


WORK 13

**JULY
'80**

IN

PROGRESS



BOYCOTT RED MEAT

are also potentially areas of resistance. ie they become sites of struggle. This has clearly happened with the structures of black education, and the article on education and resistance shows that conflict within educational institutions in South Africa has a long history.

The contribution on the press, responding to and developing the article in WIP 12, argues that the media itself may become a site of struggle, partially representing the interests of the dominated classes. This, it is argued, opens up avenues for progressive journalism within the capitalist press, as long as it is borne in mind that a press non-functional to exploitation and oppression can only fully exist in a transformed and restructured society.

The editors believe that much of this edition of WIP can be read with the following questions in mind:

1. the relationship between factory floor and community organisation and action;
2. the limits and possibilities for working class organisation within the community around issues like transport and rent;
3. the way in which the ideological institutions of the ruling classes, especially the media and education, become a focus for resistance and struggle, thereby creating the possibility for progressive activity within and through these structures.

-THE EDITORS.

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Conflict in the Western Cape

THE EVENTS in Cape Town over the last three months cannot be seen outside of the on-going conflict and organisation that is taking place there, as elsewhere in the country. Because WIP has carried so little on the situation in the Western Cape, it may be difficult for many readers to situate any one campaign in this kind of context. What is attempted here is a chronology of four current struggles - the schools' boycott, the strike of 800 meat workers, the bus boycott and the stay-away - and to point to some of the crucial questions that are being fought out and answered in people's political actions in the Western Cape.

THE SCHOOLS' BOYCOTT

At the beginning of April (80.04.08) representatives from 19 Cape schools met to discuss the students' grievances against the coloured education system and the dismissal of three teachers from two schools. The meeting demanded their reinstatement and threatened to call a boycott if their demands were not met by the end of the week. The students' approach to the nature of their demands was quite clear.

The list of grievances in a pamphlet entitled 'Resistance against Racial

Education' is limited to short-term, attainable demands:-

- 1) A shortage of teachers
- 2) No textbooks
- 3) Forced uniforms
- 4) The security police have access to school premises
- 5) Teachers at Fezeka have been unfairly dismissed
- 6) Corporal punishment is abused in most schools
- 7) In the 'Indian' schools, students are transported by bus from outlying 'Indian townships' to make Rylands Indian High School an apartheid project.
- 8) Three teachers were unfairly dismissed
- 9) SRCs are not allowed

When this group met again on 80.04.12 they decided to give the authorities until the end of the month to accede to their demands before launching a boycott. However this decision was not taken as a result of mandates from the school students, and the week began with four schools boycotting classes, with more schools joining during the week. But when the Committee of 61 met the following Monday (80.04.19), the decision was taken for students to attend school the next week, but to boycott classes. A pamphlet, 'Die

Belangrikheid van 'n metode in ons stryd', dealt in detail with the need for students to understand the issues involved in the boycott and hence the importance that must be attached to discussion. The pamphlet also discussed the importance of defining short-term demands that could be gained by the use of the boycott, and yet at the same time outlining one's long-term goals.

"The boycott is not an end in itself. It is not a holiday, neither will it transform South African society overnight. It is a planned political act, which is designed to achieve specific short-term victories within a given space of time and also to raise the general political consciousness of broad layers of students."

The pamphlet discussed the fact that the 'school becomes the centre of activity during a period of boycott'.

In the initial phase of the school boycott, the clarity and direction of such statements prevailed. With strong emphasis being placed on unity to overcome the divisions set up amongst the oppressed people by the state, the students discussed education in terms of its role in capitalist society, while restricting their demands to realistic attainable areas.

Although this approach predominated, one must not assume there was no tension among the students. There seem to have been three general trends - one of which is outlined above. Another group of students felt it was 'premature' for students to launch a boycott. Under the

cry of 'the time is not ripe', they argued that students were not well enough organised or politically aware enough, and further that such action was inappropriate in the present South African situation. A large number of students, though by no means all, have formed strong political organisation and raised their political awareness precisely through involvement in the boycott. The third trend amongst the students has been a 'spontaneist' tendency to militant action with no clear assessment of the aim of the action or its implications.

On Thursday and Friday of that week, students marched from Alexander Sinton to other schools in Athlone, calling on students to join them. The Committee of 61 criticised the Athlone students for undisciplined action that violated the majority decision to remain on school premises during school hours.

The meeting of the expanded Committee of 81 (80.04.26) decided to continue the boycott until the end of the week, demanding that there be tangible evidence that their grievances had been redressed. They called on parents of all primary school children to keep them at home on May Day, to show their support of a limited boycott. The students also called on the teachers to form a representative body and join the boycott.

The teachers responded by holding a 1 200-strong meeting on 80.04.29 which recommended that teachers down tools from 80.05.05. They elected an adhoc committee of 100 to consider the details of this

recommendation. On 80.05.01 a teachers' meeting decided to down tools should mean teacher participation in the awareness programmes being run in secondary schools as alternatives to the syllabi; and that in primary schools it should mean not teaching the Coloured Affairs Department (CAD) syllabus. The Teachers' Action Committee (TAC), consisting of 13 representatives, was formed to meet the Committee of 81 to discuss the role of teachers. A meeting of 300 teachers responded the following night to the fact that many teachers had been threatened by their principals. They voted for a mass walk-out if any teachers were victimised for any action related to the call to down tools.


This initial militancy and support for the boycott did not last. The TAC called a mass meeting in Athlone (80.05.03) which decided to call off the teachers' strike because of the difficulty of implementing it. It was decided that any further action by the teachers would be organised on an adhoc basis, to be jointly determined by the TAC and the Committee of 81. It is difficult to establish details of subsequent action by teachers, but it appears that a decision was taken to meet on a regional basis so that teachers could discuss their role and assist each other as far as access to relevant material was concerned. In some areas this appears to have happened to a limited extent.

The pattern of the teachers' support for the students' boycott raises a major

issue, and one that is also raised by the role played by some of the butchers in the meat strike. The students have laid much stress on the fact that most of their parents are workers and have clearly linked their educational demands to an understanding of the working of capitalism. Not only have they pointed out the financial burden placed on their parents, but also that their education is designed to 'qualify' them for a particular role within capitalism.

They have demanded that the content of their education be changed; that education no longer be used to produce white oppressors and black oppressed. The students have realised their demands involve much broader changes in the social system. They are anti-capitalist. The ambivalence of the teachers during the boycott must be seen in this context. The question it raises is whether the petty bourgeoisie can be relied on to adopt a position that does not further its petty-bourgeois interests. The teachers in the coloured schools have shown themselves fairly unreliable in this regard, choosing rather to act in an individualistic manner to secure their own interests.

It seems that despite the initial emphasis on discussion by the students, very few schools have run adequate awareness programmes, with assistance offered by teachers varying from school to school, as well as within each school. There has been a real need for leadership by radical, sympathetic teachers in assisting in the design of programmes as well as



in the provision of resources. As a whole the teachers have been inconsistent in this regard and, in a large number of cases, can be said to have failed in one of the areas where they had the most to contribute.

On Friday 80.05.02 the Committee of 81 rejected an offer of negotiation by

Marais Steyn, the Minister of Coloured Relations. Their argument was that he had not been elected by the majority of South Africa's people, and that they could therefore not negotiate with him. When 20 members of the Committee were fetched from their homes by security police and taken to a meeting to be told that Louis le

Grange, the Minister of Police wanted to meet them, the Committee decided to refuse to meet him.

The refusal by the coloured students to meet Steyn demonstrates a difference in strategy coloured and african students. Fezeka, the Guguletu african high school, had initiated their own boycott on 80.02.15, after their principal had rejected their demands concerning school uniforms, increases in school fees, enforced homework periods and the shortage of textbooks. This was partially resolved within a week after staff, students and parents met. The 800 Fezeka students boycotted again on 80.04.14 after making their demands that an SRC, made up of two representatives from each class, be recognised. The next day, at a meeting of the parents' committee and the students, it was decided that students would return to class on 80.04.16.

On 80.05.03 Fezeka students joined the nation-wide boycott, making their own demands and pledging solidarity with other schools. After three days of boycotting, a joint meeting of teachers, parents and students decided to end the boycott. Fezeka decided (80.05.08) to organise a week-long awareness programme.

The next day representatives from Langa High, Fezeka High, Sizamile High and ID Mkize, the four african high schools in Cape Town, took a list of their grievances to their principals. The demands related to the state of the school buildings, the lack of textbooks, compulsory school fees, lack of electricity,

the lack of laboratories and libraries and the lack of SRCs.

The Fezeka students joined the boycott again on 80.05.13. After being approached by students, the Guguletu Residents Association (GRA) declared its support for the students' stand. On 80.05.19 a meeting was called by the GRA to enable parents, teachers and students to find a solution to the problems at these schools, with the students represented by the newly-formed pupils' regional committee. The decision was to send a 10-member delegation of residents of Guguletu, Langa and Nyanga to take the students' grievances to the circuit inspector, Mr P Scheepers. The students would continue boycotting. When the delegation went to Mr Scheepers the next day, they were given the assurance that the pupils' grievances would receive urgent attention. No action has followed Mr Scheepers' assurance, and during the first week of June a delegation approached the Minister.

It is the question of whether or not to negotiate with their respective authorities that the african and coloured students have disagreed over. While there has been a strong current of non-racialism' (WIP 12) in the schools boycott, there have also been disagreements between african students on the one hand, and coloured and indian students on the other. But this should however not be seen in racial terms. It should be explained in terms of the adoption of alternative strategies in school situations that differ because of the different authorities

involved, and in terms of the fact that Fezeka had had a process for achieving changes relating to their school conditions since February.

The Committee of 81 issued a call in the middle of May to coloured and Indian students to inform their parents of the issues involved in the boycott, and to get their organised support. They specifically recommended that Parent-Teacher Associations be altered to include students. It seems that this call has been taken up in different ways, with some schools acting promptly, and others not forming Parent-Teacher-Student Associations (PISA's). In some areas, the local Ratepayers and Tenants Associations have been strong forces in the development of PISA's. On the whole, even where they have been set up, the response from parents has been disinterested, and the teachers have been relatively uninvolved. The involvement of the coloured parents stands in stark contrast to the support and participation by the parents of Langa, Guguletu and Nyanga.

On 80.05.10 the Committee of 81 decided on a 21-day truce until 80.06.06. The students agreed to return to school on Monday 80.05.19. It was at this stage that the 'Manifesto to the People of Azania' was issued outlining the students' demands relating to text books, school buildings, release of detainees, improved facilities, recognition of SRC's, adequately trained teachers, expulsions and intimidation, the narrow range of subjects offered, the permit system for

entry into certain educational institutions, equalisation of per capita expenditure on all students, removal of examination fees, the scrapping of the Junior Primary Teachers Diploma, and recommendations relating to examinations for 1980.

The boycott was resumed in protest against the closure of Fort Hare University and in support of the meat workers' strike, which had started that same week. The government threatened to expel any student who did not attend school on Monday 80.05.26.

Saturday 80.05.24 saw one of the most irresponsible displays by the students when thousands converged on major shopping centres and the centre of Cape Town, as part of a plan aimed at crippling Saturday morning trading mainly at white-owned supermarkets.

It is here that the 'spontaneist' tendency referred to before, begins to come to the fore. Why did this trend emerge only at this stage? Is there any explanation for the changes in the actions of the school students? I would argue that the reason why the 'spontaneist' trend became so clearly visible is because the change in the nature of the demands being made provided fuel for this political approach, which was already present.

'The Manifesto' issued on 80.05.15 contains two different sections. It starts by explaining the decision to end the boycott for three weeks in terms of the need to consolidate 'our forces'. 'We

have not been forced by the fascist rulers to go back. We decide what we do from a position of strength and unity'. Given the fact that student organisation in Cape Town was very unsophisticated at the beginning of the boycott, this decision to consolidate the strength of the students was most important. In the ultimatum, the second section of 'The Manifesto', the students' demands are laid out. Here three different kinds of demands are laid down - short-term demands (those to be met immediately), medium-term demands (to be responded to with 'a firm commitment (by the government) with full details to be given on this'), and then long-term demands. The students stated that the government should give a 'definite policy statement' on these long term demands. This should be contrasted with the earlier statement in which the students stated that the weapon of boycott could only be used for short-term demands to be met. The students raised as demands a number of areas which are not achievable by means of boycott - for example

"We demand a policy statement on the scrapping of BAD, CAD and IAD (Bantu Affairs, Coloured Affairs and Indian Affairs Departments) - and wish to be merged into one educational authority for all students in South Africa. We reject racism and all its manifestations. We reject the divide and rule tactics of this regime. We demand justice and freedom"

In some of the pamphlets put out after the manifesto, this is developed further. The focus of the pamphlets is no longer on particular demands. One argues that 'the struggle for education is part of the

larger struggle'. In identifying capitalist exploitation as the fundamental problem, while at the same time not clearly stating the limits to the school boycott, the students undermined the successful organisation which had taken place thusfar. Many students had their heads turned from the issues relating to their schools to the 'broader system' - but without realising that while one's long term aim may be anti-capitalist, there are limitations to one's power. The later part of the boycott has been characterised by fiery anti-capitalist rhetoric which has stirred up the students' interest, but given it no channel through which to act.

The students' actions at the shopping centres (of unshelving products, particularly meat, and packing trolleys without paying for the goods) were a direct result of the fact that no clear strategy of realisable demands was being articulated. This action, in which 105 students were arrested, drew much criticism - especially from the meat workers who reiterated their request that all support activities be approved by them first.

On Tuesday 80.06.27 the government withdrew its threat from the previous week to expel students when students boycotted in defiance. Two days later the government issued a statement concerning long-term improvements in coloured education. The special grant for textbooks would be increased, the school building programme would be stepped up, repairs to damaged schools would be speeded up, and new

schools would be built with adequate facilities. In addition it was announced that new Technikons and an agricultural college were to be opened.

During that week there were a number of instances of unrest - on the University of the Western Cape (UWC) campus where rector Van der Ross called the police in; at Nyanga station where police dispersed 300 students going to a meeting; in Halt Road where repeated baton-charges on 400 students lining the road and stoning cars resulted in two youths being shot.

The Committee of 81, which had decided to function as far as possible through regional committees because of police harassment, issued a statement appealing to students to avoid direct confrontation with police (80.06.29). 'Any violence on the part of students will be against the decision of the Committee of 81'. The statement said that the decision had been taken 'in the light of the new strategy of the community which entails complete non-violence and an intensification of the mobilisation of the broader community'. What was being referred to here was the fact that throughout all the Cape Flats communities there were community meetings being held on a wide range of issues, including the school boycott and the meat strike. These meetings became the central means of co-ordinating action, of informing people of issues and developments, and of keeping people's interest/involvement going.

The statement also emphasised the democratic structure of the schools

boycott. 'Decisions taken by the committee were not forced on the schools and educational institutions they represented, but were taken from mandates received from representatives from their respective institutions.'

The double funeral of the two youths shot in Halt Road became a peaceful demonstration as people, mainly students, joined the procession stretching for 2 km, as the bodies were transported from the church to the cemetery.

Throughout the last week of May, and during June there were widespread detentions with many pupils being detained in pre-dawn raids. 41 students were arrested and charged with public violence after police, having forced the gates open, baton-charged a group of pupils inside the grounds of Bellville South High School.

On 30.06.04 the Committee of 81, after a series of meetings, decided to end the boycott and called on students to return to school on Monday 30.06.09 to discuss the boycott and decide whether they should end it or not. In a statement on 30.06.06 the Committee said that students were being called on to reinforce awareness programmes on current issues.

"The Committee also realises that the students and the general community are starting to see the boycott in its historical perspective, and the students understand that the real power lies with the workers and it is for workers to make the fundamental demands".

The oppressed community has been indoctrinated by government propaganda, and the entire community 'should actively

counteract this by organising community programmes, voicing their frustrations and discussing how to remedy their dissatisfaction'.

On Tuesday 10th June the Committee of 81, acting on the mandates of 60 schools and educational institutions, decided to continue the boycott. The Committee called for the release of all detainees, the reinstatement of suspended pupils, and pledged their support for the planned stayaway and the bus boycott.

In the second last week of term the rectors of training and technical colleges refused to act on the instruction from the secretary of Coloured Relations, demanding the expulsion of all boycotting students. The following day, 30.06.13, 3 000 students from these institutions staged a walk-off and decided to stay away from the campuses until July when they expect to be unconditionally reinstated.

The Prime Minister announced that a comprehensive investigation of all aspects of South African education was to be launched through the Human Sciences Research Council. The following day, 30.06.14, a pamphlet 'Our Aim: Education for All' was distributed over the Peninsula. The pamphlet quoted extensively from Prime Minister Botha.

During the holidays, students in some schools have decided to hold study groups with assistance from sympathetic teachers, in an attempt to cover part of the work which they have missed. This is in response to the realisation that unless some attempt was made to cover this work, the

whole year would have to be written off, which would in itself prevent any resolution of the boycott. At this stage, there have been no indications of what the students intentions are.

The schools boycott has raised two major issues - the one relating to the way in which the students have understood their education, and conceptualised their current struggle, and the other relating to the manner in which the organisation of the boycott has been undertaken.

I have already dealt with the fact that the students have not seen their struggle simply as an educational issue. They have examined the educational system from the point of view of the provision of skills necessary for the maintenance of an exploitative system. I have also pointed to the negative way in which the anti-capitalist understanding of their position manifested itself at a particular point in the boycott. Throughout the boycott the students have stressed the need for discussion both within the student body and with the community generally. They have however not been entirely successful in this aim. The democratic form of organisation that has emerged during the boycott has certainly aided the educational aspect of the boycott. But the violations of the majority decisions are indicators of a weakness in the student organisation. The students have aimed to encourage thorough discussion of strategic as well as analytical questions, but one must question the extent to which this has taken place. At various s es,

large numbers of children were not even going to school grounds, let alone participating in awareness programmes. The form of organisation has developed out of the situation, and has tried to move away from a division between a leadership group and the student body to a situation in which decision-making has been decentralised to a large degree. For this to be a successful way of organising, widespread understanding of the issues is essential.

THE MEAT STRIKE.

THE EVENTS leading to the industry-wide strike of 750 meat workers in Cape Town, which is at the time of writing in its seventh week, involved disputes in two meat factories - Table Bay Cold Storage, and National Meat Supply (NMS). In April the Western Province General Workers Union (WPGWU), representing 100 workers at Table Bay (all members of the union), sent a letter to the management requesting a meeting at which the workers' democratically elected committee of 6 workers would be introduced. Management convened a meeting but insisted that a liaison committee only would be recognised, and that the workers should dissociate themselves from the union - this last point despite the fact that the workers had not demanded final recognition of their union. The workers refused to accept a liaison committee or the conditions laid down by management. The union sent out a second letter repeating the workers' stand on these issues.



On 80.05.07 the workers went to work but refused to start work until Mr Selzer, the managing director, had spoken to them. They were duly addressed by Mr Selzer, and representatives from the Department of Manpower Utilisation. The workers refused to accept the conditions offered to them and left the factory. The following day they returned to work and indicated that if management recognised their committees, they would work.

Management refused and told the workers to take their money and leave. The workers refused their money, and left.

The next day, 90.05.09, the Joint Meat Workers Committee, representing 14 factories, convened a meeting and drew up a letter to Table Bay management, copies of which were sent to the managements of all other meat factories. The meat workers indicated that they were not prepared to do the work of the Table Bay

members for them. On May 10th, 500 meat workers held a mass meeting to discuss the Table-Bay dispute.

On Monday 30.05.12 the Table Bay workers returned to work to hear management's response. Mr Selzer refused to speak to them, but sent a message to the workers that they had terminated their contracts by striking (they are all contract workers) and should collect their pay and leave. The workers refused to collect their pay and left the factory,

where there were a large number of police. Management issued a statement repeating their basic points and claiming the collective support of all meat employers in their stand.

The dispute at National Meat Supply (NMS) involved 250 workers approaching management for recognition of an unregistered democratically elected workers committee representing all workers, african and coloured. NMS agreed to recognise the committee if it represented

african workers only. The workers' rejection of this is in line with WPCWU policy.

A meeting of all meat workers on Saturday 30.05.17 decided that the Table Bay workers committee should go again to the firm on Monday morning and try to discuss the position. The Table Bay committee was accompanied by worker representatives from each of the other meat firms. Mr Selzer refused to talk to the committee and when the representatives reported back to their firms, about 750 workers walked out in a one day protest. On Tuesday 30.05.20, when the workers returned to work to demand a settlement at Table Bay and NMS, they found the riot police surrounding all the firms. The workers were locked out at nearly 20 factories. 400 workers walked to Langa where they held a meeting. They decided to stay on strike until the following demands were met:

1. The unconditional reinstatement of all meat workers;
2. The recognition of an unregistered workers committee at Table Bay Cold Storage.
3. The recognition of an unregistered workers committee at National Meat Supply.

On 30.05.23 the employers in the Cape Town Meat Industry and Livestock Agencies issued a joint statement, a half-page paid for advertisement, 'to correct the misconception about the current labour unrest in this industry.' They maintained that the workers had bypassed



normal channels, and had

"reverted to illegal strike action before attempting to discuss their claims in a constitutional manner... The employers' position is to show that such irresponsible and illegal strike action which tends to escalate conflict and promote confrontation will not succeed".

SUPPORT FOR THE STRIKE.

On 80.05.22 the workers called for support in three areas:

1. Financial support to enable the workers to stay out until their demands were met.
2. Support for a red meat boycott;
3. Discouragement of scab labour in the meat firms.

Many community organisations, ratepayer and tenant associations, organisations of students and pupils, and the butcheries in the african townships endorsed the call for the boycott.

During the preceding week, the 17 butcheries had closed due to community pressure. The Union appealed to the community to allow them to sell their old stock and to sell chicken and eggs. When the call for a red meat boycott was formalised, all 17 butcheries agreed to sell chicken only. These sympathetic organisations were invited by the union to elect representatives to a boycott-support committee which would co-ordinate and direct support activities. The meat workers made it quite clear that they were to lead all activities connected with the meat strike, and that no organisation should take any initiative on its own. The action of the students

in the supermarkets, in which meat was one of the main products to be unshelved, was one violation of this request.

The union has so far received R60 000 in donations, with a large proportion of this support coming from low-paid workers, arriving in small but regular contributions. Collection of money has been organised in various ways, on a door-to-door basis in townships and Cape Flats communities, and in factories. There have also been extensive collections from churches and from private individuals. Support committees have been set up in Johannesburg, Durban and Pietermaritzburg to co-ordinate fundraising activities in these areas. As yet, it is difficult to assess the contribution made by these centres.

The boycott call was rapidly taken up in the black areas of the Western Cape with pupil/student organisations and the large number of community meetings that were being held at the time playing an important role in spreading the boycott. The butchers of the Cape Flats were pressurised by the communities to take a stand. Representatives went to the meat bosses on 80.05.22 to urge them to negotiate a settlement. This attempt failed. The 180 butchers came out in support of the boycott on 80.06.02 when they decided to stop selling red meat. However, after 3 days 150 of these butchers started selling red meat again; this points to the conflicting interests of the meat workers and the petty-bourgeois butchers. The people in the community

have remained committed to their boycott and these 150 butchers have reported very low sales. By the sixth week of the strike, many butchers felt that they might be forced out of business by the deadlock situation.

On 80.06.23 a statement issued by a spokesman for the butchers appealed to employers to begin negotiations so that the situation could be normalised as soon as possible.

On 80.06.09 the union issued a statement to the effect that they had been approached by people elsewhere in the country to make the boycott a national affair. The reason for this is that the entire South African meat industry is controlled by three large conglomerate companies. The parent companies of the Cape Town meat enterprise are based outside of Cape Town. An article in the Sunday Express (80.06.22) announced that three major Soweto organisations - AZAPO, Soweto Civic Association and the Soweto Traders Association had pledged their support for a red meat boycott, as well as pledging financial backing to the WPGWU. Three Consultative Committee trade unions and the Black Housewives League also agreed to support the boycott. If this Transvaal boycott is successful, it could have a significant effect on the present deadlock situation.

It appears that the meat bosses are having severe difficulties with scab labour. Some 15% of the original labour force did not go on strike. Apart from these workers, the companies have been

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The nature of WIP, which is to stimulate debate and present controversial views, ensures that the opinions expressed do not necessarily reflect the views of the editorial collective.

Editorial

THIS EDITION of Work In Progress explores a number of the questions raised in the editorial of WIP 12. There, we suggested that working class issues extended well beyond the factory floor, or 'point of production', and in some cases included matters related to transport, rents and education.

The issues of transport and black education are dealt with in some detail in the articles that follow. The long contribution on the Western Cape includes sections on both the schools boycott and the Cape Town bus boycott, and explores the content and dynamics of these issues. 2 case studies on bus boycotts (Madadeni-Umizweni, and Hammarisdale) suggest that the question of transport may have a working class content, especially when working class areas are situated some distance from industrial and commercial centres, and transport fares are a large and recurrent expense for workers.

These contributions are a specific intervention in certain debates. There are those who have argued that working class organisation should be confined to factory floor issues: this position has reflected legitimate concern that wider issues have often seen the subordination of worker interests to those of the petty bourgeoisie or other classes. A

number of 'political' and 'community' issues have seen the de-emphasising of worker interests within broad alliances organised around notions like 'the community', 'blacks', 'the people', etc.

However, recent developments have suggested that alliances led by working class interests can take up 'community' issues such as rents and transport without any necessary loss of a working class content.

Underlying this position is the idea that the capitalist separation between factory and community can be overcome in struggle and through organisation, and WIP has attempted to document certain instances of this where a working class interest has dominated the alliances involved in such activity.

There is a second major theme in this WIP, which runs through the contribution on the press, as well as the two sections dealing with resistance to the imposition of 'ethnic education'. Ultimately, the institutions of the ruling classes (be they the schools of uantu Education or the commercial press) serve the interests of that class and function to maintain the existing structure of society. A national press that is not a capitalist press is impossible to imagine within the confines of capitalist society, as is a non-oppressive educational system. However, as the contributions referred to above argue, the major institutions of ideological control (the media, education)

using casual scab labour. The meat bosses have found it hard to keep these scabs at work because of community pressure on them not to take such jobs, and because many complain that the jobs entail very heavy work. The level of production is apparently very low. Reports from butchers and a meat processing factory indicate that they are not receiving any stock. During the week 9 - 15 June, three meat ships docked in the Cape Town harbour and there was no meat to be loaded.

ATTEMPTS TO END THE STRIKE.

There have been various attempts to end the dispute. I have already mentioned the attempt by representatives of the Cape Butchers Association (CBA) at the end of May. On the 9th or 10th of June, the chairman of this association, Mr Jaffer, spoke to one of the meat firm managers who indicated that he was prepared to take his workers back, but that the other managements, particularly Table Bay Cold Storage and National Meat Supply, were still intransigent. A further meeting between the CBA and the managers was suggested, but this meeting has not taken place.

On 30.06.06 the Progressive Federal Party (PFP) issued a statement to the effect that the Regional Council of the party was to request a meeting with employers in the meat industry. A decision on whether or not to support the meat boycott and the strike would be taken in the light of the Regional executive report, to be submitted by 30.06.11. The decision was that the PFP could not support the

boycott. PFP representatives did meet with the meat employers and in a statement issued on 30.06.12. Mr Philip Hyburgh indicated that 'management was more than prepared to negotiate with a properly elected workers committee.' According to them, therefore, the dispute does not focus on the issue of workers committees, as is claimed by the workers. Management is not, however, prepared to negotiate the return of workers who went on strike! The PFP representative had, however, indicated to the union officials that both the workers committee and the return of the workers were non-negotiable as far as the employers were concerned.

On 30.06.26 Dr Boraine of the PFP issued a further statement requesting that the government release the detained union officials 'so that they could play their rightful role in ending the deadlock which was hurting all parties concerned'. Boraine also said that 'In separate discussions with management and workers it is clear that there is considerable difference of opinion as to the basic causes of the dispute.' He called on management to use the initiative which lay with them to open negotiations.

Bishop Tutu of the South African Council of Churches offered his services as mediator in the meat dispute, in a press statement he issued. As yet, nothing has come of this.

Various churchmen have come out in support of the meatworkers and issued statements urging the employers to enter into negotiations. Both the Catholic and

and Anglican Bishops of Cape Town have made statements on the strike.

It is quite clear that the WPGWU has used every avenue open to it in attempts to get the negotiation process started.

STATE INTERVENTION IN THE STRIKE.

The state has been characterised by unprecedented strike intervention. On 30.05.23 the meat bosses attended a meeting with Mr Morrison, deputy minister of the Department of Co-operation and Development. A statement was issued indicating that the government and the bosses had decided on a common line of action to settle the dispute. No clarity has been provided as to what this line of action is. The only indication of its nature can be gauged from the form that the rest of state intervention has taken.

On 30.05.29 two of the union's organisers, Dave Lewis and Ji Cooper, were detained under section 22 of the General Law Amendment Act, and were subsequently transferred to section 10 of the Internal Security Act, which allows for indefinite detention. Subsequently, on 30.06.13, two people who helped the WPGWU, Mike Morris and John Frankish, were also detained under section 22, and then transferred to section 10 detention. On 30.06.20, another two organisers were picked up by police at 5-30am: at the time of writing, Wilson Sidina is still being held under section 22, while Zora Mhlamakulu was released later the same day, after being questioned.

Another organiser, Rev H Maravu, was detained for questioning for three hours.

Various pamphlets put out by the union have been banned. During the week 9 - 15 June, several people were arrested and charged with offences relating to the meat strike.

On 80.06.12, 42 striking workers were arrested for pass offences in a police raid on Table Bay Cold Storage hostel. They appeared in court later that day, and after being refused bail were told that they would appear in court again on Wednesday 80.06.18. The magistrate found all 42 workers guilty of being in Cape Town illegally. The prosecutor asked the court to caution and discharge the men, who were then sent back to the Transkei on 80.06.19 under police escort. The union said that these workers would be called back if the meat dispute was settled.

On 80.06.02 the state raised the floor price of meat by 25%. This floor price is the statutory minimum price paid by the Meat Board for meat at auctions. Its direct effect is to ensure a minimum price for the farmers. The raising of the floor price indirectly decreases the pressure from farmers on the meat industry due to decreased production caused by the strike, as well as the decreased consumption due to the boycott.

One needs to ask why support for the meat strike has been particularly widespread, and why the support from the black communities has been so strong. The answer seems to lie in the nature of the demand being made. The demand for democratically elected representation

and active participation in processes affecting one's own position is an integral part of most struggles by the oppressed people in South Africa. Seen in this context, the meat workers demand for a democratically elected workers committee takes on an added significance as part of a more general struggle. The government's ban on all meetings related to strikes and boycotts is directed against the support that has been given to these struggles. Not only has the ban placed a further restriction on the WPGWU, in that it prevents any co-ordinated decision-making and action. It has added implication for the meat workers' strike because of the reliance of the union on community support for the red meat boycott and for financial assistance. Both of these issues had been raised at community meetings where union organisers and meat workers could explain the issues involved in the strike and elaborate on the workers' calls. Community organisation in Cape Town is not strong enough at the moment for community awareness to be sustained without regular meetings.

One has also to question the high degree of state intervention in this strike, and the nature of the interventions made. As yet, none of the state's actions have been directed towards negotiation and settlement of the dispute. The workers' demand for an unregistered elected workers committee is an entirely reasonable one. But the state's response has been repressive. The state has allowed the meat managements to adopt a

particularly aggressive stand in a politically extremely explosive situation in the Western Cape. The roles of the various organs of the state from the beginning of the dispute, and the state-tolerated intransigence of the employers raises the question of whether this strike is being used in an attempt to crush progressive trade unionism amongst workers in the Western Cape. This should be examined in the light of the WPGWU's stand against registration under the conditions laid down by the Wiehahn Commission; it should also be viewed in the light of the strength displayed by the WPGWU's members in the stevedores' dispute at the beginning of the year, where the union gained recognition of the workers' right to be members of the WPGWU and to have union representatives in an observer capacity, despite the fact that WPGWU is unregistered.

THE BUS BOYCOTT.

ON SUNDAY 80.05.25 a meeting of 40 community organisations decided to implement a mass boycott of buses as from 80.06.02. A Bus Action Committee was set up to co-ordinate the boycott. Throughout the following week, community meetings were held in all the Western Cape townships to discuss and endorse the meeting's decision. Action committees were elected to take responsibility for the organisation of the boycott within the communities. In most areas, central pick-up points were organised so that those who had cars could assist those

who had no alternative means of transport. Over the weekend, the school students went from door to door pointing out why there was a need for a bus boycott and explaining what arrangements had been made for it.

They explained that the call for a boycott had been made in response to fares being increased by between 30% and 100%. The increases were in accordance with the decision of the National Transport Commission on the recent application by City Tramways Company, which controls most bus transport in Cape Town. This company had been unsuccessful in raising bus fares towards the end of last year.

The boycott began on Monday 80.06.02 in an already militant atmosphere created by the 6 week-long school boycott, the lock out of the meat workers, and the boycott of red meat. Very few people caught buses on Monday morning and on some routes the buses were completely empty. People either walked to work, hitched lifts from those with cars, or caught trains, although some townships, such as Hanover Park, are not served by the railways. During the day on Monday, there was one stoning incident in Halt Road, Elsie's River, the area in which two people had been shot dead by police the previous week. On Monday night, however, stoning of 80 buses caused City Tramways to withdraw services from Cape Flats townships.

Normal services were resumed on Tuesday morning. Fifteen buses were stoned and most buses were half full. City Tramways announced that the company

would begin adjusting the services to meet the demand. People on the Cape Flats had organised themselves more effectively, with many of them displaying placards with their destinations on them. Taxis were charging lower than normal rates to ferry people to work. The fare being charged was only slightly more than the bus fare. On Tuesday night, 50 more buses were stoned, in the course of which two drivers were injured. The Cape Times of 80.06.04 reported that City Tramways had decided to run services only on demand from Howbray to Claremont. These buses did not, however, go all the way to their normal destinations. Buses from Howbray went to Mannenburg Police Station in Klip Road, and from Claremont along Lansdowne Road to Nyanga Station in Duinefontein Road.

During the course of Wednesday, 80.06.04, 66 buses were stoned in the township of Elsie's River, Ravensmead and Heideveld. The reduced bus service was still carrying only half its capacity. The services to more areas were cut off because of stonings, for example the service to Elsie's River. The South African Railways announced that they had put additional trains on the lines to Nyanga, a route servicing Nyanga, Guguletu and Langa that was no longer served by buses due to the lack of demand, and stone throwing. City Tramways confirmed that they had cancelled five buses the previous day and three buses on Wednesday. Police confirmed that they had made nine arrests and charges of public violence had been

laid.

On Thursday a spokesman for the Tramways and Omnibus Workers Union said that City Tramways had been asked to attach grids to bus windows to protect drivers from stone throwing. More drivers had been injured during the preceding days. He also said that the bus boycott was to put City Tramways out of business and added that commuters had had their opportunity to air their grievances in the Supreme Court and to the National Transport Commission.

On Friday 80.06.06 a spokesman for City Tramways declined to comment on the drivers' request. He also explained that the company was unlikely to suffer any financial loss in the long run, since it would carry the cost only up to a point, and then the cost would be passed on to the commuter in the form of increased fares or would have to be recovered from the government in the form of a subsidy or grant.

Friday saw a heightened level of violence, with services to Elsie's River being withdrawn. Buses were stoned in Athlone, Retreat, Phillippi and Grassy Park. A City Tramways spokesman said that bus services were running at about 50% of trips. Police set up road blocks throughout the Peninsula and the Western Cape Divisional area in a 'routine' blitz on Thursday night. They searched cars and checked on the number of passengers being carried.

On Saturday morning 130 000 pamphlets signed by 'Concerned Citizens of Cape

Town' were dropped from a light aircraft over Mitchell's Plain and Athlone. The pamphlets talked about the position of the bus drivers, and ended with the call 'Let's not be foolish. Stop the boycott.' Over the weekend the Bus Action Committee met and decided to continue the boycott. The pamphlets appear not to have had any noticeable effect.

City Tramways said on Monday 80.06.09 that the bus services continued to be under-used. They had had to limit their services in two areas on Monday night. People continued to hitch lifts along all the main roads leading to places of work. Many people used their cars as a ferry system from particular points in the communities. On Tuesday 80.06.10 the already overloaded Cape Flats railway system produced delays when only one half of the line between Langa and Bonteheuvel could be used due to repair work. Some people felt that this had been deliberately done to inconvenience them so that they would end the boycott.

On 80.06.12 a high school student was knocked down by a bus after pupils had been helping to organise lifts for people boycotting buses near Hanover Park bus terminus. There are conflicting stories as to the exact nature of the accident but it was one incident in the midst of escalating stoning, violence and police action in the bus boycott. The police had intervened at Hanover Park to prevent people from allegedly removing others from buses.

Until 80.06.13, when meetings were

banned, community meetings had been held extensively and had played a central role in keeping the boycott going and in ironing out problems that emerged. For example, in Langa a community meeting set a maximum fare of 25c for taxis along normal bus routes between townships. Anyone who was charged more than this was asked to report the vehicle registration number to the local bus action group. This enabled the Bus Action Committee, with the support of the particular community, to approach the taxi drivers and thus control the prices. This is the way in which community involvement in the bus boycott has enabled the Bus Action Committee to co-ordinate events. This kind of community-based democratic organisation has been an important part of all the struggles in Cape Town over the last three months.

Throughout the following two weeks, the Bus Action Committee and City Tramways have issued pamphlets and statements arguing their respective cases. The Argus carried an article on 80.06.26 claiming that the bus service had been 'cut by 50% last week and was providing only a token service to certain townships'. The token service to Langa, Nyanga and Guguletu, was not being used, according to a City Tramways spokesman. It appears that there has been a further increase in the fares being charged on certain routes.

GENERAL.

DURING THE last two months there have been a number of work stoppages and day-long

strikes in the Western Cape, in which demands for higher wages have been made. In all of them, the impending increase in bus fares has been specifically mentioned as one of the main hardships.

3 000 workers downed tools at lunch-time on 30.05.21 at the clothing factory, Rex Trueform, in protest against the steep increases in busfares due to come into effect a week later. Workers received a letter from management saying that wages were under investigation, and that workers could be assured of an increase. The Garment Workers Union executive met with management during the course of the afternoon. The following day a 10% across the board wage increase was granted by the industrial council, although the Garment Workers Union emphasised that the increases had not 'been granted as a result of work stoppage at Rex Trueform, but because of increased bus-fares'.

200 workers at Tej knitwear factory in Steenberg stopped work for several hours on 80.05.27, demanding a R3 increase in their attendance allowance, which was then R1. The Garment Workers Union, which represents the workers in that industry, had already negotiated a 10% increase for all knitting workers, and agreed to make representation to the industrial council on the issue of the increased attendance bonuses. The workers complained that the R1 was not enough to cover the increased bus-fares.

On 80.06.02 workers at Fine Chemicals in Epping refused to work, in support of demands for higher wages and a

democratically elected workers committee. The demand for higher wages was 'in response to the rising cost of living and the increased bus fares'. Management was having discussions with them. No further reports were made on this strike.

On 80.06.03, 28 temporary staff members in the mail section of Africa Mail Advertising walked out in a dispute over wages and transport. The workers asked for a wage increase due to the increase in bus fares, and for transport for the duration of the bus boycott. The management refused to discuss grievances on 3rd and 4th of June, and no subsequent reports appeared on this strike.

400 construction workers at a water treatment plant of LIA Construction Company in Blackheath downed tools in a wage dispute, because of bus fares, on 80.06.03. After a two day stoppage they returned to work having been given an assurance that the firm would 'do its best to see that wages were raised.' An immediate increase was problematic, however, and workers were told to wait until the next Wage Board determination in September.

On 80.06.10, 800 workers downed tools on the Model-Morris building site at Mitchell's Plain business centre because of a dispute over the new Industrial Council wages agreement for the building industry. After being assured that the matters they had raised would be taken up at Industrial Council level, the men returned to work on 80.06.12, but again stopped later the same day. It appears

that the issue has not yet been resolved and that there are divisions amongst the workers as to how the issue should be tackled. Some are happy to process their demands through the Industrial Council. Other workers handed management a petition on 80.06.12, demanding a general increase for all workers on the site, labourers and artisans and demanding that the holiday fund section of salaries be included in pay packets. The petition argued that the demands were due to the cost of living and the inflation rate.

A stayaway was called on the 16th and 17th of June throughout the country, but the response to the call in the Western Cape was unique. It has been estimated that 70% of the workers in the Western Cape stayed away from work on the 16th and that although more people were at work on the 17th, still more than half of the coloured and african workforce stayed at home. An estimate by the Cape Employers' Association was a 60% stayaway on Tuesday 17th.

In the clothing industry, some 400 factories employing 50 000 workers had to stop production and losses of four to five million rand were incurred. Building construction sites were inactive - attendance in the building industry was described as 'pretty poor' by the chairman of the Building Industrial Council. There was a 75% stayaway on the docks. Bread and milk deliveries were severely disrupted. All shops in Athlone closed for the two days

in accordance with a decision by the Athlone Business and Professional Traders Association.

From 80.06.16, the unrest and violence which had been restricted to the stoning of buses and motorists by students became more widespread. The authorities have ascribed this to the 'skollie' element. What is apparent is that this 'skollie element' is not a definable group of people. There are a number of factors which lead to people in particular circumstances behaving in a violent way. None of these can be seen to offer a complete explanation. Le Grange, commenting on the violence, said:

"All I say is that we no longer have to do here with school, meat or bus boycotters. We are concerned now with criminal, violent, skollie elements and we will act relentlessly against them. No longer is this community action, but a case of completely irresponsible elements."

The actions of the state had, on the one hand, limited the extent to which people could constructively participate in community action, and on the other, had increased the direct confrontation. At the same time, the state had taken little direct action to address itself to the grievances and demands that had been articulated.

The banning of political meetings and the communities' apparent acceptance of the ban, can be said to have had an escalating effect on the unrest. To argue this, one has to examine the role that meetings were playing in the communities. From the end of May, it had been precisely these meet-

ings through which people were informed of events and issues, were politicised and through which action was co-ordinated. These meetings had kept people motivated and directed. They had channeled people's frustration, anger and commitment in certain constructive directions. The vacuum that was left by the banning of political meetings had more severe results because it had been preceded by the arrest and detention of many community leaders.

But that is not a sufficient explanation. The provocation provided by excessive police action on a number of occasions is, under the circumstances of the Western Cape over the last three months, a very important factor. The 'police protection' provided for the workers who intended going to work on the 16th and 17th was seen by many as an act of aggression. The baton-charging of 200 singing people at midnight on 30.06.61 in Mfuleni (in which one policeman was stabbed to death), the shooting of at least 42 people in the course of four days and the use of tear gas and roadblocks all over the Cape Flats, all served to increase the anger.

The violence of that week centred on particular areas - mainly in Elsies River, Ravensmead, Retreat, Valhalla Park, Steenberg, Mannenberg and Parkwood. In these areas people erected makeshift barricades of burning tyres, mattresses and bedsteads across many of the main service roads. There were reports of stoning of cars and buses from a large number of areas. On the evening of 30.06.17, looting and arson began. Supermarkets were looted,

factories, shops and schools in some areas were set alight. At 19h50 the police received instructions to use shotguns when they came across looters. The papers carry many reports of instances where the police opened fire on crowds.

Until meetings were banned on 30.06.13 the intention was to hold peaceful meetings on Monday and Tuesday to commemorate the events of 1976. These were being organised within communities. After the ban, these meetings were cancelled. In some areas pamphlets were distributed explaining why the scheduled meetings had been cancelled. The people who had been organising the stayaway and commemoration activities made a concerted attempt to persuade ministers in various churches to devote part of their services to remembering 1976.

Despite the fact that political action in the Western Cape over the last three months shows a marked sophistication and political maturing since, for example, 1976, it must not be misread. There are still a number of problems that hinder organisation in the Western Cape. Despite the fact that extensive organisation has occurred over the past three months, it must be recognised that organisations are not, as yet, very strong. There remains a very real need for consolidation to take place to provide strength for mobilisation of a united response from Western Cape communities.

An indication of the growing strength of organisation in Cape Town, is the success of the June 16th stayaway. The

nature of this stayaway differs from the stayaways of 1976, in that, even more than then this stayaway was not directed against anything. It was neither a protest against something nor a demand for a specific issue. If anything, it was a statement that the oppressed people in South Africa can choose how to commemorate their history. The fact that a stayaway was successfully called for without it being directed at a particular achievable goal, is a real indicator of the breadth of organisation in Cape Town. I would argue that it is on the basis of the comparative strength of the organisation in Cape Town as opposed to elsewhere in the country, that one can understand why the success of the stayaways was restricted to this area. It is not sufficient to explain it by arguing that it was called for when there were already campaigns being run. There are similar struggles taking place in other parts of South Africa as well. The question to be examined is how these struggles have been fought. The methods and strategies adopted in all the struggles in Cape Town have been aimed at strengthening the comparatively recent organisation of the people.

THE EDITORS of Work in Progress would appreciate receiving further contributions from the regions, such as the one on the Western Cape, above.

Farm Labour in the Western Cape

FOR THE last two decades small independent capitalist farmers in the rich fruit-growing areas of the Western Cape have been fighting a losing battle against giant national wine corporations, and even bigger multinational food producers. These big capitalist agricultural-businesses are capital intensive, replacing farm labourers with the advanced technology of the highly developed capitalist countries, and demanding higher skills from their work forces.(1) Although smaller farms in the area have benefitted from the increase in cheap labour thrown onto the market by these developments, they are rapidly finding themselves the dumping ground of the resulting unemployed 'surplus' population.(2)

(1) "The motive force of capitalist production, which is the creation of profits in order to accumulate more capital, is at the root cause of unemployment in South Africa....Put simply, there is a tendency for capitalism to utilise more and more productive machinery in order to increase the surplus produced by workers. This tendency means that.... as more machinery is introduced....fewer workers are employed". (Work In Progress 10 November 1979:i). For a discussion of capital intensity, and the replacement of workers by machinery, see the editorial in WIP 10.

(2) People excluded from employment are collectively referred to as the relative surplus population. "They form a surplus group relative to the average needs of

Among this hidden 'surplus' group in their 'volkenhuis' are those that cannot find work, together with the old, the maimed, the jobless youth and the alcoholic wake of the notorious tot system. As the low wages are driven lower and spread more and more thinly over a growing population, so 'informal' sector activity grows: petty trading, shebeens, prostitution and also violence and abuse of alcohol born of desperation.(3)

On a larger scale this situation is being paralleled in the 'coloured' townships of the urban concentrations in the in the area, where the numbers of those ejected from the surrounding farms are being swelled by the industrial reserve army of labour.(4) In Cape Town this has

capitalism for labour. But because capitalism's needs in this regard are not constant, the size of the relative surplus population changes under different circumstances". (WIP 10, November 1979:ii. The various forms the relative surplus population takes are discussed in the WIP 10 editorial).

(3) For a discussion of the 'informal sector' and a critique of the term, see David Webster's The Political Economy of Survival, Work In Progress 10, November 1979:57-64.

(4) "Part of the relative surplus population is referred to as the industrial reserve army of labour....This reserve army of labour fulfils a dual role within the economy. Firstly it provides a reserve

given rise to an increase of loosely organised gangs of unemployed, roaming the streets with knives and guns, preying on the classes above them on the income scale. The casualty rate is enormous. During a recent weekend in Cape Town there were 10 murders and 360 reported acts of violence. Police estimate this figure to represent about one third of actual acts of violence. The city has one of the highest per capita crime rates in the world. With no 'colouredstan'(5) in which to hide away the relative surplus population created by capitalism, the urban poor in the region are mobilising in a war for survival at a rate faster than the state can control by force.

This is a threat to capital in general through the destabilisation of the labour force and urgent representations have recently been made to the Minister of Police (!) by members of commerce and industry in Cape Town, calling on him to

of people (workers) who can be employed when the economy expands rapidly....and when new large scale (economic) activities are undertaken. Secondly, because of the competition for jobs between employed workers and unemployed workers who constitute the reserve army of labour, capitalists are able to keep wages down" (WIP 10:ii).

(5) One of the functions of the Bantustans is to ensure that unemployment amongst africans is 'hidden' in the rural areas, far away from the centres of production. Control of the african unemployed then falls upon the Bantustan administrations, rather than the central government. Because there is no similar 'Colouredstan' policy, unemployment amongst 'coloureds' has some different effects when compared to african unemployment.

exert more control over the unemployed and 'dangerous' classes.

This pilot study was done in an attempt to understand the movement of labour between the city and its rural hinterland. It was done in the Paarl-Wellington area and cannot thus be regarded as representative of the whole region: its aim was to assess the effects, rather than the degree, of unemployment and marginalisation, (6) migrancy and job insecurity among farm workers in the area. However, the labourers interviewed disclosed remarkably different job histories, exhibiting widely varying responses to the situation in which they found themselves.

The farm on which they worked (all four have subsequently left it) is a medium-sized stand backing into the Klein Drakenstein mountains near Wellington. It has plum and apricot orchards together with smallish fields of youngberries, strawberries and granadillas, and an olive orchard which is not yet producing a crop. There is also a small dairy herd, and some pigs.

DANIEL TENKWAN (23).

Born in De Aar, he reached Standard 8 before joining the railway offices there as a clerk. However, he met a girl from Wellington and they decided to settle

near her home and marry. The only work available to him there, he found, was farm labour and he managed to find work on the above farm in 1976. He was taken on at R10 a week and in four years it had risen to R13. He received a free house, firewood and half a bag of coarse meal a month, in addition to a large beaker of wine every weekday and two on Saturdays and Sundays. The two workers' toilets were communal and water was from an external tap. The house had no ceilings, and a concrete floor. It was intolerably hot in summer and cold in winter.

His hours of work were from 5.30 to 7.15, 8.00 to 13.00, and 16.00 to 18.15 on weekdays. Work on weekends consisted of milking at 5.30 to 7.00, and again from 18.15 to about 19.15. He was also required to feed the stock at weekends and light the fire for hot water in the farm house in the mornings. Total time worked came to about 50 hours a week, but he was on call at all times. He was the 'boss boy' and organised milking and feeding of stock, fencing, tree felling and planting, all tractor work and was a skilled power mower driver. He undertook all minor mechanical repairs on the farm.

On R13 a week Tenkwan supported a wife and two small children. Wages were paid every two weeks. Most food purchases were made at the farm 'shop' - and at the end of the two week period were deducted from his pay. During the month under review the 'credit' of two of the workers interviewed exceeded their wages, and in the case of a third worker, debts equalled

his pay. A constant concern of all three older workers interviewed was the cancellation of their debts. But looking back in their credit books for the previous six months showed that they had never succeeded in doing this. Tenkwan said this credit system was general on all farms in the Paarl/Wellington district. He considered his wage as being about average, R15 being 'high' and R20 exceptional. His wife occasionally added to their income by doing 'stukwerk' or casual labour in certain seasons when she could get it.

COMMENT.

In his research in the Hex River Valley, Brian Levy found that farmers there had changed the non-resident seasonal labour force there from male 'coloureds' to women, children and african contract workers. (7) This was because the traditional seasonal labourers, 'coloured' men, were commonly brought in from the rural areas of the Karoo, which had become depopulated through changing farming methods. The move of agricultural workers into the towns had obviously been aided by seasonal recruiting to the Western Cape. Farmers in the Paarl-Wellington area complained of building contractors who were bringing in gangs of 'coloured' labourers from De Aar and refusing to take

(6) Marginalisation refers to the process whereby certain groups of workers are permanently excluded from employment in the most important (monopoly) sectors of the economy.

(7) Brian Levy: Seasonal Migration in the Western Cape. In Farm Labour in South Africa Wilson, Xoooy and Hendrie (eds) 1977: 101.

them home on the completion of their contracts. They have also found that, whereas up until a few years ago workers would be seasonal, staying on the farms for the entire period, they are now mainly daily commuters from other farms and towns.

It appears that the rural areas of the Western Cape are being used as a springboard into Cape Town for workers from further afield. This migration is increasing as Karoo farmers expand their use of capital-intensive technology, replacing workers with machinery. By comparison, farming techniques in the Western Cape are relatively labour intensive, there being no ready substitute for human labour in fruit thinning, picking, pruning and packing operations. However, as huge firms such as Anglo American, Woolworths and Stellenbosch Farmers Winery buy into the region, even this position is beginning to change, swelling the relative surplus population (unemployed) on both the smaller farms and in the towns as families move in search of work or are housed with friends or relations. Many simply squat in the peri-urban areas of Cape Town, taking part in 'informal sector' activities including prostitution, shebeen running or crime.

Although this abundance of labour has benefits for the smaller capitalist farms and industries, the growing size of the at least temporarily unemployed labour force has implications for stability within society. The unrest and conflict that accompanies this competition for survival is a threat to the capitalist system of

production over time. It is especially threatening to monopoly capitalism as this demands stability - "no riots at the factory gates, no blocking of roads, no boycotting of transport preventing 'their' workers from getting to the factories and offices".(8) Work In Progress has observed that in South Africa an ever-growing number of people are realising that they probably have no chance of ever finding steady employment:

"This would be especially prevalent among the youth - those people with high expectations - and those workers being retrenched when their jobs are taken over by machines. This would apply particularly to farm workers, who when displaced from employment by mechanisation in agriculture, have no qualifications for jobs in industry, especially not in monopoly industry. These people form a threat to the reproduction of the capitalist system - to the ability to maintain the calm and a belief in the system which allows it to function over a long period".(9)

What Daniel Tenkwan and his family have undertaken is a two-stage migration from the Karoo into Cape Town. Because most of his skills are unsuitable for urban living he will probably enter the labour force on the lowest rung or join the unemployed reserve army of labour.

PETRUS ZAMMANA (35).

When interviewed, Zammana had been working on the farm for a week. He had

(8) Editorial in Work In Progress 10, November 1979:iii.

(9) Ibid p iii.

been fired by his previous employer for demanding a half-day holiday on Christmas day. The employer's version was that Zammana was drunk and that 'daar is iets snaaks met hom, hy's 'n slim een', and because the farmer's wife was nervous in his presence.

Zammana was born in Wellington and got several jobs in the town before being forced to do farm work. He moved from farm to farm between Stellenbosch and Wellington being fired often or leaving after coming into conflict with the farmer. When interviewed he was extremely bitter about his situation. He had a wife and four young children to support on a wage of R11 a week. His temperament (and no doubt his quick tongue) obviously did not endear him to employers, nor would his increasing alcohol intake and a tendency to violence when drunk. He had thus not been favoured in the training of skills, and although obviously intelligent was completely unskilled. He claimed to have been replaced several times in his job by african migrant labour from the Transkei, and expressed intense dislike for 'dom kaffirs'. It was apparent that since entering the labour market his living standard had dropped.

Three months after being employed on the farm on which he was interviewed, he was fired for 'insolence'. He was said to be working on another farm 'on the other side of Wellington somewhere'.

COMMENT.

In addition to permanent employment

on farms in the Western Cape, Levy identifies three types of labour: casual labour, in which the worker is hired purely on a daily basis - either as in the case of women and children living on the farm and undertaking odd jobs, or in the case of a worker hired for a specific task for which he is paid on completion.

workers employed on a daily basis to perform a seasonal task.

workers seasonally employed but on a regular rather than a casual basis, as in the case of migrant workers on short term contracts.

Although Zamana's wife and children fit into the first category, it can be seen that he fits into none of them. Although a quick survey may place Zamana as a permanent worker - and the farmer would identify him as such - his job history shows that he is in a slow migration across the rural areas of the Western Cape. Because of the high relative surplus population of unemployed, and the low level of skill demanded on the smaller farms, there is tremendous job insecurity - dismissals often being for 'cheek' or 'making a noise'. This has embittered Zamana, and his attitude makes farmers unwilling to teach him the skills that would give him a toe hold of bargaining power in a conflict or allow him to land a job at a more skilled level on the large agricultural-business estates.

His job insecurity is also increased by the threat of replacement by african contract labourers from the Transkei.

Although the Western Cape is theoretically a 'coloured labour preference' area, large numbers of 'permanent' african migrants are brought in on six, nine and eleven month contracts. They are cheaper and tend to be more politically docile than 'coloured' labour.

Recruiters of african labour in the Western Cape include the following:

- Hex River Boeregroep
- Berg River Farmers
- Krom River Apple Farmers
- Appelwaite
- Cape Flats and Peninsula Farmers
- Elgin Farmers Group
- Stellenbosch Farmers Group
- Grabouw Farmers Group
- Philadelphia Farmers Group
- Westelike Graan Boere
- Kromvlei Farmers
- Oak River Farmers
- Owendale Farmers
- Pandekloof Landgroep
- Ceres Farmers Group
- Landeshoff

In addition, many farmers appear to be able to recruit labour independently of these groups, although this is technically illegal. Others, until fairly recently, recruited teams of workers from the Karoo through team gang leaders who although also labourers, were nevertheless paid a higher wage.

Further threats to job security of male 'coloured' farm labour involve the use of children and builders' labourers from the towns during the grape-picking season (their holidays coincide with this activity) as well as women both from towns and farms who are hired at a lower wage rate.

Because Zamana is unwilling to seek work in Cape Town he faces constant

migration, a declining standard of living and the disruptions to social and family life resulting from continuous changes of living place.

LEFINA KAMMIES (about 50).

When interviewed, she had been working for the same employer for about four years. In that time her wage had risen by 50c to R7,50 a week. In her previous job she, together with her 9-year-old son and older daughter, had worked as a team on a fruit farm near Elgin. They appear to have been employed both casually and seasonally, but were paid per task (for every load picked or tray sliced or de-pitted). Their combined wage came to R18 a week and no food was given. Evidently during the day tea was served with vetkoek, but cost 15c.

Kammies was born in De Aar and was brought to the Paarl-Wellington area by her father, who worked for the Post Office. After marriage she did seasonal work on or around the farms on which her husband was employed. She bore nine children. However, her husband became an alcoholic and was unable to support the family. She was forced to use her family as a work team doing casual and seasonal work, acting as a char in the towns between seasons. Her position, when interviewed, was complicated by several factors. During her previous employment on another farm she had lost all her 'papers' when she burned down her house while drunk. She had never been to school and was illiterate. She was terrified that the loss of her documents would be found

out by the 'government'. Her fear was increased by demands, lawyers' letters and visits from debt collectors of a Wellington clothing store to which she owed money. (These were all seen as 'government' demands). She had bought clothes at the shop two years previously, and although she was repaying at R2 a week she was required to pay at a rate of R7. The store was evidently not prepared to compromise.

Kammies was supporting her husband and five of her nine children, including a daughter over the age of 20 who occasionally got casual farm work. Also sharing part of their house was a couple - the man worked in a piano factory in Wellington while the woman ran a shebeen at the weekends. This led to tension with the farmer due to the noise, and both families were subsequently evicted from the house, Kammies being fired.

Kammies worked the same hours as Tenkwan and Zamana. Her duties were domestic - washing, ironing, cleaning four houses and attending to the sterilisation of milk equipment - as well as watering and weeding the large vegetable garden. In addition, she had to attend to the youngberries, strawberries and granadillas.

After being fired, Kammies was thought to be working 'at another farm down the valley'. It was not possible to find out if she had obtained a house there.

COMMENT.

Within the larger cycle of slumps and booms in the capitalist economy, which

cause the ejection and re-employment of some of the potential work force, there are smaller seasonal cycles. These are particularly linked to agriculture. Workers caught in these smaller cycles tend to move between casual labour in both rural and urban areas, and periods of worklessness in their search for permanent employment. Others, higher up on the scale, supplement their urban wages with seasonal spells of farm work during holidays and between jobs. In the Western Cape women and children, particularly, are involved in this cycle. Women form a large proportion of this seasonal labour force: They are drawn from three sources: dependents of men working on farms women commuting daily from towns during seasonal activities on the farms. Between seasons they form part of the reserve army of labour in the towns, perform domestic labour or undertake activities in the 'informal sector' women in a similar position to the above, but who actually migrate between town and country, living on farms during the thinning, picking and packing seasons, and in back yards or townships for the rest of the year. Levy has estimated that these women work an average of eight months a year on farms in the Western Cape. Farmers interviewed by him thought that for the rest of the year women were either unemployed, worked in domestic labour or in fruit processing factories, or in the West Coast fishing industry. (10)

(10) Levy 1977:93

During her life Kammies operated in the first and third of these categories. Her position when interviewed, however, was that of Zamana's (ie in a slow migration across the Western Cape), possibly through the need for adequate accommodation for her large family which only a farm would provide. However, in the absence of farm work it was likely that she would be forced into a town and again into a rural-urban movement.

The situation of Kammies reveals several other aspects of farm labour in the area. Apart from her children, she was supporting an alcoholic husband and an out-of-work older daughter. Furthermore, she shared her house with a couple who had a very different relationship from hers to capitalist employment: the man a permanent labourer in a factory, and his wife engaged in classical 'informal sector' activity - running a shebeen. Although the latter two were evicted from the house, they would have no trouble in obtaining other accommodation through their ability to pay rent. They were simply part of the urban proletariat (working class), the difference being that only part of their income was derived from labourers' wages.

FOLLIES KAMMIES (13).

This child, born in the Wellington area, had been used as an assistant by his mother, Lefina, since he could walk. When interviewed in mid-1979 he was 15 and attending school in the mornings. In the afternoons he was required to work

on the farm, for which he was paid R2,50 a week together with a piece of available fruit each day. His entire wage apparently went to his mother, who occasionally allowed him a few cents for a treat. All younger children on the farm assisted their elders and were paid with only a small amount of fruit each day.

During the year (1979) Lollies began dropping out of school for days, then weeks at a time. On several occasions he made trips to Cape Town accompanied by other youths of his age. About the time his mother was fired he had apparently passed beyond her control. He was not sleeping at home or attending school, and was constantly in the company of a group of youths roaming the farms, working where they could and probably living on stolen fruit and chickens, about which there was much complaint from farmers.

COMMENT.

In Lollies we catch a glimpse of the march of proletarian children into the lumpen-proletarian 'skolly' gangs which operate in many working class townships around Cape Town. It is these gangs which fuelled the fire in the 'riots' of 1976, and have given rise to urgent meetings between commerce and the repressive arm of the state (mainly the police in this case). However, the emergence and development of these gangs is a complex process.(11) Levy has shown that during

(11) D.Pinnock: Argie boys to skolly gangsters: the lumpen-proletarian challenge of the street corner armies of District Six. Unpublished, UCT 1979.

school holidays children from 'coloured' schools are often formed into agricultural work teams under a (well-paid) teacher for the purpose of fruit thinning or picking. He found that the seasonal thinning work force in the Hex River Valley comprised 51 percent school children, 38 percent women and 11 percent adult men during the period of his study (1977), and that the children were drawn from as far afield as Cape Town.(12)

By the time Lollies was ten he was a fully fledged labourer being paid a very low wage or simply fruit 'gesondheid' while having to attend school five miles from his home. He had no time for homework in the afternoons and no space for it in his crowded, candle-lit house at night. By the age of twelve he was milking, hay-baling and cutting, digging holes and planting, fruit picking and preparing, and able to drive a tractor, for which he effectively earned nothing. His rebellion at the age of thirteen is hardly surprising and his movement into a peer group gang of wandering minors suggests that other youths found themselves in the same position.

During this study, he made several trips to Cape Town: If the situation on the farms made it difficult for him to live there, as it undoubtedly would do if he was stealing to survive, he would probably move to Cape Town. And the only organisation there which would welcome

(12) Levy 1977:97

him is a street gang, of which there are hundreds. However, preliminary research suggests that at peak agricultural seasons farmers are simply driving to the outskirts of Cape Town in trucks and picking up whatever labour wishes to join them. The labour obtained in this manner is largely from street gang members, so in part the migration of youngsters from farms into the urban area is, for some of them, turned back into a cycle from the gutters of the city into the fields and back again.

A NOTE ON CONSUMPTION.

A breakdown of purchases from the farm store by two of the above labourers was made for the first two weeks of June 1979:

Daniel Tenkwan.

Debt brought forward	13,18
100 g tobacco	50
750ml cooking oil	83
bread	06
matches	02
cheese	30
corned ox lung (tin)	31
1kg potatoes	30
1/2 cake soap	33
ox lung	31
6 eggs	29
1kg sugar	32
1/2kg peanuts	40
cow head	2,00
tobacco	50
cigarette papers	02
matches	02
bread	08
matches	02
ox lung	29
2kg sugar	64
2pkt yeast	05
100gm rooibos tea	15
1 bag meal	2,75
loan to pay HP debt	6,00
loan to bail out wife	10,00
tobacco	50

margarine	29
ox lung	29
candles	28
1/2 cake soap	33
matches	02
margarine	29
1kg sugar	32
1/2kg potatoes	10
peanuts	20
writing pad	40
1kg sugar	32
plums	10
TOTAL OWED	43,18
Pay for two weeks	26,00
Debt paid off	20,00
CASH WAGE for two weeks	6,00
Still owes	23,00

Lefina Kamies.

Debt brought forward	10,64
cooking oil	42
tomato paste	13
sunflower oil	69
2kg sugar	64
2kg maize rice	50
corned ox lung	62
1kg potatoes	30
tomato paste	13
cow head	2,00
oil	43
2kg sugar	64
tomato paste	13
500g margarine	29
onions	05
stamped mielies.2 5kg	50
split beans	46
1/2 cake soap	33
oil	83
ox lung	29
bag of meal	3,54
200g tea	30
radio battery	1,02
1/2 kg potatoes	10
condensed milk	51
margarine	32
2kg sugar	64
tobacco	50
TOTAL OWED	27,35
Pay for two weeks	15,00
CASH WAGE for two weeks	00,00
Still owes	12,35

It can be seen that purchases, apart from tobacco, condensed milk and radio batteries, were for essentials only. Loans had to be made for unexpected outlays, one to bail a wife out of jail after a brawl in Wellington, the other to honour hire purchase (HP) demands for purchases of clothing and blankets. The two workers were constantly bombarded with final demands and lawyers letters from retail firms in Wellington which offered goods on easy terms. In addition to these loans, the other major outlay was on meat - usually cheap cuts such as sheep or cow heads and trotters or offal. In Ienkwan's case it can be seen that the largest cash outflow was an unexpected R10 which he did not have savings to cope with. He came into the two week period with a debt of R13, pushed this up to R43 during the next 14 days, paid off R20 of this and was left with R6 in cash. Had it not been for the R10 fine his eventual debt would again have been R13, suggesting careful budgeting on his part. What actually occurred was that Ienkwan received a minimum amount of food in order to reproduce and maintain himself and his family plus R3 a week to buy clothes, non-food essentials and to cope with unexpected demands. It is likely, however, that much of this cash went to the purchase of wine for the bi-weekly Saturday night party.

A NOTE ON THE TUT SYSTEM.

Given the extremely poor conditions on the farm, it was interesting to discover why the workers stayed there for

the length of time they did. The reasons they perceived included

- *free house for them and their family and an absence of such accommodation in the towns,
- *no jobs in the towns;
- *fear of 'the city';
- *because their family and relations were on surrounding farms;
- *guarantee of free wine.

The last factor was stressed by all workers in the district. In the four weeks of June 1979 the two male labourers on the farm drank more than 40 litres of cheap white wine given out free from the farm store at the end of each day. Much of what little cash they received was also spent on wine. The farm wine is given in smaller measures during the week when labour is required, and doubled at week-ends. This consumption of wine is reflected in the high level of violence among 'coloured' labourers in the Western Cape, which reaches a peak on Saturdays. During this time the roads between the towns and the farms become full of drunken men and women either staggering along the verges or lying in heaps, unable to move. Admissions to the casualty ward of the Paarl Coloured Hospital during one hour on the third Sunday in June 1978 included a man with his throat cut, one stabbed just below his heart, about 30 men and women with concussion, cuts or breaks sustained in drunken brawls in the area, and many children with wounds in advance stages of sepsis.

The tut system dates back to the

origins of the wine industry in the Cape when wine was often the only payment received for labour. Although it has been extended to include a small wage, the system is still in force, and thousands of labouring families have built up an historic dependence on wine. The dependency ties them to farm work, for in towns housing would have to be paid for, and wine bought. More detailed investigation is needed, but the above study suggests that alcoholism, which is a disease particularly linked to capitalist control of the 'lower' classes, is being used in the Western Cape to bind the labour force to the land and the requirements of capitalist farming.

Don Pinnock.

LABOUR ACTION

This regular feature, dealing with strike and other action taken by the working class, should be supplemented by a reading of 'Conflict in the Western Cape', beginning on page 1 of this work In Progress. The article draws attention to several strikes not covered below. It also refers to the stay-away commemorating the events of June 1976, and gives comprehensive coverage of the meat workers' strike in Cape Town, and the associated boycott of red meat.

Strike at Kromco

THE RECENT strike by 1 000 workers at the Kromrivier Apple Co-operative (hereafter referred to as Kromco) in the lush apple-producing area of Grabouw in the Western Cape was particularly significant for the following reasons:

The vulnerability of the workers because of their dependance on the company and its shareholders for housing which is in drastically short supply in the area, and because of the seasonal nature of their work.

The age and sex of the workers, a large proportion of them being women between the ages of 15 and 22.

The connection between school children boycotting classes and workers/parents striking.

BACKGROUND.

Kromco is an apple co-operative owned by about 30 local farmers. Its function is to pack and market the apples brought in by the farmers during the season, which lasts from about February to the end of April. Probably about 600 of Kromco's workers are only employed during this season. 35 of them are contract workers from the Transkei, while the rest come from the Grabouw/Elgin area or from the surrounding farms. During the week, the latter are housed by Kromco in a hostel at Bot River, about 10 kilometers away:

they return to their homes at weekends. Many of the local seasonal workers are the wives and children of workers on nearby farms. Elgin/Grabouw is an extremely wealthy, fertile farming area, producing a large proportion of South Africa's apple supply, as well as a large supply for the export market.

THE STRIKE.

In about February this year, Kromco management established a nominated liaison committee at about the same time as the Food and Canning Workers' Union began organising there. The workers say they were promised R25 a week at the start of the season, but the vast majority were paid between R13 and R15 a week plus a R2 attendance bonus. Those staying in the hostels say they had to pay R5 a week for accommodation. On Friday April 25th, the workers decided they would not start work until management agreed to give them the extra R10 a week they had been promised. They gathered outside the factory, one of them holding a placard demanding a minimum wage of R40 a week. The police, including riot police, were called in by management, and 42 workers were arrested on charges of public violence.

According to a pamphlet issued by the Food and Canning Workers' Union, workers had resisted a police attempt to

arrest the worker carrying the placard demanding a minimum wage of R40 a week. Fighting broke out, and stones were thrown. Riot police advanced with guns, plastic shields and teargas. When they moved towards the workers, some ran away. The riot police followed these workers and arrested them in nearby bushes. The others stayed where they were and went home afterwards.

The 42 workers arrested were held in custody for the weekend, and appeared in Grabouw Magistrates' Court on Monday 28th where 18 of them pleaded guilty to public violence and were convicted. The trial was held in camera because three of the accused were 15 years old, and several others were under the age of 18. After they had been released, several claimed that they had been beaten and subject to electric shock treatment by police during the weekend.

According to the Union pamphlet, these workers were examined by a doctor who found marks on several of them which were consistent with burn marks left by electric shocks. A 16 year old was found to have strangulation marks on his neck. Food and Canning Workers' Union lawyers are trying to get the case re-opened, and the guilty plea changed on the grounds that they were made under duress.

One of the 42 arrested, Mr Nicolaas Feroa, 21, was found guilty of malicious damage to property. He told the court that because he wanted more pay, he had slit the canvas on trucks used to transport

workers to the hostel where they were staying.

The police were once again called in by the Kromco general manager, Mr Jan Engelbrecht, on Tuesday night (29th April) to help him evict about 300 coloured workers from the Bot River hostel where they were staying. One of the workers who lives in the Bot River village said she arrived home at about 6pm to find the hostel workers and all their goods outside the hostel building, and several policemen around. She said that the workers came into her house for shelter because it was a very cold night. After they had been there for a while, riot police burst into the house, ordered the workers out, dumped their goods outside the house, and ignoring her demands for a search warrant, searched the house. Some of the hostel workers were then accommodated by people in the village for the night, while others were forced onto Kromco buses and taken back to their homes in Rivirsonderend, Moltana, Caledon, Napier, Bredasdorp, Riversdale and Genadendal.

The following day Engelbrecht, again accompanied by the police, fetched the 85 contract workers employed by Kromco from the hostel in Houw Hoek (also near Grabouw) where they stayed and took them to the Grabouw magistrates' court where their contracts were summarily cancelled. They were then loaded onto a bus and taken back to the Transkei. Engelbrecht's claim that this was done by 'mutual consent'

between him and the workers was dismissed as 'rubbish' by the Food and Canning Workers' Union, who said that it was hardly likely that the workers would voluntarily return to the Transkei where they and their families faced starvation.

The next night (Thursday 1st May), at a mass meeting called by the Labour Party to discuss the crucial housing shortage in the area, and attended by over 2 000 people, the Grabouw community called for the re-instatement of the Kromco workers on their (the workers') terms. The meeting, which was held in the Gerald Wright Hall in Pineview, Grabouw's coloured township, was also attended by hundreds of schoolchildren from the local school who were boycotting classes. Solidarity for the pupils' boycott was also expressed by the community at the meeting.

Management agreed to meet the Food and Canning Workers' Union for the first time on Friday 2nd May. Negotiations continued the following Monday, and by Tuesday afternoon a settlement had been reached. During the weekend, management brought in 100 workers from nearby towns in an attempt to undermine the bargaining power of the union. Considering that the position of the workers was particularly weak because the strike took place at the tail end of the season, when a lot of workers could be laid off anyway, the settlement was a workers' victory.

THE SETTLEMENT.

All the coloured workers were re-instated although some of them would later be laid

off until the next season. The 85 contract workers were given an ex gratia payment of half their wages until July this year. All contract workers under a yearly contract will be re-employed and those under six-monthly contracts will be re-employed 'when further contract labour is required'.

The weekly wages of all female labourers were increased to R23,92 and those of male labourers to R26,22. All workers will be given an increase of R2.50 on January 5th next year.

Cape Town contributors.

Eastern Cape

WIP 11 OUTLINED the growth of PEBCU (the Port Elizabeth Black Civic Association), the developments in the Ford strike and the detention of 3 people, Thozamile Botha, Phalo Ishume and Mono Jabela, as a result of their simultaneous involvement in factory floor and community organisation. The events during the strike highlighted the fact that the unions representing Ford workers - the unregistered though management-recognised United Automobile, Rubber and Allied Workers Union (UAW), and the registered National Union of Motor Assembly and Rubber Workers

(NUMARW), both FUSATU affiliates, - were unwilling to support workers outside immediate point of production issues. This goes some way towards explaining why the state came down so heavily on PEBCU leaders, who carried the weight of community organisation; furthermore, tension between the union and PEBCU were heightened by the union's willingness to work through the liaison committee system which has recently been strongly resisted by workers in the Eastern Cape. The result was a progressive breakdown of communication between the union and workers, who then elected their own representatives during the strike, with assistance and leadership provided by PEBCU members. According to workers it was through the efforts of this worker committee that they were reinstated.

DANNINGS.

On Wednesday 27th February the three civic leaders detained under Section 6 of the Terrorism Act, and a fourth executive member of PEBCU, Dan Jeje (who was released from detention earlier) were placed under banning orders. No charges were brought against them.

During the previous weekend, PEBCU had called for a protest boycott of administration board liquor outlets, and white traders, the head of the Port Elizabeth security police, Col GN Erasmus, stated that this had not prompted the release of the detainees, and that the state 'would not be pressurised into taking such decision'. (RUM 90.02.29)

The boycott of liquor outlets was

started on Friday, February 29th: PEBCU decided to step up the campaign until

- i. the banning orders were lifted;
- ii. the authorities stopped moving residents from Walmer Township, and
- iii. until PEBCU was given permission to use community halls by the Community Council, which had refused such permission.

However, as the months of March and April went by, the banned PEBCU people were refused relaxations of their banning orders which would have allowed them to return to work: Botha at Ford (where management was prepared to re-employ him), Jabela as a journalist for Post, and Ishume as a personnel officer at Goodyear Tyre factory in Uitenhage. Jeje's movement, as a national selector for the SACUS-affiliated South African Rugby Union (Saru) was also restricted.

At the beginning of May Botha left Port Elizabeth and it was reported a few days later that he was seeking political asylum in Lesotho where he may by now have been joined by his wife. Since then, sources have speculated about his alliance with ANC exiles, which is seen as an important gain for that organisation. It has also been suggested that a bomb planted at the house of exile Tesbi Hani on June 17th was meant for Botha, who was living there at the time.

Meanwhile, in Port Elizabeth two people who helped Botha to escape from South Africa were tried and given 6-month suspended sentences. They are Alfred Hente and Nkelo Ntali.

The report on the Ford strike in WIP 11 concluded with the state's response to a visit by the American Deputy Assistant Secretary of State, Robert Keeley, who was in South Africa to examine the operations of American-owned firms, the WIP report also gave a brief summary of the findings of a team of academics investigating Ford's general work conditions and implementation of the Sullivan Code of Conduct. Responding to the report's findings that management was not committed to the code, and that racism persisted, industrial relations officer Fred Ferreira stated that it was not surprising that outside industrial relations management, there was not much support for policies devised by the United States office of Ford. The report, however, still had good faith in the company's advanced planning and training programmes; the increase in african employment would

"increase the bargaining power of each of the unions and their interests would complement rather than conflict with each other" (ie including the white unions).

Even Ferreira did not have as much faith in the 'liberalising influences': he stated that the company had 'created these expectations' amongst black workers, and a major reason for the strike was that for the black workers, neither their unions nor management had met those expectations.

On the other hand the report stated (with trade unionists' backing) that

during the strike workers' scepticism of the objectives of management had grown, as did the view that management had close connections with state security agencies; management was increasingly 'equated with the status quo within a much wider context than the factory milieu', and its extensive co-operation with the Cape Administration Board (eg housing loans) 'lent credence to the belief that Ford was part of an unholy alliance between white employers and the two most hated arms of the state'. Ferreira denied this:

"While various government departments - including the security police - may contact Ford management from time to time, there is no relationship between the company and the security police". (Sunday Express, 80.02.24)

As with the Ford strike, the recent labour action in the Port Elizabeth - East London region also brings into question the relationship between community and workplace, between working class demands and trade union organisation. On the weekend of 19-20 April, more than 400 workers and members of UAW passed a motion of no confidence in a Port Elizabeth union, and demanded the resignation of Mr John Hke, FOSATU's president, and president of the union. An action committee was formed by workers, and chaired by Dumile Makanda who said that union bosses refused to accept the no confidence vote. Union officials at first agreed to hand union property to the action committee, but later changed their minds, saying that they had been voted out

unconstitutionally. Mr Makanda said 'we elected them as office bearers so we cannot see how our demand for them to go could be unconstitutional'. Workers were dissatisfied with the union's handling of the strike: the reinstatement of hundreds of dismissed workers was a result of actions taken by the worker committee led by Government Zini, a PEBCO member. The workers also questioned the motives for the termination of office of six union official on the grounds that they had not attended meetings: according to workers, the officials involved had not been notified of the meetings.

An advisor to the union, Fred Sauls, claimed that the union was being attacked because reinstated strikers had not received their bonuses, and some did not get their old jobs back; according to him, however, this was the result of the union's recommendations being rejected during the strike, and the outcome of the workers' own decisions. Another 'labour observer' said that although the workers action reflected on the union's position at Ford, this did not affect their position at other factories where they were still strong.

As yet, WIP has not been able to obtain detailed information on workers' attempts to oust union executives, but this is crucial if recent labour and union action in the Eastern Cape is to be understood; contrary to the views of the 'labour observer', relations between

workers and the union at one plant will affect worker organisation in the whole region; this is even more so where the plant involved is Ford, and the whole region is dominated by the motor industry.

The report on the Eveready strike in WIP 7 examined the weakening of worker organisation in a situation where a large industrial reserve army exists, and where the organisation involved (a trade union) does not have the organised support of the unemployed. Whom management are likely to draw on during a strike. The Eastern Province is still a particularly clear case in point, and the recent strikes again question the role of a union which does not confront the question of organisation of the unemployed as one part of the working class.

EASTERN CAPE LABOUR ACTION, April - July.

30.04.07: One of three shifts in the yarn manufacturing department of Veldspun International, a Uitenhage textile factory, walked out after presenting a list of grievances to management. DU Mr Redelinghuis refused to comment on the nature of the grievances, and said that workers were 'free to resume employment today'; production was not affected, as buffer stock had been stored between various stages of production.

30.06.13: Against the background of the state's attacks on worker and student organisation in Cape Town, 650 workers walked out of the Western Province

Preserving Company in East London, after management's refusal to disband a liaison committee 'which workers had long since realised represented managements' interests, not workers' interests' (Sunday Post, 30.06.15). Management refused to recognise workers' trade union representatives. Over 700 of the factory's 1 000 workers are members of the African Food and Canning Workers Union. Two union shop stewards were picked up by the police. By 30.06.17 the strike had ended.

30.06.14: Uitenhage's magistrate issued an order banning indoor meetings at which UAW and NUMAW representatives were due to report back to Volkswagen workers on wage negotiations with management. Volkswagen recognises both unions, but workers believe that management had a hand in banning the meetings. This was 3 weeks after an hour-long stoppage by VW drivers.

30.06.16: 3 500 black VW workers went on strike demanding higher wages: a basic minimum of R2,00 an hour, with R2,60 for drivers, as against the existing minimum of R1,15 an hour. New wage rates were at the time being discussed in the regional Industrial Council for the Motor Industry. Management of Volkswagen, Ford and GM, whose strategy is to have a uniform wage policy in the Port Elizabeth-Uitenhage area, were in the process of negotiating with the unions. VW management expressed the fear that a lengthy stay away at VW would push up wages at all three companies before the

Industrial Council settlement was concluded.

30.06.17: Freddie Sauls, on behalf of the unions, addressed workers at VW and urged them to return to work pending negotiations on new wage rates. Workers rejected the plea and returned home.

The strike spread from VW to vital component suppliers in Uitenhage, raising managements' fears that the strike would affect the whole SA motor industry.

At Hella, manufacturers of lighting equipment, 700 workers, mainly women, downed tools. They demanded an increase over the minimum wage, from 65c an hour to R1,50 an hour.

At SKF wheel-bearing factory, 130 african workers struck for a minimum of R2,00 an hour. They were not supported by their fellow coloured workers.

Production at Ford and GM had to be cut, as their sole source of supply was affected when workers at these two firms downed tools.

30.06.18: Worker action spread in Uitenhage to involve about 5 000 workers at 3 motor component supply firms, a construction company, and a milling company, while at VW 'industrial relations' management negotiated the 80% wage increase demand with union officials. Workers at Link Construction struck for higher wages; at UCM Milling Company 250 striking workers were dismissed; at a transmission plant, almost the entire black workforce walked out.

At SKF workers rejected management's

offer to increase the minimum wage to R1,70 - like their fellow workers at VW they stuck to their R2,00 an hour demand. According to management, production was being kept up by white 'personnel', including office workers.

At Borg-Warner, a transmission plant, almost the entire black workforce walked out. Workers demanded a minimum hourly wage of R2,50 for sweepers, the lowest paid workers.

At Hella, police used teargas to disperse women 'who had not yet left the grounds when ordered to do so'. Teargas was used to disperse other workers, reportedly returning home from the industrial area; at least 7 teargas attacks are claimed during an 18 hour period, particularly in KwaNobuhle where workers responded by throwing stones.

Sources in the motor industry insisted that the strikes were not primarily over wages and work conditions, but rather to draw attention to 'political, economic and social grievances'.

30.06.19: The Ford Cortina plant in Port Elizabeth closed due to shortage of wiring looms; GM were forced to cut back on production as were motor assembly companies in Rosslyn outside Pretoria.

In Uitenhage strike action spread. Workers at four more factories joined other strikers, bringing the total number of workers out to over 7 000. At least two people were wounded by birdshot. Police claimed that they had to 'shoot their way through barricades in the black

townships'. Teargas was also used to disperse workers.

At the Goodyear Tyre factory 300 workers called a meeting about pay after the night shift; they were joined by workers on the morning shift when production was stopped at 09h30. Workers demanded an increase in the minimum wage - from R1,10 to R3,00 an hour. Management rejected the demand and told workers to leave. The plant closed until 30.06.23. Management said that if workers did not return by then they would be subject to 'normal disciplinary procedures' which would include dismissal.

120 workers at National-Standard, a steel-wire firm, demanded a R2,00 minimum. Management told striking workers that they would not be dismissed, and that they would negotiate with a workers' committee.

700 workers struck for higher wages at Gubb and Inggs, a wool-washing plant.

At Guestro Industries, the fourth motor component plant affected, 650 workers went on strike,

New developments in other industries were the following:

The UCH Milling Company dismissed the entire workforce of 250 workers and began to employ scab labour.

It was reported that Hella workers returned to the factory, and that production had returned to normal; however, reports later in the week denied this.

At Borg-Warner, shop stewards agreed to ask workers to return to work after the firm offered to implement increases

due in terms of the Steel and Engineering Industrial Council agreement. They were confident workers would return.

At SKF, management put off its ultimatum to workers to return (due on this day) until Monday 30.06.23. Workers demanded a R2,00 minimum, while management offered an increase from R1,15 to R1,40.

At Link Construction the plant remained closed: management said that they would remain shut until the 500 striking workers specified their demands.

Fred Sauls, general secretary of NUMARW said that the banning of meetings over the weekend had triggered off 'long-standing frustrations over wages' which led to the wave of strikes in Uitenhage where workers lived and worked very close together. He rejected the view that political organisations were involved, and said that management believed that anything about R1,00 an hour was a good wage. Workers from 9 factories were now on strike, and Sauls added that negotiations at most of these factories were being conducted by worker committees attached to NUMARW, UAW or other FOSATU-affiliated unions in the area.

Seven officials of the African Food and Canning Workers Union in East London were detained after a brief work stoppage at the Koo factory. As with the strike at Western Province Preserving Company, it was a protest against the liaison committee system. The detentions were seen as a similar strategy to the one adopted by the state in Cape Town to crush the

union and its support for worker demands for democratic organisations. East London branch secretary B. Norushe was detained and held under Section 22 of the General Laws Amendment Act; Zodwa Mapela, the unions typist, Marlene Fraser, a shop steward, the East London branch chairperson and an executive member were all held for 2 days questioning and then released.

80.06.20: In the Eastern Cape, 10 000 workers were on strike, at industries in Uitenhage and Port Elizabeth.

Two firms, Goodyear and National Standard announced that workers who did not return by 80.06.23 would be paid off. 600 Goodyear workers marched through town after collecting pay and restating their demand for a basic R3,00 an hour minimum wage. They were escorted by a convoy of 'riot' vehicles and an armoured car into Kabah Township, where teargas was used to prevent workers from gathering.

Ford, GM and Volkswagen management parties to the Industrial Council made new wage offers in a meeting with union officials, and called a full Industrial Council meeting for 80.06.24. Union officials rejected the offers as workers would not accept a minimum wage that was still far below R2,00 an hour. Ford and GM sources in Port Elizabeth were satisfied that 'the unions were in control of the situation, through shop stewards'.

Workers at Borg-Warner returned to work reducing the number of firms involved

to nine.

Contrary to mid-week reports, Hella workers refused to return to work; the majority were dismissed and production was continued with more scab labour being employed each day.

At UCH Milling striking workers were also paid off; 250 people lost their jobs and 30 scab workers were taken on.

At SKF, striking workers were paid off and production continued with the 'help of white office staff'.

Three unaffected companies in Uitenhage sent workers home claiming that they 'feared for their safety'.

The Vw workers council in Germany declared its solidarity with the SA South African workers, they learnt about the conditions in the South African plant during a two day trade union meeting.

Uitenhage was declared an 'operational area'. When 1 000 workers marched home after collecting their wages, police fired birdshot and teargas at them. Reporters were banned from 'trouble spots' - which effectively banned them from some 'white' areas, the whole of the industrial area, and black townships. A blanket ban was placed on taking photographs and a Post photographer was arrested while following marching workers.

80.06.22: According to Harian Roux, the strikes once again showed that workers were not only aware of their 'collective bargaining power' but also of 'wider political and social issues'. The Ford strike had also shown motor workers that their position in the industry was

strategic. However, many 'less skilled' workers could easily be replaced which would test the workers solidarity as well as relations between worker organisations and the unemployed.

The unions involved in the VW strike predicted that the company would be unable to find replacements in the face of growing solidarity, and would grant wage increases. VW became a focus for union negotiations with management as success here would lead to wage increases in other industries.

Black workers held an all-day meeting with FUSAFU executive members: all workers except those at VW were asked to return to work on Monday 80.06.23.

The head of the security police said politicised workers were influenced by overseas and exile organisations, including the World Federation of Trade Unions. This applied particularly to members of unions resisting registration. He also said that PEBCU had a strong influence among workers who belonged to unions which hoped to strengthen themselves before registering. (Report, 80.06.22).

80.06.23: Workers at Goodyear and National Standard were given ultimatums to return to work or be dismissed. SKF once again withdrew its ultimatum. More than 7 000 workers were still out on strike.

Restrictions on press operations continued to apply, but only in black townships.

Workers arrived at Goodyear and repeated their demands. Management told them that 7 worker representatives should present these demands at the Industrial

Council meeting the following day. Workers doubted whether representatives elected from outside the ranks of registered trade unions, liaison committees and representative committees would have any power: workers walked out again, and management said they would be paid off.

At Jitenha, 30 fired women returned to work. The entire black staff of the Jitenha electricity department went on strike. Alec Erwin, secretary of FUSATU, said the demand for a R2,00 minimum had been carefully thought out. 'It's the minimum on which a worker and his family can live a decent life'.

Ford was able to reopen at Strandale with parts sent from Britain. The International Metal Federation (IMF) sent over R25,000 to help support VW strikers. The strike at VW was seen as a major challenge to a European multi-national company.

Police dispersed workers and riot police were stationed at intersections to prevent workers passing through the town

30.06.24: Representatives of VW, Ford and GM management met union officials and worker representatives from Goodyear at a special Motor Assembly Industrial Council meeting. White workers were represented by the right wing Iron, Steel and Allied Industrial Union; management released a statement with new wage offers: a series of four 6-monthly increases which would reach the R2,00 demanded by January 1982. There would be an immediate increase in the minimum

wage to R1,40 an hour, as well as increases in shift premiums, short-time pay and end of year bonuses. The Council asked VW to return to work as soon as possible.

All workers in Jitenha except those at VW and Goodyear returned after negotiations with management.

30.06.25: The planned meeting between trade unionists and Volkswagen workers to report back on the Industrial Council meeting did not take place.

Police used teargas to disperse 1 200 dismissed workers from Goodyear, many of whom refused to accept pay-off money. The company announced that it would start re-employing workers the following day. Management told workers that their demand for R3,00 an hour had been rejected, and they were told to reapply for their jobs.

FUSATU asked IMF not to send funds to support the striking workers because the Fundraising Act prevents organisations accepting foreign donations without state permission.

That night, national executive members of the NUMARW addressed 2 000 workers at Jevandale township in Port Elizabeth. GM and Ford workers made it clear that once legal channels were exhausted, they were willing to join Volkswagen strikers for as long as 7 weeks if necessary. The union executive detailed the wage offers made by the Eastern Province Automobile Manufacturers Association (Ford, GM and VW) and asked workers not to strike because this would 'cripple the motor industry'. Workers rejected the R1,40 offer and set a deadline for July 4th

by when their demands should be met.

30.06.26: At Goodyear about 1 000 workers were paid off and 300 re-employed by the afternoon. The company claimed not to be hiring 'new' workers. At Volkswagen 3 500 workers rejected management's offer, and called for workers at GM and Ford to down tools. They decided to stay away until the July 4th deadline. Some workers wanted to return, but the majority were prepared to stay on strike despite union inability to support them.

30.06.27: Volkswagen re-opened, but most of the striking workers did not return. Management tried to encourage workers to return by saying that new wages would be paid as from July 1st. Some sources said 60 workers returned to work, others 120. Union officials said that these were in the higher-paid categories, for example tool makers who earned up to R3,25 an hour. Unions denied management allegations that workers were intimidated into not returning. VW sources said that white workers and supervisors resented having to do black workers' jobs. The strike at Volkswagen was seen as a result of PEBCO infiltration into unions. PEBCO and its Jitenha counterpart wanted to 'bring VW to its knees'.

30.06.30: About 160 workers returned to Volkswagen. The NUMARW said said workers would accept an offer to meet the R2,00 minimum demand within 6 months.

One man was shot dead and another wounded by police in KwaNobuhle township.

30.07.01: IMF sent a representative to South Africa to 'settle the disputes in

the Eastern Cape motor industry'.

80.07.03: 400 Volkswagen workers returned to work. The IMF representative had discussions with the union and management. Management said it was 'economically impossible' for the motor industry to meet worker demands.

80.07.04: A union joint committee called Volkswagen workers back to work, and asked Ford and GM workers to stay calm. The IMF representative said that by calling on workers to return, the unions were showing their strength, and management should take note of this.

Union leadership claimed that management had accepted the principle of a living wage, and saw this as an important breakthrough.

80.07.05: Volkswagen worker representatives met with unions and decided to ask the 3 500 striking workers to return to work on Monday 7th. Management was still offering only R1,40 minimum wage, and negotiations would continue.

80.07.07: Thousands of workers returned to their jobs and agreed that there should be no further strike action while negotiations continued. A spokesman for Volkswagen said all workers had returned, and that production was in 'full swing'.

80.07.08: Negotiations were resumed.

80.07.11: Police arrested 128 people in terms of the Riotous Assemblies Act in East London. They were among 200 workers who had been fired from National Converter Industries after a strike in support of recognition for the Allied Workers Union.

Ford and GM workers decided to accept pay offers of R1,45 an hour minimum. Union leaders are currently negotiating with management over the introduction of a closed shop agreement.

At this stage, very few conclusions can be drawn from these events in the Eastern Cape. Questions which need to be explored include:

- xthe changing relationship between the unions and the workers;
- xthe role of the IMF in negotiations,
- xthe relationship between employed and unemployed workers in strike action.

general

Steel Pipe Industries (Elandsfontein): More than 300 african workers stopped work on the 7th June over the dismissal of a colleague. Management sacked 30 workers including seven works committee members. Most of the workers at the factory belong to FOSATU's Workers' Project. The majority of the workers returned to work after management promised to recognise the workers' committee.

Twenty-eight of the dismissed workers were unable to get their jobs back.

UKBW Valve Factory (part of the Associated Engineering Group) (Prospecton, Natal): After a two day strike over a wage dispute the entire staff of 80 workers at the factory was dismissed. Workers demanded a 20 percent increase including shift allowance payment. Workers also refused to be represented by the

industrial committee or elect a spokesperson.

Seventy-five workers were retired two days later. Elwyn Seekins, factory manager, refused to increase wages, but stated that the company was prepared to negotiate with the industrial council.

This company stands accused of breaching the EEC 'code of conduct' for foreign firms investing in South Africa - along with many others - by paying black workers poverty wages (Sunday Tribune, 80.06.22).

African Cotton Manufacturing Company (Isipingo, Natal): Eleven african workers walked out on 80.06.24 after a 'go-slow' strike demanding wage increases from R18 and R23 a week to R50, and recognition of their trade union, the Textile and Allied Workers' Union, an affiliate of the South African Allied Workers Union. The walk-out was the direct result of manager AJ Gavin's 'kaffir' insult to workers and also kicking one of them.

Management apologised but the workers refused to return to work until their demands had been met.

Outcome not known.

Natal Thread Company (Hammersdale, Natal): Workers went on strike during the last week of June over a shift dispute. This concerned a new shift system whereby

Natal Thread Company (Hammersdale, Natal): Workers went on strike during the last week of June over a shift dispute. This concerned a new shift system whereby workers work 12 hr shifts for three days followed by three days off.

Workers also demanded a pay increase.

'Riot' police in camouflage uniforms were called in to disperse a crowd gathered outside the factory.

Outcome not known.

Dominion Dairies (Turffontein, Johannesburg): The latest in a long line of strikes to hit the dairy industry took place early in May, in demand of wage increases. Manager Piet Henning promised wage increases to the 45 delivery men by July, and rectification of errors allegedly caused by the computer over deductions.

The delivery men went back to work.

Ullean Brothers Cartage (Industria, Johannesburg): One hundred and twenty men went on strike (Post, 80.05.14) for higher wages and against 'odd working hours'. An increase to R30 a week was demanded. Further complaints related to over-time pay and the non-registration of workers.

No further information available.

Scooter Drivers (Johannesburg): Over 200 scooter delivery men gathered in a Johannesburg park (Post, 80.05.27) to protest against low wages and the high risks of the job.

Police were called in and the protesters forced to disperse.

Rex Trueform (Cape Town): Three thousand workers stopped work (RDM, 80.05.22) demanding pay increases. The Garment Workers' Union had been investigating wages and represented the workers during the strike. Stewart Shub of the Rex Trueform management

promised wage increases within 48 hrs. It was reported that this strike was a spontaneous action brought about by bus fare increases (see material on bus boycotts in this issue. Also WIP 10, and editorial in WIP 12).

Northwest Timber and Hardware (Johannesburg): Eight workers who demanded higher wages were fired by manager Charlie Steyn (Post, 80.04.28).

Itereleng Workshop for the Blind (Pretoria): Three hundred blind workers at Itereleng Basket Factory (GaRankuwa, near Pretoria) were sacked after complaining of poor wages.

Management however denied this report saying that they only refused to take back the twenty 'agitators' when the factory reopens. Manager Geoff Hilton-Barber claimed that '40 militant, politically motivated' workers had 'planned to stage a riot which would coincide with the fourth anniversary of the 1976 unrest' (Star, 80.06.27).

Two weeks prior to the strike the workers were given 40c to R1,30 pay increases. The average wage is about R11 a week and workers have recently been forced into a 'piece rate' system.

During the dispute BophuthaTswana police were called in after management reported that the workers had threatened to dig up the institute's petrol storage tank and set the institute on fire. A blind worker commented on that: 'That is unthinkable because it belongs to us. How could we destroy our own school? Besides, how can we set fire to the buildings when we can hardly see'.

Alec Gorshel, Chairperson of the Society

for the Blind, denied that the blind workers had been fired. The institute factory remains closed until mid-July.

A later report (RDM, 80.07.11) said that when the institute was closed all 300 workers effectively lost their jobs.

The second round of discussions to attempt to reopen the factory was set for 14th July, and it was hoped to have production resumed a week later. The talks have involved Bophutha-Tswana Minister of Health and Welfare, Dr KP Mokhobo, Geoffrey Hilton-Barber, the workshop's manager, Alec Gorshel, chairperson of the Transvaal Society for the Blind (black section!) William Rowland, director of the SA Council for the Blind.

No mention has been made of any worker representation.

Table Bay Docks - stevedores:

600 stevedores walked off the job (RDM, 79.12.12) on the Cape Town docks. The dispute concerned workers' representation - the workers had been pushing for over seven months for a non-racial committee to represent them. Management agreed to negotiate with such a committee formed under the auspices of the Western Province General Workers' Union. Workers regarded this as a total victory (Cape Times, 79.12.13) for them and for the General Workers' Union.

For a fuller discussion of this action by the stevedores see South African Labour Bulletin.

Journalists, Nurses and Teachers: There has been considerable agitation among professionals in South Africa over the past year, related

both to salaries and working conditions and their relationship to South Africa's racially divided society. We hope to carry analyses of these trends in future editions of WIP, and ask for contributions from our readers, especially those who are themselves in these professions.

English-language newspaper journalists received an 11% increase after a dispute with management had been referred to an arbitrator. The South African Society of Journalists had been negotiating for a 22 percent increase in total salary since January 1980.

Teachers have been even more militant in their demands for better salaries and employment conditions, as well as for a just dispensation for all teachers. Initially protest revolved around the budget announcement of increases made by the Minister of Finance, Owen Horwood. He has been accused of gross misrepresentation of the facts relating to teachers' salaries. There has been talk not only of boycotting extra-mural activity, but also of striking - a course of action that has several precedents in South African history.

A new move from some teachers has been a rejection of apartheid in education, at least as far as salaries and opportunities go.

In June it was reported that an integrated National Education Union of South Africa had been formed.

A new move that has been noted is that teachers from 'independent black states', or bantustans, are being forced out of 'white' South Africa unless special permission has been given.

The Sunday Post (80.02.09) reported that student nurses from the bantustans would no longer be allowed to train in South African hospitals. Baragwanath outside Soweto had been given specific instruction to stop accepting student nurses from the bantustans.

This is only one of many wrongs that have come to light in the nursing profession, and it received much less publicity than the grievances of the white nurses. The complex interrelationship between the use and exploitation of black and white nurses needs to be examined in detail.

What has reached the headlines of the commercial press has been the critical conditions that exist in the white hospitals, with 3 000 nurses reported to have resigned from Transvaal provincial hospitals (see RDM, 80.02.16).

The Minister of Health has claimed that certain doctors - unnamed - were involved in the agitation about nurses' salaries (a sexist variant of the theme of 'the natives can't think for themselves', no doubt).

Further discrimination exists between the salaries paid to nurses in private hospitals and those in state/provincial hospitals. This state of affairs has now been rectified with an increase announced by the National Federation of Private Hospitals.

Calls have been made for the drafting of 'girls' into nursing for two years to solve the crisis. This was done in the Transvaal Provincial Council.

There are many questions that need to

be answered in relation to the situation of professionals in South Africa. A few are suggested below:

- * Is there a tradition of low wages in the nursing profession because it has been primarily the domain of women, and what are the ideological implications of this? To come to any understanding of this aspect would probably demand an examination of the profession as it was transferred from Europe. An example of this can be seen in the comment from hospital management that resignations were due to women getting married or moving elsewhere with their husbands.
- * Are there many male nurses, and if so what are their salaries and status.
- * What is the nature of 'unionism' for professionals, especially important in the light of calls by the teaching profession for a 'union'?
- * What are the facilities provided for the different nursing groups? What are the facilities available for african nurses in the bantustans?
- * The hierarchy that exists especially within hospitals needs to be examined, but also within the teaching profession and journalism. These hierarchies relate to job categories, qualifications, race and salaries.
- * Part of the ideological perception of women as nurses refers to 'natural' or 'instinctual' characteristics (such as 'caring', etc), which characteristics override aspects such as the long hours and poor working conditions. Nursing is a job.
- * Private hospitals and their workings as well as mental hospitals need to be examined.

* What are the implications of the state take-over of ex-mission hospitals in the bantustans, and the use of national servicemen in these hospitals.

* How does the system of 'student nurses' operate - is it a system of apprenticeship?

* Is a non-racial teachers body a feasibility in the light of the wide and growing antagonism that exists within education in South Africa - mainly, but not exclusively, since the 1976 protests.

* What has the state's response been to the extremely sensitive area of education for whites?

African Cables Ltd (Vereeniging, Transvaal): 1 100 african workers threatened a mass walk-out over the premature retirement of Dr Edward Levin, the managing director of the firm. It was reported (Citizen, 80.04.09) that Dr Levin had had considerable clashes with the ultra-conservative board of directors.

No further information is available.

Trade Unionist (Ciskei): Thozamile Gqueta, the national organiser of the South African Allied Workers' Union was reported to be in detention at the Mdantsane police cells after being arrested under the Riotous Assemblies Act. He had been arrested by the Ciskei Central Intelligence Services during a strike of bus drivers (see previous issues of Work in Progress).

The CCIS is on its way to establishing itself as a worthy participant in the array of security services in South Africa set against the working class and their organisations.

Premier Paper (Klip River): In June workers from this firm went on strike demanding higher pay. Workers returned after a few hours after having been told that a reply would be given to their demand a few days later.

No further information is available to WIP.

Strikes: The official version of labour action was given by the Minister of Manpower Utilisation, SP Botha, who said in parliament that during 1979 there had been 51 strikes.

Causes of the strikes had been wage demands (36 cases), dismissal of fellow workers and dissatisfaction with wage increases (the remainder). No mention of a single strike in support of worker representation.

Rely Precision Castings (Boksburg, Transvaal): After a work stoppage caused by objection to the dismissal of a fellow worker 55 african workers were arrested (RDM, 80.05.28). They were charged with striking illegally.

Their case was remanded to June 10th. After being released on bail, 11 of the 55 laid charges of assault against the police. Bail was withdrawn later (Post, 80.06.11) in three of the cases.

The Metal and Allied Workers' Union has taken up the case of the striking and charged workers.

No further information available to WIP.

Stilfontein Gold Mine (Transvaal): 4500 african miners refused to go underground at the beginning of June (see RDM, 80.06.04).

It was reported that the miners attempted to set fire to the two community centres. Police were called in and used teargas to disperse the crowd at the shaft of the mines where the miners had gathered.

The following day the miners returned to work. It was reported that the cause of the strike was unknown. Management attempted to get the miners to appoint a spokesman and set up a 'representative committee'

Further information unavailable, probably partially a comment on the inaccessibility of the mine workers within the compounds.

Lingerie Factory (Johannesburg): One hundred female workers went on strike at an unnamed factory over their demand for a 12 percent increase in wages. A Hirschowitz, manager of the company, offered them a 7 percent increase.

Management finally negotiated with the Garment Workers' Union which eventually achieved a 12,5 percent increase for most of the Transvaal's 23 000 garment workers.

Putco Bus Company (Johannesburg): Putco's african bus drivers went on strike on 80.07.09 until noon after having been refused a R35 a week raise in wages.

The company offered a 15 percent increase.

The 450 bus drivers submitted a petition to management (on 80.06.25, according to the RDM), rejecting the company's liaison committee and calling for the R35 a week increase. The petition rejected the 15 percent agreed to by the liaison committee because the Putco workers had not been consulted. The petition complained that 'there is no proper

structure at Putco through which workers can bargain' (RDM, 80.06.25).

By 80.06.30 (Post) the Workers' Action Committee had given management until 80.07.02 to respond to their demands. It was reported (Post, 80.07.03) that the Putco drivers would go on strike if the R35 increase was not in their pay packets that morning. The drivers also demanded that A Carleo (a Putco director) should be at the Putcoton depot that morning. When A Carleo refused to meet drivers at the Putcoton depot in New Canada, Soweto, the decision to strike was carried through. All four depots were affected. Police baton charged crowds in Johannesburg who were stranded because of the strike.

The strike ended when management agreed to continue negotiations on the pay and other grievances. The bus drivers were said to have accepted the 15 percent increase 'under protest', but demanded further negotiations.

The dispute has now been referred to the Department of Manpower Utilisation in order to set in motion the long process of arbitration that is required before a 'legal' strike can take place.

Among the demands are those for the recognition of the Transport and Allied Workers' Union, and the reinstatement of dismissed workers.

The strike has added to the problems experienced by this firm. Putco has also applied for fare increases which are being opposed. A date for the hearing on the wage increases has been postponed once, and a new date has not been set.

Work in Progress will follow up developments relating to this firm.

Frame Group (New Germany, Natal): Six thousand textile workers went on strike at the Frame Group textile complex outside Durban (Frame-tex, Nortex, Seltex). The strike was the culmination of a long standing wage dispute.

Strikers were demanding increases for workers who were on minimum wages as low as R18,40 a week. It was reported (Sunday Times, 80.06.01) that the Frame Textile empire, owned by the Frame family, was instrumental in 1973 for the insertion of a clause in the then Bantu Labour Relations Act which allows employers to decide (without negotiating with workers) on minimum wages (then to be referred to the Minister of Labour).

Male workers' weekly wages range between R23 and R30 and for women from R18 to R25. The workers have liaison committees consisting mainly of shop steward members of the National Union of Textile Workers, which the company does not recognise.

After a meeting the Frame Group decided to fire the textile workers, but the workers refused to accept their dismissal and continued with their demand for a 25 percent increase. Management was only prepared to consider a 10 percent increase.

It was reported that three representatives of the striking workers had been arrested and charged with promoting an illegal strike (RDM, 80.05.29).

Clashes between groups of township residents and those workers who had not joined the strike were also reported. Groups of workers returning from factories were said to have been assaulted. However, it was claimed by some workers that scabs (those workers who had been willing to break the

strike) had been armed by management or other people and that several strikers had been killed. No confirmation of these claims have been received.

Twelve days later the strikers returned to work but 117 workers were unable to get their jobs back. Most of the 18-man workers' committee who had negotiated with management had been dismissed. Management announced a 15 percent pay rise to come into effect in July and 10 percent in January, and promised a pension scheme identical to the one for white workers.

Obed Zuma, general secretary of the National Union of Textile Workers hailed the outcome of the strike as 'a historic victory for the workers'.

(The Frame Group factories had achieved public notoriety during the 1973 strikes in Natal, and became the whipping 'boy' for all the evils that no other firms were guilty of - at least as far as the press was concerned. For an examination of the textile industry in Natal see The Durban Strikes 1973, published by the IIE and Raven Press).



COURTS

TERRORISM ACT TRIALS.

Thandi Ruth Modise (21) Moses Nkosi (24) and Aaron Slim Mogale (21).

Charge: Terrorism Modise is alleged to have left South Africa for military training during 1976, undergone such training in ANC camps in Angola and/or Tanzania, and returned to South Africa during 1978. She is further alleged, during March 1978, to have set fire to piles of clothing in Johannesburg branches of the OK Bazaars and Edgars. Modise also faces charges of possessing a machine pistol, ammunition and explosives, and investigating police stations and the Bantu Affairs Administration Board offices in Krugersdorp with the intention of sabotaging them.

Mogale and Nkosi are charged with harbouring Modise on her return to South Africa, and storing a firearm and explosives belonging to her.

Modise has claimed that a statement she made to a magistrate while in detention was because of assaults and threats made by security police at John Vorster Square. When detained, she was 6 months pregnant, and continually feared the loss of her child as a result of the assaults and treatment she underwent.

She has also claimed that a Johannesburg District Surgeon refused to make a note of her complaints, of assault, saying that the report would be returned to security police who would only assault her further.

The trial continues on August 13th in the Kempton Park Regional Court.

Renfrew Leslie Christie (30).

Charge: 7 counts under the Terrorism Act, with alternate charges under the Atomic Energy Act, the Internal Security Act, and an allegation of theft of a document.

Christie, holder of a doctorate for a thesis on energy in Southern Africa, was detained in Cape Town on October 23rd 1979, and first appeared in court on 3rd April 1980. It was alleged by the state that, during 1978 and 1979, Christie supplied information on South Africa's energy situation to the ANC, the International University Exchange Fund (IUEF), ANC official Frene Ginwala, and South African exile Horst Kleinschmidt.

The preamble to the charges levelled against Christie states that the ANC is an unlawful organisation committed to the overthrow of the South African state, and that Christie was an active supporter of the ANC. It is further claimed that the IUEF has, as one of its objects, the overthrow of lawful authority in South Africa. Christie, it was alleged, intended to make available information on all aspects of energy in South Africa to the IUEF, its director (Lars Gunnar Eriksson), the ANC and one of its office-bearers (Frene Ginwala), and to Horst Kleinschmidt, an official of the International Defence and Aid Fund.

Specifically, it was claimed that Christie obtained information as to what regions the Atomic Energy Board regarded as seismologically safe to explode nuclear

devices within South Africa, and transmitted this information to Eriksson by letter during February 1978.

It is further alleged that Christie attempted to remove a drawing of the Koeberg Nuclear Power Station from the Electricity Supply Commission Library, as well as a report entitled "Public Reaction to the Introduction of Nuclear Power and the Influence of Public Relations Techniques", and attempted to send this material to one of the people or bodies mentioned in the charge sheet.

Further charges related to alleged inspections of the Duvha Power Station near Witbank, and the Kriel Power Station near Bethal, with the intention of obtaining information to send to the ANC, IUEF and/or its office bearers, and the obtaining of drawings entitled "Flow diagram, Camden Power Station" and "Electrical diagram, Camden Power Station."

Much of the trial revolved around 2 statements Christie made to security police in Cape Town and Johannesburg. Christie testified that, after having been made to stand in one spot for 12 hours by Cape Town security police, he made a statement to avoid further treatment of this kind, and to ensure that innocent friends and colleagues of his were not detained and subjected to interrogation.

Subsequent to the Cape Town statement, he was transferred to John Vorster Square, Johannesburg, where he made a second statement to police. According to his evidence, this statement was made to avoid the sort of treatment he had received in Cape Town.

While the defence argued that the coercion involved in the extracting of the first (Cape Town) statement should be seen as continuing as part of a process at John Vorster Square, presiding judge Eloff ruled that the Johannesburg statement was admissible as evidence against Christie, having been 'freely and voluntarily' made. Police claimed that in Cape Town they had offered Christie a chair, but that he had stood 'voluntarily' for such a long period that his feet had swelled up!

Security policeman Captain CM Williamson testified in the trial, giving certain details of his infiltration of the IUEF, and subsequent activities.

Verdict: Guilty on 5 counts of Terrorism.
Sentence: An effective 10 years. Leave to appeal against verdict and sentence has been granted by the trial judge.
(Pretoria Supreme Court, 80.06.06).

Kedibone Christopher Mathabe (21), Colin Makgato Kotu (23), Simon Mashigo (19), and Elias Modiga (19).

Charge: Terrorism, with alternative charges of arson, public violence, attempted murder and malicious damage to property. The accused, all members of the Soweto Students' League (SSL) were alleged to have set fire to a Soweto school on 16th August 1978; incited others to set fire to the house of a school principal in Sebokeng, near Vereeniging; and organised riotous activities at the funeral of Robben Island prisoner Johannes Matsobane.

Verdict: All accused guilty on various counts of Terrorism.

Mathabe was found guilty of participation in the fire bomb attack on a Soweto school during August 1978. The other accused were acquitted on this count. All 4 accused were found guilty on the remaining 2 counts of Terrorism, ie the events relating to the Matsobane funeral, and the inciting of people at an SSL-organised meeting at Holy Cross Church in Orlando West.

Sentence: Mathabe: 9 years.
Kotu: 7 years.
Mashigo: 5 years.
Modiga: 6 years.

An application for leave to appeal was refused by the trial judge.
(Kempton Park Supreme Court, 80.04.25).

A 17-year old youth.

Charge: Terrorism. The accused is alleged to have recruited a person for military training, as well as undergoing training himself in Lesotho between March 1978 and January 1979; he was further alleged to have returned to South Africa after receiving training with the intention of endangering the maintenance of law and order.

A statement made by the accused to police while in detention was admitted as evidence against him by the presiding magistrate, after the accused had claimed that he was assaulted and tortured in the 'waarkamer' at John Vorster Square. Police denied the existence of such a room, and the magistrate accepted the police version.

Verdict: Guilty.

Sentence: 5 years.
(Johannesburg Regional Court, 80.06.?).

Wellington Vikile Gumenge (23), Paul Khumalo (32), Wandile Abila Dayile (24), Fikile Ernest Mohali (19), Vusumzi Kenneth Zibonda (18), Wandile Goodman Gcakazi (19), Lizo Zwelimirza Kula (18), and Aba Xhego Dayile (18).

Charge: Terrorism. The accused were alleged to have attempted to leave the country for military training, and to have robbed a van driver of R350.

Most of the evidence against the accused was in the form of alleged 'confessions' made by them while in detention. The presiding magistrate found that these confessions may have been made under duress, and accordingly could not be accepted as evidence.

Verdict: After 18 months in custody, all accused were acquitted.
(Port Elizabeth Regional Court, 80.04.25)

Archibald Monty Mzinyathi (24), and Bingo Bentley Mbojeni (46).

Charge: Terrorism. Mzinyathi is alleged by the state to have joined the ANC in 1975 and undergone military training in the Soviet Union between March and July 1977; on his return to South Africa, Mzinyathi was allegedly harboured by Mbojeni, who knew he was a trained guerilla.

Both the accused have contested statements they had made to police while in custody, claiming to have been assaulted and tortured by security police before

making the statements. The presiding magistrate has accepted both statements as evidence, ruling that they were made freely and without coercion from the police.

(Johannesburg Regional Court, 80.05.22).

Zinjiva Winston Nkondo (37).

Charge: Terrorism, and Internal Security Act. The accused, detained by security police on 12th December 1979 while on a trip from Swaziland to Lesotho, is an alleged member of the ANC. While in detention, his brother, Curtis Nkondo, brought an application before court to have his detention declared illegal, but this was turned down.

After appearing in court, all charges were withdrawn against Nkondo, and he was escorted to the Lesotho border by South African Police, and released. It is presumed that the state agreed to release Nkondo because of the illegal nature of his arrest, and because of persistent pressure brought to bear by the Lesotho government.

Thabo Makunyane and Ephraim Mogale.

Charge: Terrorism, with alternative counts under the Internal Security Act. Mogale is the president of the Congress of South African Students (COSAS). The state claims that, between October 1977 and October 1979, the accused furthered the aims of the ANC and of communism. They are alleged to have recruited ANC members, produced and distributed pamphlets, and established an organisation called the 'Communist Advancement Movement'. The trial begins on August 28th in the

Pietersberg Regional Court.

Athlone Khima (32).

Charge: 2 counts of Terrorism. The state alleges that the accused recruited two people for military training. (Pretoria Regional Court, 80.06.10).

Simon Lucky Moeketsi (26).

Charge: Terrorism. The accused was alleged to have left South Africa during 1976, joined the PAC, and undergone military training.

Verdict: Guilty.

Sentence: 5 years.

(Johannesburg Regional Court, 30.05.80)

Mothibi Mordegai.

Charge: Terrorism. The state alleged that the accused left South Africa, joined the ANC and underwent military training, and returned to South Africa with the intention of endangering the maintenance of law and order.

The trial begins in the Vereeniging Regional Court on July 30th.

APPEAL PROCEEDINGS.

Desmond Mzukisi Madlavu, Mayimbo Rixana, and Nkwenkwe Mzvandile Madela.

The appellants were found guilty of Sabotage in June 1978, and sentenced to 18 years (Madlavu) and 12 years (Rixana and Madela) respectively. They were found to have participated in a series of incidents in the Kabah and Langa townships, near Uitenhage, on 16th June 1977. An application for leave to appeal against sentence was turned down by the

trial judge, sitting in the Grahamstown Supreme Court. The convicted men petitioned the Chief Justice for leave to appeal, but this was recently turned down. Sentence and conviction accordingly stand unaltered.

Jarius Kgokong.

The appellant appeared as a state witness in a Terrorism Act trial during 1976. His evidence in court conflicted with a statement he had made under oath as a detainee, and he was subsequently charged with obstructing the course of justice, convicted and sentenced to 2 years imprisonment. He appealed against sentence and conviction, but this was dismissed by the Supreme Court. A further appeal was heard by the Appellate Division, but this was also refused.

As Kgokong was due to enter prison to serve his sentence, it was reported that he had left South Africa. (Appeal Court, 80.05.01).

Zvelakhe Sisulu.

As previously reported, Sisulu was called before a magistrate, and required to answer certain questions relating to a possible contravention of the Terrorism Act on the part of Thami Mkwanazi. He refused to answer these questions, and was sentenced to 9 months imprisonment.

He appealed against sentence and conviction, and after hearing argument, the Supreme Court set aside sentence, and referred the matter back to the magistrates court for a reinvestigation of the reasons Sisulu had offered for declining to answer the questions put to

him:
(Pretoria Supreme Court, 80.05.05).

Vusumuzi Nicholas Zulu.
The appellant was convicted of Treason during the recent trial of 12 ANC activists in Pietermaritzburg, and sentenced to 13 years imprisonment. He applied for leave to appeal against sentence, but this was refused by the trial court. However, a petition for leave to appeal was successfully brought before the Appellate Division, and he now has the right to appeal against sentence (but not conviction).
(Appeal Court, 80.06.09).

SABOTAGE CASES.

Unidentified man.
The accused is alleged to have incited a person to place a packet of explosives in the Dundee police station. Charged with incitement to commit sabotage, the accused, an african man, was due to appear in the Dundee Regional Court during April 1980.

CONTRAVENTION OF BANNING ORDERS.
(Internal Security Act).

Aubrey Mokoena (31).
The accused faces 5 counts of contravening his banning order. The charges relate to his alleged attendance of meetings of the African Methodist Episcopal Church (AME). The trial continues in the Johannesburg Regional Court on October 6th.

Father Smangaliso Mkhatahwa.
The state alleged that on two occasions during 1979 the accused received visitors

at his home, thereby contravening his house arrest order.

During 1980, all charges were dropped against the accused.
(Pretoria Regional Court, 80.06.27).



Chronology of Conflict

what follows is an incomplete chronology of important 'incidents' which reflect the growing intensity of conflict in South Africa. The chronology is misleading in two ways:

1. only the more 'dramatic' incidents are shown. This excludes a large category of resistance which includes 'spontaneous' attacks on symbols of repression and control, eg the burning of black schools, Jantu Affairs Administration Board offices township bottlestores, bantustan institutions, attacks on policemen, etc.
2. any focus on incidents blurs the fact that resistance is an ongoing process, rather than a series of dramatic events. Each act listed below needs to be looked at within the whole nature of South African society, the sorts of conflicts that society gives rise to, and the resistance to society which is part of conflict and struggle.

The columns under which the various events are detailed are date of incident; incident; organisation involved (if known); and legal proceedings relating to the incident (if any).

24.10.76	Bomb attack on Jabulani Police station, Soweto	SSRC	S vs Paul Langa. Suicide Squad	2.06.77	Explosives placed on railway trucks at Langlaagte station. ANC pamphlets distributed, Johannesburg	ANC	S vs Canai Liza.
25.10.76	Explosion on railway line between New Canada and Mzimhlope stations, Soweto	SSRC	S vs Paul Langa. Suicide Squad	14.06.77	Arms and pamphlets seized by police in Soweto	-	-
7.10.76	Explosion near Dikgale railway station, Pietersburg	?	-	18.06.77	Railway line between Durban and Umlazi blown up about 400m from Lindokhule station. Kruger claims done by same group as responsible for Goch Street.	-	-
30.11.76	2 policemen injured when 4 ANC guerillas they had apprehended in the Eastern Transvaal escaped by throwing a hand grenade into the cab of a police vehicle	ANC	S vs Mosima Sexwale and 10 others.	16.06.77	2 bomb explosions on Soweto railway line: between Orlando and Nancefield stations, and on line West of New Canada	-	-
2.12.76	2 explosions on railway line between Pietersburg and Izaneen.	ANC	S vs Mosima Sexwale and 10 others (Naledi Tsiki).	27.06.77	Police capture 3 guerillas with arms and explosives when truck overturns in Transvaal	-	-
07.12.76	Bomb blast at Carlton Centre, Johannesburg	-	S vs Isaac Dondry Seko.	26.07.77	2 policemen wounded in shoot-out with ANC guerilla Nicholas Molekwane in Dobsonville house. Molekwane killed	ANC	S vs Aitken Ramudzuli and Enoch Duma.
01.01.77	Bomb explodes in ANC 'bomb factory' in Klikspruit, Soweto, home of Phillip Khoza. 1 killed, 5 injured	ANC	S vs John Phala and 5 others.	7.07.77	Explosion on railway line between Princess and Morison, Transvaal	ANC	S vs Aitken Ramudzuli and Enoch Duma.
07.01.77	Bomb explodes on Johannesburg-Vereeniging railway line.	ANC	S vs John Phala and 5 others.	07.09.77	ANC pamphlet 'bombs' in Cape Town	-	-
18.01.77	Bomb on railway line near Krugeredorp kills railway worker and injures another	-	-	19.09.77	Leonard Nkosi, ex ANC guerilla turned security policeman shot and killed in what was seen as an ANC death contract	ANC	Referred to in S vs Mzilikazi Khumalo.
28.01.77	Police discover explosives cache in Soweto	-	-	27.09.77	Arms and grenades found by police near Swaziland border. 2 guerillas arrested	-	-
17.02.77	Police discover arms cache in Graaf-Reinet	-	-	28.09.77	2 guerillas captured near Mafeking. Large arms cache discovered in vicinity	-	-
07.03.77	Pretoria restaurant destroyed in bomb blast	-	-				
13.06.77	2 whites killed, 2 injured in Goch Street shooting	ANC	S vs Solomon Mahlangu.				

7.09.77	Bomb allegedly planted in main Pretoria post office. Not found, and incident not proved in subsequent trial	-	S vs Aitken Ramudzuli and Enoch Duma.	7.02.78	Unexploded bomb, capable of destroying a 22-story building, found in Johannesburg office block	-	-
02.11.77	In a police clash with ANC guerillas near Pongolo, one policeman injured, and guerilla (Toto Skosana) killed	ANC	S vs Aaron Sipho Madondo.	09.03.78	Bomb explodes in PE, killing man carrying it when it explodes prematurely	-	Inquest into death of MacDonald Makhwezi Mtulu.
25.11.77	Bomb explodes at Carlton Centre - 14 hurt.	-	-	10.03.78	Bomb explodes outside of PE Bantu Affairs Administration Board, killing a woman	-	Inquest into death of Vuyelewa Gladys Tengile.
30.11.77	Bomb explodes on Pretoria-bound train	-	-	14.03.78	Fires under clothing in OK Bazaars, Eloff Street, and	ANC	S vs Thandi Modise and 2 others.
12.12.77	Bomb explodes at Germiston police station	ANC	S vs Norman Velaphi Ngwenya.	15.03.78	Edgars Store, Market Street, Johannesburg. Incidents not reported at time	-	-
14.12.77	Bomb explodes in parking lot next to Benoni railway station	ANC	S vs Norman Velaphi Ngwenya.	19.03.78	Grenades and explosives found in Soweto	-	-
22.12.77	Unexploded bomb found in Roodepoort OK Bazaars	-	-	26.03.78	Explosive device thrown at house of Chatsworth police sergeant (Rohlathi)	-	-
07.01.78	Stephen Mtshali, ex ANC member turned regular state witness shot in his KwaMashu home. This was the second attempt on his life	-	-	7.04.78	Guerilla killed while making a bomb in an Alexandra house (Sipho Sibisi)	-	Inquest into death of Sipho Sibisi.
02.02.78	Bomb explodes at Daveyton police station near Benoni	ANC	S vs Norman Velaphi Ngwenya.	04.04.78	Petrol bombs thrown, and shots fired at homes of two police in New Brighton	-	-
7.02.78	Police and guerillas clash near Swaziland border. 2 police killed. Kruger says there have been other battles like this in Eastern Transvaal	ANC	-	06.04.78	Oscar Xaba, Mangabeni councillor and member of KwaZulu Public Service Commission, attacked in AK 47 rifle incident	-	-
7.02.78	Thousands of ANC pamphlets distributed around SA	ANC	-	14.04.78	Abel Mthembu, former ANC executive member who had given state evidence in a number of trials, killed outside his Alexandra home	-	-

03.05.78	Police announce discovery of a number of large arms caches in Natal	-	-	05.12.78	Alleged PAC member Kenneth Mkwazi shot dead by police when he attempted to detonate a hand grenade during a police raid on a Soweto house	PAC	5 vs Thusi and 2 others.
25 06.78	Well known black policeman Det. Sgt. Chapi Hlubi shot with Russian weapon in Soweto. House had been burnt down in August 1976	-	-	07.12.78	Bomb blast at old Urban Bantu Council chambers in Soweto: chambers currently house the Soweto Community Council	-	-
01.08.78	Running gun battle between at least 3 guerillas and police in Witkleigat area. Police discover arms cache nearby	ANC	5 vs Sekete and 11 others.	16.12.78	Railway line between Berlin and Fort Jackson in the Eastern Cape sabotaged in bomb blast	-	-
21.08.78	B Mayeza, JONS member, shot dead in Umlazi	-	-	27.12.78	Police find small arms cache in Bochabella township, near Bloemfontein	-	-
27.10.78	3 guerillas clash with security forces in BophuthaTswana. 1 guerilla killed (Richard Mapella) and one subsequently arrested (Iladitsagae Moses Molefe). Police find large arms cache nearby	ANC	5 vs Sekete and 11 others.	13.01.79	Gun battle between police and guerillas in the Derdepoort area. One guerilla killed, one captured, one escapes. Please find large arms cache nearby	-	-
30.10.78	-In a clash between 3 guerillas and police about 50km west of Louis Trichard, a police sergeant was seriously wounded while the guerillas escaped	-	-	22.01.79	Bomb explodes on New Canada-Johannesburg railway line	-	-
22.11.78	A farm in the Ishipise area attacked by an armed man, and the owner of the farm wounded	-	-	24.01.79	Unexploded bomb found near Pierie Station in Eastern Cape	-	-
27.11.78	'Bucket bombs' distribute pamphlets in Durban	ANC	ANC	24.02.79	Police announce discovery of two large arms caches in Eastern Transvaal	-	-
29.11.78	'Bucket bombs' distribute pamphlets in Johannesburg and Cape Town	ANC	ANC	16.03.79	Grenade of foreign origin found lying in white suburb of Pretoria	-	-
				23.04.79	Unexploded bomb on railway line between Vereeniging and Johannesburg	-	-

01.05.79	ANC/SACP pamphlets distributed in Johannesburg and Durban	-	-	15.08.79	Soveto child loses hand while playing with explosives found in Klipepruit	-	-
02.05.79	2 people injured when grenade explodes in white Pretoria suburb	-	-	05.09.79	ANC pamphlets distributed in Johannesburg	ANC	-
03.05.79	3 ANC guerillas attack Moroka police station, killing one policeman (Brian Themba), wounding others, and destroying police records. Pamphlets left on the scene explain the attack as revenge for the execution of ANC guerilla Solomon Mahlangu (06.04.79)	ANC	-	10.10.79	Police Minister le Grange says that in past 2 years, SAP have found 496 kg dynamite, 175 firearms, 34 000 cartridges, 1 076 detonators and 376 hand grenades in investigations relating to security matters	-	-
15.05.79	Bomb partially explodes in Cape Town Supreme Court	ANC	S vs Nqubelani	02.11.79	Attack on Orlando police station. 2 police killed	ANC	-
16.05.79	Pamphlets distributed in Soweto calling on people to support the "freedom of the gun" promised by "our comrades"	-	-	09.11.79	Hand grenades thrown into home of black security policeman at Wesselton, near Ermelo. His children injured	-	-
16.06.79	ANC pamphlets calling for stay away from work	ANC	-	06.12.79	Explosion on railway line between Alice and East London	-	-
18.06.79	Explosives found on Eastern Transvaal railway line	-	-	04.01.80	Guerillas attack police station at Soekmekeer	ANC	S vs Lubisi and others (pending).
25.06.79	6 Soweto youths injured in explosion while playing with hand grenade they had found	-	-	08.01.80	Man shot dead near Soekmekeer. Arms cache found near by	-	-
27.06.79	Police seize TNT, detonators, explosives from Soweto home	-	-	25.01.80	Siege of Volkskas Bank, Silverton. 3 guerillas killed, 1 white killed	ANC	S vs Lubisi and others (pending).
28.06.79	Alleged Moroka attacker, Johannes Ramagacha, escapes from Protea police station	-	-	16.02.80	"Guerilla attack" on store near Ingwavuma, Northern Zululand. Arms cache found nearby. Certain doubts about whether attack ' <u>politically motivated</u> '	-	-
7.07.79	Arms and ammunition found in Eastern Transvaal	ANC	S vs Luskwane and 2 others	04.04.80	Attack on Booysens police station	ANC	-
12.07.79	6 Soweto children injured while playing with a hand grenade found in Orlando East	-	-	01.06.80	Attack on SASOL plants	ANC	-
				15.06.80	Explosion on railway line in East London	-	-

Rents: Mhluzi

AT the end of March, 1978, a series of events took place in the Transvaal town of Middelburg and its accompanying location, Mhluzi. As a result charges were brought against several people, and the police wounded a number of residents, mainly children.

These events relate to rent increases in the Mhluzi township, decided upon by the Highveld Bantu Administration Board (HAB) and enforced through the Mhluzi Urban Bantu Council (MUBC). It was proposed that rents paid for HAB houses be increased from R16 to R20, and on self-built houses from R11 to R15. Furthermore, married adults would be expected to pay for lodgers' permits. The increases were due to come into effect on the 1st April, 1978.

On Wednesday (30th March) residents staged a protest march, but this was soon broken up by police who claimed that the marchers had been mainly children (from the Sozama Secondary School), 'incited by their parents to protest at the rent increases'.

'Agitators from Johannesburg' were also blamed (see the article on the Newcastle bus boycott for similar scapegoats) and it was claimed that pamphlets were found (?) (Star, 78.03.31). However, no mention was made of any of this during the subsequent trials.

Thursday, 31st March, saw a large protest attended by about 1 000 people gathered

together at a clinic. The protesters were mainly women and children. The men were probably at work; and the women are more immediately affected by increases in household expenditure.

Police used teargas to disperse the crowd of protesters. Brigadier MIA Abbot (Divisional Commissioner for the far-eastern Transvaal) said that the crowd held a protest meeting with HAB officials, but refused to disperse when ordered to do so - he was obviously not referring to the HAB officials.

On Monday, 3rd April, a large crowd gathered once more to protest at the increases. Following a meeting between HAB officials and a 10-women residents' delegation JM Jonker of HAB addressed the crowd that had gathered. Police claimed that a section of the crowd then started stoning the HAB vehicles, Jonker's car, and the police. Police once again used teargas and opened fire with birdshot, wounding several people (6 according to initial reports, 8 according to a later report).

The Middelburg Observer of 7th April (1978) said that Jonker had announced that the rent increase would be postponed to the 1st July. This proved to be unacceptable to the crowd.

The same issue of the Middelburg Observer mentioned some of the complaints voiced by residents (along with tales of a 'totsi element', 'influencing youths to rebel against their elders (sic) with wild promises of schooling in places like Botswana'): no increases until water and electricity was provided in the houses (in some cases 16 houses per block had a single tap, while the

only lighting was street lighting); a bucket sewerage scheme was still in operation; refuse was removed too infrequently and the bins that were provided were inadequate; roads were in a state of disrepair.

During the first week of April it was announced that the rent increases had been suspended until the 1st July, and that only married adults would be liable to pay for lodgers' permits (Post, 78.04.05).

Two separate court cases arose out of the incidents. In the one Daniel Maseko (21), Peter Ndlovu (20), Geelbooi Skosana (38), and youths aged 12, 14, 14 and 16 (one a girl) appeared in the Middelburg Magistrate's Court for the first time on the 8th May, 1978, charged with public violence. The accused all pleaded not guilty, saying that they had been part of the crowd but not active participants in the stone throwing. All had been wounded and most said that they had been arrested after reporting to the hospital - a selection mechanism that also seemed to have applied to the defendants in the second court case.

The Middelburg police station commander, Captain Steenkamp, said that on the 30th of March teargas was used several times against groups of pupils 200 to 300 strong. The final action on that day was against pupils who had apparently been planning to march into the white suburbs with a banner reading 'TO HELL WITH RENT VORSTER STUPID'. Two other banners confiscated by the police during that day read: 'TO HELL WITH RENT, MARCH TO CLINIC NOW', and 'LOVE AND PEACE DEMONSTRATION, AWAY WITH RENT RACKET'.

The police captain claimed that police

were stoned and that the pupils only finally dispersed at 18h30.

The next day was very much the same and involved about 1 000 people, gathered at the clinic and the HAB offices. All was quiet during the weekend.

Over the weekend a meeting between a residents' delegation and the HAB was agreed upon. The meeting, attended by the police, Jonker of HAB, and Bantu Affairs Commissioner Viljoen, started at 09h30 on the 3rd April. Police claimed that about 500 women and 1 000 children had gathered at the clinic where the meeting was to be held.

At 13h30 the woman who had chaired the meeting reported to the crowd (Mrs Lepela). Jonker of HAB also spoke to the crowd. A group of about 200 youths were then said to have broken away from the crowd and started throwing stones and shooting at the police with catapults. The police captain pointed groups of pupils out to policemen armed with 12-bore shotguns. This was done after a strong wind had made the teargas ineffective and the children had poured buckets of water onto the grenades.

This carried on until 18h00 on the Monday. Sixty-one cartridges of birdshot were used between 14h00 and 18h00, 200 to 250 teargas canisters were thrown and fired.

Captain Steenkamp said that the rent increase was the only cause of the protests. The worst damage was the broken windows of a bus, and no buildings were damaged. Captain Steenkamp said that birdshot had little effect at a range beyond 100 m, but that the catapults used by the children (armed with nuts, bolts, marbles and washers) were effect-

ive up to 200 m (1) While policemen had been hit there had been no serious injuries.

During the trial it was claimed that one person in civilian clothes also handled a shotgun (an accused said that two people in civilian clothing used shotguns). They were said to be detectives.

Maseko testified that he had been assaulted at the charge office by a constable Dekker. The same policeman had also shot him during the protests.

A detective constable who had filmed the events testified that the children gave the 'black power salute' of a clenched raised fist.

In evidence, the girl accused said that she had made a brief statement because she had been hit on her gunshot wounds by a policeman. A young boy also testified that he had been beaten up to make a statement.

The accused were not represented until sentence on the 26th May, 1978. A lawyer then appeared for them. All seven were found guilty:

Accused one (Maseko)	- 6 months (3 suspended for 3 years)
accused two	- 9 months (4 suspended for 3 years)
accused three	- 6 cuts with a light cane
accused four	- sentence suspended for 3 years
accused five	- "
accused six	- 4 cuts with a light cane
accused seven	- 6 months (3 suspended for 3 years)

At the time of writing WIP had not been able to find out what had happened during the appeal that had been lodged.

The second case once more involved charges of public violence, this time against

Jafta Mabena (60), Wilton Dlamini (42), and Jabu Mnguni (20).

In this case Captain Steenkamp said that the catapults were used from the second day of the protests, forcing the police to fire the teargas canisters from rifles, rather than throw them, at the children.

The defence pointed out that only people wounded with birdshot were being charged. All the accused said that they had not been involved.

Mabena and Dlamini were not even township residents, but lived in a workers' hostel and were, therefore, not involved in the rents issue (or if so, only indirectly).

Once more all the accused were found guilty by the magistrate and sentenced to R500 or 250 days in all three cases (half of Mabena's sentence suspended for 3 years; and R150 or 75 days suspended for four years in Mnguni's case).

On appeal the two hostel residents were found not guilty, but sentence was confirmed in Mnguni's case.

At the end of June, 1980, a Mhluzi community council was formed, and opened with the pomp and ceremony that seem to accompany such unimportant events. The MP for Middelburg, NW Ligthelm, did the honours in the presence of such other non-representative leaders as Steve Kgama, chairperson of the Urban Councils Association of South Africa, Joseph Mahuhushi of the Diepmeadow Council, and Tom Soya of the Davayton Council.

John Hall, managing director of Middelburg Steel Alloys, handed over a share of R150 000 to pay for a R225 000 community centre to 'mayor' Phillip Nhlapo.

Playing Ball

"AS FAR back as 1956,...the policy of separate development expressed the South African custom that whites and non-whites should organise their sporting activities separately, that there should be no inter-racial competition within our borders, and that the mixing of races in teams to take part in competitions within the Republic and abroad should be avoided."

Minister of Interior, 1962.

"By means of sport, a new dimension is given to our policy of multi-nationalism and to the South African set up, which since 1652 has become an embryo of what it has become today."
Piet Koorhof, 1978.

Independent 'homelands' have emerged from the bantustans, multi-nationalism from separate development. Since 1976, when the problems of internal resistance and external pressure presented themselves more acutely than ever before, the fundamental policy shift towards multi-nationalism has been implemented with increased zeal. The image currently being created is of South Africa's various 'nations' co-existing peacefully in a state of mutual interdependence. Ethnic army units have been created; Miss BophuthaSwanas and Miss Transkeis can now mourn with Miss South Africa over being excluded from world beauty competitions. According to a statement from the Broederbond executive in 1978, 'international sporting ties...have serious

implications at this critical stage for our country, regarding international affairs, national trade, military relationships and armaments and strategic industrial development'. (Super Afrikaners, p 250).

A multinational sports policy was announced in September 1976. Previously strictly segregated, administration and control of sporting activities were divided so that

"Non-white associations were to exist and develop alongside the corresponding white associations. The latter associations could then act as co-ordinating bodies between the associations at top level and serve as representatives in the corresponding world bodies". (Minister of Interior, 1962).

Although no specific laws to prohibit mixed sport were passed, the Group Areas Act (1950), Separate Amenities Act (1953) and Liquor Act have functioned to maintain a territorial segregation, restrictions over the use of facilities, and a prohibition on social mixing. These laws have not changed. Permits for matches involving blacks and whites, or between blacks in white areas, must still be applied for and granted, while the refusal of City Councils to grant these permits embarrasses supporters of the policy of multi-nationalism.

Parallel with the moves towards entrenching sports apartheid, and the dominance of white organisations over black in international competition, organisations have emerged to resist them. Their strategy has operated on two

levels: internally they have called for the abolition of apartheid in sport, while externally they have called for a world sports boycott against unrepresentative teams. Their success (strengthened by anti-apartheid organisations overseas) is shown by the fact that by 1972 South Africa had been expelled from the International Olympic Committee and suspended from international football, table tennis, weightlifting, swimming, cycling, gymnastics and other sports.

This has not only inhibited the development of South Africa's sporting potential, but has also been constant evidence of massive world-wide resistance to apartheid.

Leaders of these resistance organisations have been harassed, and the bodies themselves crushed.

South African Sports Association (SASA) emerged in the late 1950s. By 1964 it had been destroyed, and the South African Non-Racial Committee (SANROC) was formed to continue the struggle for international isolation, until sport became non-racial. Its leaders too were banned and exiled. South African Council of Sport (SACOS), which has been in existence since 1973, is the present body organising resistance to sports apartheid. Recognised by the Supreme Council for Sport in Africa, the OAU and the major world sporting bodies, it rejects multi-nationalism in sport on the grounds that there can be 'no normal sport in an abnormal society'. It regards the

present concessions of allowing teams of different 'races' to compete and even play in the same teams as an attempt from government and official organisations to regain international acceptance and revive South African sport.

As ex-cricketer Owen Williams said in 1973, 'Only now that they (South African sportsmen) have been ousted from world sport, do they, in the hope of again being accepted, turn to the non-whites and say - alright, we'll give you a chance.'

The basis of multinationalism in sport is that white, coloured, african and indian sporting bodies can unite to form umbrella bodies while retaining their separate identities as clubs.


These clubs have been left with the choice of agreeing to this policy and joining officially backed leagues, or rejecting it outright and forfeiting opportunities to compete with good facilities and strong financial support. SACOS-affiliated bodies recognised by world organisations such as the South African Table Tennis Board and South African Darts Board of Control) have chosen not to compete internationally in solidarity with those bodies who don't enjoy this recognition. The SACOS stance rejects the transformed tribalism of multinationalism, and calls for non-racialism at all levels. It calls for mixed sport at club and school level, total integration of facilities, training and coaching, scrapping of discriminatory laws and the right to play anywhere without having to apply for a permit. What they

are demanding, in short, is a radical alteration of the status quo. The Nationalist Party government is fully aware of the possible implications of sport 'mixing'. Despite proud reports from the Minister of Sport listing 2 615 multinational sporting events in 1978, Nationalist MP AJ Vlok assured parliament in May 1979 that 'far less than 1 percent of the total sport activities in South Africa are integrated'. Furthermore, the Minister of Sport said in the same month that mixed sporting events are still very rare exceptions which 'must be dealt with in such a way that they do not, in fact, become the rule.'

Permission must still be granted for mixed sport to be played on a school level and it has been left to individual clubs and leagues to decide whether or not they want to 'open their doors' or not.

The sudden 'opening of doors' by the National Professional Soccer League (NPSL) in late 1977 was viewed with suspicion by the rival non-racial Federation Professional Soccer League (FPL), which was SACOS-affiliated. The reason for this is the inconsistency of the sports administrators. As one George 'Kid Action' Thabe, president of the South African National Football Association (SANFA), parent body of the NPSL and the umbrella Football Council of South Africa (FCSA), as well as being a Vaal Triangle Community Council politician, once said, 'We don't intend to integrate NPSL. It will be a body

administered by blacks and will always remain open to black teams only'. (Post 78.12.23). Mr Thabe has been involved as a soccer administrator since the latter days of the Johannesburg Bantu Football Association (JBFA) and the South African games (early 1970s), where the 'white nation', 'african nation', 'indian nation', and 'coloured nation' played against each other for the multinational cup. This was the crude origin of the mixed/normal sport we have today in the NPSL.



George "Kid Action" Thabe

The introduction of 'mixed soccer' by those administrators was not a sincere desire for non-racism. Foremost in their minds was the enormous financial reward that could be had.

The second motivation has been international recognition and contact. Expelled from the world soccer body in 1964, it is in the interests of both the government and sports administrators to break South Africa's sporting isolation and the embargo on sporting tours to and from South Africa. Soccer multi-nationalism has produced results in this regard - the Jeeps Commission of Britain toured the country last year on a fact-finding mission: they found that soccer and cricket were 'totally multi-racial' and should be accepted back into the international bodies. Thabe himself has said

"We must be positive in our outlook. No country in the world meets all FIFA's requirements. We need most of them. We must polish our image and present it with pride and dignity. Perhaps then Europe will make up its mind in our favour."

The third is the access to white sporting facilities and crowds given to both black teams and sponsors. One of the SACOS criticisms against the NPSL is that, when accepting white teams into the league, it made no attempt to integrate the amateur wings of the clubs. The financial rewards of the game are clearly the most important considerations in the pursuit of 'mixed' soccer by the NPSL. Kaiser Motaung, founder of Iwisa Chiefs, has said himself that 'professional soccer is a business'. Given this, one can only look at the committees that run the leagues as boards of directors. SANFA, under president Thabe, has a monopoly over use of grounds in

african townships thanks to the cordial relationship he enjoys with local community councils. Because of this monopoly, no genuine opposition can emerge to the absolute control exercised by the SANFA and NPSL directors by the FPL or any progressive sportsmen. For example, a Soweto-based FPL team, Botofago, became a victim of this monopoly. They have been forced to use the Lenasia stadium about 15 km away, as their home ground.

Historically, it is through controlling access to facilities that the authorities have straight-jacketed soccer to fit its requirements. The JBFA, from which the NPSL emerged, was one of the first organised leagues for africans. Formed in the late 1920s, the Johannesburg Municipality provided it with grounds. Even then, a rival league, the Johannesburg African Football Association (which became multi-racial in the mid-1940s) was forced to disband because it could not get fields.

Today, when the correct exposure is needed to boost both the game and the coffers of the business, a set-back like the recent Caledonian one is enormous. The refusal of the Pretoria City Council to let Arcadia Pepsi use the grounds because of the racist clause 1, is a slur on the law-abiding and conservative NPSL. They, in line with government policy, apply for permits for their games, unlike SACOS-affiliates, who refuse to play if a permit is needed. The offensive clause 1, centre of the present storm, reads as follows:

SUBJECT TO THE FOLLOWING TERMS AND CONDITIONS:

- 1) The leased premises shall be used by the Lessee for the purpose of playing football thereon, arranging and exhibiting football games and matches thereon, and enabling the public to witness such games and matches and generally for the purpose of football grounds, provided that no football matches between non-European football teams be held on the grounds without the prior consent in writing of the Lessee being had and obtained provided that no football match in which one or more non-European players participate shall be held on the leased premises without the prior consent in writing of the Lessee, which consent shall not be given unless it has been authorized by the Administrator as defined in Section 2 of the Local Government Ordinance No. 17 of 1939, as amended.

This incident is reminiscent of the Rand Stadium incident last year, when the Johannesburg City Council (JCC) refused a permit to the BP final match between Moroka Swallows and Orlando Pirates. Then too, the reaction was the same as now: 'boycott the Rand Stadium'; 'Declare war on Caledonian'. Then too, like now, Thabe supported the militant protest whilst he had secret talks with the JCC. Why did the boycott not get off the ground? Why the secret talks?

Firstly, if the community boycotted the Rand Stadium it would have meant a loss of between R28 000 and R29 000 in advertising revenue a game for the NPSL. Secondly, the vast income drawn from matches played at the Rand Stadium (mecca of South African soccer) is too great to lose, as is the occasional TV coverage. The game was moved to Orlando Stadium, Soweto, which has no stand for TV equipment.

The money stakes of the game as a whole are enormous. With the largest

sports market in the country (soccer is the sport supported by the majority of the population) gate takings alone are astronomical. Current prices are R1,50 for adults per game, and 50c for children. Coupled with this are the revenues received by the clubs themselves. Iwisa Chiefs, which is so popular that it is 'playing at home even when it is playing away', receives R2,00 annually from all its members, runs a burial scheme that meets its members halfway' and costs R12 to join, and has a large range of Chiefs souvenirs - clocks, badges, rings, clothing and others.

Secondly there are the big money sponsors and advertisers who support the game. Many of the sponsors invest in teams (Iwisa Chiefs, Dion Highlands) as well as the leagues and competitions themselves. Sponsorship of the 1978 season was R186 000, of which the largest slice was given by South African Breweries (SAB). The breakdown for the various competitions was as follows:

Castle League	R75 000
Mainstay League	R61 000
BP Top 32	
Challenge Cup	R40 000
Sales House	
Champs	R10 000

The generous sponsorship from the SAB has questionable effects given the oppressive role liquor has played in South Africa's history. Since the days of the Western Cape's 'tot system' when liquor was a form of payment (still in

operation), and the early mining days when liquor was used to occupy workers on the weekends, liquor has contributed to a certain disintegration in black communities.

Financial difficulties have caused great problems for the FPL. In 1979 they started the season with no sponsorship, and in July 1980 Cape Town Spurs were forced to withdraw from the league because they could not afford airfares. The power of sponsors is emphasised by the president of the FPL who said, on receiving a R50 000 sponsorship from Distillers Ltd., 'Unlike the SA6 our present sponsors are not dictating to us how and whom to play with'. The FPL is nevertheless nearing bankruptcy.

Because of the big money at stake, back stabbing, corruption, violence and even death have become occupational hazards to NPSL administrators. Among them, Modise, Sekgabi and Jack Sello have been shot at. Sello claims hired killers were sent to stop him attending an NPSL meeting. He added that the shooting had nothing to do with him being a policeman (CID at John Vorster Square). The deaths of Mposula (Pirates' boss), Nene (Chiefs' director) and Bahlekazi (former Pirates coach) were directly linked to NPSL affairs. Nene was killed while recruiting Nelson 'Teenage' Dladla to join Iwisa Chiefs.

The constant purges, unconstitutional elections and juggling of personnel during

the past two years emphasises the control 'Kid Action' and his clique have over the sport. Some of soccer's most able administrators have been removed, and

Is the world playing games with South Africa?

While the dispute rages over the Moscow Olympics, no one suggests that Soviet athletes should be penalised. They have competed freely throughout the Winter Olympics and will not be cold shouldered at future meetings elsewhere.

However, with South Africa in the athletic themselves, why are denied by the International Olympic Committee's boycott of the ultimate goal of competing internationally?

Why? Because it is alleged that South African athletes are denied opportunities to visit athletes in other countries, and public events could be organised to raise awareness and support for the Olympic game?

Their contributions are non-social and no barriers of a racial or other nature are imposed by the government. No laws deny the black players the opportunities of the white.

The skeptic may say: so what? The plain answer is that in nine months of 1978, 2,625 mixed sports events took place, including 44 at international level. Since then, mixed sport has become so common, racial differences do not seem to keep

South African athletes are being trained for political reasons, while the sponsors of many other sports, whose revenues and public events could be organised to raise awareness and support for the Olympic game?

Send to the Information Centre, South Africa, Embassy, London.

replaced by people in unconstitutional elections. Clubs, afraid of lodging objections in an 'atmosphere imbued with violence' risk suspension if they voice opposition to Thabe's regime.

Misappropriation of funds has been rife. On his dismissal, NPSL PRO Iso Modise had to return a car - a BMW valued at R15 000- leased from a company at R350 a month for him. A commission of enquiry set up in 1979 exposed large loans made to clubs and discrepancies over amounts taken at the gates and amounts finally banked.



The nature of the way the sport is structured and run is reflected in how it is played. Clubs themselves are undisciplined, while the players are under pressure of massive money stakes they will fight to keep. Crowds too are undisciplined, while the racial division of teams adds to the fanaticism expressed by soccer crowds the world over. Some of

the most extreme crowd violence occurred when racially segregated teams were pitted against each other.

Nevertheless, the Secretary of Sport assures us in his report that no problems exist:

REPORT

of the

Secretary for Sport and Recreation for the Calendar Year 1978

The Honourable the Minister of Sport and Recreation:

I have the honour to submit a report on the activities of the Department of Sport and Recreation.

B. K. de W. HOEK
Secretary for Sport and Recreation

1. INTRODUCTION

All is well with sport and recreation in South Africa despite constant efforts by many countries to isolate the Republic in the field of sport. These efforts at isolation have not lead to a decline in participation in South Africa or to participants becoming rebellious owing to the lack of international competition, but have rather made the Republic strong internally in the field of sport. The sportsmen and sportswomen of our country reveal a marked determination to do well and an equally marked loyalty towards the country, notwithstanding less opportunity for participation at international level. I make these statements with pride and with appreciation towards the sportsmen and sports administrators of South Africa.

THE letter with which the Pretoria City Council this week damned itself of raw racism in sport is reproduced above. And with it is the notorious "Clause 1" of an agreement between the Council and the Northern Transvaal Football Association, which states the Council must give special permission for non-whites to play at the Caledonian Ground. It was the implementation of the conditions in "Clause 1" that enabled the Council to refuse permission for Aroada to play Dynamos at the Caledonian Ground tomorrow and Durban City next Saturday.



Ureke J'haraf.
Gawwe/Ou af. 222/1/78 (Vol. 22)

NR 2, R. KEDILINGHUIS/10

Stadsraad van Pretoria
City Council of Pretoria

Afdeling van die Stadsbestuur
Department of the City Secretary

22 00 000000 000000

11 Jun 1978

BY REGISTERED POST

The Secretary
Northern Transvaal Football Association
PO Box 90
WITWATERSBURG

Re

LEASE IN RESPECT OF CALEDONIAN STADIUM

I am writing with reference to the incident which occurred on Monday, 29 May 1978 at the above stadium, details of which are provided within your knowledge and previous incidents of a similar nature.

You will appreciate that in the interest of the citizens and subsequent of Pretoria, my Council cannot allow a recurrence of these incidents and that it has no option but to take whatever steps in its power to prevent such a recurrence.

In the circumstances my Council has resolved that in so far as it may be necessary you be formally notified, as I hereby do, that it requires strict adherence to the provision of clause 1 of the lease in respect of each and every match played at the said stadium to which the said clause applies.

Any match played at the stadium in breach of clause 1 of the lease will be regarded as breach of contract in which event my Council will apply the provisions of clause 22 and terminate the lease (forthwith).

This letter is written against the background of my Council's information that of the future soccer matches which are scheduled to be played at the leased premises may constitute a breach of clause 1 of the lease.

Under the circumstances and considering the urgency and impact of the problem referred to in the 1st paragraph hereof, my Council requires your undertaking and guarantee that no match will be played in contravention of the said clause 1.

In order to resolve the matter in sufficient time, my Council requires the said undertaking and guarantee in writing with a copy of the relevant regulations by your governing body, authorizing the undertaking and guarantee, to reach this office not later than 30 June 1978.

It must be pointed out that should the said undertaking and guarantee not be received as stated, all my Council's rights, including the right to apply for an interdict on an urgent basis, are fully reserved.

Yours faithfully

CITY SECRETARY

BUS BOYCOTTS

The next two articles are case studies of bus boycotts in the early and mid 1970s. The first deals with the 1975 boycott in the Newcastle townships of Madadeni and Osizweni, while the second covers an earlier boycott of buses (1972) in the Mpumalanga - Hammarsdale area.

While neither of these studies are directly contemporary, they both deal with important present-day issues. Both show clearly that transport is an issue of crucial concern to the working class, especially when the areas where workers live are situated some distance from the workplace (as is usually the case in South Africa). Although the question of transport is not directly related to the factory floor (the 'point of production'), it may nevertheless be a working class issue around which organisation and action can occur. This is not to say that all transport issues have a working class content: for example, a struggle by township taxi drivers for the legalisation of 'pirate taxis' is an issue for the petty bourgeoisie to fight, not the working class. What the case studies show is that transport struggle may, under certain circumstances, have a working class content, although it is not directly a factory floor issue.

In the Madadeni - Osizweni bus

boycott of 1975, a clear conflict of interests emerged between the working class and the KwaZulu administration, which had partial ownership of the bus company attempting to raise fares. It is interesting to note how this conflict between the workers of Madadeni and Osizweni, and the participants in the bantustan scheme, was clearly shown up in the resistance to increased fares. These events foreshadowed recent events in Natal, where both Inkatha and the KwaZulu administration seem to have attempted to control and suppress popular struggle and action.

The Mpumalanga - Hammarsdale study is reproduced from a document issued during 1972 by the Wages Commission of Durban University. The wages commissions emerged on the NUSAS-affiliated campuses during the early 1970s, and played a particularly progressive role in research, publications and to some extent actual worker organisation. They were one of the factors leading to the formation of independent trade union organisations in Natal, the Western Cape and the Transvaal. Attacked by the state throughout their existence, losing leadership through bannings, and gradually changing their original functions as the independent trade union movement gained strength, they had either ceased to function on most of the NUSAS campuses by mid 1976, or else defined for themselves a more limited role.

Madadeni - Osizweni

MADADENI and OSIZWENI:

THE Madadeni township outside the northern Natal town of Newcastle, a regional mining and industrial centre, is located about 12 km from the factories and construction companies its residents serve. The township was established in the early 1960s, preceding the state's thrust towards 'urbanisation of the homelands' that took place from the early 1970s onwards.

The workers from Madadeni and the nearby Osizweni (established at the same time) provide labour for the enormous Ancor and Iscor steelworks, and for the many related industries that have sprung up in this complex in northern Natal.

Studies of urbanisation in South Africa have pointed to the 'artificial reasons' for urban development in the bantustans, 'reflected in the location and functional composition of most of these towns' - 'they are little more than economic appendices to or dormitory towns for white urban areas. If the borders of independent homelands should ever be closed to commuter traffic, these towns would inevitably die'.

COMPUTERS:

TRANSPORT services of commuters from the bantustans to the centres of industry and commerce situated outside the bantustan

regions has grown enormously.

Increase in urban population of bantustans:

1960: 33 486
1970: 594 420
1975: 984 271

It can be taken that these figures refer to the population within 'formal' settlements and not to the inhabitants of such places as Winterveld and Malukazi - results of the same processes.

Commuters from bantustans to industrial areas:

1970: 290 000
1975: 557 000
1976: 638 000 (51 percent of whom were living in KwaZulu)

From 1970 to 1975 there was an increase of 36,8 percent in the number of houses in

KwaZulu. As BENS0 cynically stated:

A distance of 70 km and a travelling time of 90 minutes is considered the maximum acceptable to commuters. Because of this a large section of KwaZulu is ideally situated for commuters. Many commuters live in Umhlangeni (near Durban) and in Osizweni and Madadeni (near Newcastle).

In 1974, the estimated number of commuters in KwaZulu was 180 000, but this is a conservative figure ...

Buses are the most popular mode of transport ...

BENS0's conservative figures:

	1965	1970	1971	1972	1973	1974	1975	
Madadeni	1574	2658	3251	3946	4448	4845	5062	Housing units
		15848	23192	32739	41562	59241	62039	Population
Osizweni	1463	2633	2717	2997	3306	3489	3514	Housing units
		18798	20175	25216	29747	32341	33704	Population

Estimated number of commuters (Madadeni-Osizweni to Newcastle):

	Bus	Other	Total
1974	16 185	4 565	20 750
1976	17 100	8 600	25 700

THE BOYCOTT:

ON Monday, 29th September, 1975, the fares charged by the Trans Tugela Transport (TTT) bus company went up 5c single and 10c return on a fare of 25c and 50c previously charged for the journeys - the increases would, of course, have affected different routes in different ways. The increases meant that fares had risen by nearly 400 percent in two years on the routes between Madadeni and Osizweni, and Newcastle.

The TTT was set up by the then Bantu Investment Corporation (BIC) and was the only bus company operating between the townships and Newcastle, with some 170 buses.

The police prepared the way for the use of the term justifying police action - 'agitators'/'intimidators' - when Captain GS Maunis (police station commander) said that

If there is going to be trouble, then it is going to be people preventing people going by bus.

This was said on the Saturday before the boycott started and before the increases came into operation.

He also formulated the grievances of the township residents for them, clearly

excluding some demands:

The workers are not boycotting work. This is not a protest about their wages. They are dissatisfied about the increases in the bus fares.

But, as we have discussed before, the issues are, of course, not to be separated - and nor have they been in the workers' demands, both earlier and since 1975.

More than 10 000 workers refused to board buses. According to newspaper reports this ensured a virtual complete boycott, but these figures are obviously far too low if compared to the admittedly conservative figures given by BENS0 and quoted above. But then newspapers have their own reasons for toning down events.

Dr Frank T Mdloose (at the time chairperson of the Madadeni Town Council) asked the walking workers to be calm.

An incident was reported of boycotters trying to stop people buying bus coupons.

A call was made on the company to justify the increases.

Later reports were received of two buses being stoned, as well as a police van and a car. On Monday night (75.09.30) a public meeting was called and TTT announced the limited concession of a two-week postponement of fare increases. However, this was not accepted by residents who said that bus fares were 'too high anyway'.

Boycotters stormed the bus coupon office, wrecked a nearby beerhall and flattened bus shelters.

On Tuesday Madadeni workers stoned buses carrying people from Osizweni (the further of the two townships) and at the Veka clothing factory prevented women who had

caught buses from entering the factory premises.

Meetings were being held between BIC officials, TTT bus company representatives, Iscor (a very large employer in Newcastle, apparently with its own bus service) and the Madadeni Town Council.

Police reinforcements were called in.

During that first week of October, 1975, the first week of the boycott, one man was reported killed ('apparently beaten to death by the rioters'), police fired shots and at least two people were treated for bullet wounds. The boycott also extended to industry and at the Dafy factory a 90 percent absence was reported, and Bester Homes came to a standstill. The second, and last, BIC beerhall, the only 'recreation' offered in the township, was destroyed (these institutions, so essential to the financing of townships for africans, also became 'targets' in 1976).

More than 180 TTT buses were withdrawn from use after 19 had been stoned. The boycott extended to taxis as well at this stage.

Most commentators during this first week, apart from the police, related the boycotts to the economic position of the african working class. For example, Ray Altman, then general secretary of the National Union of Commercial and Allied Workers, said that

Bus fares, ... had always been a flash point with low-paid workers because most of them were unable to pay the higher fares without imposing further serious hardships on their families. Clearly Black workers could not afford the ever-increasing costs of transport.

On the 2nd October, 1975, Dr Frank Mdialose, Madadeni 'mayor' at the time and

at present KwaZulu Legislative Assembly (KLA) member for the area and 'minister of the interior' for KwaZulu, said that the police had handled the boycott issue 'extremely well. I think they are showing a lot of restraint'. He continued that

Irresponsible elements - youngsters between 16 and 20 - had used the dispute over increased bus fares 'as an excuse for anarchy' (Daily News, 75.10.02).

The mayor was involved in negotiations between the town boards and the BIC over the fare increases.

More than four years later Mdialose revealed to the KLA that he and Chief Gataha Buthelezi had been threatened with 'elimination' over their handling of the Newcastle bus boycott. Mdialose said that this threat had been made to him in a Manzini bar in 1975 by Albert Dhlomo, said to be an ANC member. Chief Buthelezi, on the same occasion, said that

the common talk in the Vryheid area, where two black men had been arrested and suitcases of ammunition, guns and bombs confiscated was that he should be eliminated (Natal Mercury, 80.05.31).

A specific field for investigation would be the contradictory position that the KLA and Inkatha leaders find themselves in because of the financial stake that the bantustan authorities have in such ventures as bus transport, and productive and distributive enterprises. This makes their intended control function within South Africa extremely clear. While Buthelezi may (with limited justification) claim that the KLA and Inkatha are operating outside the government's 'homeland' policy, they are not operating outside of the South Africa

social formation ('society'). This places certain structural constraints and demands on the individuals and the Inkatha movement, constraints that they are themselves not always fully aware of - leading to contradictory statements and explanations of events and actions. MIP will be returning to these issues in the future.

The first week of the boycott ended with three police injured, burning of buildings, stoning of buses, and an extensive stay-away from work. Police continued putting out the 'inciters' angle and were said to be investigating reports of 'transvaal-registered vehicles' in the Newcastle area.

Walter Khanye, KwaZulu Councillor for Community Affairs, said that the KLA was concerned and would investigate grievances. He appealed to residents to listen to the advice of KwaZulu government officials and members of the Madadeni Council.

GO Raytham, Santu Affairs Commissioner for Madadeni, announced that Inkatha would distribute pamphlets issued by Khanye.

The Madadeni Town Council wanted the TTT to 'pack and go' and PUTCO and the SAR to take over transport services.

White Newcastle residents responded by buying firearms.

The Natal Mercury stepped outside the expected reporting of such incidents in one article in which the reporter examined social and economic conditions in the Madadeni and Ceizweni townships (75.10.04): It was pointed out that bus fare increases were not the only problems (Iscor workers live in compounds and were not affected by bus fare increases and yet the most serious outbreaks of violence

had occurred here). Wages featured prominently among the grievances (R72 to R124 per month were reported); the distances involved from Madadeni and Osizweni (about 12 and 23 km respectively); quality of housing (for example no hot water, dull uniformity, overcrowding, rental of R4,38 a month); in Madadeni two, and Osizweni one beerhall (all destroyed) had been the total community 'recreational' facilities offered (for a total estimated population of 130 000 - considerably higher than the BENS0 figures above).

The township councils, 'representing' the residents were appointed by the Department of Bantu Affairs (Madadeni chairperson, Frank Mdalalose, is described as a 'moderate' by the conservative Natal Mercury newspaper).

The reporter concludes:

The danger of the situation remains that it must inevitably create radical leaders, a class of whom already seem to be emerging from the ranks of taxi owners.

At this stage I will let this interesting remark pass without comment.

Over the weekend of the 5th October Dr Mdalalose denied that his township council had called for the bus service to be taken over by PUTCO - a denial that is not surprising in the light of the connection between BIC and the bantustan authorities.

However, a meeting was convened by the Madadeni Town Council which 'called for immediate negotiation for the introduction of PUTCO buses if the BIC-sponsored Trans-Tugela Transport Company withdraws its services as has been threatened. An enthusiastically-supported motion said the TTTC must go' (Dick Usher writing in the

Sunday Tribune, 75.10.05).

On Monday, 6th October, the boycott had achieved total success with no workers boarding the buses that were running. Camouflage-clad police and Natal Provincial Administration traffic officials were stopping almost all taxis and private vehicles involved in transporting workers, and charging them for minor defects with their vehicles, in an obvious attempt to force people to walk or to catch buses.

PN Dlamini, chairperson of the Madadeni Taxi Association (MTA) called on the police to rather be lenient during this period.

Police confirmed that 2 people had been killed (one stabbed and one shot - whether by the police was not made clear) and 40 arrested during the first week of the boycott.

Dr Mdalalose and Dr Simon Maseko, chairperson of the Inkatha committee at Osizweni, deplored the 'violence and vandalism' that followed the 'spontaneous protest'; and Dr Maseko confirmed that a vigilante group (numbering 150) had been formed in Osizweni with the knowledge of the police - 'to prevent further vandalism which to date is estimated to have caused R100 000 damage' (Natal Mercury, 75.10.06). The protection of private property has remained of central concern to the Inkatha movement over the past 6 years, up to Gatscha Buthelezi's 'shoot to kill' call to protect buildings, and the Inkatha movement's suggestion that 'impis' be formed to protect schools and maintain 'law and order' (cf Star, 80.06.02; Post 80.06.03).

By Thursday (9th October) the campaign against non-bus transport had been stepped

up. The police denied that they were involved - 'Our job is not to break up boycotts or strikes (sic), but to keep the peace', said Major-General CP Pretorius, Divisional Commissioner of Police for the Natal Inland Division.

Transport Department officials were enforcing 'a law that prevents any person carrying passengers for any reason on a route that has an authorised scheduled service' (Daily News, 75.10.09).

Thirty-eight people had been charged with public violence.

The press were excluded from a meeting of representatives of industry, commerce and the Newcastle Town Council, held on the 9th. However, a press statement was released that evening, stating

- that the bus boycott was not a reflection on wages paid ('Bantu liaison committees' had made this clear!);
- that intimidation was 'to a large extent' responsible for the boycott;
- that a five-member liaison committee had been formed from the representatives at the meeting 'to identify the real problem and to assist in the resolution thereof'. The rest of the statement dealt with wages and benefits said to be paid by individual concerns.

General Pretorius now said that the roadblocks had been ordered by Major JS Joubert at Newcastle to check on 'overloaded vehicles' - 'The check was necessary to prevent a serious traffic hazard developing especially in view of the fact that thousands of pedestrians were also using the roads' (Natal Witness, 75.10.10).

The government announced that it would

not reduce fares because the TTT was sustaining heavy losses, and the government fares subsidy was already 66 percent (Natal Mercury, 75.10.10). It was also said that the TTT would only be transferred to a KwaZulu 'holding company' (which had been formed for the purpose) in April, 1976.

Dr Ndlovu had to react to criticism from an unexpected area when the Inkatha movement was blamed by an Afrikaans-language newspaper with having started the boycott:

'This is absurd nonsense ... Inkatha is committed against violence and loves peace, humanism and good orderliness ...

...
'Can they not realise that this was not organised? It was a spontaneous upsurge by people who have been suffering deep grievances'.

Dr Ndlovu said that Inkatha had been caught by surprise by the boycott and then tried to establish order. 'We tried to pull the people together to get them away from this anarchy' (Daily News, 75.10.10).

It rained during this second week but boycotters walked through the wet and mud while empty buses passed them.

Dick Usher reported (Sunday Tribune, 75.10.12) on an interview with J Griessen, Secretary for Transport, 'who admitted that the actions taken against taxis and private vehicles this week were part of a campaign to break the boycott'.

'It is illegal. I have my duty to do and I am not going to let people break the law just as they like...

'A bus boycott is illegal and I cannot let anyone come in and have a boycott every time there is an increase in tariffs - what would happen to the economy?

...
'The Government is paying R10 million a year for Bantu transport, and that will

increase to R15 million next year'.

Griessen denied the report that same night, saying: 'That's nonsense. A boycott can't be illegal. What I said was that Whites who were fetching their staff from Madadeni and Osizweni were breaking the law, by not having transport licences'.

The start of the third week (Monday, 13th October) saw the boycott continuing, but there were reported to be some full buses from the more distant Osizweni township.

Griessen said that employers who were transporting their employees were 'not acting in the public interest', as they would 'get into the habit of transporting their staff'. Employers suffering under staff shortages were increasingly clashing with Department of Transport officials over the transport of workers.

Police were withdrawing reinforcements from Madadeni early in the third week of the boycott.

Wednesday, 15th October, saw an offer of an 18c fare, but for a shortened route (from the outskirts of the township to a point close to the Newcastle railway station). This offer was turned down after the township residents had debated the issue. Dr Ndlovu was reported to have turned down a directorship on the board of the KwaZulu holding company (formed to take over the TTT).

Senator JC Moll repeated an earlier call for a rail link to be established between the townships and Newcastle, and said that he had warned the Senate of unrest related to transport on May 15th, 1975. Senator Moll said that while TTT had been losing money, an Indian bus owner operating

on the same route was making a profit.

This was confirmed by MS Dessi, owner of three buses who said that he was taking R150 - R200 a day. Dessi said that 'The trouble with TTT is mismanagement. They have no control over the buses'.

Senator Moll said that reported waits for buses from 04h00 and arrival home at 20h00 'must influence their (the commuters) productivity' (Natal Mercury, 75.10.15).

On the 15th October the KwaZulu 'cabinet' issued a statement saying that lack of consultation had 'created a backlash among Black commuters', and that the 'unrest was causing considerable concern to the KwaZulu Government' (Daily News, 75.10.16). The 'cabinet' was to meet the Madadeni Town Council to attempt to break the deadlock.

Not much seemed to have come of this meeting as the boycott was still in effect on the 25th October. A few days earlier the formation of a holding company was announced in which the BIC and the KwaZulu government would take over the TTT on a 50-50 basis (as well as other transport companies operated by the BIC in KwaZulu). This step was announced after a meeting of people including the deputy Minister of Bantu Administration, Punt Janson, the KwaZulu 'cabinet', delegations from Madadeni and Osizweni, BIC managing director Dr J Adendorff, and top TTT officials.

Guthelazi said: 'We are aware that going into these companies will cost the KwaZulu Government a lot of money but we must provide a service for the people'.

A 'rationalisation of routes' was also announced, which would, through the introduction of 'fare stages', 'enable passengers

to pay less' (and get less in the process).

On the 26th October a meeting was held to decide on these proposals. In the meantime the TTT had been losing about R6 000 per day for the duration of the boycott.

On Monday, 27th October, the residents of Gaizweni ended their participation in the bus boycott, but many commuters from Madadeni walked on. A meeting of about 8 000 people in Gaizweni had decided on Sunday to accept the proposal of a 'rationalised' shorter route. Madadeni residents rejected a similar cheaper and shorter route.

Gaizweni may have ended their boycott before Madadeni because they had to walk about 25 km (as against about 15 km from Madadeni), and fewer taxis were said to be available to them.

One reason for the rejection of the 'rationalised' routes was that it meant a walk after dark for workers, through the poorly lit, poorly policed townships.

Drs Masoko and Ndlovos chaired the meetings in Gaizweni and Madadeni respectively. Ndlovos announced that 'firms in Newcastle had agreed to subsidise the fares' - a statement that is probably false and that was not repeated by anybody else.

Despite the rejection by Madadeni residents of the proposals at the Sunday meeting it was reported that some workers had started using buses on Monday (27th), including the boycotting residents of the men's hostels in the township.

During the first week of November the flagging boycott picked up briefly after the distribution of pamphlets, written in Zulu,

saying that Gqeba Buthelezi 'had failed to help the boycotters' and calling for the return of the former KwaZulu Community Affairs Councillor, Barney Dladla. Dladla had, before his expulsion from the KwaZulu 'cabinet' and subsequently before his death, built up a strong support base among workers (especially during and after the 1973 Natal strikes), and rural people resisting relocation in the name of 'homeland consolidation' in the Drakensberg area of Natal.

Police reinforcements were called in during this period but the call failed to have any large scale or long term effect - probably because it came after many people had started using the buses again.

POINTS:

SEVERAL important points emerge from even this brief and superficial look at the 1975 bus boycotts in the Newcastle districts

- In no way could it be said that the issue was only related to bus transport,


but that low wages and general social conditions were the background factors. Several times the boycott spilt over into a stay-away from work (for example at Iscor), and destruction of state property (for example the beerhalls).

Workers living in Madadeni and Gaizweni were estimated to be paying nearly 17 percent of their average wages on travelling to work (white communities living in Durban were paying about 5 percent) unless they used concession tickets.

In Durban african workers were paying about half the amount for a journey similar to that to Newcastle from Madadeni or Gaizweni (the service in Durban is run by PUTCO).

- The separation of community and place of work under capitalism (see WIP 12) is aggravated in the South African context by the racial segregation of the society, with africans and other blacks suffering most through this separation of 'apartheid'. Furthermore, many of the residents of Madadeni and Gaizweni had previously been residents of 'black spots' (african-owned land within what has been declared to be 'white south africa'), or labour tenants on white-owned farms in Natal.

After relocation these people and their families were now totally dependent on permanent wage employment (with no access to land as means of production - whether it be for grazing or planting), at low wages. No wonder that resentment should build up against transport costs (see also WIP 10 and the article 'Bus Boycotts' for a discussion of the 'relocation townships' of Ezakheni



and Ekuvukeni outside Ladysmith, some 100 km from Newcastle.

- The control function of the Inkatha movement and the KLA was already becoming apparent, becoming even more blatant the more extensive their financial involvement in various concerns became, and as their budgetary dependence on the central state increased.

As the central state depends for its reproduction on educational, political and repressive institutions (schools and universities, parties, police and army, vigilante groups, etc), so the bentustans branches of the central state establish their own means of reproduction (these are sometimes defined in terms antagonistic to the central state - for example, Inkatha as a 'liberation' movement - but still within the scope of the reproduction of the social formation).

This point will be investigated in later articles, but to take just one example at this stage, an example of the KLA and its officials' tightrope walk between structural integration into the South African economy and political processes, and attempting to represent a power base whose interests are permanently in conflict with those of the wider economic and political forces.

Reference has already been made to Drs Mdlalose and Maseko (see above), and also to the alleged threats on the lives of Mdlalose and Buthelezi, because of the role they played in 1975 in relation to the bus boycott.

These events were echoed in 1980 when a meeting attended by about 10 000 people was held in Osizweni (March, 1980), addressed by Gatscha Buthelezi, to resolve the faction-

alism that had been building up between Mdlalose (Minister of the Interior and national chairperson of Inkatha), Maseko (now a member of the KLA) and their supporters.

It appears that the conflict manifested itself over support for, and antagonism to RZ Masondo. He was unseated as chairperson of the Inkatha regional committee in 1979, after delegates 'from Ulundi' (the capital of KwaZulu), and therefore probably senior Inkatha officials and supporters of minister Mdlalose) found that he had not been 'properly elected'.

New elections were held under the control of the Inkatha central committee and EM Khumalo was elected. The elections were boycotted by Masondo's supporters.

At the Osizweni meeting in March it was said that Dr Maseko was backing Masondo and maligning Dr Mdlalose (who was also Madadeni's representative in the KLA).

The Daily News report (80.03.10) said that:

During yesterday's five-hour-long meeting it was clear that Dr Maseko had much local support and that the KwaZulu Government was for the first time beginning to feel the wrath of many blacks because of bus-fare and rent increases.

Dr Mdlalose, as Minister of the Interior, seems to be regarded as directly responsible and this could be sensed at yesterday's meeting.

Osizweni and Madadeni outside Newcastle are probably the most volatile townships in Natal and, judging by the big crowd yesterday, the people are not prepared to accept steep busfare increases.

In Natal the bus boycotts of last year (see WIP 10) were followed by a committee of inquiry (representing workers, KwaZulu Transport, and commerce and industry in

Ladysmith). Increases in bus fares were to be held over until the committee had reported to Koornhof. (KwaZulu Transport is owned jointly by the KwaZulu Development Corporation (KDC) and the Corporation for Economic Development (CED, ex-BIC)). (See article in the Sunday Tribune, 80.02.24).

On the 10th May, 1980, Dr Frank Mdlalose opened a R600 000 KwaZulu Transport operating centre in Hammarsdale, presumably as a representative of the KDC and, therefore, of KwaZulu Transport. Quite understandably for someone in that position, Mdlalose spoke of 'unavoidable increases', and attacked employers for not paying higher wages. He said that boycotts had cost KwaZulu Transport R1,5-m.

Transport issues (along with rent increases, housing shortages, educational issues) are potential flashpoints for the frustrations of the black working class - frustrations that have their immediate origin in low wages, poor working conditions and lack of effective representation.

These also closely relate to the specifics of racial separation and differential discrimination in South Africa.

It, therefore, comes as no surprise that the first half of 1980 should have seen several such boycotts, threatened boycotts, and warnings about the danger inherent in fare increases and rent hikes for the stability of the social formation. PUTCO has applied to have fares increased and is waiting for a postponed sitting of the Road Transport Board to meet and decide on the application, while rent increases for Soweto during the second half of the year have been announced.


BLACK WORKERS in South Africa are showing a new spirit in the face of a rapidly rising cost of living. Food is becoming more expensive, and African families budget up to 50 per cent of their income on this item alone. But workers are most sensitive to rises in the costs of the 'constant' items of expenditure, such as rent and transport. The recent rise in the cost of transport in Hammarsdale brought hundreds of African workers to boycott the bus service and walk.

By Monday 17th January (1972), hundreds of African workers living in Hammarsdale, which is a model border area between Durban and Pietermaritzburg, were boycotting their local bus service in an angry protest against the increase in bus fares the previous week. The weekly bus coupon fares from Hammarsdale to Pinetown where many of the residents work increased from R1,70 for a five day week to R2,00. In protest against the increase, workers refused to use the African-owned Sizabantu Bus Service. Towards the end of the previous week workers started using taxis in a desperate attempt to persuade the company to lower its fares, even although taxis are more expensive.

"We can't afford to pay any more for transport. We just don't know what to do", a domestic appliance mechanic who works in Pinetown which is 30 km from Hammarsdale said. "We like living in Hammarsdale. The houses are in good condition and the rent is fair. But most of us have to find work in Pinetown and we can't afford to pay so much for transport". The worker,

Hammarsdale Bus

Boycotts



who did not want his name mentioned, earns R17,00 a week, which is equal to the poverty datum line in Durban. For wife and himself he pays R16,00 a month for transport, and R6,10 a month for rent. He has four children but does not have to pay bus fares for them because they walk the 4 km to school. "My position is not so bad but most of my friends earn much less than I do and they are really very worried", he

said. (Daily News, 17 January 1972)

The superintendent of Mpumalanga Township in Hammarsdale, Mr RK Francis, said about 500 workers were employed in Pinetown. "It is difficult for the bus company. They are faced with rising costs of tyres and petrol and so on and are already operating at below the minimum

prescribed rates laid down by the Transportation Board", he said. He doubted whether a subsidised corporation or provincial bus service could operate more cheaply. "The real problem is the low wages. The average worker in Pinetown earns about R6,00 a week and in Hammarsdale itself they probably earn far less". There were 4 000 houses at the Mpumulanga Township which had been open since 1968. (Daily News, 17 January 1972). There is also hostel accommodation in the area.

Although employers argue that the cost of living in rural and semi-rural areas is lower, this is never substantiated by the facts. The workers barely have enough money to spend on the basic essentials of life. Workers in rural areas buy their requirements in rural stores and usually have to buy in small quantities. Buying in small quantities is more expensive and buying at rural stores is also more expensive than buying at supermarkets.

An outline of events constituting this latest crisis is perhaps best begun with the comments of an editorial writer in the Daily News who pointed out in the 18th January issue that the responsibility for the present situation rested squarely on the shoulders of the white community which is "prepared to buy cheap goods whose price depends on the payments of starvation wages" and who called for a national minimum wage sufficient at least "to keep body and soul together" to be laid down. (Daily News January 18 1972)

The same day, police had to rush to Clermont location, where 400 Africans had

gathered at the Corporation (Durban Municipality) bus depot because they said they had been promised transport home when the Sizabantu Bus Co. withdrew its buses that morning after stoning incidents. The Africans had to wait until midnight before the Corporation, which had to get temporary permits, could take them back to Hammarsdale. Discussions were held at the Inchanga police station between the parties concerned in an attempt to settle the problem. According to reports, trouble had been brewing for some time in the area because many residents claimed the old fare of R1,70 was already crippling. However, because there was no other service they had no choice but to use it. The fare rise to R2,00 however, tipped the scales resulting in the boycott and the attendant violence and anger.

The boycott continued through the next day (19 January) despite the decision reached previously to revert to the old fare of R1,70 per week. Most people refused to board the buses and forced others to join them. The police had to provide armed escorts for the buses and those few passengers who used them. The Bantu commissioner for Pinetown, Mr J Rieveling, also revealed that the government was to be asked to subsidise the vital bus service and the newspapers reported that the five day boycott was over as Africans began to use the buses again on January 20th.

On the same day, January 20th, the Natal Mercury published a survey of conditions in Pinetown - New Germany

complex, where the Hammarsdale Africans work and found that the average factory wage of these people was R10,00 per week. This survey embraced nine top employers and the paper pointed out that the bus fare of R1,70 represented nearly 20% of the Africans' weekly wage. Many of the employers remarked that wages were "governed" by Wage Agreements, implying that these minimum levels were in fact a maximum above which they could not legally pay. These implications are in fact totally erroneous; wage board determinations fix only a bottom wage to an industry.

A motor car component factory employing 134 Africans pays a minimum R9,66 per week, an average of about R11,00 per week, and R13,00 per week to skilled African workers. This manufacturer said that

"if Africans could be given job training, conditioning in the necessity for productivity and incentives, they would be as productive as whites".

He did not, however, say that his company was providing these facilities. (Natal Mercury 20th January). One company expressed the view that low African wages were paid because there were too many Africans chasing too few jobs. Another company maintained that although they paid women an average of R8,50 and men an average of R9,50 per week,

"these people actually cost us about R18,00 per week each in terms of training, attendance bonus, canteen facilities and other fringe factors" (Natal Mercury 20th January 1972).

He omitted to give details of what his white employees cost the firm in terms of similar conditions and benefits!

..... The Daily News reported on January 20th that the bus boycott was continuing. The weekly coupon remained at R2 00 with the cash fare being 28 cents per single trip. The owner of the bus service, Bishop PH Nzuza, said that these increases were the first in 23 years and had been caused by the illegal operations of private taxis which were in fact more expensive.

In an editorial on January 21st, the Natal Mercury said:

"If the border industries of Pinetown and New Germany can pay no better than an average wage of R10 per week - a long way below the family breadline - then it is time to take another look at the morality of our economic structure. It is no good expecting employers to increase wages voluntarily to an acceptable level in a competitive capitalist society. The only course is to introduce a national minimum wage for bread-winners based on the poverty datum line for each area. Nor does it make sense to demand increased productivity before better wages. Productivity will improve as living conditions and training programmes improve ... What does it take to jolt public opinion into a concerned awareness of the appallingly low wages and bad living conditions endured by so many black workers? In South West Africa (Namibia) it has taken mass strikes to shake people out of their complacency about the evils of the contract labour system. Must we wait until the same or worse happens here?"

By the morning of the same day, news reports said that the boycott was beginning to break. Hundreds of workers were still

ignoring the service and using trains, but some were, under police protection, using the buses again at the return fare of 40 cents a day (coupon). The weekly coupon system remained at R2,00 however, and workers were against this.

The evening papers quoted the owner of the service, Rev. Nzuza, as saying that unless the boycott ended immediately, the company faced bankruptcy. The company had been losing R1 000 per day since the boycott began and the buses which usually carry 400 passengers had, that day (21 January) carried only 6. If the company closed down there would be no other service available as the Durban Corporation stated that they had no intention of operating buses in the area.

The Sunday Tribune of 23 January reported that some Hammarsdale factory workers earned as little as R4,50 p.w. (men) and R3,60 p.w. (women). Some men in the Pinetown area earned only R9,00 p.w. and women only R5,00 out of which they had to pay R2,00 for weekly bus coupons. The Mpumalanga township manager, Mr RK Francis, blamed these low wages for the trouble, and the Progressive Party national executive chairman called for an immediate Government enquiry into African wages particularly in the border industry areas.

The Mercury of Monday 24th reported that a man had been shot in the Hammarsdale township on Sunday, after a mob of about 15 000 Africans attempted to free the man, who had been arrested for stoning police vehicles. This had happened after a protest meeting to discuss the bus fare

increase had been held in the location. This meeting had been stopped by the police after a crowd had tried to attack one of the organisers' cars. Immediately thereafter, the shooting incident occurred.

The Haritzburg Wages Commission issued a statement on January 21st which was published in the Natal Witness, backing the cause of the African commuters in the bus dispute. The statement made the point that

"workers have to commute such long distances....due to the dictates of the apartheid economy, which requires that workers should be separated by long distances from the place of employment....and are expected to pay for the transport which makes it possible to carry on economic activities when such separation is enforced".

..... The Daily News that evening carried a comprehensive survey outlining the problems and analysing the situation.

"The Sizabantu bus company is owned by the church. It began as a small service operating in the Camperdown area 25 years ago, and served the church mission, the Peaceville mission, at which 200 families reside. With the establishment of the Hammarsdale industrial complex in the Elangeni area and the nearby Mpumalanga township in 1968, the company expanded to provide services for workers from Mpumalanga to Hammarsdale".

When Unit 3 in the Mpumalanga township was ready, the Department of Bantu Administration and Development moved hundreds of African families, who had been living in slum conditions at Clermont, near Pinetown, to Mpumalanga. Most workers retained their jobs in Pinetown and the

Sizabantu bus company was authorised to provide transport for them.

The background to the....boycott is described in terms of a long feud, as follows:

"A long feud is behind the boycott of the African-owned Sizabantu bus company by workers in the Mpumalanga area near Hammarsdale. Commuters have been protesting against the old fares charged by the company at public meetings in the township since the beginning of last year. The Sizabantu company, already running into financial difficulties because it was operating on the Pinetown route at R1,05 less a passenger a week than the required charges laid down by the Pietermaritzburg Transportation Board in 1968, appealed to the Government for a subsidy on July 13th last year.

In addition to the higher prices of tyres, fuel and spare parts there had been a sharp rise in the cost of buses, by nearly R1 000 each. By January 1 this year, there had still been no reply to the application for a subsidy. Notices were put up in buses on the Mpumalanga-Hammarsdale circuit. While coupon fares would remain at the old rate of six cents a single trip, cash fares would go up from seven cents to the authorised eight cents. This increase appeared to be accepted by the passengers.

At the same time the company decided to raise the weekly coupon fare to Pinetown from R1,75 to R2,00 a week, which was still 80 cents below the authorised R2,80 a week.

This increase was introduced at the beginning of the year. No notices were put up in advance, but the buses ran smoothly until January 10 when hundreds of workers who had taken on leave during the three week Pinetown factory recess returned to work. There were immediately complaints about the new fares.

A crowd of about 30 people marched on the Peaceful mission depot on Sunday January 16, and told bus company

spokesmen that unless fares were reduced the buses might as well be kept at the depot.

Their threats were reported to the nearest police station at Inchanga, 15 km away.

The crowd was also told that the matter would be reviewed at a meeting of the transport committee on the following Sunday.

The next day, however, an angry mob stoned four buses, smashing windows and injuring one of the drivers. The crowd refused to use the transport, with instigators (sic) preventing any potential passengers from doing so.

The Inchanga police were called, and the township manager, Mr Francis, was informed. The bus company was advised to withdraw its buses from use that day.

That night, crowds of angry workers, stranded at the Pinetown depot, were taken home by three Durban Corporation buses after an appeal to the Durban Transport Management Board by the Pinetown police.

The Durban Corporation buses also conveyed workers to Pinetown on the following morning, charging on both occasions the old prices for the routes. This was purely a temporary measure.

A well-organised boycott, led by men in unit 3 of Mpumalanga township, then went into operation. Few passengers dared break it, even though police protection was offered to any passengers wanting to use the buses. The managing director of the bus company, the Reverend PM Nzuza, decided from Tuesday evening, January 16th, to run the buses according to schedule at the new rates even though his buses remained empty. On Friday January 21, he announced that his company was losing R1 000 a day, and that unless something was done soon the company would be bankrupt.

Representatives of the Mpumalanga township residents' committee and the bus company met at the Peaceville mission on Sunday January 23, where the residents' representatives accepted the bus company's reasons

for raising the coupon fares and agreed to inform the boycotters at a public meeting that afternoon. The meeting, however, ended in violence and disorder. The boycott is continuing."
(Daily News January 21)

The Daily News reporter goes on to analyse the action of the residents:

"This boycott reaction is something of a disturbing nature. It is a manifestation of deep resentment, chilling in its obstinacy and persistence. It suggests a permanent dissatisfaction in the lives of the residents of Mpumalanga township. Nearly 8 000 Africans are employed in the industrial area of Elangeni, at Hammarsdale, and 'their rates of pay are far too low', says the township manager, Mr RK Francis.... According to the head of the labour bureau at Mpumalanga, Mr L van Belkum, starting wages can be as low as R3,45 for a woman to R4,50 for a man, 'and this is an improvement on what they were paid a few years ago,' he said.

The rent at Mpumalanga is R6,10 a month. Workers feel that this is fair. The houses are in good condition. They have electricity and waterborne sewerage. But for a man earning R5 a week this constitutes 30 percent of his wage. Bus fare for the worker at Hammarsdale is an extra R2,50 a month. Subtract bus fare and rent and the R5 a week man is left with R3 a week to buy food, clothes, medicine, to educate his children and support his wife. At Hammarsdale there are no minimum wage levels. Employers can literally pay what they wish."

The reporter interviewed the chairman of the Hammarsdale Industrial Association, Mr Milner-Smyth, on the reasons for low wage policies.

"Mr Milner Smyth said that the main reason the wages were so low was that

the Hammarsdale labour force was unproductive, and almost 50 percent illiterate.

'The people here have no background of anything mechanical, and so continuous training schemes are needed to educate them,' he said. 'What we need are technical schools which will train people for trades. A semi-educated mechanic is far more valuable to industry than a matriculated clerk.'

(Daily News January 21)

In an apartheid economy, an extended transport system is essential to maintain the long distance between the home and the work place. The poorest members of the community are expected to pay the costs of their own segregation with high train and bus fares to make 'white by night' policies practicable. This policy decision cannot be changed, but.....the least that employers of workers from Hammarsdale can do is to pay their workers monthly family transport costs if they insist on keeping wages low.

Finally we (the Wages Commission) recommend that the people living in the Hammarsdale area form their own People's Bus Co-operative to take over the running of the services necessary to them, and by avoiding profit motives, this co-op would be in a position to keep fares as low as possible.....

Furthermore, we demand that the Government provides a subsidy for this and all other border area bus services, whether they be privately or co-operatively controlled, because the burden on African workers of long distance commuting is a result....of apartheid policies over which they (the workers) have no control.

The Press

- a response



UNLIKE MANY critiques of the press, the article in WIP 12 ends on a positive note. In contrast to the usual pessimistic view of the media, which sees it as completely controlled by conservative pressures, the WIP 12 article tells journalists that these factors 'make our task difficult, but they do not prevent it.' (p 33)

After analysing how the press supports the status quo - in influencing what people think about and how they think about it - the article concludes that 'the solution is not to get out of the commercial press!'

This article is to add support to the above view by trying to give it some theoretical underpinnings.

The main theoretical concept to be used is that of 'ideological state apparatus' (Althusser). This, it will be argued, allows for an understanding of both the possibilities and the limits of the commercial press.

Althusser's view of the state extends far beyond the traditional view where the state is seen as comprising only of political structures, government and administration. For him, not only are bodies like educational institutions part of the state apparatus - but also those conventionally seen as part of 'private' life: churches, family and the media.

Why does Althusser lump all these institutions together as part of the state? This is because, in the long run they all serve to maintain a basic system of capitalist production involving exploitation. At this stage of his analysis, there is no fundamental difference between these institutions, since they all (in different ways) do the same thing, ie serve the interests of the capitalist class.

The family produces well-behaved workers and enthusiastic consumers; the school trains and disciplines them further, and the police/army keeps them in check. As the WIP 12 article also notes, newspaper owners and managers

'are no different from owners and managers of any other profit-orientated institutions. Their interests are in maintaining the status quo or, at most, changing it to meet their interests. It would be ridiculous to expect anything else from them or from their appointees, their editors.' (p 31)

There is certainly much truth in this view and we would be blind to miss just how much the 'opposition' press and the rest of the state apparatuses have in common in serving the same ultimate purpose.

But to remain at the level of this

insight is also to miss the real differences that do exist between the press and the other apparatuses, and also to obscure the relationship between the press and capital. To remain at this level leads to a pessimistic view of the press - a view which sees the media (and other apparatuses) solely as the arm of the capitalist class - a thing to be manipulated as capital so desires. Options for progressive journalism in the commercial press are thus nil, and the only strategy is to try to build up new institutions from outside of the old.

The more detailed conception of the state and its apparatuses enable us to correct the problems involved in this view. The 'pessimistic' view of the state apparatuses described above lacks a notion of contradiction, conflict and struggle. By bringing in these elements and correctly seeing them as part of the state a different picture emerges.

A state apparatus (like the media) is not simply a neutral area of society, at present controlled by capitalist interests, and around which conflict centres. An institution like the media is not a stake or area to be fought over by class struggles external to it, but rather a site or arena of class struggle. Contradiction and struggle against this background are relevant at two levels:

1. It is important to realise that while the state apparatuses of a capitalist society function ultimately in the economic, political and ideological interests of long-term capitalist

economic growth, and of capital in general, the capitalist class is not a unified grouping. Instead it comprises competing and conflicting individual capitalist and capitals (companies). According to the specific situation, these competitors group themselves against each other on the basis of industry/area/size/political strength/tactics and so on.

This explains in part why the state apparatuses show differences between each other: it is possible for different 'fractions' (or sections) of the capitalist class to control different parts of the state, ie different state apparatuses. This means that the state is not simply a weapon of a (united) capitalist class, but rather that its apparatuses have some independence from the capitalist class as a whole.

Applying this view, it is easy to see how the English commercial press has reflected the domination of one fraction of capital based in mining and manufacturing industry. It is also possible to see how the repressive and economic apparatuses have in recent years been controlled by other fractions of capital. For instance, racial capitalism (influx control, job reservation, etc) may have benefitted one sector more than the others (this indeed has been part of a the root of the conflict between the English press and other state apparatuses). It is also possible to understand the Afrikaans commercial press as directly dominated by financial capitalist interests (Sanlam) which in a wider

society have been allied to farming capital, small manufacturing, and the white petty bourgeoisie and the labour aristocracy. The current 'co-nerding' (co-operation) of English and Afrikaans press reflects, by and large, the growth of monopoly capitalism in the economy, and the developing political unity between fractions that goes with it.

It must of course be remembered that the state apparatuses do not stand in an equal relationship to each other. Depending on their major function (ideological, repressive, economic) and the organised strength of the different fractions, one specific apparatus (or combination of apparatuses) usually dominates the others. This explains the vulnerability of the press in South Africa to other state apparatuses imposing official limits on its functioning.

The question which arises here is - why is it still necessary for the repressive apparatuses to be used against the English press in the present period of interpenetration of capitals and the growing unity of purpose between fractions (as illustrated by the Urban Foundation, and press praise of total strategy, etc). Why, if in a wider society the political and economic differences are declining amongst fractions of capital, do the state apparatuses still display conflicts when it comes to the English press? This can be answered by turning to the second level of the analysis where contradiction and conflict become relevant.

2. A state apparatus is not the tool of

the whole capitalist class. It is not even a tool of a particular fraction of capital - for the simple reason that each apparatus (in varying degrees) contains the presence of the interests of the dominated and exploited classes. A fraction cannot 'summarise' do anything it wants with a state apparatus, since it has to contend with resistance (both internally and externally) to its interests. This has been most graphically illustrated by the current resistance to capitalist interests in the schools. Schools tend to be functional to capitalism, but can also, as is currently occurring, become areas of resistance to the maintenance of capitalist society. This factor explains why state apparatuses have a degree of independence from any ruling class interests, and why one sector of the state apparatuses still finds it necessary to act against other apparatuses.

The nature of news production (within limits of style and language) provides a journalist with a fair degree of operational control over his/her job. Although broad policy decision and control lie with that capitalist fraction controlling the press, the journalist is able to substantially influence the actual gathering and shaping of news information.

Thus it is within those apparatuses which function primarily through ideology (rather than repression) where the presence of the interests of the dominated classes are more easily manifested.

These interests make themselves felt within the media firstly through the sheer weight of the dominated classes' struggle in society. This compels the press to notice these struggles. These interests are also manifested through journalists adopting progressive political positions; this is often in response to clearly just struggles of the dominated classes.

To sum up this point then: by acknowledging the existence of the dominated classes' struggle within the media, we can explain why the English press expresses - on occasion and in parts - an opposition not merely to other capitalist interests, but to aspects of the whole capitalist system. The current Steyn Commission of inquiry into the press is precisely the response of the other state apparatuses and fractions of capital to the failure of the English press to 'keep its house in order'.

The possibilities for progressive journalism are therefore apparent in the understanding of the media as a site of primary struggle between dominated and dominating classes. These possibilities are also apparent in the understanding of the real secondary contradictions and conflict within the state apparatuses contradictions which enable the partial representation of the dominated classes' interests either through a loose or temporary alliance of one fraction against another, or through exploiting the opportunities caused by infighting between capitals.

It is important, however, to point out the limits of progressive struggle within the commercial press. Clearly, these limits are defined not simply by the control that a capitalist fraction exerts through ownership of the press, but by the dominance of capital in society as a whole.



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Black Education and Resistance

IN THE year 1975-76, immediately preceding the Soweto student rebellion, it was reported that the increase in defence spending by the South African state exceeded the total allocated to african education; in 1973-74, R403 was spent on the education of every white child, while R28 was spent on the education of each african child.(1) The suppression of the '76 and '77 revolt has been short lived: 1980 has seen black students taking a lead once again. What follows is an account of the historical origins of those revolts.

The first school for africans was opened by JI van der Kemp of the London Missionary Society in 1799, near present-day King Williamstown.(2) The next school was opened 17 years later, in 1816, near what was to become Fort Beaufort. The colonial government itself took no initiative in the development of african education, but it was prepared to provide land to the missionaries running schools. Thus it was that the Glasgow Missionary Society was provided with land near East London, where they built the Lovedale Mission, opening a Sunday school which by April 1839 had 139 pupils.(3) In 1841 the colonial government began to provide small grants-in-aid for african education, and a Superintendent-General of education was

appointed, claiming the right to inspect. The English language as a medium of instruction was to be used as far as possible, and religious instruction was to be given only during periods set aside for Scripture. Many missionaries feared interference and consequently did not apply for these grants.(4)

In 1855, Sir George Grey, the new governor of the Cape outlined his plans to subordinate africans to the dominant ideology of colonialism, and to incorporate them into the expanding Cape economy. The promotion of a select class of africans would no doubt serve to undermine the power of the chiefs, who constantly posed a threat to the colonial government.

"...unrelenting efforts should be made to raise the Kaffirs in Christianity and civilisation by the establishment among them and beyond our boundary of missions connected with industrial schools, by employing them on public works and by other similar means."(5)

The emphasis was therefore laid on industrial training, ensuring education for subservience, with a select few acquiring a more advanced academic education in order to create a small 'elite'. An industrial department was opened at Lovedale and this was followed by the establishment of industrial schools at Healdtown, Salem,

Lewseyton and J'Urban.(6)

The standards of the Cape mission schools were, however, appalling and various superintendent-general of education produced scathing reports on the quality of african education in the mission schools. In 1863 Dr Langham Dale conducted a survey on the progress of african education and proposed a series of recommendations designed to impart the necessary skills to create a labour force of blacksmiths, gardeners and domestic servants.(7) Reporting again in 1865, Dale found that the missionaries placed far too much emphasis on religious training and his successor, Sir Thomas Blair found that 60% of all african school children failed to reach standard one. The Cape Education Act of 1865 provided for three types of schooling: public, mission and Native schools, the latter being segregated and providing the most rudimentary form of education. Many of the mission schools were multi-racial, and at times white enrolment at Lovedale exceeded that of black enrolment, although dormitory and dining facilities were segregated.

The mineral discoveries changed all that, as large amounts of revenue began to flow into the Cape, bringing significant changes to the structure of the economy. The role of africans in the economy began to change and this is reflected in the 1872

report of an educational mission which appeared in the Cape Colony: it was specifically concerned with whites who were now to take up a privileged place in the increasingly racist society that was developing. In keeping with the growing demands for an unskilled, cheap and disciplined labour force, the evidence to the commission of G. M. Theal, a South African historian, bears powerful testimony to the close correspondence between the level of development of the economy, and the educational system.

"What is the education (africans).. should have in their own interests and in the interests of the public? I would say it should be industrial.(1) It seems to me that there is a very large number of natives on the frontier who attend these mission schools and are taught to read and write and they become really unfit for other work, and the class of person is increasing and they are doing no good to themselves and to the country".(9)

Implicit in Theal's statement is a perceived threat of an education which elevates africans beyond their 'rightful place' in a country whose division of labour between workers and capitalists was increasingly based on race.

The result of the Commission was that white education was upgraded in relation to black education, and the segregation of schools was strictly enforced. In 1893 a new law was passed providing for the subsidising of white mission schools, and by 1905 the Cape School Board Act had established segregated state schools.

Educational expansion for africans was even slower in the South African



interior, and the Dutch frontiersmen who trekked into the present-day Orange Free State and Transvaal saw little potential in africans beyond slave labour, servants or farm labour. Nevertheless, mission stations were opened and provided forms of basic education for africans. The most important of these was established by missionaries at Kilnerton, near Pretoria, in 1885, training africans as teachers; a minimum of standard three was the entrance qualification. In 1904 the first superintendent of Native

Education in the Transvaal was appointed along with the introduction of a special curriculum for african children. Progress in the OFS was even slower, with token funds being provided to the mission stations.

In Natal, following the military defeat of the Zulu, a policy of segregation was introduced, and the government set up a number of mission reserves each of which was placed under the control of a mission society and held in trust for africans. Schools and churches were

set up, and missionaries had the sole right to use the available labour. Adams College was established in 1853, and a seminary was set up for girls at Inanda in 1869. The 1881 Natal Native Commission, in making recommendations for industrial education, pushed for an education whose quality would ensure the promotion of an unskilled work force. In 1912 there were 18 000 africans in 232 primary schools, 5 industrial centres and 3 teacher training colleges in Natal. The Union of South Africa inherited an educational system for africans that was grossly uneven in its distribution and for the first 40 years of its existence, the state played a very minor role in african education, which continued to be controlled and run by missionaries.

Apart from higher education, control was placed in the hands of the Provinces, who had differing attitudes towards african education. Taxation was employed as a method of obtaining funds for 'Native Schooling' but the central government intervened with the result that expansion slowed down. By 1943 all general tax was channeled into the education account, but finance contributed by the provinces was less than recurrent expenditure and did not provide for buildings or grounds. The period of the Great Depression was characterised by stagnation in terms of general expenditure on african education, although the numbers enrolled at school rose steadily. In 1936 it was estimated that 18,1 percent of all african children were enrolled at school. in 1946 27,4

percent, and in 1951 30 percent. These figures should be read with care since the majority of those attending school usually stayed for under four years.

In 1936 an interdepartmental committee on Native Education recommended that although it would be unrealistic for the state to take over african education from the missions it should play a part in financing such education. The committee reported that the aims of education were different for different people:

"The education of the white child prepares him for a life in a dominant society and the education of the black child for a subordinate society Limits (of Native Education) form part of the whole social and economic structure of the country" (9)

By the onset of Nationalist rule in South Africa, the missionaries had achieved what colonists like Grey and Theal had hoped they would achieve: the establishment of a small service class of doctors, lawyers, nurses, teachers and religious leaders.

It is to the resistance which the barren structures of black education gave rise that we now turn.

The Bambata rebellion of 1906 in Zululand marked the last of the tribal wars against enforced white rule. Before the Act of Union of 1910 was passed, a feeling began to develop of a wider unity between africans, and this was organisationally expressed in 1912 with the foundation of the South African Native National Congress, which in 1925 changed its name to the African National

Congress (ANC). Its founding members were by and large a product of the education system under review. Other important early resistance movements to oppression were the Industrial and Commercial Workers Union (ICU) formed under the leadership of Clemens Kadalie in 1919, and the Communist Party of South Africa founded in 1921.

The period between 1920 and the introduction of Bantu Education in 1953 was characterised by periodic unrest in black schools throughout the country. These strikes were generally directed against the prevailing conditions of poor food, enforced manual labour and the harsh punishment meted out by teachers. In February 1920 students at Kilnerton struck for more food, and in the same year theological students at Lovedale committed arson in protest against the poor quality of food that they were receiving, causing damage estimated at between £3 000 and £5 000. Those involved in the attack were charged and received a series of sentences and fines.

Noting the blatant discrepancies in the South African education system, the Communist Party set up a number of night schools which, under adverse circumstances, aimed at informal worker education. Started in Johannesburg, the idea spread to Cape Town where in 1936 a school was started in District Six. Persecution of communists saw the dwindling of these schools but the impetus was regained by radical students who set up the African

College in Johannesburg in 1939, and the early 1940s saw a flourishing of these schools which despite handicaps and harsh conditions made notable yet limited progress.(10)

The formation of the Congress Youth League (CYL) of the ANC in 1943 saw the attempt to win recruits at the University College of Fort Hare, but although student strikes often occurred in response to outside events, they were not called by political organisations. The access which the students had to the wider struggle often spurred them into action. In August 1946, a serious riot broke out at Lovedale, and in the unofficial Commission of Inquiry set up under Douglas Smit, evidence was given that students involved had responded to a call to support the african mineworkers in their 1946 strike. The Lovedale strike was followed by a number of strikes in the Cape and Transvaal, culminating in the sitdown strike at the Bethesda Bantu Training College near Pietersburg at the end of 1946. The coming to power of the Nationalists in 1948 further aggravated the situation, and was probably largely instrumental in Fort Hare students coming out in support of a sitdown strike called by nurses at the Victoria Hospital in 1949. The University itself was becoming a forum for political activity, and the CYL gained wide support, although many students held back, aspiring to the class position which their university degree certificates would offer them.(11)

The coming to power of the

Nationalists and the advent of the policy of Apartheid corresponded to an attempt to re-create 'traditional tribal life', as is shown in the 'homelands' policy which was followed. In January 1949, the government appointed a commission under the chairmanship of Dr W Eiselen, with terms of reference including the following:

"The formulation of the principles and aims of education for natives as an independent race, in which their past and present, their inherent racial qualities, their distinctive characteristics and aptitude, and their needs under ever-changing social conditions are taken into consideration."(12)

The Eiselen Commission tabled its report in 1951. It noted that africans were totally opposed to any education specially adapted 'for the Bantu'. However, the Commission supported the separate existence of a black education system, and argued that bantu education would have a central and dynamic role to play in the development of a specific socio-economic policy planned for african people.(13)

In 1951 the Bantu Authorities Act was passed in Parliament, providing for the establishment in the reserves of tribal, regional and territorial authorities, in 1953 the Bantu Education Act was passed whereby the major recommendations of the Eiselen Commission became law. The essential unity of purpose in the passing of these laws was made explicit in statements made by the Minister of Native Affairs, Dr Verwoerd, and serve to show the link between educational structures and the rest of society.

"My department's policy is that education should stand with both feet in the Reserves and have its roots in the spirit and being of Bantu society...The basis of the provision and organisation of education in a Bantu society should, where possible, be the tribal organisation".

Speaking of the previously existing form of african education, Verwoerd further commented that

"Education has served to create a class of educated and semi-educated persons without the corresponding socio-economic development which should accompany it. This is the class which has learned to believe that it is above its own people and feels that its spiritual, economic and political home is among the civilised community of South Africa, ie the Europeans, and feels frustrated because its wishes have not been realised."(14)

The 'solution' according to Verwoerd, should be sought in the fact that

"...education would (now) have its roots entirely in the Native areas and in the Native environment and Native community. The school must equip him to meet the demands which the economic life will impose on him ..There is no place for him above the level of certain forms of labourFor that reason it is of no avail for him to receive a training which has as its aim absorption in the European community."(15)

In terms of the Bantu Education Act all mission schools were placed under state control. In 1954 the state's yearly contribution to african education was fixed at R13million, and excess expenditure was to be met by the african taxpayer. Attempts to further cut back expenditure were seen in Verwoerd's announcement that

it would be departmental policy to employ women teachers in primary schools, and that new salary scales for teachers would be less favourable than those existing at the time.

Spearheaded by an ANC recharged with the new militancy of the Youth League, the 1950s saw the beginning of mass action in opposition to Apartheid legislation. In 1950 the Suppression of Communism Act was passed and the Communist Party was banned following a May Day stay away it had organised. The stay away was to become one of the major tactics of the ANC, and has characterised struggle to the present day. 1952 - 53 saw the launching of a series of passive resistance campaigns by the ANC, to which the state replied with violence, intimidation and repression, resulting in hundreds of arrests. Resistance to Bantu Education was initiated in 1954 with a boycott, having initial success on the Witwatersrand. On April 21st it was reported that over 10 000 children from different centres on the Rand were out of school.(16) Verwoerd responded by expelling about 7 000 students who persistently refused to return to school, but they were later re-admitted on condition that there would be no further boycotts.

In 1955 the African Education Movement (AEM) was formed, and survived under increasing government harassment until 1960. Its members and leaders were banned and were forced to impart informal education since the state had a monopoly on black education.

The struggle within educational institutions grew as black students continued to protest against racist education. The headmaster of Adams College, Rev E Grant, opposed the Bantu Education Act. Before long the government seized control of the institution, renaming it the Amanzimtoti Zulu Training College, and replacing most of the staff with government employees. Discontent spread to the student body, who initiated a passive resistance campaign in response to a white teacher striking a black worker. Students were arrested, expelled, and in 1960 50 students walked out in protest at the standard of tuition. The CYL continued to take the lead at Fort Hare, and following the institution of a commission of inquiry into conditions on the campus, the SRC resigned and students boycotted the graduation ceremony.

In 1959, in a logical follow-up to the Bantu Education Act, the Extension of Universities Act was passed, prohibiting the 'open universities' (which then and now comprise predominantly white student members) from registering black students. Fort Hare was to be open to Xhosa-speaking africans only, and two new tribal colleges, Ixifloop and Nyoye, were opened. 'Coloureds' were re-directed to the University of the Western Cape, and Indians to the University of Durban-Westville. Protest to this Act was largely non-violent, and the Universities of Cape Town and Witwatersrand unveiled plaques proclaiming their commitments to the ideal of an 'open university', and introduced

annual 'academic freedom' lectures. Staff and students at Fort Hare passed strongly worded resolutions, and the state reacted by purging staff members, including an ANC member Professor ZK Mathews, who was forced to resign his position as Vice Principal. In 1960 a number of students were refused re-admission. SRCs were forced to disaffiliate from the predominantly white liberal National Union of South African Students (NUSAS). The impending student reaction was stemmed when students were forced by authorities to sign a declaration of acceptance of the college regulations. Bantu Education had been implemented: mother tongue was introduced in all african primary schools and by the end of the 1950s had been extended to the first class of secondary schools. The Extension of Universities Act had extended Bantu Education to all levels of african education.

The anti-pass laws campaign of April 1960 was followed by the banning of the ANC and PAC. The ANC launched a campaign of sabotage, having mounted a secret armed wing, Umkhonto we Sizwe (MK), while certain PAC energies were channelled into Poqo.(17)

A huge array of repressive machinery was constructed to destroy opposition in the country. In July 1963 the police swooped on a Rivonia farm near Johannesburg and arrested much of the MK leadership, including Mandela, Sisulu and Mbeki, who were sentenced to life imprisonment in the trial that followed. Those who escaped the police net regrouped overseas and

began to conduct activity from exile. This left a vacuum within the country, which was eventually filled by ideas and organisations coming from the black campuses.

The 1960s saw an effort by black students to affiliate to NUSAS. Formed in 1924, NUSAS had never been fully able to break with the white liberal position. Despite progressive elements within its ranks, it was never really able to pose as a radical organisation. In 1968, despite a rising militancy in NUSAS action, the black student body led by Steve Biko partially broke from NUSAS, and founded the South African Students Organisation (SASU). This action led to the formation of a black consciousness position, inspired largely by the ideas of SASO, and holding that black students had to organise on their own, independently of white organisations and influences. Their ideas are reflected in the preamble to the SASU constitution, written in July 1970.

"Whereas we, the black students of South Africa, having examined and assessed the role of black students in the struggle for the emancipation of the black people in South Africa and the betterment of their social, political and economic lot, and having unconditionally declared our lack of faith in the genuineness and capability of multi-racial organisations and individual whites in the country to effect rapid social changes....do commit ourselves to the realisation of the worth of the black man. the assertion of his human dignity and to promoting consciousness and self-reliance of the black community".

SASU began to involve itself in the

literacy campaigns and community projects initiated by the University Christian Movement (UCM).

Black resistance in the 1970s was often characterised by Black Consciousness in action, and 1972 saw the foundation of the Black Peoples' Convention (BPC) and its subsidiary, the Black Community Project (BCP).

Despite its avowed 'black self-sufficiency', black consciousness groups found themselves collaborating with white liberals such as Donald Woods as well as white clergymen, as black consciousness took on a religious tone in its commitment to 'Black Theology'.

In April 1972, DR Tiro, a former SRC president of Turfloop presented a speech to assembled students in which he criticised discrimination in education, and the entire apartheid system. In early May, Tiro was expelled, and a boycott of lectures took place, followed by a closure of the University. The boycott spread to other black campuses, and by June all black universities were on boycott. Attention in the press was diverted to the white universities where NUSAS launched a 'Free Education' campaign which the police crushed using violence.

In 1973 black workers took the lead, and in the period until June 1974 over 300 strikes involving 80 000 black workers occurred. During this period more than 170 black miners were killed by police, and 500 were injured. The University of Durban-Westville held protest prayer meetings and SASO condemned the shootings,

but it was the white campuses who conducted the most overt action carrying their protest to the Anglo-American headquarters, while Turfloop students removed their SRC for failing to arrange a protest meeting. The overthrow of the Caetano government in Portugal in April 1974 created the impetus for BPC and SASU action, and 25th September was declared a day for nationwide pro-Frelimo rallies. The Minister of Police reacted by banning all BPC-SASU gatherings for a month, but in Durban at Curries Fountain a crowd gathered, only to be dispersed by police. Many BPC-SASU leaders were subsequently detained, and remained in detention for long periods. Students gathered at Turfloop, but were dispersed by police with dogs, and two students were arrested. The university closed soon after for its mid-term vacation, and on re-opening the SRC president was detained. Impetus was lost, however, when students chose to write examinations, rather than continue the boycott which they had begun.

Black students at secondary schools were not inactive during this period, and a number of organisations were formed, the most important of which was the South African Students Movement (SASM) which was initially constituted in Soweto, but rapidly gained a following throughout the country. SASM was originally formed as the African Student Movement in 1970, but in 1972 it made contact with schools in the Eastern Cape and Eastern Transvaal, and reconstituted itself as SASM. Despite the close ties which SASM maintained with

SASU, the 1976 Secretary General, Isabello Motapanyane, denied that the movement was an offshoot of SASO. It has been claimed that SASM had links with the ANC, of which Motapanyane himself was a member. SASM was to play a major role in the 1976 rebellion.

Following the Sharpeville massacres of 1960, the South African economy enjoyed a period of rapid growth as direct foreign investment increased, caused by the West's need for strategic minerals and raw materials. In addition, the West began large scale investment in South Africa's manufacturing industry, so that by 1966 the latter had overtaken mining as foreign capital's major concern. The rapid industrialisation that followed as South Africa move towards state monopoly capitalist development made fresh demands on the Bantu Education system. In order to maintain a steady growth rate in the South African economy, black workers had to be shifted into semi-skilled and skilled job categories. The government was slow to act, but granted a 'concession' of allowing private funding of Bantu Education. In 1978 Anglo-American, the Johannesburg City Council and the Bantu Welfare Trust donated large sums of money for african education, and the TEACH fund was launched by the Star newspaper to collect funds for building classrooms. The latter effort failed to deal with a growing shortage of accommodation for students entering secondary schools, and problems became acute in Soweto in 1976. The situation was made worse when the Department of Bantu Education announced

the enforcement of the rule that half of the school subjects were to be taught in Afrikaans as the medium of instruction. The move was to be the immediate cause of the 1976 uprising.

During this period, the economy entered a recession, and in 1976 industrial activity dropped significantly. Many black workers were laid off, and unemployment rose dangerously. Prices soared as inflation ate up black wages. Food prices rose at a rate of 30 percent, so that in May 1976 the poverty datum line in Soweto, was estimated at R129,05 a month - 75 percent higher than it had been in November 1970. The average black family was estimated to be earning R75 a month.

In March 1976 the Thomas Mofolo School in Soweto had Afrikaans as medium of instruction imposed on it. An immediate student protest resulted and police were called in to discipline the students. The discontent spread to other Soweto schools. On 13th June, SASM decided to hold a mass demonstration against the imposition of Afrikaans as medium of instruction and formed an Action Committee under the leadership of Tsietzi Mashinini. On June 16th, 20 000 students marched through Soweto in what was intended to be a peaceful demonstration. The police opened fire, and 13-year old Hector Peterson became the first victim of the 1976 rebellion. Students responded with violence and vehicles belonging to the West Rand Bantu Affairs Administration Board were burnt and its offices destroyed. Beerhalls, liquor stores, a bank and a hotel as well

as several post offices were burnt. Within 24 hours the unrest had spread throughout Soweto, and more vehicles and buildings were burnt. Prime Minister Vorster announced in Parliament that police had been instructed to maintain 'law and order' at all costs.(18)

The following weeks saw the rebellion spreading to townships throughout the country, as SASM threw its efforts into spreading resistance to Bantu Education throughout the country.(19) In August the revolt took on new dimensions as the Cape 'coloured' students came out in support of the african school rebellion. What had started as a peaceful protest march against the imposition of Afrikaans as a medium of instruction had turned into a full-scale rebellion in which police shot, and shot to kill.

The state reacted in early July and in an attempt to mollify the students, withdrew Afrikaans as a medium of instruction, and announced that the schools would re-open on July 22nd. Mashinini called for a return to class, probably in an attempt to organise the students, which would be impossible if they were scattered in the streets. His call was a failure, but on 76.08.01 Mashinini got his chance to address students at a BPA meeting at Regina Mundi Church and called for each school to send two delegates to a meeting and reaffirmed the return-to-class call. The police reacted by raiding schools and detaining students. Students responded by calling a stay-away on 76.08.04 and initiated the first of a number of attempts

to form some form of worker-student alliance. A march on the city centre was organised by the SSRC, but failed to get beyond Soweto and was fired on by police, leaving three students dead. A fresh wave of student violence ensued and the rebellion spread beyond Soweto to the Eastern and Western Cape. On 76.06.05 'coloured' students burned down the administration buildings of the University of the Western Cape. Events in Soweto also spread to other parts of the Transvaal, as two schools in Garankuwa and three in Middelburg were burned down. In mid-August Henry Kissinger, the US secretary of state, visited South Africa and Soweto students greeted him with slogans that were to receive world-wide publicity:

"Kissinger your visit to Azania is bullshit. Even animals are angry."

The solidarity shown by coloured students in the Western Cape was an important landmark in the struggle. Until 1963 coloured schools were by and large in the hands of state-aided missions, but later came under the control of the Department of Coloured Affairs. There were blatant discrepancies - R483 was spent annually on every white child, but only R125 on each coloured child. The government rejected the recommendations for the removal of some of the barriers to coloured advancement contained in the Theron commission, tabled in parliament on 76.06.18. The attempted divisive tactics of the apartheid regime, to enforce separation between africans and coloureds, had clearly failed when August, 1976, saw

the coloured students firmly identifying themselves as part of the oppressed black majority. Events in Cape Town embraced both coloured and african townships as youths and adults boycotted, demonstrated and faced consequent police action. At the beginning of September, first africans and then coloureds streamed into central Cape Town and staged demonstrations. On the second day of central city demonstrations, police sealed off the city centre and responded ferociously with batons and tear gas. In the Eastern Cape, authorities also tried to crush the revolt. In early August students were shot in New Brighton (Port Elizabeth) and Mdantsane (East London) as the unrest spread to nearby areas, including the Transkei and Ciskei.

As has been seen, early August saw the first attempts to initiate a worker-student alliance, and the stay-away call was heeded by an estimated 50 to 60% of the Johannesburg workforce. The second stay-away was called for 76.08.23

An SSRC pamphlet read:

"The racists in our last demonstration - called by the cynics a riot - lost millions of rands as a result of people not going to work. Thus they thought of immediately breaking up the student-worker alliance. They immediately called on workers to carry knobkerries and swords ... parent workers ... we want to avoid further shootings - and this can be done by you keeping at home without being stopped." (20)

The call was heeded by a reported 70% of Johannesburg's black workforce. (21) But the leaflet proved prophetic, as Mziashlope migrant hostel dwellers went on the rampage reportedly with police backing, attacking

students, parents and their property. Chief Gatshe Buthelezi flew up from KwaZulu in an attempt to calm the situation, but it has been claimed it was the students themselves who effected a reconciliation with the hostel dwellers. Migrant workers actively supported the third stay-away on 76.09.13-15, when police responded by going from house to house in parts of Soweto and Alexandra, attempting to force people to go to work. The fourth Azikhwelwa (we shall not ride) call of November 1 - 5 was a relative failure, partially explained by the harsh attitude that employers began to adopt, threatening workers with dismissal. The SSRC call to workers to boycott liquor, Christmas shopping and celebrations was generally a success as Johannesburg businessmen reported a general slump in sales for December 1976.

The greatest victories won by the SSRC were those relating to the proposed rent increases, and the abolition of the Urban Bantu Council in Soweto. WRAB announced that from May 1977 site rentals were to be raised by 84 percent, students marched in protest to the Urban Bantu Council Chambers, which had agreed to the rent increase for Soweto. The march ended in stone throwing, teargas and shooting, but ultimately the resignation of the UBC was obtained, and the rent increase withdrawn.

In February 1980, the Cillie Commission, set up in 1976 to investigate the causes of the June uprising, tabled its report. In its findings, a clear relationship between education and the

form of capitalism peculiar to South Africa emerges. The immediate cause of the uprising in Soweto was held to be the enforcement of Afrikaans as a medium of instruction in the schools, but a number of other contributing factors are mentioned by the report. They include influx control laws the Group Areas Act, the 'homeland' policy and the citizenship issue as applied to urban africans. The commission found that organisations such as the ANC, SACP, PAC and SASU had played an active role in the rebellion, while damage suffered by the Administration Boards totalled over R29 million.

Cillie noted that

"When in the course of the riots, Bantu Education had virtually superseded Afrikaans as the rioters dissatisfaction, there were many who described the object of this system as a deliberate attempt to train the black pupil in such a way that he be subservient to the white man, or put more strongly, that he would remain the oppressor's slave.(22)

These findings have an echo in the words of Seatholo Mashinini's successor as SSRC chairman:

"We shall reject the whole system of Bantu Education whose aim is to reduce us, mentally and physically, into 'hewers of wood and drawers of water'".(23)

It was at the politico-economic level however where the fundamental causes of the rebellion were to be sought:

"Discrimination which has always been considered unjust has engendered not only dissatisfaction but also a great hatred in many. This dissatisfaction and hatred were some of the main

factors that created the milieu and the spirit of revolt".(24)

In 1980 coloured students in the Western Cape left the events of 1976 behind as their slogans went well beyond educational demands, and tackled their very foundations: apartheid and its role in the development of capitalism in South Africa. April marked the beginning of a boycott against coloured education in the Cape: it spread rapidly through the country, and included indian and african students. At the end of the month davelodi pupils joined the boycott, and 1 500 students from 4 schools were sent home, while 9 were detained by police. Amidst reports that 1980 could turn into another 'Soweto', Cape students called for the resignation of the Minister of Coloured Relations, Marais Steyn. While the latter promised to look into coloured student grievances, Prime Minister Botha and his Minister of Police, le Grange, warned that they would deal harshly with dissenters, and baton charges and tearsmoke once again became common in the townships. On April 30th police arrested about 860 pupils at a protest meeting held at Bosmont High in Johannesburg. Charges under the Riotous Assemblies Act were eventually dropped by the state but detention and interrogation of school children became common.

The boycott spread to black university campuses in Natal, while striking school children from KwaMashu township were urged by Gatsha Buthelezi to return to classes. While Prime Minister Botha called for a probe into all South African

education, students at more than 200 overseas universities took part in an International Day of Solidarity with South African students. Black parents played a prominent role amidst calls for a worker-student alliance. At a gathering called by parents in Parow, a decision was taken to boycott a particular business for two days. One of the parents present claimed that while this action "will not cripple the merchants economically...it will make the people aware".(25)

What has been remarkable about the student struggles this year is the level of awareness and sophistication displayed in the students' manifestos and slogans. Whereas Soweto '76 was clearly inspired by the ideology of black consciousness, the 80s have witnessed the growth of student understanding of the dynamics of capitalist exploitation, and apartheid's role in it. The students of the Western Cape had noted that equal education is useless in a society based on exploitation. A clear attempt has been made to situate their demands within a wider context:

"We must see how...short term demands are linked up with the political and economic system of this country. We must see how the fail-pass rate in schools are linked up with the labour supply for the capitalist system.."

Stressing the importance of a worker-student alliance, the students have said that

"Our parents, the workers, are... strong. They have power. We, the students, cannot shake the government in the same way....We have got to

link up our struggle with the struggle of the black workers. Our parents have got to understand that we will not be 'educated' and 'trained' to become slaves in apartheid-capitalist society.....(T)ogether with our parents (we) must try to work out a new future. A future where there will be no racism or exploitation, no apartheid, no inequality of class or sex."

The students have analysed the role of education:

"The two functions of education have been thoroughly discussed by students. The one is ideological control by the state. The second one is to prepare us for a specific labour market."

The students of 1976 found themselves in a position where their guiding ideology was limited for the purposes of wider demands which they attempted to formulate as the revolt developed. Their attempts at an alliance with workers was weakened, inter alia by their belief that they would lead that alliance.

The black consciousness position claimed to oppose both capitalism and socialism, which were seen as foreign and imperialistic. Black consciousness was seen as itself able to formulate political, social and economic demands which could be found in the heritage of 'black culture', and would ensure the creation of a new social order. This meant that the black conscious position tended to distance itself from the mass of exploited South Africans: black workers. It is highly unlikely that members of the black working class felt a cultural 'emptiness' described in some black

consciousness writings, nor the necessity to realise their blackness. This problem was clearly realised by some of the black consciousness analysts themselves. Gwala noted that

"...it is only the elite that are plagued by the problem of identity. Not the mass of the black people. The common black people have no reason to worry about blackness. They never in the first place found themselves outside or above the context of being black."(26)

The struggles originating in the black educational structures of South African society have tended to reflect the countrywide basis of conflict in society. Certain statements issued by the Cape students suggest that they are aware of their own limitations as students. They have seen that the most important aspect of any worker-student alliance is for black workers to lead, and to see how, through their own action, they are able to bring their exploitation to an end. It is this challenge which the 1980 black student revolt has placed before progressive movements and organisations in South Africa.

NOTES.

1. Cellinicos, A and Rogers, J. Southern Africa after Soweto. pp 161-162.
2. Horrell, M. African Education: origins and developments until 1955. p 2.
3. ibid p 3.
4. ibid p 4.
5. Governor Sir George Grey's address to the Legislative Council and House of Assembly at the opening of the second session of the Colonial Parliament. Quoted in Rose, B and Tunner, R (eds). Documents in South African education p 205.
6. Horrell, op cit p 7.

7. Rose and Tunner, op cit p 207.
8. Quoted by Rose and Tunner, op cit pp 213-214.
9. ibid p 233.
10. Roux, E. Time Longer than Rope. p 348.
11. These views were expressed by a student D. Gordon, written in 1949, and appeared in the journal discussion vol 1 no 2.
12. Horrell, M. Bantu Education to 1968 p 4
13. ibid p 5.
14. Rose and Tunner, op cit p 264.
15. ibid pp 265-266.
16. Roux, op cit p 395.
17. ibid p 428.
18. Kane-Berman, J. Soweto: Black Revolt. White Reaction. p 2.
19. Motapanyane's account of the rebellion.
20. Kane Berman, op cit p 113.
22. Cillie Commission. Report on Riots, 1976. pp 556-557.
23. Kane Berman. op cit p 24.
24. Cillie Commission op cit p 604.
25. Cape Times, 80.05.18.
26. Gwala, MP. Towards the practical manifestation of black consciousness.

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