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THEORIA

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EDITORIAL COMMENT

We are glad to have two controversial letters for our Correspondence Column—one from Dr D. E. van Dijk, continuing the debate on the Population Problem, and the other from Mr F. H. Langman, attacking a recent Matriculation English paper and suggesting that the universities should interest themselves in school education by paying more attention to the kind of Matriculation paper that is set. Both questions are of central importance and extreme urgency, both in the world today and in our own country; for the fate of man depends largely on how the population problem is tackled; and the very quality of his life depends on the quality of his education, especially in the humanities. We hope that many readers will join lustily in one of the two battles, and that our next *Theoria* will "ring with the loud and cheerful sound of intellectual strife". It is a noise that warms the heart, for it indicates the stir of life beneath the political apathy into which our country seems to have sunk.

Theoria 18 is a mixed bag, and we hope that we shall continue to receive good articles on all the various humanities.

THE OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY

by M. D. W. JEFFREYS

THE FOLLOWING additions might be incorporated in the next issue of this dictionary.

BAR. This word 'bar' for a form of currency on the Guinea coasts is not listed in the *Oxford English Dictionary*. I give herewith some information on its use. The Churchills, A. and J., *Collection of Voyages* (Vol. V, London, 1746. P. 459), translating from Jean Barbot who had been on the Guinea coast in 1699, state that the Negro traders at Bonny had at last agreed to 'the Reduction of their Goods into Bars of Iron as the Standard Coin, viz:

Goods	*Bars*
One Bunch of Beads.	1
Four Strings of Rings, ten Rings each. . .	1
Four Copper Bars	1
One Piece of narrow Guinea Stuff . . .	1
One Piece of broad Hamburg	1
One Piece of Nicanees	3
Brass Rings	1

And so per Rate for every other Sort of Goods.'

T. Salmon in his *Geography: The Present State of Africa* (Vol. III. London, 1746. P. 115) gives an instance of the use of this currency in Sierra Leone. He quotes from the account of surgeon Atkins who was on the Guinea coast in 1721 as follows: 'Mr Atkins . . . observes that there are about thirty private settlers on the river Sierra Leone. That they all keep Gromettas (Negro servants) which they hire from Sherbro river at two accys or bars a month.'

Salmon on page 112 then proceeds to give an account of the origin of this Guinea currency. Thus he writes: 'A bar is a denomination given to a certain quantity of goods of any kind, which quantity was of equal value among the natives to a bar of iron when this river [the Gambia] was first traded to. Thus a pound of fringe is a bar, two pounds of gunpowder is a bar, an ounce of silver is but a bar, and one hundred gun-flints is a bar; and each species of trading goods has a quantity in it called a bar: therefore their way of reckoning is by bars . . .'

BLOODYMINDEDNESS. The earliest use of this noun given in the *Oxford English Dictionary* is dated 1870, but it occurs in a legal document nearly a hundred years earlier. Thus in the *Life of Gustavus Vassa* (London, 1790. P. 142) occurs the following passage: 'By the 329th Act p. 125 of the Assembly of

Barbadoes it is enacted "that . . . if any man shall out of wontoness, or only bloody-mindedness . . . wilfully kill a negro . . . he shall pay into the public treasury fifteen pounds sterling." '

CATTER. This word, like carter, also means a mule. There is no record of it in the *Oxford English Dictionary*. The word is found in the *Early Voyages and Travels to Russia and Persia* by A. Jenkinson and others. (Vol. II, 1st. Ser. Hakluyt. London, 1886. Edited by E. D. Morgan and C. H. Coote.) On page 412 one reads: 'No man trauelleth from hence thither but such poore people as need constraineth to buy Rice for theyr reliefe to live vpon, and they lay not above twentie batemans vpon a catter . . .'

CHINEA. The use of this word, as an alternative to Guinea, the coasts of western equatorial Africa, is not recorded in the *Oxford English Dictionary*. However, I have come across an instance of the use of Chinea for Guinea. Father Merolla on his voyage to the Congo in 1682 is reported by A. and J. Churchill in *A Collection of Voyages and Travels* (Vol. I, pt. II. London, 1704. P. 748) as follows: 'Coming to anchor in the island of San Tomé to take in fresh provisions, where the wind & current are always fair for *Chinea* or *Mina*, he [the Captain of the ship] made what haste he could to put to sea again.'

The alternative 'Chinea or Mina' leaves no doubt that Chinea is here Guinea because Mina is an area on the Guinea or Chinea coast where the Portuguese in 1482 built their first fortress of São Jorge da Mina.

DISH-WASHER as a popular name for the *motacillidae* or wagtails is recorded in the *Oxford English Dictionary* as first used in 1575, the next date is 1730-6. Ogilby, in his *Africa* (p. 689, published in London in 1670), describing the 'fowls' of the north of Madagascar, mentions: 'Lapwings, Dish-washers, and many others.'

KEELOS. This word is not given in the *Oxford English Dictionary* as a measure of quantity. There is given the word *keel* as 'the quantity of coals carried in a keel, now = 8 Newcastle chaldrons or 21 tons 4 cwt.' However, *keelos* appears to be connected with *keel* as measure of quantity. It was so used at the beginning of the seventeenth century. Thus Purchas in *Purchas His Pilgrimes* (London 1625. P. 1600), quoting from Robert Withers's 'The Grand Signeors Serraglio', writes: 'And the yeerely prouison thereof [of wheat] is about seuen or eight thousand *Keelos* which makes almost so many Bushels of ours here in *London*.'

PHARAOH'S HEN. Cadamosto, while in the Senegal river in 1420, remarks of the birds found there, 'there is plenty of others called Pharaoh's Hens in Europe, whither they are brought from the Levant.' (Moore, J. H., *A New & Complete Collection of Voyages*, Vol. I. London, 1745. P. 436).

The *Oxford English Dictionary* says Pharaoh's Hen = Egyptian Vulture. Why should vultures be introduced into Europe? I suggest the bird indicated is the Turkey.

SAULF is recorded in the *Oxford English Dictionary* as an obsolete spelling of 'safe' and no example is given of its use in the sixteenth century. It appears to have been in use *circa* 1568 as the following extract shows: 'Knowing how willinge your honnor wilbe to heare of our saulf arrivall in this Emperours countrie, yt may please you to vnderstande that we landed here at St Nicholas the thyrde of this instant (Aug. 1568) in the morning.' (Morgan, E. D. and Coote, C. H., eds.: *Early Voyages and Travels to Russia and Persia*, by A. Jenkinson and others. Vol. II, 1st Ser. Hakluyt Soc. London, 1886. P. 256.)

SHADES. The Dutchman P. de Marees published in Amsterdam, in 1602, his 'Description and History of the Gold Coast'. S. Purchas, in *Purchas His Pilgrimes*, published in London, 1625, gives a translation of portions of de Marees's book. On p. 954 Purchas is writing of maize on the Gold Coast and gives: 'it groweth higher than a mans length aboue the ground, like to great Reeds that grow in the water, or in drauned land, wherewith husbandmen vse to couer their shades.' The Dutch word translated by Purchas as 'shades' is 'schueren'. (De Marees, P., *Beschrijvinghe ende Historische Verhael van het Gout Koninckrijck van Gunea*, s'Gravenhage, 1912. P. 119). Now *schueren* in Dutch means 'shelters, screens, sheds'. Consequently 'sheds' would have been to-day a better translation of the Dutch 'schueren': though better still the word 'shelters' would have been. 'Screens' or 'booths' are also possible translations. In the supplement to the *Oxford English Dictionary* examples are given of the use by the Americans of the English word 'shade' as a booth or screen, e.g. '1863. O. W. Norton, *Army Lett.*, 174, A large force of men putting up booths or shades of poles and bush over the tents.' There is, however, now this example in English of the use of 'shade' in 1625 with the same meaning of shelter, or shed, or screen or booth.

WEYED ANKER. No example of this spelling of 'weigh' in connection with the anchor is given in the *Oxford English Dictionary*. The following extract is therefore quoted: 'And about nine of the clocke at night the same day weyed anker . . .' (Morgan, E. D. and Coote, C. H., editors: *Early Voyages and Travels to Russia and Persia*, by A. Jenkinson and others. Vol. II. 1st Ser. Hakluyt Soc. London, 1886. P. 449.)

WHAT IS HISTORY?

by M. KATZEN

IN A TALK ON 'The Making of Victorian England' published recently in the *Listener*, Dr G. Kitson Clark pointed out that 'As men grow older, they normally have to undergo one rather curious experience. The periods of time which they know by living report dry and harden into chapters of history upon which scholars comment in the ordinary way. This is not pleasant. It is like watching the life fade from a well-known landscape and then learning about it from people whose only knowledge is derived from what they have bumped into in the dark . . . I am not really a Victorian . . . But in boyhood and early manhood I lived and talked with people to whom the England of the last thirty or so years of the reign had been the ordinary workaday world. They are mostly gone now, and instead I learn about Victorian England from books, and the result is startling. It all seems to have shrunk into generalisations and clichés which do not fit the living reality: it all seems over-simplified and it is all curiously foreshortened, as if all that time England was the same, with the same kind of people and the same conditions prevailing throughout.[1] Dr Kitson Clark then goes on to correct various misconceptions about Victorian England but the point he has made remains—would his new generalisations not appear equally dry and oversimplified to those who had known that time either directly by living in it themselves, or by hearsay? Is it ever possible for the historian to recover or to recreate the past in all its immediacy? Even if it is possible, should that be his primary aim?

It is not surprising that historical knowledge should sometimes seem to be as unreliable as the knowledge of blind men bumping into a landscape in the dark. The past is gone for ever, and, especially as far as remote periods are concerned, very little evidence of it has survived. And even this evidence has very often survived purely by chance, so that mere chunks or even splinters of the totality of concrete experience remain embedded in the present, deposited arbitrarily by the river of time. A picture of the past constructed from these fragments must necessarily be oversimplified, foreshortened and thin—clearly a grotesque distortion of the living reality, either because it is mean, boring and stumpy, or because it is over-dramatised, highly coloured and exotic. This, of course, presupposes that the historian has been able to use these fragments as evidence. But how can he do so? He has received his evidence at best at second hand. He is not in a position to verify it by looking for himself. It is possible that the evidence may have been deliberately faked, either at the time or later. This problem

was of particular concern in medieval times when, as an eleventh century squire engaged in a lawsuit with some monks armed with documentary proof against him complained, 'With ink anyone can write anything',[2] and when forgery was common and difficult to detect. That it has been given a new lease of life today, is suggested by the terrifying and brilliantly-conceived fable in George Orwell's *Nineteen-Eighty-Four*, where all the evidence of the past was systematically destroyed and re-faked wherever necessary to provide the justification for every shift in official policy. Then again, where maliciously or piously intended fraud is absent, how can the historian defend himself against built-in bias in his sources, or against their sheer ignorance? Since he is always looking at his subject at least at one remove, through the distorting lenses of other minds, how can he reach truth?

It was the outstanding achievement of seventeenth- and eighteenth-century scholars in particular to work out methods of establishing the reliability of evidence. By the late nineteenth century the craft of history had become a systematic discipline, with its own strict code of professional ethics, and historians were able to claim for history the desirable status of a science with an unimpeachable standard of objectivity. These methods vary with the nature of the material used. If it is a written document, it may be necessary to date it, by examining such details as its form, the material it is written on, the type of ink used (chemical tests may have been employed here) the author's handwriting, his style, incidental details mentioned in the document, such as an eclipse of the sun or an earthquake, and so on. Once dated, it can be fitted into a context of already established knowledge, and tested against that. Are there any anachronisms? Is the document too different from others of the same type to be genuine, or on the other hand too unnaturally the same? If so, it may very well be a fake. Even if it is accepted as genuine, are the facts which it relates presented with bias, conscious or unconscious, did the writer know what he was talking about, is he writing from direct experience, or from hearsay? Here the historian will have to use what he knows about the writer, his background and his prejudices, as well as internal literary criticism to decide how far the document can be accepted as reliable. All this helps to break down the distance between the historian and his subject. In addition, the modern historian is beginning to see more and more direct evidence of the past around him—the relics of the past in its art, literature, buildings, decoration, clothing, tools, laws, language, roads, even its system of agriculture, which can be deduced from the long-forgotten fields which aerial photography shows lying below the present lay-out of the land—in short all the artefacts which man has made and which survive him.

Equally important, perhaps more important, in enabling the historian to communicate directly with the past, is his ability to use his documentary material as direct as well as indirect evidence.

I say more important because it is in words that men express themselves most fully and most subtly. Therefore verbal evidence, where it exists, whether written, at the time or later, or incorporated in spoken myths and chronicles of primitive peoples who tend to cultivate a very accurate oral memory just because they lack writing, is likely to be the historian's most valuable source of information. In this respect, in being able to cross-examine the dead document so that it gives forth even an echo of the life of the past, the historian is like the psychoanalyst, to whom everything about his patient is interesting, his lies and evasions and half truths just as much as his truths and insights. A certain document is a fake, is it? Indeed, says the historian, why should anyone have found it important to perpetrate it? Is a witness clearly biased, does he present half truths as truth, prejudice as self-evident fact? What was his purpose, whom was he trying to persuade, how successful was he in his aim, did he know what he was doing? The answers to these questions may be more valuable to the historian than the crumbs of information the document purports to give. They give his work range, depth and subtlety, and enable him to get what Collingwood, the great English philosopher of history, called the 'inside' of the event,[3] the why and how of it, not merely the fact that it happened. In other words, history can become more than a string of dead dates and facts linked together by 'and then' (in *1066 And All That* style). It can become a living narrative whose lifeblood is cause and effect. As a result, the nineteenth- and early twentieth-century historian was able to claim for his subject an independent status, as high as that of any other science, and could use as his watchword Ranke's famous dictum: 'the way things really happened.' This meant that by fitting together all the individual facts into an interlocking structure, the historian would be able to reproduce a 'slice of life' of his period which would have an entirely objective validity due to his correct use of the historical method.

On the face of it, this seems to have disposed of Kitson Clark's objection. If the historian can really show what really happened, surely he must be reconstructing the past as it really was? And the dichotomy between history and life as it was lived seems to have disappeared. But there is clearly all the difference in the world between an experience, any experience, and that experience given form in words, even though the words may enable that experience to be relived in a certain sense and shared. It seems to me that the difficulty pointed to by Kitson Clark comes about because one forgets that any individual knows only incoherent fragments of his own life, let alone his own time. To the extent that he wishes to know his own life, he must sit back and try to re-create it, not primarily by trying to remember every single thing that has ever happened to him, or that he has ever felt or thought or done, that is to say not by reduplicating every experience in his own mind, but by trying to give his past some ordered shape. This implies that he must leave out certain things, write some things large and

others small in order to create a coherent pattern. In other words he must create themes out of the chaos of his experience. Some of these, of course, may have come to him in flashes of intuition while that life was being lived. But the total pattern created will not have come to him without the dissolving and regrouping of his experience by constructive thought, although, of course, he will not be able to create such a pattern without knowing the details of his own life, and using them as evidence. In the same way, to the extent that he wishes to know his own time, he must have performed the same set of operations on the welter of information which he gets from his own experience, from hearsay, from the newspapers and the books he reads and so on. To this extent he is constructing contemporary history, and using the same technique in principle as the historian uses.

The point I am trying to make is that pure experience, if it exists, must be chaotic and meaningless. Even such an apparently simple experience as the experience of our senses is meaningful only because we have learned to pattern it. We create patterns of texture, perspective and so on when we open our eyes and see assortments of shapes and colours, and it is these patterns that enable us to use this experience. And the more complicated the experience, the more it needs to be reduced to order so as to become meaningful and assimilable. Now reduction implies selection, and selection some criterion of selection. The criterion chosen depends on the purpose of the selection, the problem which needs solving. As Collingwood pointed out, the historian, like the archaeologist, cannot approach his data with a completely blank mind, and think that this is an open mind. From his total experience, which includes his experience as a historian, he must be able to ask significant questions about the past, and frame significant answers from what he finds. If he merely amasses data, and hopes for a pattern to emerge somehow without his conscious agency, he hopes in vain.[4] It is a point worth stressing that the commonly-accepted nineteenth-century distinction between facts and interpretation as expressed for instance by Taine's dictum 'Après la collection des faits, la recherche des causes,' has come to be distrusted as a false one. The modern historian does not see himself as a jigsaw puzzler, fitting facts together as best he may, and then sitting back to interpret the picture. Every so-called fact has been established in practice by weighing, interpreting and judging the evidence for it. Fact finding and interpretation are only different aspects of the same process of research. As E. H. Carr indicated recently 'as any working historian knows . . . the historian is engaged on a continuous process of moulding his facts to his interpretation and his interpretation to his facts. It is impossible to assign primacy to one over the other'.[5]

Therefore when a modern historian says that he wants to discover what really happened he is likely to mean, firstly, that he is basing his pattern on the facts as he knows them, not on fiction,

secondly, that any pre-conceptions that he may have held about the way things happened or should have happened have been considerably modified or even abandoned altogether in the face of the stubborn intractability of any facts, and thirdly, that he has tried to ask questions ranging sufficiently widely to enable him to dredge up from the past the unpalatable as well as the palatable facts. His aim is to connect together evidence of the most varied possible kind into a significant whole of the maximum complexity consistent with intelligibility.

Therefore, in this the most important aspect of his work the historian sees himself not as a mere passive recorder of information, but as an active creator of new knowledge, as a literary artist who orders experience into significant wholes. As such he must bow to the same rules as any other literary artist. He must have a keen brain, a clear eye, a discerning heart and a dedication to his craft and his art. Like any other artist he instructs through delight. The delight of history has many facets. It is the pleasure of curiosity satisfied, of understanding and participating in things outside oneself, the appetite of the gossip refined and transmuted to new purposes, the enjoyment of seeing the exotic or the familiar recreated and known, and the interest of a good story well told. It is also the satisfaction which comes from clearly stating and solving a problem, of having sorted out the trivial from the important, and above all the supreme joy of the fresh, new vision and sense of control which we derive from the re-ordering of experience into a more intelligible pattern under the sway of a powerful, imaginative intellect. The only difference between the historian and other literary artists, as Aristotle pointed out, is that while they deal with general truths about man, with what might happen, he deals with particular truths. He must be able to convince his reader not only that things did actually happen in a particular way, but also, by showing how and why they fitted together, to be able to convince his reader that given all the facts of a particular case, all the choices made and the decisions taken, they could not have happened in any other way.

But, it might be argued, if even the facts are arrived at, so to speak, through the historian's choice, what becomes of the objectivity of history? It must be all subjectively determined, all bias, and how can anyone choose rationally between good and bad history, or even, say, between the Richard III of Shakespeare and the Richard III of the historians?

The answer to this lies in the copious mass of footnotes that every historical work is so bespattered with, and that the layman finds so tedious. However he may disguise it, the historian is presenting an argument, and the essential counters in that argument are his facts and their interrelations. Like any scientist he must make it possible for anyone else to repeat and test his work. Although he cannot reduplicate the past he can make it possible for the steps in his argument to be repeated, by showing how and why

he has chosen his facts. By giving the evidence for his conclusions he makes it possible for anyone else to question its validity, the use to which he has put it, and, if necessary, to adduce other evidence to prove him wrong.

It is very often the case that if historians disagree on interpretation they also disagree about the facts. For instance, Professor Marais in the introduction to his book *Maynier and the First Boer Republic* states that he will show that not only was the interpretation given by Theal, the previously accepted authority, wrong, but that some of Theal's facts are wrong too, that Theal has not been sufficiently critical of his authorities, and that sometimes he has ignored facts which make another interpretation possible.[6] In cases like these it may be that one historian has just been a shoddy worker. More often it will be that his questions about the past have been such that he has been blind to other evidence which another historian may bring forward, and which, if the argument is conclusive, he himself must also admit.

Collingwood illustrates this point by his stimulating analogy between the historian and the detective in the detective story.[7] The detective's questions enable him to get the answers which will finally click together to give him the final solution to the problem of who the murderer is. Halfway through the book the brilliant amateur may point out that the detective is on the wrong track, having been so bedazzled by a red herring that he cannot ask the right questions, and so dig up the right facts. With his help the detective does so. Whatever his own convictions, he must provide proof in the shape of an argument strong enough to convince a jury. The counsel for the defence must not be able to pick on facts which the prosecution has ignored and so demolish its case. In the best detective story we are given a complete explanation with no loose ends.

In history, too, the best explanation must always be the one that can connect together the most evidence into a coherent comprehensive whole. Old arguments must be accommodated to meet new ones. Logic is not merely a matter of preference. This is because there are some facts about which we feel absolutely certain. As Father M. C. D'Arcy points out in his *The Sense of History, Secular and Sacred* '. . . They have been continually presupposed in statements about other . . . events and by indirect reference they have grown in certainty with our general growth in knowledge . . . We cannot doubt the existence in the past of persons like Napoleon and Queen Victoria. Too many other truths would vanish if their place in history became empty. We do not live on isolated truths. We live by co-ordinating facts, fitting them into what we have already come to believe. Facts complement each other and take hold of others so that what is chaotic and dim comes into the light in terms of complex wholes and unities.'[8]

Historical criticism therefore is not only a matter of one subjective point of view challenging another equally subjective one.

Both points of view presuppose a considerable amount of common ground—previous judgments about the past sufficiently well-established to be taken for granted as indisputable facts with an objective reality beyond the range of a point of view. Literary criticism operates in exactly the same way. The literary critic is given his raw material in the particular work which he is trying to understand and judge set in a historical context of the development of language, the literary tradition and the facts about the writer's life. Although the individual capacities of the critic, his experience, sensibility and intelligence will equip him better or worse for his task, the objective work of art remains, consisting of these particular words in this particular order, and it is the relevance of the critic's judgments to this which makes what he says true or false up to any point. Thus one explanation can be better than another and good history can drive out bad. Even though it is very true that the historical work done at any particular time provides excellent evidence of that time itself, that therefore certain interpretations may be superseded or modified with time, others do remain rooted in reality and are only reinforced or enlarged with the passage of time. The essential process through which this sifting of historical knowledge takes place is through controversy, controversy arising out of the fact that at different times and places, or at the same time and place, each historian by virtue of his individual inclinations and his contemporary situation will be drawn to certain problems, rather than to others, and the problems he chooses and his own conscious or unconscious presuppositions will determine the questions he is able to ask and the answers he is able to get. To this extent controversy reflects the liveliness of issues in the historians' own contemporary world. When these issues have been solved, historians will be unanimous in their agreement, and the questions which the controversy aroused will appear relatively trivial. Thus it seems to me that not only the interest of history, but its very objectivity and validity is guaranteed to the extent that historians differ radically in outlook and interests, while sharing a common professional reverence for truth and a willingness to be persuaded by rational argument.

This brings me to the very interesting question of the relationship between ordinary, work-a-day historians and philosophers of history or historiographers, like Toynbee, Marx, Bossuet or Spengler, for it is the philosophers of history, in their search for a general overall meaning in history, who very often make explicit the hidden presuppositions of the specialised historian. There has always been, and will probably always be, a certain amount of tension between the two. The 'everyday' historian is always rather suspicious of the philosopher of history, because his whole training and method of work inculcate a distrust of generalising on insufficient evidence. He is very much aware of the great difficulty of picking out the causal factors that have operated in a particular situation, and of assigning priorities amongst them. He knows

that in any particular situation things happen in a complex fused whole, and that to dissolve this whole into parts and put them together again in an intelligible way by spelling out their interrelationships (as he himself does) is to do violence to reality. How much more suspect then, are the grand generalisations of the philosopher of history, which range over vast areas of time and space. It is axiomatic to the specialist historian that time is irreversible, that history never repeats itself exactly, and that an essential part of his task is to refine his judgment and that of his readers by making distinctions, by discriminating between as well as comparing, the similar and the same. Thus, while he could not work without generalising, his instinct is to confine these generalisations as far as possible to the time and place that he knows, his own particular field. What affronts him most about the historiographers is that they claim to base their generalisations on historical fact in the same way that he does, but that they have little reverence, as it appears to him, for differences and distinctions, and range freely over time and space in their search for examples, tearing them brutally out of their context to illustrate a preconceived theory. One might even go so far as to say that the specialist historian suspects the historiographer of having no historical sense. He therefore sets about demolishing the philosophy of history by attacking the facts selected and the weight they are made to bear in the theory.

The philosopher of history argues that he is trying to make sense of the whole of human history, and that ultimately his work rounds off, indeed crowns, the efforts of the specialist historian by isolating general causes that operate in human situations. He wishes to come to some conclusions about the course of human history as a whole, using historical events to illustrate this theme, and he argues that this is a legitimate, indeed an all-important aim. He is deliberately trying to reach a further degree of abstraction than the ordinary historian. He is trying to distil the experience of the past into a formula or set of formulae which will help to make not only the past, but also the future, intelligible.[9] Such formulae (like 'The history of all hitherto existing societies is the history of class struggle' or 'The rise and fall of civilisations depends on the response evoked by a challenge') though on the face of it looking like scientific laws, are in fact much more like the insights of the poet, 'gnomic' utterances, as Father D'Arcy calls them.[10] As Toynbee says, and here I think most other philosophers of history would agree, they provide one with possibilities or probabilities[11] not in a statistical sense but in a poetical one. As such they are valuable to the ordinary historian. It goes without saying that any knowledge that widens the historian's horizons will make him a better historian. But the work of the historiographers can have a special usefulness for the historian because it represents the result of study of and meditation on the human past, on human history rather than on human nature divorced from time as other

poetry tends to do. They provide him with new ways of looking at his material, and they are to be judged by him in accordance with their usefulness to his work. Did they give his myopic search, lost among the details of his particular field, a clearer, more sharply defined vision, or did they act as blinkers restricting the range of his understanding? It is not the historian's task as such to provide case material to prove or disprove the contentions of the philosopher of history, although of course he may do so incidentally. The historiographer's conclusions are part of the scaffolding of the historian's work and though they may have helped to build up the final structure they can be taken down with advantage when the building is finished. Although the historian must of course generalise, his generalisations must be appropriate to the field he is working in and must be confined to that field. For example, it would be inappropriate for a history of the Second World War to end by saying 'Thus Man moves through his life in ignorance' or 'Political views are determined by class affiliations,' or 'Power corrupts and absolute power corrupts absolutely,' as if this were the final stage in proving a theorem, however true these statements might be. If such statements are made, they must be taken as mottoes on the flyleaf of a book, not as final, proved conclusions. Perhaps I can make my point clearer by comparing the relation between historian and historiographer to that between the novel and the allegory. Everyone would agree that it is very difficult for the novelist to avoid having moral themes in a novel—indeed, the preoccupation with such themes may help him to write a better and more significant novel. But in a novel the moral theme of the author offends if it is stuck in as a lump of moralising, or if we begin to suspect that the author is writing a tract. The theme must be part of the very fabric of the novel. In a successful novel, the whole work is luminescent with its theme, and therefore it is unnecessary and indeed inartistic to insist on it at any point. In an allegory on the other hand the issues are made open and explicit: the generalisations are large and have firm edges, they are not malleable to individual circumstances. The allegory deliberately sets up an epitome of man and personifies qualities and events so as to bring out the truth of the moral illustrated. Like the allegorist the historiographer also tries to read the riddle of the universe. His methods are appropriate to his particular end, but neither method nor end can be simply transposed to another genre without a feeling of gross inappropriateness.

The question of what the historian's field of study is and what his aims are has, as yet, been left open. The field of history, one feels, should be allowed to be as wide as each historian wishes to make it. It clearly includes the past of man, or perhaps the past of men would be a better way of putting it, for historians, however deterministic some of them may seem, do agree that history is made by the actions of individuals, by their interaction, conflict and co-operation. Most historians would agree, I think, that it is useful

to qualify this a little further by saying, the actions of men in social groups. The aim of this historian, put at its broadest, is to be able to throw light on these actions, to be able to lay bare the extent and the limits of individual freedom of action in any particular situation; to show how human affairs happen as they do. By carefully delineating the particular features of each unique past situation and explaining it in a way that is intelligible in general terms, the historian helps to develop discrimination and judgment here and now, not by giving mechanical lessons to be learnt from the past, but by showing how things have fitted together. His interests and problems must, because he is a human being living in a real world, spring in some way from contemporary interests and problems. By tackling his historical problems to the best of his ability he revivifies tradition for each generation and helps to create new tradition—tradition being here the whole inheritance of the past that the present takes up and participates in. Since we are human and not animal by virtue of our whole social inheritance, and since we can keep it or change it only if we know what it is, the historian's function in the widest sense is to tell us what we are and how we have come to be so, and to help us to judge ourselves so that we may act more effectively.

[1] *Listener*, March 16, 1961.
[2] Quoted in Marc Bloch: *The Historian's Craft*, p. 79.
[3] R. G. Collingwood: *The Idea of History*, pp. 213-214.
[4] R. G. Collingwood, *Autobiography*, pp. 83-90.
[5] *Listener*, April 20, 1961.
[6] J. S. Marais: *Maynier and the First Boer Republic*, pp. v-vii.
[7] Collingwood: *The Idea of History*, p. 243.
[8] M. C. D'Arcy: *Sense of History, Secular and Sacred*, p. 56.
[9] For a very interesting illustration of the divergent attitudes of the historian and the historiographer see Geyl and Toynbee 'Can we know the Pattern of the Past?—A Debate,' reprinted in P. Gardiner, (ed.) *Theories of History*, pp. 308-318.
[10] D'Arcy, *op.cit.*, p. 69.
[11] Gardiner, *op.cit.*, p. 317.

THE CLASSICS AND OTHER ACADEMIC SUBJECTS

by O. A. W. DILKE

IN AN ARTICLE entitled *The New Classics*, in *Theoria* 15, Mr P. J. Bicknell envisaged future classicists working almost exclusively 'in a particular sociological and historical field, having learnt the languages which are tools in their research'. Literature will be studied only in translation, 'the classical masterpieces will not be looked upon as something quasi-divine,' and the new classicists 'will be expected to make a contribution to their fellow-beings'.

Let it be said in the first place that in order to disagree with him one does not need to imagine either that everything in the ancient world was perfect or that nothing but the 'ivory tower' study of the original texts (valuable as one may believe that to be) is worth while.[1] Education in this country is based from beginning to end on the very roots of European tradition. For better or worse—and I believe for better—these roots have their origin in Greece and Rome and Palestine. For centuries, Latin was the international medium of communication on all subjects among learned men. These days things are very different, even in Europe.[2] Oxford and Cambridge have abolished or greatly restricted compulsory Latin as an entrance qualification. In only one or two English universities is Advanced Level Latin compulsory for certain subjects, e.g. Honours English at London University; as to Ordinary Level Latin, five English universities require a pass in it (or Greek) from all entrants to all Arts courses; five require the same qualification from entrants to Honours courses in English, History and Modern Languages; in the remainder, Latin or Greek is required for only one or two subjects or not at all. In no profession in Britain except the Church is Latin or Greek indispensable for entrants.

It is interesting to observe the fate of the classics in the newer English academic establishments. At the University College of North Staffordshire, the first new university centre to be set up in Britain after the war, all first-year students have to take a course which among other things gives them an introduction to the legacy of Greece and Rome. It was felt that a large proportion of first-year students simply did not know many of the things that schools ought to have taught them; that most schools were so busy preparing their pupils for examinations that they had no time, or claimed that they had no time, for the broader cultural background. Naturally the second-, third- and fourth-year students may opt for classics among other subjects if they wish. But there are also

forces at work to abolish the classics altogether; the latest news of this comes from Greece itself, where Latin in schools is to be abolished and classical Greek curtailed. There is to be no classical department, at any rate for a good time, at the latest of British university centres, the University of York, and Lord James, its Vice-Chancellor, has attacked Latin and Greek as possessing no more than a snob value.[3]

In South Africa neither classics nor classical culture courses have as yet been affected in the same way. Those of us who are keen that they shall not be must not allow our syllabuses or methods to be inflexible and open to criticism as old-fashioned. There is, despite Mr Bicknell's scorn of classical teachers' conferences, scope for experiment in the teaching of the subject; and in this connexion several lively developments recently adopted may prove useful. An article in the *Times Educational Supplement* last year[4] showed how much more interested most of the writer's pupils were when they were given medieval instead of classical Latin texts. The King Arthur type of story appealed to their imaginations; they found Latin easier, and their progress in learning classical Latin was not impaired: they recognised that medieval Latin was different from classical. In the same way, George Thomson[5] introduced Modern Greek into the Birmingham University Greek course. The latest Latin anthology edited in South Africa[6] devotes sixty-nine of its five hundred and five pieces to medieval and Renaissance Latin. Again, a visual presentation, where possible in collaboration with other subjects, can make the classics far more real. In a country like South Africa, even more remote than Britain from classical lands, the use of colour slides, for example, will bring to the mind of the student or pupil a far more vivid picture of those lands and of the numerous remains of antiquity still to be found in them. Two American books designed to help the Latin teacher or pupil, *Latin for Americans*, Books 1 and 2, by B. L. Ullman and N. E. Henry, are particularly well illustrated; one may only deplore the introduction into them of words like 'picum-nicum' for 'picnic' in the accusative.

In school Latin the light-hearted approach is often valuable to stimulate interest. In England there are the laudable efforts of the newspaper *Acta Diurna*, printed once a term, which presents Latin as a truly living language. In Latin America the translation of *Winnie the Pooh* was such a success that Methuen's published it in England for professors to criticise[7] and for children to enjoy. In July, 1961, the *Times Educational Supplement* published a short Latin story called *Ultio Bunteri* ('Billy Bunter's Revenge') and had to reprint the pamphlets of it, such was the demand.

Our mother tongue is mostly learnt by word of mouth. Experiments so far adopted in the teaching of Latin by direct method have been open to the objection that this seems to take longer than what are now the usual methods, and only twenty or thirty schools in Britain have carried the system very far. To learn Latin

or Greek in a slipshod manner is almost useless, and a movement for brighter classics, desirable as it is, must not lead to this. It is quite insufficient to devote only two periods to Latin in the initial stages: Latin grammar is far more formal than that of either English or Afrikaans.

It is my intention to maintain that, if the classics are to survive, they must not be taught or studied in isolation but must be related to other academic subjects. This applies equally to university and to school teaching. In the first place, it has been found invaluable for students of English to have a sound knowledge of Latin grammar and syntax. The more Indo-European languages a student or pupil knows, the easier, in many cases, he or she will find the acquisition of another. But Latin and Greek have the particular advantage that translation into and from those languages frequently demands a re-thinking of the basic ideas of each sentence.[8] This re-thinking process proves most useful in the acquisition of a good English prose style. What follows, therefore, is based on the assumption that the study of English in universities will increase steadily, and not merely in a 'purely technical department where languages are taught.'

The debt of English literature to the classics is immense and only one or two points can be given here. An obvious example of the writer steeped in Latin is Milton, who wrote in both languages, not to mention Italian. How can the student of English who has never learnt Latin comment sensibly on constructions like 'since created man'?

> For never since created man,
> Met such imbodied force, as nam'd with these
> Could merit more than that small infantry
> Warr'd on by Cranes; though all the Giant brood
> Of *Phlegra* with th' Heroic Race were joyn'd
> That fought at *Theb's* and *Ilium*, on each side
> Mixt with auxiliar gods.

It may seem poaching on the preserves of others to say so, but how much better one familiar with classical epic in the original can approach passages like this![9]

A typical work modelled on the Greek is the *Microcosmographie* (1628) of John Earle, later Bishop of Salisbury. Although it is indebted also to Erasmus, its whole pattern, and sometimes its titles, are based on the *Characters* of Theophrastus. Yet of three current annotated editions of Earle's *Microcosmographie* none gives adequate parallels with Theophrastus, or quotes much of his Greek. To fill this sort of gap, the English teacher should work closely with his classical colleague. The latest work on Shakespeare's 'small Latin and less Greek', T. W. Baldwin's, runs to over fifteen hundred quarto pages. It would certainly have been improved by consultation with a classical scholar: we should have been spared titles like *De Arte Amando*, the use of translations like Riley's of Lucan, and references to works no more up to date than Smith's Dictionaries.

Classical influence is still strongly exerted on quite a few modern writers, such as T. S. Eliot, W. B. Yeats (some of his classical allusions are bound up with his conviction that the period of history preceding the birth of Christ was nobler than the period following it), Ezra Pound (less perhaps than he claims), Robert Graves, Cecil Day Lewis and others. There is a curious instance of obscure classical allusion in Eliot's poem *The Fire Sermon.* One paragraph of this consists of one word, and that, surprisingly, in the vocative: Tereu. Yet although Eliot has a long note on a later passage showing how his conception of Tiresias comes from Book III of Ovid's *Metamorphoses,* he leaves it to the detective powers of readers to discover that this isolated vocative comes from *voluisti tu quoque, Tereu,* in Book VI of the same work, a sentence which hints at Tereus's guilty passion for his sister-in-law Philomela. When we remember this and her bird metamorphosis, we realise the force of Eliot's 'twit twit twit jug jug jug jug' three lines before (jug-jug imitates the sound of the nightingale), and the connexion with the rather brutal scene which follows.

If the student of English needs to have a thorough comprehension of its classical background, the same is far truer of the student of Romance languages. French and Latin tend to be taught with insufficient explanation how the one developed from the other, whereas a few quotations from Vulgar and Medieval Latin and a few from Provençal verse would bridge the transition. France, Italy and Spain are countries where there has been since classical times a far more continuous tradition than elsewhere in the Western world. This continuance has been partly due to the persistence in those countries of the Roman Catholic Church, which has never discarded the use of Latin for many purposes. Catholic students tend to have a greater fluency in reading Latin than others. French literature is incomprehensible without a fair knowledge of its classical background. It is not only the French classical dramatists but modern playwrights like Anouilh that often take their themes from antiquity. Whereas Racine borrowed his stories from those of the ancient tragedians, Corneille took for his plots historical episodes, most of which come from ancient history, e.g. the story of the Horatii and Curiatii; the L. Cinna pardoned by Augustus for conspiring against him, as told by Seneca in the *De Clementia;* the martyrdom of Polyeuctus; the story (somewhat distorted, as Corneille admits in his preface) of a Parthian princess involved in court intrigues of the Seleucid dynasty; and the feud (equally distorted) between Prusias II, king of Bithynia, and his son Nicomedes. When people complain today of historical plays, films and novels that embroider on history, they should remember that such treatment has respectable precedent. Nevertheless, the historical setting of Corneille's plays could obviously be best explained by an expert in ancient history. As to the rhetoric of their poetry, it is a direct legacy from Seneca's tragedies, which on this account are studied more in French-speaking countries than elsewhere.

The relationship between the other Romance languages and Latin is too obvious to need explanation. Italian is not so much one language as a series of related dialects; some of them, such as Sardinian, preserve Latin forms which have disappeared from others. From the classicist's point of view a knowledge of Italian is desirable not only for travels in Italy but for reading books and articles in that language, from Dante down to the latest classical scholar.

Until about 1830 the teaching of ancient history was based almost exclusively on Greek and Latin texts. This method has its merits, admittedly, but it does not go far enough. The German scholars of the mid-nineteenth century, especially Mommsen, showed the way to a more scientific approach, based on a study of inscriptions and of archaeological and other evidence. The tendency during this century has been to stress the economic and social aspects of the ancient world, and classical archaeology has made a greater contribution than ever to the study of various periods, particularly prehistoric Greece. At university level the teaching of ancient history is almost everywhere done by classicists, not by historians; what little can be taught in schools should likewise be taught by classicists. Whereas the historian has a wider sweep of world events and can make more comparisons, he is apt to be out of his depth in the technicalities of Greek and Roman life, and a universal historian like Toynbee is not usually the best interpreter of ancient history. One of the tasks of the classicist in Africa is to make his contribution to the early history of this continent; this may be divided into ancient and modern geographical history, and in the latter too the classicist may play and has played a part, for some of the early navigators wrote in Latin. He may also help to soften down certain of the wilder claims heard these days. In the first of the BBC's television programmes on Africa, a Ghana spokesman claimed that Africans taught the Greeks geometry. Now if he is thinking of Euclid, we have no idea of that mathematician's nationality (we simply know that he worked in Alexandria) or even of his birthplace, and it might be truer to say that observation of part of the continent of Africa, i.e. Egypt, taught the Greeks facts which increased their mathematical knowledge.

The geographer can benefit from the descriptions of ancient writers, and try to assess the extent to which they explain the Mediterranean scene today. On the other hand there is much that the classicist cannot understand without a thorough knowledge of the geographical background of Greece and Rome. He must be able to interpret maps and the way in which the landscape has changed over the generations.[10] To return to historical geography, many a teacher has discovered that even quite young children can become interested in several aspects of this, whether in Eratosthenes and his discovery of the approximate size of the earth, or in the stock of credulous travellers' tales which gradually accumulated in more and more exaggerated form and whose effect may be seen as late as Sir Francis Drake's voyage round South America. Thus,

to revert to the lines quoted above from Milton, Homer's story of cranes killing Pygmies indicates a hearsay knowledge, probably through Egyptian stories, of central African pygmies, and is borne out by modern report that the Akka dwarfs hunt cranes, which put up a stout resistance. But later writers make the pygmies disguise themselves as rams, or ride on rams or goats, or invent the myth of a beautiful pygmy girl transformed into a crane.

The history of maps is of paramount importance to geographers, and in this connexion I have tried to help in a modest way with an article in the *Geographical Journal*[11] on 'maps in the Treatises of Roman Land Surveyors'. It is amazing that no history of maps, with the exception of one in German, has any reference to the plans in the *Agrimensores*. Moreover the texts of these writers have not been translated into or edited in English. As a result the geographer would have found it very difficult to collect any information about these plans.

The roots of European tradition are to be found not only in Greece and Rome but in Palestine. The Jews were the first people to identify religion with morality; and the early Church was insistent on the necessity to embody the teaching of the Old Testament in its canonical writings. Yet it is only right and proper that the New Testament should form the main foundation of religious teaching in Christian schools. So that pupils may understand the setting in which Christ and the Apostles worked, it is essential that they should be told something of the organisation of the Roman Empire under Augustus and his successors, how Palestine and the surrounding countries fitted into this organisation, and how the early Church functioned and expanded in Rome and elsewhere. Something should be said, too, of the continuance of many aspects of Roman life during the Dark Ages and Middle Ages by the monks, who patiently learnt classical Latin to the best of their ability and transmitted to posterity the manuscripts of pagan as well as Christian writers. To Southern Europeans this story of the continuity of manuscript tradition is familiar from their environment; to South Africans, geographically more remote and brought up to some extent in a Calvinist background, it is perhaps not familiar enough.

South African law is a modification of Roman-Dutch law, whose origins go back not merely to Justinian but in some cases to the Roman Republic, so that advocates, even if not attorneys, must be able to read the original texts. A large number of the men in first-year Latin classes are those who are studying law. At the University of the Witwatersrand they are allowed to take a special course of Legal Latin. Even if other universities do not follow this lead, it might be an advantage to include in the syllabus a speech of Cicero's which incorporates some legal argument.

The widening gulf between arts and science is deplorable. Here we must be bold and show our worth to the scientist. The contribution of classicists to science is twofold. On the one hand it is very stimulating to be able to show, from a piecing together of

the evidence, that Greek science, building on the foundations laid by Thales and his successors, reached a very advanced level by Hellenistic times. Dr W. G. Landels, who has given a practical demonstration of a steam-power device invented by Hero of Alexandria, maintains that, if three such inventions of the Greeks had been combined, something like the engines of Watt and Stephenson could easily have been produced. Some of Aristotle's scientific discoveries were not improved upon until the seventeenth century, and Euclid's geometry in only slightly revised form was being used not long ago. The other contribution that the classicist can make to modern science is a more modest one, but one not to be despised. New scientific terms based on Greek or Latin are constantly being invented. Where scientists invent them without consultation, they tend either to be hybrids, or incorrectly compounded, or to mean something quite different from what a Greek or a lover of Greek would assume. Cannot something be done to remedy this situation? Sir Cyril Hinshelwood has expressed his hopes that Latin will become the international language of science. It would at any rate save a lot of trouble if contributions from the scientifically developed countries had only to be translated into one language to be enjoyed by all. And let the classicists not feel that they are completely educated if they have merely reached a high standard in a narrow approach: let us try to play our part in this scientific age.

Inextricably linked with science in the eyes of the Greeks was philosophy. Thales and his successors showed true genius by asking the fundamental questions about man and the universe, and never stopped to think what constituted science and what philosophy. Should we not encourage this approach today in the world of the atom bomb? Ever since Socrates science and philosophy have been drifting apart, and ever since Aristotle philosophy has been expressed in complicated terminology. But we classicists have a duty to clear away this unreality and, even if we cannot penetrate all the subtleties of Aristotle, to show everyone interested in the Greeks just how they came to ask the questions they did ask, and how their language, a precise but flexible language, influenced their thought, and through it our thought.

[1] Mr Bicknell mentions in this connection that after Robert Graves had given a talk on Nero on the wireless, a Latin Professor 'rang up the BBC to denounce this charlatan'. Of course the BBC had every right to ignore him. Nevertheless, when Robert Graves writes on the classics he should at least take more trouble to make his facts correct and thus undermine some of this criticism. Thus, the dedication to Lucan quoted on p. 9 of his Penguin *Lucan, Pharsalia* (why this outmoded title?) is spurious; Pharsalia was fought in summer, not spring (pp. 12 and 172 n. 1); Monaco was not Portus Menoecus but Portus Herculis Monoeci (p. 21); Sulla was not Pompey's father-in-law but his uncle by marriage (p. 35 n. 2); Terence died over 70 years before the event with which Graves associates him on p. 50, n. 1; *primi* does not mean 'last' (p. 150); there is no Philippi near Pharsalus independent of the Philippi in Macedonia (p. 173 n. 1).

[2] But Mr Bicknell exaggerates the picture. Classics departments in English universities are no smaller than they were ten years ago; the number of

'firsts' and the total number of candidates successful in Oxford Greats remained stable or even increased slightly between 1951 and 1961; and Greek is not dead (it or Hebrew is required for ordinands), any more than it is at Rhodes University, where the enrolments in Introductory Greek in the years 1959-62 inclusive have been 31, 23, 38 and 22 respectively.

[3] Yet earlier he wrote: 'For the very able, it may well be that the line of approach to the duties of a citizen will come more naturally through their academic work than through special courses on citizenship; that Thucydides or Plato will raise more fruitful, because more profound, ideas about the individual and the State than a course on the working of the Town Council.' Similarly Whitehead wrote: 'I will disclose one private conviction . . . that, as a training in political imagination, the Harvard School of Politics and Government cannot hold a candle to the old-fashioned English classical education of half a century ago.'

[4] 'Latin in the XXth Century: an experiment with medieval texts,' by Sidney Morris, *TES* April 14, 1961, p. 725.

[5] *The Greek Language* (Heffer, Cambridge, 1960).

[6] *Saecula Latina, from the beginnings of Latin Literature to Sir Isaac Newton:* an anthology compiled by Maurice Pope (Cape Town, 1962).

[7] As one pointed out, teachers of Latin prose composition spend half their time telling students or pupils not to translate everything literally: yet for 'many happy returns of the day' this translation offers *multas felices reditiones diei.* Anyone who translated this phrase literally into a modern language would be laughed at.

[8] If any version is bad or artificial, let the lecturer compose his own.

[9] For the phrase 'that small infantry' see below.

[10] For a local study along these lines see O. A. W. Dilke and Margaret S. Dilke, 'Terracina and the Pomptine Marshes', *Greece and Rome* n.s. VIII (1961), 172-8 and Pl. V.

[11] CXXVII (1961), 417-426 and Pls. 1-12.

[12] Apart from the criticism of Mr P. J. Bicknell's article, much of the substance of the above was given as a talk to the Grahamstown region of the Classical Association of South Africa in Port Elizabeth in October, 1961.

HISTORICAL OBJECTIVITY AND ANCIENT SLAVERY

by P. J. BICKNELL

IN RECENT YEARS figures given for the size of the Athenian slave population have, with the exception of the computations of Gomme,[1] tended to become lower and lower, and the role played by slavery in all ancient economies has been consistently played down. A few decades ago a figure for the slave population of over a hundred thousand was generally accepted, as was the thesis that the failure of Greek economies was due to the undermining influence of servile labour. The most recent of the new school, whom I shall call the revisionists, are Westermann,[2] Ehrenberg,[3] and A. H. M. Jones,[4] who arrives at the impossibly small total of twenty-thousand slaves employed in the whole of Attica.

The views of the revisionists are best summarised by a pair of quotations; first from Westermann. 'The slaves were employed at the same work as the free, usually side by side with them, and apparently without prejudice or friction. In any sense which implies either that the enslaved population predominated over the free, or that the Greek polis displayed the mentality of a slave-ridden society, Greek culture was not based on slavery.' Ehrenberg writes. 'Slave-labour generally offered hardly any competition to the free labourer, since there was never unemployment on a large scale, and it made no difference to a man's fellow craftsmen if he kept a few slaves in his workshop. Thus the question of free and slave labour is really the question of manufacturing on a small or on a large scale. Since we do not believe in the predominant economic importance of big ergasteria, where slave labour was generally preferred, we do not believe in the predominant role of slave labour in general . . . Free men never felt slave labour as a danger, hardly ever as a disadvantage.'

I hope to show elsewhere that the actual description of Athenian slavery, as presented by the revisionists, is wrong; in the present paper I shall be concerned only with the motivation of revisionism itself.

Why the anxiety on the part of revisionists to dismiss the importance of slavery, and the equal energy expended by the Marxists in emphasising its role? In showing that slavery was not vital to Greek civilisation the revisionists have pruned the number of slaves, have denied that the Greek *poleis* displayed the mentality of slave societies and virtually dismissed the importance of slavery altogether. Against the revisionists stand the Soviet and East European historians, and scholars like Thomson, the English Communist

theoretician, who deals with what he calls Ehrenberg's basic fallacy as follows. First of all he quotes from Marxist scripture. Marx writes[5] 'If it is a scientific task to resolve the outward and visible movement into the inward, and actual movement, it stands to reason that the conception regarding the laws and production, which the agents of production and circulation form in their heads, will differ from the real laws, being merely the conscious expression of the apparent movements.'

Thomson then observes: 'Naturally the Athenians felt no qualms about slave labour. Slaves did their work, and the free ignored the dangers which were in any case slight. So they became a class of parasites, despising manual labour. Even philosophers agreed. Plato has slaves in his ideal states, and Aristotle thinks some men are slaves by nature, living tools. Such ideological blinkers prevented the free from realising the truth. Ruling classes, as Marx hints, do not understand the real laws of production and naturally the Athenians failed to perceive the contradiction in their society. 'They merely uttered a conscious expression of the apparent movement.' Thomson[6] continues, 'The ideas of Ehrenberg and Westermann fall flat. The truth is that because they are based on small-scale production, Greek states, having grown up in conformity with new developments in the productive forces, especially iron-working and the coinage, were able, under the democracy, to insinuate slave labour surreptitiously into all branches of production, and so create the illusion that it was something ordained by nature. This was the culminating point in the evolution of Ancient Society to be followed by a long decline, in which the limitations inherent in a slave economy asserted themselves on an ever-increasing scale.'

The main error of Thomson's opponents is, if I may repeat it more succinctly, as follows. Just as the Greeks were deluded as to the slave basis of their society, so the revisionists, sharing an analogous delusion (about exploitation in their own society) see only the Greek's misconceptions and the justifications for their own social system. They all miss the real facts. They see the apparent movement, not the real laws.

This whole argument illustrates the general Marxist thesis that every historian is biased by his political beliefs. Even when Greek history is being written the 'progressive' Thomson pits himself against the reactionary, bourgeois scholar like Jones.

The Marxist view of revisionism itself, would, I believe, be somewhat as follows. The whole source of revisionist distortion lies in the cherished belief of modern historians in our 'Western Democratic way of Life'. Bourgeois scholars are imprisoned in and conditioned by a society totally dedicated and committed to a certain political ideal. Blinded by this society's beliefs and preconceptions they unconsciously defend them in all spheres of knowledge. They are completely fettered by a particular ideology. Bourgeois society believes itself to be truly democratic, and claims that Greek democracy, as its antecedent, was the first so-called

'open' society. Its pedigree is traced to Ancient Athens, the proto-democracy. Thus, Ancient democracy is set on a pedestal, and when certain historians challenge the cherished concept the representatives of bourgeois democracy set out to rebut them—for example—George Grote wrote an idealistic defence of Athenian democracy, inspired by Gladstonian liberalism. Certain writers have pointed out that the ideal democracy was based on slavery, and was therefore not so ideal. The modern revisionists have therefore attempted to show that slavery was unimportant, and that what slaves there were were really well treated and not slaves at all, but apprentices for freedom. The revisionists fail to see that Athens consisted of a free ruling class, united by a common interest, and by bonds of kinship; parasitic on empire and various types of slavery. The appearance of economic democracy had been achieved not so much by the even distribution of the wealth it produced, as by using the proceeds of exploitation to relieve the poverty of its poor section.

Whether there is truth in this Marxist criticism of the integrity of the revisionists, or whether there is not, it is at least obvious that one's social beliefs must inevitably colour one's view of history. Are the revisionists in fact reacting against adverse criticisms of a cherished ideal upon which their way of life is supposedly based? One hesitates to express a dogmatic opinion, but are we not, in fact, accustomed to speak and think of our civilisation as drawing its roots from the Greek and Roman heritage? Do we not constantly reiterate that all that is good in Western civilisation is derived from the Greco-Roman tradition? It can hardly be doubted that many of us in the West have tended to accept these views, and view the classical past through rose-coloured spectacles.

With Communists, both in the Soviet bloc and among their sympathisers in the West, the situation is different. They are concerned with building a new type of society. This being so, the doctrinaire Communist is inclined to repudiate any tradition or heritage. Marx-Leninism teaches that all societies prior to the Communist Utopia are pre-historic and imperfect, based on oppression and cruel exploitation of class by class. Dialectical materialism, being an evolutionary philosophy, explains that the various stages in human history neither can nor should be recreated with their socio-economic substructure, and their cultural products.

Hence there is a danger of the Marxist historian regarding the past as a mere museum specimen, providing no guidance for the present. Marxist literary and artistic criticism of Greco-Roman culture often degenerates into a discussion of the socio-economic milieu in which it rose, and ignores its context. Even a fairly well-balanced Marxist historian, Kolpinski,[7] can make the following typical remarks: 'Our Russian culture, based as it is on a socialism which has liquidated all slavery. . ., cannot in any way occupy itself with the imitation or duplication of an art which rose in the dawn of a slave-holding system', and, 'the exactness of our analysis of ancient art will depend on the correctness of our social approach

to it.' Kolpinski later adds 'bourgeois champions of ancient culture forget that ancient art arose in conditions which can never, and should never, be recreated.' The last remark, although it will be unsympathetic to most Western historians, deserves attention. The revisionist defenders of our own system are as likely to plunge into unobjective writing as the most doctrinaire Marxist apologists.

In my own study of Greek slavery it has astonished me to see of what distortions of evidence, of what misuse of facts the revisionists are guilty. They are excellent scholars and one hesitates to accuse them of intellectual dishonesty. Perhaps the only answer is that some distorting influence is operating, which is perhaps to be sought on the above lines.

It would be interesting to compare the attitudes of Jones and Ehrenberg, and the difference between moderate and advanced revisionism. Is the unconscious ideological conflict growing more bitter?

Fortunately there are still some moderate historians to correct us; among them, Finley, Michell and Tarn. I quote these three:

Finley[8] has spoken of an Athenian 'leisure class *élite* deriving its wealth, and hence its freedom to devote itself to non-economic activities, almost entirely from the labour of slaves'. He goes on, 'on any theory of history, the conclusion is that Greek civilisation was based on slave-labour. I will go further. The evidence is that the more advanced the city state, the more it employed genuine slavery rather than (hybrid) types, like helotage'. Finley remarks elsewhere that mere numbers make no difference to this particular conclusion, as is shown by the evidence of slavery in the Southern States of the U.S.A.

Michell's conclusion[9] is 'without the slave the ancient world could not have existed, or at least in the form it did.'

Tarn[10] says, 'Greek civilisation itself was based upon, and made possible by slavery.'

A moderate view of the harm done by slavery to the ancient world would run roughly as follows, and would sufficiently justify the remarks of Michell, Tarn and others:

While slavery was still growing and constituted no general social threat, the citizen elements struggled amongst each other, the aristocracy of birth against the wealthy commercial elements; then the city against the country; finally, the well-to-do against the proletariat. But as slave-labour gradually infiltrated the economy, it cut across the struggle between rich and poor. The poor became permanently depressed, because there was no point in employing them while slaves were cheaper, and some became mercenaries. Thus it can be well said that 'the social and economic life of the fourth century was marked by the lapse of the mass of the population into proletarianism and closely connected therewith the growth of unemployment.'

Then, the mercenary armies captured more slaves and so worsened the situation. In addition, increasing slave-labour began

to ensure a collapse in the internal market for its produce, as soon as territorial expansion of the Hellenistic world came to an end. Thus the contradiction was two-limbed. Later, the ruling classes and the free citizens in general became more and more united by a common interest against the non-free, and Macedon and Rome both symbolised the unity of the reactionary effort against emancipation and progress of any sort. Witness, for example, the fate of Cleomenes and Nabis, when the Achaean League preferred to call in Macedon rather than tolerate revolutionary developments in the Peloponnese.

At Athens, when her empire collapsed, the struggle between rich and poor broke out again, simply because external supplies were cut off, while the situation was further worsened by the growing preference for servile labour. Under Macedon a moderate oligarchy was established, with the intention of keeping down the irresponsible mob, and preserving the 'system' on behalf of the ruling classes who lived on the labour of their slaves. Meanwhile, Plato and Aristotle had helped crystallize their ideology.

Concerning the collapse of the city state, broken by internal contradictions consequent on the growth of slavery, and the change over to the universal slave-state, Kolpinski has the following excellent passage:

'After the fifth-century blossoming came a period in which the city state began to disintegrate. This period witnessed the first crisis in the slave-holding system of social organisation; while it led to the destruction of the early system of small, isolated city-states, it at the same time prepared the way for the formation of the great Hellenistic monarchies, and these monarchies, in their turn, were destined to provide a much more widely extended foundation for the development of all the contradictions inherent in a slave-holding society.'

Baldry[11] has a good passage on another aspect of the same. It has particular reference to Athens:

'It is probably in slavery that the chief cause for the development is to be found. Because the wages of free workers could never rise much above those of slaves, and because slavery made any kind of trade union organisation to raise wages impossible, a society based on slave labour suffered from chronic underconsumption, continually unable to absorb all the goods which it produced. Once slavery had reached considerable proportions in industry, the inadequacy of the internal market led to a constant search for markets elsewhere.'

As Rostovtseff[12] has correctly argued, in the fourth century the external market for Athenian goods also contracted, mainly because of the tendency of industry to export itself. In this he also thinks he has found an adequate reason for the shortage of foodstuffs—the foods could no longer be paid for by exports. May not another reason have been the large slave population all over Greece, which had to be fed?

It is not a particularly original view, but I find it satisfactory. Eventual technological stagnation was the most devastating result of leaving slaves to do all the work.

Technological stagnation is foreshadowed even as early as 500 B.C. Before this date sheep-shears, wine press and rotary quern had all been invented, yet no further achievement occurred before the Hellenistic expansion. Slavery was, of course, creeping into production. It is a fact that a commercial state normally tended to introduce slavery, more than an agricultural one—at least until the development of the large estates worked by praedial slaves, which belong to Hellenistic times. When this happened and agriculture failed to provide for the wants of the people because of the lack of machinery, the ancient world really began to crack open and reveal the contradictions inherent in its economy.

It is not insignificant that of late the revisionists have turned their attention to attacking the belief in slavery as the chief force bringing about this technological stagnation. They point out, for example, the progress made in Hellenistic times, though society was as much based upon slavery then as later.[13]

Once again they are groping among secondary causes, and ignore the basic dynamics of society. We have seen how slavery ruined the individual polis; the answer to this was a vast expansion of the Hellenic world to take over the whole Persian Empire. Markets increased, and contacts between foreign minds stimulated invention. Yet, in two hundred years the whole prospect was once more barren. Even earlier, only monarchies could maintain a social equilibrium, and the separate kingdoms were all forced to use 'a planned economy', but planned in the interest of the ruling classes. Leisure for the spate of inventions, of course, depended on slave-labour, and slave-labour prevented any mechanisation or technological revolution in industry. The only real exceptions were in war, that perennial trigger of innovation, in agriculture, where the general shortage of food (mentioned by Rostovtseff as the other main characteristic of the period) compelled the adoption of new methods.

Archimedes, however, one of the great inventors, despised his engineering works, and showed a predilection for his efforts in pure mathematics; and in general the greatest Hellenistic achievements were in this and other pursuits of the leisured, such as Astronomy. Their work was no doubt of great importance, but not immediately, and it did little to benefit the lot of their less gifted contemporaries.

The failure to exploit productively the inventions offered by science was a consequence of the structure of Hellenistic society and the contradictions in its economy. These reacted on theory too; the most original and creative activity, the epoch-making discoveries and the great constructive hypotheses, all fall within the later second and third centuries—precisely the period when the economic system was expanding.

Though the lines of research then laid down were fruitfully

pursued, subsequently, the output of genuinely novel ideas virtually ceased after 200 B.C. By 200 B.C. economic contradictions were becoming manifest in an arrest of the market's expansion externally, and a slowly growing impoverishment internally.

The latter of course was due to the exploitation of slave labour.

That the revisionists should deny that this picture is in the main correct, I find bewildering, as amazing as their treatment of slavery at Athens. Why this desire to deny the importance to the Ancient World of slavery?

To get a clear picture of slavery at Athens and in the Ancient World is hard—that is true. It is easy to be subjective, difficult to master all the evidence.

[1] *Population of Athens in the fifth and fourth centuries B.C.*, p. 29.
[2] See especially 'Athenaeus and the Slaves of Athens', *Harvard Studies in Classical Philology*, supp. vol. (1941) 451-70 for the quotation on page 470.
[3] *The People of Aristophanes*, p. 183 (for quotation below).
[4] In his book *Athenian Democracy*, which inspired an interesting article by Mr C. Webb in an earlier *Theoria*.
[5] Marx, *Capital*, 3. 369 (Moscow edition).
[6] For Thomson's arguments, see his *The First Philosophers*, 202 ff.
[7] Kolpinski, *The Blossoming of Greek Art*, Moscow, 193 f.
[8] 'Was Greek Civilisation based on Slave Labour?' *Historia* 8 (1959) 145-164.
[9] *Economics of Ancient Greece*, p. 149.
[10] *The Greeks in Bactria*, p. 9.
[11] *Greek Literature for the Modern Reader*, p. 14.
[12] *Social and Economic History of the Hellenistic World*, vol. I., p. 84.
[13] This is done by Professor White in an excellent article on technology in the Roman Empire, *Act. Class.* I (1959), p. 79 ff.

WORDSWORTH'S PATRIOTISM

by F. H. LANGMAN

PATRIOTISM is out of fashion with people of liberal views. It has been discredited by association with narrow Nationalism, with the immoral self-love that says 'my country, right or wrong!' We know only too well the chauvinism which elevates into a supreme principle the 'love of one's own', the love of one's own race, institutions, and history. The trouble with 'love of one's own', in this sense, is that it presupposes that just because they are one's own they must be good, they must be worth loving. This is not hopeful: it leads to false complacency, it denies the need for self-improvement. In one's own race, institutions, and history, there are always shameful patches, things ill-done and done to others' harm. Chauvinistic 'love of one's own' seeks to make us hide this truth from ourselves, to glorify our race and its past, like pasting wall-paper over the cracks in a house. The cracks remain unrepaired, and some day they will bring the house down. 'Love of one's own' can have ugly consequences. Too often, people think they can best show this love by hating what belongs to others and working to destroy it. And the very indefiniteness of the term 'one's own' can create a tyranny. Individuals lose their freedom to choose what to admire. They are required to love their 'own' race, institutions, and history. If they decline, they are branded as traitors to the race, or *volk*, or nation, or whatever it is called.

In this modern, discreditable, sense of 'patriotism', Wordsworth would have had nothing to do with it. But in an old-fashioned sense, he was a patriot. In this sense, I think patriotism very valuable, and it would be a loss if we allowed the ideal to become tarnished by association with chauvinism. International brotherhood is the coming idea perhaps, but it is still cold and distant, and patriotism in the better sense has much work to do. Wordsworth's patriotism did not lead him to glorify England's actions, no matter what they were. It led him to denounce her errors. He did not suppose that if she did a thing it must be good, he urged her to recognise and act by her own best self. If he held sacred the ground of his native country, he yet described himself as 'a patriot of the world' (*The Prelude*, X, 242).

Love of country need not mean blindness to that country's faults. It need not mean jealousy and hatred of others. The very opposite. It may, and it should, mean love of what is good, not exclusively in one country, but attaching itself to one country and radiating out from there to what is good elsewhere. We can only love what we know. We can love not mankind but men, our families and our friends. Loving them, we can learn to love others

and to feel goodwill towards those we shall never meet. Patriotism in the better sense, then, is like love of family. Its value may be as great. It must not be sentimental and false, but neither must it be despised and disregarded: we want neither hearts of brass nor hearts of stone.

Wordsworth's patriotism may be seen in several well-known sonnets, and in passages all through *The Prelude*. To illustrate its quality, we may refer to lines such as these in which he describes his first childish feelings for the sun and moon:

> . . . a boy I loved the sun,
> Not as I since have loved him, as a pledge
> And surety of our earthly life, a light
> Which we behold and feel we are alive;
> Nor for his bounty to so many worlds—
> But for this cause, that I had seen him lay
> His beauty on the morning hills, and seen
> The western mountain touch his setting orb,
> In many a thoughtless hour, when, from excess
> Of happiness, my blood appeared to flow
> For its own pleasure, and I breathed with joy.
> And, from like feelings, humble though intense,
> To patriotic and domestic love
> Analogous, the moon to me was dear;
> For I could dream away my purposes,
> Standing to gaze upon her while she hung
> Midway between the hills, as if she knew
> No other region, but belonged to thee,
> Yea, appertained by a peculiar right
> To thee and thy grey huts, thou one dear Vale!
> (*The Prelude*, II, 178-197)

The love in this passage is convincing and affecting, because it is rooted in fact. For we accept as fact the experience the passage describes: authenticity is there in the way the sun rises, light spreading along the horizon before the disc of the sun itself appears:

> . . . I had seen him lay
> His beauty on the morning hills . . .

It is there in the way the sun is seen to set. I say 'seen' because that of course is the time of day when we can look full at the sun, can see it as an orb; and as it sets, the mountain on the horizon grows clearer in outline, seems to reach up into the sky. And it is there in the way the huts are recalled as they would appear by moonlight—grey. These descriptive details grow out of observation. Another quality helps to give the passage its authenticity: the poet's gentle, humorous acceptance of the child's imagining of the world. This pervades the passage. We need note only one particular phrase in which it emerges: the western mountain is seen, as if of its own volition, to *touch* the sun, for the child cannot easily distinguish what is alive from what is not, and he can have

no conception of astronomical distances. The phrase is noteworthy because, at the same time as it expresses the child's vision, it expresses the adult vision too. The man knows that the sun does not set, the horizon of the rolling earth *rises* and the mountain comes between the sun and the eye. The appeal of the whole passage comes from this way by which the poet's vision is built upon the child's. From the child's strong feeling for moon and sun, however he mistook their nature and range, comes the poet's evaluation of the whole universe, 'so many worlds'.

The least pleasing line, poetically, in this passage, is worth some attention. Wordsworth describes his boyhood affection for the valley as

> To patriotic and domestic love
> Analogous.

Patriotic and domestic love for him are of a kind. The effect of the line is to suggest not their differences but their sameness, their relatedness. When we see this relatedness we are on the way to understanding much in Wordsworth's poetry that might otherwise seem obscure or empty. Not that his poetry *seems* difficult. Beside some renowned obscurantists of the present, Wordsworth is as lucid as plate-glass and as innocent as Alice. That is the first cause of difficulty. His best poems seem simpler than they are. The poetry is so smooth, so finished, no roughness arrests our superficial attention. We suppose that we have understood a poem, and pass on, when we have barely begun to understand it: we have merely swept across the polished surface. In the *Preface to Lyrical Ballads*, Wordsworth says that, to produce poems of value on a variety of subjects, a poet must have thought long and deeply. Wordsworth thought long and deeply. But his poems seldom argue. They give not his thinking but the vision produced by that thinking. Thought is sublimated, and we have instead—objects: people, scenes, and situations, seen with pellucid clarity and calm. Wordsworth speaks with the quiet, uninsistent certainty of one who does not *contend.*

His vision itself is a further cause of difficulty. His thought is so sublimated into the poetry that we are in some danger of failing to notice it. When we do become aware of the complex intellectual content of his poems, it is necessary, if we are to understand it, for our own minds to travel the same path of ideas leading to the vision he presents. That demands not only effort but also some courage. Like Blake, Wordsworth is sometimes hard to understand because his ideas are not only unfamiliar—they are humbling. They tell us too nakedly what we are. We know that Wordsworth is a Romantic Poet, and we are all too ready to suppose that we know what he writes about: Natural law, and Infinity, and Man's unconquerable mind. He does write about those, of course, but I think our attention should also go elsewhere. He writes about poverty, sickness, old age, loneliness—in short, and in his own words,

'a world
Where want and sorrow were.'

A third cause of difficulty in Wordsworth's poems is their complexity and completeness of organization. They form imaginative wholes so compact and firm that we may turn them round and round without finding a hold for our teeth.

One such hold, I suggest, is provided by our discovery that for Wordsworth patriotism and domestic love are related. I do not mean that this is the whole theme of the poem to which I would now draw attention. Even to call it a theme is misleading. The idea is nowhere stated in the poem. It lies *behind* the poem. We can understand the poem only when we *realize for ourselves* the relation of patriotism to domestic love. Nor, in realizing this, have we mastered the poem. We have merely got a hold upon it. The whole poem is far richer, more complex, and rests upon yet other ideas.

I travelled among unknown men,
In lands beyond the sea;
Nor, England! did I know till then
What love I bore to thee.

'Tis past, that melancholy dream!
Nor will I quit thy shore
A second time; for still I seem
To love thee more and more.

Among thy mountains did I feel
The joy of my desire;
And she I cherished turned her wheel
Beside an English fire.

Thy mornings showed, thy nights concealed
The bowers where Lucy played;
And thine too is the last green field
That Lucy's eyes surveyed.

In separation, the poet discovers his love for England. The feeling of separation, of distance, is conveyed in 'lands beyond the sea'. This is not a circumlocution for 'foreign lands', because the reference to the sea reminds us that England is an island and makes us aware of the physical gap between her shores and Europe.

What the poet discovers is not simply that he loves England: that he may previously have known, in some degree. His discovery is, rather, the intensity of his love—surprising even to himself. This is expressed not only in the exclamatory force of 'England!' but also in 'What'. Compare Wordsworth's lines with

. . . nor did I know till then
The love I bore to thee.

This would mean merely 'I did not know *that* I loved you'. *What love* means 'I did not know *how much* I loved you'.

This discovery is made, I have said, in separation from England. But the poetry conveys more than that: the discovery is made in loneliness, in separation from the men around him. In this context, the suggestions of 'travelled' rule out ideas of lingering, sojourning, learning to know new places. The suggestions are of simply passing through. For 'travelled' of course takes its colour from 'unknown men', and the emotion there is emphatic.

The simplicity of the second stanza is deceptive. We must take it in two ways: as we understand it when we come to it, lines five to eight of the poem; and again as we understand it when we come back to it, with the whole poem in our minds, when we grasp the far from simple time-consciousness of the poem. In the simpler view, this stanza is the slightest of the four. It makes a narrative connection between the opening of the poem and the conclusion. The voluntary isolation is over, as if it had never been: 'Tis past, that melancholy dream!' Dream, because when travelling nothing had seemed real. The return to England is a return to love, but also a return to reality, an awakening from the dream. Perhaps we should make a special note of that. In the popular culture of the present—and for that matter in some of the literature of the Romantic period—dreams have a peculiar potency. They are the horses on which our wishes would leap far from this muddy, mundane earth. In this poem, 'dream' has none of that lotus-drowsed narcosis. The love to which the past returns is fact, not fancy.

And yet, as we are now looking at it, the stanza may seem unsatisfying. We may wonder whether it shows strength or weakness to say

> . . . Nor will I quit thy shore
> A second time.

May we not argue that something is wrong with a man who clings only to what he knows, who stays tamely where he is comfortable? Isn't there something of defeat in those lines? Dissatisfaction of another sort may be felt with the rest of the stanza. 'Seem' is strongly emphasised, by alliteration, by rhyme, and by its place in the line. Is this stress not misplaced? By the force it has to carry, 'seem' comes to cast doubt upon what presumably should be most certain: that the poet's love for England intensifies. We may be tempted to wonder: 'If it only *seems* to increase, does it in reality grow less?' The eighth line, too, seems hackneyed: To love thee more and more. The attempt at intensification is trite.

All these questions may be deferred. At this point, I should like to anticipate my argument and say that we have barely begun to understand these lines. When we come to them again, not viewing them as a connection in a narrative sequence, but interpreting them in the poem as a whole, conceived as the expression of one

complex thought, then we shall find that they bear the main burden of meaning in the poem.

What an astonishing statement the next lines make! That their tone is so little excited makes no less surprising the daring of what they assert. The daring, indeed, lies partly in their calm assurance, in the simple, matter-of-fact, gladness with which Wordsworth accepts his desire. 'Desire' is not a neutral word. It expresses more than there could be in such words as 'wish' or 'hope'. Wordsworth is not a poet in whom special understanding of human love is sought as it may be sought in Chaucer or Shakespeare or Blake. Sometimes critics have gone so far as to call Wordsworth sexually neutral or null. But in this poem the suggestions of 'desire' are inescapable. And this is representative, I believe, of Wordsworth's attitude. Like Blake, Wordsworth asserts that desire is, quite simply, good. To my mind, Wordsworth's assertion is the more startling, because it is made with none of Blake's aggression, none of Blake's defensiveness. A rough paraphrase may show something of the fullness of meaning in the line:

> The joy of my desire.

It means 'the joy that I came seeking', the joy that I desired to feel. It also means the joy of human love, the joy of satisfied desire. In this sense, the idea resembles that in Blake's lines:

> What is it men in women do require:
> What in whores is always found—
> The lineaments of gratified desire.

Only, unlike Blake, Wordsworth writes here as one who does not covet gratification, but possesses it, and so he is free from Blake's bitterness.

The most striking meaning of all in the line, however, may be expressed like this: 'What joy it is to feel desire!' This idea is the most daring and the most profound of all: it implies that even without thought of gratification, to desire is itself joy. Desire is joy. Of course the tendency of the poem as a whole suggests beyond doubt that the desire knows gratification, but the point here is not mainly in that. Desire is joy because to desire is to be intensely alive, to value life, to aspire beyond oneself.

'Mountains' takes the scene well inland. What is returned to is more than English soil. The joy felt in this stanza did not come solely from the return to England's shore. It came from the return to a locality at least this much particularised: that it is mountainous. Here we should note the tense. It has changed. The previous stanza spoke in the present. Now we move into the past. 'Among the mountains *did* I feel'. The change warns us not to assume that the poet is returning to love, to the gratification of his desire. He is returning only to the scene of happiness in the past, and the lines do not promise that his happiness will be renewed. They do not promise it, but they do not deny it. They leave the matter poised,

and for the moment it need not trouble us. The drift of the lines is sufficiently seen: the return is to a region of some definiteness, loved because it has been the scene of happiness and love. 'Mountains' carries further suggestions. Perhaps it would be distorting to stress them, but some awareness of these associations does enter and colour our apprehension. Traditionally, mountains are opposed to plains and the cities of the plains, and the opposition is valid for the England of Wordsworth's day. The way of life associated with mountains is rugged, solitary, simple, and pure. And the life alluded to in the poem, as even Lucy's homely name indicates, is not a mock-pastoral. She turns her wheel not as a pretty pastime but as a trade. She lives not in a romantic grot, but in a cottage. The picture here needs little elaboration: it is of a life lived humbly, industriously, and yet with cheer and security. What is needed, perhaps, is to recall that the way of life reflected here did exist in the England of the time. It existed, but it was near the end of its existence. Between the enclosure of small fields into large farms, and the growth of Industry, England's old economy was giving way. The small farmers who augmented their earnings by cottage-industry were driven from the land and drawn into the factories. This is well enough known. The point to notice is that the older way of life survived here and there, and naturally enough it persisted longest in remote or mountainous districts.

These historical associations, however, belong in the background. In the foreground of our minds we should keep the more general associations and suggestions of the line. These, I have said, are that the poet on returning to England thinks of a known region, where his deep experience is located—his love of England is rooted in experience. And the way of life in which his love is rooted, the line suggests, is hard, spare, unspoilt—mountain life. This provides the stanza with its special tension. The joy of desire, the warmth of life, is located where the air is thin and cold, in the harsh simple life of the mountain pasture. They are not opposites. This humble austerity of life is the condition of joy, the soil in which it grows. The girl turns her wheel beside an English fire. How beautifully the rhyme fuses 'fire' with 'desire', here, so that they seem to interchange properties—desire itself becomes not the searing, crucifying agony of Blake or Emily Bronte or Yeats, but the cheering, *cherishing*, golden blaze in the hearth.

She turned her wheel. The meaning of this has already been noted. It expresses her way of life, which is of humble domestic industry. Humble, traditional, and—the suggestion is strong, and reinforces a hint of it we may already have received from 'mountains'—peaceful. The suggestion is there, too, in the undisturbed calm rhythm. And now it expands, in the rhythm of the four lines that follow, as the poem moves to the most serene of closings. In that serenity we discover the full meaning of 'turned her wheel'.

'Thy mornings showed, thy nights concealed
The bowers where Lucy played.'

'Cherished', the idea in the previous stanza, is amplified and extended. The girl whom the poet cherished, England itself cherished, in her peaceful rural setting and in the regularity of her life: thus the protectiveness felt in 'bowers', the sense of a sheltered natural spot (compare, say, 'garden' or 'arbour'). There, Lucy *played.* Played, we suppose, when she was a child. But there is more to it. Her whole life passed as play, with a child's innocence and enjoyment in all that she did.

Her whole life passed. What we already half know, the last lines tell us with a gentle shock. Lucy is dead.

I said a while back that the second stanza speaks of happiness in the past, but does not promise a renewal of that happiness. It cannot be renewed. She is dead. The poet returns not to his love, but, at best, to the scenes of love. Yet, in a sense, his happiness is renewed. It is renewed in England's reminder to him of the value of what has been. The value of what has been may be judged by the gladness brought even through memory of it. Because of the happiness that has been, the poet can accept that it is over, can accept both life and death, with a tranquillity not weakly passive. His acceptance is not resigned, it is affirmative.

At last we are ready to return to the puzzling and seemingly unsatisfying second stanza. I shall take up again the three questions I posed.

> 'Nor will I quit thy shore
> A second time.'

Of these lines, I asked: 'May we not argue that something is wrong with a man who clings only to what he knows, who stays tamely where he is comfortable?' The question loses its force. The poet has not returned to comfort, to a loving welcome. He has returned to a grave. If he finds strength and comfort there, it is no defeat. His calm joy in England embraces a worse isolation than any he felt in alien lands.

> 'To love thee more and more.'

The comment on this was that it is hackneyed, that 'more and more' is a trite attempt at intensification.

Intensification it is, but not primarily. The primary meaning is not 'to love thee more strongly' but 'to love thee increasingly'—to love more than previously, and to feel love still growing. The true rhythm of the line, I think, puts this beyond doubt. 'More and more', in its rhythmic context, is not a flat phrase in which the words run together. There is a pause, and the last two words come energetically, almost in surprise, to declare the further growth of love. We understand this when we know why England is loved: because England bred Lucy, cherished her, and encloses her remains. Here is the solution to what had been most puzzling in the use of 'seem'. By the force it has to carry, I noted, 'seem' comes to cast doubt upon what should be most certain: that the

poet's love for England intensifies. In our knowledge of the poem's conclusion, this certainty fails. Lucy is dead, and it is not at all certain that he should love, increasingly love, the scenes which must constantly remind him of that fact. 'Seems' by its doubtful note exactly expresses the poet's wonder in discovering that his love for England *does* grow.

I have reserved until now the profoundest level of the poem. England, I said a while ago, encloses Lucy's remains.

'Thy mornings showed, thy nights concealed
The bowers where Lucy played;'

We have understood this to express the regularity of Lucy's life. It expresses also the simple rhythm of her life *and death;* she is accepted back into the concealing night. Life and death are understood and accepted in the image of the pattern of day and night, the inevitable rhythm of the turning globe. The same extension of meaning, employing the same image, comes in

'She I cherished turned her wheel'

her spinning wheel, but also the wheel of her life turning to its point of rest. And the last lines of the poem carry this out in a breath-taking perfection of expression:

'And thine too is the last green field
That Lucy's eyes surveyed.'

After the powerful, brutal definiteness of rhythm in 'last green field,' it lightens, seems to linger in the long hovering vowels, as the dying gaze fades out, as the earth turns on and darkness comes down on the field.

Even now, we have not said it all. Life and death, I put it, are understood and accepted in the image of the pattern of day and night, in the turning of the wheel. This image, surely is not of a single revolution, but of a revolution endlessly repeated. The image is of a *cycle.* It is exquisitely fitting that the field where Lucy's dying gaze rests should be *green.*

TWEEËRLEI OORDEEL OVER HELENA VAN TROJE

deur M. NIENABER-LUITINGH

IN DE UITSTEKENDE bloemlezing *Digters uit die lae lande* vindt u onder de opgenomen poëzie van A. Roland Holst ook het volgende kleine gedicht:

Doorheen oude sneeuwbui
van slaap, in ommezien van
eeuwen, was ik weer bij
die eerste dreven: knapen
speelden er blij begin van
strijd om een kind. Weldra
juichten ze elkaar te wapen:
Helena . . . Helena . . .

Dit gedicht vormt een onderdeel van de bundel *Een winter aan zee* (1937), een verzameling van vier-en-zestig achtregelige gedichten, die een sterke overeenkomst vertonen wat hun bouw betreft en ook door hun inhoud met elkaar in verband staan. Toch is de innerlike samenhang niet zo sterk, dat we deze bundel zouden kunnen beschouwen als één lang gedicht, onderverdeeld in vier-en-zestig strofen. Het blijven dus vier-en-zestig afzonderlike gedichten, die stuk voor stuk op zichzelf beschouwd en gelezen kunnen worden.

Wat de vorm betreft betekenden de gedichten van *Een winter aan zee* bij hun verschijning een bijna revolutionaire vernieuwing in Holst's poëzie. Terwijl zijn lyriek vroeger vooral enigszins zangerig van aard was en een brede, stromende beweging bezat, klinkt uit deze gedichten eerder een nadrukkelike en zelfs verbeten spreektoon op. De wijze van uitdrukking is hier zo uiterst beknopt en geconcentreerd, dat bijna elk woord tot een symbool wordt. Als gevolg daarvan zijn deze gedichten moeilik verstaanbaar voor de lezer, die niet op de hoogte is van de symbolische betekenissen, die bepaalde woorden en namen steeds weer in Holst's poëzie aannemen, m.a.w. voor wie geen kennis draagt van zijn typische symbolentaal.

Om bovenstaande gedicht te kunnen verstaan, moet de lezer bovendien iets weten van de persoonlike mythe, die de grondslag vormt van Holst's poëzie.

Kort samengevat zouden we de hoofdinhoud van deze mythe als volgt kunnen weergeven: Eenmaal, in het verre verleden, heeft er een tijd bestaan, waarin het leven schoner, vuriger en edeler geleefd is dan thans. Toen was het hoogste streven van de mens gericht op schoonheid en geluk—niet op macht en geld zoals in de

verworden moderne samenleving. De herinnering aan die gelukzalige voortijd leeft voort in de oude Griekse en Keltische verhalen. In Holst's poëzie wordt de schoonheid van die vroegere eeuwen herhaaldelik belichaamd in de gestalte van Helena, de beeldschone vrouw, van wie de Griekse mythen verhalen, dat zij door de Trojaanse prins Paris aan haar wettige man, koning Menelaus van Sparta, werd ontroofd. Om deze roof te wreken, trokken de Griekse vorsten onder leiding van Menelaus' broeder, Agamemnon, tegen Troje op. Na een beleg van tien jaar werd de stad ingenomen en volkomen verwoest, waarna Menelaus zijn nog steeds betoverend schone vrouw naar zijn paleis in Sparta terugvoerde.

In Holst's poëzie treedt Helena steeds op als symbool van een schoonheid, die hij zelf eenmaal als volgt definieerde: ‚de schoonheid in haar eenig waren zin: de zielskracht, waarneembaar voor de zintuigen van het lichaam'. (*Eigen achtergronden.*) Eenmaal, in het verre verleden, waren de mensen dus zó edel en van zulke idealen bezield, dat zij oorlog voerden ter wille van deze schoonheid. Maar in later tijden zijn wereld en mensen onzuiver en verworden geraakt. Het verlangen naar schoonheid heeft plaats gemaakt voor begeerte naar macht en materiële welvaart. De meeste mensen leven volkomen gevangen in het heden en hebben geen herinnering meer aan hun edele afkomst. Maar in sommigen leeft nog het besef van die grootse voortijd en hun zielen hunkeren terug naar die verre eeuwen als naar een verloren vaderland.

In het gedicht *Doorheen oude sneeuwbui* vermeldt de dichter hoe hij in een droom ‚weer' (zoals reeds zo dikwijls immers in droom en verbeelding!) teruggekeerd is naar ‚die eerste dreven', de zuivere landelike schoonheid van die verre voortijd.

Hij is daar gekomen ‚doorheen oude sneeuwbui/ van slaap'. De slaap wordt dus voorgesteld als een sneeuwbui, waardoor hij gaat om bij die ‚eerste dreven' te komen.

‚Sneeuw' is een woord, dat dikwijls in de poëzie van Roland Holst voorkomt en bijna steeds als een symbool van een zuiverheid, die mens en wereld—voor een ogenblik of voor goed—wegvoert van en vervreemdt uit dit verdorven heden. Om maar enkele voorbeelden te noemen: in het gedicht ‚Het gestorven kind' klinkt de stem van het aan de wereld ontstegen kind vertroostend tot zijn moeder vanuit een gebied ‚tusschen sneeuw en maan'. In andere gedichten uit *Een winter aan zee* worden de vragen gesteld: ‚Ontvreemdde aan oude tijden / sneeuw dit leeg uur?' en ‚Waar bleef de tijd? hoe lang al / sneeuwt het?' In het gedicht ‚De pelgrim' wordt o.a. gezegd: ‚Na uren sneeuw lag over dorp en ommestreken / van een verloren en vergeten rijk de wade'.

De eerste regels van het gedicht ‚Doorheen oude sneeuwbui' zouden we dan ook als volgt kunnen ‚vertalen': door de zuiverende werking van de slaap, die de menselike geest bevrijdt van het lichaam en van de tijd, en hem terug voert naar een schoner werklikheid, was ik weer in die verre voortijd. En deze terugkeer geschiedt zo snel, dat het de indruk wekt alsof de eeuwen—in terugwaartse

richting—‚in ommezien', d.w.z. in een oogwenk voorbij gevlogen zijn.

En wat aanschouwt de, voor een ogenblik aan de hedendaagse werkelikheid ontsnapte geest, in deze ‚eerste dreven'? Knapen, die oorlogje spelen! Ook in die glanzende voortijd dus bootsten kinderen in hun spel het bedrijf van de volwassenen na. Maar deze knapen kennen slechts de oorlog tegen Troje, gevoerd om het bezit van de schoonste vrouw ter wereld, Helena. Daarom voeren ook zij in hun ‚blij' spel niet een oorlog om macht, maar ‚om een kind', dus ter wille van een soort kleine Helena. En de strijdkreet, waarmee zij elkaar te wapen ‚juichen' (hoe enthousiast en vrolik spelen zij hun spel!), is de naam ‚Helena', die zij zo dikwijls van de volwassen mannen gehoord moesten hebben—en die ook in de poëzie van Roland Holst zo herhaaldelik terugkeert.

Wat dit gedicht dus uitbeeldt, is een droomvisioen van een gelukzalige voortijd, toen de mensheid nog zó door grootse idealen bezield handelde, dat de kinderen—die zoals ook nu nog de volwassenen in hun spel nabootsen—geen andere strijd blijken te kennen dan die welke gevoerd werd terwille van de schoonheid, die zintuigelik waarneembare zielskracht was.

De aantekening, die in *Digters uit die lae lande* bij de naam Helena geplaatst wordt, lijkt mij dan ook misleidend en onjuist. Helena wordt daar gedefinieerd als: ‚die vrou aan wie Troje sy ondergang te wyte het—'n simboliese figuur wat telkens in Holst se gedigte verskyn. Die verraad is iets eie aan elke eeu, aan die tyd van die Griekse Helena, maar ook aan die tyd waarin ons leef.'

Het is zeker waar, dat de Helena, die ons bv. in Homerus se *Ilias* beschreven wordt, geen vlekkeloze karakter is. Maar in Holst's poëzie is zij tot een volkomen nieuwe gestalte geworden, even verheven als vreesaanjagend door de wraak, die zij neemt op een wereld, die de zielskracht, waarvan zij symbool werd, verlooch-ende. Holst's Helena lacht bij de brand van Troje (‚Bij het kristal'), want Troje was voor die verre voortijd, wat Babylon en Londen voor later eeuwen zullen worden: symbool van een verworden en onbezielde samenleving. En in zijn latere poëzie neemt zij meer en meer de gestalte aan van een wraakgodin, aanstormend om de Westerse wereld, ‚dit slecht rijk', te vernietigen (‚Helena's inkeer').

Bij Holst is Helena van Troje dus een meedogenloze wreekster van verraad. Daar is geen sprake van dat zij zelf ooit tot een symbool van verraad wordt, zoals de boven aangehaalde aantekening (misschien door onduidelike formulering?) lijkt te suggereren.

De onaantastbaarheid van Helena's gestalte in de verbeeldingswereld van Holst's poëzie wordt ten overvloede gedemonstreerd door de regels uit André Maurois' *Climats*, die hij als motto plaatste boven zijn lange gedicht, 'Helena's inkeer': ‚Le Poète Stésichore, ayant maudit dans ses vers Hélène, pour les maux attirés par elle sur les Grecs, est frappé pas Vénus de cécité et, comprenant alors sa faute, compose une palinodie où il exprime son regret d'avoir

blasphémé contre la beauté.' (De dichter Stesichore, die in zijn gedichten Helena vervloekt had wegens de rampen, die door haar toedoen aan de Grieken berokkend waren, werd door Venus met blindheid geslagen; en, nadat hij zijn misstap ingezien had, stelde hij een verklaring op, waarin hij zijn woorden herriep en zijn berouw uitsprak omdat hij tegen de schoonheid gelasterd had'.)

ON THE SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY OF FASCISM

by L. BLOOM

I. DIAGNOSTIC

ONE OF THE least well recognized but most insidious dangers that threaten mankind today is the seductive appeal of the Fascist ideology; it is insidious because it is fatally easy to dismiss Fascism as no longer relevant now that the political regimes openly based upon it have either vanished, or at least, have (like the Republic of South Africa) cloaked their aims and ideals in more acceptable clothing. The appeal is seductive because the Fascist ideology may be expressed in many socio-political forms, which in their varied ways satisfy common emotional needs. Therefore to understand modern Fascism it is necessary to employ the methods of two schools of thought: the Marxian and the Freudian, because no full analysis of Fascism can ignore either the social and political conditions that foster Fascism, or the emotional tendencies which make it possible for Fascism to satisfy so many otherwise rational and intelligent men and women.

On the one hand Freud has argued that the emotional origins of democratic society are found in the revolt of the sons against the father; this implies that conversely the victory of Fascism, the non-democratic society, is the reconquest of the sons by the father. This primeval psychological drama is still enacted behind the meretricious façade of the complex modern state, for

> 'civilized society is perpetually menaced with disintegration thru this primary hostility of men towards one another . . . Culture has to call up every possible reinforcement in order to erect barriers against the aggressive instincts of men and to hold their manifestations in check by reaction-formations in men's minds.' (*Freud:* 1946)

Following Freud's basic position, Fromm (*Fromm:* 1945) has argued disquietingly that men and women in the world affected by the Renaissance are so deeply threatened by their strivings for autonomy that they all too easily retreat into the comforting security of a Fascist ideology which provides ready-made defences against their turbulent inner conflicts and doubts.

Sharply contrasting is the Marxist argument that Fascism is not to be attributed to defects in man's ability to handle his aggressive (or other) instincts, but that it is a sociological phenomenon, a

symptom of the inability of Capitalism to preserve itself as it inevitably moves through certain stages of economic-social development. Fascism is an attempt to arrest change and to provide an ideology to justify the violent means that have often to be employed to slow (or stop) the disagreeable prospect of the struggle for profits, markets and exploitable labour being replaced by a juster economic-social organization.

Prima facie it is logically impossible to reconcile the methodological individualism of Freud (in the explanation of social problems) and the purely sociological approach of the Marxists, for if it be held that society is nothing more than an aggregation or collection of individual human beings each with its basic, unchanging biological nature, then society is itself unchanging and immutable. The Marxist would argue that according to the Freudian position the individual develops

> 'not in concrete and changing social conditions, but in this abstract society which is reputed to hold for all times and places. The social environment is stripped to a poverty of "constant" factors so that it can hardly be distinguished from a mythical state of nature . . . Marxism is the very antithesis of the isolated man theory and its necessary correlative, the social contract.' (*Bartlett*, 1938)

To become embroiled in an arid methodological battle, in times when mankind is in considerable peril, is frivolous and irresponsible; to insist upon the power of instinctual, individual biological drives is in no way to deny the reality of socio-economic influences such as the class struggle or imperialism in determining the pattern of human behaviour or the cause of that political and moral aberration: the spread and popularity of Fascist ideology.

> 'While psychoanalysis may, in a general sense, be defined as the science dealing with the desires and urges characteristic of man, so, in similar terms, Marxism may be defined as the science dealing with the external conditions which either fulfil or frustrate these desires . . . The psychoanalyst, who approaches his problems dialectically, will want to relate the discoveries of his science to the social problems of today. He will see psychoanalysis as having its real significance in the contribution it makes to the task of freeing society from the trammels of capitalistic production. He will understand the particular complaints of his patients as having reference to a general economic and social reality, besides reflecting unconscious impulses striving for conscious expression. He will therefore wish to acquaint himself with the nature of the environment which compels repressions, so that he may be able to help create that new social structure, which, Freud says, is necessary for the widespread use of psychoanalysis' (*Osborn*, 1937),

and for the canalization of mankind's destructive urges into socially valuable and individually satisfying activities.

The ideology of Fascism is one which extols the authoritarian society, in which there is a subservient mass and a dominant leader, and the structure of which is based upon a more or less explicit theory of the inheritant inability of the masses to lead themselves responsibly and autonomously. The prototype of such a society is Plato's city state and it says little for the imagination of Fascist apologists that even though over two thousand years have passed since Plato wrote, their justifications and explanations take a form similar to his. Plato contrives what he calls a 'necessary lie' to convince the rulers themselves and the masses of the nature of their society:

> 'You in this city are all brothers, but God as he was fashioning you, put gold into those of you who are capable of ruling . . . he put silver in the auxiliaries, and iron and copper in the farmers and the other craftsmen . . . There is an oracle that the city shall perish when it is guarded by iron or copper.' (*Plato*, 1948 ed.)

Plato goes on to discuss the immutability of these God-given distinctions and to discuss the system of education whereby the masses might be induced to accept their lot so that the city might continue to flourish without disharmony among the classes. Plato would be ideologically quite at home in the Republic of South Africa in 1962, in which the avowed practice of the state is the rigid separation into a hierarchy or caste system: the Africans (and to a lesser extent the other brown-skinned peoples) taking the place of Plato's men of iron or copper, and the ruling pink-skinned people taking the place of Plato's gold and silver class. The present Prime Minister of the Republic of South Africa wrote of the African that 'there is no place for him in the European community above the level of certain forms of labor' (*Bantu Education*, 1954), and in this he repeated the view expressed in an earlier report on educational policy that 'The education of the white child prepares him for life in a dominant society and the education of the black child for a subordinate society . . . The limits (of African education) form part of the social and economic structure of the country,' (*Report of Departmental Committee on Native Education*, 1935-6), clearly implying that the hierarchical structure of South African society was to be maintained by 'education' as shameless and cynical as Plato would have wished it to be.

Although it may seem at first glance that these statements are directly related to the fear of South African 'pinks' that they might sooner or later become subject to effective economic, social and political competition from Africans, accompanying the economic fears are irrational fears of a magical (or quasi-magical) nature, which become manifest when one considers the altogether unrealistic panic and passion that surrounds the pseudo-question of 'miscegenation'.

The basic emotional psychology of the Fascist ideology lies in the

> 'parent-regarding, especially the father-regarding, attitude and in the continuation of this attitude in introjected form in the super-ego; the "right" or conservative attitude (results) from a predominance of, obedience to, admiration of, and identification with the parental figure or its substitute in the external world.' (*Flugel*, 1947).

The Fascist, despite his overt aggression and boldness, has never grown up; he never wants to grow up and is afraid of the challenge of maturity; he is afraid lest others in his society grow up. His psychology is that of the insecure, selfish and hostile, overprotected spoiled child. He sinks his loyalties in a single father-surrogate, the Leader, and sinks his identity in the extension of the family: the *volk*, nation or political party. This relationship of Leader to follower is immensely satisfying to both leader and follower, for symbiotically the leader depends upon his followers for the satisfaction of his need for recognition and adoration, and the followers can abdicate their adulthood and with it the strain and conflicts of responsibility. The Fascist emphasises the need for rigid discipline in education, in the treatment of delinquents and criminals, and in the relationship of parent to child, and is sceptical of flexible and more imaginative approaches because they implicitly emphasize individuality and choice, and might allow the break through into consciousness of the aggressive and sexual desires and uncertainties that he so rigorously represses. He is afraid to be thought 'tender' or 'sentimental' and strives to appear 'tough', 'practical' and 'single-minded', for he has a strong impulsion to guilt-feelings for the aggressive and sexual desires that he is repressing, and is covertly ambivalent to the Leader whom he both reveres as a strong father but resents as the child resents his father's sexual and social maturity.

It is this ambivalence that lies behind the frequent violent failing from favour of a seemingly firmly entrenched Leader: when the much beloved Leader fails to protect his flock or the burdens he places on them are too great there is an upsurge of repressed hostility to the punishing and repressive father and we see the familiar pattern of an over-organized society deteriorating into chaos and violence. A complicating factor is that of identification with the father-leader by the children-followers. Identification may be of two types: ' "developmental Identification", in which the child *learns* to perform ego functions like his parents, and "defensive Identification" in which the child accepts the standards of his parents as a means for pleasing them and as a means for controlling his own impulses.' (*Mowrer*, 1953.) The identification of followers and leader is largely defensive identification, in which the followers accepting their role as children can abdicate responsibility, find security, and both satisfy their gregariousness (the *volk* or political party being an extension of the family) and obey the injunctions of

the leader to focus their aggressions and antipathies upon particular groups, thus controlling these inchoate impulses. From a sociological point of view: society not only provides controls that can mitigate or exacerbate the innate aggression of the members of a society, but offers targets for the Fascists' hate and aggression, for every society has defined some group to whom it stands in the relation of institutionalized hate. The targets provided by society are of groups that immediately or ultimately or in fantasy offer an economic threat to the dominating class; the Africans' struggle for economic equality has resulted in a more vicious repression as they become a more powerful economic threat to the ruling class in South Africa.

The Fascist ideology appeals to the insecure, the discontented, and to those who need the support of a group to soften their feelings of inferiority, and it therefore includes a theory of the innate (if unrecognized by its enemies) superiority and intrinsic ability of the group to the detriment of other groups. But the Fascists' ambivalence and anxiety is revealed in the practice of the Fascist state, in which this self-defined 'superior' group depends for its temporary position of power upon political manoeuvring, the intimidation of the masses *or* the successful indoctrination of the masses and the ruling class by the myths of innate superiority of the rulers and the innate inferiority of the masses. The Fascist ruler spends much of his time querulously advertising his group's abilities and virtues, and almost as much in devising laws to prevent the masses from competing with his group with anything approaching economic and social equality. In South Africa, there is, therefore, a host of repressive legislation designed to prevent direct economic competition between the ruling classes and the masses, to discourage or make it impossible for the masses to obtain adequate education and technical training, and even to minimize the social contacts by which the masses might pick up informally the knowledge and techniques that could increase their economic power.

This naked attempt to retain economic, and therefore political, power, is rarely presented in its true, unashamed and ugly form; the ideological cosmetics are frequently so skilfully applied that the democrat needs a very keen eye for whited sepulchres if he is not to be deceived. This fear of economic competition is often symbolically bedizened: the Fascist feels himself the one adult in a world of children, and parades his paternalism to a sceptical world. But he hates and dreads the thought that children grow up and want to leave home and set up families of their own as independent adults. He fears the startling speed and violence with which children move from childhood through adolescence into maturity, and like any tyrannical and short-sighted parent he labours to delay the growing-up as long as he dares, he strives to keep the children at home to fetch and to carry as long as he can bully or blarney them. It is tragic that when the 'child' becomes an adult, he repays

his stunting by an all-consuming bitterness and hate for his stultifying 'parent'. This symbolic adult-child relationship lies behind many of the more repugnant institutions and prejudices of 'white' South Africans—the use of the degrading terms 'boy' and 'girl' to call or command African adults, the mass of legislation by which almost every aspect of the African's day-to-day life is regulated with the meticulousness of a compulsive and nagging father, the African 'house-boy's' uniform of coarse cloth that makes him a grotesque, an adult-child, and is a symbol of servitude like the yellow gaberdine of the medieval Jew.

Fear and anxiety, when they are not anaesthetic, engender fanaticism, and fanaticism stimulates the exaggeration of danger and the imagination of heroically ill-considered remedies, the last refuge of a class that has lost rational hope and confidence but fervently, desperately, searches for salvation. In South Africa the ruling class knows (in its sober thinking moments, when economic considerations make its leaders face the stark unpleasant realities of the twentieth century), that even the use of force, intimidation and indoctrination will not prevent it from ultimately having to share economic and political power with the African masses. One cannot be certain, however, whether these leaders will prefer to die a suicide's death at the cross-roads of history, or whether rational considerations will prevail. The answer depends upon the emotional quality of the leaders, who may be of two types, in whom the impulsion to moral masochism differs. On the one hand there is the coldly clinical, inhuman manipulator, and intellectual *manqué*, a proud contemptuous Lucifer, with neither the sense of humour nor the zest for villainy of a scoundrelly (but sympathetic) Falstaff. On the other hand there is the ruthless, tough man of action who knows intuitively that in emergencies any powerful, dramatic policy will be accepted by a puzzled and frightened people that promises the remotest degree of success—or at least holds hope for relief from ruin. Hitler appeared as the saviour of Germany in 1933 and his fanaticism had ruined it by 1945; in South Africa a series of would-be saviours has culminated in the accession to power of the fanatical Dr Verwoerd. Hitler, typically, claimed special gifts for political crystal-gazing and his régime was punctuated by explosions of apocalyptic visions in a fine Wagnerian, *Götterdämmerung* atmosphere, requiring a background of raucous brass or an accompaniment of twittering celestial choirs. The Fascist leaders bandy visions of disaster among themselves, while resolutely ignoring the muffled clamour of the masses, unaware that their prophecies of doom and disruption are in grave danger of self-fulfilment and that their greed, *hubris* and lack of humanity and imagination will bring about the predicted Armageddon.

> 'I shall strike and not capitulate . . . every hope of compromise is childish. It is victory or defeat . . . I have led the people to a great height, even if the world does hate us

> now. I am setting all my achievement on a gamble. I have to choose between victory and destruction. I choose victory . . . We shall not capitulate—no, never! We may be destroyed, but if we are, we shall drag a world with us—a world in flames.' (A. Hitler, quoted in *Wilmot*, 1958).

The Fascist, be he a Hitler or a Verwoerd, resolutely ignores that he is going to destroy his own world by his compulsive folly, indeed he canvasses this possibility (though he consciously rejects it) with masochistic (if gloomy) pleasure. Behind the stony masks of arrogant rulers guilt ferments, guilt at the undeserved exalted position of the leader who, although father to his flock, is himself child to his own father, and his position as father places him perilously near the symbolic source of guilt at *his* usurpation of *his* father whose position he now replaces. This guilt is exacerbated by the hell-fire theology so favoured by Fascist ideology in which the Fascist is punished for his own folly and presumption, and through history the greatest failures of Fascist leaders have been the result of their overreaching themselves and courting disaster when all rational considerations should have warned them to retreat the better to maintain their front line intact.

Fascist ideology is not only a response to long-term threat of economic competition, but is also 'triggered' by crisis (genuine or fomented), that threatens the group, and the role in crisis of the leader is far from rational.

> 'The provisioning of all demands that go beyond those of everyday routine has had, in principle, an entirely heterogeneous, namely, a *charismatic*, foundation; the further back we look in history, the more we find this to be the case. This means that the "natural" leaders—in times of psychic, physical, economic, ethical, religious, political distress—have been neither office holders nor incumbents of an "occupation" in the present sense of the word, that is, men who have acquired expert knowledge and serve for remuneration. The natural leaders in distress have been holders of specific gifts of the body and spirit; and these gifts have been believed to be supernatural, not accessible to everybody . . . (This charismatic authority is essentially, therefore, unstable, based as it is upon) devotion born of distress and enthusiasm.' (*Gerth and Mills*, 1958.)

It was reported after the attempted assassination of Dr Verwoerd, that a woman dashed to the press photographers and pleaded with them not to photograph the wounded man: 'Don't you know that he is holy to us?': the remark is in keeping with the reverence shown to the charismatic leader, part of whose magical quality is this aura of quasi-divinity and his ability to give the impression to his 'flock' that he is in communion with the divine and will invoke

divine protection and advice for his threatened people. It is significant that Fascists, where they do not make a direct attempt to abrogate to their uses an orthodox theology (as the Afrikaner group has invoked a perverted form of Calvinism) create their own theology and quasi-divine inspiration and justification for their policies.

But crises are rarely, if ever, sensitive to divine intervention, and however powerfully elemental the charismatic qualities of the quasi-divine leader, these qualities seldom fit him to cope with the brute reality of economic and social difficulties such as unemployment, the loss of international markets or the rise of a class of skilled and semi-skilled workers; these are technical problems demanding for their solution a high degree of technical competence. Instead, the charismatic, and particularly the Fascist, leader employs his powers to divert (so far as he is able) the anxieties of his group, to build the group consciousness so as to foster the maximum feelings of group loyalty. Anxiety is frequently coupled with frustration, and this in turn is often coupled with aggression; the Fascist loyalty is fed by diverting anxiety and aggression against the target of an 'out group', and if no group in fact threatens the 'in group', the charismatic leader can easily create a synthetic 'out group' as a target for aggression. In Nazi Germany the aggression was directed against the Jews within Germany, and against Germany's neighbours. In South Africa the overt aggression and violence is directed against Africans, Indians, and 'Coloureds', but more sinister than overt violence is the covert aggression of living according to an ideology that lumps together the 'out group' into a congealed and formless mass in which the individual counts for nothing. If you are in South Africa a member of the 'out-group' masses you are a member of an 'inferior' group and tainted by your membership out of which you are powerless to contract. You are powerless to prove your essential humanity with the ruling group. Thus the members of the ruling group can obtain a cheap and easy status and prestige by the knowledge that in their society there is always a group below them, and an arrogant system crystallizes in which one group commands and the others obey; one group is of higher social and economic status than others; one group can artificially preserve its class-privileges and concoct an ideology in which privileges become rights, and in which the classes with few privileges are those with 'rights' that can be cancelled at the whim of the ruling class as it sees its economic and social position threatened. In South Africa a clear example is the application of the Group Areas Act of 1950 (and later amendments), by which the Government can control all changes in the occupation and ownership of property throughout the country, and has the power to decide where members of different 'racial' groups should live. A large part of the rationale of the Act is the segregation—residential and occupational—of members of different 'racial' groups, but equally important is the need to have African labour in sites nearby the industrial

areas and to eliminate Indians from where they are competing with 'white' shopkeepers, and factory owners.

> 'In almost every instance, it is the Non-European group which it is proposed to uproot and remove . . . (this) not only causes fear and uncertainty and stultifies development, but unfairly penalises the Non-European group financially . . . Further, in many smaller towns, the proposals will not only mean severe financial loss, they will also involve considerable unemployment.' (*Horrell*, 1956).

Complicating the relatively straightforward and rational fear of loss of class privileges and economic status that accompany them, is the quasi-magical fear of 'miscegenatjon'. All Fascist ideologies include much mystical nonsense about the 'purity' of the group and play is made with highly emotional ideas that many people have about the dangers of 'mixing' the blood of different groups. In Nazi Germany it was a capital offence for a Gentile woman to have sexual intercourse with a Jewish man, and no marriage could subsist between a Gentile and a Jew. In South Africa similar (though less draconic) legislation exists: the Mixed Marriages Act, 1949, forbids marriage between members of different 'racial' groups, and the Immorality Amendment Act 1950 prohibits carnal intercourse between Whites, Coloured people and Asians, there already being a law to prohibit intercourse between Africans and other 'racial' groups. The newspapers frequently carry highly colourful stories of charges made under these laws, and even professional psychologists and sociologists waste much time and energy in discussing the motives for 'miscegenation' and how to prevent it. It is significant that the problem attracts two contrasting proposed answers: (1) that the matter is one for psychiatric treatment, i.e. that to break this law is a symptom of mental disorder, and (2) that there must be drastic penalties against offenders and even higher barriers between peoples. That the Fascist so fears 'miscegenation', yet has to devise complicated, wasteful and inefficient laws and social restrictions to minimize sexual and social 'miscegenation', indicates the deep ambivalence of the Fascists' feelings about groups that he considers to be inferior. Sexual 'miscegenation' is wicked because it is desirable; it is desirable because it is wicked; it is desirable and wicked because it is sex. The Fascist is essentially maladjusted sexually, because of his inability to move beyond the stage of being highly hostile yet highly subservient to the father; in this he is unable to move beyond the early family into wider social contacts, including sexual contacts. Sex is desirable, but brings him into conflict with Oedipal guilt. Sex relationship with a member of an 'out group' to some extent relieves this conflict: the partner is by social definition not a member of the 'family', there is a mystique of 'primitiveness' in having sexual relations with a partner who is (by definition) of a 'primitive group', there is the thrill of a double breach of the law and of the unconscious dictates of the Oedipal

situation. The morbid preoccupation of the Fascist with problems of the relations between the sexes reflects his fear of the 'primitiveness' within him, and the lack of success of his attempts to cope with the pressures of this 'primitiveness'—a primitiveness not only of sexual impulses, but of aggression that is an indirect result of his sexual frustration.

Fear, then, marks the Fascist. Fear of the future, fear of change, nostalgia for a romantically idealized past, a neurotic horror of meeting the challenge of the present and of attempting to solve rationally some of the problems that face his society. The root causes of these fears I have suggested are two: the fear of the loss of class privilege and of economic advantage, and the fear of his inner impulses of aggression and sex. A further fear is the 'fear of freedom', the fear of the burdens of responsibility and individualism which result from sharing freedom in a democratic society and from fostering progress and change. Freedom necessitates change and choice, and choice and change result in conflict, doubt and insecurity. But conflict, doubt and insecurity that are a challenge and a stimulus to the stable and democratic man are stultifying to the Fascist, because the authoritarian reactionary is psychologically neither strong nor self-sufficient, but feeble, brittle, uncreative and impotent. His

> '*lust for power is not rooted in strength but in weakness.* It is the expression of the inability of the individual self to stand alone and live. It is the desperate attempt to gain secondary strength where genuine strength is lacking . . . The authoritarian character wins his strength to act through his leaning on superior power. The power is never assailable or changeable. For him lack of power is always un unmistakable sign of . . . inferiority.' (*Fromm*, 1945).

Nevertheless, human beings tend to want some degree of freedom, even though the actual range over which freedom operates is relatively narrow; but economic and technological progress may increase the range within which freedom can operate.

These considerations suggest three questions: 'Does the self-interest of the Fascist tend to modify his intransigence?' 'Can criticism melt him, or must it always harden his resolve?' 'Does removal or alleviation of his unconscious fears and of the fancied threat to his society permit him to relax, or does it encourage him to believe that others are weaker than he, and that he is therefore strengthened in his belief in his own superiority?'

Answers to these questions cannot but be tentative. Marxism would encourage us to believe that, in so far as the Fascist position is dependent upon his economic position, an alteration of that position would alter his attitudes; it would also encourage us to believe that ultimately economic self-interest should soften the exclusiveness and restrictiveness of the Fascist. Were the Fascist rational in his

beliefs and motivations, were he less a fanatic than a greedy exploiter, we could agree with the Marxist view. But the Fascist is rarely dominated by purely economic motives; he is more often a man deeply disturbed emotionally, whose disturbed emotions are exacerbated by economic and political greed and insecurity. Therefore, an adequate armoury against Fascism must include political-economic weapons, as well as those we can borrow from psychoanalysis in its battle against emotional disorder.

> 'Each one of us behaves in some respect like the paranoiac, substituting a wish-fulfilment for some aspect of the world which is unbearable to him and carrying this delusion through into reality. When a large number of people make this attempt together and try to obtain assurance of happiness or reality it acquires a special significance.' (*Freud:* 1946).

It is the mass-paranoia of the Fascists' delusions that make socio-political weapons useless unless they are supported by psychoanalytic understanding and techniques to unmask the irrational roots of Fascism.

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CORRESPONDENCE

The Editors, *Theoria*
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PIETERMARITZBURG.

Sirs,

Teachers in South Africa frequently declare their concern about the falling standard of English in the schools. Exhortations, however, do little good. Higher standards must be set by the teachers themselves, and they must look for leadership to the people at the top, to the universities and to the examiners. The Matriculation examination influences the quality and direction of the teaching in the schools more powerfully than almost anything else, and uninspired examinations promote uninspired teaching. As one speaker said recently: 'Where a premium is put upon memory work and not on the ability to select and organize material into coherent statement, there is the danger . . . that education will degenerate into the futile formula—"swot, regurgitate, forget".' (G. Knowles-Williams, 'Examinations in English Language and Literature', English Academy, July, 1961, published in *Symposium*, 1961.)

It is up to the Examiners, therefore, to set a high standard for the whole school course, in the composition of the examination paper itself. Instructions and questions must be well written. The questions should not conform to discredited routines of teaching, they should stimulate teachers to seek fresh ideas. Candidates should not learn to answer by drill. The questions should be of a kind to quicken interest and give scope for independent thought. It needs no saying that a genuine individual response, easily distinguished from spurious 'originality', can come only out of thorough knowledge on the factual level.

The recent (November/December, 1961) English Higher papers of the Joint Matriculation Board disappoint such expectations. In recording some thoughts on Paper 3 (Literature), my hope is to start a discussion from which valuable changes may follow.

The paper begins inauspiciously with an instruction the wording of which violates the very rule it prescribes: candidates are told 'answers must be brief and concise'.

Other faults of expression mar some of the questions. In Question 1 a passage is quoted from *Macbeth*, and Q.1 (*c*) reads: 'State the two possible motives for the determination expressed by Lady Macbeth in the above passage'. In Shakespeare, motives not specified in the words of the text must remain matters of speculation and cannot be definite knowledge. Some critics go even further

and argue that such motives are matters of *illegitimate* speculation, and although that view may be too limiting it gives a useful warning. To use, then, a definite article and precise number when asking about *possible* motives is to claim, in effect, a certainty of knowledge to which the examiners can have no right. Such a question both discourages perceptive and flexible responses in favour of dogmatism, and gives a misleading idea of Shakespearian interpretation.

In Question 6 a passage is quoted from *Murder in the Cathedral*, and Q.6 (*d*) reads: 'What are the following: "a monster of egotism", "means of provocation", "unimpeachable evidence", as used in the speech?' This question is obscure. What answer is expected? Will definitions meet the question: 'a monster of egotism' is an exceedingly vain, self-centred person; 'means of provocation' are acts or methods intended to cause anger and precipitate violence; and so on . . .? On the other hand, the question might be answered: 'These three phrases are figures of speech, the first a metaphor' . . . and so on. Or again, the answer might be: 'All three phrases are clichés, and they are used in the speech to suggest the character of the speaker and the journalistic quality of his reasoning.' A question directed to any of these possibilities would have been fair enough: a question as open as the one set, is not.

Question 2 quotes Shakespeare's 'To me, fair friend, you never can grow old', and Q.2 (*c*) reads: 'Point out a single line that mars the beauty of the above sonnet'. Where precision of thought, however elementary, is to be expected, 'beauty' is an unfortunate term to use. And once again the question has an unjustifiable tone of authority. Whether this sonnet is marred by one line or several, or, as I think it, is flawless, must remain a matter of interpretation and opinion. It is not a matter of fact. The examiners, in framing the question as they have done, give the impression that they credit their opinion with the force of fact. How is the candidate to answer who is intelligent enough to see meaning and merit everywhere in the sonnet, and too little presumptuous to make a hasty rejection of any line? He is compelled to reject something. Hence the question becomes an invitation to cant. One fears that this kind of question will only encourage the antipathy to poetry that many pupils already feel, and, worse still, it may discourage pupils who enjoy the poem and wonder miserably what is wrong with it and with them for not seeing the alleged defect.

It is a pity that the syllabus should contain, and thereby, perhaps, require equal attention to, works as different in merit as *Persuasion* and *Bird of Dawning*. The examination, at any rate, gives candidates little room to show their powers of discrimination. Behind the questions on these books there appears to be an assumption that factual knowledge is either all that can or all that should be tested. Memory work is at a premium. Plodding but industrious candidates can presumably answer these questions as well as more gifted candidates, because the gifted have small chance to

show more than their knowledge of some simple facts. The paper favours mediocrity. Little in it can interest, let alone inspire, the more responsive and discriminating student, whose perceptions are subtler than the questions give scope for, and who might like to say what *he* thinks about the books.

Yours truly,

F. H. LANGMAN,
Australian National University,
Canberra.

Dear Sirs,

In the article in *Theoria* 17 entitled 'Population: A Political Scientist's Footnote', four statements are made which jointly require comment.

The first follows the submission that the problem of over-population is by no means as immediately urgent as many people suppose. 'An elementary point in population studies, yet one which must be continually repeated, is that there is no such thing as over-population, except in relation to food resources'. The second refers to increased food production: 'It must at once be admitted that this only postpones the inevitable issue.' The third statement sums up: 'There is no need to try to force population restriction in the meantime which would be far ahead of the necessities of the situation.' The gist of the argument is contained in the fourth statement that 'we have no right to say that the world is over-populated or to call for legal measures to restrict population unless we have brought world food production up to its maximum figure.'

Two issues arise out of these statements: Firstly, are we entitled to postpone the inevitable restriction of population in order that one product of creation, the human species, may continue to increase at the expense of every other product of creation, be it animal or plant, river or sea, plain or mountain? Is such an anthropocentric view defensible on any standard of morals or by any religion, however interpreted? Secondly, the article 'Population Increase and Natural Selection' was written expressly to cut away the ground from under the feet of all who maintain that the problem is one of food in relation to numbers: 'But the problem is not merely that more people are born, but also that the composition of the population is changing. It is a question not merely of "how many" but also of "what?".' Since 'Population Increase and Natural Selection' appeared in *Theoria* 17, one of the world's foremost geneticists, Theodosius Dobzhansky, writing in the *American Scientist* has put the problem in much the same way as the latter sentence quoted.

The issue is clear. Are we to postpone inevitable restriction of population and allow gross increase in the proportion of such people as the blind, the deaf, the idiotic, the spastic, the cancerous and the worse; and are we to destroy every wild thing on earth

that can be eaten or which eats where humans could, or grows where human food could grow, or which stands in pristine beauty when it could be used to grow human food or house a batch of humans?

Whatever opinions may be expressed on this issue, two facts remain:

In the first place the study of evolution should be given high priority—greater than improved food production—and in the second place it should be borne in mind whenever considering population increases that food production can always be increased on a short-term basis at the expense of the future productivity of the soil—unrestricted population increase will be at the expense of the future population.

The conclusion that the population should be stabilized before food production has reached a limit seems inescapable; the greatest problem, however, remains the prevention of undesirable population changes which are bound to accompany unrestricted population increases.

Yours faithfully,

D. E. VAN DIJK.

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