


WORK

48

IN

PROGRESS



Different Roads To

SOCIALISM

In this issue:

- Ilanga: the press sells out
- Youth politics in Lebowa

Editorial

Political debate on South Africa's future is often conducted as if there are only two roads forward. National liberation is set up in opposition to the building of socialism; populism against workerism; and two-stage theories of revolution are posed against a continuous transformation to a socialist society.

But there are different roads to socialism. And positions that seem to be in opposition along those roads are sometimes not mutually exclusive.

In this issue of Work In Progress, a senior Soviet analyst puts forward his position on socialist transformation. Dr Victor Goncharov expresses concern that some ANC members put the tasks of socialist revolution before national liberation. He argues that problems of liberation have to be settled before ideas of socialism are put on the agenda. Goncharov does argue that the seeds of socialism can be planted in the stage of national democratic struggle. These should be in the form of propaganda.

A different road to socialism was discussed at the recent launch of the National Union of Metalworkers of South Africa. Delegates resolved that a 'working-class programme' was necessary to ensure socialist form and

content in current organisation. NUMSA's launching congress also decided that the Freedom Charter was 'a good foundation-stone on which to start building a working-class programme', but stressed that the Charter only reflected the minimum demands for a democratic South Africa.

This position does not necessarily ignore the tasks of national liberation. For while there can be no guarantees that national liberation will be followed by socialist transformation, the seeds of a socialist future can be sown in current forms of organisation and struggle.

This is not necessarily undertaken through propaganda alone. Structures and forms of organisation which promote working-class leadership; organisational accountability to working-class and progressive constituencies; and the struggle to win support for working-class interests within multi-class alliances all strengthen the possibility of building a democratic and socialist society in the future.

Different ways of viewing the South African struggle are not always contradictory. Socialist forms of organisation and consciousness which develop within a national liberation struggle may provide a clearer path to socialist transformation.

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The South African government claims that the Soviet Union poses a military threat in Southern Africa. But Dr Victor Goncharov, a leading Soviet analyst on the region, argues that Southern Africa is of limited strategic importance to either his country, or the United States. HOWARD BARRELL interviewed Dr Goncharov, deputy director of the Institute of African Studies of the USSR Academy of Sciences, on Soviet policy in Southern Africa.


SOVIET POLICY IN SOUTHERN AFRICA

At the centre of the Soviet Union's view of the conflict in Southern Africa is the insistence that it must be seen as a 'logical process of struggle between the forces of national and social liberation, from the one side, and the forces of colonialism, racism and neo-colonialism, from the other'.

Apartheid, in the view of the Soviet Union (and that of the majority at the United Nations), is a crime against humanity 'in struggle against which any means are legitimate'.

Apartheid is also the central cause of the regional crisis. And for both moral reasons, and in terms of the Leninist view that anti-colonial national liberation struggles are an important stage in humanity's progress, the Soviet Union will render assistance, including military aid, to national liberation movements and democratic states in the region.

These basic Soviet positions on the



region were recorded by a leading Soviet analyst on Africa, Dr Victor Goncharov, in a paper delivered at a recent Harare conference on Southern African regional security. The conference was jointly hosted by the London-based International Institute for Strategic Studies and the University of Zimbabwe's department of political and administrative studies.

The elaboration of Soviet policy in the region hinges on these

four premises.

In his paper Dr Goncharov, deputy director of the Institute of African Studies of the USSR Academy of Sciences, said the Soviet Union rejected the framework which holds that the regional conflict is another manifestation of super-power rivalry 'between East and West'.

Its presentation as an East-West conflict was 'actively propagandised by

supporters of the bankrupt policy of "constructive engagement" between the USA and RSA'.

'For some people in the USA it serves as a pretext for interference in the region, giving financial and military aid to bandit forces in Angola'.

In addition, this conception 'offers the Pretoria regime the possibility to shift responsibility for the unsettled conflict to the two super-powers and, thus, to extend its existence'.

THE MYTH OF A SOVIET MILITARY THREAT

'Both in Washington and in Pretoria they fan...the myth of a Soviet military threat to sea routes of the West around the Cape of Good Hope, and the "total expansion of communism" in Southern Africa in order to deny the West access to strategic minerals.. And all these measures are taken to declare that this region is the sphere of vital interests of the United States, and that Pretoria is its historical ally', Dr Goncharov said in his paper.

The reality is very different, argued Goncharov in a subsequent interview.

In fact, the United States and the Soviet Union have minimal interests in the region, and Southern Africa is of very limited strategic importance to either super-power.

This view was shared by American analysts at the Harare conference, one of whom stated that in terms of strictly military and economic strategic thinking the Southern African region ranked 'lowest' of all areas of the world for the United States. The wild factor for Americans was, however, that apartheid was a morally and politically evocative issue within American domestic politics.

Goncharov's view was that, for the Soviet Union, Southern Africa ranked alongside the Middle East as a strategic foreign policy issue - after 'the prevention of nuclear war, the socialist countries of Europe, the USA, China, and Western Europe'.

Goncharov added that the supposed military/strategic importance of the Cape sea route was another myth.

In his paper, Goncharov had remarked: 'Even people not possessing profound military knowledge realise that in the nuclear missile age, if the Third World War breaks out it will have a transient

character. Its outcome will not be so much dependent on regular supplies of the needed mineral resources, as it was during previous world wars.

'In these conditions, the idea of interrupting goods traffic around the southern tip of the African continent, including oil supplies from the Middle East, has become out of date from the military point of view'.

THE ANC 'NOT AN ARM OF THE SOVIET UNION'

In the interview, Goncharov scorned the view that the ANC was the long arm of the Soviet Union, and that the USSR was engaged in an adventure in Southern Africa.

'Your forces of the national liberation struggle were born in South Africa before the Great October Socialist Revolution. The ANC was created in 1912. And the socialist revolution took place in Russia in 1917. So the seeds of the national liberation struggle were sewn even before the Soviet Union became the power it is'.

The Soviet Union had 'no "vital" interests' in the region, and no desire to 'interrupt those traditional ties between some countries of Southern Africa and some Western powers.

'When I say that we are not going to infringe on somebody's interests and that we are not going to interrupt international trade and economic relations, we are pursuing our own interests also. It is not only the capitalist world which suffers from an economic crisis. The socialist world also suffers.

'If we think in the framework of the so-called "new political thinking" (in the Soviet Union), we should take into account the global problems and the global consequences of our behaviour in every part of the world. I mean not only the Soviet Union but every country in the international community.

CO-OPERATION BETWEEN THE SUPER-POWERS?

'In our very complicated world, the two super-powers should avoid confrontation, not only in South Africa, but in other parts of the world. If we take a

different approach, there will be no solution, not only in other parts of the world but in South Africa too', he said.

It was an important 'methodological point' to fight attempts to give an East-West character to the regional crisis.

'If we see this situation in the framework of confrontation between East and West, we will deprive the whole international community of their legal right to render assistance to national liberation struggles', he said in the interview.

'Nowadays, it is accepted in the United Nations that it is a process of national liberation, that the apartheid system is a crime against humanity, and in the struggle against this all means and ways are acceptable, including armed struggle. This approach justifies the rendering of assistance to national liberation forces in South Africa'.

The relative disinterest in the region on the part of the two super-powers meant the existence of conditions potentially enabling Soviet-American co-operation on resolving the crisis both in South Africa and the region. But, in the view of both Dr Goncharov and others at the conference, this would be a real possibility only after the replacement of Ronald Regan as US president by someone not pushing a xenophobic anti-communist international line.

This was perhaps the most important point to emerge at the Harare conference.

Goncharov said in the interview: 'We said at the conference that USA interests are minimal in the region, ours are even less in South Africa itself. That is why, from my point of view, there is a basis for co-operation for an acceptable settlement, acceptable to everybody, to each side.'

'From my point of view the only possible solution to the conflict in Southern Africa will be with the participation of the whole international community, including the big powers. And that is why it is necessary to find common approaches, even for the Soviet Union and for the USA to settle this problem. Though I am of the opinion that they should not directly interfere (by sending in their own armed forces) in the affairs of the region. If the two powers interfere, there will be confrontation and even more serious aggravation in South Africa'.

He understood this was also the opinion of the Soviet government.

Attempts had already been made to develop a joint approach with the United States and Britain on Southern Africa.

'We have an annual consultation between the Soviet Union and the United States, between the head of the African Department and (US Assistant Secretary of State Dr Chester Crocker) or other US State Department representatives. And we have consultations on the Southern African problems. The last one was with Armacost from the State Department. He was in Moscow this spring.'

'The US say they are for a peaceful solution in Southern Africa and so do we, but there are different approaches on how to settle it, on what conditions. They didn't change their position - it remained as it was.'

'But these contacts may in future create a basis for a collective search for a settlement of this problem. At any rate, we have a mechanism for consultation, not only with the Americans but with the British also. (Assistant deputy secretary of the Foreign and Commonwealth Office) Anthony Reeve was head of the delegation which visited Moscow in May for consultations'.

ENDING DESTABILISATION IN THE REGION

Goncharov considered that the report of the American Secretary of State's Advisory Committee on South Africa, which reported to George Schultz earlier this year, could form 'the basis for discussions' between the super-powers on the regional crisis. But the strong anti-apartheid tenor of the report differed markedly from the attitude of the Reagan administration.

Goncharov said he believed the Soviet Union had 'done everything possible to make the solution of the conflict possible'.

'Don't take it as propaganda, but it is the United States which imposed so-called Cuban 'linkage' (the demand that Cuban troops first be withdrawn from Angola before settlement of Namibian independence), which has nothing to do with the solution of the conflict.'

Goncharov considered that the two super-powers could start their co-operation in resolving the regional

crisis by joint efforts in ending South African destabilisation of the region. Mozambique could be the first arena of this co-operation.

In Mozambique 'there are, from my point of view, some spheres and fields of co-operation with the Americans', said Goncharov. And he pointed to Soviet-American co-operation in relieving the famine in Ethiopia as an example of the kind of start that could be made.

The famine in Mozambique, caused largely by Mozambique National Resistance (MNR) activity, is currently threatening millions of lives in the country.

Co-operation against South African destabilisation could logically lead to a settlement of Namibian independence.

'If we can find some common approach, the possibility may arise for a settlement of so-called Cuban "linkage". If the threat to the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Angola diminishes, there will be possibilities of removing Cuban troops from Angola.

'But the (South African) regime has lost its credibility. Neither the Angolan government, nor the Cubans can make that decision without guarantees. And guarantees can be given only by the international community, by the Soviet Union and the United States.

'As far as the Namibian problem is concerned, the draft for the settlement of the Namibian problem has already been drawn up in the framework of the United Nations on the basis of Resolutions 385 and 435. Now it is necessary only to enforce with all possible means these resolutions'.

Goncharov thought the South African government might choose Namibia as its first line of retreat - 'first of all to meet the demands of the international community, maybe to stop disinvestment or in order to get new investment, or they could give independence to Namibia in order to save their position inside South Africa itself and calm the population of South Africa'.

SOVIET SUPPORT FOR THE ANC

On South Africa itself, Goncharov said the Soviet Union's 'principle line and position remains the same', namely giving military and other support to the ANC.

But Soviet military support to the ANC, like any other national liberation movement, depended on the prospects of such an armed struggle.

'If we think that it is useless, we won't give anything', Goncharov said. Asked if the Soviet Union was considering such a withdrawal of military support for the ANC, he said it was not.

The Soviet Union did not see it as its task to dictate to the ANC on its strategy, tactics or the basis on which it should enter negotiations, if the chance for peace talks arose.

'But, in principle of course, we can give a piece of advice to our comrades in the ANC. But it depends on the concrete situation: I mean reasonable advice'.

In the course of the interview, it became clear that a controversial paper delivered last year by another member of the Soviet Institute of African Studies, Gleb Starushenko, did not reflect either the views of the Institute or those of the Soviet government. The fact that the Institute is headed by Anatoly Gromyko, son of the Soviet Union's president, was among the factors which prompted a belief in some quarters that Starushenko was telegraphing a switch in Soviet regional policy.

Starushenko had strongly argued at a conference last year that the ANC should give the white population collective guarantees and group rights. Starushenko proposed the creation of two chambers of parliament in a post-apartheid society. In the second chamber coloureds, Indians, whites and Africans should each have a veto as a group. Starushenko was, in fact, reflecting only his personal views.

Goncharov said the Soviets upheld the view that rights should be guaranteed on an individual basis.

But the 'new thinking' in the Soviet Union, which is often personalised around Communist Party General Secretary Mikhail Gorbachev, meant that research into possible solutions to the conflict was being conducted in a less 'dogmatic' way and in closer 'accordance with present-day realities', according to Goncharov.

'I wouldn't say there will be profound changes. Our principle line and position remains the same. (But) there may be changes and differences in approach to these problems. Changes to behave more realistically, more flexibly, with every

side participating in the (resolution of the) conflict - South Africa itself, the forces of national liberation, United States, Angola, Britain, etc; not to reject whoever at once, but to take everything into account and find the right solutions acceptable to everybody'.

But the two main parties in any negotiated settlement would have to be the South African government and the 'forces of national liberation'. The real compromise would have to be achieved between these two.

And the Soviet Union would like to see more 'flexibility' and 'objectivity' from the ANC, less use of 'dogmatic formulations'.

Asked if Soviet-American hosting of a settlement would not result in each super-power being expected to 'deliver' either the South African government or the ANC to the negotiating table with certain compromises already decided (such as the issue of group rights), Goncharov responded: 'That is what they (the United States) are saying now: "Tell your ANC friends to give guarantees and we shall settle this thing". But we are not going to do it. First of all because we don't want to dictate, and because we know the ANC is against it, against group guarantees'.

NATIONAL LIBERATION AND SOCIALISM

The Soviet Union endorsed the ANC's theoretical framework for South Africa, 'colonialism of a special type'.

Goncharov was, however, disturbed at what he detected as an attempt by some ANC members to 'put before the national liberation movement now the tasks of the socialist revolution'.

This will come as a surprise to many ANC members as well as the ANC's left critics.

'Firstly it is necessary to settle the problems of the liberation struggle, and then to come to the next stage of the social revolution in South Africa. If

they will insist on putting forward the ideas and principles of the socialist revolution before the settlement of the problems of national liberation, they will lose their allies in the population, they will lose potential allies', said Goncharev.

'I cannot give concrete examples, but, from my point of view I have such an impression from discussions with them. It is a so-called disease in the revolutionary struggle. Lenin called it an "infantile disorder"'.
Goncharov agreed with the formulation that the 'seeds of the socialist revolution can be planted in the national democratic phase.


'I don't say they should stop socialist propaganda, not at all. But at this stage, the stress should be on problems of the national liberation struggle. At the same time, they should prepare to sow the seeds of the socialist revolution. If the ANC stops socialist propaganda, it will not achieve anything. It will be the same organisation as Inkatha or somebody else - there will be no difference between the ANC and other national liberation organisations'.

He saw the most pressing immediate task before the ANC as being 'organisation, organisation of its cadres inside South Africa, political organisation, strong and stable political organisation in every part of South African society - first of all in the trade unions, among workers who are not part of the trade unions, and peasants'.

He foresaw that the struggle inside South Africa would escalate despite state attempts to smash resistance. But an ANC victory 'will take years and hard work'.

'The emotion of the past three years has given birth to hopes of a quick victory, but it will not be very quick', said Goncharov. 'Maybe ten years, I say not less than ten years. Yes, I believe that in the end South Africa will become socialist, maybe not in 25 years but in a century... I am an optimist'.

The new metal union



Jubilant delegates herald the launch of South Africa's new metal union

A New Road to Socialism

The new National Union of Metalworkers of South Africa is committed to building a democratic, socialist society, and developing a political programme drawn up by the organised working class.

INGRID OBERY argues that policies adopted at its inaugural congress will have a significant impact on the development of working-class politics in South Africa.

The 23 May launch of the 136 000 strong National Union of Metalworkers of South Africa was significant in the development of working-class politics.

A resolution adopted at the launch concretely outlined proposals for a democratic, mass-based socialist political programme. At the same time the new union accepted the Freedom Charter as the minimum acceptable for the institution of a democratic society, but said that the demands of organised workers and of the Freedom Charter can

only be fully realised in a socialist system.

NUMSA policy will strongly influence future COSATU decisions on the nature of working-class politics - how unions engage in politics, and the nature of alliances with other organisations and interests.

NUMSA was formed at a time when opposition forces are under severe threat. COSATU has been repeatedly attacked by the state and other right-wing agents: physically by bombs, arson,

detention and incarceration of officials and members, and ideologically through a concerted state propaganda campaign linking the federation with the ANC, violence and 'communist forces'.

The merger of seven unions into one giant metal union is a victory for working-class unity in the face of state repression and a declining industrial base. The sectors from which NUMSA draws its membership have seen thousands upon thousands of workers retrenched in the last few years. The metal industry faces severe hardships as international markets are cut off because of political pressure and fears of labour instability in South Africa. And the motor industry has suffered its most severe recession ever, as well as a number of pull-outs and mergers which significantly reduced its workforce.

Yet NUMSA is determined to become a force in these industries. 'The recession is there, and of course it affects the number of workers we lose', explained Ekkie Esau, formerly MICWU's divisional secretary in Natal. 'But our first goal is to organise all the workers in the metal and motor industries, so we should make huge gains in membership if we achieve that'.

NUMSA represents 30% of all the organised workers in the sectors it covers, and a primary goal of the new union is to draw in those outstanding - some 350 000 workers in the metal, engineering, automobile assembly, and motor component industries.

Seven unions participated in the launching congress of 22-24 May: the Metal and Allied Workers Union (MAWU) with 262 delegates representing 70 000 workers; the National Automobile and Allied Workers Union (NAAWU), with 84 delegates representing 21 000 workers; the Motor Industries Combined Workers Union (MICWU), with 132 delegates representing 35 000 workers; the Motor Assemblers and Component Workers Union of South Africa (MACWUSA), with 13 delegates and 3 000 members; the General and Allied Workers Union (GAWU), with 14 delegates and 3 000 members; the United Metal, Mining and Allied Workers of South Africa (UMMAWSA), with 13 delegates representing 3 250 members; and the Transport and General Workers Union (T&G), claiming six delegates on behalf of 1 500 members in the metal industry.

The South African Allied Workers Union (SAAWU) which has organised a small number of workers in the metal industry

failed to meet three deadlines set by the credentials committee and was, after some debate, denied entrance to the congress. Delegates stressed the need for discipline and established procedure to ensure democratic processes. Some delegates argued that SAAWU should be allowed entry on the basis of forging greater worker unity, but the majority decided it was important to set a precedent of discipline from the start. But all delegates agreed SAAWU was more than welcome to bring its organised metal workers into the new union at any stage after the congress.

FORGING A POLITICAL PROGRAMME

NUMSA believes that organised workers and their allies have a common interest in creating a democratic socialist society controlled by workers.

The congress resolved that 'the working class and its allies can only build true socialism and democracy if it has clear aims and a clear programme of how to build them'. NUMSA committed itself to building democratic socialism, and 'to the leadership of the organised working class in the struggle', arguing that 'the lack of initiatives and the confusion that exist within the community itself on political issues arises from the lack of a working-class programme'.

The congress resolved that 'the Freedom Charter is also a good foundation stone on which to start building our working-class programme', but that 'the organised working class can only take the lead in the struggle if it has a clear programme and aims which clarify exactly what is wanted by the working class and what is meant by their demands'. The union has set a priority that all NUMSA structures discuss the proposed content of this workers' political programme.

NUMSA believes that only if the struggle is led and controlled by the organised working class 'will the demands of the Freedom Charter (as minimum demands for a democratic society) be fully and completely exercised in the lives of the working masses of our country'.

The new metal union has posed a challenge to working-class organisations and their allies to develop a programme

which goes beyond rhetorical acceptance of the Freedom Charter. NUMSA has not rejected the symbols and statements characteristic of the popular movement and its politics, the most significant of these being the Freedom Charter. Rather, it recognised the significant role these symbols play, but has insisted that emphasis be placed on developing a socialist content and method of organisation.

THE NATURE OF ALLIANCES

NUMSA's political policy resolution concluded that 'organised workers should consult with their allies, especially the organised youth, in order to build a programme which can bring together as many groups in society as possible'. Other significant and 'natural' allies of the organised working class are women, students and the unemployed, and they too should be consulted when formulating a workers' programme for democratic socialism.

In his speech to the congress, COSATU General Secretary Jay Naidoo argued that to advance its own class interests, the working class, and COSATU, would have to define the basis on which it forms alliances with other organisations.

Naidoo also outlined the sorts of organisations it could form alliances with. They should

- * have a clear programme which enjoys mass support among workers and their allies;
- * have a proven record and history of mass mobilisation and struggle;
- * recognise the need for workers to lead the struggle;
- * have clearly defined democratic structures locally, regionally and nationally.

Reflecting the mood of the congress, Peter Mokaba, president of the South African Youth Congress, presented SAYCO's position on the nature of the alliance to be forged between the organised working class and the youth. Such an alliance, he said, should take place on the ground through structures, not merely through organisational rhetoric.

The youth, through SAYCO, accept that they are not the leaders of the national democratic movement. That role must be conceded to the working class 'when it

is politically organised', said Mokaba, who acknowledged that the youth had made mistakes, and had been understandably impatient at the slow pace of organisation and the even slower pace of change. But unlike 1976, which saw conflict between youths or students and workers, today's youth saw themselves as strong allies of the working class.

Mokaba argued that although 'trade unions are schools of socialism...they are not the future in themselves... Shop floor struggles are not enough to ensure the future'. The destruction of apartheid would go a long way to eroding the economic base of South African racial capitalism. The questions of the Freedom Charter must be debated 'in the crucible of the factories and the townships...and must always be linked to the question of the seizure of power'. In the ongoing battle with the state he urged workers and other people to form defence committees to defend both workers and the communities against state onslaught.

NUMSA'S IMPACT

The majority of NUMSA members are South African, urban dwellers. This means as members of the politicised and organised working class they will play a significant directing role in community politics and organisation.

NUMSA also represents two of the largest industrial sectors and will have to take on some of the most conservative managements in the country - something which to date both MAWU and NAAWU have managed with some measure of success. Both unions were involved in the debate on strategic use of industrial councils for nation-wide bargaining. And their combined strength in the South African Co-ordinating Council of the International Metalworkers Federation (IMF) successfully undermined the previously dominant conservative Trade Union Council of South Africa (TUCSA) and moved the metal federation politically leftwards.

NUMSA's political direction, clearly spelled out in its political resolutions, will no doubt form a significant part of COSATU thinking at its forthcoming July congress. And its achievement in bringing together seven unions from divergent political and

CONGRESS OF METAL WORKERS TO LAUNCH THE



NUMSA executive members David Madupela (first vice president), Daniel Dube (president), and Percy Thomas (second vice president)

union traditions with different views on policy, practice, and structures bodes well for COSATU's 'one union per industry' goal.

In his speech to the congress, Jay Naidoo urged delegates to reject terms such as 'workerist' or 'populist' and stressed worker unity: 'The political struggles since our formation have clearly sharpened the confidence of workers in their mass strength... The upsurge of millions of youths and students in the community has accelerated the political consciousness of workers. Rigorous debate and actual battles fought are shaping the dynamic of COSATU's political policy'.

And John Gomomo, previously NAAWU's president, said in his opening address: 'Only strong organisation and democracy will guarantee our future... We must start to build our future now. We cannot rely on rhetoric, but at the same time must remain vigilant in the knowledge that the state and capital will continue to protect their interests with all the means at their disposal'.

APPROPRIATE STRUCTURES

The new metal union covers two large industrial sectors: the motor industry and engineering. NUMSA has set up

departments to co-ordinate organising and negotiations, and to unite workers in these two sectors. An administration department will deal with all financial and other administrative affairs of NUMSA. Each department has a secretary and national organisers.

The job of general secretary will be shared between the three department secretaries until Moses Mayekiso, currently facing treason charges, is released from prison.

The union has also set up a legal department, an education department and a publications and media department.

Local shop steward councils will play the significant role of reflecting rank-and-file opinion in NUMSA. The councils will elect representatives to regional congresses, which will elect regional office bearers, an executive committee and four delegates to the NUMSA central committee.

The shop steward councils will elect delegates to the national congress which is the highest decision-making body of the union.

Part of the task facing NUMSA organisers, shop stewards and members in the near future will be to implement other practical resolutions adopted at the congress. These include: a national demand for a 40-hour week; a living wage of R4,50 an hour; the right to strike; six months' maternity leave; 21 March, 1 May, and 16 June as national paid holidays; an end to migrant labour and the hostel system; and equal vocational training for men, women and youths.

THE CONTEXT OF THE LAUNCH

At the NUMSA launch, SAYCO's Peter Mokaba noted that the union 'emerges today in the crucible of an intensifying war between the apartheid enemy forces on the one hand and our people on the other. It is formed exactly sixteen days after the Botha/Malan junta held its fascist whites only election out of which he asked and received a...mandate to declare an all-round deadly offensive against our struggling masses'.

Although NUMSA President Daniel Dube stressed that the union was avoiding examination of its antecedents, these remain important. For the unions forming NUMSA come from different political backgrounds and traditions of

organisation, and bringing these together is a significant achievement.

Formed in Natal in 1973, MAWU was the largest union in one of COSATU's predecessors, the Federation of South African Trade Unions (FOSATU). MAWU stressed that consolidation of shop-floor strength and organisation was the foundation of its campaigns and initiatives.

In the early 1980s, when popular politics and mass mobilisation against apartheid developed rapidly, MAWU was one of those unions hesitant to engage in 'popular politics', fearing its hard-won base would be compromised. However, its rank and file eventually pushed the union into the political terrain, particularly on the East Rand and in the November 1984 Transvaal stayaway.

NAAWU was formed in 1980 when three unions in the motor industry amalgamated: the National Union of Motor Assembly and Rubber Workers of South Africa; the United Automobile, Rubber and Allied Workers Union of South Africa, and the Western Province Motor Assembly Workers Union. NUMARWOSA was central in the 1979 formation of FOSATU. It developed from a TUCSA-affiliated coloured union to one which by 1976 had quit the federation because of its segregationist policies. The union developed strong non-racial policies and shop-floor strength.

As NAAWU, the union remained committed to industrial council bargaining. The council was unique in the early 1980s, with a black union dominant, and the only one which maintained wage increases level with inflation during that recessionary period.

NAAWU brought to FOSATU the most developed model of 'nation-wide bargaining. The rolling strikes which started at Uitenhage's Volkswagen plant in 1981 and spread to numerous local motor and related factories, involved the biggest industrial action undertaken up to that time. NAAWU, particularly in the Eastern Cape, was also central in developing the concept of the living wage, and calling for democratically-elected plant-level shop stewards in the early 1980s.

GAWU, formed in 1980, was a newer union. It grew out of the upsurge of political mobilisation of the early 1980s and was characterised by vocal support for popular political organisations. It formed part of a trend often termed 'community' unionism which

was criticised for organising and mobilising in the community at the expense of the shop floor.

UMMAWSA and MACWUSA can also broadly be located in this tradition. UMMAWSA was a split from MAWU in 1985 and MACWUSA broke away from NAAWU in 1980: both splits were largely political. But UMMAWSA took with it a number of extremely experienced unionists aware of the importance of maintaining a strong base on the shop floor, and there is no evidence to suggest that they abandoned this mode of organisation.

MICWU, which at the time of the merger represented some 35 000 workers, has made the greatest political shift of all those involved. The union began as a craft union for coloured and Indian artisans in 1960. In the early 1970s it started organising African workers into a parallel union and these were incorporated into the union when this became legal in 1979. The coloured and Indian members fell under a closed shop agreement. In the early 1980s the union, injected with younger and more innovative officials, decided to employ organisers and set up regional offices and local branch executive committees.

Partly due to these new officials, and also because of the demands of the growing number of unskilled and semi-skilled African members, the union began to change politically. Increasingly unhappy with its association with TUCSA, MICWU disaffiliated in the early 1980s. The union affiliated to the International Metalworkers Federation and began talks with MAWU and NAAWU regarding a potential merger. According to Esau, the majority of MICWU workers were keen to merge and become part of COSATU. 'Most welcomed the involvement, they believed they must be educated and wanted to be part of the struggle'.

Three unions bring to NUMSA large bases in significant regions: MAWU's largest support base is the Reef, NAAWU commands large numbers in the Eastern Cape, and MICWU has a substantial following in the Western Cape. Both MICWU and MAWU have a fairly large membership in Natal.

NUMSA is already a major trade union power. If it achieves its aim of 'maximum unity among organised metalworkers, and to organise every metalworker in our national industrial union for metalworkers', the new metal union will be a growing influence in the development of socialist politics.



On the Road Again

In February 1987, over 2 000 residents from Potsdam in the Ciskei decided they would rather live in South Africa. So they walked over the border. LOUISE FLANAGAN tells the story of how they were forced back to the bantustan.

What do you do when an entire community gets up and walks out of the 'country' in protest? If you are the South African state, you simply kick it back over the border. And if you are the Ciskei government, you set about beating the community into submission.

That, in a nutshell, is what happened to over two thousand refugees from the village of Potsdam in the 'independent' Ciskei bantustan earlier this year. South Africa and Ciskei may think they have solved the 'Potsdam problem', but the community itself would not agree. An indication of the continuing struggle is the community's application for a blanket interdict to prevent further harassment. As a member of the community said recently: 'We are living in dissatisfaction'.

The Potsdam community first hit headlines in February when it rejected Ciskei rule by walking out of the bantustan. The move followed years of harassment by Ciskei authorities. But the final straw came when police set up a temporary camp in the Potsdam tribal authorities building and proceeded with a series of raids.

Residents said the police demanded development tax from them. Those who had not paid were beaten and arrested. But residents claimed that payment was no protection anyway, as many were also arrested on 'political charges'.

Speaking of the raids, a spokesman for the residents said 'the police threatened to kill everyone here because they say we are stubborn, we don't follow the Ciskei government'.

A Ciskei spokesman, Headman Somtunzi, confirmed the arrest of over three hundred people, who later appeared on charges of failing to pay tax. He denied the assaults and said that if people objected to police activities this was an 'indirect defiance of law and order'.

A COMMUNITY FLEES ITS HOME

On 4 February about 400 people finally fled Potsdam. They walked 12 km down the road to the South African border. Once over the border, they sat down on a narrow strip of land next to the road to Mdantsane and waited for South African help. They asked for a new home: 'Anywhere as long as it is not in Ciskei'.

But the group seemed to have walked into an even worse situation. More pleas to South Africa for help were ignored.

On the first night at the roadside, Ciskei police arrived. They threatened the group with further violence if they returned to Potsdam. One policeman allegedly said they should be grateful that the group included women and children, otherwise they would all have been shot.

Even the press ignored the group at first. Some of the refugees visited the offices of the East London based Daily Dispatch to tell their story. But it was several days before a reporter actually visited the camp, or before anything was reported. Throughout the incident, the newspaper's sources were officials - who also had not visited the camp - rather than the refugees themselves.

South African authorities largely ignored the refugees, until they finally 'solved' the problem by sending in the SADF and SAP to truck the group back to Potsdam three weeks later.

AN ORGANISED COMMUNITY

One of the most striking aspects of the situation was the level of organisation in the community, despite the absence of formal structures such as a residents' association. Not only was the entire group rapidly informed of the move over the border, but once at the camp, organisation was immediately evident.

Resources were shared among all refugees, and those who stayed at the camp built shelters for those working in town. Youths were assigned the task of warning oncoming traffic and watching that young children did not run into the road. A creche was organised. And with the help of an East London clinic, sick people were taken to hospital every day. The group even kept an account of the numbers of refugees.

But Potsdam is not unique in its desperation to flee bantustan rule.

The refugees were from a specific section of the Potsdam community. Until 1983 many of them lived in a squatter community at Blue Rock, just outside East London. There is some dispute over whether this area falls within Ciskei borders.

In 1982 a South African inspector, believing Blue Rock to be in his area, condemned the camp. And Ciskei authorities, who believed the area fell under their rule, subsequently announced that the squatters would be given new houses in nearby Mdantsane. To this day, the group remains convinced that they are South African.

In May 1983 about 600 families were moved from Blue Rock to the village of Potsdam a few kilometres from Mdantsane. They were given temporary shacks in an area some distance from the permanent residents and promised permanent houses at a later stage. They are still waiting for these.

So right from the time they first moved to Potsdam, the squatters formed a separate grouping. This has made it easier for Ciskei authorities to single them out for harassment.

Spokesmen for the group have claimed that Ciskei authorities have harassed them ever since they arrived in the bantustan. And they believe this is a direct result of their refusal to join the ruling Ciskei National Independence Party (CNIP).

When the group finally fled Potsdam in February, they stayed together. The original 400 or so refugees soon notified the rest of the group, many of whom were working in East London at the time. Within a few days the refugee group had swelled to over 2 000. Ciskeian harassment of the group intensified in response to the move.

Most of the refugees fled with nothing but the clothes they wore. Those who had come from East London had not even been back to Potsdam to fetch their



Potsdam refugees collect water during their brief stay in South Africa

belongings. In the days after the move a few tried to return to Potsdam to collect belongings, but were turned back at roadblocks. Those who managed to get to Potsdam found looted homes and their livestock killed.

Children from the refugee community could not attend school in Mdantsane, only a stone's throw away from the camp. And people in need of medical attention either went without, or travelled to East London rather than risk going to the nearby Cecilia Makiwane hospital. They feared retaliation by the Ciskei if they even set foot in Mdantsane.

Refugees who managed to get into

Mdantsane and beg friendly residents for water were stopped, threatened and their water thrown away.

The South African authorities appeared to adopt an 'ostrich' attitude - if they ignored the refugees and their demands for long enough they might just disappear.

The South African police appeared sympathetic to the refugees plight at first. But they soon joined in the harassment in both subtle and not so subtle ways. Ciskei police were never prevented from driving up and down the (South African) road next to the camp and intimidating the group. Traffic

regulations were used against the group, preventing youths with red flags warning approaching cars of the camp.

Only one South African official is known to have visited the camp, despite numerous pleas from the refugees for aid.

The South African ambassador to Ciskei, Christiaan van Aardt, announced his complete lack of sympathy for the group: 'As far as I'm concerned what they need is a nice damn thunderstorm to wash them back to Ciskei. The whole thing is politically motivated - you just can't have people deciding to leave their country and going to another', he said. He had not visited the camp or spoken to any of the refugees.

The owner of a nearby (South African) quarry and farm offered to let the group live on his land. But the South African authorities warned that the group would be evicted if there was any 'trouble'. They were therefore afraid to accept the offer.

The only help came from a 'crisis committee' set up by concerned East London organisations, ranging from UDF-affiliated groups to church groups and World Vision. A construction company also supplied water to the camp.

SOUTH AFRICA 'SOLVES' THE PROBLEM

The refugees believed that the South African authorities planned to make life as difficult as possible for them, so that they would return to Ciskei. Throughout their stay, the refugees stated their refusal to return to Ciskei voluntarily, even when the Ciskei government announced that they could.

One of the refugees said the Ciskei's offer 'is a trick. We can't go back, we put our lives in danger'.

South Africa finally 'solved' the problem. Three weeks after the group first arrived in South Africa, the SADF and SAP arrived in a pre-dawn raid and trucked 2 342 people back to Potsdam. There were also allegations of Ciskei's involvement in the raid.

The Potsdam situation is not unique. At the time, a spokesperson for the National Committee against Removals (NCAR) said other communities had been watching the developments with keen interest. If the South African government had made provision for the

refugees, it would have raised the hopes of other communities suffering under bantustan rule that they too could leave. But this would have been a tacit admission by the South Africans that the bantustan system was thoroughly rejected.

Ongoing harassment, appalling conditions in the bantustan and fears of losing South African citizenship are factors which make leaving seem so attractive.

For the Potsdam group, reprisals intensified once they were back in the Ciskei.

ANYWHERE BUT THE CISKEI

Ironically, several hundred members of the group faced further removals - to Transkei. At the time, conflict between Transkei and Ciskei was at a peak and Ciskei announced a policy of repatriating all Transkeians within the next few months. The group's records show that 458 of the refugees were 'Transkeians'.

They complained of being singled out for victimisation yet again. Children were refused admission to schools and sick people were turned away from clinics. Pensions were also docked.

Not only were the refugee group harassed by the Ciskei authorities, but they were also shunned by many of the 'permanent' Potsdam residents. A vigilante grouping is now also taking action against them. Residents have alleged that the vigilantes are working hand in hand with the police.

Conflict between vigilantes and the refugee group recently flared into open violence, and refugees say the vigilantes called in the police to arrest large numbers of the group. Ciskei police say the matter has been referred to court.

Detentions have also continued. On 5 June an out-of-court settlement was reached following an urgent interdict to prevent police from assaulting a Potsdam detainee. A blanket application aimed at preventing further harassment is also due to be brought.

The group still insists that it wants to leave Ciskei. Previously spokesmen have said they do not mind where they live 'as long as it is in the Republic of South Africa'.

Youth politics and witches in Lebowa

Burning the Herbs

When 150 people were accused of being witches, youths in the North-Eastern Transvaal attacked them, necklacing 30 and burning herbs belonging to the others. These witch-hunts in the Mapulaneng district of Lebowa involved far more than superstition, or political conflict between progressive youth organisations and a reactionary older generation. EDWIN RITCHKEN explores the complex relationship between youth politics and witch-hunts in Mapulaneng.

In May 1986, members of the Zugnog Youth Organisation (ZYO) accused a shopkeeper, who was also an induna, of being a witch. They then burnt all his herbs and the hut where the herbs were kept. A week later, the ZYO called for a consumer boycott of the induna's shop. The induna's sons then approached the nearby Shatale Youth Congress (SYC) for help in the dispute. A few days later, the ZYO did likewise.

The next night, a type of people's court was convened. Nine members of the SYC acted as the prosecution. The SYC executive committee sat in judgment. There was no defence. Both the accusers (ZYO) and accused (the shopkeeper) were prosecuted in turn. Court members believed this would uncover the truth. Both parties agreed to respect the judgment of the court.

The court ruled that the accused was not a witch. This accusation had been made by an uncle of a ZYO leader, who was in fact a business rival of the induna and was using the witchcraft allegation (and the ZYO) to achieve his selfish goals. The ZYO had been set up to protect society, not to get involved in disputes between business rivals. Similarly, the judges said, when the SYC had called a consumer boycott, it was aimed at the local Checkers store in an attempt to pressurise management to intervene on behalf of the people. There was no point in calling a boycott of black-owned shops.

Although the judgment was binding and

* Without the help of Peter Delius, Peter Hudson, Wiza Ngobe, Signet Mashego John Baloyi and Glenn Moss this article would not have been possible.

final, a ZYO leader still stubbornly insisted the shopkeeper was a witch. The Mapulaneng district of Lebowa is situated in the North-Eastern Transvaal, midway between Nelspruit and Phalaborwa. It includes both Zugnog and Shatale.

During the months of April and May 1986, some 150 people were labelled witches and attacked. About 30 were necklaced. The other attacks focused on herbs belonging to those accused of being witches. If herbs were not found, a round hut symbolising the place where herbs are stored was burnt. Old men, old women, young men, young women, indunas, business people, priests: all were accused of witchcraft and attacked.

The main actors in these incidents were a mixture of unemployed youths and scholars loosely organised into youth organisations. They referred to themselves, and were known by those living in Mapulaneng, as the 'Comrades'.

DO WITCHES EXIST?

The attacks raise questions for both observers and organisers: are witches just a superstitious remnant of the dark pre-colonial past or is there a more rational explanation for these incidents? Is the belief in witches necessarily reactionary or can such beliefs be transformed into a progressive ideology? Is the political and cultural isolation of the countryside just a passing problem that will disappear in the march towards liberation? Or does it reflect profound difficulties in the ability of urban people to understand and interact with rural culture?

To christians, Christ exists. To muslims, Allah exists. To marxists, class exists. To many living in the countryside, witches exist.

It is not the writer's task to prove or disprove the existence of Christ, Allah or witches. This task should be left to theologians, philosophers and other dogmatists. It is more important to understand why, at different times and in different places, a belief in Christ, Allah or witches has such different meanings and political effects. Similarly, political organisers do not organise christians by asserting that Christ does not exist, or that the belief in Christ is a superstitious dogma. Rather, an activist would attempt to transform those aspects and symbols of Christ that share a common meaning with a particular political project.

The starting point is therefore to find out what witches mean to the people living in Mapulaneng. According to a philosopher living in Lebowa, 'if it was not for witches we would be in utopia. Everyone would know their place in the world and would act appropriately. There would be perfect harmony. Witches are to black culture what the snake was to Eve'. This captures the dominant world-view in Lebowa. Relationships between people are defined as essentially harmonious. This harmony is sanctioned by the ancestors, nature and god. Disharmony is explained with reference to a 'supernatural' force in the human form of witches. Thus a witch turns nature and society against one another in the possible forms of fatal lightning strikes, sickness and people who revolt against their 'natural' social role.

Witchcraft is therefore defined as any relationship or mode of behaviour that is seen by a particular society as unnatural and anti-social. To call someone a witch is to say that they are a traitor, that the person stands in an antagonistic relationship to the rest of society. As there is no outward sign or clue through which an ordinary person can identify a witch, it is possible for anybody to be labelled a witch.

This has two implications: we need to understand how a relationship between accuser and accused has been historically structured. And we need to understand the process through which the significance of a person is redefined from a positive social identity into a witch (ie into an

antagonistic relationship).

It could be argued that witch accusations are necessarily limited to private individual antagonisms, for example conflicts between neighbours over land as opposed to conflicts between the people and the system. In Mapulaneng witch accusations had both a private meaning (in that they were used to resolve private conflicts) and a necessary public meaning. In as much as a community councillor is necklaced as a symbol of a system of antagonistic relationships (ie apartheid) and in as much as the public nature of this punishment serves as an example for all to see and learn from, so the burning of witches served the same function for the people living in Mapulaneng.

MIGRANTS, WOMEN AND WITCHES: A CHANGE IN THE ORDER OF THINGS

Prior to the massive decline of the South African economy in the 1980s, migrant labourers provided a main source of income to the bantustans. Young men left school to find work in the cities, and a portion of their income was sent home to wives and parents. Women became both mothers and the effective heads of rural households with responsibility for managing rural resources.

Following the economic recession of 1982, unemployment shot up, especially in the bantustans. This created a huge population of unemployed youths. Rural society and culture has yet to define a productive place for these non-migrants.

Young men still leave school and try to find jobs in the cities. When they fail, they return to the countryside to their parents or grandparents' dismay. As it is the responsibility of women to manage the household, the young men have no role to play in society. They spend their days in gangs in the bushes or the shebeens, and become totally dependent on others for income to stay alive.

However, the rural household is now desperately poverty-stricken. Previously, there was an agreement between household-providers and youths that one day the youth would provide part of their migrant incomes for household support. This contract is now impossible to fulfil. As rural resources become scarcer, conflict within the household increases. Young men are

forced to live off their grandparents' pensions, creating great tension between the generations. Every cent they can get hold of is the result of a fierce struggle for resources within the household.

The following case studies illustrate these themes.

In 1985 Frank M was 20 years old, and in standard five at the local school. One day he had a fist-fight with the teacher over a woman 'with whom we were both in love'. Much to his parents' displeasure, he refused to go back to school. Frank decided to become a migrant and went to Johannesburg. He stayed with a relative in Soweto for six months, without finding a job. Then his relative, who could no longer afford to feed Frank, sent him back to the countryside.

Again, much to his parents' dismay, he refused to return to school. He spends his days in the nearby mountains with a group of eight unemployed youths, and only goes home to 'grab some food'. He once joined the Zionist Christian Church, but left when the priest continually told him to stop drinking alcohol. Needless to say, Frank's relationship with his parents is very strained.

Simon L was 19 in standard seven when his mother insisted that he leave school to earn a living. She could no longer support him. He moved to some relatives



'One can only cure if one knows how to witch':
A Mapulaneng herbalist treats a patient

in Tembisa, but could not find employment. After four months he returned to the countryside. His mother felt he had not tried hard enough to find employment. Like Frank M, he refused to return to school. He also spends most of his time in the mountains. When he gets any money he usually spends it on alcohol at the nearby cafe. He does not know when he will get married as he has no money to pay lobola.

Joe K married in 1983. He had access to a plot of ground previously owned by his parents. While his wife worked the plot he went to Johannesburg to find a job. He returned when no employment could be found. Joe K became passive and sullen. His wife bullied him, and he spent most of his time with a gang at a shebeen. The only money he received was from his wife. In January 1986 he died.

With the recession, rural households have been racked by conflict. And the bush and the shebeens have become a melting pot for all these conflicts and frustrations. Private experiences and tensions are shared and made public. A new solidarity is forged amongst the youth. In a society that cannot find a place for them, nor support them, the youth has generated a culture which is both part of, and outside, society.

This is the classic breeding ground for a gang-like structure and culture. An antagonistic youth culture has been born.

But the rural resource-managers have an equally difficult time. Migrant wages used to be an essential element in the reproduction of rural society. Household managers are forced to cope without that contribution. The result is mass malnutrition and a fierce competition for those resources that are available in the countryside. Kinship and neighbourly support networks are disintegrating. The unproductive or needy sister or mother who used to be fed and tolerated has now become too great a burden to support. What used to be neighbourly charity and tolerance has given way to neighbourly conflict and competition. A world view that approves neighbourly harmony gives way to a reality of conflict, guilt and distrust.

An important effect of this desperate situation is the increase in stress-related diseases. High blood pressure has increased dramatically, especially amongst women, since 1983. Rural people are becoming chronically ill. People are not coping with their situation because it is impossible for them to cope. Those who treat mental illness have never had so much business.

It is important to emphasise that all sicknesses, according to local beliefs, are caused by witchcraft. Herbs are used to cure sick people. But the cure is only effected if the 'spell' cast on the sick patient is reversed, and placed on the person who cast it. Thus, 'one can only cure if one knows how to witch'.

Witchcraft and herbs are integrally related in the science of herbal cure. And possession of herbs has become a strong indication of witchcraft, especially in the minds of the youth.

A DISINTEGRATING SOCIETY

But how are these changes and conflicts seen and explained by the actors who are living through them. What follows is a typical explanation of the changes in rural society: 'It is a well-known fact that powerful Xhosa herbālists from the Transkei have produced a herb which, when used by women, makes men passive and obedient to their wives'. Changes in the balance of power within the household are explained with reference to herbs and witchcraft.

Amongst migrants, witchcraft remains a common explanation for the failure to obtain jobs or for the loss of employment. Children explain their mother's loss of health by reference to a neighbour who is 'witching or poisoning her'. An old woman who refuses to part with her pension is called a witch. Any anomaly (a relationship or event that can be observed without the observer being able to explain it) is explained with reference to witchcraft or herbs.

A society is thus disintegrating, criss-crossed with antagonistic relationships. An antagonistic youth culture has developed. And most antagonistic relationships are explained with reference to witchcraft and herbs. Accusations and conflicts are passed down to, and discussed by, the youth in the schools, the shebeens and the bush. Amongst the youth a new metaphor or meaning is created, linking witches, herbs, neighbourly conflicts, dominating wives, 'selfish' parents and grandparents and unemployed migrants. This new metaphor has to be looked at to understand the meaning of the witch attacks.

An attack on a witch is a punishment for all the crimes the witch is supposed to have committed. Like all punishments it stands as an example for the rest of society to see and learn from. The witch attacks are a warning of a potential punishment for all those people involved in relationships the youth defined as anti-social.

The youth had taken power and their way of showing it was by displaying, in the strongest and most public terms, that domineering wives, unco-operative parents and grandparents, difficult neighbours and a multitude of other relationships would no longer be tolerated. It was, in effect, the most powerful political intervention the youth could make within rural society.

But how was each witch identified? How is it possible that private conflicts were resolved in public witch attacks?

NEIGHBOURLY CONFLICTS, YOUTH ORGANISATION AND WITCHES

In Mapulaneng, witches could previously only be identified by a sangoma. In the event of a major social catastrophe, the community would consult the induna, who would call on the chief, who would hire a sangoma. But in 1986 the induna, chief and sangoma were all left out of the process. How, it must be asked, was this change in the legitimate way of finding or identifying a witch, possible?

The biggest recent change in Mapulaneng political culture was marked by the formation of the mainly Shatale-based Mapulaneng Crisis Committee and the Shatale Youth Congress. Both organisations are unusual in that they display a political consciousness more appropriate to urban townships than rural areas. But the events that led to their formation show important themes that have shaped organisation in the whole Mapulaneng district.

Late in 1985 Shatale township experienced a spate of muti-murders, and in early 1986 three students were killed. Many believed that a gang of six was responsible, and parts of human bodies were found in the gang leader's refrigerator. Although he was arrested by Seshego police, Mapulaneng police released him without charges.

Students, literally in fear of their lives, resolved to rid the township of this gang. But when they confronted its leader, he shot two students. In the resulting fracas he was killed and his restaurant burnt down. The homes of other gang members, who had fled the township, were also gutted.

Lebowa police responded brutally. They arrested all youths on the streets. Some were sjambokked at the police station

until they fainted. A number of women were raped. Police then handed arrested students to the deceased gang-leader's family, who again sjambokked the youths.

Students who managed to avoid arrest fled to the mountains. In an attempt to get students back to school a public meeting was called, and the Mapulaneng Crisis Committee (MCC) elected. The Shatale Youth Congress was formed as the MCC's youth wing.

In this atmosphere of lawlessness, the MCC soon became the legitimate maintainer of law and order. When a bakery was robbed, or a woman raped, the MCC was approached. The SYC caught the culprits, and handed them over to the police.

But Shatale is not a rural village. It is a rural township displaying the political concerns of an urban township. No witches were ever attacked in Shatale. To correctly contextualise the conditions under which youth organisations operated in rural 'agricultural' villages it is necessary to examine another political process specific to the countryside, namely the creation of a grassroots political culture following the decline of chiefly power.

The transformation of the chief from political ruler to bureaucratic figurehead has created a huge political vacuum at a grassroots level. And, in a situation where bureaucrats are not accountable to anybody, this vacuum provided the space for an induna or agricultural officer to exert an arbitrary, corrupt and oppressive bureaucratic power. On the other hand, alternative legitimate grassroots structures could emerge to fill the vacuum.

Thus, opposing political factions have been created at a grassroots level, struggling to assert their legitimacy and build a following amongst the rural populace. In this competitive situation, seeking advice is no longer just a friendly act between neighbours, it is a reflection of the legitimacy and power that a particular faction wields. The overall effect of these changes is the generation of a new legitimate way of getting things done in the countryside.

It was under these circumstances that the Zugnog Youth Organisation was formed in imitation of the highly sophisticated Shatale Youth Congress. Like the SYC the Zugnog members refer to one another as comrades. But there the comparison

between the two organisations ends. The structure of the Zugnog organisation is extremely autocratic. It has leaders who are chosen by virtue of their physical prowess. Discipline is maintained with a sjambok and the leaders demand absolute obedience. Meetings are held sporadically and secretly in the bush.

The Zugnog youth called a meeting with their parents to find out what problems the 'comrades' could solve. The answer was unanimous: 'The community is having problems with witches. The comrades must please punish them'. At the next meeting, youth leaders announced that the comrades were going on a witch-hunt. A list of witches had already been drawn up by the leaders. Groups departed to punish the witches.

But where did the list originate? The trial discussed at the beginning of this article involved two business rivals, an induna and the uncle of a youth leader. In fact they were more than that. They represented two competing political factions. The induna had support and legitimacy amongst pensioners, while the other shopkeeper had support amongst the youth. In the absence of legitimate chiefly authority, the youth consulted with the political faction they supported to find out the procedure for identifying witches. Together the youth leaders and these factions drew up a list of witches. In this way both a new procedure for identifying witches was created and private conflicts were resolved in the witch attacks.

CHANGING IMAGES OF CONFLICT

Mapulaneng's rural youth are victims of a historical process that is beyond their control. The witch attacks and burning of herbs are essentially their revolt against a society that can no longer afford to support them.

But it should not be forgotten that the reign of the youth organisations was a reign of terror for many living in

Mapulaneng. Literally hundreds of people fled their homes for the mountains out of a fear that they too would be accused of witchcraft. A year later many have not returned.

Zugnog youth organisation was dictatorial, arbitrary and extremely violent. Discipline was imposed on the populace by sjambok or necklace. Power could be manipulated to achieve selfish ends.

But the centrality and meaning of witches can be changed by reconstructing the metaphor defining witches. Youth organisation cannot glibly be told that witches are nonsense. This simply will not work. Alternative explanations for the plight of rural society, and the plight of the youth in particular are needed. The enemy must be externalised, and all suffering not blamed on the unknown traitor living in the community. In this way, the centrality of witches can be displaced, and a belief in witches made compatible with progressive ideologies.

The problem of an autocratic youth culture and political practice remains. These practices, like the centrality of witches, do not spontaneously disappear. They have been historically written into everyday life. And under the present repressive situation it is almost impossible to organise openly and democratically.

But while occasional contact with a national organisation is a relatively adequate form of co-ordinating struggle in urban political movements, this is not the case in the countryside. Sustained organisational guidance is needed.

Setting up youth organisation around the hard reality of staying alive is a starting point in this process. This involves production as opposed to protection. Through self-help co-operatives, democratic, rather than autocratic, models for political practice could be offered.

Under the present political conditions it may be necessary to organise for survival now, and leave protest for some later date.

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Selling Up or Selling Out?

On 14 April this year Inkatha bought Ilanga, South Africa's biggest vernacular newspaper. Exactly a month later, Times Media Limited launched a celebrity scandal sheet. Linking these two apparently unconnected events is a clear trend in the mainstream media away from black newspapers - and thus from confrontation with the state.

DAVID NIDDRIE reports.

The Argus group sold its Zulu-language newspaper Ilanga to Inkatha in April 1987. The majority of journalists refused to stay on under Inkatha management. They had to explain why they left the paper through rival newspapers. For Ilanga itself refused to run their advertisement.

This decision signposts Inkatha's future editorial policy, even though Inkatha general secretary and Ilanga editor Oscar Dhlomo said that under Inkatha the newspaper would not become a 'party political rag'.

But the Argus decision to sell Ilanga has implications wider than Inkatha's attitude to a free press.

Argus and Times Media Limited (TML) are trying to remove themselves as far as possible from black-reader newspaper publishing. Evidence of this is the sale of Ilanga, which was not losing money, and the less visible launch a month later of TML's People magazine, the first new title from English-language media corporations since the closure of the Rand Daily Mail.

South Africa is desperately short of media serving African communities - particularly vernacular media. And the most rapidly expanding market is dominated by readers who are black, male and under the age of 21. In this context Argus gave up control of Ilanga, one of its consistently profitable titles and the country's biggest vernacular paper. At the same time TML (formerly South African Associated Newspapers - heavily influenced, if not controlled, by Argus) launched People, directed at white, English-speaking women over the age of 35.

People is a mindless 'a-political' celebrity scandal sheet based on - and drawing most of its 'stories' from -

America's National Enquirer, notorious for publishing absolutely nothing of relevance.

THE SELLING OF A NEWSPAPER

For some years the major press groups (Argus, TML, Nasionale Pers and Perskor) have been taking their investments away from newspapers, placing them in non-media operations such as entertainment television.

Argus income from non-media activities, for example, rose from 19% in 1984-85 to 32% in 1985-86. This includes retail outlets, records and tapes, electronic advertising and television.

The launch of M-Net, in which the four major press groups have jointly invested R95-million, is a further indication of this trend. In their remaining newspaper operations (which in 1985-86 accounted for 34% of Argus' income), the trend manifested itself in waning enthusiasm, under mounting state pressure, for newspapers with a high political profile. These translate in real terms into newspapers with exclusive or large black readerships.

The role of government pressure on newspaper management cannot be underestimated: Argus suffered financially when the World and Weekend World were banned in October 1977, and their successors, Post and Sunday Post closed down in 1981. The rapid granting of a licence to M-Net very shortly after the announcement of the Rand Daily Mail's closure is not easily dismissed as coincidence.

In December, Home Affairs Minister Stoffel Botha reportedly told Newspaper

Press Union (NPU) representatives that the Sowetan was one of two commercial papers the state found unacceptable. At the time Argus management contemplated selling both the Sowetan and its only other surviving black-reader paper, Ilanga.

President PW Botha cancelled a follow-up NPU-government meeting - angry because the NPU refused to control 'revolutionary influences' on the press by extending the Media Council's authority to cover the 'alternative' media. And Argus let it be known in the industry that it wanted to get rid of Ilanga.

SELLING OUT TO INKATHA

Argus appears to have had second thoughts about selling the increasingly-assertive Sowetan. But it faced additional pressures over Ilanga. At least 18 months before the sale, Ilanga staff began to protest against editorial sympathy for Inkatha. In December 1985 journalists struck over what amounted to Ilanga's pro-Inkatha policy. During 1986, as Inkatha-led vigilantes tightened their hold on Natal townships, the paper began loosening its ties with Ulundi, taking less of a pro-Inkatha position.

When the paper ran a picture of Ilanga journalist Mdu Lembede with African National Congress president Oliver Tambo in Lusaka, the formerly good relations between Buthelezi and editor Obed Kunene reportedly collapsed. Kunene resigned in September, his decision to do so apparently linked to the chill from Ulundi.

Even though negotiations between Inkatha and Argus were already underway, in early April this year elements in Inkatha became openly hostile to Ilanga. When the paper ran a story linking Inkatha officials to questionable land allocations in KwaMashu, the lives of three journalists were threatened and they fled their homes. It was only after the Southern African Society of Journalists (SASJ) intervened that Argus management agreed to put the journalists and their families up in a hotel.

Three days later, on 16 April, Argus' Natal Newspapers (NN) and Inkatha's Mandla-Matla Publishing (MMP) announced the sale which was effective from

1 April. All 25 Ilanga journalists immediately stopped work. That evening Dhlomo ordered them out of the premises and NN Managing Director Ed Booth told them if they did not wish to work for the new owners, they could resign. 'No alternative arrangements will be made and they will not be employed on other Natal Newspapers publications', he said.

Mandla-Matla took over editorial control, but NN continued to 'service' Ilanga, doing its printing and distribution and selling advertising under contract. The predominantly-white administrative and advertising staff retained their NN contracts. Only the 25 black editorial staff contracts were transferred to Mandla-Matla.

Neither Inkatha nor NN have released details of the sale, but NN sources suggest a selling price of between R400 000 and R800 000. If this is true it is a bargain price, despite repeated NN management claims during subsequent negotiations with journalists that Inkatha had 'made an offer we couldn't refuse'.

An idea of the market price of a publication can usually be worked out through the formula of R10 per sold copy. This figure increases as each circulation 'barrier' (200 000, 250 000 etc) is passed. Ilanga had a circulation of around 110 000 and showed a small but consistent profit. Using the formula, Ilanga was worth well over R1-million.

JOURNALISTS OPPOSE POLITICAL RULE

Whatever the exact price, the source of the purchasing finance remains a mystery. Shortly before the sale, Dhlomo said Kwazulu - and thus Inkatha - was critically short of finance. NN said there had been no loan arrangement between buyer and seller. And Dr Gunther Karcher of the Konrad Adenauer Foundation - which partially funds the Inkatha Institute and has enough dealings with Inkatha to justify a permanent office in Durban - flatly denied involvement.

If the source of Inkatha's funds was not clear, reaction to the sale certainly was.

SASJ's Ilanga chapel father (union branch chairman) Mdu Lembede - whom Buthelezi has called 'a fetch and carry boy for the ANC' - immediately announced

IMPORTANT MESSAGE TO BLACK READERS

THE 17 journalists who recently stopped working for Ilanga newspaper after its purchase by an Inkatha-controlled company called Mandla-Matla, wish to inform the readers they served for many years, of the following points which explain their stand regarding refusal to work for a newspaper owned by a political party:

"* THE black communities we served with loyalty, love and diligence are made up of people of different political persuasions and affiliations. In order to serve them to the best of our ability, basic tenets of journalism require a journalist to report objectively, impartially and without fear or favour. Working for a newspaper owned by a single black political party in the current black political situation, which in Natal has the most serious strife among political organisations, will compromise any journalist.

"* WE did not stop working for Ilanga just because Inkatha happened to buy it. We would have done likewise had it been bought by any one of the other political groupings campaigning directly for the support of the hearts and the minds of the black masses.

"* WHAT worries us most is that the readers, with whom we had become like one big happy family, were denied the full opportunity to read statements and our replies to certain defamatory allegations made against us and our stand since Ilanga was sold to Inkatha by Natal Newspapers. We thus saw fit to procure money and buy this space to ensure proper dissemination of our side of the story to the black masses we served."

HEREUNDER are journalists who are no longer working on Ilanga and who agreed at their union chapel meeting to the insertion of this ad:

- | | |
|------------------|--------------------|
| Clement Ntombela | Mdu Lembede |
| Cyril Madlala | Knowledge Simelane |
| Guy Vazi | Fred Khumalo |
| Fraser Mtshali | Bheki Mahlaba |
| France Xolo | Vusi Mkhize |
| Thandi Moses | Phangisile Mtshali |
| Golden Gcabashe | Derrick Nkwanyana |
| Sipho Dhlomo | Gugu Kunene |
| Theo Zindela | |

that staff refused to recognise Inkatha as their employer and would negotiate with NN. 'We do not want to work for a paper owned by a political organisation - left or right', he said.

The SASJ and the black consciousness Media Workers Association of South Africa (MWASA) expressed support for Lembede. Acting United Democratic Front publicity secretary Murphy Morobe described the sale as 'a clear indication of a liberal conspiracy to

promote Kwazulu and the bantustan concept'.

At the press conference announcing the sale, Ilanga journalists told Booth bitterly: 'We stay in the townships and are going to be seen to be aligned to one political organisation. How are we going to cope with this? Our lives are at stake'. Booth, who three days earlier acknowledged the real danger journalists faced by agreeing to put up three of them in a hotel after Inkatha threats, replied: 'You can resign'.

During SASJ - NN negotiations which followed, Booth and other Argus executives remained adamant that NN would not consider keeping journalists' contracts. They refused to acknowledge that the change in ownership had seriously affected journalists' ability to work as before. One executive said the paper had always 'basically supported Inkatha' anyway. When journalists angrily denied this, he admitted he did not read Zulu and had no idea of what Ilanga contained.

This has been an ongoing problem for Argus management. Even before Kunene left, executives complained that, in the face of complaints from Buthelezi, they could not check the evidence for themselves. They had to rely on what Kunene or Buthelezi told them.

During negotiations NN management used the words 'Zulu', 'Inkatha' and 'black' interchangeably so often that SASJ negotiators concluded that they were genuinely not aware of the differences in meaning.

This naivete is common among management in the English-language papers. Unlike management in other industries, newspaper bosses have not experienced the impact of the new generation of trade unions. Their attitudes are informed mainly by the attitudes of those journalists with whom they work and socialise - editors and senior editorial executives.

These people, particularly in Natal, are with one or two exceptions strongly pro-Buthelezi and hostile to anything or anyone he identifies as opposition. The Congress of South African Trade Unions provides a good example: three Durban journalists who covered its launch in 1985 (to which Buthelezi was openly hostile) resigned the next week. They said stories they wrote had been seriously interfered with.

In the case of Ilanga, management could not base its views on reporters'

stories - they were written in a foreign language.

NN executives were clearly unprepared for - and so highly suspicious of - any resistance to the sale, let alone a walkout by the entire editorial staff. Newspaper baron Jim Bailey's sale of City Press to Naspers was politically comparable to the Inkatha takeover. But City Press staff reaction was mild in comparison to that of Ilanga journalists.

This response has its roots in the unique situation which Natal journalists find themselves in. They work and very often live in communities battered by endemic violence and occupied by security forces overtly hostile to journalists. But particularly, they work under an ever-present and very real threat from pro-Inkatha vigilantes.

At the 1 May 1986 launch of the United Workers' Union of South Africa armed Inkatha supporters felt confident enough to 'arrest' two journalists - one from Ilanga, one from City Press - and openly threaten them with spears and firearms. This took place in front of members of the international media and Inkatha leaders. Only direct intervention by other journalists prevented their captors marching the two out of the stadium and carrying out the threat of execution.

But as journalists working for a newspaper openly sympathetic to Inkatha, Ilanga journalists are also regarded with suspicion and hostility by Inkatha's opponents.

When an entire family was wiped out in KwaMakhuta by men using AK-47 rifles, the Natal media splashed stories implying ANC or UDF involvement. Journalists covering the massacre struggled to get their papers to highlight the fact that the eldest son in the massacred family had been an activist in the local UDF youth league.

In the same way, when the corpses of seven Inkatha youths were discovered near Lindelane, the media linked the killings to the stoning to death, shortly before, of an Inkatha youth brigade member. When journalists established that the 'dead' Inkatha youth was alive and in hiding, no one was interested. Their editors were also not concerned when journalists told them that at least one of the seven dead was last seen alive at the headquarters of a local Inkatha official.

Natal University's Mike Sutcliffe

reports that 90% of politically identifiable victims of township conflict belong to the UDF or COSATU and just 7% to Inkatha. But the Natal press generally blurs the distinction into reports of 'black-on-black violence'. Members of anti-Inkatha groupings resent this press bias - and direct that resentment at the press' most immediate representatives, the journalists.

A DEAL BETWEEN GOVERNMENT AND THE COMMERCIAL PRESS?

It is no accident that debates on what constitutes 'progressive journalism' have, in Natal, tended to favour a high degree of journalistic independence. This explains journalists' fierce reaction to news of the sale of Ilanga to Inkatha, and their absolute refusal to accept MMP as their employer.

After a month of negotiations, NN agreed either to find jobs for 19 journalists (six had agreed to go back to Ilanga) or to offer them the Argus retrenchment package put together when the company was in financial difficulties two years ago. The management decision was almost certainly influenced by SASJ threats of court action and hints from MWASA - which had observer status in the negotiations - that its printworker members might be unhappy handling Ilanga until the dispute was settled.

However realistic these threats, it was clear from the outset that Argus would not meet journalists' first demand to cancel the sale. The company's decision to keep the Sowetan - after wanting to get rid of both it and Ilanga - despite intensifying government pressure, suggests other factors were involved in the Ilanga sale.

The reported low sale price, and the depth of sympathy for Inkatha both from Natal-based capital and the media itself suggests that Argus not only wanted to get rid of Ilanga, but was keen to pass it on to Inkatha. Media management sources suggest an additional factor: a trade-off, like the probably-unspoken deal they believe led to the closure of the Rand Daily Mail and the licensing of M-Net, by which Ilanga went to Inkatha and the state kept hands off the Sowetan for the moment.

But if the Sowetan won a stay of

execution, government pressure on the press groups is mounting again following the distraction of the white election and the recent Natal court rulings against a number of state of emergency regulations.

In early May, Naspers Managing Director Ton Vosloo, who was behind the December bid to strengthen the Media Council and reacted even more bitterly than PW Botha when it failed, proposed a number of changes to the council's constitution. With UNISA law lecturer Sas Strauss, he proposed upgrading the council's power to enable it to:

- * act as an intermediary between the press and the state to 'ensure a free flow of information';
- * investigate and report on the conduct of non-NPU media;
- * investigate reporting which transgressed the council's code of conduct and act against those responsible;
- * expand its scope of investigation to consider whether the overall impression of a series of reports - rather than individual reports - was 'misleading'.

The first amendment was defeated. The council voted 13 to 12 in favour but changes to its constitution require 20 votes in the full 30-member council. Vosloo then withdrew the other amendments.

In December Stoffel Botha mentioned New Nation as an example of unacceptable alternative media. After Vosloo's amendments were withdrawn, Botha resurrected his December warnings that the government would not allow the 'revolution-serving press' to continue its incitement. He expressed dissatisfaction with the Media Council, and proposed further discussions. He singled out New Nation in the alternative media, and for the first time mentioned government dissatisfaction with what he called the unsatisfactory method of correcting incorrect reports.

'FEEDING THE CROCODILE'

Under the new emergency the government has tightened up the press-linked regulations weakened by the Natal judgments. But Stoffel Botha's warnings indicate the state will continue to use press bosses to muzzle both the

commercial press and alternative publications. This goes some way to explaining why it has not yet acted to close New Nation - despite a powerful desire to do so. It is waiting for the Media Council to do the deed.

The state is also using withdrawal of visas and work permits to thin the ranks of the foreign media (BBC's Michael Beukes, ITN's Peter Sharp and Business Week's Steve Mufson) and where appropriate, the local media (SA Labour Bulletin's Jon Lewis). More action is likely to follow, with the focus expanding to non-South African citizens on the commercial media.

SASJ national organiser John Allen reacted to the Media Council decision saying that 'for 25 years newspaper management reponse to government pressure has been to feed the crocodile by making concessions'.

Certainly the mainstream commercial press has not resisted state action. It was not Argus, TML, Naspers or Perskor which led the court challenge to emergency press regulations, but the Metal and Allied Workers Union, the United Democratic Front, the Detainees' Parents Support Committee and the Release Mandela Campaign.

The four press groups' combined R95-million investment in M-Net and the increasing relocation of its capital out of news media operations continuously shrinks their need to do so.

The alternative or 'emerging' media is growing fast, but remains pathetically small, making up less than 2% of publications nationally and desperately vulnerable to even the mildest interference. Denial of access to printing presses and distribution networks (the two major networks are controlled by Naspers and Allied) could be fatal for the 'giants' of the alternative media, New Nation, South (launched in March in Cape Town) and Weekly Mail. Cutting off funds, which the state appears to believe is possible, would be an equally lethal blow to some of their smaller counterparts.

Despite this gloomy picture, the alternative media has largely survived the smothering weight of emergency regulations. When these regulations first appeared they seemed to be all-consuming. It remains to be seen what the effects of the new tightened-up regulations are. But they are unlikely to hinder the new owners of Ilanga.

The Union-bashing Bantustan

Despite constant state harassment since its formation in 1979, the South African Allied Workers Union continues to organise workers living in the Ciskei. LOUISE FLANAGAN discusses SAAWU's challenge to its banning in this anti-union bantustan.

One of the few unions to have operated in a bantustan known for its anti-union attitudes is contesting its three-and-a-half-year old banning in the territory.

The South African Allied Workers Union (SAAWU) challenged the ban in the Ciskei Supreme Court on 26 March this year.

Judgement is still awaited.

But even if the union wins the appeal, SAAWU's troubles in the Ciskei are far from over. As the East London branch secretary, Boyce Melitafa said: 'SAAWU has long been banned in Ciskei, even before the actual ban in 1983'.

NO UNIONS ALLOWED

Unions are not totally illegal in the Ciskei, but the bantustan is well known for its anti-union stance. According to SAAWU, 'Ciskei is second to no bantustan as far as harassment is concerned'.

As recently as March this year, Ciskei security police picked up organisers from the Food and Allied Workers Union and warned them to stay out of Ciskei. The organisers were told that although unions were not banned, they were not allowed to operate in Ciskei.

Since its formation in 1979, SAAWU has experienced constant harassment not only by the Ciskei state, but also by South African authorities and right-wing vigilantes.

Organisers and supporters have been repeatedly detained by both Ciskei and South Africa authorities. In 1981 Ciskei police 'hijacked' three buses returning from a SAAWU meeting in East London and detained about 250 people for nearly two weeks. Charges were brought against the detainees, but subsequently dropped.

The first national president, Thozamile Gqweta, was repeatedly detained. Gqweta's mother was killed when his house was burned down. Another SAAWU official, Sisa Njikelana, had his room set on fire, and was also subject to multiple detentions.

SAAWU has alleged that Ciskei authorities and managements of local companies collaborate against the union. Companies are told which of their employees are SAAWU members, and these workers are then dismissed.

There is also evidence of co-operation between Ciskei and South African security police. In 1985, four SAAWU officials, Thozamile Gqweta, Sisa Njikelana, Sam Kikine and Isaac Ngcobo, were detained by Ciskei police only to be handed over to South African authorities. The four then faced charges in the Pietermaritzburg treason trial. They were all eventually acquitted.

State action against the union reached a peak during the 1983 bus boycott in Mdantsane. From July 1983, Ciskei Transport Corporation (CTC) buses were boycotted in response to a fares hike. The Ciskei government owns 50% of the company.

Ciskei authorities believed SAAWU was responsible for the boycott. Immediately the boycott started, many SAAWU officials and members were detained. Possession of SAAWU T-shirts and membership cards appeared to be grounds for detention.

SAAWU has repeatedly denied that it organised the boycott. But the union does believe workers must be involved in community struggles. This meant workers did become involved in the boycott.

Officials point out that SAAWU was the largest of the three unions operating in East London at the time. As the boycott



SAAWU's Thozamile Gqweta and Sisa Njikelana address a news conference in April 1984

was initiated by workers in Mdantsane, this meant a large number of them were also SAAWU members.

'Trade unionism doesn't end at work', said a SAAWU leader, Robert Gqweta, 'but it's not the trade union which tells people what is happening to them, the people know it'.

COMPANIES MOVE TO THE CISKEI

Despite state pressure during the boycott, SAAWU's popularity in the area grew. Membership increased and the union's presence at several East London

companies strengthened.

SAAWU was banned in the Ciskei on 2 September 1983, three months into the boycott. During the application to set aside the banning, Ciskei authorities said SAAWU's role in the boycott was one of the reasons for the ban. But Melitafa said Ciskei used the boycott as an excuse: 'They wanted to establish some new companies in Ciskei where SAAWU was not able to organise, so they used the bus boycott as an excuse'.

In support of this argument, Gqweta pointed out that there were no factories in Ciskei before the banning. Now there are several. Melitafa explained that after the banning, Johnson and Johnson 'closed down' one of their East London departments - only to reopen it in

Dimbaza, Ciskei. Similarly, Border Boxes moved from East London to Ciskei.

SAAWU has tried to fight the ban in court for some time, but the matter has been repeatedly postponed. In March this year, some three-and-a-half years after the ban, the matter was finally heard in the Bisho Supreme Court.

The applicants are SAAWU and its then national president, Thozamile Gqweta. The three respondents were named as the Ciskei minister of justice, David Takane, Brigadier LB Madolo - the man who issued the banning order, and the liquidator of SAAWU's Ciskei assets, Ian Melville. It is not known when judgement will be delivered.

Before a court filled with SAAWU supporters, advocate Ismail Mahomed, for the applicants, argued that the banning order was invalid. He claimed it had been issued by a man holding a non-existent post.

Brigadier Madolo, who issued the order, was at the time acting commander-general of the department of state security. The post of commander-general had been left vacant when Charles Sebe was imprisoned.

Advocate Mahomed pointed out that this department had in fact been abolished some two months before the banning order was issued. The functions and duties of the department and its head had been transferred to the department and minister of justice. Madolo had been appointed acting commander-general to help the minister of justice with the duties of his extended justice department.

Mahomed argued that there could no longer be a post of commander-general since the department no longer existed and therefore Madolo's appointment was unlawful. He said the minister of justice should have issued the banning order, and that he could not delegate this task to the acting commander-general.

SAAWU had also not been given a hearing before the banning. Mahomed argued that Madolo had not applied his mind when he issued the order. He said Madolo had taken account of irrelevant factors and omitted relevant ones.

In response, Lewis Dison, senior council for the first and second respondents, said the minister of justice was empowered to appoint a commander-general. The security department had not been abolished, but rather had fused with the justice

department. Therefore the post of commander-general was still vacant and Madolo was lawfully appointed.

The respondents argued that Madolo had taken relevant factors into account when considering the banning. One of these factors was the bus boycott, and the state's belief that SAAWU played a leading role in it.

THE ROAD AHEAD

Even if SAAWU wins the application, the road ahead will not be easy, although Gqweta is confident things will improve: 'If SAAWU could win we would be in a better position to go to the factories in Ciskei'.

Melitafa is also hopeful of the union winning the application: 'If the banning is lifted, we are going to organise. We have a lot of members in Ciskei'.

But even if the unbanning makes matters a bit easier, most people feel that harassment is part and parcel of trying to operate in the area. SAAWU also believes that Ciskei employers do not want the union unbanned.

At the moment, no other unions operate in the Ciskei. The South African Textile and Allied Workers Union (SATAWU) has been trying to organise there but has met with extensive state harassment.

Gqweta said that both employers and the Ciskei government realise that SATAWU members are SAAWU supporters.

Melitafa pointed out that continual state harassment has resulted in a lack of continuity in union organisation. At the moment, SAAWU members are in the difficult position of operating in East London during the day and returning to Ciskei in the evening, where most of them live in Mdantsane.

Gqweta said that when Ciskei authorities ask if they are SAAWU members, 'we tell them that we are a member of SAAWU in South Africa where we work, but when we enter Ciskei we cease to be a member'. But he added that even though 'I cannot carry a membership card, what I have acquired in trade unionism will stay in my head'.

SAAWU intends to carry on its struggle even if the ban is not lifted. As Gqweta puts it, 'we will try to go back to the community and strengthen the community structures, so that people in Ciskei can understand what the situation is'.

Changing the Charges

The recently-concluded Ciskei terrorism trial was filled with drama. State witnesses disappeared or refused to testify, the presiding judge swept from the court in anger, and the prosecution was allowed to alter its charge sheet towards the end of the trial.
FRANZ KRÜGER reports on the proceedings.

After Rev Arnold Stofile was found guilty on a charge of terrorism, the Ciskei parliament was treated to the spectacle of six balaclava-clad security men paraded before them.

The purpose of the exercise was to congratulate the six for their role in catching Rev Stofile and his co-accused. The balaclavas were designed to protect their identities.

In the words of the official Ciskei statement, 'The occasion was meant to congratulate in appreciation and words of wisdom and encouragement by chiefs for the thorough investigation and evidence that led to the arrest and conviction in Ciskei Supreme Court of four terrorists amongst whom was Rev Arnold Stofile. The chiefs viewed their breakthrough in a very serious light and nothing less but an unblemished effort and display of patriotism' (sic).

Ciskei President Lennox Sebe and his chiefs had good reason to be pleased. With the jailing of Rev Stofile for eleven years, they had succeeded in putting away one of the most prominent and popular of local opposition leaders. Stofile, a popular theology lecturer at the University of Fort Hare, was active in sports organisations as well as being the general secretary of the UDF's Border region.

It is not known whether there was similar jubilation in Pretoria, but there may well have been. Rev Stofile was the man the UDF sent to New Zealand to campaign against the 1985 Kiwi rugby tour. As a South African Council on Sport rugby administrator himself, he gave crucial evidence in the New Zealand High Court case which led to the cancellation of the tour. This earned him the hostility of white South African rugby fans, and he was greeted with

numerous death threats on his return.

LINKING THE UDF AND THE ANC

More than anything else, the Stofile trial represented the most direct link the state has been able to draw between the UDF and the ANC's armed struggle. The South African government has long accused the UDF of being nothing but the internal wing of the ANC, a charge the UDF has always strongly denied.

Nevertheless, the state's victory did not come easily, as its case suffered setback after setback. After judgement was passed, the accused were granted leave to appeal and this will be heard by three retired judges of the South African Appeal Court, who form the Ciskei Appellate Division.

Initially there were six accused: Rev Makhenkesi Arnold Stofile, Mzwakhe Nelson Ndlela, Linda Michael Stofile (Rev Stofile's brother), Mveleli Gladwell Gqibithole, Nomvuyiso Stofile and Noncedo Miranda Ngwendu.

However, charges against Ngwendu were dropped before the case began in the Ciskei Supreme Court on 16 March. She was listed as a co-conspirator instead.

The first four accused were charged with terrorism, with alternate charges of taking part in the activities of an unlawful organisation. They also faced eleven counts for possession of arms and ammunition. The sole charge against Nomvuyiso Stofile was harbouring a suspected terrorist.

The charge sheet named seven co-conspirators, some of them well-known political names. These included Steve Tshwete, former Border UDF president and

now in exile, and Charles Nqakula, one-time acting head of the Media Workers Association and also now in exile.

A detailed schedule of allegations against the accused was attached to the charge sheet. Rev Stofile was alleged to have used a French citizen, Pierre Andre Albertini, as a courier to exchange messages with the ANC.

Albertini's case excited a great deal of international interest, and anti-apartheid forces in France have campaigned extensively for his release. The French government sent Albertini to the University of Fort Hare to do a form of alternative national service there as a lecturer in French.

His parents made a highly public visit to South Africa a few weeks before the trial started. They arrived without visas or permission to see their son and were refused entry. But they said they would not leave without seeing Albertini and were later allowed to visit him.

SECRET ARMS CACHES

According to the schedule, Albertini was alleged to have bought a Mercedes Benz car on instructions from Rev Stofile, and fitted a false compartment into its boot in Botswana.

In August 1986, Albertini was alleged to have used the car to smuggle four AK47 rifles, five Makarov pistols, four limpet mines, detonators and ammunition into South Africa. Rev Stofile allegedly received these arms and arranged for them to be hidden.

Ndlela was accused of undergoing military training in Angola under the auspices of the ANC, returning to South Africa to recruit members, mobilise support and organise cells for the ANC. He was accused of having trained various people in the use of arms. Others were accused of having assisted him in various ways. Nomvuyiso Stofile was charged with harbouring Ndlela.

According to a summary of substantial facts, Ndlela and Linda Stofile were caught at a roadblock on 16 October with a consignment of arms in the car. The car was registered in the name of the UDF.

A few days later, an arms cache was found buried on the banks of the Tyumie River, near Alice, and in January a Makarov pistol was found in a safety

deposit box belonging to Rev Stofile at the Alice branch of Barclays Bank. Various other arms were found in other places, including a limpet mine hidden in the false bottom of a wooden bench.

The trial began on 16 March before Ciskei's Acting Chief Justice Benjamin de Villiers Pickard. His appointment as chief justice was confirmed during the course of the trial.

The Ciskei Supreme Court was packed. There was a substantial local interest in the case as a whole, as well as a large French presence focused on Albertini's position. Among those present was the French Consul-General in Cape Town, Gerard Perrolet.

The state began its case by leading police evidence on the arrest of Ndlela and Linda Stofile at the roadblock, on the pointing out of the arms cache by Gqibithole, the finding of the Makarov in the bank safety deposit box and of other arms in other places.

A CASE BASED ON POLICE EVIDENCE

There was testimony about a letter Rev Stofile smuggled out of prison to his wife, in which he advised her to keep the keys to the safety deposit box safe. Police intercepted the letter and then obtained the keys from Mrs Nambitha Stofile.

As it turned out, the state's case came to rest almost entirely on this police evidence, as one after the other state witnesses failed to deliver the goods.

Albertini was to be a key witness. But he first asked to see a lawyer, and then refused to testify. Motivating his refusal, Albertini said he was 'not now in a position to testify and face the social consequences of testimony in France where many people have asked for my release and where it seems the French government does not want me to testify'. He was sentenced to four years in jail, one year less than the maximum possible sentence.

One state witness gave substantive evidence. This was Mr X, an alleged ANC defector. The state first asked that he be allowed to give evidence while seated behind the witness box so that the accused could not see him. This was turned down but the judge ruled that the man's identity should not be revealed in



The pride of Ciskei's security police on parade

court.

Mr X testified he had seen Ndiela in Pango camp in Angola, attending an ANC crash course. Defence advocate Mockie Friedman began cross examination by asking Mr X details about his past. Ciskei Attorney General WF Jurgens objected, saying it would reveal Mr X's identity. The defence then made a formal application for his identity to be disclosed. When this was turned down Friedman declined to cross-examine, saying he could not do so adequately without knowing the witness's identity.

The state intended to lead eight further witnesses who would be warned as accomplices, and was granted permission to call them all in camera.

The evidence of seven failed to materialise. Two were charged with perjury after they denied any knowledge of the events alleged in the charge sheet. The attorney general admitted

that three others could not be found. Another was referred to a doctor when first called and the attorney general later said he would not be called as it appeared he might not be competent.

The final member of this group - he was in fact the first to be called - was warned as an accomplice. He pleaded illness but refused to tell the judge how he was feeling. Only a doctor could tell, he said. The witness also refused to be examined by a district surgeon, saying he did not want to be seen by a state doctor. At this a visibly angry Judge Pickard swept from the court.

Security policemen forcibly removed the witness from the witness box, intending to take him to the district surgeon. But when the court reconvened, the judge accepted his refusal to be examined.

The witness then refused to testify and was also sentenced to four years in

jail.

This left the extraordinary case of Mr W, who first gave evidence but then returned to court to say he had lied. But the judge decided to accept his initial evidence.

Mr W originally testified he had arranged a safe place for Ndlela to stay, at Rev Stofile's request. He said he had seen Ndlela dismantle a Makarov pistol and had asked Ndlela to show him how to dismantle the pistol. Ndlela had refused on the grounds that his political profile was too high, and he was 'too involved with women'.

During Mr W's evidence, Judge Pickard warned the accused not to influence the witness by laughing at him. After the state closed its case, the defence produced a letter written by Mr W to Mrs Nambitha Stofile, in which he apologised for testifying, and said he had lied in fear of the police. On the basis of this letter, Mr W was recalled to the stand, and he repudiated his earlier evidence.

In an unusual development, Judge Pickard called Mr W's lawyer to the stand and asked him about the circumstances surrounding the drawing up of an affidavit of Mr W's. The judge also questioned the lawyer about who was going to pay him for appearing on Mr W's behalf.

CHARGES CHANGED TO SUIT THE EVIDENCE

Two amendments were made to the charge sheet during the course of the trial. The defence contested the validity of Mr W's original testimony. They said it was irrelevant because the charge sheet did not mention any conspiracy involving Rev Stofile to shelter Ndlela. In response, the state applied for the charge sheet to be amended to allow the evidence within its ambit. This was granted.

The second amendment came after the state had closed its case. The defence brought an application to have the main count and several minor ones dropped. Advocate Friedman argued there was no evidence that the accused had committed, threatened or even attempted to commit violence, and that the main charge of terrorism should therefore be dropped.

Ciskei Attorney General Jurgens admitted there was an error in the charge sheet. He said a typographical mistake had led to the accused being

charged with committing violence. They should have been charged with acts aimed at bringing about violence, which was provided for under a different section of the Ciskei National Security Act. He asked for the charges to be amended, and this was granted despite strenuous opposition by the defence.

Judge Pickard said it was clear the accused had known all along what they were being charged with. He said the charge sheet was not the most important part of the document, and that the accompanying particulars made it clear what the charge was. He said the error was 'extremely negligent', but added he found it difficult to imagine that the attorney general would quote a non-existent section.

The judge also turned down the defence's application to have the main charge dropped, although some of the minor charges were withdrawn with the state's agreement.

POLICE ASSAULTS

Two of the witnesses spoke of assaults at the hands of police. Under cross-examination Mr W testified that he had made a statement to Transkei police after they had assaulted him. The second witness, later charged with perjury, gave a detailed description of assaults by Ciskei policemen, whom she named in court.

The first defence witness was Rev Stofile, who testified that the UDF's policy was non-violent. He denied the charges, and said the Makarov found in his bank safety deposit box was a Christmas present from a friend. It was wrapped when he received it and he had not known what it was. Earlier police evidence stated the pistol was found wrapped in gift paper.

Ndlela denied he had been out of the country for training. He said when he was caught with the arms at the roadblock, he had been given a lift and did not know there were arms in the car. Asked about a Makarov pistol found on his belt, he said he had found it on the floor of the car and had picked it up, intending to steal it.

Linda Stofile, who was driving the car, testified he had borrowed the car to take his girlfriend somewhere, and had also not known there were arms in

it. The other accused did not testify.

FOUR FOUND GUILTY

Argument from both the state and defence was heard on 21 May, and the next morning, Judge Pickard passed judgement. He rejected all the accused's explanations. Tracing the course of the trial, he said every effort had been made to frustrate the state's case, stopping just short of blaming the defence for this. He found Mr W's first statements in court to have been the truth. He had been lying when he returned to court to repudiate his earlier evidence, the judge found. Judge Pickard acquitted Nomvuyiso Stofile, but found the four other guilty of terrorism and various arms charges

Evidence in mitigation was led by Dr Tom Lodge, a Wits University academic. The same afternoon, sentence was passed. Rev Stofile was jailed for an effective 11 years, Ndlela to 15 years, and Linda Stofile and Gqibithole to eight years each. Shorter sentences for the arms

counts are to be served concurrently.

Judge Pickard said he accepted that no violence had been perpetrated, but that when people were found in possession of arms, 'they were hard put to say they did not intend violence'. The judge said he found it difficult to understand how 'terrorism in the Ciskei can serve the aims of the ANC, which are ostensibly the liberation of black people of South Africa, the abolition of apartheid, equal social rights and opportunities and political rights'.

Referring to the Ciskei, he said: 'We live in a country which has no apartheid laws, which has no social discriminatory laws, and where black people have full and equal political rights'. The judge outlined Rev Stofile's sporting, academic and political achievements and said his leadership role constituted an aggravating factor. 'If the management of the UDF starts supporting violence, then it is only a matter of time before the UDF itself starts increasing the level of violence at its gatherings'.

Leave to appeal was granted. The Ciskei attorney general has indicated he may reopen a terrorism case against Albertini.

Profile: SA Youth Congress (Sayco)

The recently launched Sayco, which has adopted the Freedom Charter, is the largest national youth grouping to emerge since the formation of the ANC Youth League in 1944. Launched in Soweto, March 28 in Cape Town November 1983 - 700 000 members. Colours: Black, green, gold and red. Slogan: Freedom or death.

Labour and trade unions

Number of strikes	643
Work days lost due to strikes	1 161 84
Number of workers involved	323 858
African	310 626
Indian	1 340
Coloured	11 538
White	234

Black education: Some basic facts

Number of teachers		Total	
1981	1982	1981	1982
31 377	36 911	23 278	25 278
7 042	11 111	11 918	14 040

Foreign trade and sanctions

On Monday March 6, Norway announced an extensive trade ban against South Africa. On Thursday, March 12, Sweden announced a total ban on trade with South Africa, effective from April. On Wednesday, March 16, Israel announced that it was reconsidering its economic ties with South Africa and would not be renewing trade contracts since they had a serious problem for the South African economy.

Total volume of trade	
1980	1982
Exports	R41.8 billion
Imports	R26.3 billion
Exports as a % of GDP	30%
Imports as a % of GDP	23%

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FACTS AT YOUR FINGERTIPS

Court Briefings

Street committees and people's courts are under the spotlight as Alexandra townships activists face charges of treason.

GLENN MOSS reports.

In two separate trials, the state has claimed that the structures of administration which developed in Alexandra and elsewhere during 1986 were aimed at developing organs of people's power, and undermined institutions of state power such as the supreme court, police and local authorities.

The prosecution at first charged the Alexandra accused with sedition, alleging that their activities undermined state power; subsequently, charges were altered to treason, with the prosecution claiming that those involved in organs of people's power aimed to overthrow the state.

The first of the Alexandra trials, currently underway in the Rand Supreme Court, involves eight accused:

Ashwell Mxolisa Zwane (20)

Vusi Andries Ngwenya (20)

Andrew Mafutha (22)

David Mafutha (19)

Arthur Selby Vilikazi (24)

Albert Ali Sebola (21)

Piet Mogano (28)

and a 17-year old youth.

Their trial, which focuses on the operation of people's courts, involves a main charge of treason, with alternative charges of sedition and subversion.

According to the state, the accused conspired with a number of organisations to overthrow the state, including the African National Congress, the Congress of South African Trade Unions, the United Democratic Front, the Alexandra Action Committee and the Alexandra Youth Congress.

In aiming to make the township ungovernable, the accused allegedly developed organs of people's power, based on a Cuban model. These were meant to replace government structures and institutions.

The accused, according to the state, formed a common purpose to

- * prevent and investigate crime;
- * discourage inhabitants from reporting offences to the police;
- * prosecute, sentence and punish those found guilty in a people's court;

- * keep sjamboks and canes used for corporal punishment in a house used for court hearings;

- * keep petrol, to be used for punishment of offenders, on court premises.

More generally, the state has charged the accused with involvement in the formation of yard, block or street committees; renaming Alexandra streets with names like 'Grenade', 'AK 47', 'Amandla', 'Moses Kotane', 'Winnie Mandela' and 'Bazooka'. Schools in the township were renamed after ANC president Oliver Tambo; Western Cape trade union leader and community activist Oscar Mpetha, who is currently serving a five-year sentence after a Terrorism Act conviction; and Solomon Mahlangu, the ANC guerilla executed for his part in the 1977 Goch Street shootings.

POLICE OR PEOPLE'S COURTS?

According to a summary of facts supplied by the prosecution, a mass meeting of residents was held at the Alexandra stadium early in 1986. Those present were told that they should no longer report complaints to the police, but rather to the people's court.

Cases before the court dealt with household problems, civil claims, maintenance, collaboration with the state, assault, theft and murder. Sentences ranged from orders for compensation to victims, warnings, threats and corporal punishment to an instance where petrol was obtained to burn a convicted person.

Groups referred to as 'Marshalls' or 'Comrades' exercised the power of a police force within the township.

The state alleges that Alexandra residents who ignored instructions to report complaints to the people's court rather than the police were threatened with necklacing, had their homes burnt

down, or were lashed.

While all the accused are charged with involvement in people's court hearings, Ashwell Zwane is specifically named as chairman or president of a people's court. In this capacity, he allegedly sentenced others to be sjambokked, and arranged to obtain petrol to be used in the burning of people.

As part of a move to establish people's power in Alexandra the accused were allegedly involved in an anti-crime campaign. According to the state, 'comrades' visited shebeens and private homes as part of this campaign. There, they interrogated and searched people present. Anyone found in possession of dangerous weapons, or deemed too young to be in a shebeen or at a party, was sentenced to corporal punishment.

According to minutes of a meeting allegedly kept by accused number 6, Albert Sebola, 'the campaign was a success because dangerous weapons were found such as knives, screwdrivers and...a gun'. A note in these minutes records that, after an explanation from its owner, the gun was returned.

Minutes of a meeting dated 25 April 1986 record a discussion as to the proper attitude if a 'comrade' is in difficulties: 'Comrades are not bound to assist a harassed comrade who is committing armed robbery (stolen vehicle), but in the case of a comrade harassed while performing duties of the struggle, comrades are bound to help at all costs'. This meeting went on to suggest that 'cars and commodities of Alexandra residents must not be harassed by fellow comrades'.

Other issues listed on meeting agendas included rent boycotts, 'hijacking of funerals by Boers', and the recruitment of female comrades. In the last-mentioned discussion, participants were urged to be patient in the process of incorporating women into structures.

In their confrontation with the lawful structures of the state, the accused and their co-conspirators are alleged to have made food and medicine available in the township, provided first aid, organised defence systems, and created 'no-go' areas for South African state forces.

In a second Alexandra trial, five accused also face charges of treason, sedition and subversion. They are:
Moses Jongisizwe Mayekiso (38)
Paul Ndlovu Tshabalala (38)
Richard Mzameni Mdakane (29)
Obed Kopeng Bapela (28)
Mzwanele Mayekiso (22).

All five are alleged to have been office bearers of the Alexandra Action Committee (AAC). Moses Mayekiso, recently-elected general secretary of the National Union Of Metalworkers of SA, is charged with being chairman of the AAC.

In this case, the accused are alleged to have conspired to

- * seize control of Alexandra and render the township ungovernable;
- * establish organs of people's power;
- * organise Alexandra residents into yard, street and block committees under the Alexandra Action Committee;
- * form people's courts;
- * form a group known as the Marshalls or Comrades to investigate misbehaviour by residents; discuss disciplinary measures; liaise with street and block committees on punishment; execute discipline; act as functionaries in people's courts; and act as a people's army.

The accused are charged with launching a campaign against the police, defence force, Alexandra Town Council and their collaborators; and starting a rent and consumer boycott.

In an 11-page annexure to the charge sheet, the state sets out 37 gatherings associated with people's court hearings. These cover the period March to June 1986. Charges and complaints listed in the hearings include house breaking, assault, theft, domestic problems, assault, attempted murder, witch-craft, supporting tribalism, being bossy, retrenching employees, adultery, marriage problems, rape, civil claims, grudge, rental disagreement, working with the system, demolition of a shack, being a sellout, swearing, child stealing, failure to control vicious dog, possession of arms, attending a disco or shebeen, and ignoring a stay-away call.

Public Sector Workers Strike Back

Two successful strikes in the last three months have opened the way for real bargaining between workers and management in the public sector. SHAREEN SINGH reports on the SATS and Post Office strikes.

The three-month-old SATS dispute ended on a high note with victory for striking workers. SATS has agreed to re-instate all 16 000 strikers who were dismissed.

According to COSATU general secretary, Jay Naidoo, all demands have been met: workers will not lose pension, travel, medical or long-service benefits; all workers in detention will get their jobs back upon release; workers will be able to elect their own representatives democratically; SATS facilities at the Delmore and Kazerne hostels will be upgraded at a cost of about R10-million; and all workers will be given the same status, ie permanent or temporary staff, irrespective of race.

The strike was sparked off by the dismissal of a SATS worker Andrew Nendzamba, who was fired because he was late in handing in R40. Six hundred SA Railways and Harbour Workers Union (SARHWU) members at City Deep went on strike demanding his unconditional reinstatement.

Within a few days the strike spread to other depots on the Reef and workers put forward other demands. The independent National Union of Railway Workers (NURW), which has a membership of about 8 000 nationally, pledged support for the strikers and called upon management to recognise and negotiate with worker-elected unions. Several hundred NURW members also participated in the strike. They were among those dismissed and subsequently reinstated.

Two weeks into the strike, SATS general manager Bart Grove was given special powers to dismiss the striking workers without notice. COSATU warned management to negotiate in good faith with the workers and their union and to reach settlement.

There is no doubt the state used the SATS strike to clamp down on COSATU. On 28 March the police and army surrounded COSATU House and then broke up a meeting

of 3 000 SATS workers taking place in COSATU house. About 332 workers were arrested at Springs, Meyerton and Ogies.

All meetings between SATS and worker representatives deadlocked and COSATU urged SATS to accept independent mediation or arbitration. SARHWU officials and lawyers tried to persuade workers to return to work as they believed this would be tactically advantageous. But the strikers refused and stood their ground.

The state and its allies continued their vicious attack on COSATU. On 22 April police broke up a SARHWU meeting in Germiston and three workers were shot dead. Another three were killed in Doornfontein. Police once again laid siege to COSATU house and detained 400 workers. Union sources allege police assaulted workers and officials and caused damage to property estimated at more than R53 000.

SATS obtained a court interdict against SARHWU and COSATU, preventing the alleged torture and assault of SATS workers not on strike. These allegations were widely publicised by the SABC and Citizen newspaper, and contributed substantially to the smear campaign against SARHWU and COSATU.

But these attacks, and the subsequent bombing of COSATU House, failed to crush the trade union movement. On the contrary, they have built a stronger militancy and solidarity among workers. COSATU has launched a 'Hands Off COSATU' campaign which is gaining support in organisations and communities. According to COSATU's information officer, Frank Meintjies, many organisations have discussed the campaign and taken resolutions supporting it. Organisations have also committed themselves to popularising COSATU in their media.

Speculation is rife over why SATS gave in to the strikers. Perhaps SATS management believed it would be

embarrassed in planned court action, and tried to avoid this situation. SARHWU believes the case regarding the unlawful dismissal of three workers contributed heavily to SATS decision. The union was going to argue that in dismissing the workers SATS ignored its own in-house disciplinary procedures. SARHWU's lawyers intended to call senior SATS officials to give evidence. This would have embarrassed the officials as the case was going to centre around SATS labour practices and general working conditions.

SATS' first sign of weakening was when management withdrew the court application against SARHWU and COSATU on allegations of torture and assault.

The SATS strike is historic, being the biggest and largest to hit the public sector. During the strike, union membership increased to 22 000. The Black Trade Union (BLATU), a sweetheart union recognised by SATS, claims a membership of 90 000. SARHWU alleges that during the strike many members resigned from BLATU but their resignation forms were not accepted. According to COSATU's Frank Meintjies, workers are being coerced to remain BLATU members. This has given SARHWU the confidence to call for a ballot to establish which union is representative of the workers. There is no doubt the victory gives SARHWU the space to consolidate its membership in the public sector.

Post Office workers came out on strike on 8 April, adding fuel to the fire in the public sector. The strike started at the Power Park depot with about 400 Post Office and Telecommunication Workers Association (POTWA) members who went on strike because they felt grievances were being ignored by management. Grievances included bad race relations between black and white staff, management and senior officials' arrogant attitudes towards workers, union bashing and unsatisfactory working conditions.

Like the SATS dispute, the post office strike spread to other depots on the Reef and the number of workers involved increased to 8 000. Negotiations with management seemed to deadlock, but settlement was eventually reached after about five weeks.

Post Office management agreed to the following: reinstatement of 13 dismissed workers; full union representation at all disciplinary hearings; and POTWA member Yannie Malevu is to get full pay



SARHWU members during the strike

for the two years he may spend in jail on a charge of intimidation. In addition, workers will be paid for 18 days of the strike, and the other 10 days will be taken off annual leave; workers will receive covered transport; and segregated canteen and toilet facilities have been scrapped. According to POTWA president Vusi Khumalo, workers have hailed the strike as a victory.

Public sector employees do not enjoy the same rights as those in the private sector. Transport and postal services are regarded as essential services and are therefore excluded from the provisions of the Labour Relations Act. Legally, workers in these sectors may not strike. Shortly before the SATS strike, industrial relations expert Nic Wiehahn examined SATS labour relations policies and recommended that an industrial council be established to act as a bargaining forum for wages and working conditions, and to handle disputes between SATS and its employees. Inevitably, worker rights won in the in the private sector must spill into the public sector.

COMPANY AND AREA	UNION	WORKERS	DATE	EVENTS AND OUTCOME
Strikes and Disputes: Transvaal				
Allied Publishing	CCAWUSA		March	CCAWUSA and Allied Publishing agreed to a 17% wage increase for Transvaal employees. This raises wages by between R110 and R223,04 a week bringing the average minimum wage to R476 a month, and the average monthly wage to R666.
Caltex Oil	CWIU	174	April	CWIU and Caltex Oil reached a settlement on wages and employment conditions for workers in the Transvaal region. Workers will receive an across-the-board increase of R155 a month, bringing the minimum wage to R735 a month. May Day and 16 June will be additional paid public holidays. Shift allowances, long service awards and compassionate leave provisions have all been improved.
Cerebos Foods	FBWU	400	April	Four hundred workers were dismissed after going on strike over the dismissal of two workers accused of theft. FBWU said workers wanted their colleagues tried by a court before being dismissed and demanded that the two be reinstated unconditionally. Management has offered to re-employ the workers without loss of benefits and is waiting for a response from the union.
Coca Cola	FAWU	2 500	20.03-24.03	Workers on the Witwatersrand and in Pretoria embarked on a go-slow in protest against the way in which the multinational company was conducting its withdrawal from South Africa. Workers organised a national meeting of delegates from Coke plants around the country on 15 April to plan a new strategy. Workers ended the go-slow but vowed to fight for their benefits from the company.
Dorbyl	MAWU	1 000	April	Dorbyl is set to become embroiled in a major dispute over retrenchments and severance pay. Dorbyl's severance pay offer was a day's pay for a year's service. The maximum severance is just over a month's pay for service of ten years or more. According to MAWU, between 1982 and 1984, the company slashed its labour force by more than 7 600 and between 1985 and 1986 more than 850 workers were retrenched. This year another 1 000 jobs are threatened with retrenchments being planned at five Dorbyl factories. Dorbyl boasts an annual turnover of R1,5 billion a year. The company has controlled the presidency and vice-presidency of SEIFSA for three consecutive years, while Dorbyl chairman F Kotze also chairs the board of ISCOR.
DHL International	SASDA	30	08.06	Thirty employees stopped work in solidarity with two shop stewards who faced dismissal from the company for rejecting promotion. They are all union members. The association said the promotion was offered to shop stewards on condition that they serve a three-month probation period. If they failed to make the grade, they would be considered to have dismissed themselves. One of the shop stewards was dismissed on Monday 8 June while the other was given promotion forms to consider while on a two-week suspension.
Diverse Foods Kempton Park	FAWU	83	March	The workers were allegedly evicted from the company after a go slow. Workers had taken industrial action after a dispute over the recognition of FAWU.
Gillette	CWIU	250	20.05-	About 250 workers on strike to back wage hike demands returned to work following a settlement. Union

COMPANY AND AREA	UNION	WORKERS	DATE	EVENTS AND OUTCOME
Springs			28.05	members won a R130 a month increase across-the-board, bringing the minimum wage to R775 a month. The company also agreed: to reduce the working week from 44,5 to 43 hours without loss of pay; recognise 1 May and 16 June as paid holidays; grant six months maternity leave (of which five months would be paid) and one day paternity leave. The company agreed to future negotiations on job security, housing, education and training and the question of PAYE deductions from workers wages. All of these issues are in COSATU's living wage campaign.
Knitting Wool Centre Fordsburg	TWIU	15	May	Fifteen workers were dismissed for protesting against the assault of two colleagues. For a long time, workers have been discontented with working conditions: low wages (ie R45 a week for women and R57 a week for men); and harassment and intimidation for no apparent reason. A TWIU organiser said attempts to resolve the dispute collapsed when management ignored worker grievances. The union is contemplating taking legal action to secure workers' unconditional reinstatement.
New Union Hotel Pretoria	HRWU	70	07.05	HRWU members dismissed from the New Union Hotel for observing May Day were unconditionally reinstated. No pay deductions will be made for the time they were away from work. Negotiations to declare 16 June as a paid holiday continued but May Day will in future be a paid holiday.
Noristan Pretoria	SACWU	300	31.03	The Industrial Court ruled against SACWU's application for the reinstatement of 300 Noristan workers. The case resulted from the alleged unfair dismissal of 58 workers in March 1986, following the discovery of irregularities in the packaging of pharmaceutical products. The remaining 242 workers were dismissed after a strike to protest the dismissals of their colleagues. The court ruled that they had not been justified in striking illegally. The initial 58 workers, however, won payment of benefits and wages from the company.
SEIFSA	IMF unions	330 000	10.04-	<p>Metal industry wage talks deadlocked, opening the way for a legal strike by about 333 000 workers. The IMF unions declared a dispute with SEIFSA over company level bargaining. SEIFSA offered a R2,59 minimum wage for bottom grades going up to R6,49 at the top. This is only a 10,5% increase, which is far below the inflation rate. For the past five years the council has passed on wage increases of less than the inflation rate. SEIFSA has also refused to adjust the industry's wage curve against semi-skilled and unskilled workers.</p> <p>Before legal strike action can be taken, the Industrial Council's executive committee will meet to discuss ways to settle the dispute. This could involve re-opening dispute meetings between SEIFSA and the IMF or calling for mediation or voluntary arbitration. The unions have also demanded that a sub-committee investigate a shorter working week. They have argued that the reduction of the working week from 45 to 40 hours could create between 40 000 to 50 000 jobs in the metal and engineering industry.</p>
SA Pharmaceutical Johannesburg	SACWU	380	12.06	About 380 workers at SAPDC were dismissed because they refused to return to work during a wage dispute. The workers demanded an across-the-board increase of R80 a week. They rejected the management offer of R100 a month across-the-board. Negotiations between SACWU and SAPDC reached deadlock and management agreed to mediation.
Steeldale Reinforcing	NUMSA	1 000	10.06	Workers went on strike in an effort to obtain improvements in wages and service conditions. A union

COMPANY AND AREA	UNION	WORKERS	DATE	EVENTS AND OUTCOME
				spokesperson said this was the second time workers at the factory had downed tools for better pay.
Thokoza Town Council	SABMAWU	500	08.05	SABMAWU brought an urgent application restraining the Thokoza Town Council from reducing its members' wages after increases were effected in January. Some council officials submitted an affidavit opposing the application. But Thokoza's mayor submitted in an affidavit that no council official had the authority to oppose SABMAWU's application. However, the Industrial Court ruled that the 500 employees' salaries were being lawfully adjusted in terms of a notice issued in March this year. SABMAWU said they would brief lawyers to take further action.

Strikes and Disputes: Natal

BTR Sarmcol	MAWU UMUSA	950 800	May	BTR, which dismissed 950 MAWU members in May 1985, signed a recognition agreement with the Inkatha-backed union UMUSA. This comes a few weeks before the Industrial Court is to give judgement on the dismissal of the 950 workers. MAWU said UMUSA recruited most of the 800 scabs who replaced the dismissed workers. It appears UMUSA has made significant concessions relating to job security, one of the issues in dispute before the dismissal of the 950 MAWU members. UMUSA is committed to clearing factories of a radical union presence. The government has assisted in this process by enforcing a ban on meetings in Mpopomeni, where the majority of the SARMCOL strikers live.
Corobrick	Brick and Allied Workers Union	1 950	03.04	About 450 workers at Corobrick's Effingham plant went on strike because of management's delay in announcing a wage increase. Following alleged intimidation, about 1 500 more workers at three other plants went on strike. BAWU rejected an undisclosed pay offer by management. The strike brought production to a virtual standstill.
CPC/ Robertsons	CWIU FAWU		02.04	Workers protested against the manner in which the sale of Robertsons, formerly owned by CPC, a multinational food giant, was conducted. CWIU and FAWU said workers were not given any notice of the sale and issues directly affecting workers were not negotiable. Only after a work stoppage did bosses assure workers that no jobs would be lost and that the pension fund was secure. Workers demanded that a committee of union officials and bosses be set up to administer royalties CPC would receive from the new owners. This demand was made after CPC indicated that any royalties would be used solely for social programmes in SA. Similar money was previously used to fund organisations headed by Inkatha members. Workers also demanded that the new owners recognise the two unions.
Die Casting Natal	NUMSA	110	May 1985 June 1987	About 110 workers went back to work after being on strike for over two years. The workers were dismissed in May 1985 after a legal strike. The Industrial Court ordered their reinstatement in February 1986 and confirmed by the Supreme Court earlier this year.
Putco	IGWU	230	May 1985 June 1987	The Industrial Court ordered the reinstatement of more than 200 Putco bus drivers following a dispute last year. The grievance arose when a manager instructed an employee to attend a disciplinary enquiry during his time off. So the union asked the manager to attend an investigation. His refusal prompted industrial action by some bus drivers who transported passengers without collecting fares. The court

COMPANY AND AREA	UNION	WORKERS	DATE	EVENTS AND OUTCOME
				found the dismissal of the bus drivers both unjustified and unfair.
SAB	SAAWU	300	03.04-10.04	The wage strike at the SAB Durban plant in Prospecton ended after management said they were prepared to continue discussion when workers returned from their illegal strike. Management warned workers they would be dismissed if they did not return to work. The strike brought Durban to the brink of a beer drought.
Stocks and Stocks	CAWU	400	16.04-18.04	Workers on strike resolved to go back to work despite dissatisfaction with management's proposed wage increase. Wages were R1,60 an hour and workers demanded R1,40 an hour increase. A final meeting with management was planned and workers said they would down tools again should their demands not be met.

Strikes and Disputes: Cape

Claude Neon	EAWTU	11	01.04	Management said workers retrenched from the Epping plant will not be automatically re-employed if job vacancies occur within the next three months. Workers would be re-employed only if vacancies occurred in their particular job categories. But retrenched workers would be given first option if the company employed additional staff in the next three months.
Eastern Province Textiles	SATAWU	50	April	Eastern Province Textiles officially recognised SATAWU. A few weeks previously the Industrial Court ordered management to temporarily re-instate 50 women who were dismissed in December last year. The workers were to be paid for the time on strike. This was the first time the Industrial Court reinstated illegal strikers.
Firefite	EAWTU		04.05	Workers staged one-hour stoppages at Cathdalen, Maitland and Plessey in Retreat in support of 55 strikers dismissed from Firefite. The workers wanted their managements to put pressure on Firefite to reinstate the dismissed workers.
Langeberg Fruit East London	NUFW	700	07.04	More than 700 workers were dismissed from Langeberg fruit canning factory after a wage dispute. Workers who were locked out and dismissed are accusing the company of using coloured labour to replace them.
Republican News Agency	PWAWU	30	13.05	Workers on strike in Parow returned to work after reaching a compromise with management. Workers demanded that wages be increased to between R80 and R90 a week. Management agreed to negotiate with PWAWU.

Strikes and Disputes: Mines

Anglo American	NUM	600	02.04-	NUM members in seven Eastern Transvaal coal mines brought their families to live with them in single sex hostels. This move followed a resolution taken at the NUM congress in February to fight for an end to the migrant labour system and to 'take control' of their hostels.
Bank Colliery	NUM	1 500	29.05-	About 1 500 NUM members ended a five day stoppage, sparked off by the death of a worker in a blasting

COMPANY AND AREA	UNION	WORKERS	DATE	EVENTS AND OUTCOME
Witbank			03.06	accident, after talks between management and worker representatives.
Bracken Evander	NUM	27	04.05-05.05	Six miners were killed and 21 injured in fighting between groups of workers at Gencor's Bracken gold mine near Evander. Investigations are being carried out as to the cause of the violence.
Blinkpan Colliery Eastern Transvaal	NUM	1 200	09.04-13.04	About 400 miners resumed work after a four day stoppage by most of the work force. Strikers were protesting at the alleged presence of management informers on the mine.
Chamber of Mines	CMU	26 000	05.05-	CMU agreed on a wage and service conditions compromise, thus averting a strike by about 26 000 white miners. Negotiations between CMU and the Chamber started in February this year. CMU threatened to strike for the first time in more than eight years if wage talks with the Chamber did not produce results. the Chamber's initial offer was 13-14% and CMU demanded 20%. They compromised on 15% on non-marginal mines and 13,5% on marginal mines. CMU's demand for an extra seven days leave and Ascension Day and New Year's Day as paid public holidays were not granted, but improvements have been obtained in artisans bonuses, in standby pay and in substitution pay. Tom Neethling, secretary of CMU, said the new agreement did not meet all their demands but it was reached after considering the damage a strike would have caused to CMU members and to the country as a whole.
Chamber of Mines	NUM		May	Negotiations between NUM and the Chamber deadlocked. NUM applied for a conciliation board to resolve the dispute. NUM rejected the Chamber's offer of 12,5% increase for coal miners and between 12% and 17,9% for workers on gold mines and stuck to its demand for increases between 40% and 55% depending on job categories. NUM's also demanded: 44 days paid leave across the board, a 100% holiday leave allowance, an 80 hours fortnight, a ban on overtime, danger pay and an improved death benefit scheme, a living out and transport allowance, a stop on income tax deductions and 16 June as a paid holiday. Despite outstanding profits in 1985/86, the Chamber's offer was well below the inflation rate.
Chamber of Mines	NUM		08.04-	NUM declared a dispute after negotiations over May Day as a paid holiday. The Chamber was prepared to make Labour Day an optional public holiday: workers would have to report to management if they wanted the day off. NUM believed this scheme meant workers who did not go to work would be victimised and intimidated. The dispute was resolved when the Chamber agreed that only workers wishing to work on Labour Day should report to management.
Coronation Mine Vryheid	NUM UWUSA		11.05	NUM obtained an urgent interim interdict in the Pietermaritzburg Supreme Court restraining UWUSA and certain of its members, from assaulting, intimidating, threatening and interfering with NUM members and officials and the union's legitimate trade union activities. This follows the killing of a NUM member at Coronation Mine, Vryheid. According to affidavits collected by NUM's attorneys witnesses claim the attack was led by a well known UWUSA official.
De Beers Kimberley	NUM	2 000	14.05-16.05	Two thousand workers at the De Beers mine in Kimberley downed tools to demand the release of a detained shaft steward. Management agreed to negotiations. The shop steward was released.
De Beers	NUM	1 200	19.05	Workers went on strike in protest against the dismissal of 37 union members arising out of the

COMPANY AND AREA	UNION	WORKERS	DATE	EVENTS AND OUTCOME
Northern Cape				stayaway on 4 and 5 May. Workers returned to work after De Beers obtained an interim interdict declaring the strike illegal and in breach of the recognition and procedural agreements.
Ermelo Mine	NUM	34	09.04	Thirty four miners died in a methane gas explosion at Gencor's Ermelo mine. Over the last seven months 208 mine workers have died in gas explosions. An investigation has been launched and seven unions have been invited to the underground inspection of the mine.
Freddies Gold Mine	NUM	8 000	25.03-02.04	About 8 000 black miners at Freddies Gold mine were locked out after refusing to carry bags for white colleagues. Five hundred miners engaged in a go slow which culminated in an illegal strike. After negotiations the shaft was reopened and miners returned to work.
Impala Platinum	NUM UWUSA	1 200	April	Workers downed tools to protest management's decision to allow the UWUSA recruiting rights at the plant.
Kinross Evander	NUM	4	24.04	Three men died and one was injured in a fall of ground at Gencor's Kinross Gold mine near Evander. This is also the site where 177 miners died from toxic fumes last year. NUM condemned the incident and said the mine has become a deathhole for workers.
Lorraine Mine Odendaalsrus	NUM	3	26.05	Three mine officials were injured at the Lorraine Gold Mine in Odendaalsrus. The Police Directorate of Public Relations said a group of black miners gathered at about 4pm and stoned mine security officials and overturned two private vehicles. Three miners were arrested. Police said two of the officials were seriously injured.
Leslie Gold Mine Evander	NUM	900	10.05-15.05	Two workers were killed in fighting which broke out in the mine hostel at Leslie gold mine near Evander. Fighting continued and six workers died. This resulted in a stayaway by 900 workers. They returned to work after it was agreed that a joint enquiry into the violence on the mine would be instituted.
Matla Colliery Kriel	NUM	3	18.04	Three miners died in a rock fall in a tunnel 80m underground at the Matla No 2 coalmine near Kriel. The cause of the accident is being investigated.
New Denmark Colliery South-west Transvaal	NUM	1 500	07.04	Workers went on strike in protest against the detention of 75 colleagues in Transkei. They were detained in Transkei while attending a colleague's funeral. Workers demanded that management put pressure on Transkei authorities to release the detainees.
Betrix Gold Mine OFS	NUM	23	25.05	A miner was killed when he plunged nearly 1 000m down a mine shaft after an explosion ripped a hole in the floor of a cage waiting to take miners down. Two other workers received severe foot injuries and a further 20 were treated for shock and light wounds. NUM has demanded an independent commission of enquiry into mine accidents.
Randfontein Estates/ Western Areas	NUM	23 000	21.04-24.04	Miners at the two mines went on strike in protest against retrenchment programmes. Randfontein Estates was retrenching 367 miners and Western Areas aimed to lay off 1 453 miners in April and 490 in July.

COMPANY AND AREA	UNION	WORKERS	DATE	EVENTS AND OUTCOME
				NUM declared an official dispute with JCI. They see the retrenchments as arising out of JCI's movement towards mechanisation, and the decision to put profits before workers. Negotiations proved futile as JCE refused to review their retrenchment programme. Miners returned to work after they were told to choose between dismissal or working.
Randfontein Estates	NUM	10	13.04	Seven mineworkers died and three were injured after a fall off ground at the Randfontein Estate goldmine by a massive rock fall at JCI's Randfontein Estates goldmine Cooke 3 shaft. An inquiry will be held by the inspector of mines.
Vaal Reefs Orkney	NUM	32	14.04	Five mineworkers died and eighteen were hurt in a pressure burst at Anglo American's Vaal Reefs gold mine at Orkney. The incident is being investigated.
West Rand Consolidated Krugersdorp	NUM	5 000	19.05	A mineworker was shot dead and 15 injured during a confrontation between striking miners and mine security and the SA Police at West Rand Consolidated Mine. About 5 000 miners were on strike in protest over food, production bonuses and the closure of the union offices. The miner who was shot dead had allegedly struck a policeman with an iron pipe. According to NUM, teargas, sjamboks and dogs were used to disperse miners.
Western Holdings Welkom	NUM	49	05.06	Two white mine employees and six black mineworkers were killed in a clash between mine security and workers at Anglo American's Western Holdings gold mine. At least 41 other miners were injured. A NUM spokesperson said the violence was sparked off when mine security broke up a workers' meeting to discuss the dismissal of five union members. Workers were dancing and singing union songs when mine security arrived and began firing on them. A mine spokesperson said security had been called in because workers were armed with pangas. Mine management closed number six shaft, where the violence took place, for a few days. They believed it would be in the interests of the safety and the well-being of all employees. The shaft was re-opened but investigations into the violence continued.
Zincor	NUM	600	13.04-16.04	Workers downed tools in protest against the shooting of five NUM members at the company hostel. NUM alleges it has evidence that Gold Fields security and the rival UWUSA were involved in the shootings. The strike ended and police are investigating charges of attempted murder in connection with the shootings.

BRIEFS: ELECTION AND 16 JUNE STAYAWAYS

COSATU and UDF declared 5 and 6 May as national days of protest against the whites-only elections and also against the severe repression directed at workers, trade unions and their communities. According to the Labour Monitoring Group's statistics 500 000 workers were involved in the stayaway. The LMG estimated 99% stayaway by black workers in the Eastern Cape, in the Transvaal at least 300 000 workers stayed away from work and at least 60% stayed away in Durban and surrounding areas. NUM estimated the stayaway at the mines between 25 000 and 30 000. The stayaway was supported by the NECC, youth organisations, women's organisations and civics. The University of Natal, Durban Westville, and Western Cape were officially closed on both days and Wits University was officially closed on the 6 May. The stayaway proved to be peaceful with scattered incidents of clashes between residents and police. Thousands of people throughout the country stayed away from work to mark the 11th anniversary of 16 June. The LMG estimated the stayaway in the PWV's manufacturing sector at 75%, 58% in the public sector and 95% in the retail and commerce sector. There was a 95% stayaway in the African areas of Port Elizabeth and Uitenhage and a 45% stayaway in Natal. Some universities and companies were officially closed for the day. Although 16 June is not declared a public holiday most workers and students regard it as one. The stayaway was a peaceful one with most residents remaining indoors.



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
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