that the cost of aid was much less than occupation expenses . . . and, of course, far less than the cost of colonial wars. After all, the Vietnam war cost France a million francs a day.

Talk of Western investments financing development schemes in Africa, said Loutfi El Kholi, was highly misleading. The nature of international monopolies' investments had not changed since independence. 'These investments are mainly directed towards exploitation of the peoples of these countries and the draining of their natural resources.' It was remarkable that since independence monopolistic investments in Africa had doubled, due to the return of colonialism to the exploitation of previously neglected African resources after the liquidation of most of its strongholds of Asia; to the massive arrival in Africa of U.S. imperialism and its huge monopolies; and the opening up of former British and French colonies to the penetration of other imperialists, notably West German.

The predominant character of imperialist investments is their concentration on extractive and related industries. Such industries already existed before independence without bringing about any real development: the big profits made by foreign concerns out of the Katanga did not enable the Congo to take any effective steps towards development. Where certain light or consumer industries, such as breweries, were introduced, it was notable that efforts were made to associate the emerging bourgeois elements with imperialist interests through agencies and appointments to senior posts in local branches of imperialist concerns, or even through offers of partnership in local enterprises.

Even where local industries were established to process raw materials, an important element of foreign exploitation remained. Formerly the Western countries imported low-price raw cotton and sold it back in the form of high-price textiles. Now, thanks to abundant raw materials and cheap labour rates in Africa, 'they import cotton textiles at a cheap price and, in return, export at the highest prices, machines, spare parts, technical experience and foreign capital'.

Here we may depart from a summary of Loutfi El Kholi's opening report to add that a number of other contributors presented detailed papers on various aspects of neo-colonialism imperialist investment and 'aid' in African countries.

An important study of many aspects of capitalist and imperialist investments in Africa was contributed by the economist MOHAMED SID AHMED of *Al Talia*. Pointing out that Africa was one of the wealthiest potential areas and had 'unlimited possibilities for development', this paper pointed out that, nevertheless, income per head in African countries (excluding the Republic of South Africa) amounted to 90 dollars a year as compared with 1,400 to 1,600 dollars in West Europe and 3,057 in the United States.

Despite these great changes that have occurred on the map of Africa, African independent states did not all embark on the way to economic independence, nor have they developed their productive capacities in the most suitable way to increase the prosperity of their people. Foreign monopolies maintain their grip on the orientation of these states, since they hold key positions in their national economies. This phenomenon is known as neo-colonialism.

The backwardness of Africa is not due to lack of wealth. Imperialist capital investment is directed not towards industrial development but, on the contrary, towards maintaining Africa as a source of raw materials and a market for the products of the developed capitalist countries. This objective is secured in various ways, including loans and economic aid 'with a view to maintaining the state of dependence, to keeping newly-independent countries within the world capitalist system, and to oppose the setting up 'of a solid public sector capable of steering the national economy on the non-capitalist path'. Also they used the situation prevailing in international trade, the balance-of-payments factor and the existing gap between developed and undeveloped countries to strengthen their control over the wealth of African and other newly liberated countries.

The disequilibrium which was the main feature of the African countries' relations with the imperialist countries had its origin in the fact that 'equal amounts of products exchanged on the world market do not actually have the same value, which varies according to the productivity of labour'. Thus, the disequilibrium is situated 'not in

the sphere of exchange and trade, but in the sphere of production itself, in the inequality in degrees of development and industrialisation'. Hence the opportunity for the wealthier countries to become always still wealthier at the expense of the poor countries. This phenomenon is aggravated further by monopoly, a feature common to imperialism, and the ability of international monopolies to influence and determine prices in their own interests.

Losses by developing countries, as a result of trade disequilibrium, pointed out Mohamed Sid Ahmed, are estimated at between 14 and 16 billion dollars a year—i.e. 55 per cent of their overall exports to the imperialist countries. This amount corresponds to twice the total economic aid from the developed countries, including private investment.

In other words international monopolies got hold of 9 per cent of the national income of the developing countries, thus depriving them of a sum that exceeds the whole of their investments, which are estimated at about 15 billion dollars a year.

One consequence of trade disequilibrium was the steadily increasing indebtedness of the developing to the developed countries. United Nations estimates showed such debts to have risen from 9 billion dollars in 1955 to 33 billion in 1964. Adding private debts, and other commitments, one found that the amount of dividends and interest payments from the developing group of countries already amounted to over 3,500 million dollars, and this amount was steadily rising. The proportion of the exports of developing countries devoted to such payments had risen from 4 per cent in 1955 to 12 per cent in 1964. The export of monetary resources from rich to poor countries was already counterbalanced by 50 per cent in the reverse direction to pay for dividends and interest on loans. 'This proportion increases from year to year, and this phenomenon threatens to block entirely the transfer of monetary resources to newly independent countries, even if we assume that these sums were being directed to development projects. If such a situation continues in the years to come we should expect that in fifteen years this transfer of capital will stop completely; any transfers of capital would be counter-balanced in the reverse direction' by interest payments.

This paper supported these general conclusions by a good deal of detailed statistical material of absorbing interest, which there is no space to reproduce here. In fact he shows that imperialist investments in developing countries 'are not material capabilities and energies offered . . . to contribute to the process of development, but merely act as a "pump" to absorb the wealth of developing countries and pour it into the developed capitalist countries'.

These investments are mainly directed to extractive industries, to pull out African resources for processing and manufacture abroad. In nine years United States investments in Asia, Africa and Latin America amounted to 4,500 million dollars. These investments were a source of profits (representing a transfer of capital in the reverse direction) amounting to 14,400 million dollars—a gross loss for the developing countries of 9,000 million: 1,000 million a year.

Only a part of these profits are usually re-invested in the developing countries, the lion's share being repatriated for investment in the imperialist countries. Thus from 1947 to 1953, French concerns in Africa made 23,200 million francs; they re-invested only 7,200—about one-third.

Assuming foreign investments in Africa to be not more than 20 billion dollars, earning a profit of 25 per cent (almost certainly too low an estimate); and assuming further that half these profits were re-invested in Africa (an over-estimate), 'this means that 1,500 million dollars are transferred every year from African countries' to the imperialist countries.

Following a close study of the direction, amounts and purposes of American 'aid' to African countries, and U.S. investments in South and South West Africa, the Congo (Kinshasa), Nigeria, Morocco, Ghana, Angola, Mozambique, Somalia and elsewhere in the continent, the paper notes that 'a principal object of the American aid is to create the most favourable conditions for the exploitation of capital and to reduce the amount of expenditure which does not lead to any immediate or clear profit. American aid is used for the purpose of exporting American goods, thus helping the United States to find a market for agricultural surpluses and help her balance-of-payments difficulties'.

Despite the influx of American investments the traditional investing countries maintained the lead. After 1960 Sid Ahmed estimates British investments at 6,500 million dollars, French at 7,000 million and U.S. at 1,100 million. British investment is concentrated in former British colonies in Southern Africa (including the Republic) and Rhodesia, East and West Africa. Similarly, French investments are mainly in former colonies of the French empire. The magnitude of these is shown by a detailed list of French companies in the continent, with their capital, field of activity, date of establishment and site of headquarters.

Attention is also drawn to the increasing penetration of West German finance capital in Africa, and the close relationship between

West Germany and the racial regime in South Africa. The Portuguese colonies are also brought under examination, with a note that American, Belgian, British and West German capital is increasingly infiltrating these areas and demanding their share in return for financial and military aid lent to the Portuguese in their war against Angolan, Guinean and Mozambique guerilla fighters. The paper concludes with a note on the role of Israel, which facilitates the infiltration of foreign capital in some African countries. A major part of U.S. investments in Israel as well as West German reparations, is not retained but re-exported as capital exports in African countries.

Similar conclusions, based on the examination of independent data, were reached by ALI YATA, General Secretary of the Moroccan Communist Party, in his outstanding paper on *Neo-Colonialism*. For example he reveals that of 1,629 million dollars invested in Africa by the United States in 1964, only 225 million was for manufacturing industries—and of this amount 192 million were invested in the Republic of South Africa, leaving 33 million for the rest of the continent. This paper also contains a valuable analysis of imperialist economic manoeuvres in Morocco itself. In the same spirit, many contributors to the seminar presented highly significant data on imperialist economic interests in their own countries. Thus the representative of the *South West African People's Organisation* pointed out the close connection between the imperialist powers' covert backing for the Republic's annexation of South West Africa and the activities of American and other foreign companies with investments in s.w.a. and are interested 'in keeping the Territory as a field for the investment of their capital, a source of raw material and cheap labour'. P.A.I.G.C. (*African Independence Party of 'Portuguese' Guinea and Cape Verde*) presented a detailed analysis of the foreign capitalist concerns in their territory, as 'a striking testimony that the machinery of the colonial economy in our country is in the hands of a handful of big finance men'. A similar analysis of the set-up in 'Rhodesia' was presented by Mr. STEPHEN NKOMO of the *Zimbabwe African People's Union* (Z.A.P.U.). A South African paper pointed out that this country 'was made safe for foreign capitalists by the Boer War of British imperialism seventy years ago. It became the pioneer example of neo-colonialism in 1910 when political power was transferred to Smuts and the white minority. Since then, imperialist investments had poured in—but at the cost of the wholesale robbery of the Africans' land, a regime of unbridled terror and racialism, and all the other well-known horrors of apartheid. 'It is precisely because the Republic of South Africa is an investors' paradise that the great imperialist powers are at such pains to protect and save the evil Pretoria regime. . . .'

THE STRUGGLE FOR AFRICAN UNITY

To return to the opening paper of Loutfi El Kholi. Against the neo-colonialist manoeuvres of colonialism, he said, Africa had adopted the banner of unity. 'Since 1945 African unity has come to mean unity of destiny of the peoples of the continent—i.e. unity in action against the common enemy, for independence and national sovereignty.' It began with co-operation in the independence struggle, but after independence the slogan was widened to embrace co-operation to safeguard independence and solve the economic and political problems which could not be solved by any country alone. In the series of all-African conferences a 'programme' of struggle had been adopted, 'taking as the point of departure the common struggle against neo-colonialism and for the liberation of the African territories still under colonialist domination'. This gave the concept of African unity 'a militant and profound content; it broadened the fight against colonialism to include that against neo-colonialism; it acquired a social content through the realisation that co-operation was needed to safeguard independence by eliminating economic, social and cultural backwardness. With this new concept, unity became the aim and objective of the popular masses in Africa, for which the workers, peasants, intellectuals and revolutionaries are struggling.'

A big step forward towards African Unity was the establishment in 1963 of the Organisation of African Unity (O.A.U.) and the adoption of its progressive, anti-imperialist Charter. The establishment of the O.A.U. opened up opportunities to extend their co-operation in all fields and develop common attitudes in defence of the cause of world peace and African liberation. But these opportunities had not all been taken, due to shortcomings—the O.A.U. faced such difficulties as: subversive activities of the neo-colonialist forces; negative stands by certain African governments which were inclined to depend on neo-colonialism; differences in the political and economic structures, and levels of development, between O.A.U. members; theoretical and ideological difficulties. Yet the desire and trend to African unity remained the most powerful factor.

The forces interested in African unity—the newly-free African states, political, national and progressive parties and organisations, trade unions and social organisations—should work to safeguard African freedom, stick to the path of independent development through liberation of the national economy, and the promotion of industry and agriculture in the interests of the people. Most African countries needed to extend economic co-operation on all levels, from the development of trade to plans for economic co-ordination and integration, to establish national industries and make full use of natural resources.

Loutfi El Kholi envisaged a struggle to maintain the anti-imperialist stand of the O.A.U., and prevent the emergence of factions and new divisions. It should concentrate on questions which would unite and mobilise all Africans. The way to unity would be paved by united struggle of the workers, peasants and revolutionary intellectuals, who should establish 'a strong alliance of all anti-imperialist, anti-colonialist forces'. All progressive parties and organisations should establish, on a continent-wide scale, 'an order of priorities', and thus define common actions and positions. The trade unions have a glorious part to play; it was necessary to strive for a powerful unity of the trade union movement and against divisionist activities by colonialist agents. A peasant movement should be encouraged in alliance with the trade unions and the revolutionary intellectuals.

The forward posts in the defence of African unity were held by the African countries which had chosen the socialist path. A heavy duty fell on the revolutionary parties and political organisations in these countries, to safeguard internal unity—a pre-condition for socialist transformation.

'At this stage, characterised by rabid attacks of neo-colonialist forces on the continent, the revolutionary parties (in these countries) are faced with the task of struggle in the ideological field with the aim of purging their respective societies of ideas antagonistic to scientific socialism' and of exchanging experience to help solve the complicated problems of the 'fusion of the national and social revolutions'.

The African revolution, he continued, could not be classified under the category of 'slow classical developments in the history of mankind'. It came rather under the category of 'revolutionary leaps and profound transformations of exceptional rapidity'. It was like an explosion that took place after centuries of suppression and repression. Modern communication and science had made the world small; socialism had become a material world phenomenon and revolutionary thought and radical change on a world scale had found loud echoes in Africa. The African toiling masses had nothing to lose but chains. Hence the explosion, taking place in favourable world conditions, with great support from the socialist countries, especially the Soviet Union which offered unconditional material aid and support.

But we should not only look on the bright side. Revolutions knew their ebb and flow. The map of the continent, flying the flags of forty independent countries, was in a sense deceptive.

Less than ten African countries had been able, in varying degrees, to attain true independence through the emancipation of their econo-

mies; the rest, the great majority, had yet attained no more than formal independence. The fight for economic emancipation was complicated by backwardness, lack of possibilities of financial accumulation and shortage of technical cadres. Also imperialism had disintegrated the continent into small units; only three African countries had populations exceeding 20 million; twenty-five had below 5 million and thirteen below 1 million. These factors militated against viability of most African countries to develop on their own and severely limited their internal market. Thus the struggle for economic emancipation was closely associated with the question of African unity. The struggle was also closely associated with the need for pursuing the road to socialism.

Loutfi El Kholi emphasised that only the road towards socialism could mobilise all human, technical and material resources in development which would serve the masses and raise their living standards. Any other path would only serve the interests of a minority of parasites who would soon develop into a bourgeois class 'linked by its interests and nature with the foreign monopolies and neo-colonialism'.

The paper considered that in Africa the capitalists could not, as in the past century in Europe, lead the national revolution. Even in countries like Egypt where a local capitalist class had been allowed to develop under colonialist rule, that class was too weak to undertake big development within the framework of capitalism. Further, as the masses had been more strongly attracted towards socialism, especially since World War II, the capitalist class had become antagonistic towards the national liberation movement; it had lost all classical revolutionary attributes which had characterised it earlier when it fought against imperialism to win the national market and achieve some degree of independence.

Moreover, unlike the old variety of colonialism, imperialism today, in the neo-colonialist period, was not hostile to this bourgeois class and its ambitions; it was ready to play the role of partner with it and help consolidate it as a counter to the progressive national revolution with its trend towards socialism. Neo-colonialism was prepared to tolerate political independence and even a limited degree of development—provided that development would not go beyond strategic and processing industries and proceed to heavy industry—the basis of national economy and essence of independence.

The plan of neo-colonialism for Africa envisaged building the nucleus of a national bourgeoisie in countries where there was no such class. Local bureaucrats were found to replace the colonial civil service in the state apparatus; aid and loans were granted to set up

private firms linked with foreign monopolies. This all-continental phenomenon also required continent-wide mobilisation to secure, throughout the continent, the following-up of the achievement of formal independence by economic liberation, advancing to socialism under the class leadership of the working people. It was impossible for each country to concentrate purely on its own development. 'The independence of every African country is seriously menaced by the existence of imperialist forces anywhere on the continent; for imperialism's present zones of influence are in fact but springboards against independent states.'

Loutfi El Kholi underlines the importance of this point by referring to the fate of the Lumumba government in the Congo, the Nkrumah government in Ghana and the stabilising of the Smith regime—'a serious and direct menace to Zambia'. The common struggle against imperialism was not only a duty to oppressed brothers; it was vital for the safeguarding of the independence of each African state. This 'duty to self and brother' was not observed with the required effectiveness by a considerable number of independent countries'. Our revolutionary unity in Africa had not attained the standard required by the fierceness and nature of the battle. We had experienced bitter lessons of the cost of inaction and disunity.

The revolutionary African forces should reject, in theory and practice, the policy of anti-Communism. Communist forces should simultaneously reject doctrinal rigidity before the new phenomena that appear in Africa. We are called upon to build our revolutionary unity through the scientific vision of reality, and to participate in drawing up a unified plan of African revolutionary action, taking into account the special circumstance and distinguishing features of every one of our societies.

Drawing attention to the lessons of the coup in Ghana and other coups, which he analysed in some detail, Loutfi El Kholi said that the imperialists, old and new, were pooling their resources in a life and death struggle against Africa. African countries could not withdraw into isolation from one another without giving up not only the principles for which they had fought and abandoning their defences against colonialism and reaction. To try to bargain with imperialism would mean forfeiting the gains of independence and eventually reverting to the status of colonies. The only road that remained was to continue the revolution against colonialism throughout Africa, 'pooling all efforts and reorganising our forces in the light of the experience gained in the battle'.

'This is the path of History, Hope and Life—a hard path, in fact, but with no alternative but slow and gradual suicide.'

PATHS OF AFRICAN DEVELOPMENT

DR. SOBOLEV'S PAPER

'I am far from thinking', began Dr. Sobolev in his paper on *Some Problems of Social Progress in Africa*, 'that I have managed to find the absolute answers to the problems of Africa today'. He emphasised that he was speaking for himself, not for his journal, which belonged to many Communist and Workers' Parties all of whom had their own viewpoints. And he welcomed frank opinions on the questions he raised.

Like practically every contributor, he saw the most important contradiction at the basis of African reality as that between imperialism and neo-colonialism, on the one hand, and the African people on the other. But there were also other contradictions, in close connection with this basic one: between the African exploiters and working people; the poverty of the masses and the wealth of the élite; the archaic social relations and the requirements of the productive forces; between growing populations and slow rate of production. Ethnic, tribal and racial contradictions were interwoven with class struggle.

As a result of the slave trade and then colonial domination, 'accompanied by savage and crude forms of plunder', African development had been delayed and distorted. There existed two parallel sectors in the economy—the colonial commodity sector and the traditional patriarchal sector—with no organic link between them. The economy was based on natural small-scale production in the embryo and tribal, communal relations using 'non-economic methods of compulsion'. Class differentiation proceeded extremely slowly, without clearly defined class boundaries, many intermediate groups, uneven development and inter-penetration of social groups. The National Revolutionary Movement of Congo (Brazzaville) had enumerated no less than fourteen classes and strata in the country.

Tribalism, or remnants thereof, existed in all tropical African countries. Some African politicians defended tribalism as an expression of the originality of the African way of life, and criticised the Marxists for alleged hostility to African traditions and ways of life, and to tribalism. But the tribal and communal relations were dying out, not because of Marxist criticism but because of cash crops, because of the bourgeois striving for profit implanted by colonial policy. 'The golden calf is the real enemy of the best features of Africanism.' Marxists, while resolutely opposing reactionary aspects and stagnant social phenomena, want to preserve the best features of the traditions and cultures of Africa. The colonisers had brought about the degradation of much of the tribal upper strata into exploiters, administrators

who slavishly carry out the will of their masters, and impose semi-feudal or semi-bourgeois types of exploitation. Again, it was not the Marxists who were responsible for aggravating class contradictions and destroying unity of African society. Inevitably in the course of history, tribes would disintegrate, but it was possible to see that this progressive development took place without stratification into antagonistic classes and bloody clashes, on a democratic basis. Working classes would develop, peasants, preferably working in co-operatives, and workers.

TRIBAL COMMUNE AND SOCIALISM

One thing is sure: the elimination of communal relationships has long since become a necessity and is an indispensable and important condition for the growth of productive forces, not only in agriculture but also in industry, declared Dr. Sobolev.

The lot of most African working peasants making up the communes is one of extreme poverty; and this poverty 'the greatest evil of our time' was growing instead of decreasing, hampering the development of productive forces. The consumption of some members 'is to a considerable extent of a parasitic character', and there was no possibility for productive accumulation. 'However much some may earn somewhere, everything goes for non-productive consumption within the tribe, which is not a bit interested in productive accumulation of modernisation of production.' The peasants and farm workers were 'plundered' by moneylenders, second-hand dealers and merchants. Poll taxes and other taxes also ruined the African peasant, so that, unable to feed his family, 'he goes to towns, mines, railroads, ports, in search of work and becomes the victim of colonial exploitation. But he always maintains his ties with the tribe . . . where his income does not fully belong to him but to all members'.

While, therefore, most African peasants who do not produce cash crops are not petty bourgeois in their outlook or their attitude to property, the tribal commune as such 'possesses no driving motive or internal sources for extended reproduction or for the organisation of modern production'. This is due to the backward and conservative character of the organisation of production and the obsolete system of distribution, Sobolev continued.

The commune cannot serve as a source of socialism, and does not alleviate as many believe, the advance to socialism but, on the contrary, hinders it.

This outspoken challenge to certain concepts of 'African socialism' was supported and echoed by other contributors, perhaps most notably in a paper specially prepared for the Seminar by DR. KWAME

NKRUMAH and read by the Ghana C.P.P. representative, MRS. SHIRLEY GRAHAM DUBOIS.

In this paper, *African Socialism Revisited*, Nkrumah argues that the phrase African Socialism no longer expresses its original meaning, 'tends to obscure our fundamental socialist commitment', and should be abandoned. Today, the phrase,

seems to espouse the view that the traditional African society was a classless society imbued with the spirit of humanism. . . . Such a conception of socialism makes a fetish of the communal African society. But an idyllic, African classless society . . . is certainly a facile simplification; there is no historical or even anthropological justification for any such society.

Nkrumah dismisses this approach as 'anthropological'. Certainly we should try to recapture the philosophy and humanism within communalism, but this was rather philosophical than anthropological. It was not possible, practically, to return to communalism. 'Such a return to a *status quo ante* is quite unexampled in the evolution of societies. There is no theoretical or historical reason to indicate that it is at all possible.' 'It is,' he concluded, 'the elimination of fancifulness from socialist action that makes socialism scientific. To suppose that there are tribal, national, or racial socialisms is to abandon objectivity in favour of chauvinism.'

Dr. Sobolev did not merely condemn communalism as an unsatisfactory basis for the building of a modern socialist society; he also discussed, though briefly, its future. Should it be destroyed? Or should one await its inevitable decay through the spontaneous development of commodity-money relations? Rejecting both these alternatives, he envisaged the transformation of the commune, 'maintaining the features of a democratic and collective character', and turning it into 'a productive unit with equality of all members and the obligation to work; with the gradual introduction of wages, the translation into practice of a broader system of individual and collective incentives in the development of production'.

Such a renovated and transformed commune can ensure extended reproduction, serve as a form, opening up broad vistas for the development of productive forces in agriculture and handicraft.

THE AFRICAN PROLETARIAT

Dr. Sobolev next turned his attention to some special features of the proletariat in Africa, which has emerged as a result of the intrusion of foreign capital, and is counterposed to foreign, rather than indigenous, exploiters. The colonialists had infected the African working class with three serious disabilities—inconstancy, migration and lack of skill—in an attempt to limit its political role of creator of a new society. But, history prevails. Though numerically small, a modern

experienced proletariat was emerging as the most progressive section in African society, to carry out its historic mission as the creator of a new society and in the final event the builder of socialism.

The study of the characteristics of the African working class was amplified in much greater detail, and in a particular area, by the outstanding Marxist sociologist MAJHEMOUT DIOP, General Secretary of the African Independence Party (P.A.I.) of Senegal. In facts and figures this paper—*Notes on the Senegalese Working Class*—analyses the categories, wages and conditions of various sections of workers in this country; their degree of organisation into trade unions, co-operatives and political parties. 'Our society is far from being an exact copy of European society,' noted Diop. 'We should try to avoid superficial similarities.' Class consciousness among African workers was complicated by such factors, connected with the pre-colonial period, as—the extended family of the patriarchal type; the ethnic or tribal aspect; vestiges of communal organisation and feudal-type classifications. The colonial period too had left its mark in the development and ideology of the petty bourgeoisie, various types of nationalism, the transition of people from one class to another, and the differences arising from religion, all of which factors taken together tended to blunt and obscure class differences and class consciousness among the workers. On the basis of such a study Diop considers the Senegalese population can be divided thus: peasant strata (77.6 per cent), 'pre-proletarian' strata (17 per cent), 'pre-petty bourgeois' strata (5 per cent) and 'pro-bourgeois' strata (0.4 per cent). Each of these 'strata' is again subdivided into a total of no less than eighteen categories and sub-categories. The purpose is to arrive at a more exact understanding of class forces and alignments. It is most likely true that the era of bourgeois democratic revolutions is over, and all revolutions should lead to socialism. But to conclude from this that our revolution is a socialist one and must be led by the proletariat would be too hasty. 'What is actually taking place in our countries are transitional democratic revolutions. The leadership might be petty bourgeois, or led by classes developing towards a proletariat, or developing towards a working class—or a combination, giving them a dual character. A struggle was developing between those right-wing elements who sought to turn the revolution towards a capitalist direction, and the radicals who sought to advance to socialism. The developing working class should not seek to 'by-pass certain stages'. To seek an exclusive worker-peasant alliance would mean to isolate the radical petty-bourgeoisie, misunderstand the revolutionary perspectives and commit serious mistakes 'for which our enemies would blame socialism'. Rather, in line with Lenin's concept in *Two Tactics of Social Democracy*

in the Bourgeois Democratic Revolution, the developing working class should unite with the petty bourgeoisie and together with it win over the peasantry. The transitional democratic revolution leads to the establishment of a national democracy, in the course of which fierce class struggle develops against the pro-bourgeois strata. National democracy does not mean 'peaceful coexistence of classes'. We must anticipate 'open and sharp conflict between progressive classes and those aiming at hindering the advance of society'.

Dr. Sobolev continued by discussing the relevance of Marxist theory in general, and the experience of the Soviet Union and other socialist countries in particular, to the specific problems of Africa. He considered that the Marxist-Leninist conception of the development of human society had been fully substantiated by history. Scientific communism had guided the peoples of the Soviet Union in carrying out the October Revolution, in building socialism; and the same principles had been the guide to revolution and building socialism in a number of countries of Europe and Asia, as well as Cuba. The experiences of these countries were of international significance. But 'the experience of one country can never be fully utilised by another'. 'Historical experience teaches but it does not dictate; it enriches and deepens our knowledge of social processes but is not a stencil for duplicating revolutionary forms.'

Considering the transition of African countries to socialism, one had to supply the general theory to the actual conditions and special features, as well as to make use of the experience of other countries which had built socialism already. Powerful enemies stood as obstacles to African development in a socialist direction—imperialism and neo-colonialism; local reactionary forces; and economic and cultural backwardness, the heritage of colonialism.

In most African countries there was no feudalism, nor did capitalism exist 'as an advanced social system'. This meant that the enormous task of destroying these established social formations, which had faced other peoples building socialism, did not exist in Africa; there was a real possibility of avoiding violent armed conflict between antagonistic classes. 'There does appear in Africa a fundamental possibility of waging a widespread struggle with the aim of isolating hostile class elements by peaceful political and economic means.'

At this stage the speaker warned, however, that his remarks referred to internal conflicts, not the clash between the African peoples and imperialism, 'against which a struggle is being waged with all means . . . including armed means of struggle'.

This point was fully borne out by all the representatives from countries still enslaved by direct colonialism or colonialism of the

special type of white supremacy regimes in the South. Representatives from the Portuguese colonies reported on the progress of the armed struggle in Mozambique, Angola and 'Portuguese' Guinea, and in some cases of the revolutionary methods of administration, land reform and education within the liberated areas. Similarly, from Zimbabwe, South West Africa and the Republic of South Africa, representatives of the fighting movements against apartheid made it clear that their perspective embraced all forms of struggle, including armed struggle. 'Our people everywhere in Southern Africa,' said J. B. MARKS, a leader of the African National Congress and head of the South African delegation, 'have fought and will continue to fight for their liberation . . . with modern arms in hand. Armed counter-revolution must be faced with armed revolution'. 'In all the countries now remaining under white minority rule armed struggle is the only perspective left for the people.'

NON-CAPITALIST STAGE

The solution of the democratic tasks of the African continent, continued Dr. Sobolev, could not be found within the framework and by the methods of capitalism; they could only be solved 'within the framework of a transitional stage . . . conditionally called . . . the non-capitalist stage of development'.

It might be noted here that this particular formulation did not meet with unanimous approval among the participants in the Seminar. An extremely thoughtful paper submitted by the governing Party of Mali (the *Sudanese Union-R.D.A.*) considers that 'there is no qualitative difference between "the non-capitalist path of development", and "the socialist path of development", though of course there are degrees or steps within the socialist path. The Mali delegation felt that the expression was used because it was considered axiomatic that the socialist way could be led only by a vanguard, class party, not by a mass party. But was this so? If a mass party, organised on the principles of democratic centralism, set out to achieve socialism, and took radical actions—such as: nationalised finance; state monopoly of imports and exports; control of distribution controlled essentially by the state and self-management sectors; main means of production owned by the state and workers; prevention of large private exploitation in agriculture—was it not at the stage of building socialism? Vanguard parties of the proletarian type did not exist in many African countries simply because economic and social conditions did not permit of them. Yet there were united parties functioning on the basis of democratic centralism, aiming at a socialist way of development and acting according to the principles of scientific socialism. 'An

original solution for building socialism in countries escaping directly from the colonial era must exist.'

Dr. Sobolev himself stressed the transitional character of what he called the non-capitalist stage, embodying elements both of the past—capitalist in character—and of the future—socialism. There was a 'complicated and varied picture of social relations taking shape'. What was important was the role of the masses, the extent of their participation in social life, the level of democracy, the possibility of the people really influencing policy. Power alone was not the source of socialism; the needs of production and the interests of the people were the basic source. 'The people are the builders of socialism.'

This concern for the strengthening of democracy as an essential condition for African development was reflected in a number of other contributions. A significant paper was presented by OMAR MUSTAFA of the Communist Party of Sudan, in which he pointed out that true democracy required that 'the masses of the people enjoy full rights in the administration of their political, social, economic and cultural affairs and . . . grasp their destiny'. The Western-type parliamentary democracy bequeathed by the colonial powers had proved empty of content, lacking ties with the working classes . . . 'a hollow body which fails to provide food and clothes for the worker or peasant'. In Sudan, bourgeois democracy proved a failure; 'the masses witnessed their Parliament transformed into a market where deputies were bought and sold . . . the so-called democratic system became more and more isolated from the masses and they ceased to believe in it'. That paved the way for the Aboud coup of November 1958. Mustafa characterised the revolutionary movement of workers, peasants and intellectuals headed by the Communist Party and the Democratic People's Party, which had overthrown the military regime and opened up new horizons to progress. But using anti-communism, slander and violence, reactionary forces in collusion with the imperialists, had carried through counter-revolutionary acts, faked elections, banned the Communist Party and once again, under the cloak of bourgeois democracy restored the power of feudalistic, capitalist and other retrograde elements. 'We do not reject bourgeois democracy absolutely and in all cases . . .' but 'there is no such thing as an absolute democracy in any society. . . . 'The presence of the forces of the working people in power is the only way to safeguard the utmost democracy.'

The final stage of Dr. Sobolev's paper dealt with the prospects for developing the democratic revolution in Africa into a socialist revolution. There was a real prospect, due to the historical circumstances of Africa's liberation, not least the influence and support of the world socialist system, that Africa would enter socialism—the

only direction in which to overcome the heritage of colonialism quickly—in an easier, more humane way than that of the Soviet Union and other countries which had pioneered the trail. 'Africa has already made its contribution to world history and it will contribute many powerful, original, valuable and rich features to it.'

AN HISTORIC OCCASION

Looking back on the Cairo Seminar, one feels that it would be difficult to over-estimate its significance, though there are those—who for one reason or another did not participate in it—who are anxious to belittle it. Even the above curtailed and incomplete account will give some idea of the breadth of the field that was covered, the wealth of original and challenging ideas which were discussed. As more of the material is published, it will be a mine of inexhaustible value for theoreticians and students in our continent and indeed all over the world, the more precious because the material emerges from the heartland of revolutionary Africa itself.

The Seminar represented a coming together, in a spirit of the utmost friendliness and goodwill, of the main revolutionary forces of Africa, both Marxists and non-Marxists, to discuss some of the most serious problems of the continent. This, in itself, underlined the overriding need for continuing and deeper unity in the life-and-death struggles against imperialism, colonialism of all types, and reaction. As KHALED MOHEI EL DIN pointed out in his illuminating address:

Conflict and dissension among militants and revolutionaries is no less dangerous than enemy attacks. . . . The existing contradiction between non-Marxist and Marxist revolutionary forces should be resolved on the basis of objective discussions free from the influence of imperialist propaganda.

The participants practically to a man endorsed the aim of socialism both a goal and as a means of securing victory in Africa's struggle against imperialism, colonialism, backwardness and poverty. In this respect, the vanguard role of those African countries aiming at socialism—the United Arab Republic, Guinea, Mali, Congo-Brazzaville, Algeria and Tanzania—was repeatedly stressed, as well as the need for all African patriots to rally for the defence of these countries, as an all-African task on a par with the liberation of the still enslaved areas dominated by Portuguese and white-supremacy regimes.

It was a source of great inspiration that the exchange of views was held on the soil of revolutionary Egypt, in the front line of defence of the gains of the African revolution against imperialist attacks, and striving under the dynamic leadership of President Nasser and his colleagues towards socialist construction. In addition to their efficient

arrangements and truly African hospitality, the U.A.R. gave the participants an opportunity to study at first hand the progress of their country by organising visits to the Aswan High Dam, the Suez Canal Area and the reclamation scheme of Al-Tahrir.

'Noting the success of the Seminar, the need for and importance of further joint discussions on the new and burning issues arising daily in the course of the African revolution, the participants believe that it will be useful to hold more joint meetings in the future.'

Thus read the communiqué unanimously adopted on the motion of the Sudanese delegation, and fully reflecting the wishes of all who took part. Indeed, the two journals have rendered a great service to Africa. The Cairo Seminar was a landmark in our history.

M.H.

WORLD MARXIST REVIEW

English-Language edition of

PROBLEMS OF PEACE AND SOCIALISM

*Monthly journal of Marxism, Leninism, published in
Prague, Czechoslovakia*

January 1967 issue contains papers delivered at the Cairo
Seminar, Africa—National and Social Revolution

London distributors:

Central Books Ltd., 37 Gray's Inn Road, London, W.C.1

A NATION BEHIND BARS

A. ZANZOLO

NOBODY REALLY KNOWS how many political prisoners there are in South Africa. Estimates range from four to ten thousand. For a long time it was thought that the number in the Eastern Cape was over nine hundred. Then the notorious Mr. Vorster, who has now become Prime Minister of South Africa, revealed in Parliament that there were no less than 1,669 prisoners in the Eastern Cape alone! This was almost double the accepted estimate. This could mean there has been under-estimation of the national total. Bearing in mind that the authorities themselves will do everything to conceal the true state of affairs we can expect that the real figures are much higher than generally accepted.

Robben Island. Glamorgan Prison in East London called KwaNongqongqo by the Africans. Leeukop prison on the Rand—already a byword for brutality against prisoners. Port Elizabeth Central. Pietermaritzburg gaol. Pretoria Central. Viljoensdrift. Kroonstad. Umtata. Kokstad. The list is endless.

There has always been a legend about Robben Island. The most persistent was built around the story of the famed war strategist and prophet Makana, otherwise known as Nxele (the left-handed). After the defeat of the AmaNdlambe in the fifth Eastern frontier war in 1819 Makana was sent to Robben Island as a prisoner of the British. Later the authorities let it be known that Makana had died whilst trying to escape from the island. The Africans were naturally suspicious of this version of Makana's death. It was prophesied that one day Makana would arise from Robben Island to lead the people in the struggle against the White invaders.

Later, other famous African leaders were imprisoned at Robben Island including the redoubtable King Cetshwayo of the Zulus and his successor King Dinizulu.

For a long time before and after the present government came to power Robben Island was abandoned as a prison settlement. But as the prisons were filled by opponents of apartheid the island regained

its former role. Simultaneously the legend of Makana has revived. With such famous freedom fighters as Nelson Mandela, Walter Sisulu, Govan Mbeki, is it any wonder that our people feel that this is what the prophecy meant that in modern times the spirit of freedom would arise to overwhelm the oppressors? With their lack of historical sense the oppressors had forgotten the significance of Robben Island when they re-opened it as a prison settlement.

But then to the prison authorities all over South Africa the thousands of people kept in gaols for political 'offences' are just nameless 'Natives' who have dared to challenge White Supremacy. They do not know and do not care to know who these men and women are—their contributions to the welfare of mankind, their gifts and skills which in other circumstances could do so much for progress. But to the vast majority of the people who support the freedom movement of all races these are not nameless prisoners. They are individual men and women who have made great sacrifices that men may be free. We are not concerned for the moment with the great names of Mandela, Sisulu and so on, but with all those others who are just known as 'political prisoners'.

SCREAMS IN THE NIGHT

(to the prisoners of apartheid)

*Saliva drooling from their gums
tearing into you
like a pack of ravenous wolves
they rip your naked flesh
with wild beast fangs.*

*Brothers
we hear your screams
your tormented cries
that split the night
in half*

*Hold on brothers
Hold on
we hasten to your den of desolate hell.*

*Your sun is hidden
behind a cloud
of locusts on the swarm
we come brothers we come
to rip their wings apart.*

A. N. C. KUMALO

One thinks of men like **MASANGO MAYEKISO**, former chairman of the African National Congress, New Brighton Branch. This is one of the most powerful branches of the A.N.C. in the country. He succeeded Raymond Mhlaba as Chairman when the latter was banned from participation in the activities of the A.N.C. Both are in Robben Island. Masango is so unexpected. A thin, middle-aged man, bespectacled and definitely with no charisma of leadership. Where one would expect a towering personality to lead so militant and powerful an area we find Masango Mayekiso a gentle soft-spoken figure with a monotonous delivery of speech. No one looking at him would suspect that he held an unassailable position as leader of the people in Port Elizabeth.

The answer lies in Masango's consistency and integrity as a working-class and national liberatory leader. Always principled, never personal and concerned only with the good of the organisation. Originally from the Transkei, Masango worked for many years at a textile factory in Port Elizabeth owned by French capitalists. He helped build a strong branch of the textile workers' union and eventually became the leader of the African textile workers in South Africa.

In all the stirring struggles of the fifties Masango played an important role. He went to prison during the historic Defiance Campaign of 1952. In the following two years Masango was arrested numerous times. One never knew whether he would be available for an engagement. On one occasion in 1954 he was charged with incitement to public violence. His offence was that in a speech before an enormous crowd at Veeplaats he had supported the struggle of the Kenya African Union and Jomo Kenyatta. He was defended in the trial by Mr. Sam Kahn. Key witness for the defence was Milner Ntsangani, who explained the background to the Kenya struggle. Milner, a prominent leader of the youth, was imprisoned in 1964 in Natal.

In 1956 Masango was charged with High Treason in common with many others. He was involved in the trial right to the end in March 1961. Shortly thereafter he was arrested again. He is still in prison. There were reports last year that Masango has been beaten so severely in prison that his hearing had been affected. But this physically small man is made of steel. His wife and children always gave him their full support and loyalty despite the fantastic difficulties caused by his frequent absences from work as a result of imprisonment. How long will this fine family man and workers' leader remain in prison?

What about that sensitive intellectual and writer **HENRI-GORDON MAKGOTHI**. The last we heard of him he was detained at Leeukop gaol. This is one of the worst gaols in South Africa where people are often reported dead in inexplicable circumstances. Henri-Gordon,

who is 37 years old now, was always an unhealthy man even during his schooldays. He was educated at St. Peters Secondary School in Johannesburg and then at Fort Hare University College where he specialised in English and History. His contemporaries included Duma Nokwe, Secretary-General of the A.N.C., now in Tanzania. O. R. Tambo, his teacher in Mathematics and Physical Science, first inspired him to fight for his people. After his graduation Henri-Gordon taught in Johannesburg. He hated teaching perhaps because of his essentially withdrawn and shy disposition, perhaps because he is essentially a writer and a very gifted one. In English, Sesutho and Afrikaans he wrote brilliantly. One of his hobbies was to write absolutely ridiculous and hilarious letters under Afrikaans pen-names wherein he posed as an extreme anti-African racist. Despite the absurdity of the letters they were invariably published by the humourless fascist press, providing weeks of merriment for the writer. In political writing Henri-Gordon's pen was very trenchant. Once when a fuss was made by some people in progressive circles at African leaders wearing national dress on the grounds that this was a reversion to 'tribalism', Henri-Gordon wrote a letter to *New Age* pointing out the 'grotesque spectacle of tribalists like Mr. Tshombe sporting the latest creations of Bond Street and Savile Row'.

When Henri-Gordon was arrested for his present term of imprisonment it was not the first time. Although he had recently recovered from a chest disease the prison officials would not give him treatment. He has lost a deal of weight but is bravely bearing the rigours of prison life which for Africans is no joke in South Africa. Writer, artist, poet, physically weak but with tremendous spiritual reserves, Henri-Gordon Makgothi is an example of the indomitable will of the African intellectuals to suffer for the cause of freedom and national liberation.

WILTON MKWAYI was born in Middledrift, a member of the famed Gqunukhwebe people. The son of a peasant and one himself, he went to work as a migratory worker in Port Elizabeth. Even in his home village he had made his mark as a leader. This is very difficult to do in peasant society where age and experience are the qualifications for acceptance in leadership. In Port Elizabeth he joined the A.N.C. and worked as an organiser. During the 1952 Defiance campaign he emerged as the top organiser in the New Brighton branch. He served a term of imprisonment in 1952. After his release he helped Gladstone Tshume with the selling of the progressive newspaper *New Age*. Then he started work in the trade union movement where he once more emerged as a first-class organiser. But he remained in many ways a peasant leader with enormous influence throughout the Ciskei area. He was arrested in 1956 with others and charged with High Treason.

During the State of Emergency in 1960 he escaped custody and left the country. The next time he came to public notice was as an accused in 1964 on charges of plotting the overthrow of the South African State. He was alleged to be a member of the High Command of Mkonto WeSizwe (The Spear of the Nation). He was sentenced to life imprisonment and is serving his sentence at Robben Island.

Wilton Mkwai is a tall powerfully-built man with very little or no formal education. He has a peasant shrewdness and confidence in handling men. A superb organiser, Mkwai has the gift of silence which makes him unobtrusive. He owed a great deal to this quality in his numerous evasions of the police.

And so we could go on. Trade unionists, intellectuals, business men, women leaders. Mrs. Frances Baard. Mrs. Florence Matomela. What is happening to them?

These thousands of prisoners in South Africa are not just numbers. They are individual characters with different backgrounds, interests and ideas. They share only their love of liberty, democracy and national freedom. It is the responsibility of those outside prison to ensure that the story of these men and women is constantly before the eye of the world. We must never for one moment forget our heroes or allow them to be just anonymous prisoners. They must be seen for what they are—the cream of South Africa. And it must be remembered that among them are men and women of every national group and race in our country. The oppressors with their powerful instruments for influencing public opinion are trying to denigrate the fighters for freedom in all ways. They must on no account be allowed to get away with it.

TRANSKEI

TOUSSAINT

THE FLOOD OF sentimental adulation which South African Government propaganda channels have poured out over Dr. Verwoerd, has kept a consistent note; the Bantustan scheme, we are told, was 'his inspiration', 'his creation'. Attempts have been made to portray it as a 'visionary' 'liberal' scheme of national independence for the various African tribal groups of South Africa, as an 'inspired' 'experimental' searching for a new form of national freedom, as a real sincere essay in the development of 'separate freedoms'. The Nazi-admirer, former Ossewa Brandwag petty führer Vorster, who stepped into the dead man's shoes, made haste to announce that he would carry on 'on the path on which Dr. Verwoerd fell', and would pursue with equal faith the course of Bantustans which Verwoerd chartered six years ago.

What is the truth of the Bantustan programme? Where is it leading? What does it achieve in reality after all the fulsome words of praise have been stripped away? This is an appropriate time to attempt an answer to these questions. But an answer is not easy. South Africa has erected a smokescreen of words around the Bantustans, through which the truth filters out only thinly and slowly. Perhaps even the phrase 'Bantustan policy' is a smokescreen. For even now, six years after its announcement in South Africa's Parliament, there is only one 'Bantustan'—only one ethnic group area operating any form of self-administration even within the straitjacket of Pretoria civil-service control. That area is the Transkei, the test case of Bantustans.

'The Xhosas are the first of South Africa's distinctive Bantu peoples to win their right to self-determination. But they will not be the last. In the years to come others will follow them. That is firm policy.'

Thus the official pamphlet on 'The Transkei and the Case for Separate Development', published in December 1963 from South Africa House, London. It remains firm policy—or so it is said. But thus far, no-one has followed. Most realistic observers of what has happened in the

Transkei do not believe any others will follow. For the government, the experiment has proved to be fraught with danger, an essay in the dangerous art of trying to ride a tiger. The Transkei, despite all its weighted electoral system, its emergency regulations, its clamp down on civil liberties, its gendarmerie of venal chiefs and bought headmen, is perpetually on the edge of a real and direct challenge to Pretoria, and to its ideology of apartheid, its suzerainty and its domination.

For the people, the promises of 'self-determination' and of 'separate freedoms' have been revealed as too false and hollow to attract any other peoples anywhere to claim such conditions for themselves.

Consider the evidence. A scheme of 'self-determination' leading to eventual full independence—this is the official claim for the scheme—may be tested in practice. Does it advance the national readiness or capacity for independence? Does the economy progress, and grow towards viability or self-sufficiency? Do the people advance in education, in technical know-how and in experience of administration? Does internal security, public liberty, popular democracy flower? Look at the Transkei.

CRIPPLED INDEPENDENCE

An eminent British historian, Sir Keith Hancock, recently gave his considered opinion on some of these matters, in the course of a lecture to the South African Institute of Race Relations. The output per head of population in the Transkei, he told his audience, is falling, five years after Verwoerd's inspirational scheme, three years after the first elections of a Bantustan parliament. This fall in production would indicate the likelihood of deepening poverty and hunger in the territory. But such hunger, he explained, is mitigated only by the fact that the territory still exports the bulk of its able-bodied male population—and a fair part of its female population—to work in the mines, farms and factories in the rest of South Africa, remitting their earnings home to prevent starvation of their families. Present trends, he said, made it virtually certain that the Transkei would be an economic cripple before it was politically independent.

'To my way of thinking', he said, 'a state which has no prospect of earning its keep is only fictionally independent.'

This 'fictionally independent' area has some 1.6 million people, it is unlikely that more than 300,000 are adult males; of these, an average of 80,000 each year are employed in South African gold mines alone—the most vigorous and able-bodied of that male group. They and other

emigrant workers send back £4.5 million per year from South Africa to the Transkei. An even sharper picture of the fictional independence of the area is given by the 'budget' solemnly presented to the Transkei Territorial Authority by its 'government'. For the year 1964-65, the budget totalled £8 million, of which £6.5 million came from the South African Government; a further £8 million was spent by the Verwoerd government in paying salaries of South African civil servants on official duty in the Transkei. The largest single source of revenue was the 'General Tax'—more often and opprobriously called in South Africa the 'Poll Tax'. This tax was budgeted to bring in £600,000, of which £500,000 would be collected in South Africa from Transkeians employed there. In January 1966 it was officially announced that the tax year had in fact ended with a surplus of £2.5 million—a feat which was duly trumpeted as a triumph for Bantustans. Only the careful follower of Transkeian affairs discovered that the surplus resulted from '... the over-estimation of expenditure by some departments, together with a lack of skilled labour to carry through the industrialisation and building programmes'.

The 'industrialisation programme' is more fictional than real. The figures were given to Parliament by Minister De Wet Nel. From May 1948—(Repeat 1948. No misprint!)—to May 1965, the government, he said, had established nine industries in the Transkei, employing in all 1,389 Africans! Seventeen years! A programme of industrialisation creating eighty-two new jobs per year! In August 1965, it was officially announced that 'since self-administration' i.e. 1963—new Transkei industries have absorbed a total of 841 workers, of whom some 400 are in one establishment. The total number of jobs available and filled in the territory, the announcement claimed, was 32,000, the majority of these in the towns designated 'white'. (See below.) But, it said, in the first five years, 260 African technicians will have been trained! In Pretoria, it claimed, fifteen Africans were being taught to drive buses, twenty-four were being trained as mechanics and twenty-five as railway officials. The purpose of these railway trainees, pathetic as it is, is not related in any way to Transkeian independence. We have it on the authority of Minister of Railways in the South African Government, Mr. B. J. Schoeman, that '*Railways in the Transkei will remain in South African control whether the Transkei is independent or not*'. (Speech 27.1.66.)

ECONOMICS OF POVERTY

Industrialization is a sick joke in the Transkei. Perhaps of more real substance is shopkeeping, formerly an almost entirely white preserve. Measures put into force to ensure that trading stations in the territory

are transferred to Africans are taking effect slowly, at considerable cost to the territory, and at very favourable prices for the traders. There were some 630 white-owned trading stations in the area, almost all of them in local monopoly positions. By June 1966, 237 of these had been offered for sale to the South African Government agency known as the Adjustment Corporation, set up to effect the transfer from white to African ownership. Of these 237, the Corporation had made offers for eighty-six shops at a total cost of £800,000, slightly less than £10,000 apiece. How many of these offers have resulted in completed sales of shops is not clear, but figures show that since the beginning of 1966, forty-five properties in 'reserved' areas—that is areas no longer open for white occupation—had been transferred to Transkei citizens, and a further forty-six were in course of transfer. To accompany this creeping change, it was revealed in June of this year that thirteen Africans had completed their training as managers of trading stores and were employed in that capacity in the Transkei; five more were being trained! More significantly, of the thirty-eight trading stations owned by the Bantu Investment Corporation, thirteen were being managed by Africans.

This snail-pace change takes place as part of what is referred to as the 'five-year plan'—which ran from 1961-2 to 1965-6. The total estimated expenditure in the territory during this period—covering all planned economic development—amounted to just under £9½ million. The total figure, £6 per head over five years, looks even less impressive when broken down into the categories of official statistics:

For village development:	£1.67 million
irrigation:	1.75
forestry:	3.51
soil conservation:	2.38
fibre cultivation:	.14

These figures are worth careful consideration. The figure for village development does not represent spending on improvement of existing villages, but rather on the development of new villages in places close to the Bantustan border. These new villages are needed not for Transkeian purposes. They are essentially dormitory towns from which white industry in the areas just across the border will draw cheap labour, without any responsibilities for social services and family welfare which will fall on the Transkei. Forestry requires large-scale capital resources for road, transportation and haulage, and can only be developed by the Bantu Investment Corporation. If the Transkeian people benefit from it at all, they will do so only indirectly and over

very long term. But in the short term forestry serves a different purpose, of shutting off large tracts of land from peasant occupation, of assisting the growth of a landless peasantry, and thus of speeding the growth of the dormitory labour-reservoir villages near the borders.

ADVANCING BACKWARDS

If the economic change is slow, perhaps even so slow that conditions grow worse, not better, development towards political independence is proving equally slow and equally fettered by white South African chains. Only education has been transferred fully to the Transkeian government. Yet the very decision to do so, forced on an unwilling Verwoerd government by mass pressure in the area, immediately revealed the perils for white supremacy raised by even emasculated and bogus independence. 'Bantu education' created by the South African Government to maintain white supremacy was immediately abolished, and the first hesitant steps towards a wider education started. For the rest, little change. In mid-1945, for example, the Transkei's own police force was formed. The most significant change was that of name. For the force was to consist of 114 former members of the South African police, commanded by a South African police major, white, seconded to the force, together with a South African police lieutenant and three South African warrant officers.

Figures released of the Transkeian civil service tell the same story —'the more things change, the more they are the same'. At the end of 1963, there were 468 white civil servants seconded to the Transkei from Pretoria. By the end of the following year, the number had dropped to 427. *'White officials' said Verwoerd's proconsul in the Transkei, Commissioner General Hans Abraham underlining the obvious —'White officials will be a strong factor in the Transkei for a considerable time to come'. Minister De Klerk was even more blunt. 'The South African Government has not yet given the Transkei a single essential right enjoyed by a sovereign independent state' he blurted out in defence of Verwoerd policy. 'Every department of the Transkei Government has a white official to give it leadership and guardianship.'* (22.3.66.)

Amongst the rights it does not enjoy is what is called in South Africa 'security'—what would be known elsewhere as civil rights. Proclamation No. 400, issued by the Verwoerd government in 1960 is still in full force. It gives the South African authorities in the Transkei the powers of arrest without trial or charge. It prohibits freedom of assembly. It puts stern punitive powers into the hands of local chiefs. The number of victims of this six-year-old 'emergency' measure seems to grow larger. The figures have to be pried out of the government by persistent ferreting, and even then they are vague and confusing,

deliberately so. Between January and June 1965 there were 114 people imprisoned without charge; between January and April a further sixty-two. How many have been held altogether, for how long and under what conditions of terror no one knows. How many are still held, no one knows. In this atmosphere of intimidation and lurking terror, democracy flickers feebly.

BOUGHT SUPPORT

Yet still strongly enough to challenge the proscriptions on assembly, the authority of venal chiefs and the influence and money of the South African Government. Not powerfully enough to swing the first Transkeian elections sufficiently to defeat the overwhelming preponderance of government-paid, government-appointed chiefs who take their seats in the Transkeian Territorial Authority—the 'parliament'. After the first elections in 1963, this weight of chiefs voted the Government-favoured Kaiser Matanzima into the position of Prime Minister by the narrow margin of fifty-four votes to forty-nine. It has only recently been revealed how even that majority was won. Of the fifty-four votes for Matanzima, fifteen were cast by chiefs and headmen owing allegiance to Chief Botha Sigcau. In the face of popular opposition to Matanzima's pro-apartheid policies, Sigcau wavered in his support, his henchmen waiting on his decision to decide their votes. Sigcau finally voted for Matanzima. Only this year has a South African newspaper unearthed and disclosed the story that, five months before the election, Sigcau was presented by the South African Government with the gift of a farm, 2,630 morgen (almost 5,500 acres). No explanation of the gift has been offered officially. The farm, formally valued at £5 per morgen is said by experts to be worth about £12 10s. per morgen on the open market.

With Matanzima thus installed in power by a combination of nominated chiefs and bought supporters, every aspect of Transkeian change is paltry and slow. It took until January 1966 before the zoning of all Transkeian towns for exclusive white occupation and ownership was cancelled. The cancellation applies to twenty-three towns, and in most of them only to designated portions of the town, not the whole. Port St. Johns, the most important town in the area, and the only port, is not included in the de-segregation, nor are the 11,000 morgen of land in the Port St. Johns area. Port St. Johns is to remain the domain of white South Africa, and so, too, the entire coast of the territory, no part of which will fall under the control of the Transkeian government.



THE BORDER ZONES

There is a startling contrast between growth of the economy in the Transkei and the growth of the white-owned, exclusively white-occupied areas on its borders. A new phrase has come into South African speech—‘the border areas’. This has a peculiarly South African meaning. Border areas are those on the *white* side of a Bantustan or African reserve only; the phrase does not apply to territory on the African side of the border. Nor does it apply only to the border of a sizeable area, a territory, province or region. It applies equally to the white area surrounding a single town, township or dormitory area set aside exclusively for African habitation. Since statistics generally do not distinguish between the Transkeian ‘border area’ and other border areas, the figures herein relate to both kinds. But in fact, such development as has taken place in border areas has been mainly on the borders of the Transkei-Ciskei area, and around three major white cities of Port Elizabeth, Pretoria and Durban.

By contrast with the pathetic record in the Transkei, border area industry between 1960 and 1966 grew by the capital investment of almost £90 million. It employed 52,000 people in jobs established in that period, of whom 41,000 were Africans—naturally drawn as migrant or commuting labour from ‘across the border’. In that period, state aid established eighty-eight new industrial undertakings, and assisted in the expansion of fifty-seven more. Fifty-two industries started without state aid. Reporting this, the ‘Permanent Committee for the Location of Industry and the Development of Border Areas’ says: ‘The committee is not aware of all new industries and expansions. Secondary activities such as construction, business undertakings and the provision of services which usually accompany primary employment and usually provide additional employment for twice as many other persons should be taken into account’. Dr. Diederichs, the responsible minister, estimates that ‘border industries provide a means of livelihood for 115,000 Bantu in “homelands”.’

‘The homelands had not yet reached the stage where they were able to sustain a reasonably high standard of living. . . . Developments in border areas, however, showed a satisfactory picture. . . .’ (4.4.66.)

There is no need to mince words about this. The ‘homelands’ policy of coralling as many Africans as possible into exclusive African areas—of which the Transkei is the most grandiose and advanced but not unique—has a single simple purpose. That is to provide reservoirs of cheap labour for white industrial development. The contrast between Transkeian stagnation and border growth is not accidental. It is part

of the whole *raison d'être* for the Bantustan policy, and explains fully the rigid South African Government determination not to permit any 'white'—that is to say non-Transkeian—capital into the territory for investment or development purposes. White South African capital and state development funds are to be channelled into white South Africa. While the Transkei stagnates, therefore, the state Electricity Supply Commission (E.S.C.O.M.) has spent £17 million in the past six years in establishing power stations in the border areas. The state Water Affairs Department has approved schemes to the total of £16 million in water conservancy, irrigation and reticulation. Private capital has also been poured in, and for the period for which figures are available—1961 to 1964, it is estimated that £20 million was invested in new border industries, and a further £6 million in extensions to existing industries; government investment in the same period amounted to £6½ million. Some measure of border development can be gauged then from the available figures for state investment, which it can be assumed have continued at proportionately much the same rate in the later period.

THE NEW MONOPOLIES

What sort of development is this border industry? On the whole it is large, often very large industry, and quite a considerable part of it foreign-owned. Britain's Cyril Lord has established a large textile factory in a border area; Japan's Datsu Nissan has a £1¼ million vehicle assembly and manufacturing plant in another. In the Northern Transvaal area of Potgietersrust, a border area surrounded by African reserves, Mr. Kuschke of the State Industrial Development Corporation when opening a £3.7 million farm implement plant told the assembled audience—white—'According to the 1960 census there are 160,000 Africans in the Potgietersrust area, and 'not less than one million in surrounding areas. . . . This labour force provides a basis for large-scale industrial development in the area'. Figures given by the Minister in reply to a question in Parliament in February 1965 showed that the Industrial Development Corporation had advanced the following sums to industrialists in border areas:

	advances	value
For lease and purchase of factories:	34	£5.9 m.
Loans for equipment and working capital;	39	7.5 m.
Other financial aid:	18	5.6 m.

This gives an average of over £200,000 aid per enterprise. It must be rated not just absolutely, but also relative to the aid given by the state 'Bantu Investment Corporation' to African entrepreneurs in

the 'homelands'. In reply to a question by Mrs. Helen Suzman, the Minister told Parliament (26.3.65) that the loans granted by the B.I.C. in 1964 numbered forty-two, total value £225,000—an average of just over £5,000. Averages are perhaps misleading. Yet by contrast, it is reported that in the Northern Transvaal alone, fifteen industrial enterprises in border areas had received Government loans of £7.7 million, an average for each of more than twice the year's total advance from the Bantu Investment Corporation to all African businessmen.

The attractions of the border industries are much more than the mere financial assistance which is available to white entrepreneurs, and the presence of a plentiful labour supply. Every encouragement is given, special rates of taxation, specially favourable terms for power and water supply, specially favourable rates for rail transportation of goods. But above all, specially favourable wage rates. The border areas, lying well outside the established strongholds of trade unions, are deliberately excluded from the operations of industrial agreements and wage-and-condition legislation which apply in the main towns. Wages of Africans employed in what is officially designated a 'border area' clothing factory a few miles outside Durban are 28 per cent lower than those laid down by statutory industrial agreement in Durban itself. In a sewing machine factory wages are reported to be 'lower than in Japan'. (*Star*, 14.5.65.) The Japanese motor and truck assembly plants established outside Port Elizabeth and Pretoria in designated 'border areas' pay to coloured assembly line workers wages of less than £12 10s. per week; on this basis they have managed in a few years to capture one-third of the lorry market, and one-half of the light truck market. In the King William's Town area, where an industrial council—a statutory body composed of equal numbers of representatives of workers and employers—twice recommended an agreed wage for textile workers, there are two 'border area' factories. Twice the Minister of Labour refused to promulgate the agreement, and changed its terms to permit border area factories to pay 20 per cent less than the standard rate elsewhere. Figures issued by the Trade Union Council of South Africa (T.U.C.S.A.) show that some of the border area workers receive only half the wages paid for the same job in nearby towns, work a forty-five-hour week against the town's forty, and have shorter holidays or no holidays at all.

It is to keep this capitalist paradise staffed that the Bantustan policy exists. The African workers will commute, daily, from impoverished and stagnating 'homelands', to work in white enterprises in the 'border areas'. It is of this employer paradise that the South African Government propaganda paints an idyllic picture. But not everyone is deceived, even in the South African Parliament.

Mr. Hughes: Could the Minister tell us what transport facilities are available to Africans living in the Transkei to go to work every day?

The Minister: The honourable member must please give notice of that question.

Mr. Plewman: Arising out of the Minister's reply, will he please tell the house whether the government has any intention of establishing an industry for the manufacture of seven-league boots?

The question might well be asked. It is, unfortunately, not very funny. There is nothing worth while being spent on seven-league boots or any other form of transport in the Transkei. The plan is rather different. The people are being moved bodily from the places where they now live to new villages, set up close to the white borders—but not across them. Thus, of the £57 million earmarked for the development of all African areas under Verwoerd's so-called 'five-year plan', £42.5 million is to be spent on the establishment of new rural townships.

Thus Verwoerd's new deal for the African inhabitants of South Africa. It is this path on which Vorster will lead South Africa. Verwoerd managed to cover the reality of it with clouds of words, promises and visions. But for Vorster, camouflage is no longer possible. The Transkei stands as living testimony to the way the Bantustan policy works out in fact. Truth—like murder—must out.

AFRICA

Notes on Current Events

by SOL DUBULA

Sandhurst—A Lesson to All Africa

'THE GHANA COUP—FEBRUARY 24TH, 1966', by Colonel A. A. Afrifa, should be made compulsory reading for all in Africa who may still harbour the illusion that independence comes with the lowering of the foreign flag. In this book a man who played a leading part in the planning and execution of the coup demonstrates (though quite unintentionally) how he was ripened to play the role of neo-colonialism in Ghana.

A neo-colonialist collaborator is not only one who is on the secret pay-roll of the M.I.5 or the C.I.A. (although this must be so in many cases) but also one whose values have been so moulded by Western orientated training that he has contempt for his own people, their traditions and institutions and nothing but fawning admiration for those of his mentors. Bitter experience has demonstrated that to attempt the process of reconstruction and the consolidation of independence in Africa with men like Afrifa in important positions of State—whether in the Army or Civil Service—is an almost impossible task. And especially in the context of unstable conditions which are often the hallmark of a country which finds itself on the brink of major social changes, it is playing with fire to allow the military institutions of the colonial powers to train and, inevitably, corrupt those who will take command of the police and of the army.

In 1958 Afrifa, still an impressionable youth, was sent to Sandhurst. 'I was thrilled by Sandhurst,' says Afrifa, 'the beauty of its countryside

and its calm Wish stream which separated Sandhurst from the rest of the world. Sandhurst, so far, was the best part of my life—learning to be a soldier in a wonderful and mysterious institution with traditions going back to 1802.'

Did Afrifa ever wonder to himself that amongst the most consistent and not so mysterious traditions of this institution was the preparation of those who commanded armies of conquest which enslaved for so many centuries such a large area of Asia and Africa? Obviously he did not, or if it did cross his mind, it all became lost in a sort of enthusiasm for things martial as if bearing arms was in itself a noble and glorious act. 'It was' goes on Afrifa 'a good, solid, military school, where one pulled oneself up as a man. I met many boys of my age for whom there was nothing sweeter than bearing arms in the service of their country, boys to whom Her Majesty's army was a symbol of their very existence.' Amongst those whom he recalls having passed through 'one of the greatest institutions of the world' are men like King Hussein of Jordan and Ayub Khan of Pakistan.

It comes as no surprise that Afrifa's military lessons were supplemented by subjects such as Constitutional History—'we discussed problems frequently, particularly problems facing the Commonwealth which was assuming a new character with the independence of the African and Asian countries'.

Was it at these classes that the job of transforming the young Ghanaian into a black Englishman was so splendidly achieved? He not only expresses a great affection for the English breakfast (which he 'loves') but talks of the British Crown and its policy with an almost Tory-like reverence.

'Our severing of diplomatic relations with Her Majesty's Government of the United Kingdom over the Rhodesian issue was a rash and foolish step. It was in Kwame Nkrumah's scheme of self-glorification to break relations with Britain in this dramatic manner in which he did and in the same breath threaten the very existence of the Commonwealth. . . .'

As to where his loyalties lie in the tug-of-war between the forces of neo-colonialism and African unity, Colonel Afrifa leaves us in no doubt. 'Organisation of African Unity or no organisation of African Unity, I will claim my citizenship of Ghana and of the Commonwealth in any part of the world. I have been trained in the United Kingdom as a soldier and I am ever prepared to fight alongside my friends in the United Kingdom in the same way as the Canadians and the Australians will do.' Their breasts must be swelling with pride—those military pundits of Sandhurst—to read such stirring words from their protégé. He was certainly a good pupil. Despite a cliché here and there about

being proud of his Ghanaian citizenship, Afrifa makes clear the overriding role which the Union Jack plays in his life.

Perhaps the most disgusting and sick-making portion of Afrifa's unwitting self-revelation is that which deals with the struggle for Ghana's independence. The following could, almost word for word, have been written by one of the imperial spinsters who frequent Chatham House or by the official historian of the Colonial Office (and, for all one knows, might have been).

And while those big brains—J. B. Danquah, Akufo Addo, Obetsebi Lamptey and many others—advocated self-government step by step in the shortest possible time, Kwame Nkrumah insisted that it should be self-government 'now or never'. His majority of illiterate followers, to whom he promised bread and honey if they supported him—as if self-government did not mean hard work—disregarded brain and wisdom in favour of brawn. The British had no alternative—not that they believed it would work—but to grant to the country its independence as the wish of the majority of the people'.

And, to cap it all, read the following and see whether you have any doubt left as to the calibre of the men behind the Ghana coup:

The more the British tried to hand over power step by step, the more Kwame Nkrumah and his followers shouted for self-government 'now'. The British, duty conscious, tried to do that which was right against all odds, but the people had become so inflamed that they became violent. . . . This was a situation which Kwame Nkrumah exploited. The Colonial Government had to hand over power to the people. (My italics.)

Does it not read like a citation which usually accompanies the award of the Victoria Cross? In this case it is Her Majesty's gallant government which 'duty-conscious' and 'against all odds' tried to delay independence but was forced to retreat by the illiterate masses of Ghana!

Afrifa's admiration for the Imperialist-imposed political institutions knows no bounds. He complains bitterly that the previous generations under Nkrumah 'paid lip-service to the great institutions under which they were brought up. They mismanaged the affairs of Ghana, dissipated our heritage and abused our land'.

In almost every situation which involves a struggle between the people of Africa and their overlords, Afrifa uses words which demonstrate unequivocally whose interests he came back from Sandhurst to protect. During the U.N. Congo operation Afrifa was in command of an Engineers platoon. His narration of this episode again underlines that his affections for the Great White Chief extend beyond the British.

In the face of growing unrest and the near breakdown of civil law and order in the Congo, the Belgians had no option but to bow to the 'wind of change' which was then sweeping the whole Continent. Gradually they set about introducing measures giving a semblance of autonomy to the Congolese. At the same time, and for the first time, Congolese citizens were to be trained as administrators and eventually to take over the reins of government when independence was finally handed over. To Congolese Nationalists and the arch-enemy of imperialism, this was not enough.

Afrifa goes on to describe how Nkrumah 'worked on' Lumumba and invited him to Accra. 'Of course, this meeting was at the expense of the Ghanaian taxpayer.' Furthermore, Nkrumah helped split the Congo's National Progress Party which favoured a 'more natural change-over from Belgian rule to independence. At the same time he boosted up Lumumba's Party'.

'We had lost lives in a struggle which was not ours and in a cause that was not ours'. (Contrast this with his readiness to fight alongside the Canadians and Australians to defend Her Majesty's Commonwealth).

To Nkrumah and his aides the U.N. troops had failed the Congo because they could not eject Belgian troops. Of course, Patrice Lumumba was made to think likewise. Had he been left alone by his master-mind, Kwame Nkrumah, perhaps he would have realised the risk he was taking by deciding against U.N. troops and insisting upon troops from the East. Kwame Nkrumah had placed us in a terrible dilemma through an unbridled political adventure. He appointed and directed a stream of stupid ambassadors like A. Y. K. Djin and N. A. Welbeck, who did everything to obstruct the work of the U.N. in the Congo by their direct involvement and *interference on the side of Lumumba*. (My italics.)

A reader will be wasting his time if he searches in Afrifa's book for one word of criticism of imperialism, of the cruel oppression which the Ghanaians and other Africans were subjected to by it, of the distortions of the Ghanaian economy by imperialist economic policy in the interests of its sterling balances, etc., etc. Instead, every bit of muck which the Western press has thrown at Nkrumah's Ghana is swallowed by this lover of English breakfasts. He repeats without any qualification the exaggeration that 'Ghana was on the verge of famine. Commerce was at a standstill' under Nkrumah.

But now, almost unnoticed in the English daily and Sunday press, comes the publication of the Economic Survey 1965 published by the *present* Ministry of Information and Broadcasting for the Central Bureau of Statistics of Ghana. According to an analysis of the survey, by even such an anti-Nkrumah journal as *West Africa* (November 19th, 1966), 'Ghana's infra-structure improved rather than deteriorated under the Nkrumah regime'. In particular, there was a big increase in freight handled by Ghana Railways and water production by Ghana's Water-

works increased in 1965 by some 18.6 per cent. The population served with piped water, wells, bore-holes and ponds rose to some 32 per cent of the population. 1965 alone showed an increase in the generation of electricity of 9.1 per cent over 1964. In 1965 the two postal departments made tremendous improvements in their operation and made a surplus compared with a loss in 1964.

I do not claim that all was well with the Ghanaian economy when the coup occurred. But this report, for which no sort of Nkrumah bias can be claimed, nails the lie once again that Ghana under Nkrumah was in an economic quagmire. But let us return to Afrifa.

After the Congo operation he was again sent to the United Kingdom to the Infantry Schools at Hythe and Warminster. When he returned to Ghana from this course he became more interested in the political situation in his country. On his own admission he was deeply affected by the indirect indoctrination to which he was subjected during his second stay in the United Kingdom. 'Many questions were being asked about what was happening in my country. Having spent the best part of the year in the Congo, I could give no answers to these questions. People wanted to know why Nkrumah and Ghana were drifting towards Communism.'

Thus was prepared one of the men who was behind one of Africa's coups. It was not necessary that money should pass. It was not necessary that Whitehall should give the order. The legacy of slavish worship of the Master race and its institutions has been deeply imbedded in the minds of men like Afrifa. That this indoctrination was brought about with the co-operation of the very regime which he helped to destroy—for it is independent Ghana which sent him to Sandhurst—is one of the grave errors of the Nkrumah government. I wonder how many Afrifas there are at the moment being moulded by the Sandhursts of the West? How many of these men will be able to rise above the subtle ideological pummelling to which they are subjected in these institutions? I can only express the hope that the Afrifa book will alert those African governments to the extreme dangers of accepting this sort of 'assistance' from those who have never really accepted their technical withdrawal from the seat of power in Africa.

'West Africa' Makes Excuses for its Pets

You will remember the act of international thuggery when the Ankrah regime decided to arrest and detain the Guinea delegation which was on its way to Addis Ababa for the last meeting of the O.A.U. The

excuse given was that the Guinea authorities were detaining Ghanaians in Guinea against their will and were preventing them from returning to Ghana.

We now know that a mediation mission consisting of Mr. Justin Bomboka (Congo), Mr. Joseph Murumbi (Kenya) and Mr. John Nelson-Williams (Sierra Leone) visited both Accra and Conakry and in Conakry interviewed 81 Ghanaians whom the Ankrah regime alleged were being held against their will. According to Mr. Murumbi, each Ghanaian was interviewed separately and told that there was an aircraft at his disposal which would take him back to Ghana if he so wished. Said Mr. Murumbi: 'All 81 said that they did not want to leave and signed a statement to that effect.'

This comes as no surprise. But what should cause surprise is the following piece of disingenuous journalistic chicanery. Commenting on the report of the mediation mission, *West Africa* of November 12th, 1966, says:

Has Ghana lost face because in the end in spite of the agreement reached in Addis Ababa the O.A.U. could not find any Ghanaian in Guinea who was ready to return to Ghana? We think not. We pointed out last week that most of these Ghanaians were the ex-president's security men, many of whom would deservedly be arrested if they returned to Ghana. The rest were students, some of whom have already returned to Ghana; others might feel that their welcome there would be cool. Moreover, most of them can be said to have gone to Guinea by choice. No doubt some are held there against their wishes, but this is not easy to prove.

Not only is this last statement a serious reflection on the integrity of the three gentlemen who served on the mediation mission, but in the absence of a reference to one bit of evidence, it constitutes a deliberate lie.

I suppose one should not expect too much from a journal which appears to have dedicated itself to the cultivation of those forces in Africa which would be most acceptable to the huge private monopolies whose advertisements and company reports stud the pages of *West Africa*.

Africa and the Common Market

In this column in issue No. 26, we commented on the announcement that an agreement had been reached between Nigeria and the six members of the European Economic Community whereby Nigeria was made an Associate Member of the Common Market. Up to then there had been 18 nations in Africa with the status of Associate Member, and most of these were from the French-speaking territories.

We counselled a suspicious approach to an association with those who for centuries had used their economic power to bleed Africa dry.

Now comes some confirmation of this suspicion and from no less a source than M. Diori, Niger's President, who is also the Chairman of the French-speaking O.C.A.M. According to M. Diori, the States which were not associated with the Common Market had, in relation to the value of their exports, profited at the expense of the African 'Associated States'. The advantage which Associates have of not being required to pay the E.E.C.'s common external tariff levied against 'outside' countries is more than offset by the internal taxes which are imposed on such products. According to M. Diori, this 'in practical terms cancels out the preferences we get from the Yaoundé Convention'. He went on to point out that while the Common Market urged the African States to sell their products at world prices, 'as far as they themselves are concerned the notion of selling at competitive prices is absolutely unknown'. By this hypocritical process the 'Big Six' can ensure (and have in fact ensured) that the relationship remains an unequal one. For example, consistent with this attitude, the E.E.C.'s vegetable oil is protected at around 80 per cent higher than prevailing world prices.

Let us once again remember the age-old proverb: 'Fear the Greeks—especially when they come bearing gifts.'

Malawi

Once again Malawi found itself in the camp of the imperialists when the General Assembly of the United Nations passed the 54-Nation resolution which called for the establishment of a 14-member ad hoc committee to recommend practical measures by which South West Africa should be administered so as to enable the territory to exercise the right of self-determination and to achieve independence. The resolution was passed by 114 votes to 2 (South Africa and Portugal) with France, the United Kingdom and Malawi abstaining.

What is the value of independence if a country's policy is determined by the need to appease the White racist Vorster regime or the Smith clique? No one belittles the real problem facing South Africa's smaller neighbours, whose economies are very much linked with South Africa's. But if this factor is taken too far, the mass of South Africa's non-whites will have as little hope of some sort of solidarity from these countries as they have from Matanzima's Transkei.

Congo--Kinshasa

Very few individuals outside the group which stands for and supports colonialism and neo-colonialism, ever doubted that the chaos of the post-1960 Congo situation was manipulated by financial interests.

In a recent book by Jules Chomé, a Belgian lawyer (*Moise Tshombe et L'Escroquerie Katangaise*) it is proved beyond a shadow of a doubt by means of documentary and other evidence that the pawn Tshombe was, in the words of Chomé, created by the Colonial milieu in conjunction with the Union Minière of Upper Katanga. This preparation for Katanga secession was made long before Independence and the revelation nails the lie of the Belgian authorities that they had nothing to do with it.

The imperialist-created chaos of the last six years in the Congo has been of the utmost value to the racialists and their supporters. The cry of 'What about the Congo?' studded the editorial outpourings of the Western press each time it discussed Africa's problems. That the same forces are still making efforts to manipulate the situation becomes clear once again from the announcement by the Mobutu Government that all foreign consulates outside Kinshasa would be closed and no new consulates would be allowed before the promulgation of new legislation concerning consular representation. When this decree is enforced foreign diplomats will have to have special permission to travel outside Kinshasa.

The reason for this, according to President Mobutu is 'to check the activities of imperialism, colonialism and neo-colonialism'. The decree will affect four Belgian, three United States, three West German, one U.K. and one French Embassy outside Kinshasa. It should be noticed that none of the Socialist countries have found it necessary to have a multiplicity of diplomatic establishments outside the capital. The lesson is clear. In the words of President Mobutu 'we have been told for a long time that Communist countries were responsible for subversion. But there is very little Communist representation in the Congo. We must ask who is responsible for the Kisangani mutiny and the Bukavu and Albertville incidents. The answer is that it is the Western countries, those which claim to act in the name of Western civilisation. . . . Freedom and independence are far more precious to us than the sacks of rice we are offered. What we want most is to be able to conduct our own affairs in peace'.

President Mobutu has also announced that an international pilgrimage centre would be made of the place where the former Prime Minister, Patrice Lumumba was murdered. We can only hope that in the not

too distant future the murderers of Lumumba and those behind them will be completely eradicated from Congolese national life.

Zambia

Following the report of the Brown Commission into pay and conditions in the copper mining industry which recommended a rise for African mineworkers, the copper mining companies in Zambia have agreed to raise the earning of African mineworkers by 22 per cent as from October 1st, 1966. The report also attacks racialism amongst the expatriate miners and recommends recruitment from places other than South Africa. It also recommends the abolition of discrimination in everything from 'wages and leave to toilets'.

Company Profits

In the company report for the first nine months of 1966 Unilever complains that in a large part of tropical Africa conditions continue to be disturbed with resulting adverse effects on profits. In the same report it is announced that the combined results of Unilever Limited and N.V. pre-tax profit was £92.5 million for the first nine months of 1966, compared with £89.6 million in the first nine months of 1965. The net profits for the same period stands at £48.6 million compared to £48.3 million in 1965.

Guinea

Writing in *World Marxist Review* (No. 11) on the *Guinean Experience and Progressive Development in Africa*, Sikhe Camara, a member of the Democratic Party of Guinea and Guinea's Ambassador to the U.S.S.R., shows clearly that his Party and Government is conscious of the danger facing the newly independent States in Africa from imperialist intrigues:

The men who over the years had organised the resettlement of its peoples, destroyed its social structure, occupied its territory, in a word who systematically despoiled the continent, have not changed. Resorting to more veiled forms, acting more subtly and therefore all the more dangerous, they repeat or try to repeat the things done in the past. This new system of indirect domination, which is more effective and more in keeping with the period of decolonialisation, is known as neo-colonialism.

The Democratic Party of Guinea has continuously sought effective means for abolishing economic and military domination. It is conscious too of the need to overcome the dangerous survivals of the colonial era in the sphere of education and in the consciousness of the people.

The main weapon in this struggle is the Democratic Party of Guinea whose special character is described by Sékou Touré in his book *The Guinean Experience and African Unity*.

From the very moment the Democratic Party was founded, our wish was that it should not resemble the political parties in the European sense. Our party remained a broad movement for the liberation of Africa, whose mission it is to unite all Africans of goodwill around an anti-colonial and progressive platform. Thus plantation owners, merchants, chiefs and their subordinates, men and women, Muslims, Catholics, Protestants and those 'without religion' can find a place in the party provided they accept its programme.

Camara deals with the steps which were taken in the economic sphere to lay the foundations for an independent economy. These steps included a State monopoly of foreign trade, creation of an independent monetary system and National Bank, nationalisation of electric power and transport companies, of real estate societies, foreign banks, insurance companies, etc.

In coup-torn Africa, the measures taken by Guinea's National Council of Revolution is of special interest. These include the organising of civil defence brigades, a people's militia and an increase in the army personnel of the so-called border Federations in order to prevent an attempt which may be made to stage a coup from the outside. 'The army in Guinea is not a separate unit isolated from the rest of society and is, therefore, a reliable sentinel of the people's future and the Republic's sovereignty. The D.P.G. constantly sees to it that the army's morale and efficiency are on a high level.'

Camara deals also with certain general characteristics of countries which have embarked on the path of building a non-capitalist democracy. He states that regimes of this character guarantee not only democratic liberties but social rights including the right to work. In addition 'to restore the equilibrium unjustly upset in the past, the new regime must grant privileges to the formerly disinherited social strata and recognise the paramount importance of the working people'. On the multi-party system, he comments:

In the new countries the system of rival parties is hardly desirable, and even harmful, since in most of the regions of tropical Africa class differentiation is not the decisive factor in social life. During the colonial period all sections of the population of the continent suffered the same deprivations, persecution, inequality and injustice, in a word, all found themselves

in the same position. Even if some social classes did emerge in some of the countries they are of minor importance, and the contradictions between them are far from the stage when clashes break out spontaneously and become inevitable.

Dealing with the O.A.U., Camara makes the point that it would have achieved far more were it not for the intrigues of the imperialists who 'are acting hand-in-glove with the native reactionaries now again rearing their heads in our continent'.

Sudan

A NEW CRISIS has developed in Sudan arising over the illegal banning by the right-wing government of the Communist Party, which played a leading role in toppling the hated military dictatorship. The Party, which had claimed from the start that the law declaring it illegal was unconstitutional, appealed to the Supreme Court, which duly upheld the Communist Party's right to exist and ruled that the law banning it was *ultra vires* the Constitution.

But the reactionary government refused to accept the Court's ruling and has continued to suppress Party activity by administrative methods. This has led to a storm of protest from workers and intellectuals; the fight for democracy and the rule of law still continues in this strife-torn country.

BOOK REVIEWS

African History: Professor Sik's Second Volume

The History of Black Africa, Vol. II, by Endre Sik (Academy of Sciences, Budapest, Hungary. 70s. in Britain).

THIS IS THE second volume of this three-volume work to appear in English.* As in his first volume, Professor Endre Sik analyses the history of four-fifths of the African continent. This book covers the period 1900-1939. This major work by a Marxist historian is a pioneering effort that opens the way for other Marxist scholars. He has put together a jigsaw puzzle of African struggles and imperialist machinations in the territories seized by England, France, Italy, Belgium and Portugal.

His work describes how financiers, mine magnates, industrialists, landowners and their agents exploited Africa's wealth and peoples with only one aim in view, and that was to extract the maximum profit in the shortest time.

The author has devoted many years to studying the national liberation movements of Africa and Asia. His book has grown out of his interest in and contact with the struggle against imperialism and colonialism. It is a work of great labour and love that reflects his sympathy with the oppressed and hatred towards the imperialists. His hatred, especially of British imperialism, has led him at times to make faulty evaluations, notably in his treatment of Afrikaner (Boer) nationalism in South Africa.

* The first was reviewed in *The African Communist*, No. 25.

In Sik's account of South Africa he tends to concentrate on the conflict between British finance capital and Boer nationalism. Though the theme is not unimportant, this concentration tends to divert attention from the basic identity of interests of the two groups in relation to the African, Coloured and Indian peoples—the majority of the population, who often looked to Britain for assistance against the virulent racialism of the Afrikaner. As pointed out in the Communist Party's programme *The Road to South African Freedom* (adopted in 1962):

In the oppression, dispossession and exploitation of the non-Whites, British imperialism and Afrikaner nationalism found common ground. This was the basis for the establishment of the Union of South Africa in 1910.

In fact, British and Boer imperialism, despite their rivalry and competition, co-operated with one another in oppressing the working people. The special form of colonialism in South Africa is that of an imperial power dominating an oppressed colonial people within its borders. It is this correct understanding which seems to have eluded our author.

Contrary to the impression given by Professor Sik, Louis Botha and Smuts served the interests of both finance capital and the land-owners. The 'Pact Government' of 1924 was not 'a compromise between the Boer nationalists and British finance capital' as he states (page 150); it was rather an alliance (a coalition government of the Nationalist Party and the S.A. Labour Party) between the big land-owners and the White labour aristocracy—at the expense of the African workers and peasants. It introduced the Industrial Conciliation Act of 1924 and the Mines and Works ('Colour Bar') Act—laws which gave to skilled workers' trade unions the legal recognition and status denied to African workers, and which closed skilled jobs to Africans. Thus this Government established the privileged position of a section of the working class and initiated the historical process of degeneration of the once militant labour movement of the skilled workers which paved the way to its virtual disappearance and to the fascist South Africa of today.

Professor Sik has taken much trouble in examining the primary sources available to him. It is evident to our great regret that he did not have access to much of the material needed for a correct study of the working class and national liberation movements. This is the reason why he made incorrect evaluations of such major events as the introduction of the industrial colour bar, the 'Rand revolt' of 1922, and of the role of the early socialists and communists, of the A.P.O. (which he ignores) and of the African National Congress.

He describes S. P. Bunting, a founder of the Communist Party, as an opportunist and a racist. He asserts that the Party had a colour bar, and that until 1928 it was chauvinist, sectarian and opportunistic (page 153). Such sweeping allegations are false and unjust. The Communist Party of South Africa never had a colour bar, though some of its members retained certain of the prejudices and reformism that belonged to their Labour Party antecedents. The founders of the Party—the trade unionists and intellectuals like Bill Andrews, C. B. Tyler, S. P. Bunting and D. I. Jones who organised and led the Party in its early years—never faltered in their adherence to Marxist principles and were deeply involved and closely linked with the labour movement. They were engrossed in the workers' struggle against capital. 'To be with the workers, wherever they are, in struggle or defeat'—this was their motto.

It is true that because of their absorption in the class struggles of the organised workers—at a time when African trade unionism was in its infancy—many of the pioneer Communists did not correctly interpret the Leninist policy of the Communist International regarding the national liberation movement. But S. P. Bunting and Ivon Jones in particular insisted that the Marxists should make the liberation of the African, Coloured and Indian people from national oppression a primary aim of the revolutionary movement. S. P. Bunting suffered much for his principles and never surrendered them. He was no chauvinist, though like other Communists of his time he failed to arrive at a correct appreciation of the white workers' racial prejudices, and believed that the 'class struggle' would force them into solidarity with the Africans. Events have shown that this was a false optimism, which did not foresee the role of the white labour aristocracy as a junior partner of a Nazified Afrikaner nationalism in the ruthless oppression and exploitation of the Africans under the system of apartheid and white domination. Professor Sik's failure to make such assessments detracts from the usefulness of the present volume.

But whatever their shortcomings, our early pioneers made an immortal contribution to the history of our country. They founded a great Party. It has played a glorious role in our people's hard fight for liberation and socialism and will continue to do so. Their organisational and Marxist educational work among the masses of workers and oppressed people made a profound and enduring impression and helped give our labour and national liberation movements that exceptionally progressive character, resoluteness and maturity which enabled them to withstand and fight back against the most severe persecution, which earn them a foremost place in Africa and the

world, and which will lead our people forward in our revolution to victory.

The history of the Communist Party and the relations between class and national liberation forces in South Africa has still to be written.

R. E. BRAVERMAN.

Who Owns the Press in Africa ?

The Press in Africa, by Rosalynde Ainslie (Gollancz, London 1966, 38s.)

ONE OF THE most astonishing features of independent and free Africa is the manner in which a hostile, imperialist-controlled press has been allowed to continue functioning with relatively little interference. This misplaced tolerance can hardly be regarded as an example of respect for the principle of freedom of the press which is not in issue in Africa for most countries. Rather is it an indication of the continuing strength of imperialist control of the commanding heights of the economy in Africa of which "Communications" are an essential part.

During the struggle for independence from the period of the Scramble for Africa to our day Africans have felt very keenly the frustration of imperialist-controlled instruments of communication. Newspapers, popular and serious literature, and later radio were used effectively to denigrate African culture and aspirations; history was distorted so as to provide justification for conquest and domination of our people; the efforts of the people to free themselves were belittled; Africans were consistently projected as inferiors who were savage, corrupt and incapable of governing themselves; Africa was insulated from the most progressive ideas of the epoch and tendentious notions of international affairs were imposed on them.

With all these bitter experiences one would have expected that whatever else they tolerated African states would promptly assume complete control of mass media including the press, radio, printing and publishing, television, telephonic and telegraphic institutions. Certainly it would be ridiculous to allow the erstwhile imperialist enemy to retain ownership directly or indirectly of such a vital part of government. This has not happened.

It is true that there has been a great expansion of services in this field all over Africa. Governments have started or expanded radio

services. With the rapid growth of educational facilities the potential of newspaper readers and radio listeners is growing fast. News agencies and newspapers have been started. Yet by and large it can be said that Africa does not control the mass media. This is an intolerable state of affairs.

All this has been recognised by African political organisations and numerous resolutions have been passed at Pan-African conferences and by the Organisation for African Unity urging the setting up of press and news agencies controlled by Africans. But apart from the doubtful expedient of deporting foreign journalists nothing really fundamental is being done to end imperialist influence of mass communications in Africa.

Yet this is a most vital element in the struggle for national independence and freedom. By using the hoary weapon of anti-communism the imperialists have regretfully caused a number of Africans to think that African control of the press, news agencies and so on is somehow linked with 'communism'. This is because African control under present conditions can only mean public or state control except in a few countries. Such an attitude is clearly nonsensical. Would the French, British or other nations really tolerate a situation in which practically all their vital centres of communication were owned by foreigners inside their countries? Already the tendency for American influence to grow over certain sectors of mass media such as films is arousing apprehension and opposition in Europe. In other words the issue here is the *national* struggle for independence and freedom. The question is whether the imperialists should be allowed to exercise such influence over communications and education in Africa? That is why the hypocritical talk of alleged 'threats against freedom of the press' with reference to Africa by certain Western commentators is so much poppycock. The African people must assume control of all means of communication on their continent in the interests of their emancipation.

The subject is of such importance to Africa that the absence of literature dealing with it comes as a surprise. Hence the book by Miss Ainslie is all the more welcome to all genuine supporters of African freedom and independence.

Miss Ainslie modestly remarks that this book is not by an 'expert' nor is it 'a thorough survey of the subject'. Having read hundreds of rave notices in the imperialist press on books by so-called 'experts' on Africa which are not worth the paper they are printed on we have no hesitation whatsoever in disagreeing with Miss Ainslie's assessment of her book. This book contains a very comprehensive survey of the African press both in the past and present with an astonishing amount

of factual material. Furthermore, all the real and crucial issues affecting 'communications' in Africa in their widest sense have been dealt with in this excellent book. This is not to say that the academic researcher could not find any inadequacies in the book. There are. But here we have the first book to deal with the subject in so complete a manner.

Miss Ainslie first of all gives a useful region by region historical survey of the press in Africa. She then deals with the position that developed after the Second World War and finally the present situation in both liberated and unliberated Africa.

Very interesting material has been included in the book on the international news agencies, radio and television. The effects of the colonial legacy on postal, transport and telecommunications systems is also examined. The absurd situation whereby Zambian Ministers could not communicate abroad except through Salisbury—the capital of the rebel Smith regime—is eloquent testimony to the need to break with the imperialist past.

Throughout, Miss Ainslie gives fascinating examples of how events and issues vital to Africa have been influenced to our disadvantage by the imperialist news and press agencies. The notorious invasion of Stanleyville in 1964 by Belgian paratroops is very well dealt with in the book. The use of the mass media and communications as an instrument of counter-revolution and subversion by the imperialists is proved to the hilt.

To the false and hypocritical cry of 'freedom of the press' with which the imperialists seek to confuse the issues Miss Ainslie shows how revolutionary governments will seek to expand and foster mass media as a means of spreading education, national unity, economic and social ideas for modernisation, and consolidation of independence. These are the major tasks faced by most countries in Africa. Not the freedom of individuals or private companies to own and publish news. In any case, after filching the wealth of Africa for decades the imperialists can hardly expect to be allowed to use this ill-gotten wealth to give them an unfair advantage. Individuals in Africa do not have the kind of capital required for these enterprises. Only public ownership or the state can afford it.

Of great interest to African patriots is the effect on African unity of the present unhealthy situation of dependence on the imperialists in the communications field. The imperialists through their control over the distribution of news, literature and books can virtually manufacture dissension and divisions among and between African States. Thus the imperialists can publish stories indicating that hundreds of Ghanaians are held prisoner in Guinea and cause great indignation in the latter country. By the time the facts were established the damage

would be done. Similarly, stories of White nuns (it is always nuns, never women) being raped can be put out to influence a situation before facts can be checked which prove the allegation untrue. This has happened over and over again in the Congo (Kinshasa). To what extent are some of the inter-African crises artificially fomented? One way of solving the problem is not to engage in endless debate with the imperialists but simply to make it impossible for this sort of mischief to occur by taking control of the mass media.

Miss Ainslie herself obviously looks on this book not as an academic treatise but as a challenge to Africa—a programme of action in the press and communications field. Unless Africans control their press, radio and communications their independence is incomplete.

As for the imperialist attitude to this book we would like to predict that either all manner of irrelevant accusations will be hurled at Miss Ainslie without serious review of what the book contains or alternatively there will be an angry silence. It is the duty of all liberation organisations and independent African states to see that this important book reaches every corner of our continent.

A.Z.



RHODESIA—THE CASE FOR ACTION

Address by Julius K. Nyerere, President of Tanzania, at the session of the Organisation of African Unity, Addis Ababa, November 1966.

IN OCTOBER 1965, at the time of the O.A.U. meeting at Accra, there was a clear basic opposition between the Southern Rhodesian authorities on the one hand, and free Africa on the other, with the United Kingdom's position being ambiguous.

Africa objected to the continuation of the white minority rule in the British colony of Southern Rhodesia, and demanded independence on the basis of majority rule. In other words, Africa wanted two things: firstly, some form of democratically elected government responsible to the majority of the people, and secondly, independence. We recognised that independence without majority rule was useless, and would represent a worsening of the situation.

The Rhodesian Whites' position was that their domination was not sufficiently secure while they remained a British colony. The fact that they had gradually secured complete control of Rhodesian internal affairs, and even had their own army, air force and armed police force, did not satisfy them. They resented Rhodesian affairs being subject even technically to the British Parliament.

The real position of Britain was, in October 1965, a matter about which there was some argument. Although their post-war policy position had been that all their colonies should achieve independence on a democratic basis, there were many grounds for the suspicion of certain African countries that Rhodesia was being regarded as an exception. In particular, at the Commonwealth Conferences of 1964 and 1965, successive British Governments had refused to give a British commitment that there would be no independence for Southern

Rhodesia before majority rule existed. Further, negotiations with the Smith Government had been proceeding for many months in the face of public threats of a Unilateral Declaration of Independence, and the threats themselves had not called forth any response in action from Britain. In October 1964, on coming to power, Prime Minister Wilson had said 'a declaration of independence would be an open act of defiance and rebellion and it would be treasonable to take steps to give effect to it'; but statements had also been made, subsequent to that, indicating clearly that military measures would not be used to suppress such a rebellion.

At the Accra O.A.U. meeting, African Heads of Government therefore spent some considerable time discussing the Rhodesian situation. At the end of this discussion they agreed to a conditional resolution which specified various steps which might be taken in the event of a declaration of independence by Rhodesia and an inadequate British response to it. One of these steps was reconsideration of the African states' diplomatic relations with Britain under certain circumstances.

THE EVENTS SINCE THE ACCRA CONFERENCE

1. Further British-Rhodesian Negotiations

Almost simultaneously with the ending of the O.A.U. Conference, the British Prime Minister flew to Salisbury for further discussions with the Smith regime. The content of these discussions has since been published by the British Government; the document shows that the suspicions of some African States were justified. The British willingness to compromise on the basic principle is clear, and during these discussions the British Government even weakened the effect of their own 'principle number 5', by saying that 'the opinion of the people of Rhodesia as a whole' could be ascertained by a joint British and Rhodesian Royal Commission instead of through a democratic vote. The only thing they insisted upon was that the Royal Commission report was to be unanimous.

After his return to London, Prime Minister Wilson continued his efforts to avoid U.D.I. by refusing to accept a deadlock and always making new proposals when Smith refused earlier ones. Then, however, on November 1st, Mr. Wilson specifically told the British Parliament that force would not be used against Rhodesia, even to deal with an illegal assertion of independence. This had been indicated earlier, but never in such unambiguous terms.

2. U.D.I. and the British Reaction

On November 11th, 1965, the Smith regime declared Southern Rhodesia to be independent. It immediately became apparent that

the British were not prepared for it! Strong words were spoken, and a series of totally ineffective sanctions were introduced. All of these sanctions were imposed gradually (it was not until February that Britain banned all purchases from Rhodesia), and in such doses that Rhodesia was able to adjust itself. It is also relevant that immediately after U.D.I. the British Foreign Secretary flew to the United Nations in order to ask for support for the British measures and to prevent the United Nations itself intervening. He succeeded in this endeavour.

Late in November Zambia asked Britain for an air force unit to protect her air space, and for British ground troops to occupy the Kariba Dam (which was jointly owned with Rhodesia and which supplied most of the electric power for the Zambia Copper Belt). Zambia received an air force unit, which was stationed at the Lusaka and Ndola Airports. Britain replied to the request for ground troops at Kariba by offering to station troops in the Zambia capital and in the north of Zambia on the Copper Belt!

3. O.A.U. Foreign Ministers' Meeting in Abbis Ababa

On December 2nd the Foreign Ministers agreed on certain steps to be taken by all independent African States. They were: (a) a complete boycott of Southern Rhodesian goods and the ending of all communications with that colony; and (b) the breaking of diplomatic relations with Britain if, by December 15th, she had not crushed the rebellion and restored law and order in Rhodesia.

Before coming to this decision the Foreign Ministers had considered all the steps which Britain had taken to end the illegal regime. They had noticed the reluctance with which sanctions had been imposed, and the fact that no action was being taken to prevent Portugal and South Africa pouring goods into the colony. They had also considered the difficult position of Zambia, and the British unreadiness—and apparent unwillingness—to relieve that independent African State of the consequences either of the rebellion or the method by which Britain had chosen to deal with it.

To this African ultimatum Britain's only response was to accuse free Africa of irresponsibility. And in the event only nine of the African States represented at Addis Ababa honoured the resolution—two of whom have since resumed diplomatic relations with the United Kingdom.

On December 17th however—that is, two days later—the British Government announced oil sanctions against Rhodesia. In the following week a British air-lift of petrol and oil products for Zambia was instituted from Dar es Salaam, Nairobi and the Congo. At the same time much greater supplies began to flow from Tanzania by road to

Zambia. There had, however, apparently been no steps taken to enforce the oil blockade against Rhodesia; after an initial hesitation by the South African Government, supplies in large quantities began to pour in from South Africa. At one time (the present position is unclear) some oil supplies were even going to Rhodesia on the rail running through the then British Protectorate of Bechuanaland!

4. Lagos Commonwealth Conference

Held in January, this special Commonwealth Conference on the subject of Rhodesia was called on the initiative of the Prime Minister of Nigeria, the late Alhaji Sir Abubakar Tafawa Balewa. The conference was most notable for the British Prime Minister's statement that sanctions would bring down the Smith Government in weeks rather than months—a statement which those attending assumed was being made on the basis of British Intelligence work and therefore accepted in good faith. Nonetheless, they insisted upon the setting up of a special Commonwealth Sanctions Committee and an undertaking that a further meeting would be held in July (i.e. six months later) if the rebellion had not by then been brought to an end.

5. Security Council Resolution of April, 1966

The sanctions committee met regularly in London from February until September. It may have had some influence on the British decision in April, to ask the Security Council for authority to stop oil tankers bringing crude oil to Beira for pumping through the pipe-line to the refinery in Rhodesia. This authority was granted, and one ship was stopped from entering Beira harbour, and another was prevented from discharging her oil. The resolution, which was framed by Britain, made no mention of oil supplies through South Africa, nor those landed at Lourenço Marques in Mozambique. Britain refused to accept any amendment which covered these points.

6. Talks with the Smith Regime

Later in the month of April, at the request of the Smith regime, British officials were sent to Salisbury to begin what has turned out to be a protracted series of 'talks about talks'. Great secrecy has been maintained as to the content of these talks, and the British Government has maintained the pretence that no negotiations are being carried on with the illegal regime. Four months later, however, the British Government ostentatiously withdrew its officials just before the delayed Commonwealth Conference was held in September 1966. They did this on the grounds that new Rhodesian 'Legislation' contravened the 'entrenched clauses' of the 1961 Constitution.

After the Commonwealth Conference, on the grounds that the decisions there had to be explained to the people of Rhodesia, the British Government first sent officials back to Salisbury, and later sent two senior Ministers for discussions with Mr. Smith. They are reported to have had three separate long meetings with the White minority leader.

7. Commonwealth Conference, September 1966

At this conference, held in London, almost a full week was spent discussing the Rhodesian situation. African members first directed attention to the objective in Rhodesia. But despite the almost unanimous demands from Afro-Asian and Caribbean members, supported by Canada, for a British commitment to the principle of majority rule before independence, the meeting concluded without such a commitment. What was obtained from Britain was the admission that Britain is prepared to grant independence to Rhodesia on the basis of a racial minority government, and would only withdraw this willingness under certain conditions.

The British Government stated, in the Conference communiqué and afterwards, that Smith would be offered a last chance to accept the proposed terms of independence on the basis of racial minority rule. If Smith rejects those terms, Britain would take two steps. Firstly, Britain would 'before the end of the year' go to the United Nations and ask for selective mandatory sanctions against Rhodesia on condition that she received the 'support of the Commonwealth as a whole' for her request. Secondly, if this condition was fulfilled, but not otherwise, Britain would at the same time declare that independence for Rhodesia would only be granted on the basis of majority rule.

THE CURRENT POSITION

Thus, one year after the white racialists declared themselves independent, they are still in power, with no obvious likelihood of their falling in the near future. Sanctions against them have undoubtedly caused some difficulty, and may have some long-term effects. But they have not had the desired effect. Goods of all kinds seem to be coming through to Rhodesia from South Africa and Mozambique, and the trade statistics of at least one European country (Germany) have revealed an increase in trade with Rhodesia since U.D.I. In fact, although we are constantly promised that the economy of the colony will become bankrupt because of unsold tobacco, lack of foreign exchange, etc. or that the whites will begin to leave the country, the truth is that the white Rhodesians seem to be remarkably unaffected.

Most of all, they are clearly convinced that if they can only hold on a little while their position will be accepted.

Neither has there been any mass unrest from the African population. Both nationalist political parties had been effectively broken even before U.D.I., and the continued detention of the leaders, combined with ruthless suppression of the first sign of discontent, has effectively controlled the position. Incursions of freedom fighters from outside have been few, and although censorship prevents an accurate assessment it would appear that most groups have been picked up soon after arrival. The effect of this activity has therefore been very limited up to now—except to provide a ‘public-relations’ excuse for further oppression.

The independent state of Zambia, on the other hand, has suffered considerably—both from the rebellion itself and the measures which have been selected to deal with it. Her power supplies are at constant risk, as is the fuel she needs for her vital copper industry, and her imports now have to come through Beira and Malawi or through the long Northern route, unless she is to break the boycott completely. In addition, the inherited structure of her economy and the lack of indigenous skilled personnel means that many of the people in industrial key positions are sympathetic to the racialist governments of Southern Rhodesia and South Africa. The Zambian Government has faced these difficulties with remarkable courage and political skill; the British failure to give her unstinted support has, however, inevitably reduced the extent to which this border country can take active steps against Rhodesia.

THE CASE FOR ACTION

In October and early December 1965, all-African meetings determined on certain actions which it was hoped would cause a speeding up of movement towards democratic independence for Rhodesia. After the Addis Ababa meeting, however, the majority of states had second thoughts about the wisdom and efficacy of one of the actions agreed. In particular, these states felt that the resolution to break diplomatic relations with Britain betrayed an unnecessary suspicion of British intentions, that it gave insufficient time for Britain to bring down the Smith regime, and possibly that the action proposed would not have the desired result.

Eleven months have passed since the Foreign Ministers passed their resolution. Do these considerations still apply? It is worth considering the position in some detail.

1. First and foremost, the majority of African States were, at the time of the Accra Conference, working on the assumption that Britain's

refusal to commit herself to majority rule before independence was a tactical move designed to avoid U.D.I. The refusal to give such an assurance even privately was discounted on the grounds that a private assurance to so large and disparate a group as the Commonwealth Conference might not have remained private. Quite apart from the temptations to which African leaders under pressure from radical elements might be subject, the fundamental opposition to Smith of some other Commonwealth leaders was thought to be a matter for doubt.

Britain's willingness to concede independence before majority rule is not any longer a matter for dispute. The British Prime Minister has himself agreed that 'if the people of Rhodesia as a whole' are shown to be in favour of independence before majority rule, then the British Government will agree to it. Further, the British Government has made it clear that this agreement or otherwise will not be tested by a referendum. Finally, the British Government has said that Britain will make the demanded commitment 'before the end of the year' if (a) by that time the Smith regime has not accepted the terms he is now offering them; and (b) if the 'Commonwealth as a whole' supports the promised British proposals for selective mandatory economic sanctions.

In other words, Britain has said that she will make this fundamental commitment on principle if the Smith regime does not accept the British terms for betraying the principle, and if Africa 'behaves itself' by allowing Britain to determine the pace of action against Southern Rhodesia.

2. In December 1965, the Foreign Ministers' resolution rested on the assumption that Britain was not acting with determination against the rebellion. Some countries questioned this; they said that Britain's policy of sanctions had not had time to have their effect, that the gradual 'tightening of the screw' was aimed at giving encouragement and opportunity to white opposition groups within Rhodesia, and that the British Prime Minister in particular was fully committed to the downfall of the Smith regime.

These questions may have been reasonable less than a month after U.D.I. Are they reasonable after twelve months?

A whole year has gone by without sanctions bringing the Smith Government even into disrepute among the whites of that colony. Few have left the country, and the Southern Rhodesian Government budget was less severe than that of the British Government—which does not suggest national bankruptcy! The expected 'white liberals' have also failed to materialise in any significant numbers. A few individual white people have been placed in restriction, detained, or

imprisoned on trumped-up charges; any others are so overwhelmingly outnumbered that they are clearly helpless in the present situation.

But it is British determination to bring this situation to an honourable and quick end which is really in question now. The British Government has consistently refused to say that it will take whatever action is necessary to bring the Smith regime down. It has repeated on every conceivable occasion that force will not be used to achieve a constitutional settlement. It has objected to mandatory United Nations economic sanctions on the grounds that they would lead to force (which would, of course, only happen if the economic sanctions were ineffective for their purpose). Further, the British Opposition Party is constantly attacking the British Government for taking 'punitive' action against the rebels, and sending its leaders to Rhodesia to 'try and bring about a peaceful settlement of the dispute'.

Thus the Rhodesian Government might reasonably believe that if they can only negotiate the present difficulties and be seen to be firmly in control, then they will gradually secure 'de jure' recognition internationally and the boycott will collapse. This is a very different prospect from knowing that if the present economic measures do not lead to surrender then military force will be used. But British policy up to this moment precludes such knowledge.

3. A further objection which may have been raised by African states in December 1965, is that it was unrealistic to expect the British Government to act in response to an ultimatum. In support of this argument they can point to the fact that oil sanctions were imposed on December 17th—two days after Africa's deadline—and suggest that the O.A.U. Resolution might even have had the effect of delaying this action. This argument would betray a rather naïve and one-sided view of national prestige. For it would not have been very good for British prestige if 36 diplomatic missions from Africa had returned to Whitehall together.

But even if this argument were valid, and even assuming that British pride made it impossible for her to give advance notice to the countries whose support she would need in this operation, this does not account for the failure to take effective action since that date. There has been no ultimatum since December 1965. Why then has there been such a continued reluctance to take strong action against the Rhodesian regime?

4. Some African countries pointed out that at the time of the Declaration of Independence, and in December 1965, the British Government had a Parliamentary majority of three and was consequently unwilling to take any action which would have been very unpopular with the

British public. This fact was used to account for Britain's promise not to use force, and the initially mild form of sanctions.

On March 30th. 1966, however, a new General Election returned the same government with a majority of almost 100 Members of Parliament. The April appeal to the United Nations for authority to stop oil tankers going into Beira appeared at first glance to be the kind of action which the previous political situation had inhibited. It may have been. But, if so, it is difficult to understand why the switch of Rhodesian oil supplies to South African ports and to Lourenço Marques (which could have been foreseen) has not brought a similar response. The British Government's Parliamentary majority is still nearly 100, but Rhodesia is clearly in no particular difficulty about oil supplies. If the British Government were anxious to bring down the regime, would this situation be allowed to continue?

5. In recent months a new reason for British inaction has been advanced, and that is the British international monetary crisis. It is said that this makes it impossible for the British Government to take any action which would not meet with the approval of International Bankers, or which might lead to a further run on sterling.

This may be a good reason why Britain could not itself undertake an expensive military exercise without at least American support. It is also a good reason why Britain should be willing to hand the whole Rhodesian issue over to the United Nations. But in fact she had strongly resisted any suggestion that this should be done. Why does she do this if her reason for inaction is real economic inability? The answer can only be that this is an excuse, not a reason.

6. In 1965 it was argued that Britain's reluctance to invoke Chapter 7 of the United Nations Charter arose from her belief that South Africa could be induced to co-operate, or at least to remain passive, in any economic campaign against the Smith regime. It is also true that at the beginning of the rebellion South Africa desisted from open and large-scale assistance. But this is no longer true. The evidence suggests that South Africa watched to see how strong and effective the steps against Rhodesia would be, and only after being reassured on that matter did she begin to risk her own internationally correct legal position in order to give practical support to the Smith regime.

The position now is clear. South African support has made nonsense of the oil blockade, there are strong reasons to believe that she is giving financial and foreign exchange assistance, that she is acting as agent for certain kinds of Rhodesian exports, and that she is in other ways assisting the rebel regime to overcome its difficulties. There can no longer be any hope that South Africa will voluntarily

co-operate in any action against Smith—partly because the South African authorities are not convinced that Smith will really be brought down.

7. Finally, in September 1966, when Britain insisted upon a 'last chance' for Smith, there were British sympathisers who argued that this was simply a 'time-wasting device' while Britain waited for the mid-term United States elections to be completed. The argument was that Britain could not afford to take strong action until she had positive American support, and that it is impossible for an administration to give such support immediately prior to the elections.

In fact Britain has had consistent American support since 1965. From outside it would appear that Britain and America had tacitly agreed that the former would support the U.S.A. in Vietnam in return for an acceptance of British leadership in Rhodesia. There is no reason to believe that American support would not be forthcoming for tougher British action; on the contrary, there is much to suggest that the Americans would like the Rhodesian question settled quickly.

CONCLUSION

In October, and even December 1965, there may have been valid arguments against strong and immediate action in the Rhodesian situation. These arguments could be used to excuse the British position, and by those African States which failed to implement the resolution their representatives had passed.

Not one of these arguments has any validity now, in November 1966.

The question before us now is 'What is Africa going to do about Rhodesia?' Are we going to acquiesce in the betrayal of four million people in Southern Rhodesia? And are we going to agree to the continuation of Zambia's intolerable position?

It was Great Britain which created South Africa fifty years ago. It is Great Britain which now clearly wants to create a second South Africa. Fifty years ago only Ethiopia and Liberia were independent African States. Today Africa has nearly forty independent States.

Individually African States are weak. Collectively we are not weak. It is only failure to work together which now makes us weak. Collectively we are quite capable of making a meaningful statement to Britain. We shall be doing this if we all say, and mean, 'You cannot now create another South Africa and still hope to remain on friendly terms with independent Africa'. This voice we can raise. It is the least we can do to restore the honour of Africa.

SOUTH AFRICAN COMMUNISTS ON VIETNAM

Resolution of the Central Committee of the South African Communist Party

I. The Central Committee expresses the heartfelt solidarity and unqualified admiration which all members and supporters of the South African Communist Party feel towards the people of Vietnam in their fight for freedom and independence.

The U.S.A., the biggest and most powerful imperialist country, has subjected this small but valiant nation to an all-out war of aggression and mass murder. In South Vietnam, an invading army of over 400,000 American troops, armed with the most technically-advanced and terrible weapons and equipment, and supported by 600,000 troops of the puppet Saigon regime and of the U.S. satellite governments of Australia, South Korea and New Zealand, is waging a war of indiscriminate slaughter whose crimes exceed those of the Nazis in the second world war.

In defiance of international law and the U.N. Charter, the U.S.A. has committed innumerable acts of aggression by bombing the territory and populated areas of an independent socialist state, the Democratic Republic of Vietnam, destroying many homes, schools and hospitals, killing and wounding thousands of innocent people including women and children.

President L. B. Johnson, Defence Secretary McNamara, State Secretary Dean Rusk, General Westmoreland and other U.S. political and military leaders are guilty of war crimes and crimes against humanity committed in Vietnam, for which they will never be forgiven. They have used poison gases and chemical warfare. They have deliberately destroyed the people's crops and food supplies. They have dropped huge quantities of bombs, including napalm, phosphorus and fragmentation bombs, to kill and terrorise civilians. They have destroyed hundreds of villages and herded the inhabitants into concentration camps. They have been responsible for the torturing and murder of innumerable captured civilians and prisoners of war.

In common with the overwhelming majority of the world's people, we demand an immediate end to American aggression and intervention and the withdrawal of all foreign troops from Vietnam. We demand peace and self-determination for Vietnam in terms of the Geneva Agreements, and the four-point and five-point proposals

advanced by the government of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam and the National Liberation Front of South Vietnam.

II. In the face of this most frightful attack, the people of Vietnam under the leadership of the National Liberation Front in the South and the Ho Chi Minh government in the North, have responded with an iron determination, military skill and devotion to freedom which are an inspiration to all who love freedom, and in particular to those who are themselves the victims of oppression. To the 14 million non-White people of South Africa, ruled by a racist regime of terror, the resolute stand of the people of Vietnam is a glorious example and a guarantee that we too, like all oppressed people, can and shall win our freedom.

We pledge ourselves to unremitting efforts to rally the people of our country for the support of their brothers and sisters in Vietnam. Despite the fascist bans on free speech in South Africa and the Vorster government's servile support for U.S. gangsterdom, the people of South Africa must learn the truth about Vietnam, whose struggle for freedom is one with our own struggle against imperialism and national oppression.

III. The fight to end imperialist aggression and secure independence, peace and freedom in Vietnam, is a cause of central international importance to all peoples. No more crucial single task faces the world's working class, peace, national liberation and other progressive movements than to help Vietnam repel the invaders and secure her people's rights.

This central task urgently calls for the unity and common action of all anti-imperialist and progressive forces. The Central Committee of the South African Communist Party makes a renewed appeal to all democratic, progressive, revolutionary and anti-imperialist forces—and in the first place, to all our comrades of the international communist movement—to unite in defence of Vietnam—the cause of all freedom-loving mankind.

The U.S. must quit Vietnam!

Long live free and independent Vietnam!

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