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Readers who are concerned about the future of the universities should find much to interest them in this issue, for we publish three articles dealing with aspects of higher education. In the opening lines of one article the author declares that it is not his intention 'to provoke discussion on the ultimate aims of university education'. This notwithstanding, we hope that our readers will weigh into debate. Literary subjects in the following pages are also interesting and provocative: it would be unaccountable if issues raised in these articles were received without comment.

We note with pleasure that the 1973 Pringle Award of the English Academy of Southern Africa has been won by Mr. P. E. Strauss for his article on 'The Poetry of Ted Hughes', published in *Theoria* 38, and we salute him on gaining this distinction.

THE EDITORS

AUTHORITY AND EDUCATION*

by H. W. F. STELLWAG

One of the most striking phenomena in our time is the rapid disappearance of the old tradition of the university. Let it be granted that the European continental university in a certain way was a relic of mediaeval times, and that its professors held a position of undisputed and nearly absolute authority. Certainly it would not have harmed the old schools of learning if a few outmoded tokens of their dignity had been replaced by more informal procedures, and if the administrative structure had lost something of its rigid formality. But owing to the rashness and sometimes violence by which the more democratic principles were forced upon the universities they had to change at such a rapid pace that one who visited a Dutch university even five years ago, would now be forced to acknowledge the then unbelievable: that a simple commonsense view is recognized no longer. It is no longer accepted that before becoming someone whose opinion is to be considered in a certain field, one has to learn and to experience and to know; nor is it accepted that men may be born equal but differ in aptitudes and qualities, and that political equality in itself does not stand for or guarantee professional and intellectual equality. The political slogan, 'one man, one vote', has been forced upon the essentially non-political structure of the university.

It would, of course, be interesting to try and analyse the situation from a political point of view; to try and find explanations for the fact that science and the pursuit of learning, which in a long and venerable tradition proclaimed themselves as the strongholds of objectivity and disinterested endeavours, were all of a sudden expected to support and proclaim political interests, and were expected to engage in promoting one economic theory or ideology.

But as I myself am neither a politician nor a political scientist I would rather avoid topics about which I professionally do not know more than anybody else. I would rather try and deal with the crisis of authority from the point of view of education. This does not exclude some political, sociological and psychological aspects, education being a multidisciplinary affair.

In dealing with my topic I will not picture actual situations, nor illustrate changes in relationships by means of case studies and concrete examples — interesting though this might be — but will concentrate on the word 'authority' and the way it is used in various

* Presented as a University Lecture at the University of Natal, Pietermaritzburg, 4th April, 1973.

contexts, hoping thereby to contribute to a clarification of the situation.

The reason for this approach is that, rather late perhaps, I discovered that we people engaged in education, and looked upon as having something to say in this field worth listening to, very often do not realise that our audiences have in their minds meanings of the words we use totally different from ours. This terminological issue is not only intensely irritating and a cause of many quarrels in daily life, but it is detrimental to scientific intercourse and research. So I thought we had better do something about it by means of concept- or linguistic analysis.

'Words' may be compared with currency or money. They are subject to inflation or revaluation. It is not only that they, like coins, may be devalued, but their alloy may also change. Take for example the Dutch word 'guilder' — originally a piece of gold. I myself have only known silver guilders — logically impossible, one would say; worse still, the silver coin has now been displaced by a nickel one, and in times of war a piece of paper served. Not only has the word 'guilder' been 'devalued' — instead of a gold piece it indicates a piece of inferior metal — but also the commercial value of the coin is forever changing and diminishing, and also what one can but for it. The word 'guilder' has a definite meaning and a value fixed on the Exchange, but it has lost the value it etymologically should have. The real guilder is a coin in its present alloy with its internationally 'fixed' value, which may change from day to day.

To a certain extent it is the same with 'authority' and many other words. It does not help us to look into history to find out what it stood for, or to consult etymology and semantics to define its real essence. We can only ask: what does it mean today, how is it used, what is its established value, what do we get for it in exchange? It may perhaps help us to try and distinguish its several aspects and connotations in various contexts, so that we can make out whether we are dealing with one and the same concept, or with a family of concepts.

But, you will object, does not authority always and at any time point to something which is above change, something of absolute value?

Here I must point to yet another tricky feature of words. Let us suppose Mr A. and Mr B. are very angry with each other. Mr A. is doing something which exasperates Mr B. Mr A. is sure that he hates Mr B. for it. On the other hand Mr B. hates Mr A. because of his lack of understanding of his — Mr B.'s — circumstances or motives or whatever the case may be. We could very well describe the situation by saying that there is 'hate' between

Mr A. and Mr B. We might perhaps say that 'hate' should not govern human affairs, but 'love'. In saying this we seem to say that there exists a power which causes some people to hate and others to love each other. We seem to account for a struggle between these powers. It looks as though abstract nouns like 'love', 'friendship', 'hate', 'respect', acquire the qualities of beings.

We know that mentally far less developed people than we ourselves personify these 'powers': as we know from Homer, they presuppose a god of hate and a goddess of love, who interfere with human affairs and cause people to do things which they may deplore. However, there is only a slight difference between personifying and deifying relationships between people.

In this respect we do not differ principially from primitive man, in somehow taking for granted that the abstract nouns we use point to powers, qualities and beings, rather than to various forms of relationship. So 'authority' is looked upon and is spoken of as something which can be bestowed upon people, which makes them venerable and worthy to be obeyed, a quality which some people have and others have not, something everyone has a right to have. And, of course, having something which others have not may lead to a situation in which the others try to get for themselves what the other has, and the dispute starts about the legitimacy of authority.

Now authority is distinguished from hate and love in this, that it is pretty easy to see that all there is between Mr A. and Mr B. is the way they feel about each other; but we would not have got to the core of the meaning of authority in assuming that, like hate and love, it is only a feeling between people. An authority-relationship may indicate an emotional relationship, but there is more to it than merely emotion. Here we must do a bit of concept-analysis to answer the question what the structure is of the relationship called 'authority' or 'gezag' in the Dutch language. The two words 'gezag' and 'authority' are not equivalent. The word 'gezag' is connected with *saying*: an ability or capacity or power to say something in such a way that it is believed and obeyed by others: it is 'zeggingschap'. That means that there are always two partners in an asymmetrical relationship: the one who utters the authoritative pronouncements, the other(s) who obeys or follows. But the 'gezag' relationship is not, like a pure emotional relationship, a twofold one: it is rather threefold because 'zeggen', commanding, is always saying *something*, and thus it is related to this something and what it stands for.

A characteristic feature of the structure of the 'gezag' relationship in contrast to power and sheer force, is *voluntariness*: the voluntary acceptance on the part of the partner, who obeys because what is

asked seems rightful to him. If 'gezag' is identified as a sort of power or might, as 'influence', neither physical nor psychical coercion is implicit.

In ordinary usage, personification of 'gezag' prevails. It is either indicated as something high and venerable, majestically enthroned above both partners, or emotionally negative feelings are connected with it: then it is depicted as something abject, deserving to be extirpated, to revolt against and to replace by something more reasonable and just. All the same, in both cases it is considered as something either to do away with or to venerate. It has an essentially abstract meaning, and does not, like the word 'authority', indicate a person in authority. One can say 'he is an authority', but not 'he is "een gezag" '.

The English word 'authority', etymologically the same as the Roman word 'auctoritas', originally implied more than 'gezag': a creating, assisting, counselling, protecting institution. Its use in the political history of the old Roman republic stresses the advisory, sponsoring, not the executive, function of 'auctoritas'. Political history shows that the advisory function of the senate was rooted in religion and tradition; the venerable quality of the senators was due to their being the 'patres', the founders of families and 'authority' as a venerable quality was afterwards ascribed to the emperor Augustus and his successors. In this way 'auctoritas' became a hereditary quality of rulers, good or bad.

The Christian Church claimed an authority which was directly deduced from Christ and His words.

Modern times have done away with the religious, mystical interpretation of the word which was connected with the Bearer of the Crown or the Head of the Church. The Enlightenment, the French Revolution, and thereafter modern Liberalism rejected the conception of a hierarchical authority-structure, which had its head in heaven, but did not distribute justice upon earth.

The word 'authority' came into discredit, not fitting in in a democratic society; it became notoriously hateful during the time of Hitler. Many of the Nazis believed in a re-establishment of law and order, and 'authority'. The word 'authoritarian' was used to indicate this inclination in favour of a no-longer democratic but totalitarian regime. It became an equivalent of sheer willful power. It is quite easy to see how, in consequence of these catastrophic developments, the word 'authority' became abhorred; its opposite, 'democratic', which points to a principially equalitarian structure, was fervently promoted.

The deplorable identification of 'authority' and 'power' is also due to sociological influences.

The famous economic philosopher, Max Weber, describes authority as 'Herrschaft', i.e. mastery, or rule. According to him power is the chance to carry through one's purpose; authority, a lower part of power, is a kind of social influence directed towards people who willingly submit. But there is no 'Herrschaft' without some coercion, so that the qualification of authority as 'rule' or 'mastery' accentuates its negative connotations.

Why do people willingly submit? Because of their beliefs. Weber distinguished three kinds of belief: in the first place *tradition and religion*, which bring about the authority-structure which is found in the patriarchal society, where fathers and older people play a dominant role; secondly, the belief in the rationality and rightness of the legal, *bureaucratic* order in which one works and which one wishes to maintain; thirdly, the belief in great persons, born heroes or saints, or as Weber called them the *charismatic* leaders upon whom heavenly grace is bestowed.

It is clear that with the disappearance of the two kinds of belief first mentioned authority wanes, and the charismatic leader is only venerated as long as he comes up to the expectations of his followers.

The strong accent Weber puts on the formal aspects of the relationship suggests that the structure of society as such is responsible for its specific type of authority.

After Weber one of his followers distinguished types of authority which are not rooted in a belief, but in knowledge, or rather in the belief in knowledge. It cannot be denied that the authority of the man who knows, the expert, in our days excels any other authority. Beforehand it is assumed that the instructions and indications of the expert are legitimate. This type of authority-relationship is called functional authority. The social inflence of the expert, be it the scientist or the professional manager, is continuously growing in our days. It seems that having done away with tradition and religion, modern man has only one source of authority left: namely knowledge.

The most striking characteristic of functional authority is that it is continuously challenged and must prove itself again and again. On the one hand, because of its subjection to permanent criticism, the position of the functional authority might seem precarious; on the other hand, however, if he proves himself repeatedly, it is strengthened to such an extent that the trust in him may become almost absolute and even blind.

But sociologists have drawn our attention also to another type of authority which has been established in our democratic society, the 'representative authority'. This kind of authority is responsible for a clearly formulated mandate from the part of the community or group to which it belongs. This authority is temporary, partial,

delegate. The relationship is interchangeable and terminable. This type of authority, the mandate-authority, is often qualified as 'democratic'; it is contrasted with the bureaucratic, hereditary, static, 'authoritarian' authority; its liabilities come up from below, not down from above like the hierarchical structure. It is this kind of authority people have in mind when discussing democracy in the field of education.

Sociologists do their utmost to do justice to authority as a social phenomenon. Psychologists on the other hand, do what they can to reduce it to a psychological category, an innate or acquired tendency to dominate, or alternatively to submit. I will mention here the theory of Freud, especially in the version of the neo-Freudians and neo-Marxists. And I will draw attention to the American socio-psychological studies about leadership.

About the Freudian conception, which I presuppose as well known, I need not say much. The super-ego or the ideal self, or the 'conscience', the 'moral censor', is formed by the identification of the young male child with its father. The super-ego, once formed, projects itself on persons of authority, upon whom therefore are bestowed all the idealised traits of the father *imago*, and who, as such, become exempt from all criticism. The neo-Freudians combine the Freudian theory with a neo-Marxist social philosophy. The super-ego which the young child develops is not that of the father himself, but it represents the norms of his social environment, of the social ideology to which the father belongs. In this way the family becomes a bulwark for the conservation of the prevailing society-structure. By means of projection it is exalted as a moral authority; but owing to repression and sex drive-inhibition this state of affairs is not recognized. It leads to the formation of a character called: *the authoritarian personality*. This is a syndrome: it shows adoration of authority, unlimited admiration of persons of authority and father figures.

This inclination to submit has its counterpart in the tendency to suppress others, especially weak persons and groups, e.g. minority groups. A group of investigators, among whom were Horkheimer and Adorno, formulated the hypothesis that this syndrome results from the education the young child receives in the family, and that it produces race discrimination, nationalism and terrorism. After the investigations which seemed to confirm this hypothesis, the term 'authoritarian personality' became identical with a person in an authoritative position, and so authorities who pronounced in favour of law and order were often looked upon as disguised fascists, nazis and anti-semites. These rather mythical presuppositions, propagated shortly after World War II, have received a renewed and astonishing

interest in recent times. Their adherents advocate an 'anti-authoritarian education', which seems to mean 'an education without authority', which should deliberately assault the structures of Western society. This educationally very influential group rejects the criterion of voluntary acceptance of the authority-relationship, because, they say, the mechanisms of projection, working during early childhood, make voluntary choice impossible. Horkheimer has put it in his way: 'The family has a key position in the formation of the character which maintains the present society-structure, which is the product of economic processes. The claiming of subjection by the father made sense in a time when those qualities which led to progression could be developed only under fatherly dictation, e.g. work-discipline, firmness of character. But because this relationship was not seen as functional but was veiled by religious and metaphysical ideologies, it still seems ideal in a time in which the small family offers only limited conditions for education. The authoritarian relationship in the family brings about the authoritarian character'. Even as late as 1960 Horkheimer wrote: 'The attitude of irrational respect for authority is founded within the family'.

Marcuse, who has thrown himself upon the doctrines of Luther, Calvin, Kant and Hegel as inspirers of the bourgeois morality, and of a 'mine and thine warranting society', introduced the concept of a not-repressive culture, in which the conflict between pleasure and reality will no longer exist. His ideas about 'authority' he laid down in an article called *The Obsolescence of Psychoanalysis*. Here he does not recognize the family any more as being primarily the setting in which socialization takes place. For the paternal authority has been taken over by the authority of the prevailing production-apparatus.

The educational ideas of Marcuse, which have been received with enthusiasm by students in the U.S.A., especially California, and in Europe, are not exactly new. In the field of education they belong to the common mental stock of the members of the New Educational Fellowship, who were inspired by Rousseau. But there is a difference. These people believed in education as a means for the betterment of society, and they had a pretty definite idea what kind of society they wanted. They defended the freedom of each child to develop his personality according to his needs and his capacities. They were against all traditional educational method which held this childish personality captured. Nowadays, however, one gets the impression that the critics of modern society and education are more overwhelmed by a blind urge to destroy than by a desire to offer an alternative for reconstruction. This makes conversation with them vague and pointless. The educational theories they proffer do not go beyond those at the beginning of this century, after World War I.

One should not suppose, however, that they happen to be in favour of Russian communism. They decidedly are not. But they are in favour of a form of communism which does not exist anywhere in the world. Only in China and Cuba, and North Vietnam do they hope to find it.

The radical attacks on high schools and especially universities are inspired by the above-mentioned concept of authority.

A second stream of psychological theory which influenced education, and which originally showed the same contamination of psychological and political categories, started with the American investigations of Lewin, Lippitt and White, in 1939, on 'Patterns of aggressive behaviour in experimentally created social climates'.

These social climates — not without connection with the above-mentioned investigations of Adorno — were indicated as 'authoritarian', 'laissez faire', and 'democratic'. Although the authors stated explicitly that their use of these terms differed from the current usage in political and economic discussions, the larger public did not keep to this restriction and explanation. The criterion of an authoritarian climate was afterwards described as follows: the leader organizes the planning, and distributes the tasks; he personally blames or praises. In the democratic climate the leader encourages group discussions; the task division is done by the group; the criteria of evaluation are objective and factual.

These distinctions have had an enormous impact upon the educational conceptions of teacher-pupil relationships. The results of several (often superficial) investigations were negative in the case of the so-called authoritarian climates. 'Authority' in education was associated with suppression, arbitrariness and inhibiting of development. Democratic leadership, on the contrary, got all the positive criteria. R. G. Anderson, who in 1959 brought together all the investigations in this field from 1939 onward, came to a pretty negative conclusion concerning the scientific value of these researches, the dimension democratic-autocratic not being sufficiently elaborated to be used in scientific research. Besides, so he argues, neither the character of the task involved was taken into account, nor was it clear whether the effectiveness of different social climates was judged in relation to task achievement or group morals.

The socio-psychological investigations of the last ten years show a laudable tendency towards a more concise description of the terms leadership and leader, and differentiation of functions. The approach now is strictly situational. The investigations show that in some situations an authoritarian form of leadership is more effective, in others another form. The tendency is now to refrain from ideological and ethical preferences.

More and more the sociological and socio-psychological positions seem to approach each other in the functional leadership and authority-concept. Instead of the dominance-submittence-construct, the concept of interaction comes to the fore. More and more 'authority' is conceived as a group function, instead of a personal relationship or capacity. So it is held that each member of a group, insofar as he contributes to changes of the group in the direction of the desired goal, has a leading function. It appears that both 'power' and 'social prestige' are influential in the group. Flanders' opinion is that the teacher still is the most influential person in the group, owing to his official status. No competent teacher, he says, can abdicate his position of authority; he can never avoid taking responsibility for any activity which takes place in the classroom. The social climate, however, is on the whole a function of the group towards which the leader contributes no more than the group-members.

Now I must draw your attention to the fact that the publications about 'authority' fall into two categories: empirical and fundamental. *Empirical* studies try to describe authority-structures as they seem to occur, be it from a political, sociological, psychological or socio-psychological angle. They try to explain factual relationships. The empirical studies do not consider the issue by whom or what the authority-structure or authority is authorised: they explain the psychological motives of this relationship; they do not enter into the question of its rightfulness or legitimacy.

Fundamental studies, on the contrary, deal with the ethical or metaphysical principles which are held to justify and legitimise the structure of authority as such.

In accordance with the approach that is adopted, two different types of authority emerge from these studies: on the one hand, what might be called 'factual' authority; on the other hand, 'legitimate' authority.

Factual relationships, like charismatic authority, are relationships based exclusively on needs and on personal feelings. They are covered by psychological research, which deals with empirical interpersonal relationships.

Principially different from these psychologically conditioned relationships are those based on moral, logical, ethical or metaphysical considerations.

Now even from the empirical studies alone it may be deduced that authority never speaks or orders on behalf of itself—unless we have to deal not with 'authority' but with an authoritarian personality — but always 'in the name of' someone or something. Even the charismatic person in the eyes of his followers represents some ideal.

So what we reserved as a criterion for the representative 'mandate' authority is implicitly a characteristic of authority as such. As long as both partners agree that this name is the binding force of their relationship, it remains stable. Not so if this 'name' is no longer acknowledged by every relating person. In the course of history many 'names' have been offered as the ultimate source of authority: the mythical founder of a town, the founder of a religion, the 'mos maiorum', the tradition of the forefathers, God, the common welfare, Nature or natural law, the 'contrât social', reason or justice.

It is one thing to describe, classify and explain the various forms of authority which spring from psychological needs, or social pressures — i.e. factual authority; but it is a wholly different matter to justify the claim to obedience on the one hand, and the obligation to it on the other. As an actual example of factual authority the mother-child-relationship may be offered. As an example of legitimate authority that of the policeman and the road-user. Of course in daily life both mingle, so the mother, for instance, may justify some authoritative pronouncement in the name of society, and a road-user may be emotionally dependent on the policeman. But in the case of the legitimate authority-structure, feelings are not the conditions of obedience to authority. Its claim rests on an ethical or metaphysical, transcendental or ultimate ground. How should this be formulated? This is not difficult for people who argue from a metaphysical or religious conception of the world. Others experience the philosophical difficulty, which is connected with the objectivity, viz. criterion, of value-pronouncements. The answer may reside in an axiological relativism, or in a transcendental conception: the idea of goodness and justice, the categorical imperative, reason. One recent and very satisfactory formulation was given by C. J. Friedrich (Harvard), in his latest book, *Tradition and Authority*. According to him the legitimation of authority depends on its *reasoned elaboration.*

We will now try to draw a conclusion about educational authority. It occurs both as factual and as legitimate authority. As factual authority it appears clearly in the emotional relationship between parents and children, which is rooted in the biological and psychological dependence of the child upon his parents, and, on the side of the parents, in consanguinity, love, the need to protect, responsibility for the psychological and social development of the child — for what in a certain sense is their physical creation (auctor, the father). It is a natural authority, in which the issue of legitimacy plays no part.

Authority-relationship based on personal feelings may occur in almost any other educational situation, those between students and professors not excepted.

But we have to look also for objective criteria to justify the relationship. As such we proffer the expertness of the educator, for instance, the teacher as a guide into a field of knowledge. As an official authority he functions in the bureaucratic hierarchy of the social institutions for organised learning which are called schools. As a representative-authority he may function in so far as he feels himself responsible for the maintaining of societal values, or the improvement of the structure of society. He will justify this responsibility in referring to what for him is the ultimate truth. His authority is often challenged, but may be re-established by reasoned elaboration. But this presupposes a common ground from which discussion starts! A serious crisis, however, arises — as in our days — when no common ground is there anymore (Benne).

I started speaking about the crisis in the universities. We can now draw our conclusions. The authority of professors and academic teachers as scientific experts cannot reasonably become a case for political action. Each scholar's authority in his discipline may be challenged of course by other experts, which may include staff members, and eventually senior students. In the sphere of academic intercourse, this challenge has always been accepted. But it is objectionable that a majority of the votes of the members of the so-called university community — which includes freshmen as well as technical-administrative personnel — should decide which topic an academic teacher should deal with in his lectures or inquire into by means of research, what approach he should use, whether this approach corresponds with the 'kritische Theorie' and is therefore acceptable, what system he should adopt to evaluate the progress of students, and how he should plan his teaching.

The authority of the academic teacher in management affairs may be an issue of dispute. If he claims authority on the basis of his position in the bureaucratic university hierarchy, I am afraid this claim will not be honoured, nowadays, and perhaps rightly so. However, other authorities, perhaps even more autocratic than the professor, may be put on the stage: the management experts. But the academic teacher, in so far as he represents his discipline according to its intrinsic rules and standards, should be inviolable. In the last ten years this has ceased to be the case. Voices have been heard which discard the ideal of the objective pursuit of knowledge, and which consider any epistemological approach, except that of the 'kritische Theorie', suspect as inspired by ideological interests.

I am sure that in this case the common ground is lost, and that it simply becomes a question of belief, or, as the Greeks said, of 'doxa', of opinion, which side one will take. As in the case of Socrates, one can only say: Between those who have this opinion

and the others who have not, there cannot be any agreement, but they must of necessity despise each other. Indeed, this has happened and will go on happening. But there is also a more positive side to what has happened, for in so far as discussions about democracy have resulted in more democratic administrative procedures, in less mediaeval, less formal staff-student relations, in more modern teaching methods, in a stronger feeling of mutual staff-student responsibility, in less administrative rigidity, and in more personal involvement in matters of common and corporate interest, one can only welcome the changes that are reshaping the universities.

Amsterdam

OUR UNIVERSITIES AND SOCIETY

by C. K. HILL

'Set your heart upon your work but never upon its reward' enjoins the Bhagavad Gita. The vagaries of the English language are such that when this spiritual advice is followed at a 'university' there results what is called the *disinterested* pursuit of truth, despite the setting of the heart of the pursuer upon this pursuit. Of course 'disinterested' is here used as when a judge is enjoined to cultivate disinterest in a court of law, and the reason for extolling it is similar. Disinterested judgments are the most likely to approximate best to 'The Truth'. Like the good judge, the true academic tries to prevent any private or public desires or preconceived beliefs from blinding him to the implications of the evidence. But unlike the judge he is not bound to remain with the question with which he started. Should other questions arising in his honest researches come to seem more fundamental he may well turn to them. This article is written in the faith that such 'work' is one of the justifications for the existence of man, is vital to his spiritual progress, and is, as it always has been, under severe attack from powerful forces in society. This is a call to arms of all true academics inside and outside universities, and of all who recognise the value of free enquiry for its own sake.

Of all the disciplines taught at a modern university only a small number, basically a fixed number, are *fundamental* in the sense that they search for basic principles governing the spiritual, aesthetic, mental, living and physical worlds. No one will deny the intensity of the interactions which take place between these worlds. Therefore the fundamental disciplines are intimately related and the deep study of any one can lead to all. That is why they have all always been the concern of philosophers. It is *their* disinterested pursuit which is here called a justification for man and a vital necessity for his spiritual progress.

In some of these fundamental disciplines man has been brought humbly to accept that he can never find 'The Truth', he can only continually improve on imperfect models of it. Einstein revolutionized Newton's concepts of space and time, with important consequences for cosmology and atomic physics, while still validating Newton's great laws of motion in ordinary life. While the quantum mechanics challenges the whole deterministic outlook shared by Newton and Einstein it makes practical differences only for the microscopic. Most physicists have now come to accept that our models of physical reality will always undergo revision and revolu-

tion, and therefore still recognize the genius of a Newton, an Einstein and a Heisenberg. It may come as a surprise to many that so 'a priori' a discipline as Logic has undergone a similar revolution. For two millenia Aristotle dominated it, but the reforms of Peano, Frege and Russell started recently a movement of reappraisal which has gone beyond them and shows no sign of stopping. It is the writer's belief that aesthetic, religious and mystical experience, though valid roads to truth, are subject to this same limitation. Man can hope in all disciplines and searches, fundamental and derivative, only to find better and better approximations to 'The Truth'. The Truth, the Whole Truth, and Nothing but the Truth are not for him to find. Newton must have felt that his law of gravitation was a revelation as eternal and unchallengeable as the Qu'ran to the Prophet, or his vision on the road to Damascus to Paul. We have still in large measure to learn in our moral and religious thinking the humility which came to Physics with the realisation that it was not. But despite his limitations man does well to set his heart upon the work of humbly seeking better and better models of reality in all its fundamentals.

There are three sources in society of grave threat to such humble search. They are fear, envy and ambition. The fear of losing comforting beliefs, beliefs which often also pander to vanity or allay conscience on a false basis, constitutes a powerful threat. The leading citizens of Athens made Socrates drink the hemlock out of such fears. Church and state are often the enemies of the *True University* even now. But here ambition too has played a great part since service in church or state has often been the road to power and status. The envy of the intellectually less gifted for the intellectually more gifted is something very real. In all ages it has caused conflict between 'Town' and 'Gown'. But it would seem that today *personal ambition* — which by its very nature vies with disinterest — is the greatest threat of all, a threat from without and within. As opposed to personal *commitment* personal *ambition* seems to be the great poisoner of human relations in all walks of life. But before we can see the workings of all these threats in full we must formulate the concept of the *True University* in greater detail.

Every citizen should have the *right* of free enquiry into all matters of interest to him except people's private personal relations, and the right to publish his findings as best he can. But the great enquiring minds of any age have, in addition, the *duty* to meet together in the free, disinterested enquiry into *fundamental* truth, consulting through writing their peers of the past, and attracting to them and developing the best young minds of their day for the future, publishing their findings and their continual revisions of them widely. This meeting

of minds is the *True University*. In it only honesty and depth of thought are sacrosanct. It may institutionalise the academic rights of its members and so claim to be master in its choice of teachers, pupils and syllabi only in so far as it remains true to its calling to set its heart upon fundamental truth. It may teach only what it believes to be true *and important*, and only to those whom it has reasonable grounds to suppose have both the intellectual ability and the desire for disinterested, or at least, for non-self-regarding, enquiry. It is a dangerous overstatement of a 'fundamental truth' to say that the True University may teach whatever it likes to whomsoever it likes. Nor may it try to suppress any doctrines although it may challenge all with reasoned arguments.

There is always much inter-disciplinary contact in the True University and its members are rarely narrowly specialist. It does not teach applications of the fundamental disciplines, except applications to each other, and therefore it does not train in the professions and it grants no professional degrees except the certificate to teach fundamentals. It may accept no funds to which strings are attached. Having, therefore, only modest funds, comparatively few disciplines and 'degree structures', and only students with good enquiring minds imbued with love of truth, its numbers are small and it needs only rudimentary, informal, administration. This saves it from the ravages of personal ambition, for its members know each other well, and where nearly all have set their hearts upon truth for truth's sake, a self-regarding ambition destroys itself.

It must be frankly admitted that this is a far cry from any institution which has ever been called a university, although most universities harbour potential 'true' ones. Socrates with Plato and his other pupils, Plato with Aristotle, rather than the Neoplatonic Academy, would seem to have come near to a True University, as also Abelard with his pupils rather than the medieval universities. Yet the True University expresses a vital need of man and is always being recreated. The fundamental disciplines are always relevant to the fundamentals of social living. The True University is always examining society and man's environment and publishing its findings. It is therefore no ivory tower. Witness the reactions of society to Socrates and Abelard. It becomes an ivory tower only when it becomes fossilised by a too great and too uncritical worship of the great thinkers and seers of the past, and so has nothing new to say. Often a True Academic stumbles upon a truth with dire warnings for man and turns prophet. One such was Malthus with his 'premature' fear of the population explosion. Had there been more support for True Universities from his day to ours we might have been spared the horrifying discoveries of the Club of Rome that in

all likelihood man has already damaged his environment to the point of threatening disaster. As the biosphere takes revenge will man learn the hard way to value free enquiry and *listen* to its findings? Or will his captains of industry and commerce suppress that spirit because its findings set their ambitions at naught, leaving nature itself to set those ambitions at naught? Will the 'developing peoples' turn in fury on the True University for telling them that the biosphere can never support their rise to the present, transitory, material standards of the 'developed peoples'. The fates of the True University, of man and of life on earth, would seem to be inextricably intertwined.

But surely man may nobly set his heart upon the *application* of fundamental disciplines in the service of society and life. Is then not, for example, medicine a noble profession which should continue, as of old, to be taught in universities? It is a noble profession which should continue to be taught in *True* Medical Schools. Man needs the *True* Professional Training Schools and the *True* Technological Schools, but these must be true to high ethics of *service*, assessing and catering for man's needs in the light of what the biosphere can stand rather than of the projected *demands* of society. But we contend that even with these limitations the organisational needs of these schools are so different from those of the True University that the marriage which we have had since at least mediaeval times of the True University with the School is fraught with tragedies for both, especially in our day. Since in South Africa we seem to hold that marriage to be especially sacrosanct, it is especially fraught with tragedies for us, and it is to these tragedies that we now turn.

The True Professional Training School needs considerable numbers of good specialist teachers and teachers of the *elements* of the fundamental disciplines, the former hopefully imbued with the best ethical precepts of their professions, the latter with love of teaching. It needs expensive laboratory training and classroom equipment. Society wants its services and will pay for them. Consequently governments, commerce, industry, donors and parents have rights of control over it incompatible with any claim by it to the academic freedom proper to a True University. The professional societies and its students have similar rights of control. Of course, like any employer, the True Professional Training School should respect the rights of its employees to academic freedom *in their leisure occupations, but the institution itself has nothing like these rights.* But, trying to make an unworkable marriage work, our professional training schools, which we call universities, make maximum claims to institutionalised 'academic freedoms'. Indeed, perhaps because their consciences are guilty about their neglect of the shadowy partner,

they make them in the extravagant form which we have seen does not befit even the True University. In consequence society is angered, and rightful academic freedom is placed even more at the mercy of those many forces which detest it.

The second great tragedy in the present-day marriage of the True University to the True Professional Training School is that it enables society to buy the top *enquiring* minds, the rightful property of the True University, for other purposes. This is accomplished in two main ways, granting scholarships and bursaries to 'university' with strings attached, and bringing the young enquirers into corrupting contact with both teachers and fellow-students whose motives are far from disinterested. For inevitably many will train for the professions not primarily to serve but to gain wealth, status or power, and able ones will gain these, thus seducing our enquirers. How much better it was when the Einsteins found employment which left their minds fresh to create the True University by night. At our 'universities' we even *officially guide* the young enquirers into ambitions for professional 'success'. A society which encourages young men and women under thirty to put their idealism to serve aside, and think of what they want to *get out* of their lives, is spiritually sick. And even if our young enquirer is too loyal to a fundamental discipline to be seduced by money-making or social-climbing, personal ambition may still get him. He may become 'well-motivated' by the vision of himself as *the* authority in his field. No wonder the bride (or is it the husband?) in this unhappy marriage is so hard to discern.

Moreover, it is the worldly success of those able students of the professions whose ambitions are self-regarding, rather than self-abnegating, which excites the envy of many in society possessed of similar ambitions, but who lack the ability or the funds to 'go to university'. Thus the marriage of the not-so-true professional training school to the True University is even more disastrous for the latter through evoking hostility from sections of society which are unable to see the distinction between the marriage partners. Society as a whole, however, seems always to have been able to draw this distinction, disliking the man on the make but having a soft spot for the absentminded professor. And, of course, the professional man who works himself to death in a spirit of service to society is loved for his dedication.

The third great tragedy springs like the first from guilty feelings about the marriage. The ghostly partner must be re-embodied by pushing up the standards of 'research' which we demand. Therefore even to get a job as a teacher of a very practical, down to earth, applied profession, an application of a profession which itself only

occasionally uses something fundamental, but nevertheless an applied profession which needs many specialised *skills*, our would-be teacher, while learning all these skills, must also prove his ability to do research, with a capital R. What a lot of rubbish gets published as a result. How *disinterested* can research so motivated be? Bitter rivalry to be the first to publish some specialised triviality is not to be compared with the *fun* of searching *together* for some *fundamental*, a search which may never succeed, because really deep things are being sought, but which is always rewarding when reward is not the motive. But here it is the full-blooded partner, the True Professional Training School, which loses most. It probably loses many potentially good teachers because they cannot, or will not, demean themselves to do such trivial 'research'.

The final tragedy lies in the impossibility of managing a huge Multi-Professional Training School, with thousands of students, hundreds of teachers, and volumes of regulations for degrees, by means of that more or less informal consultation which the True University demands. Inevitably the administration grows out of proportion, and, as always, finds more and more ridiculous administrative loads for hard pressed departmental heads. The latter, of course, are always appointed for their *academic* excellence. They are now to prove their *administrative* excellence. Some do — better than they prove the first excellence. Most do not. Occasionally we slip up and appoint a first class teacher, thus robbing the pupils of some of his stimulating presence in the classroom. Research and teaching both suffer. The ideal of efficient administration for the sake of efficient administration can kill that of truth for truth's sake. As the last character in our play (published below) might well say, efficiency is relative to the goal desired.

But the tragedy of administration is worse than this. Inevitably large administrations try to centralise and grow powerful. To balance this academics with the best of motives insist on a greater and greater share in decision-making. The good teachers, scholars, thinkers and talkers leave the classroom, the library, the laboratory and the all-important common room, for the committee room more and more often. Teaching, learning, thinking and talking all suffer, for while the talkers perform valiantly in committee they lose inspiration. And some of all these get caught by the lure of power for power's sake.

And despite it all the administration grows in power. Some great teachers can inspire the whole class with a love for the subject taught. Many lesser teachers can do this with the *enquiring* minds in their classes. God help them if they so try. For their pass rates will drop and then the wrath of government, commerce, industry, donors,

professional societies, parents, the other students in their class and student power will descend upon them. And their powerful administration is powerless to save them. Indeed it may well lead the pack. We have seen why this must be so, indeed even should be so in the True Professional Training School, *but it is disastrous for the True University*.

Why does the academic world of South Africa leave unturned the one stone whose turning could avert these tragedies? Why does it not call for the official divorce of the True University and the True Professional Training School, a divorce settled out of court, leaving the former marriage partners good friends thereafter? It is happening elsewhere. Why not here?

Undoubtedly one major reason is fear of the howl which society would set up, society which pays the salaries, at the suggestion that the degrees received by its sons and daughters do not stamp them as thinkers with a capital T. But they do not. These degrees are certificates of routine skills acquired, and the teachers as a body are powerful enough to say so, and should say so, at all times. The professional societies are in part responsible for these silly snobberies. There is nothing less noble in the title 'server of society' than in that of 'thinker', and the professional societies should take their stands upon this fact. They will get far better service from the True Professional Training School than from what we have today, but even so they and parents should curb the cruel ambitions which send 'E level' matriculants to 'university' to fail and harbour lifelong resentments.

Then there are weighty doubts about the feasibility of the True University. It is all very well to say that the fundamental disciplines are philosophical, but how, for example, is Theoretical Physics to function without Experimental Physics? Is not the fundamental discipline the two together? But Experimental Physics often needs very expensive equipment, and who will pay for *expensive* True Universities in society's present state of unenlightenment?

I grant the difficulty but I think there are partial solutions. Society will pay for expensive physical laboratories at both Engineering Schools and Councils for Scientific and Industrial Research. Perhaps it will also, as part of the settlement of the divorce out of court, agree to finance a high level Institute of Technology like M.I.T. Let each fundamental discipline start an academy, not to be confused with a professional society, with a paying membership of all who are interested, amateurs included, and with the function of publishing a journal and holding congresses through which those with the laboratories will meet those with the ideas. When a theory of relativity is proposed all sorts of practical institutions will pay to find the answer.

Then there is the fear of the majority of the academics, who will inevitably be left behind in the Professional Training Schools, that *in their work* they will be even more at the mercy of society and powerful administrations. In some ways they should and it is happening anyway. But the imbalance of power in the professional school arises from its size and multiplicity of disciplines. It is an evil to be avoided in any organisation. Part of the settlement out of court should be that the professions divide themselves up into related groups, and each group should have its own training school with a relatively small, manageable administration.

But then the educationalists have two objections. There is an obvious educational value in students enrolled in widely diverse faculties rubbing shoulders with each other on the same campus. We agree. But even better would be for the public moneys which now subsidise university residences to be used to help reduce the rents at colleges of residence run by private enterprise for all kinds of post school students, including, for example, apprentices. In the end this kind of contact has the best chance of breaking down the age old hostility between town and gown.

Finally, will not our separated Professional Training Schools produce only uncultured, narrow specialists? They may. Our multi-professional training schools called 'universities' today do so. What opportunity does the scholar who enrols to become an engineer, a doctor or a chartered accountant have to read Philosophy, French Literature or Music? American society has been persuaded to pay for one whole extra year in the training *required* by most professions, a year in which the student is *required* to obtain a certain number of credits in disciplines far removed from his speciality, disciplines which are to be chosen by him from amongst a number offered at his college in what we call other faculties. There are all sorts of ways in which the same end could be achieved in South Africa, and the onus is upon the professional societies to take the lead in sponsoring one.

And since our minds now inevitably turn to the Muses, may we claim that we have written a true tragedy, full of evil, but with glimpses of hope for man. (We got 'hopefully' in.) In the last Act we want to pay even more respect to the Muse of Drama, with apologies to that of History, imitation being the greatest form of compliment. Copyright is not reserved — we might fall foul of the laws against plagiarism were we to try to reserve it — and any resemblances to living persons are purely accidental. We end with the triumph of man, or perhaps, of a higher Being.

ONESTONE LEFT UNTURNED

A Play in One Act

SCENE: The office of the Student Counsellor at the University of ..... in the year 19.. The Student Counsellor is looking benignly across his massive desk at young Albert Onestone. Albert's hair is long, dark and inclined to curl. As all the world knows he never lost it, but there is no sign yet of the magnificent white shock that later became a legend and a symbol. Albert is still a young man, though some years older than the average freshman. He is, of course, also seated, on a chair somewhat lower than that of the man across the desk.

S.C.: The tests do show that you have some ability for Physics despite — if you will pardon my mentioning it — your not very distinguished school record. Actually you show all the signs of what we call a late developer, and I have little doubt that if you make a wise choice now you will have a profitable and distinguished career. But, you know, with the curtailment of the American Space Programme, there are men with good doctorates in Physics walking the streets of New York. I really must advise you not to read Physics. You must think of your future career, you know, and of your future family. You will have one, you know.

A.O.: I should also be reading a lot of Mathematics. Surely that would always get me some sort of a job?

S.C.: Hum, yes, if you are good enough at it. The schools need teachers, though I do not see you as a schoolmaster. But to be frank, I don't really like this talk of 'some sort of a job' in one as gifted as you. It doesn't show good motivation. You come from Europe. Many of our lads love outdoor lives and this used to lead too many of them to take up Surveying. There were no jobs for them. But we have rectified that since we started our Student Advisory Services five years ago. I say services, because we cooperate at all our universities. Industry and commerce were clamouring for properly trained personnel managers. We managed to persuade most of the would-be surveyors to read for that. It is early yet to say how successful they've been. A few have actually got jobs in the open air. Road gangs and so on. But come to think of it, Surveying is *now* rather short of people. A properly qualified surveyor can command a high

salary from the beginning. How about that for you Onestone? It could combine your interests in Physics and Mathematics.

A.O.: Gauss earned his living as a surveyor and liked it too. It didn't prevent him from doing great Mathematics. In fact it helped him and secretly he was always hoping to find that space is not flat. I like the countryside too. I could have studied the Physics journals at night. But unfortunately it can't be, Sir. You have forgotten that I squint.

S.C.: Ah, yes! Sorry! But your interest in people; and the way you seem to understand them has given me another idea. What about your registering for Social Sciences bearing in mind the possibility of becoming a personnel manager? We haven't trained one with your I.Q. yet.

A.O.: Oh no, Sir. I don't mind what sort of job I get but I will need to work to be able to buy the journals. Actually I think that the Customs job I saw advertised this morning might be best. Tom Paine started that way. I'm sorry to have wasted your time for so long, Sir. Thank you for your patience, but I shan't come to university — not yet anyway. (Rises)

S.C.: Oh, but you won't get a professional degree that way. What sort of heights can one aspire to in the Customs and Excise Service? (It would be unfair to say that the smile which comes to Albert's lips has any wickedness in it. This is a story of the triumph of Good over Evil. But the honest Producer must not excise Albert's rather uncustomary reply.)

A.O.: Secretary of Trade. Of course heights are relative. I might go for Minister of Trade; don't you have them in South Africa? Paine got to be Secretary of Congress, but, of course, that needed a U.D.I. I couldn't hope for such luck. I'm afraid, Sir, that I shall be disappointing you. I shan't rise to the top in the Customs and Excise Department. My journals will weigh me down. Physical impossibility, Sir; all my spare energies will be locked in the journals. I can see you don't think I'll find any sources of new energy there. By the way, Sir, if you will pardon my mentioning it, may I send you a little book entitled *Feedback and Control Theory*? It might help your work, Sir. Good day. (Exits)

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THE MULTI-MEDIA APPROACH IN UNIVERSITY TEACHING

By R. H. LEE

The theoretical background

It is not my intention to provoke discussion on the ultimate aims of university education. Ultimate aims are an ideological matter, and any assertion about them will be a statement of a belief, not of a fact. Different universities in the same country may — and do — have different aims at the same time; and the same university could have different aims at different times. The needs and pressures of society, the growth in the complexity of knowledge, and the demands of students will all play a part in determining those different aims; and little will be gained by contesting the superiority of one set of aims over another.

Consequently, I base my discussion, not upon statements of ultimate conviction, but upon two ideas so commonplace that I hope they will pass as fact. The first of these is that students attend a university in order to learn. The second is that the university recognizes some obligation to teach those students. A university, then, is an institution where learning *and* teaching take place, and this essay has as its object of enquiry certain modern methods of linking learning and teaching, certain modern ways of mediating between the learner's needs and the teacher's abilities and resources.

Before going into the detail of these new media, I wish to make two other observations on these mediating pathways between learning and teaching. The first concerns the nature of learning. The American educational technologist C. R. Carpenter has written:

> Let us agree once again and for all . . . that only individuals learn. Classes, groups, seminars, families, audiences and populations do not learn. Individuals alone learn, but most frequently they learn in classes, groups, seminars, families, audiences, and populations . . . learning is (thus) individualized *and* socialized. Only individuals learn but social factors provide positive and negative conditions which importantly affect the kind and rate of learning.[1]

At university level, one of the 'social factors' affecting individual learning is, of course, teaching method, and the nature of the situations in which teaching takes place. The individual is entitled to, and

will, set his own aims in learning, though, if he wishes to graduate, he will adjust these to the needs of the institution. In teaching, the matter is more complicated, as the teacher feels at least some commitment to a body of acquired knowledge (called his subject), to the standards set by the university, and to the progress of the class as a whole, as well as to the needs of each individual student. The familiar tension then arises between what the teacher sees as his needs and commitments, and what the student sees as his needs and commitments. The aim of all teaching strategies, including the multi-media approach, is to negotiate this area of tension with success. The term 'mediate' comes to mind here in both its meanings. Media can help to bridge the gap between learning needs and teaching resources, and to arbitrate between the claims of teaching and learning when these compete.

Secondly, I wish to observe that one at least of the aims of teaching should be to teach the student eventually to learn by himself. Ideally, any teacher has the aim of eventually making himself redundant to each student he teaches. The mediation of knowledge and insight through teacher to student should eventually be replaced by the direct confrontation between the student and the subject. If this is so, then one of the aims of the teaching strategy will be to bring students into learning situations in which they directly confront material, unmediated through the teacher. Some of the new educational technologies have this important potential.

Before discussing in greater detail the multi-media approach, it is necessary to consider the nature of mediated instruction itself.

All teaching is, strictly speaking, mediated. A lecturer in front of a class is 'mediating' information and insight through his voice, gestures and blackboard work. A student studying a textbook is receiving the writer's knowledge through the 'medium' of the printed page. But the term 'mediated instruction' now applies more precisely to the use of modern communication technologies in education. In discussing the multi-media approach, I shall be considering the integration of these new media with each other, and with older forms of teaching. It must be stressed, however, that the multi-media approach has two objectives: to use each contributing medium in ways that release the potential of the medium to achieve the objectives of the learning programme; and to stimulate the student by offering him a variety of learning modes and experiences. The multi-media approach seeks to go beyond the verbal version of the subject usually given to students in lectures, by providing direct representations of reality, chances for self-assessment and other modes of experience.

The matter of integration is complicated by the fact that it is now clear to us that communications media are not neutral carriers of

whatever content-information is committed to them. Increasingly we are recognizing that no technology is neutral, but conditions and shapes the environment in which it is used.[2] It should then, be a cardinal point in the ideology of any mediated teaching strategy to try to recognize the effects of the chosen medium as medium. For instance, the lecture as a medium creates an authoritarian environment with a premium on student passivity; while the language laboratory creates a personalised and actively responsive medium, even though the teacher is more distanced from the student than in the lecture. Teachers would do well to recognize the different environments created by different media and choose the material to be treated in each according to its suitability to that environment.

However, what McLuhan calls the 'massaging' effect of media becomes a crucial decision-point in the multi-media approach, where we are trying to utilize the nature of each medium to increase learning of the content so carried — and ideally, also, to provide stimulation and insight through controlled integration of media in a carefully devised learning programme.

It follows, then, that the successful integration of media into a multi-media package involves a commitment to the systematic design of courses. I will discuss this in greater detail later, but here wish to observe that little explicit course design is at present attempted in South African higher education, and that the real imperative and potential of the multi-media approach is that teachers would be forced to think of the teaching-learning system as a whole process, in which different media are appropriate to the achievement of different objectives.[3] It should also be observed here that the media which are available will, in practice, play a part in determining the teaching objectives. This is in the nature of scientific technology itself, of which it has been observed that

> (it is) the most dynamic single force in determining the scope of our possible duty . . . because it changes the domain of what we can do, out of which emerges the domain of what we ought to do.[4]

In educational terms, then, the existence of new media, such as film and television, can affect decisions on desireable ends, as well as suggest new means of attaining those ends. One of the main reasons for the failure to see that media influence ends as well as provide means has been the tendency to think of modern media in terms of the hardware or equipment involved. This kind of thinking dominated the early days of educational technology; but, today, concentration is directed more towards the channel of response in

the learner that is awakened by the medium. Professor Robert M. Gagné has identified five major channels of learning information. He writes:

> One may conveniently describe media in several major (channels) as follows:
>
> 1. actual objects and events
> 2. veridical pictures (static and moving)
> 3. diagrammatic pictures
> 4. printed language
> 5. auditory language
>
> These are the different ways in which the learner is affected by media. He may be stimulated by actual objects and events . . . in his early years, the learner may be stimulated with apparently equal effect by pictures, whether he sees them in a textbook or on a movie or television screen. Again, following some early learning, he responds to diagrammatic pictures . . . As schooling proceeds, learning comes to depend increasingly on the stimulation provided by printed language . . . Auditory language has always been another major source of information for use in learning, whether presented by itself as in a lecture, or combined with the pictorial mode as in a motion picture or a television programme.[5]

Increasingly it appears that fruitful thinking about media and multi-media teaching programmes should concentrate upon the senses activated by the channel of information employed by a medium. Decisions concerning media-hardware should follow this kind of analysis. All too often, the interest of media innovations is focused upon the equipment available, rather than upon the channels of stimulation and response most appropriate to the desired learning. This may be partly explained by the fairly short history of educational technology. Systematic thinking about any form of mediated instruction is recent, dating from the 1920s,[6] and for several decades has been dominated by concentration upon the hardware. What has been lacking is an organized utilization of systems processes, which gained acceptance in technological fields outside education at a much earlier date. Robert Heinich has called this a 'trick of history' and has commented:

> Technology is both process and product. Its power lies in the former, but its successes are measured by the latter . . .[7]

We see then that a complex interaction of media-potential and educational objectives arises in planning any multi-media system. We are only beginning to see how this interaction can be directed and controlled.

Implications of the multi-media approach

We can say with virtual certainty what are the implications of a multi-media approach for the individual teacher or lecturer. These implications can be divided into two main categories: firstly, the increased emphasis that must be placed upon formal and explicit course design and, secondly, the resultant severe and often painful shift in role and career expectations required of the individual. Obviously, these two categories interact, but for analytical purposes we can discuss them separately. Let us consider first the question of course development, beginning with McKenzie's succinct definition of the topic:

> It is useful to consider a course as a system in which students, teachers and learning materials interact: the purpose of course development is to optimize the system.[8]

Many university courses are designed, it is true, but the use of integrated multi-media poses problems that make formal course design essential. First, each medium of instruction used is only one part of the system and has to be considered in relation to all the other components. In turn, this makes it essential that the objectives of the course be clarified and explicitly stated, so that intelligent choices can be made about media to achieve certain objectives. For objectives and media to be meaningfully discussed by the persons developing the course, some mutually comprehensive model and vocabulary must be evolved. By this stage, planning has almost automatically gone beyond the rather vague discussions of course content that take place in universities — not because the people involved are more conscientious or knowledgeable, but because it is not possible to discuss a multi-media course *at all* without moving into the area of more formalized course design. Also, persons of differing backgrounds will be involved in the production of the course (especially in the case of media specialists), and a common vocabulary and course model will be needed to communicate with them. There is a third and equally crucial reason for the almost inevitable association of multi-media systems and formal course models. This concerns the issue of feedback. Inevitably in systems using television, film, audio-tape and other, non-personal modes of communication, feedback about the success of the teaching unit will

be, as the Germans say, 'at a distance'. The teacher will not be present to assess from moment to moment, the success or failure of the teaching strategy or the materials. Instead, formal feedback procedures must be built into the course to obtain this information, and formal provision must be made in the course design-model for this feedback information to be used in assessing and changing the course.[9] All these factors make one think that multi-media teaching and formal course design are inseparable — or, at least, highly desirable — companions.

The appearance of complex course designs[10] is the first of the effects upon the rôle and career expectations of the individual university teacher, which we mentioned as the second important implication of the introduction of the multi-media approach. Perhaps the kindest way of phrasing this is to say that the rôle of the teacher shifts from that of performer before an audience to that of designer of learning situations in which he plays a greatly diminished personal part. The formal design of courses shifts the decisions about teaching away from the implementation stage to the design stage, away from the classroom or lecture room, to the consultations, planning, writing and recording undertaken by a group of persons. Capacity for team-work rather than individual brilliance becomes a desirable quality, and the system forces the admission of many kinds of person who have not to date been regarded as relevant to the problems of education. In commenting on this aspect of the experience of the Open University, Bates writes:

> . . . the term 'teacher' at the Open University could equally well be applied to the subject specialist working centrally, the subject specialist as intermediary, the television and radio producers, the (student) counsellor, the educational technologist, or any other of the ancilliary people who are nevertheless essential to the whole enterprise.[11]

In short, the teacher faces a decisive reallocation of his own time from student-contact to peer group-discussion, and a far-reaching redefinition of skills he has been used to call teaching. Attitude-research shows strong opposition to both these changes among lecturers.[12]

For all South African universities, the multi-media approach will be in the nature of an educational innovation. The implications for the institution will thus be largely those of finding strategies for the introduction of the approach. Local variations will be important here, but some general points can be made:[13]

Influential people must sponsor and be associated with the introduction of new media. The initial cost is usually high, and the systems cannot be expected to appear spontaneously at lower teaching levels.

In-service training opportunities must be provided for existing lecturers to become familiar with new systems.

The media equipment-systems must work efficiently and be satisfactorily maintained.

Research must be conducted into the most suitable areas for introducing multi-media, and results must be assessed.

It seems desirable that some central department or office of educational innovation or technology be established to handle these problems. However, perhaps more important than this, the status of the innovators must be assured within the structure of the university. They should be regarded, and be able to regard themselves, as 'equal partners in the University's endeavours, rather than as a staff of a service or advisory group occasionally called upon by a handful of academics'.[14]

The introduction and use of multi-media teaching systems is a subject of considerable complexity in itself, as well as part of the general problem of change in a university. We might, of course, ask ourselves why we should think at all of new communications technologies in university teaching. This is perhaps the value-question I should have asked at the outset. Let me now try to answer it in two ways. The first is positive. Modern media, singly or in combinations, *do* communicate, they do touch human senses and evoke learning responses that even the human voice and face together cannot reach. Let us then use them. The second version is perhaps more negative, and summed up in Marshall McLuhan's observation that the level of media-information in our world is so high that the modern school child regards going to school as an interruption of his education. It seems that universities must face the reality of the second idea, and realize the potential of the first. And they will only do both if they now turn serious attention to the rôle of educational technologists in their structures, and the 'investment of faculty time'[15] that will allow meaningful use to be made of media for educational purposes. For, in the multi-media approach, all decisions must be educational decisions first and media decisions second.

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[2] In this area, see: McLuhan, M., *Understanding media*, London 1964; Ellul Jacques, *The technological society*, New York, 1964.

[3] In this regard, see: Mackenzie, N., Eraut, M., and Jones, Hywel C., *Teaching and learning, an introduction to new methods in higher education*, Unesco and I.A.U., 1970, pp. 101-169.

[4] Heathers, Glen: 'Educational Philosophy and educational technology', in Tickton, op. cit, p. 105. This point of view is supported by the experience of the Open University in Britain. See Bates, A. W., *The role of the teacher in a video-teaching system*, a paper delivered at the Unesco Conference 'Auto-Video', May 1972. Bates writes: 'I would not even like to argue that objectives should be set first, then the suitable media chosen. Particularly in the field of higher education, the availability of a medium such as television influences to a certain extent the kind of course that is chosen.' (p. 6).

[5] Gagné, Robert M.: 'Learning theory, educational media and individualised instruction', in Tickton, op. cit, p. 62.

[6] See Saettler, Paul, *History of instructional technology*, New York, McGraw-Hill, 1968.

[7] Heinrich, Robert: *Technology and the management of instruction*, Washington 1970.

[8] McKenzie, op. cit., p. 159.

[9] See Bates, A. W., *The evaluation of broadcasting at the Open University*, a paper presented to the Annual Conference for Programmed Learning and Educational Technology, April 1972 (unpublished).

[10] Lewis, B.: 'Course production at the Open University', *British Journal of Educational Technology*, Volume 2, Number 2, May 1971, pp. 111-123.

[11] Bates, A. W.: *The role of the teacher in a video teaching system*, p. 20. See also Hooper, R., 'A framework for studying instructional technology', in Tickton, op. cit, pp. 141-161.

[12] On the question of rôle changes, see Heinich, Robert, 'Technology of instruction: impetus or impasse?' in Morphet, E. L. and Jesser, D. C. (eds), *Designing education for the future*, New York, Citation Press, 1969.

[13] For a fuller treatment see Carpenter, C. R. and Greenhill, L. P., 'Providing the conditions for learning: the new media', in Baskin, S. (ed), *Higher education: some newer developments*, second edition, New York 1971.

[14] Hawkridge, David G., *Applications of educational technology at the Open University*, paper delivered at the Annual Conference of the British Psychological Society, 1971.

[15] McKenzie, N.: 'Educational technology — the next quinquennium', in *Papers presented at the seventh annual conference of the Society for Research into Higher Education*, London, 1972.

THE STARS OVER DENMARK

Some metaphysical considerations for a reading of *Hamlet*

by W. H. BIZLEY

Let us recollect how the play *Hamlet* makes its unique impression on us. What is its characteristic tone, what is the predominant colour of its landscape? Its courtiers and its princes, its ghosts and its kings seem to emerge from so glassy and refracted a light that we aren't sure whether the ethos of the play isn't more that of night than of day. The pole-axe on the ice, the moist star sick with eclipse, the glassy brook at Ophelia's death — such items supply so unforgettable a resonance that the lonely Hamlet's 'pale cast of thought' seems after all to belong to a more general complexion than can be attributed to him alone. In this play the uneffectual fire of the glow-worm makes more impact on us than the daylight it heralds,— locates better for us the stark emergence of persons and events on its elusive, enigmatic stage. The general climate seems so transparent, so ambiguous, that we might ask whether its subdued light isn't itself metaphoric, whether we are not confronted here with the very rub of the drama.

Under the Danish stars, we shall hold, the half-tones and receding definition create an ambiguity that is essential to the dramatic design. At any moment, such is the texture of the poetry, the starlight might be the finest vehicle of watchful spirit, the shrewdest metaphor for all we might call 'consciousness', and yet, at any moment, it might be the bodiless colour of 'mind' alone, the colour of that notorious 'mentality' D. H. Lawrence ascribed to the play's chief character.[1] The ambiguity throws up a continual excitement in this most 'northern' of Shakespeare's plays, testing, as it were, the very edge of consciousness. 'Consciousness', spirit, would be less braced, less vigilant, if the stars weren't so transparent that they mobilised a metaphor. It palpably increases the range of the drama that they should be evanescent and ambiguous, their pale beauty fading in a moment to leave the deserted beholder on a promontory below. In observing the stars, as Hamlet bids his friends do with his 'look you' (II ii 301), a visionary sympathy feels a flow, a resonance, a far-off contemporary moment which nevertheless might be, after all, just another little centre, a pin-point merely, a star amongst the stars we see. So unsubstantial a reference for cultural constancy makes more evident than ever that all claims to fixity on earth must be shrewdly declared, that all 'address', all cultural posture, is com-

paratively a licensed position, and that if men are only real to themselves by cultural or religious means, they have no automatic claim to the declaration of 'centre'. Would the enigmatic Danish sky endorse the magnificent confidence of Tamburlaine, for example? — an unlikely parallel to Hamlet perhaps, but the prince could easily have had such poetry in memory as that of Marlowe's resounding hero:

> Nature that fram'd us of four Elements
> Warring within our breasts for regiment,
> Doth teach us all to have aspiring minds:
> Our soules, whose faculties can comprehend
> The wondrous Architecture of the world:
> And measure every wandering planet's course,
> Still climing after knowledge infinite,
> And always moving as the restless Spheres
> Will us to weare ourselves and never rest, . . .
> (*Tamburlaine* II vii 18-26)

Perhaps this is the universe that Hamlet takes down when he finds the night-sky overhead

> no other thing to me than
> a foul and pestilent congregation of vapours.
> (*Hamlet* II ii 303)

At any rate before we blame the prince for reading his melancholy into the sky, let us acknowledge that, not being housed in the rhetoric that Tamburlaine is (enjoyable though that might be in terms of *its* relative licence) it is Hamlet who will always be for us the three-dimensional presence, always have a mobility in his soul quite different from any grandiloquent hero whose restlessness can only become a repeated momentum. Hence the recurring transparency in the Denmark of Shakespeare's drama — its light is glassy yet its air is intense, what is seen can be pointed at, what is unseen must be inferred. It is Shakespeare's design surely to keep us keyed up at this moment where consciousness might suddenly become a canopy of the mind, where a living soul might retreat behind a veil.

This ambiguity, we shall argue, represents a powerful dynamic in Shakespearean metaphor. It is an aspect of tragedy, and yet it has a great poetic strength, for it invests not only the cosmos but the individual case, the nature of the stars but also the nature of a man. We see this psychological development in for example the first of the sonnets to the young man, where the poet observes how, like the

pin-points of fire in the sky, the eyes of a human being might flow or retreat, glow or consume:

> But thou, contracted to thine own bright eyes,
> Feed'st thy lights Flame with self-substantial Fuel,
> Making a famine where abundance lies,
> Thyself thy foe, to thy sweet self too cruel.
> (*Sonnet* I 5-8)

An aspect of tragedy is indeed locked up here, as is often painfully clear in the course of the sonnets. The transparency of a person lies in the unpossessable way in which his reality might or might not be fully at hand, might or might not be 'here' for our knowing.

If we bear this factor in mind we see that the stars above Denmark, like the glassy colour of the whole play, offer themselves as a subtle and incisive metaphor for a version of being that invests man as well as cosmos, the eye as well as the star. Whatever unity we might declare when we say the word 'I', it is of inferior reality if it cannot celebrate time with the sort of urgency that this transparency must insist upon, cannot flow towards us over the gulf of consciousness. An 'I' too heavily possessed is a declaration of unity that outrivals consciousness, is a premature unity, and in a play that is inexorably taken up with the way a man says 'one', (V ii 74) we must be particularly aware of the drama inherent in the nature of one-ness, especially if seen unity is never a sensed unity.

Consider, for instance, the sympathetic characters in the play, the prince and his friends, the wondering players. How do they 'come' at us, how do they arrive as speaking presences? Never so self-enclosed but that they are vulnerable to experience, attendant on life. The whispered questions, the intense reception of each other, the lightness of their fellowhood — these suggest an unusual ability not to confound 'consciousness' with private identity, to feel the moment at hand as the moment of their being. Consider their speeches each to each, never filling up space, never clogging the stage, never taking up room like dramas of rhetoric. Here, words are open to experience, attentive, and even Hamlet's soliloquies, at the very point where many of his critics would prefer them to consolidate in 'positive thoughts', never lapse into premature resolution. The sonority of the poetry never becomes self-enclosing, questioning leads on the movement of its thought.

Hence the peculiar atmosphere of the play — not an 'atmosphere' in any romantic sense, but rather a precise and creative suspense. 'Suspense', rightly understood, should be a characteristic of any higher, ethically-based culture. For when 'consciousness' is so per-

petually fluid, so unpossessed, there must be a continual drama in the coming about of human affairs. Thus the collapse of a mutual suspense in the sovereign field of Denmark must be an event that can never be seen, can only be inferred. In the same way, it is the feeling that stars are 'suspended' creatures, not mere fixities, that makes them such potent metaphors for the huge unseeable factor in pre-psychological consciousness. They have more 'looking-power' in their reflex glimmer than men below have power to see them. They are behind us as well as forward of us. They comprehend us as we don't comprehend them. Indeed, whenever we want to comprehend them, see them as entities, we must first turn them inside out, take up for ourselves a 'Newtonian' stance. When this occurs, there is a loss of suspense. We no longer have to wait on life, to 'be comprehended', we already comprehend. The dynamic in unity is then briefly removed, our 'way of saying one' becomes like that of Claudius. We cease to infer in the stars that existential 'moment' celebrated by Thomas Aquinas, for whom, in their case at last, 'the form fills the whole potentiality of matter'.[2] We no longer feel — as is tucked up in that formula — a confession as to 'consciousness', that the stars have 'moment' which is independent of us, transcendent of us, which looks down on us, and yet which is centrally 'our' moment of being. And, no longer inferring such a moment in the cosmos, we no longer infer it in human beings, the moment Hamlet used to feel in the majesty of his father who had

> A combination and a form indeed
> Where every god did set his seal.
> (III iv 60-61)

In that 'Thomist' formula, Hamlet precisely demonstrates why the king's presence could be representative, why his stance was not an 'atomic' unity. It also shows us in fact why, imitating such a moment, all men could participate in the 'combination' of sovereignty. Itis this king's 'combination' that gives him such mobility in presence —

> New-lighted on a heaven-kissing hill (L.59)

— a mobility that Hamlet reveres, and which is a very different way of declaring unity in the self from that, say, of Caesar, in *Julius Caesar*, whose 'for always I am Caesar' is more like the resounding weightiness of Claudius. Sovereignty, by comparison, is a most spacious continuity — consider how the 'This' in John of Gaunt's famous speech,

This royal throne of kings,

makes the throne more continuous than any one incumbent, or consider how the rhythm of sovereignty is comprehensive enough to embrace

this plot, this earth, this realm

in a grander rhythm,

this England.
(*Richard II* II i 40f.)

When the metaphysical presuppositions of 'unity' are analysed, it becomes clearer, we suggest, to what extent *Hamlet* is ontological drama, how it spreads beyond the psychological area where criticism usually focusses. We shall claim that the death of a king is only the most striking aspect of the unseen event that the play hinges on, the diminishing in quality of the sovereignty of Denmark, a loss that can't be accounted for in the death of 'one only man' — not even by the 'works' of his brother, much though they activate and demonstrate the whole disalignment.

We plead this case in order to try and explain why the death of a king should affect Hamlet in quite the way it does, why it doesn't brace his sense of the 'moral', doesn't make him more ethically charged, why, if anything, it fills him with the very complexion, the fallen humours, that one might wish rather on the usurping king. How unlike, in this respect, its peers in the Revenge Tradition this play is! Against particular wrongs, particular wrongdoers, one might have thrilling redress, but Hamlet, never 'Fortune's star' as the revenge hero so wearingly is, is up against an unseen event, an unseen death, the death of sovereignty. The ontological consequences of such an event, the loss of moment and the coming of 'minutes', the fragmenting of unity into so many ego-units, the whole metabolic disorientation that the play traces, simply can't be particularised with a revenger's confidence. It is the unseenness of the event that makes it such a test,—the outward forms go on as before and 'prophetic' persons only infer the loss, often by feeling it most vividly in themselves.

In this sense it is a good thing that the play has proved problematic to those who scout for virtues in enigmatic young princes. Even morality has presuppositions in 'consciousness', and it is because he suffers the consequences of that fact that Hamlet isn't able to mobilise himself against Claudius with the vigour expected of him

by those who can apparently reduce his situation to one of 'moral issues', 'ethical decisions' and the like. (Hamlet, as it turns out, is at his least convincing when he is touched by such thinking, his punitive projects lacking any authoritative timing.)

It takes a certain sort of discernment, therefore, to realise in what way even the black Denmark of this problematic tragedy implies a normative sense of what should be, what is truly sovereign. Just as the ability to feel the companionship of the stars, to infer the whole unitary place of 'time and the hour', demands reflexes and sympathies that don't immediately have contents, so should the discerning audience focus not too much on the moral imperatives pressing on Hamlet and rendering him guilty, but hear in the pathos and rththm of his speech how his real nature is actually extended. In this play the degree to which the implicit is at odds with the explicit, —undermines the explicit, —the way in which the poetry defines a value by being canny as to its loss, will satisfy only those who can accept 'consciousness' to be the test-case of value, even when all demeanour and concept seem negative in their reach. Perhaps we can give force to our sense of the 'positive' that can lurk in tragedy by suggesting that Denmark must have been a state, a 'ground' of some quality to field such excitement, to field such persons, or, dipping from bias, to create 'tragedy' in fact, and not merely to rust or stagnate. In this sense the 'transparency' we have described is an extreme positive, keeping up a buoyancy, an immanence of personality, a floating of phenomena that keeps man at the quick, even when his whole conceptual life seems hugely to have deserted him. Thus only a rich reserve of those sympathies that are acute to the actual immanence of life, which find 'metaphor' the natural medium for keeping it contemporary and not locking it away, will be 'visionary' enough to sense the demise of true inner 'being', that spirit that can drain away while its forms are still abundant.

This is the 'prophetic' sense by which, for instance, Horatio marks that desperate haste in the battle-preparations of Claudius, a portentous lack of rhythm reminiscent of any era when 'the moist star' is 'sick to doomsday with eclipse'. The furtiveness of Claudius is in flat contradiction, as one might perceive, who has stars in memory, to the urbane weightiness of his posture. Uneasy rhythm is what is spotted by Hamlet in the impatience of his mother after his father's funeral, the quick-drying of her eyes stopping up any flow of kinship or sympathy. It is before he knows of any murder as such, before he knows of any specific moral wrong, that he can tell — and this is the order of events that we must get correct — a nervousness that has run to preconception, that won't share a common ground, has no sense of a common parade.

Such general haste can't be put down to one local crime, no matter how villainous. Haste is one aspect of the loss of a truly contemporary moment or rhythm in which both sovereign and subjects should duly participate. In this Danish state, however, from its new king downwards, men are occupying fragmented positions, are no longer 'there' where the stars judge events. Even Ophelia, admiring Hamlet as 'the glass of fashion' and the 'mould of form' (III i 153) can't fill and make actual these empty vessels, can't share with Hamlet moments deeply common to them both. If this shared consciousness weren't a factor in drama of the most wide-ranging ontological implications, Hamlet would never be able to generalise as he does about the 'law's delay' and the 'contumely of office', or to feel 'fortune' hanging over him so closely and oppressively.

Shakespeare's poetry, then, is a remarkable analysis in what we might call the ontological factor in tragedy. If 'consciousness' is no longer braced with a sovereign rhythm, the very feeling for gravity will alter in men's dispositions. Consider how vividly it is demonstrated for instance that in a loss of common 'being', beings start forward, events knock at one's door, how, with the general loss of a resonant objectivity, 'objects' will impinge on the self with unusual force. In an evacuated universe 'The present eye praises the present object' (the way it is put in *Troilus and Cressida* III iii 180), men approach the condition where they are 'all eyes and no sight' (ibid. I ii 29) so that when Horatio warns Hamlet that if he loses his 'sovereignty of reason' he will see only 'toys of desperation without more motive', (I iv 73), he gives, in his warning, a model by which we can see what happens in Denmark when it is no longer a ground overlooked by the stars. The lapse of sovereignty is marked by 'whips and scorns', by 'slings and arrows', by that whole unmediated future that bears down on Hamlet and, as 'outrageous fortune', attacks him just when he has lost the social resonance that can stave off its 'thousand natural shocks'.

Perhaps we can give weight to our proposition by asking whether it is not in such a period of ontological loss, the period when the draining of objectivity increases the size of objects, that men will most tend to seize on to see-able stabilities, most tend to opt for that 'objective correlative' that T. S. Eliot made famous in his essay on the work.[3] Eliot, of course, is out to recommend 'objective correlative' to the so-subjective prince of his interpretation, and we must wonder if he at any time considered the possibility that it is just in such a climate as we have described that the smaller man will desperately search for premature unities, structural stability, for objects 'forward' of himself that the eye can contain. Must not

Eliot's doctrine find itself patronising, as Rosencrantz and Guildenstern do, the false empire of a Claudius, whose

> massy wheel,
> Fix'd on the summit of the highest mount,
> (III iii 17-18)

is a hub for the nervous, whose constancy is in fact like that of Caesar, a star that can be seen, 'unshak'd of motion', quite different, in its stability, from any *felt* constancy. When men no longer live in the true medium of sovereignty, they will reach for that inferior order promised by Claudius, the sort to whose 'single and peculiar life' (L.11) one can only be 'mortis'd and adjoin'd' (L.20).

Seen in this light, there seems point in saying that in Denmark 'objective correlative' ('a set of objects, a situation, a chain of events')[4] is precisely the insistent temptation, the refuge for those eyes that lack any vision. Eliot's formula shows not much more, we would say, than a familiar irritation with an aspect of romanticism, and it is not to be laid at the prince's door that romantic sensibility took him for its own. Eliot must have recognised the inadequacy of his solution — that is poetically evident at least in his later writing. Here, the man who has himself now suffered ontological loss, who lives in an air that is 'thoroughly small and dry' (*Ash Wednesday* I) asks now as poignantly as Hamlet ever did for a correlative that isn't so objective:

> Where shall the word be found, where shall the word
> Resound? (*Ash Wednesday* V)

Here is sufficient clue — one far from anything in the Revenge Tradition — why Hamlet should not have been able to take a tough line on his Uncle, why he himself should have become tainted by the dethroned environment. It seems it is the most sensitive man, the one most attuned to a transparency in things, who must bear the 'original sin' of a deflowered community, — all the more when so few can sense any wavering or change. Such a person must perceive in himself more than any the loss of any genuine 'moment', the tendency described in *Troilus and Cressida* as trying to fit 'unbodied figures of thoughts' to 'surmised shape' (see Act I Sc. iii l. 15f.) and be his own worst example of a general lack of rhythm, with, as he tells Ophelia,

> more offences at my back than I have thoughts to put them in, imagination to give them shape, or time to act them in.
> (III i 122f.)

It is the ability to feel that sort of 'wickedness' that marks the finer perception, perception that knows, like Donne (writing not of Denmark in 1611), that the

> Element of fire is quite put out

and that those who can't feel it will have (like Polonius) an undisturbed complacency, where

> Wicked is not much worse than indiscreet.
> (*An Anatomie of the World* 1.206 & 1.348)

It is in such a climate that Hamlet must shoulder the general wrong of Denmark. If his morality weren't based on the very quality of consciousness, he could perhaps take a simpler attitude to Claudius, could make of him one confinable phenomenon, not just the symptom of a more general one.

It is with this background in mind that we can perhaps win Hamlet some credit for his failure to reach any resolution in the famous 'To be or not to be' speech. The moral casuistry of Revenge Tragedy is left far behind in the poignant heroism (not heroic to itself of course) by which Hamlet isn't hooked to the question 'To act or not to act', by which he staves off the imperative his critics would so often press upon him and asks instead 'To be or not to be?' 'Action', in the Danish context, would only acerbate and extend the fragmenting of that quality whose measure must lie prior to action, whose memory alone gives to any act 'the name of action'. The 'rub' in Hamlet's problem, we claim, lies prior to the question of action, prior to the relation between 'psyche and volition', 'mind and will',—even though 'This thing's to do' represents most concretely to the prince the underlying dislocation. Hamlet's experience is one of ontological evacuation, that unseen event of which Donne could report:

> Nor in ought more this world's decay appears
> Than that her influence the heav'n forbeares,
> Or that the Elements doe not feele this,
> The father, or the mother barren is.
> (Ibid. 388-391)

The quality Donne here describes as 'influence' can't be immediately located, can't be seen. It is because Hamlet is susceptible to it that he knows when it is lost, but his 'shame' in such a loss is that his speech cannot launch him, his thinking can't reach an end. While

one feels the 'influence' of the stars, one is contained in a field, 'conscious', in fact, rather than 'given to thoughts'. One doesn't feel alternative possibilities forever opening up in an abstracted area, forever proposing themselves 'in the mind'. In even the sincerest man, 'in the mind' is a rival place to consciousness,—the 'space' of the one competing with the other, and the dualism can only debilitate the 'actuality' of action. That distinction, we might note, comes from Aquinas,[5] and we can perhaps enforce it with another relevant teaching, his doctrine that, whereas the process of man's knowledge is always a double process, 'one of succession only', God's way of knowing is a single process, His oversight is 'never discursive'. 'He does not consider one thing after another successively, but everything simultaneously'.[6] In Denmark, 'God's position' (to speak in this convention) is no longer subscribed to. To make that point is to claim nothing evangelical! — God is subscribed to all too often in the play, with many a clichéd reference, and it is his 'position', an ontological fact, that is no longer felt, is no longer in consciousness. Instead, Man has become his own overseer, projecting chains of cause and effect, and even Hamlet, insofar as he rehearses to himself possibilities both active and passive, is likely to become the victim of the causal drift, the proliferating schemes that 'succession' and 'double process' would have him enjoin. His failure, then, is a strange sort of triumph, an ability of what is 'non-discursive' in him to keep his mind from running to ends. We can see how in terms of the Thomist view to rehearse alternatives 'in the mind' is to prepare a space that is no longer 'contained' from without, is instead in one's own comprehension. If a man launches himself from his own platform, he places himself outside the area of influence, presumes to a transcendent position that isn't rightfully his. (We are not, let us insist, arguing that Shakespeare was consciously a man of the schools. Insofar as sensibility is a cultural inheritance, however, his poetry surely shows him sympathetic on this point. Consider for instance Sonnet XV 1-4:

> When I consider everything that grows
> Holds in perfection but a little moment,
> That this huge stage presenteth nought but shows
> Whereon the stars in secret influence comment . . .)

The either-or, then, of Hamlet's thinking is the false discursiveness, the dialectician's handle, and it is to the credit of his underlying sincerity that the rehearsing of alternatives 'in the mind' can't sustain itself as a process, runs short of energy. The very utterance 'To be or not to be', already so intent and characteristic in its tone, prevents

the wave-motion of practical either-or. Hamlet, of course, cannot see this as a distinction. It is we, the audience, privileged to hold the overlooking position, to look down like the gods whose 'burning eyes' watch the travails of Hecuba, we see that what the prince feels as 'sicklied', 'the pale cast of thought', is nothing less than the true reflection of the stars. Here is that subtle and unseen resistance that prevents 'resolution', resolution which, if put into effect, would come across to us as jerky and premature. Action at this stage could only emulate Claudius, who is caught in a 'bi-fold' world of cause and effect, 'a man to double business bound'.

Yet having argued thus much for the prince we must consider in his speech an even subtler temptation, one closer to him than the 'active' or 'political'. Let us recollect again the peculiar colouration of the Hamlet landscape, the bodiless light which is its tonal centre, the intense ambiguity that tests its characters. At times it might seem to echo a certain tendency that is recognisable in Elizabethan poetry, that pervasive and characteristic aesthetic which is eager to enclose itself in the 'glassy essence' of a jewelled universe. And is it not here, perhaps, that the most exacting test occurs? Is not the greatest temptation of Hamlet to at last make of starlight the refracted world in which alone he can live? Isn't there a propensity in him to divide off 'essence' from 'existence', the beautiful gleam from the pinnacle of fire?

Of all the ways of 'saying one' in the fading era of Elizabeth, none was more seductive than the one which spoke with the Renaissance voice of Plato. It is true, of course, that the degree to which any species of neo-platonism can be attributed to its founder will always be a matter for speculation, but we can claim surely with a degree of confidence that Platonism has on the whole been inherited in Europe as a-historical, even anti-historical, 'casting pale, cold, grey conceptional networks over the motley whirl of the senses' as Nietzsche gleefully put it,[7] or, in Etienne Gilson's phrase, reverting to 'the stability of essence'.[8] Perhaps the colouration of *Hamlet* is a subtle and rarefied instance of the platonising temper noticeable in his age! Is there not, after all, a certain nuance in the prince's speech, a certain deft and fleeting tone that might only too readily linger on 'essences'? And was a more poised resistance to the assault of unities possible than that inward unity described in the *Symposium*, 'subsisting of itself, and by itself in an eternal oneness'?[9] Is it not perhaps in thrall to that sort of oneness that Hamlet might be drawn to such subjective words as 'dew', 'infinite', 'sleep', 'dream'?

The drama of starlit ambiguity is here at its most intense. The evanescent tone that hovers over the play is marvellously suited to testing just that hollow in the wake of true sovereignty where the

aesthetic permanence of 'tone' or 'beauty' might yearn to become a whole world, an 'infinite space'. Many critics speak as though in 'To be or not to be' Hamlet did finally succumb to the subtle ennui of 'sleep' and 'dream'. If one were to believe Lawrence, for example,[10] one would conclude that he finally took advantage of that complete dualism prescribed by Ficino, head of the Platonic Academy in Florence,

> 'Know thyself, divine race, clothed with a mortal garment.'[11]

One can see why it is that Hamlet might be pulled in this alluring direction, Denmark being what it has now become, 'state' rather than kingdom. With that Platonic resonance one might inherit the old consciousness in aesthetic form, a distilled quintessence. But when we attend closely to the prince is there any case at all for saying he adopts the doctine or 'muse' we've described? No matter how heavily he might dip towards that nuance, isn't Hamlet always of sufficient ironic resilience to see that a kingdom of infinite space is only a 'nutshell'? Does he ever speak his 'platonic' words in a truly invocatory spirit, 'O sleep', 'O dream', ever at all 'commune' with their one-ness? Is he ever likely to give up his quest, finally come to rest on their characteristic note? We must emphatically deny it. Though 'dew', 'sleep', and 'dream' are temptations of the spirit, the poetic texture of Hamlet's muse never closes him in, the 'shrewd and nipping air' of actual consciousness won't permit an aesthetic accommodation. The 'rub' that keeps Hamlet from 'sleep' and 'dream', that moves on the sentence despite its lingering, is at the very quick of his thought, keeping him from the enclosing effect of inner permanence. The 'pale cast of thought' is certainly beautiful in itself — we see how it could make a whole world of mirrored introspection, but some recurring resilience in the prince always knows that it is 'sicklied', that consciousness is always the reflex of 'conscience', and won't permit an aesthetic union.

It isn't Hamlet, then, who would dismiss the warning Donne gave to poets living in the world of departed sovereignty:

> What artist now dares boast that he can bring
> Heavens hither, or constellate anything,
> So as the influence of those starres may bee
> Imprison'd in an Hearbe, or Charme, or Tree, . . .
> (*Anatomie of the World* ll.402-405)

To enclose oneself in a contained world is never to be accosted by that thin edge we have been calling 'consciousness'. It is the case

where the 'pales and forts' of reason are broken down by a complexion that remoulds its universe in the refracted light of jewelled beauty.

Strangely enough — perhaps not so strangely, if we think of a certain historic tendency — one of the most eloquent statements of this 'dual-world' position comes not from a poet at all. Francis Bacon is reported as saying that

> if he had had the 'ordonnance' of the stars, he would have arranged them 'into some beautiful and elegant order, as we can see in the vaulted roofs of palaces . . . so great a difference is there between the spirit of man, and the spirit of the universe'.[12]

Here, under guise of reverence, is the dangerous transcendentalism that Donne rejects. And if Hamlet is often blamed for visiting his pessimism on the sky above, he is never in danger of this subtle wilfulness, this 'beautifying' that announces an utter independence of the world that is 'given'. If he were as 'subjective' and mind-ridden as is implied by so many of his commentators, might he not have followed some other advice of Bacon? —

> But it is not good to stay too long in the theatre. Let us now pass on to the judicial palace of the mind, which we are to approach with more reverence and attention.[13]

At least Hamlet's stage is under the stars, its metaphors fluent!

At the end of the play there is one further reference to the 'o'erhanging firmament', part of a good-humoured but clumsy joke:

> I'll be your foil, Laertes, in mine ignorance
> Your skill shall, like a star i' th' darkest night,
> Stick fiery off indeed.
>
> (V ii 247-9)

The brevity of the reference, the off-the-shoulder nonchalance, suggests the old comradeliness with the stars has returned. A fragment of wit merely, it nevertheless goes with Hamlet's complete reconciliation to a non-transcendent position. The stars overhead will point out his destiny, show him his act, the duel will be judged by 'this audience'. So brief, the reference only hints at the heart-rending presuppositions it surely entails. Perhaps that is why Laertes is suspicious of it:

You mock me, Sir.

But Laertes is intent on a smaller design.

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[3] Eliot, T. S.: *Selected Essays*, Harcourt, Brace and World, N.Y., 1960, p. 121.
[4] Ibid., p. 124.
[5] Aquinas, St. Thomas: *Philosophical Texts*, ed Gilby, O.U.P., 1951, see para 579.
[6] Ibid., paras 297 and 298.
[7] Nietzsche, F.: *Beyond Good and Evil*, trans. Cowan, Gateway, Chicago, 1955, p. 16.
[8] Gilson, Etienne: *The Christian Philosophy of St. Thomas Aquinas*, Gollancz, London, 1957, p. 48.
[9] Vyvyan, J.: *Shakespeare and Platonic Beauty*, Chatto and Windus, London, 1961, p. 18.
[10] Lawrence, op. cit.
[11] Vyvyan, op. cit, p. 35.
[12] Willey, op. cit, p. 33.
[13] Willey, op. cit, p. 209.

SAMUEL BECKETT AND THE TEMPTATIONS OF STYLE

by J. M. COETZEE

The art of Samuel Beckett has become an art of zero, as we all know. We also know that an art of zero is impossible. A thousand words under a title and a publisher's imprint, the very act of moving pen over paper, these are affirmations of a kind. By what self-contradictory act can such affirmations be deprived of content? By what act can the sentences be, so to speak, erased as they flow from the pen? Here is one answer: 'Islands, waters, azure, verdure, one glimpse and vanished, endlessly, omit'.[1] The first four words, blatantly *composed* though they may be, leading associatively one to the next via even the bathos of rhyme, threaten to assert themselves as illusion, as The Word in all its magical autonomy. They are erased ('omit') and left like dead leaves against a wall. The sentence thus embodies neatly two opposing impulses which permit a fiction of net zero: the impulse toward conjuration, the impulse toward silence. A compulsive self-cancellation is the weight imposed on the flight of the sentence toward illusion; the fiction itself is the penance imposed on the pursuit of silence, rest, and death. Around the helix of ever-decreasing radius described by these conditions Beckett's art moves towards its apotheosis, the one-word text 'nothing' under the title 'Fiction'.

If we can justify an initial segmentation of a set into classes X and not-X, said the mathematician Dedekind, the whole structure of mathematics will follow as a gigantic footnote. Beckett is mathematician enough to appreciate this lesson: make a single sure affirmation and from it the whole contingent world of bicycles and greatcoats can, with a little patience, a little diligence, be deduced. The Unnamable, in the third of the *Three Novels*, has his being in a state prior to this first consoling affirmation, and prolongs his existence 'by affirmations and negations invalidated as uttered',[2] the subject of an incapacity to affirm and an inability to be silent. Doubt constitutes his essence. What forms do the processes of his doubt take? One is familiar to us from the *Nouvelles* and *Malone Dies*: tell desultory stories to pass the time (to fill the pages, to embody oneself), pouring scorn on them intermittently. These stories typically draw themselves out to such length that they become the fictional properties of their narrators, who dramatize the conflicting impulses toward illusion and silence by dramatizing themselves as thaumaturges of their stories (as well as of their being) and then as avengers

of the truth (Moran's last sentences in *Molloy* belong here). Side by side with this process of doubt exists a second, smaller in scale and less dramatic: the parenthetical commentary. The following sentence from The Unnamable contains the familiar phrase-by-phrase self-creation and self-annihilation ('I seem to speak, it is not I, about me, it is not about me', says the Unnamable: a little bird follows Theseus into the labyrinth gobbling down the thread), but it contains as well a new editorial relation:

> Respite then, once in a way, if one can call that respite, when one waits to know one's fate, saying, Perhaps it's not that at all, and saying, Where do these words come from that pour out of my mouth, and what do they mean, no, saying nothing, for the words don't carry any more, if one can call that waiting, when there's no reason for it, and one listens, that stet, without reason, as one has always listened, because one day listening began, because it cannot stop, that's not a reason, if one can call that respite (370).

The phrase 'that stet' belongs to an editorial meta-language, a level of language at which one talks about the language of fiction. It is the language not of 'cogito ergo sum' but of 'cogitat ergo est': the speaking 'I' and its speech are felt not securely as subject but as object among other objects. And the language of the fiction exists in a *meta* relation to the fiction itself, as The Unnamable recognizes:

> To elucidate this point I would need a stick or pole, and the means of plying it, the former being of little avail without the latter, and vice versa. I could also do, incidentally, with future and conditional participles (300).

The editorial metalanguage deployed in this scholium is perfected in *Ping* (1966), where the 'ping' of commentary that repeatedly fractures the surface of the fiction has evacuated itself of lexical content. Contrast 'ping' with its primitive forebear 'plop' in *The Unnamable*, which is yet heavy with content: 'But let me complete my views, before I shit on them. For if I am Mahood, I am Worm too, plop' (338). The sound/word 'ping' interrupts the permutation and combination of a set of murmured phrases ('bare white body fixed', 'head haught', etc.) as the combinations promise or threaten to erect themselves into a tiny, cryptic, but autonomous image of a rudimentary naked human being sitting in a room, plus the glimmering of a meaning for this image. The demands of 'ping' occur more frequently (become more imperative) as the image gains in definition

and its meaning comes to the edge of materializing: 'last murmur one second perhaps not alone eye unlustrous black and white half closed long lashes imploring'.[3] Then we have 'ping silence ping over': the monologue calls to be switched over to the source of 'ping', that is to say, to the anti-illusionary reflexive consciousness celebrated and damned in *The Unnamable.*

In *Lessness* (1969) an infinite series of nested consciousnesses, each of them dismissing the figments of its immediate predecessor, is presented in the paradigm of a two-component switching mechanism. The two components are called day and night, each annihilates the figments of the other, and even the two components are figments of an embracing consciousness whose figments are in turn annihilated by the next member of the series: 'Figment dawn dispeller of figments and the other called dusk'.[4] This annihilation or decreation is symbolized in another binary device: *Lessness* can be broken neatly into two halves, the second consisting of nothing more than a random rearrangement of the sentences of the first (or vice versa).

The progression from *The Unnamable* to *Lessness* is toward a formalization or stylization of auto-destruction: that is to say, as the text becomes *nothing but* a destructive commentary upon itself by the encapsulating consciousness, it retreats into the trap of an automatism of which the invariant mechanical repetitions of *Lessness* are the most extreme example to date. Among the monotonous texts that form Beckett's *Residua*, the only remaining variable is *how* the auto-destruction is done. This is an intriguing development, for it has a close analogue at an earlier stage of Beckett's career. Let us go back to *Watt*, that *ouvrage abandonné* of the war years. What trick of style is it that lies behind Watt's logical-computational fantasies to make these excursions sound so much like what Leibniz called music, 'the mysterious counting of the numbers'? The trick is that Watt abandons Occam's razor, the criterion of simplicity, and allows speculative hypotheses to proliferate endlessly, generated by a matrix which is rhythmic in character. Consider the form of the following typical sentence:

> Perhaps who knows Mr Knott propagates a kind of waves, of depression, or oppression, or perhaps now these, now those, in a way that it is impossible to grasp.[5]

As a first step we can break the sentence into three rhythmic groups, the first two of which are in a *coupled* relation of parallelism:

(a)	(b)	(c)
Perhaps who knows Mr Knott propagates a kind of waves of depression, or oppression	or perhaps now these, now those,	in a way that it is impossible to grasp.

Within group (a) there are two further couples, equivalent in phonological pattern and juncture:

(a1) perhaps (a2) who knows
(a3) of depression (a4) or oppression.

There is another couple in group (b):

(b1) now these (b2) now those.

The entire couple (a3, a4) itself forms a couple with (b1, b2). Underlying the sentence there is thus a system of couples, embedded at three levels, their components linked by phonological or syntactic equivalences. We can define a couple in general as a pair of text-elements between which there exists a relation of equivalence or contrast, phonological, syntactic, or semantic. The sentence we have analyzed, for example, is itself one element of a couple, the other element of which occurs ten sentences earlier. It also belongs to a sequence of nine sentences which forms a couple with a sequence of seven sentences earlier in the paragraph.

That coupling is *the* principle of structure at all levels from phrase to paragraph can be seen if we map out the paragraph in detail. We find over sixty couplings, embedded one within another as many as eight deep. Here is the map of one of the more involved sentences. (Notation: brackets isolate components; (every now)$_{a9}$ indicates that *every now* is the left-hand component of the ninth couple, (and then)$_{b9}$ being the corresponding right-hand component.)

((sentences 4-5)$_{a1}$ sentences 6-10)$_{a2}$ ((sentence 12)$_{a3}$
(((Orperhaps Erskine,)$_{a4}$ (finding the first floor trying,)$_{a5}$
((is obliged)$_{a6}$ (to run))$_{a7}$ (((upstairs)$_{a8}$ ((every now)$_{a9}$
(and then)$_{b9}$)$_{a10}$ ((for a breath of)$_{a11}$ (the second floor,)$_{a12}$)$_{a13}$)$_{a14}$
((and then . . .)$_{b8}$ ((every now)$_{a15}$ (and then)$_{b15}$)$_{b10}$
(. . . downstairs)$_{b8}$ ((for a breath of)$_{b11}$ ((the ground floor,)$_{a16}$
(or even garden,)$_{b16}$)$_{b12}$)$_{b13}$)$_{b14}$)$_{a17}$)$_{a18}$ (((just as in
certain waters)$_{a19}$ (certain fish)$_{b19}$)$_{b5}$ (in order to support the
middle depths,)$_{b5}$ ((are forced)$_{b6}$ ((to rise)$_{a20}$ (and fall,)$_{b20}$)$_{b7}$
((now to the surface of the waves)$_{a21}$ (and now to the ocean bed.)$_{b21}$
)$_{b17}$)$_{b18}$)$_{b3}$)$_{b1}$ sentences 14-20)$_{b2}$

The paragraph grows, then, out of a rhythm or pattern of *A against B*. This rhythm infects most of *Watt*, extending to the logic of Watt's discourses. The process of his reasoning pits question against proposition, rejoinder against question, objection against rejoinder, qualification against objection, and so on until an arbitrary stop is put to the chain of pairs. This binary rhythm is above all the rhythm of doubt, internalizing the philosophical debt to Descartes until finally meaning is submerged beneath it:

> Dis yb dis, nem owt. Yad la, tin fo trap. Skin, skin, skin. Od su did ned taw? On. Taw ot klat tonk? On. . . . (168)

'Grammar and Style!' wrote Beckett to a friend in 1934: 'they appear to me to have become just as obsolete as a Biedermeier bathing suit or the imperturbability of a gentlemen. A mask . . .'[6] In 1934 Beckett was composing his lapidary *Murphy*; what he means by Style here is style as consolation, style as redemption, the grace of language. He is repudiating the religion of style that we find in the Flaubert of *Madame Bovary*: 'I value style first and above all, and then Truth'.[7] The energy of Beckett's repudiation is a measure of the potency of the seductions of Style. *Watt* was the battleground for the next encounter, an encounter won by Style. *Watt* trembles on the edge of realizing Flaubert's dream of 'a book about nothing, a book without external attachments', held together by 'the internal force of style'.[8] The rhythm of A against B submerges *Watt* in its lulling plangencies: the style of the book is narcissistic reverie.

Asked to explain why he turned from English to French, Beckett replied, 'Because in French it is easier to write without style.'[9] The tendency of English toward chiaroscuro is notorious. At the very time in history when the French language was being modified in the direction of simplicity and analytical rigour, the connotative, metaphoric strain in English was being reinforced by the Authorized Version. Thus eventually, for example, Joseph Conrad could complain that it was impossible to use a word like 'oaken' in its purest denotation, for it brought with it a swarm of metaphorical contexts, and Beckett could say that he was afraid of English 'because you couldn't help writing poetry in it'.[10] The style of even Beckett's first published French work, the *Nouvelles*, is more jagged and paratactic than the style of *Watt*. While still as recognizably his own as his English prose, his French prose has freed itself from the stylization, or automatism of style, of *Watt*.

But there is a second and deeper impulse toward stylization that is common to all of Beckett's later work. This occurs with the stylization of the impasse of reflexive consciousness, of the movement

of the mind which we can call *A therefore not-A* and which Beckett apophthegmatizes in the phrase 'imagination dead imagine' and elsewhere explicates as 'the expression that there is nothing to express, nothing with which to express, nothing from which to express, no power to express, no desire to express, together with the obligation to express'.[11] The experience of actually reading Beckett's late fictions, his *Residua*, is an uncomfortable one because they offer us none of the day-dream gratification of fiction: they call for an heroic attentiveness which they continually subvert by a stylized repetitiveness into the sleep of a machine. They offer no day-dreams because their subject is strictly the annihilation of illusion by consciousness. They are miniature mechanisms for switching themselves off: illusion therefore silence, silence therefore illusion. Like a switch they have no content, only shape. They are in fact only a shape, a style of mind. It is utterly appropriate for an artist to whom defeat constitutes a universe that he should march with eyes open into the prison of empty style.[12]

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NOTES

[1] *Imagination Dead Imagine* (1965), in *No's Knife* (London: Calder, 1967), p. 161. All the translations quoted from in this essay are Beckett's own.
[2] *Three Novels* (New York: Grove, 1965), p. 291.
[3] *Ping*, in *No's Knife*, p. 168.
[4] *Lessness* (London: Calder & Boyars, 1970), p. 21.
[5] *Watt* (New York: Grove, 1959), p. 120.
[6] Quoted in Lawrence E. Harvey, 'Samuel Beckett on Life, Art and Criticism', *Modern Language Notes* 80 (1965), 555.
[7] Letter to Louis Bonenfant, December 12, 1856.
[8] Flaubert, letter to Louise Colet, January 16, 1852.
[9] Quoted in Niklaus Gessner, *Die Unzulänglichkeit der Sprache* (Zurich: Juris, 1957), p. 32n.
[10] Richard N. Coe, *Beckett* (London and Edinburgh: Oliver & Boyd, 1964), p. 14.
[11] 'Three Dialogues', in *Proust Three Dialogues* (London: Calder, 1965), p. 103.
[12] Of his friend Bram van Velde, Beckett writes that he is 'the first to admit that to be an artist is to fail, as no other dare fail, that failure is his world . . . ' 'Three Dialogues', p. 125.

LEO III AND ICONOCLASM*

by J. ATKINSON

Theodosius was thrust onto the imperial throne in 715 against his wishes. Soon the imminence of a massive Muslim offensive and the determination of the Byzantine commander in the Anatolikon theme gave Theodosius the chance to abdicate and Leo became emperor in 717. Presently there was fresh talk of a move to check the abuse of icons, but as yet no action.[1] Then in the summer of 726 a volcano erupted near the island of Santorini, and Leo apparently took this as his cue to demonstrate his determination to curb the histrionics of the iconophiles.[2] *The Liber Pontificalis* states in the 'Life of Pope Gregory II' that Leo proscribed icons of all saints, martyrs and angels. Although this proscription bears no date, some scholars have termed it the first iconoclastic decree, and have assumed that its promulgation must have preceded the police action which, in Theophanes' account, opened the iconoclastic campaign.[3] Ostrogorsky attacked this reconstruction, showing that it had tenuous support from the sources.[4] Nevertheless the sources indicate that Leo made public his attitude to icons before the first 'police' action was initiated, and this seems highly probable in itself.[5]

Force was used for the first time, as far as we know, in 726 (or 727) when Leo had the icon of Christ Antiphonetes removed from the Chalke Gate in Constantinople. The icon was particularly popular as many miracles had been performed at the site. Pope Gregory presents us with a picture of devout women like latter-day Maenads attacking the *spatharocandidatus* Jovinus and the other officers, and pounding them to death.[6] There was a swift and bloody retaliation against the crowd[7] and perhaps a more protracted purge of iconoclasts from the different strata of society.[8]

However there followed a more serious crisis as Greeks and islanders from the Helladic theme put up a rival to the throne — his name was Cosmas. The expeditionary force was defeated near Constantinople in April of the tenth indiction year of Leo's reign.[9] P. J. Alexander dates this battle to the year 726,[10] but Ostrogorsky set the battle in April 727 as, in his view, the tenth indiction ran from 1st September 726 to 31st August 727.[11] Ostrogorsky's date is the more likely, for we know that the submarine eruption occurred in 726, and Theophanes set this eruption in the summer of the ninth indiction, whereas he set the defeat of the Helladic rebels in April of

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the tenth indiction and the Muslim attack on Nicaea in the same summer. Similarly Nicephorus set the eruption in one summer and put the attack on Nicaea in the following summer.[12]

However even if the battle belongs to the year after the eruption, and therefore to the year after the first action against icons, we must not assume that iconoclasm was the main grievance of the Greek rebels. Admittedly Nicephorus stated unequivocally that the Greeks rose in revolt because they disagreed with Leo's iconoclastic policy, but Theophanes did not commit himself to any statement that the Greeks were motivated by the desire to halt iconoclasm.[13]

Leo then busied himself on the diplomatic front, trying to win over Germanus, the Patriarch of Constantinople, and Gregory II, the Pope. Encounters between Germanus and Leo are recorded;[14] and there exist two letters which purport to be from Pope Gregory to the Emperor.[15] Ostrogorsky perhaps exaggerated the readiness of the several parties to compromise. Gregory's first letter shows that Germanus' position was already in jeopardy, though he was not deposed till January 730; and Gregory's arguments are laced with invective against Leo. The issue came to a head with a confrontation of clerics in January 730, when Leo convened the church council known as the Silentium. Germanus refused to capitulate, was deposed and replaced by Anastasius. Leo issued at this time an edict (some would call it the second edict) ordering the destruction of icons, or perhaps — but less likely — icons of the saints.[16]

Although Leo's writings on the subject of iconoclasm have not survived, yet we possess an indirect record of some of his pronouncements in the letters of Pope Gregory II.[17]

The issue concerned in part the question of authority. Leo claimed that he was a priest no less than a king and could legitimately intervene in the running of the Church. He also asserted that he would have no compunction about going to place the Pope under arrest.[18]

Leo based his iconoclasm on the injunctions in Scripture against idolatry. He noted too that none of the six Ecumenical Councils had provided any justification for the use of icons: as the Pope pointed out, this was an *argumentum ex silentio*.[19]

Leo believed that veneration should not be accorded to man-made objects nor to any realistic representation.[20] Further he seems to have resolved to counter practices that were becoming embarrassingly exaggerated; for he was critical of the preservation of relics and hostile to the growing belief in the magical efficacy of icons and relics.[21] However, as the early chroniclers saw it, Leo himself was prone to superstition, for his first action against icons was prompted by the belief that the Santorini eruption was a manifestation of divine wrath.

Scholars differ about the nature of Leo's opposition to icons on the theological plane. The general view has been that the issue was not christological.[22]

Others have suggested that christological objections to icons were existent from the beginning of the iconoclastic movement even if they were not clearly articulated.[23]

In the absence of Leo's own writings we must again consider Pope Gregory's response to the challenge from the Emperor. Gregory was careful to indicate that Christian practice differed from that proscribed by the Old Testament. The difference lay in the Incarnation, which inspired pictorial representations.[24] The Incarnation was God's revelation of himself, and those who saw Christ were inspired to preserve in iconography the memory of the revelation.[25] Icons were in a way an extension of the Incarnation.

It is clear from coins of Leo's reign that he was not opposed to iconography of the cross. The cross appeared on gold coins up to 720, when it was replaced by the portrait of the emperor's son; and it appeared after 720 as a regular feature on copper coins, often as an adornment on the crown.[26]

Part of the irony of the situation was that the worship of icons and belief in the magical efficacy of icons had arisen under the influence of the cult of the emperors.[27] Nonetheless iconoclasts and iconophiles were agreed that the use, and adoration of imperial images was justifiable. *Proskynesis* could be performed to the imperial image, but Christians differentiated between *proskynesis* to the Christian image (*latreutike*) and *proskynesis* to the imperial image (*timetike*).[28]

If iconoclasm was something of a cultural revolution, it was nevertheless not dedicated to the suppression of art. Secular art flourished and in the churches Christian iconography made way for artistic representations of the natural world.[29] The choice of subjects is significant in that the Byzantines clearly did not follow the lead of the Muslim iconoclast, Yazid II (720-4), whose attack on mosaics covered all representations of flora and fauna.[30]

Leo seems to have been primarily concerned to check the extravagant forms of adoration of the icons and to cool enthusiastic belief in the miraculous efficacy of icons. Significantly the first recorded use of force concerned the removal of an icon which was believed to have worked miracles.

His campaign against icons was in one respect a clash between his secular authority and the authority of the church officials. He was a usurper and no doubt he had a desire to gain acceptance from the church Establishment: hence his numerous letters to Pope Gregory.

Leo put Gregory to the test: What limit would the Pope set to his

own authority? How far would the Church concede to the secular authorities the power to determine policy according to the dictates of conscience? Was Gregory personally prepared to accept Leo as emperor?

Gregory's actions indicate that he was not prepared to surrender to Leo; and his letters reveal a certain arrogance. His rhetorical and patronising style was hardly likely to induce Leo to mend his ways. Gregory attacked Leo for being stupid, arrogant, insolent and a trouble-maker, not least because he had failed to take counsel with the scholars of the Church. He called on Leo to abandon his childish, puerile actions.

Leo was ill-informed on the theological background to Christian worship, in Gregory's eyes, and he was also slow to comprehend the basic principles of government. For Gregory also criticises Leo's iconoclasm for deceiving and inciting the lower orders. Gregory's imputation of a political motive behind iconoclasm doesn't carry us any closer to an understanding of the origins of iconoclasm. Rather we can see that Gregory was on the defensive and felt threatened by the way Leo had questioned the relevance of ecclesiastical institutions. The Pope called on Leo to leave ecclesiastical matters alone.[31]

From Gregory's references to the contents of Leo's letters it is clear that, whether or not iconoclasm served a political purpose, Leo was concerned about the religious issues. Iconophiles alleged that Leo was incited by Jews or Muslims, or had simply accepted the teaching of one or other of the two faiths. In the context of Leo's struggles with the Muslims the allegations of Muslim influence would hardly have won instant acceptance.

A few months after Leo became Emperor the Muslims launched a massive campaign against Constantinople. The Arab force pentrated as far as the city, but the defence was adequate and the caliph, Umar II (717-720), recalled his men. Despite this débacle and the successes of Muslim imperialism, trade with Byzantium was not impeded,[32] but religious differences were made more divisive: first Umar II took action against the Christians in his empire, for instance by removing the dhimmī, non-Muslims, from the civil service;[33] then his successor, the caliph Yazid II (720-724), took strong measures to ban icons within the Muslim empire.[34] The story of Yazid's action gained status through narration at the Council of 787;[35] it appears later in numerous sources.[36] Yazid's iconoclastic edict was issued in 721/2, or less likely in July 723, but either way before Leo first used force to remove an icon.

Yazid's decree marks a stage in the shift of the caliphs away from Byzantine influences and Imperial forms. This rejection of Byzantine influences was perhaps a reaction against the defeat incurred by the

Arabs in 718, but beyond that it may be seen, as Gibb has argued, as reflecting the switch of the centre of Muslim culture and thought from Syria to Iraq.[37]

Whilst there was a cultural move away from Byzantine influences, Hishām (caliph 724-743) also intensified the military and political opposition to Byzantium. In 736 Hishām's son Sulayman was sent to harass the Armenians[38] and in 738 his campaign netted a large crop of prisoners-of-war, including a Pergamene who claimed to be Tiberius the son of Justinian. The caliph supported the pretender's claim and sent him to Jerusalem and Syria to parade as a monarch.[39]

In 739 Sulayman again raided into Imperial territory, and this raid was remembered because one of his captives, Eustathius, the son of a patrician was later martyred.[40]

The climax came in 740 with what was basically a two-pronged invasion of Asia Minor. The issue was decided by the victory of Leo and his son Constantine at the battle of Acroinon in Phrygia.[41]

Ironically Hishām made concessions to the Christians and reverted to the earlier policy of tolerance towards the dhimmī.[42] Thus the Muslims did not use their power in the Jund of Filastin to support the iconoclasts, for in 726 and 763 councils were convened in Jerusalem by orthodox patriarchs to consider the issue of iconoclasm.[43] The Arab Christian best known as John of Damascus, though dismissed from the Islamic civil service, was left in peace in the monastery of St. Sabas near Jerusalem, where he wrote refutations of the Muslim faith and of iconoclasm.

It is possible that the Muslims tolerated iconophiles as a way of strengthening the opposition to Leo in the Byzantine Empire.[44] Certainly the tolerance was not universal for Muslims who turned to Christianity were in danger of execution, like the Armenian prince martyred in March 737.[45]

Much has been written about the influence of Islam on the early iconoclasts, but the early texts are preoccupied rather with Jewish influences. Thus, for instance, John of Damascus quoted in favour of icons Leontius of Naples in Cyprus, a bishop, who wrote a Christian apologia *Contra Judaeos*.[46] The iconophiles were indeed wont to toss out antisemitic comments, as did the Patriarch Germanus[47] and Pope Gregory, who remarked that iconophiles should dismiss, like the yapping of a dog, the voices of those who were moved to attack in Jewish style the cult of icons.[48]

Anti-semitism had already had a long history within the Christian church: it can be traced back to the very formulation of the Gospel tradition.[49] A series of Christian apologetics for the use of icons in the late sixth and seventh centuries was addressed to Jews.[50] Baynes has suggested that some of the apologists who wrote against the

Jewish view of icons were more concerned to counter the doubts of Christians than to persuade the Jews to change their minds. Nevertheless opposition to the graven image was part of the Jewish faith, and it seems that this article of faith was sometimes translated into positive iconoclast action. At least, Christian legends told of Christian icons that responded miraculously to the attacks of Jews.[51]

The Jews had a point, and their argument no doubt became more cogent as the worship of icons grew more excessive.

A Jew features as the initiator of iconoclasm in the earliest narrative account of Leo's decision to attack the icons. For John of Damascus relates that Leo was influenced by a Jew who before the accession predicted that Leo would become emperor and destroy the icons, and who appeared ten years after the accession to remind Leo of his mission and to help him in its implementation.[52]

At the Seventh Council held in Nicaea in 787 — that is some 40 years after the death of John of Damascus — another John blamed iconoclasm on the Jews, but this time their agent was the caliph Yazid II. A Jew promised that he would rule for thirty years if he destroyed every icon in all public places and especially the Christian churches. Christians fled and Yazid despatched blasphemous Jews and impious Muslims to destroy Christian icons. Their onslaught against the Church was copied by the Bishop of Nacolea and spread in the Byzantine empire.[53] In this version of the story Yazid's Jewish adviser bears the odd nickname Tessarakontapechys (Forty Cubits) for he was a man of exceptional physique.

The story is further complicated by an early Arabic source which mentions that one of Leo's aides was a Jew and bore the name Tessarakontapechys.[54] The factual basis for the somewhat insubstantial Forty Cubits may perhaps be found in Theophanes' account. Theophanes used good sources on the eastern Empire and it is thus of some significance that he names as Leo's chief instigator and supporter a certain Beser. The man was much admired by Leo because of his unusual physical strength.[55]

The giant Beser may well be an historical figure, but he was not a Jew. He was a convert to Christianity, but later had to accept the Muslim faith when he was captured by Arabs. Then he gained his freedom and secured citizenship in the Roman Empire, perhaps reverting to Christianity at the same time.[56]

The introduction of Jewish advisers into the story reflects an anti-semitic fashion. John of Damascus may have found it only diplomatic to blame Leo's excesses onto a Jew rather than onto a Muslim. His knowledge of Leo's court would have been indirect and the taunt that Leo was incited by Jews was being thrown around in the East and in Rome.

It made no difference that Leo had taken measures to compel Jews in the Empire to accept Christianity.[57] In 721-2 Leo had decreed that all Jews and Montanists should be baptised.[58] It is thus unlikely that Jewish religionists impelled Leo to iconoclasm. Incidentally anti-semitic practices did not disappear when iconoclasm was removed; thus we know, for instance, that in 787 Jews were not allowed to own slaves[59] and at the end of the eighth Century Jews were not allowed to hold office in the Byzantine civil service and army.[60]

Leo showed no particular affection for the Jews but it was not easy to avert the insidious charge of being soft towards the Jews. To charge Leo with being a sympathiser with the Jews was more of an incitement than an exposé.

Though Theophanes rooted out some of the names of Leo's advisers, including the Muslim Beser, yet it was the popular tales that mentioned Jews which attracted more attention. As we have noted, John of Damascus declared that a Jew incited Leo to attack the icons, and at the Council of 787 the story was told of a Jewish soothsayer who promised Yazid that he would rule for 30 years if he attacked the icons. These stories were elaborated: Yazid's instigator acquired a twin, and the promised 30 year rule received a bonus of ten years. Similarly Leo's adviser became several Jews, and even the same Jews as had exhorted Yazid to iconoclasm. Leo's encounter with the Jews became a set piece at a well or fountain, and they promised him that he would rule for 100 years if he took action against the iconodules.

The increasing emphasis on the part played by Jews illustrates how myth grows from a few basic 'facts' and it illustrates the intensification of anti-semitism, but it has little bearing on the historical genesis of iconoclasm.

We must return to consider the identity of Leo's supporters.

Iconoclasm was ushered in with rioting, but we cannot say how general the opposition to iconoclasm was amongst the lower orders in Constantinople. Security was tight as the local military units were loyal and the circus factions were now under state control. Leo had made provision for greater certainty in the supply of corn to the city and thus the danger of hunger sparking off a conflagration was removed.

The failure of the plot of Nicetas Xylinites in 718/9 allowed Leo to weed out a number of dissidents[61] and to strengthen his administration. In Constantinople Leo's position was strong if not popular.

However it is generally considered that iconoclasm depended mainly on the leadership of certain clerics and army officers in Asia Minor.

Leo was helped to power by the *strategos* of the Armeniac theme, Artavasdus. Many have seen significance in the fact that Leo was from North Syria and received military support from an army recruited in an area that produced many Monophysites, Montanists and Paulicians. Thus Diehl and Bréhier argued that Leo depended principally on troops of the Armenia theme for the implementation of iconoclasm. Iconoclasm was certainly a real force in the eastern provinces before Leo's day — for instance in Antioch and Edessa in the sixth century, and Armenia too had its iconoclasts. But there was no unanimity for there is record of anti-iconoclast treatises: Vrt'anes K'ert'ogh[62] wrote a treatise in defence of the use of icons, and John Odsnetsi, who died in 728, wrote:

> 'we worship the image of the only-begotten
> Son and the sign of (His) triumph . . . We represent
> in every medium the living and life-giving Christ.'[63]

The use of icons had at times official blessing too in Armenia. The patricius Ashot (685-9) returned to Armenia from a visit to the West with an icon of Christ.

The heyday of iconoclasm in Armenia seems to have been the seventh Century, whilst the country frequently passed between Muslim and Byzantine control. In the period we are considering Muslim control predominated: after much vacillation prince Smbat VI collaborated with the Muslims from 711 and then his cousin Ashot III governed Armenia in the Caliph's interest from c. 732 to 748. The Armenian ascetic iconoclasts were now an isolated minority group linked with a new group that was beginning to thrive, the Paulicians.[64]

As for the Armeniac theme, that is the part of Armenia that fell within the Byzantine empire, it was Armenian troops who in 741 fought against Leo's son to instal Artavasdus as emperor. Artavasdus had been *strategos* of Armenia when Leo was competing for the throne in 717. For his support Leo rewarded him with the hand of his daughter, and Leo transferred him to the command of the Opsikion theme. However in 741 Artavasdus refused to accept the accession of Leo's son, Constantine Copronymus, and refused to support iconoclasm.[65] Thus the Armenian army that had once put the iconoclast Leo into power now gave support to its ex-commander as the champion of orthodox practice. Kaegi has argued that none of the armies in Asia Minor was clearly and consistently iconoclastic and that 'theme rivalries overshadowed and complicated the religious issues at stake'.[66]

At least we can say that during Leo's reign the Anatolic theme,

which he had governed, and the Armeniac theme remained loyal; and when Leo transferred Artavasdus to the command of the Opsikion theme that too gave no trouble. The Cibyrrhaeot theme was the base for the navy which Leo used in the ill-starred expedition to Italy.

Within the church a number of senior clerics played a major part in initiating iconoclasm: the sources mention Constantine, the Bishop of Nacolea, and Theodosius, the Archbishop of Ephesus.[67] We should perhaps add to the list Anastasius, whom Leo later appointed to replace Germanus as patriarch of Constantinople,[68] Thomas, the Metropolitan of Claudiopolis,[69] and Pastillas, who later appears as the Bishop of Perga.[70]

Our information on Leo's supporters is regrettably too flimsy for any serious reconstruction.

Leo could not have implemented his iconoclast policy without solid support in the army and the administration, but iconoclasm exacerbated differences that already existed. It was a mobilisation of prejudice.

The religious issue was certainly a divisive force in the eastern half of the Empire. Its potency was revealed soon after Leo's death, when, as we have seen, Artavasdus aroused troops of the Armeniac and Opsikion themes to attack Leo's son, Constantine.

Leo's reign marked a critical point in relations between the two halves of the Empire, but it would not be correct to say that iconoclasm caused the split. Rather iconoclasm widened the gap. In the period 719-725 the Pope interrupted the flow of tribute from Italy to Constantinople.[71] This measure was no doubt taken for economic reasons, but Leo showed that another solution would have been possible: he ordered the transfer to the state treasury of money housed in the Apostolic Patrimonia in Rome.[72] Then he added to the tax burden of the people of Sicily and Calabria. As the fiscal change antedated the iconoclastic decree it is possible that Leo was motivated in part by a desire to hit back at the Sicilians who in 717/8 had set up the pretender to the throne, Sergius.

In 732-3 Leo sent an expeditionary force to Italy, but again it is likely that the objective was not to punish the opponents of iconoclasm: more likely his concern was to hit back at the Lombards and to recover the city of Ravenna from their control.[73]

Lombardy was powerful partly for the reason that iconoclasm had alienated the Italians, and the Pope was unable to work in harmony with the senior Byzantine official in Italy, the Exarch of Ravenna.

Though the Pope was concerned to protect the integrity of the Empire he could not rely on the Emperor for help. Ironically he had

to turn to the Lombards and later to the Franks. The West moved further away from the Eastern empire, till in 800 Pope Leo III crowned Charlemagne 'Imperator Romanorum' as he refused to accept the authority of the last of the Isaurians, Irene. Not even Irene's rejection of iconoclasm could bridge the gap.

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NOTES

[1] Theophanes *Chron.* a.m. 6217, p. 621 in the Bonn edition of 1839; *Vita Stephani Magni* ap. Migne *Patrologia Graeca* c, col. 1084 B–C=H. Hennephof *Textus Byzantinos ad Iconomachiam pertinentes* Brill, Leiden '69 (hereafter referred to as Hennephof), passage no. 47.

[2] Theophanes *Chron.* a.m. 6218, p. 621 sq., Nicephorus *Historia* ed. de Boor, *Teubner* 1880 p. 57; G. Ostrogorsky in *Mélanges Diehl* i, '30 240. On the date of the eruption see Hennephof, p. 2.

[3] M. V. Anastos in the *Cambridge Medieval History* iv, 1 '66 68. (This work is hereafter referred to as *CMH.*)

[4] *Mélanges Diehl* i, '30 esp. 238 sq., and *Geschichte des byzantinischen Staates* Beck, München '63 p. 131 (available in an English translation by Joan Hussey: *History of the Byzantine State*, Blackwell, Oxford '68 163).

[5] Theophanes *Chron.* a.m. 6217-6218, p. 621 sq.; *Vita Stephani* ap. Hennephof no. 47; *Acta Sanctorum* ad Aug., ap. Hennephof no. 67 with Leo Grammaticus *Chronographia* in the series *CSHB*, Bonn 1842, pp. 175-6; W. E. Kaegi *Byzantinoslavica* xxvii, '66 52.

[6] Mansi xii, 970 C sq. = Hennephof no. 85; Theophanes *Chron.* a.m. 6218, p. 623 = Hennephof no. 3.

[7] Hennephof no. 85.

[8] Hennephof no. 3.

[9] Theophanes *Chron.* a.m. 6218, p. 623.

[10] Alexander *The Patriarch Nicephorus* Oxford '58 10.

[11] *Mélanges C. Diehl* i, '30 242, followed e.g. by Kaegi *Byzantinoslavica* xxvii, '66 52.

[12] Nicephorus *Hist.* pp. 57-8.

[13] A. Salač has suggested that the Greeks' attitude to iconoclasm would have been neutral (*Eunomia* i, '57 32-4).

[14] Theophanes *Chron.* a.m. 6218 and 6221, pp. 625 and 626 sq.; Ostrogorsky writes of two encounters in late 727 and late 729: *Mélanges Diehl* 243.

[15] Available to me only through the Latin versions in Migne *PL* lxxxix.

[16] Theophanes *Chron.* a.m. 6221, p. 629; Nicephorus *Hist.* p. 58.

[17] The surviving version of a letter of Leo to the Caliph Umar II (717-720) may well be genuine, in which case we have an idea of Leo's ideas in the period before he adopted the iconoclast line. In the Letter leo justifies veneration of the cross and sentimental attachment to images handed down through the generations, but says that adoration of wood and colours would not be acceptable since Sripture does not specifically allow it (J. Meyendorff *DOP* xviii, '64 esp. 125 sq).

[18] Hennephof nos. 81 and 82 and Migne *PL* lxxxix, cols. 517-8.

[19] Hennephof nos. 77 and 84.

[20] Hennephof no. 77.

[21] Migne *PL* lxxxix, cols. 515 and 521, with Hennephof no. 85.

[22] Romilly Jenkins *Byzantium, the Imperial Centuries* '66 83.

[23] M. V. Anastos in *CMH* iv, 1 esp. 78-79; H.-G. Beck *Kirche u. theologische Literatur im byzantininchen Reich* München '59 300; E. Kitzinger *DOP* viii, '54 esp. 134 sq.

[24] Migne *PL* lxxxix, col. 508.
[25] Migne *PL* lxxxix, col. 514.
[26] A. R. Bellinger *Speculum* xxxi, '56 70 sq.; P. Grierson *Numismatic Chronicle* 7th s., vol. 5, '65 183 sq. Leo's coins in a way advertised his iconoclast policy since they differed from the coins of Justinian II in not bearing representations of Christ.
[27] Jenkins *Byzantium* esp. 77 sq.; E. Kitzinger *DOP* viii, '54 90 sq.; Malalas *Chronographia* xiii, Bonn ed. 1931, p. 322.
[28] G. B. Ladner *DOP* vii, '53 esp. p. 20; Hennephof nos. 172, 182 and 287.
[29] Alexander *Nicephorus* 8; D. Talbot Rice *Art of the Byzantine Era* Thames and Hudson, London '63 74 sq.
[30] Alexander *Nicephorus* 7-8.
[31] Gregory II letter to Leo ap. Migne *PL* lxxxix, esp. cols. 513, 515, 517-518, 520 and 522, cf. Hennephof p. 35, nos. 85 and 86.
[32] H. A. R. Gibb, Arab-Byzantine relations *DOP* xii, '58 230-1.
[33] Theophanes *Chron.* a.m. 6210, p. 614; A.-T. Khoury *Lés Theologiens Byzantins* '69 36.
[34] Byzantine sources indicate that Yazid's ban applied only to Christian churches, but it was in fact of broader application: Ostrogorsky *Hist. of the Byz. State* '68 162.
[35] Hennephof no. 37.
[36] E.g. Theophanes *Chron.* a.m. 6215, p. 617 sq.
[37] H. A. R. Gibb, Arab-Byzantine relations *DOP* xii, '58 esp. p. 232; Oleg Grabar, Islamic Art and Byzantium *DOP* xviii, '64 69 sq. and esp. 82 sq.
[38] Theoph. *Chron.* a.m. 6227, p. 632.
[39] Theoph. *Chron.* a.m. 6229, p. 632. However he was soon exposed as a fraud and executed in Edessa (J. B. Segal *Edessa* Oxford '70 p. 200).
[40] Theoph. *Chron.* a.m. 6230, p. 633 and a.m. 6232, p. 637.
[41] Theoph. *Chron.* a.m. 6231, p. 633; CMH iv, 1 64 and 699.
[42] Khoury *Théologiens byzantins* 36.
[43] J. Parkes *Whose Land?* '70 71; *History of Palestine* London '49 93.
[44] R. Jenkins *Byzantium* 84-5. Kitzinger has suggested that Yazid's iconoclastic edict had a similar intent to exacerbate differences within the Christian community (*DOP* viii, '54 134).
[45] Khoury *Théologiens byzantins* 38.
[46] Migne *PG latine editae* xlvii, col. 608 sq. He flourished c. A.D. 610; Alexander *Nicephorus* 32 sq.
[47] Letter to Thomas, Bishop of Claudiopolis, *PG latine editae* li, e.g. col. 97.
[48] Migne *PL* lxxxix, col. 507 sq.
[49] Jules Isaac *The Teaching of Contempt* '64.
[50] By Leontius of Naples, John, the Bishop of Thessalonike, and Anastasius Sinaita; Kitzinger *DOP* viii, '54 esp. 135 sq.; P. J. Alexander *Nicephorus* 31 sq.
[51] Gregory of Tours *de gloria martyrum* c. 22, ap. Migne *PL* lxxi, col. 724 with Kitzinger *DOP* viii, '54 101, 102, 129 and 130.
[52] Migne *PG* xcv, 336 sq. with J. Starr *The Jews in the Byzantine Empire* '39 90-1.
[53] Mansi *Sacrorum conciliorum nova et amplissima collectio* xiii, 197 A sq. = Hennephof no. 37.
[54] E. W. Brooks *JHS* xix, 1899 p. 26. The source is of the eleventh Century but appears to be based on ninth century chronicles.
[55] Theophanes *Chron.* a.m. 6215, p. 618 = Hennephof no. 1.
[56] J. Starr *Speculum* viii, '33 501; Alexander considers it probable that Beser reverted to Christianity (*Nicephorus* 235).
[57] Theophanes *Chron.* a.m. 6214, p. 617; J. Starr *Jews in the Byzantine Empire* 91 sq.
[58] By Montanists one should understand a Jewish sect that linked Messianism with nationalism: A. Sharp *ByzZ* lix, '66 37-46 (known to me indirectly).
[59] Mansi xiii, 427 and 430 with Starr *Jews* 96-97.
[60] Starr *Jews* 97-98. Incidentally anti-semitism was generally less apparent in the eastern half of the Empire than in the west: A. Andreades *Mélanges Diehl* i, '30 p. 7 sq., esp. p. 14 and A. Sharf *Byzantine Jewry* New York '71.

[61] Nicephorus *Hist.* pp. 55-6.
[62] Flor. 605.
[63] Translation and facts from Sirarpie der Nersessian *Armenia and the Byzantine Empire* Harvard Univ. Press '45 111-2.
[64] Alexander *Nicephorus* pp. 42-3.
[65] Theophanes *Chron.* 6233, p. 638 sq.; Nicephorus *Hist.* p. 59 sq.
[66] W. E. Kaegi Jr. *Byzantinoslavica* xxvii, '66 48 sq. (quotation from p. 56); *Balkan Studies* x, 2 '69 289 sq., esp. p. 291.
[67] Germanus *Ep.* III; Theophanes *Chron.* a.m. 6215, p. 618; *Vita Stephani* ap. Migne *PG* c, 1140 = Hennephof no. 54.
[68] Theophanes *Chron.* a.m. 6221, p. 630; Nicephorus *Hist.* p. 58.
[69] Germanus *Ep.* IV.
[70] *Vita Stephani* ap. Hennephof no. 51 and Theophanes *Chron.* a.m. 6245, p. 659.
[71] Theophanes *Chron.* a.m. 6217, p. 621; Bertolini (*Byz. Forsch.* '67 16) and Alexander (*Nicephorus* 103) support Grumel's dating scheme.
[72] Theoph. *Chron.* a.m. 6224, p. 631.
[73] O. Bertolini *Byzantinische Forschungen* xxi, '67 15 sq.

TIME AND MEMORY IN RILKE'S *DIE AUFZEICHNUNGEN DES MALTE LAURIDS BRIGGE*

by G. W. CROWHURST

One of the criteria of modern literature and more specifically the modern novel is said to be the experience of reality.[1] In the modern novel the plot has lost its wholeness and a clearly defined character is no longer possible. The narrative continuity has been broken up, standing for this new experience of reality. Reality itself is investigated and not the story of an individual. The presentation, i.e. the novel, attempts to fixate the figure. The modern novel reflects the search for the lost unambiguity (Eindeutigkeit) of the person, and the diary-form can be regarded as a further attempt to objectivate, delineate and define a figure.

Rilke's *Notebooks of Malte Laurids Brigge* give the impression of having been listed in a random fashion. They do not follow any chronology as is usual with diary-notes. There is only one mention of time in the beginning — 11th September — but no year is given, and all subsequent entries are without time references. There is no narrative thread to allow for a perspective alignment. Instead we are presented with experiences and impressions which seem to be entered without any logical links but rather follow an associative pattern. Malte is subjected to the dictate of a reality which he is unable to control or exclude. As an individual he becomes completely isolated within himself. The struggle which is reflected in the *Notebooks* is the struggle of an individual to find its own entity and be someone and not to succumb to the overpowering objective reality, the reality outside, which reduces the individual to a mere mirror of outside objects.

The structure of the novel is determined by this over-weight of objective reality to which Malte is abandoned, and by an inner world without stable substance which opens up into a bottomless abyss. He is faced with external and internal alienation and loses all identity. To Malte this loss of identity becomes the law governing objective reality in general, and to find the law of his own being and constitute it as a being of its own, he attempts to objectivate his experiences by writing them down. In so doing, his notes are not determined by any chronological pattern, but by a polarity of opposites, i.e. in particular the contrast of present and past time.

The first entry of Malte enumerates impressions in an impression-

istic way and yet at the same time the main themes are immediately set out:

> So, also hierher kommen die Leute, um zu leben, ich würde eher meinen, es stürbe sich hier.
>
> (So this is where people come to live, I would rather think this is a place where one would die.)

What Malte experiences are 'states' (Zustände),[3] not actions — the list of what he has seen makes this obvious. The word 'here' and the indication '11 September' do not so much refer to facts (we know that the 'here' refers to Paris; it is stated expressly much later), but rather to atmospheric entities. The state favours a punctual, apparently static here and now (nunc). As such it stands for a phase of time. Within the continuous medium of time, the states are artificially rigid forms. In an ever-streaming time, which strictly speaking consists only of future and past, we are presented with the fiction of a present that has passed. In the dialectic 'still' and 'again' the subjectively understandable qualities of time become apparent. For the true present is in reality nothing solid and static, but a course (Ablaufen).

> Die Analyse der Geschichtlichkeit des Daseins versucht zu zeigen, dass dieses Seiende nicht 'zeitlich' ist, weil es 'in der Geschichte steht', sondern dass es umgekehrt geschichtlich nur existiert und existieren kann, weil es im Grunde seines Seins zeitlich ist.
>
> (The analysis of the historicality of Man tries to show that this being is not 'temporal' because it 'stands in history'. On the contrary it exists and can only exist historically, because it basically is temporal.)[4]

With Heidegger 'zeitlich' means: incorporating the dimension of the future which he regards as the basic phenomenon of time.

In order that occurrences may be co-related, the impression of possessing an ignorance of the future has to be submitted. From here the structure of the *Notebooks* becomes obvious. The order of sequence of the phases or states of Malte determines contents and structure.

> ... le *nunc* ne semble en quelque sorte qu'un accident, une modalité qui ne touche pas au temps qui passe. Les *nunc* n'ont

> tous qu'une existence ephémère. En effet, pour que le temps, qui ici n'est conçu que rétrospectivement, soit concevable, il faut que quelque part la postériorité du savoir intervienne. Reculant de plus en plus cette intervention, nous devrons bien nous arrêter quelque part, si nous voulons enregistrer toute la série, ou, autrement dit, il faut qu'il y ait un *nunc* terminal, un point final. Or cet acte d'enregistrement se passe nécessairement après le dernier événement et sera ainsi *a posteriori* par rapport à toute la succession des événements. Nous aurons alors enregistré tout ce qui s'est passé, temps clos, objet de la mémoire. (. . . the *nunc* appears to be somewhat accidental, a modality which does not affect passing time. The *nunc* only has ephemeral existence. In order that time which can only be recognized in retrospect, can be conceivable, it is necessary that somewhere a posteriority of knowing intervenes. Even if we defer this intervention, we have to stop somewhere if we want to register the whole series, or, there must be a terminal *nunc*, a final point. But this act of registering happens, out of necessity, only after the last occurrence and will therefore be in relation to the succession of occurrences *a posteriori*. We will then have registered all that happened, we will face an entire past, closed time, an object of memory.)[5]

Thus the states achieve a unity in retrospect due to the workings of memory and memory always stands for an ending. In this way one can say that the novel has been started from the end, which also applies to other modern novels besides Rilke's, e.g. *Ulysses*, *A la recherche du temps perdu*.

Malte's arrival in Paris is marked by a new awareness of the outside. The fourth and fifth entries both point to this:

'Ich lerne sehen.' (I am learning to see.) (pp. 710-711). In German 'sehen' is to see, behold. In the way in which Rilke uses it, it is not so much an action, but rather a state of registering. Malte sees other people, houses, etc., but this seeing does not lead to any personal contact. All the things he sees are horrible and frightening. They are, in fact, mere projections from inside Malte. When Malte writes that he is *learning* to see, it is really 'wahrnehmen', i.e. 'erkennen' which he is learning. One could describe 'sehen' as a superficial taking note of, while 'wahrnehmen' (in English: notice, observe, discern, recognize, know) refers to something basically familiar and of decided being. The Biblical phrase 'ein Weib erkennen' (lit. to know a woman physically; viz. Lat. 'cognoscere feminam') comes to mind. It points to the specifically physical and bodily act of 'erkennen', of

appropriating something and taking possession of. That this interpretation comes into play here, is obvious from the fourth entry:

> Ich lerne sehen. Ich weiss nicht, woran es liegt, es geht alles tiefer in mich ein und bleibt nicht an der Stelle stehen, wo es sonst immer zu Ende war. Ich habe ein Inneres, von dem ich nicht wusste. Alles geht jetzt dorthin . . .
>
> (I am learning to see. I don't know, what the reason is, but everything penetrates deeper into me and does not stop where it used to come to an end in the past. I have an inner being of which I had no knowledge. Everything goes there now . . .)

This seeing is a new experience, something which Malte has been lacking to a large extent, as he himself observes:

> Es ist lächerlich. Ich sitze hier in meiner kleinen Stube, ich, Brigge, . . . von dem niemand weiss. Ich sitze hier und bin nichts. Und dennoch, dieses Nichts fängt an zu denken und denkt . . . diesen Gedanken: Ist es möglich, . . . dass man noch nichts Wirkliches und Wichtiges gesehen, erkannt und gesagt hat? (p. 726).
>
> (It is ridiculous. I am sitting here in my little room, I, Brigge, . . . of whom no-one knows. I am sitting here and I am nothing. And, yet, this nothing begins to think and thinks . . . this: Is it possible . . . that one has not seen, recognized or said anything real and important up to now?)

At this stage Malte still uses the word 'sehen', but in a later entry he speaks of 'erkennen' and describes it as something that drops deep into his inner being and is contained there.

> Ich erkenne das alles hier, und darum geht es so ohne weiteres in mich ein: es ist zu Hause in mir. (pg. 751).
> (I recognize everything here and that is why it penetrates so easily into me: it is at home inside me.)

Linked up with the difference of 'sehen' and 'erkennen' in German is the differentiation of 'Gedächtnis' and 'Erinnerung'. The English translation for both words is memory; 'Gedächtnis' (memory, remembrance) is the ability to take note of things seen, heard, read or experienced. It is associated with the intellect, being a thinking act. 'Erinnerung' (recollection, reminiscence) and the verb 'erinnern'

('er-innern') come from the old High German word 'innaro' = the one deep down inside. It refers to something that is known; it is, as it were, an internalising subjective process. 'Gedächtnis' and 'Erinnerung' are subtle indications for two specific forms of time consciousness. The former belongs so to speak to the body:

> Wir haben kein Bewusstsein über den Augenblick hinaus, weil jede unserer Seelen nur einen Augenblick lebt. Das Gedächtnis gehört nur dem Körper: er reproduziert scheinbar das Vergangene, d.h. er erzeugt ein ähnlich Neues in der Stimmung. Mein Ich von *Gestern* geht mich so wenig an wie das Ich Napoleons oder Goethes.[6]
>
> (We have no consciousness beyond the moment, because each of our souls only lives for a moment. Memory belongs to the body: it reproduces seemingly the past, i.e. it produces a something similarly in mood. My ego of *Gestern* (Yesterday, a play) is of just as little concern to me as the ego of Napoleon or Goethe.)

The consequence of this form of memory is self-estrangement. 'Erinnerung', however, guarantees an identity. It is a form of retentive memory which does not forget and so the past remains always present. It is being ('Sein') and gives a centre to an ego, a continuity of identity. Malte is conscious of the connection between his new way of seeing and 'erinnern':

> Ich glaube, ich müsste anfangan, etwas zu arbeiten, jetzt, da ich sehen lerne. Ich bin achtundzwanzig, und es ist so gut wie nichts geschehen. Wiederholen wir: ich habe eine Studie über Carpaccio geschrieben, die schlecht ist, ein Drama, das 'Ehe' heisst und etwas Falsches mit zweideutigen Mitteln beweisen will, und Verse. Ach, aber mit Versen is so wenig getan, wenn man sie früh schreibt. Man sollte warten damit und Sinn und Süssigkeit sammeln ein ganzes Leben lang und ein langes womöglich, und dann, ganz zum Schluss, vielleicht könnte man dann zehn Zeilen schreiben, die gut sind. Denn Verse sind nicht, wie die Leute meinen, Gefühle (die hat man früh genug),—es sind Erfahrungen. Um eines Verses willen muss man viele Städte sehen, Menschen und Dinge, man muss die Tiere kennen, man muss fühlen, wie die Vögel fliegen, und die Gebärde wissen, mit welcher die kleinen Blumen sich auftun am Morgen. Man muss zurückdenken können an Wege in unbekannten Gegenden, an unerwartete Begegnungen und an Abschiede, die man lange

> kommen sah,—an Kindheitstage, die noch unaufgeklärt sind, . . . — und es ist ist noch nicht genug, wenn man an alles das denken darf. Man muss Erinnerungen haben . . . Und es genügt auch noch nicht, dass man Erinnerungen hat. Man muss sie vergessen können, wenn es viele sind, und man muss die grosse Geduld haben, zu warten, dass sie wiederkommen. Denn die Erinnerungen selbst *sind* es noch nicht. Erst wenn sie Blut werden in uns, Blick und Gebärde, namenlos und nicht mehr zu unterscheiden von uns selbst, erst dann kann es geschehen, dass in einer sehr seltenen Stunde das erste Wort eines Verses aufsteht in ihrer Mitte und aus ihnen ausgeht. (p. 723-725)
>
> (I believe, I should start working a bit, now that I am learning to see. I am twenty-eight and practically nothing has happened. Let's repeat: I have written a study on Carpaccio which is no good, a drama called 'Marriage' which wants to prove a wrong thing by ambiguous means, and verses. But, alas, with verses so little is done if you write them young. You should wait and collect sense and sweetness all through a whole life and possibly a long one and then, right in the end, perhaps you might be capable of writing ten lines that are good. Because verses are not, as people are inclined to think, feelings (those you have early enough),—they are experiences. To be able to write a verse you must have seen many cities, people and things, you must know the animals, you must sense how birds fly and you must know the gesture with which small flowers open in the morning. You must be able to think back to paths in strange places, to unexpected encounters and to farewells you saw a long time coming — to childhood days that are still unenlightened . . . and it is still not sufficient if you are allowed to think of all this. You must have memories. And it is still not sufficient to have memories. You must be able to forget them if there are many of them and you must have great patience waiting for them to come back. Because memories as such are not the main thing. Only when they have become blood in us, look and gesture, nameless and not to be distinguished from our own being, only then it may happen that in a very rare hour the first word of a verse stands up in their midst and proceeds from them . . .)

Thus 'Erinnerung' is not only a guarantor for a past continuity of identity, it is also a preparation for the future. Malte's consciousness is not restricted to the now-time. Literary reminiscences and his own memories and the memory of others (e.g. his grandfather) have the

same quality of presence. However, true 'Erinnerungen' rest deeply within the person and can always return. They become possessions which can never be lost. Present, past and future then become contemporaneous.

Here another entry from Malte's note-books referring to his grandfather Brahe elucidates this 'Erinnerung' which Malte is striving to attain:

> Die Zeitfolgen spielten durchaus keine Rolle für ihn, der Tod war ein kleiner Zwischenfall, den er vollkommen ignorierte, Personen, die er einmal in seine Erinnerung aufgenommen hatte, existierten, und daran konnte ihr Absterben nicht das geringste ändern. Mehrere Jahre später . . . erzählte man sich, wie er auch das Zukünftige mit demselben Eigensinn als gegenwärtig empfand. Er soll einmal einer gewissen jungen Frau von ihren Söhnen gesprochen haben, von den Reisen eines dieser Söhne insbesondere, während die junge Dame, eben im dritten Monat ihrer ersten Schwangerschaft, fast besinnungslos vor Entsetzen und Furcht neben dem unablässig redenden Alten sass. (p. 735)
>
> (The different times were of no importance to him, death was a minor incident which he completely ignored, people that he had once admitted to memory existed and this was not changed at all by their death. Several years later . . . it was reported how he, equally obstinately, regarded the future as being present. He was supposed to have spoken to a certain young woman about her sons, particularly about the travels of one of these sons, while the young lady, just in the third month of her first pregnancy sat next to the continuously talking old man, nearly fainting with fright and horror . . .)

The capacity for 'Erinnern' makes events and things timeless, time stops and becomes being. This 'being within one' presents for Rilke a true refuge from time, but it can only be achieved by real experiences. And only with experience, according to Rilke, can any true creative literature ('Dichtung') be possible. This again is a means of neutralising time, i.e. creating a space in which the passage of time is without consequences. With that 'Erinnerung' and creative writing become closely linked with Rilke's conception and experience of time.

Time exists by its limits; before and after offer objective confines and insofar time exists only between a beginning and an end. Clock time follows an even pace, whereas each person has his own time-dimension. In this respect every living being possesses his own time.[7]

The inner time consciousness has to be linked to something stable to enable a human being to exist. Obviously 'sehen' is located in the now-time, while 'erkennen' connects this now-time to the past; 'erinnern' possesses a certain time-ambiguity — it originates in the past and is known in the present. In a unity of consciousness past and present are joined and memory has to be regarded as a synthesizing factor. Malte comes up against objective reality and he sees people, but he does not come into contact with them. They merely act as a release device. Reality for Malte is not so much in the actual events or rather objective reality, but more in the recalling. His 'erinnern' concentrates on his search for identity.

Malte's entries are not tantamount to a stream of consciousness, they take on the form of interior monologues, as we know his thoughts only in as far as he writes them down. Every object of experience is translated into personalized terms of its perceiving subject, but Malte's character is not really revealed — we do not get to *know* him. We only witness his search for a principle of unity. He does not act, but is acted upon. Although the question 'Who am I?' is not asked directly, his attempts to recall his childhood are dictated by this. As the first entry reflects, his thoughts revolve around two traumatic experiences: living and dying. Malte believes that if he is able to recall his childhood, he will be in a position to attain his own special form of death. The problem of living is approached from the end — dying. His projections into the past — his own and reports of others—are based on the certainty that a future (death) is only possible through the presence, i.e. possession of, the past. Objective reality ('sehen') and memory ('erinnern') have to be synthesized and only then can this complete reality be internalized and become his own. For things to really be, they have to be mirrored inside the onlooker. In the same way time has being only as a recalled past, i.e. time which has been made present from the past.

It is through the time factor and within time that an ego acquires substance. By referring the present to a past ('erinnern'), the ego has a means of determining itself, establishing itself as an identity. The famous Hofmannsthal question comes to mind: 'Was ist das: Ich? Wo hats ein End?' (What is this: I? Where does it end?). It is important to note the specific values of the words used: 'ein Ende haben' can be understood in a time-sense, to end or terminate; but, as in English, there is also a spatial implication, where is the borderline? This is intensified by the preceding 'Was ist das?' which seems to point to a three-dimensional object in space. The ego seems to lose all clear-cut contours and cannot be defined either in time or in space. Inside and outside merge.

Malte, too, thinks along parallel lines:

> Sind wir nicht ohne Handlung? Wir entdecken wohl, dass wir die Rolle nicht wissen, wir suchen einen Spiegel, wir möchten abschminken und das Falsche abnehmen und wirklich sein. Aber irgendwo haftet uns noch ein Stück Verkleidung an, das wir vergessen. (p. 921)
>
> (Are we not without actions? We do discover that we do not know our part, we look for a mirror, we wish to take off our make-up and do away with counterfeit and really be. But somewhere a bit of disguise is still sticking to us that we forget.)

This reminds one of an incident in Malte's childhood (p. 802.) which he recounts. He had come across a large selection of historical outfits and robes in an old cupboard and he liked to put them on and parade before a mirror. As long as he kept to actual costumes, the confrontation with the mirror was unproblematical. Malte always discovered himself again in the mirror. He was able to differentiate clearly between appearance and dress, between being and image. On one occasion, however, he found 'vages Maskenzeug . . . phantastisches Ungefähr' like dominoes, pierrot costumes and other masquerade clothes as well as masks. These he put on. But when he stood in front of the mirror, his distorted reflection proved to have a stronger reality than he himself. An utter state of self-alienation resulted:

> . . . er (der Spiegel) . . . diktierte mir ein Bild, nein, eine Wirklichkeit, eine fremde, unbegriefliche monströse Wirklichkeit, mit der ich durchtränkt wurde gegen meinen Willen: denn jetzt war er der Stärkere, und ich war der Spiegel. Ich starrte diesen schrecklichen Unbekannten vor mir an, und es schien mir ungeheuerlich, mit ihm allein zu sein. Aber in demselben Moment, da ich dies dachte, geschah das Äusserste: ich verlor allen Sinn, ich fiel einfach aus. Eine Sekunde lang hatte ich eine unbeschreibliche, wehe und vergebliche Sehnsucht nach mir, dann war nur noch er: es war nichts ausser ihm. (p. 808)
> (. . . it (the mirror) . . . dicated a picture, no, a reality, a strange incomprehensible hideous reality with which I was saturated against my will: because he was now the stronger of us and I was the mirror. I stared at this terrible stranger before me and it seemed monstrous to be alone with him. But in that very moment when I thought this, the worst happened: I lost all sense, I simply dropped out. For a second I felt an indescribable, painful and futile longing for myself and then there was only he: there was nothing beside him.)

The mirror does not reflect time, but space, more particularly, non-enterable space, because its space is not made up by bodies or objects. Thus the mirror stands for the relatedness of things in space. It reveals the pose and the reflected image becomes a frightening double which accentuates the estrangement of the individual with regard to itself. The child concentrates on its own person and as long as Malte keeps to 'real' costumes, his power of differentiation is not impaired. The unreal mask, however, hides his face and immediately with the loss of his face, Malte loses all means of orientation. He cannot see himself any longer, still less can he recognize ('erkennen') himself.

This playing with identities is also reflected by another childhood reminiscence. Malte and his mother liked playing a little game where Malte acts as Sophie. He had found out that at some earlier time his mother had wished he were a little girl. And so Malte plays Sophie to please his mother and together they talk about bad Malte — 'der böse Malte' — whom they do not want around. At a time of his life, where Malte has the possibility of being himself and in this way becoming himself, he dresses up and masks his identity. He fixates himself on a fictitious image. He cannot accept himself as an identity since he directs his attention to a non-existent being, a model which has not been dictated by his own being.

According to Rilke, childhood is the state of complete openness. The child does not know the grown-up's urge into the future. It lives in a perfect present (compare Rilke's Eighth Duino Elegy) in which the objects have not yet been fixated, isolated and made absolute. The child's relationship to things in general is freely playing. It rests within a space where all things are related. Because it possesses 'Abstand', distance, to everything, including itself, identification is much easier. Anything can be anything. For the child the world is made up of objects that are objectless ('ungegenständlich'). Its openness is objectless world. But if it isolates itself in any way, it experiences world as something alien confronting it. Through fixation, the distance ('Abstand') is lost and everything outside becomes 'the other'. Malte is not in an open state; he is literally locked inside the mask and not even the tears appear outside. He pleads to other people 'to take him out', but not even his voice is heard. He has no 'Abstand' to the mask and therefore no relationship to it. Similarly, when he is Sophie, Malte as Malte is rejected by himself. Again there is no distance and no relation between Sophie and Malte.

Children and those dying, according to Rilke, are on the threshold of openness, because they are not conscious of themselves. They do not commit themselves like Malte does by assuming the false guise of either the masquerade or Sophie, and so they do not experience

world as something opposing and alien. Here this openness links up with 'Er-innern'. Time in the deeper sense becomes 'erinnerte' time, i.e. time that is neutralized within and in this respect loses its negative aspect of passing time.

For Rilke love is 'Bezug': relation, relatedness, and only in the love-relation can the past be neutralized into memory. The ultimate form of love which Rilke has in mind, is the love towards God. This form of love is not directed towards an object; it is merely a direction:

> ... dass Gott nur eine Richtung der Liebe ist, kein Liebesgegenstand ... (p. 937)
>
> (... that God is only a direction of love and no object of love ...)

Rilke speaks of direction and I feel one can interpret it as 'Bezug', relatedness, It does not cling to a definite object; in a way it becomes non-personal and completely non-object-bound. Instead of being directed at something outside the self, it is taken within the self, it is internalised. Only when this love is without Gestalt, without being committed to a body, does it attain the state of 'unendlicher Bezug'. The German word 'unendlich' does not only refer to infinite space, but also to non-ending time. The relatedness then transcends time and space. It is a state of complete openness, and, according to Rilke, the child comes closest to this state. A similar ability for distance ('Abstand') is necessary for this form of love.

At first reading, the end of the *Notebooks* seems to have little bearing on the beginning. The last entry is a re-interpretation of the parable of the Prodigal Son. It seems far removed from the two aims of living and dying of the first entry and Malte's process of learning to see. On closer inspection however, the link between the beginning and the end is the problem of 'Bezug'. That is why learning to see is so important. It leads to 'erkennen' — to recognize the relatedness of things outside the individual to the individual. In such a state of 'unendlicher Bezug' the identity of all things and beings is guaranteed. The identity does not get hidden behind an image. The commandment 'Du sollst dir kein Bildnis machen' (Thou shalt not make an image) is the top commandment of love. Only if each identity remains undisturbed in its own being, is a true relatedness possible. The reason why the outside world has this overpowering impact on Malte is that he lacks 'Bezug'. In the same way as in the fancy dress masquerade Malte's reflection became the stronger, so the outside things seem to have a more forceful presence than he himself.

He cannot relate them to himself within the dimensions of time and space:

> Automobile gehen über mich hin. (p. 710)
>
> (Cars go over me.)

The dividing line between inside and outside has become blurred, since the outside is a projection of Malte's inner self. Rilke writes in a letter to the Polish translator of the *Notebooks* that all Malte encounters in Paris is to be regarded as 'Vokabeln seiner Not' (vocabulary of his distress):

> Die Verbindung beruht in dem Umstande, dass die gerade Heraufbeschworenen dieselbe Schwingungszahl der Lebensintensität aufweisen, die eben in Maltes Wesen vibriert.[8]
>
> (The connection is that those just brought on have the same frequency in their intensity of life as vibrates in Malte.)

The outside reality turns into an image, instead of being itself. That is why Malte registers expressly that he is learning to see. Similarly in the mirror experience the child Malte loses track of the demarcation line between himself and the reflection, the image. It is impossible for him to relate 'the other' to himself, having no identity of his own. In consequence the other, the image, succeeds in literally blotting out Malte himself.

The Prodigal Son, as Malte, and in this instance also Rilke, sees him, leaves home to escape love.

> Man wird mich schwer davon überzeugen, dass die Geschichte des verlorenen Sohnes nicht die Legende dessen ist, der nicht geliebt werden wollte. (p. 938)
>
> (It will be difficult to convince me that the story of the Prodigal Son is not the legend of the one who did not want to be loved.)

This love restricted him to an image which had been made of him and to which those who loved him, forced him to conform. Likewise Malte, remembering those childhood days of his, remarks that this form of love was difficult to bear:

> Das alles leistete man schliesslich, wie es verlangt wurde, auch ohne besondere Begabung. Talent war eigentlich nur nötig,

> wenn sich einer Mühe gegeben hatte, und brachte, wichtig und gutmütig, eine Freude, und man sah schon von weitem, dass es eine Freude für einen ganz anderen war, eine vollkommen fremde Freude; man wusste nicht einmal jemanden, dem sie gepasst hätte: so fremd war sie. (pp. 843-844)
>
> (Finally you fulfilled all this as demanded and without any special ability. Talent was only necessary if someone had gone to some trouble and, feeling important and good-natured, presented a pleasure and you could see from afar that it was a pleasure for somebody quite different, a completely strange pleasure, you did not even know anybody who could have suited it, it was so strange.)

For the Prodigal Son this love prevents a true being:

> . . . im ganzen war man schon der, für den sie einen hier hielten; der, dem sie aus seiner kleinen Vergangenheit und ihren eigenen Wünschen längst ein Leben gemacht hatten; das gemeinsame Wesen, das Tag und Nacht unter der Suggestion ihrer Liebe stand . . . (p. 940)
>
> (. . . all in all you already were the one which they believed you to be; the one for whom they made a life long ago out of his little past and their own wishes; the common creature that stood under the influence of their love by day and night . . .)

It is a love which has no relatedness to being and which has no openness. Instead it ties down the individual to an image, while the love that the Prodigal Son, means, attempts to

> den geliebten Gegenstand mit den Strahlen seines Gefühls zu durchscheinen, statt ihn darin zu verzehren. (p. 941)
>
> (. . . to shine through the beloved object with the beams of one's feeling instead of consuming it (i.e. the beloved object) . . .)

God is the utmost distance, 'Abstand'. In striving for this love, the Prodigal Son has to become pure being.

> Er ging ganz darin auf, zu bewältigen, was sein Binnenleben ausmachte, er wollte nichts überspringen, denn er zweifelte nicht, dass in alledem seine Liebe war und zunahm. Ja, seine innere Fassung ging so weit, dass er beschloss, das Wichtigste

> von dem, was er früher nicht hatte leisten können, was einfach nur durchwartet worden war, nachzuholen. Er dachte vor allem an die Kindheit, sie kam ihm, je ruhiger er sich besann, desto ungetaner vor; alle ihre Erinnerungen hatten das Vage von Ahnungen an sich, und dass sie als vergangen galten, machte sie nahezu zukünftig. Dies alles noch einmal und nun wirklich auf sich zu nehmen, war der Grund, weshalb der Entfremdete heimkehrte. . . . (p. 945)
>
> (He was entirely taken up mastering what made up his innermost life. He did not want to leave out anything because he was sure that in all this his love was present and increased. Yes, his inner composure went so far that he decided to finish the most important parts of the past which he had been able to fulfill, having got past them simply by waiting. He thought especially of his childhood. The more quietly he considered it, the less complete it appeared to him. All its memories had the vagueness of presentiments and that they were supposed to be past, made them so to speak future. To take all this upon himself once more and this time really was the reason why the estranged one returned home. . . .)

It is within this context that we have to see Malte's resolution to once more take upon himself his childhood, in the hope of truly fulfilling it:

> Der Verdacht stieg in mir auf, dass noch keine dieser Einflüsse und Zusammenhänge wirklich bewältigt worden war. Man hatte sie eines Tages heimlich verlassen, unfertig, wie sie waren. Auch die Kindheit würde also gewissermassen noch zu leisten sein, wenn man sie nicht für immer verloren geben wollte. Und während ich begriff, wie ich sie verlor, empfand ich zugleich, dass ich nie etwas anderes haben würde, mich darauf zu berufen. (p. 856)
>
> (The suspicion crossed my mind that none of these influences and relations had really been mastered. One day they were secretly abandoned, as unfinished as they were. Likewise, childhood would still have to be fulfilled as it were, if you did not want to give it up to be lost forever. And while I understood how I lost it, I felt at the same time that I would never have anything else to refer to.[9]

Only with true 'Bezug', 'Erinnerungen' are possible and consequently

life. Malte realizes that only in his childhood is this to be found. The moment something rests within one as memory ('Er-innertes'), there is never any need for leave-taking and so death becomes unimportant. Again the grandfather Brahe sets an example (p. 735). The future lies not in directed time, but in the open, in an all-encompassing state of being. Malte is not afraid of death as such, but he is afraid of being a failure at dying, dying some anonymous death, instead of his very own personal death. Death is the moment of truth, because it must rest within one like a seed that grows and determines life. Life is only the shell of death, allowing death to ripen fully. Malte understands death as a duty and an obligation. Only if he breaks through to his own death, will his life in retrospect have been a real life. The struggle for identification is won when death has become a personal one. Life and death have equal values and are contemporaneous and as such stand for a completeness of world. When the world becomes entirely 'open' and everything simply is, then time is neutralized.

> In jener grössesten '*offenen*' Welt *sind* alle, man kann nicht sagen 'gleichzeitig', denn eben der Fortfall der Zeit bedingt, dass sie alle *sind.*[10]
>
> (In that biggest 'open' world they all *are*, not contemporaneous, because the disappearance of time causes them all to *be.*)

Malte tries to reach out for pure being to be able to live, but he fails:

> Ist es nicht das, dass diese Prüfung ihn überstieg, dass er sie am Wirklichen nicht bestand, obwohl er in der Idee von ihrer Notwendigkeit überzeugt war, so sehr, dass er sie so lange instinktiv aufsuchte, bis sie sich an ihn hängte und ihn nicht mehr verliess?[11]
>
> (Isn't it that, that this test went beyond his strength, that he didn't stand the test of reality although he was convinced of the idea of its necessity. So much so that he instinctively hunted for it, until it attached itself to him and did not leave him again?)

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[1] viz. U. Fülleborn: Form und Sinn der ‚Aufzeichnungen des Malte Laurids Brigge', p. 148; in Unterscheidung und Bewahrung: Festschrift Kunisch (Berlin 1961).

[2] R. M. Rilke: Sämtliche Werke, vol. 6 (Frankfurt/M 1966).
[3] cf. 'Erleben des Lebens nicht als eine Kette von Handlungen, sondern von Zuständen' (experiencing life not so much as a chain of actions, but rather as states). H. v. Hofmannsthal: Prosa I (Frankfurt/M 1956) p. 174.
[4] M. Heidegger: Sein und Zeit (Tübingen 1953) p. 376.
[5] B. Groethuysen: De quelques aspects du Temps in: Recherches philosophiques V 1935/36, p. 161.
cf. O. Holl: Der Roman als Funktion und Überwindung der Zeit (Bonn 1968).
[6] H. v. Hofmannsthal: Aufzeichnungen (Frankfurt/M 1959) p. 93.
[7] An observation which we find clearly stated in Thomas Mann's *Magic Mountain*: 'But after all, time isn't actual! When it seems long to you then it *is* long; when it seems short, why, then it is short. But how long, or how short, it actually is, that nobody knows . . . We say of time that it passes. Very good, let it pass. But to be able to measure it — wait a minute: to be susceptible of being measured, time must flow evenly, but who ever said that it did that? As far as our consciousness is concerned it doesn't, we only assume that it does for the sake of convenience; and our units of measurement are purely arbitrary, sheer conventions.' (New York 1924) p. 66.
cf. 'Es ist nur eine Gewohnheit, in jedem Augenblick schon auf den nächsten zu warten, stau dies, und die Zeit tritt aus wie ein See. Die Stunden fliessen zwar, aber sie sind breiter als lang. Es wird Abend, aber es ist keine Zeit vergangen.' (It is only a habit to wait at every moment for the next one; dam it (up) and time overflows like a lake. The hours flow past but they are broader than long. Evening comes, but no time has passed.) R. Musil: Der Mann ohne Eigenschaften (Hamburg 1952) p. 1462.
[8] R. M. Rilke: Briefe (Wiesbaden 1950) p. 890.
[9] cf. 'Alles, was je da war, ist immer noch da; nichts ist erledigt, nichts völlig abgetan, alles Getane ist wieder zu tun; das Gelebte tritt, leise verwandelt, wieder in den Lebenskreis herein.' (All, that has ever been, is still there; nothing has been finished, nothing has been completely disposed of, all things done have to be done again, the lived substance enters again, slightly changed, into the life circle.) H. v. Hofmannsthal: Prosa III (Frankfurt/M 1964) p. 228.
[10] R. M. Rilke: Briefe, p. 897.
[11] Ibid., p. 196.