

WORK

46

IN

PROGRESS



IN THIS ISSUE:

* Natal Indaba *

Inkatha Youth Interviewed *

* Life in Venda *

**Striking
OK Workers
in Class War**

Editorial

The current state of emergency is into its ninth month. If anything, regulations promulgated during December and January make it more restrictive than before, and recent statements from government ministers suggest that there is no intention of ending emergency conditions at present.

With a whites-only election scheduled for 6 May, opposition political parties have protested that the terms of the emergency favour the National Party in the election campaign, and seriously hinder other party efforts.

And there is no indication that some of the most repressive aspects of emergency life - long-term detention, comprehensive media censorship, and a blanket ban on all sources of information concerning security force activities unless sanctioned by government - are softening.

Government is clearly using emergency powers to undermine and attack serious challenges to its power - the ANC, the trade union movement, popular political organisations, and the embryonic structures of 'people's power' that developed in townships after 1985.

But it is important to recognise that the state of emergency is not only being used to attack: it also functions to support and promote some interests and organisations at the expense of others.

Organisations like Inkatha and its trade union wing, UWUSA, are benefitting from repression suffered by progressive organisations in Natal. The detention of all leading COSATU trade unionists in Northern Natal, for example, created a space for UWUSA in that area.

In East London, government is attempting to create a basis of legitimacy for Duncan Village's newly constituted town council. But this could only happen after the UDF-affiliated Duncan Village Residents Association was severely weakened by police raids and detentions.

Strikers involved in the OK Bazaars dispute have been so badly harassed by police that OK management approached government on this question. And government's attempts to silence discussion on the ANC within South Africa, and at the same time wage a propaganda war against that organisation, are greatly helped by emergency provisions. The blanket ban on advertisements calling for the unbanning of the ANC is just one example of this trend.

Importantly, then, progressives must not only look at which organisations and interests are being undermined by the state of emergency. They must also ask who benefits.


For government and its allies are not just involved in a battle against progressive opposition forces. They are also intervening in an attempt to create, support and direct structures and organisations which are more sympathetic to government's view of the future than any progressive groups will be.

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PLEASE NOTE THAT SARS HAS A NEW TELEPHONE NUMBER: (011) 403-1912.

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'Anti-Apartheid Bosses are not Our Friends'

Mediation has not ended the dispute between management and workers at the OK Bazaars. And management's strike-breaking tactics have enraged workers and officials of the Commercial, Catering and Allied Workers Union of South Africa. The strike has developed into a test of strength, with police intervening on behalf of management, and a wide range of unions and community groups supporting workers. INGRID OBERY talked to CCAWUSA organisers and shop stewards about the OK struggle.

'We have seen overt collaboration between capital and the state over the OK workers strike - it has become a class war of attrition', said a CCAWUSA organiser discussing workers' attitudes to OK management.

With intense harassment of shop stewards, workers and union officials, and police intervention in peaceful strike demonstrations, workers increasingly recognised that the 'anti-apartheid bosses' were not necessarily their friends. The anti-apartheid struggle must be distinguished from the anti-capitalist struggle, claimed one worker representative.

'The workers are angry', said a shop steward recently fired from an up-market OK store in Sandton. 'With constant intimidation by police we have to restrain workers from taking drastic action'.

In February 1985, OK Bazaars management tried to retrench 2 000 workers. CCAWUSA fought back, and succeeded in obtaining a lay-off agreement from management. Management agreed to give two weeks notice prior to retrenchment, to show cause for retrenchments and not to disguise an unfair labour practice as retrenchment. OK management also agreed to alternatives such as short-time and a ban on overtime to avoid retrenchments.

Over the next two years, say CCAWUSA organisers, approximately 2 000 wage earners at OK were dismissed - a process of 'back-door retrenchment'. Reasons for dismissal included petty, minor and 'political' offences, such as not seeking 'official permission' to attend union conferences.

This, together with dissatisfaction over wage levels, led to the wage dispute between OK and CCAWUSA currently at mediation.

The OK pays low wages, especially when compared to wage scales of workers doing similar work in other retail chain stores. At the OK a 'general assistant' - shelf packers, sweepers etc - receives R232 per month. Similar workers at Pick 'n Pay, for example, are paid almost double at R97 per week.

According to a CCAWUSA organiser, 'OK has won in the past, they have got away with murder'. The last wage agreement with the union was signed in September 1984. It detailed a R40 increase over 18 months, but bound management to review the increases in the light of improved profits.

CCAWUSA believed OK was obliged to review the increases in April 1986. Management refused, arguing it was only obliged to negotiate wages for 1987-88. This set off the dispute.

By 18 December negotiations reached deadlock, conciliation failed and workers decided to strike. 'They are trying to make us forget the 1986 period and just negotiate for 1987, but workers will not do that', said the CCAWUSA organiser.

Organising a national strike in a retail chain store is not easy. In all stores management insisted on being present at meetings to discuss the strike ballot. 'We explained to workers they were free to vote for or against the strike', said a shop steward.

CCAWUSA is organised in 137 OK stores throughout the country. 'It was not a strike that started in one day', the organiser explained. 'We started having meetings on 15 December and were only finished four days later. And we cannot organise at 'homeland' stores - CCAWUSA is banned in Venda and Bophuthatswana'.

Feelings about wages ran high, and most branches voted to go on strike. Middleburg and Randfontein branches voted against the strike, 'but they joined the strike after it started'.

MANAGEMENT AND POLICE COLLUDE

Union tactics have been hampered by ongoing state and management harassment. Management applied for interdicts preventing workers from entering or being near OK premises. The union was forced to settle out-of-court as it lacked funds to oppose these applications. 'We undertook that our members would not come near OK shops to commit unlawful acts until the resolution of the dispute. This was the only tactic available to the union'.

This followed incidents at the Eloff Street, Hillbrow and Faraday branches where workers demonstrated in the canteens, singing and dancing. Management claimed workers caused extensive damage but would not disclose the costs. In Vereeniging, management took matters into its own hands, and threw large amounts of pepper onto the floor where workers were singing. Workers there were also subjected to strip searches. Management gave no

reason for this.

And at Sandton Hyperama, the manager admitted contacting police to deal with strikers. He also tricked strikers into the hands of police on 5 January, telling workers in the canteen that 'friends' had come to visit. When the workers came out, police grabbed them.

OK stores have been picketed by striking workers. But picketers have been arrested, some under emergency regulations, others under the Internal Security Act. 'Management wants to drain union finances with huge legal bills', said one organiser.

The union suspended pickets in areas where it was most seriously attacked. 'But this is not hard and fast policy, it is flexible and we can reverse this decision when we feel things are better. Workers often refuse to be intimidated and continue. In Witbank, for example, workers were arrested for a day on 22 January. They were warned to appear in court on 5 February and were told not to picket. However they continued to picket. In this way police try to protect company legitimacy, doing their dirty work'.

Two weeks into the strike there was more evidence of management/police collusion. Police carrying management personnel files visited eight Sandton workers at home. In the Orange Free State, store supervisors visited workers at home and with threats tried to force them back to work.

'Anglo American, through South African Breweries, and Premier Milling own many shares in the OK. We are tired of their hypocrisy. They visit the ANC in Lusaka

and then come home to crush legal strikes', said one angry shop steward.

STRIKE TACTICS |||

Opposing the management onslaught is difficult. Shop stewards and union officials are denied access to stores. Scab workers in Sandton are allowed to carry weapons to work, although the company expressly forbids this in workers' 'induction' programmes.



OK workers at a strike meeting

But CCAWUSA receives moral and material support from other unions, community organisations and friends overseas. Support committees have been set up, consisting of representatives from a very wide range of unions, including COSATU, CUSA/AZACTU, and

independents like MWASA, as well as community organisations. 'The working class is under attack here', an organiser said, 'and all concerned organisations must have a chance to participate. At a time when there has been a lull in political organisation, the OK strike has provided a rallying point. And this has enabled those organisations and unions from different political tendencies to work together. Even the bourgeois press has recognised this is unprecedented'.

Those involved take what action they can. Food and Allied Workers Union, for instance, organises at South African Breweries, which holds OK shares, and has more leverage than other unions to demand action from management. FAWU has also refused to deliver goods to OK outlets.

CCAWUSA has not called a consumer boycott of OK stores, but an informal boycott by those supporting the strikers appears to have been successful. 'OK began using Jazz carrier bags at their check-out tills. Spar packets were also used in some areas and today we heard they have started using Pick 'n Pay packets. This is so that boycott-breakers cannot be identified by strike supporters'.

After reports from CCAWUSA, a Jazz Supermarket executive went to OK and was handed a Jazz packet at the till. Jazz immediately applied for a supreme court interdict against OK. On 27 January the court prohibited OK from using Jazz bags.

CCAWUSA lodged similar complaints with Spar management, which said the packet suppliers, Nampak, had mixed up deliveries between themselves and OK. This issue was settled between the managements of the two companies.

But the state of emergency has made organisation more difficult. CCAWUSA offices around the country have been subjected to numerous police raids. Organisers have to engage in 'guerilla tactics' - moving in to organise and talk to workers and getting out fast. And in Pretoria, an extensive police presence outside stores brought organisation to a virtual standstill.

Those who picket are arrested, with police often unable to state charges against arrested picketers.

But, said the organiser, 'Workers do

not hesitate to stand on picket lines, even with the threat of arrest. We must recognise and respect their courage and persistence'.

CCAWUSA believes OK management has miscalculated the strikers' determination. 'They thought workers would starve and go back to work. But black people have suffered harder times, and we are used to sharing with each other', said a shop steward.

A TEST OF STRENGTH

The union does not have vast resources, and most funds have gone to bail out picketers. On one day alone, 64 workers were arrested and given R1 000 bail each. Other money goes on transporting workers to meetings. 'It is very important that workers meet often to discuss the strike', said the organiser. Little is left to buy food for strikers but workers at other CCAWUSA-organised stores have pledged between R5 and R10 per month to help those on strike.

CCAWUSA blames OK management, its attitude and its willingness to call in police for the breakdown in negotiations. The union believes OK is determined to sit the strike out, and while management may want to settle the dispute, it will be unwilling to submit to worker demands and so lose face.

For the union, the issue seems equally clear cut. All strikers have rejected management's final offer, and there is 'no question of going back to work'. Organisers recognise mass dismissals are a possibility, but according to a shop steward, 'You would not get out of a meeting alive if you suggested workers go back to work'.

A number of important issues are on CCAWUSA's agenda for 1987. 'This year we will push strongly for job security, a living wage and the right to strike and picket. These are not ends in themselves, but these issues together with state responses to things like the OK strike and general repression, educate workers. Workers now see that the state and the bosses are one and the same'.

Regional Rule for Inkatha?

Government has rejected proposals from the Natal/Kwazulu Indaba. But pro-capitalist interests in Natal will no doubt continue lobbying for a 'regional option'. GERHARD MARÉ argues that while the Indaba initiative cannot meet the basic needs of Natal's people, it must be taken seriously. For if implemented, the Indaba's proposals will entrench highly conservative interests in the province, and lead to the domination of Inkatha's style of authoritarian politics.

The Natal/Kwazulu Indaba may be the 'seat of counter-revolution' in South Africa, with conservative pro-capitalist interests mobilising a large constituency.

And progressive forces will have to take the Indaba more seriously in the future if its efforts are to be limited.

The Indaba aimed to 'reach consensus regarding the formulation of proposals to be put to the central government regarding the creation of a single legislative body to govern the combined area of Natal and Kwazulu'.

A number of Natal interests had become dissatisfied with the direction and pace of the state's 'reform' programme, and saw the Indaba as a solution to the crises of economic profitability and political stability.

These interests had found expression in two previous Natal and Kwazulu initiatives, the Lombard and Buthelezi Commissions.

The South African Sugar Association commissioned the Lombard investigation to suggest alternatives to Kwazulu land consolidation proposals. This aimed to influence the state's investigation into further juggling of land area and people.

The Sugar Association was particularly worried that consolidation would cause loss of valuable sugar land, and therefore profits, to Kwazulu. In 1980 the Lombard report proposed a 'Natal solution' based on a single, if still racially-based, administration system for the province.

The Buthelezi Commission, established in 1980 under Professor Schreiner of Natal University and presented as a 'black initiative', was essentially Buthelezi's blueprint for a Lancaster House-type solution in South Africa.

This commission argued for a political system of cross-cutting allegiances to dull the antagonisms of racial as well as class divisions. Its proposed structures kept political planning separate from popular participation, and placed decision-making in consensus sessions between leaders representing various constituencies. This is also the essence of the Indaba deliberations.

In the years between the Buthelezi Commission and the Indaba, popular politics moved to the central stage, and the organised working class began to intervene directly in national politics. The tricameral political system was eroded as the state failed to respond to demands for national African political participation - demands that were clearly not going to be met within the tricameral structures. These developments convinced regional political and economic interests to go ahead with the Indaba.

ORIGINS OF THE INDABA

After the United Democratic Front's formation in 1983, popular politics in Natal distanced from Inkatha with its ethnic, conservative, pro-capitalist base. Popular politics centred more and more around the tradition of the Freedom Charter which implied a politics of national unity rather than regional division. This threatened Natal's ruling interests in a way that Inkatha never had.

In 1982 the state had refused to consider the Buthelezi report, and the New Republican Party's participant in the commission, Ron Miller, declined to

sign the final draft. But in 1984, after Miller had left the NRP for the National Party, the NRP-controlled Natal Provincial Council (NPC) executive initiated contact with Kwazulu again.

By the end of October 1984, the local press was full of the 'inseparability' of Natal and Kwazulu. Professor Lawrence Schlemmer of the Inkatha Institute, National People's Party leader Amichand Rajbansi, Chris Saunders from the huge Tongaat-Hulett sugar conglomerate, and NPC member Dering Stainbank were among notables supporting the move. But Buthelezi refused to consider an alliance with the Indian and coloured tricameral parties or the NPC.

The 'Ulundi Accord' was launched in November 1984 with a meeting between the NPC executive and the Kwazulu Cabinet. Two committees emerged from this: the Joint Action Committee with senior officials of the two administrations; and a Joint Policy Committee or Strategic Planning Group (SPG) with members of the NPC executive and the Kwazulu Cabinet. NPC executive committee (EXCO) member Frank Martin and Inkatha secretary general Oscar Dhloomo were appointed to speak for the SPG.

Areas of technical and service co-operation and joint administration - to be distinguished from a joint legislature - included roads, health and unemployment. These proposals and agreements constituted Phase One of the 'Natal option'.

Phase Two was the Joint Authority Bill introduced in the central parliament to allow services and planning under a Joint Executive Authority of Kwazulu and the now-appointed provincial government. This becomes operative in April 1987. Indian and coloured people were left out of these proposals - because, it was argued, they already had central representation in parliament, and no second-tier government structures equivalent to the NPC and the Kwazulu government.

Phase Three was intended to be a joint legislature for the region. Van Zyl Slabbert, Progressive Federal Party leader at the time, was the first to publicly use the word 'indaba' for this process. In May 1985 he called for a 'Natal/Kwazulu indaba' to work out a political solution for the region. He said the Buthelezi Commission had shown the region was able to experiment for the rest of South Africa: 'Here in Kwazulu/Natal we have the major interest

groups who have declared themselves willing to test this political experiment'. Similar views were expressed by local capital.

Regional commercial, sugar and industrial interests formed a Joint Private Sector Committee. Members included the Natal Chamber of Industries, the Durban Metropolitan Chamber of Commerce, the SA Sugar Association (SASA), and the Durbanse Afrikaanse Saekamer. This committee, together with the Natal and Zululand African Chamber of Commerce (Inyanda), actively promoted the idea of a Natal/Kwazulu solution.

Durban city councillor and present director of the Inkatha Institute, Peter Mansfield, argued there was growing consensus 'among people of almost all political persuasions' on the need for joint government between Natal and Kwazulu. And Buthelezi, Natal PFP leader Ray Swart, and a number of Natal newspapers claimed that there was popular 'democratic' approval for a regional solution.

In mid-1985 Swart called for a 'regional convention'. But there was little substance to the 'open' invitation to the convention extended to the UDF, Natal Indian Congress and the ANC. They were definitely non-participants from the start, even if the Indaba organisers had to go through the motions of canvassing them.

In December 1985 Martin and Dhloomo announced that discussions on a joint legislature would begin in 1986. Rather ambiguously the NIC, UDF and ANC were told their input would be 'welcomed' but the ANC at least would have no role in the initiatives because 'it rejected peaceful change'.

At that time Buthelezi refused to participate in the government's proposed National Statutory Council unless the state accepted the idea of a regionally specific Natal/Kwazulu option.

Early in 1986, US Secretary of Commerce Malcolm Baldrige asked Buthelezi how they could 'work together to promote increased economic development in the...region'. Buthelezi later urged the US government to pressurise South Africa to acknowledge the 'importance' of regional moves in Natal. He also asked Margaret Thatcher to send an observer to Indaba discussions.

In mid-February Dhloomo and Martin announced that the Indaba would be

formally launched on 3 April 1986, saying 'everybody' would be invited and those who did not participate 'will have excluded himself (sic)'. Indaba was to be the voice of moderation, peaceful change, negotiation, goodwill and democracy. Those who refused to participate or who offered criticism stood for violence, revolution, extremism and were against democracy.

SHROUDED IN SECRECY

The ANC and AZAPO were among those who declined to participate, and the *Daily News* editorialised that: 'In both cases the inevitable conclusion must thus be that these organisations do not want to see the people of Natal living together in peace and prosperity'.

The same newspaper called for a political alliance ensuring stability to defend the proposed government, and both the NRP and Inkatha's Dhlomo likened the proposed alliance to the Democratic Turnhalle Alliance in Namibia: 'We will stay together, either in the form of a pressure group or perhaps as a political party taking up what is...referred to as the middle ground', said Dhlomo.

Thirty-seven organisations were invited to attend the Indaba. Each organisation was offered a single representative, and five non-voting advisors could attend. The letter of invitation said a 'Joint Organising Committee' of four representatives each from Kwazulu and Natal had already been formed. The Indaba would meet once or twice a week in strict secrecy with no pre-given agenda.

How the list of 37 organisations was drawn up, and what discussions took place around the letter of invitation, remains secret. Nor were invited organisations consulted about the issue of equal representation for groups as diverse as the 500 000-strong COSATU and the largely unknown Kwazulu Local Government Association.

But informed speculation is possible about those involved in pre-planning. The SA Sugar Association must have been involved given its central role in selling the Indaba idea. And from the method of approach, the Indaba structure and its mode of operation, it is clear that the invitation list was drawn up knowing it was impossible for

organisations which had previously refused to participate to change position.

When the Indaba started, nine invited organisations had refused involvement: the Conservative Party and the Herstigte Nasionale Party said they stood for greater physical and administrative segregation, but also said the Indaba was undemocratic; the ANC, UDF, NIC, Pan Africanist Congress and AZAPO all objected to the fragmentation and federalism of regional solutions.



Inkatha's Buthelezi: making alliances for power

Other reasons for non-participation were that the venture worked through a bantustan structure; and it was fundamentally undemocratic, not allowing for a mandate based on an agenda of what was to be discussed. This did not allow free report-back opportunities and accountability to members, nor did members have access to deliberations, a point central in COSATU's refusal to

attend. Finally, it was pointed out that the banned organisations invited could not join in legally.

Rejection of the Indaba invitation meant bad publicity in the local commercial press. The commercial media has a close relationship with Natal's major economic interests and gave the Indaba largely uncritical support both before and after its discussions started.

Some organisations applied to join in the Indaba with a limited status. The National Party and the Trade Union Council of South Africa (TUCSA) requested observer status, and the Natal Law Society, after criticism from some members, changed from full participation to observer status. Some time after the initial invitations, several other groups were mentioned by the press as participants: the SA Hindu Maha Sabha, the Coloured Ad-Hoc Committee, the Junior Rapportryers and the Federasie van Afrikaanse Kultuurvereniginge.

THE PARTICIPANTS

The Indaba has involved some 34 full participants, and several with observer status.

* Political Organisations: eight political parties are full members, one an observer. All, except the tiny Reform Party, take part in either the tricameral or bantustan systems.

Of the seven groups which refused, two are far-right political parties and the others represent almost the full spectrum of extra-parliamentary opposition in South Africa. The right wing has mobilised on-going opposition to the Indaba through Aksie Blanke Natal.

Those in the Indaba can be characterised as at best reformist in political goals, if not method, and generally opportunist and conservative. In several cases their support is negligible or unproven.

* Capital: regional capital had nine votes through organisations which included: SASA, the DMCC, Inyanda and the Afrikaanse Handelsinstituut.

Capital is in the Indaba to safeguard 'free enterprise' and protect and advance regional interests. One way is through the promotion of Chief Buthelezi and Inkatha. Another is through presenting an example of 'real reform'

to national and international observers. Categorically excluded from capital's agenda is any extensive redistribution of social wealth.

* Regional and local government: among these nine organisations are the Natal Provincial Council (until its abolition in June 1986), the Kwazulu Local Government Association, the Kwazulu government, and the Natal Association of Local Affairs Committees.

The inclusion of these probably reflects the practical, down-to-earth goal of the Indaba to create stable joint structures of administration. No talk here of 'ungovernability', but rather giving more credibility and power to existing structures.

* Sundry groupings: these include the National African Council of Women, the Women's Bureau, the Islamic Council of South Africa, Junior Rapportryers and the Black Allied Workers Union.

The most glaring absences in the Indaba are those groups centrally involved in extra-parliamentary politics in the 1980s and the most significant representatives of working-class interests.

Academics, who were the architects of the Buthelezi Commission's reformist politics, are present only as advisers in the Indaba. And there are no direct representatives of the 'peasantry', rural unemployed, the agricultural working class and women, although Inkatha no doubt claims to represent all these interests.

The Indaba, like the Lombard and Buthelezi Commissions, arose from the poverty of state policy on bantustans and political reform. The initiative also developed from a popularly held and in part real view of Natal as regionally 'unique' - a specific colonial past, a greater degree of consolidation amongst its African population before that, and a pathetically inaccurate portrayal of a political culture of 'English Liberalism'.

BEHIND THE INDABA


The Indaba initiative emerged at a time of a new wave in the economic and political crisis of apartheid and capitalism: the threat of instability due to growing unemployment is aggravated in Natal by the proximity of

Kwazulu pieces to sites of production; opposition strategies of 'ungovernability' and a radicalism that has burst out of the confines of rejection of racial discrimination to include a rejection of economic exploitation; more effective and political trade unionism; and a focus for resistance in the national liberation movement.

In this context, Indaba is presented as the 'last chance for peaceful

Saunders and Tongaat-Hulett set up an Indaba Support Group (ISG) which presents itself as a group of concerned individuals. It has publicised Indaba's 'process' and 'principles', plans to set up regional support committees, and raise funds. Press releases have claimed overwhelming support for the Indaba: this is based on the absence of major criticism to a proposed bill of rights distributed to thousands by a mailing service.

'The Indaba cannot solve the problems of the majority of South Africans'



change'. It is about political and administrative rationalisation of the region to ensure stability. For apartheid legitimacy has been so fundamentally challenged that it has to rely on direct repression, which undermines stability.

Indaba involves multi-racialism, rather than non-racialism, and the maintenance of economic structures and political control by a highly conservative alliance with scant regard for democratic processes.

The ISG, Natal newspapers and the Indaba pushed for a referendum or some other test of opinion on the proposals. While this has not taken place, a vote for the PFP-NRP alliance in the forthcoming white election in the region will be presented as white support for the Indaba.

The far-right has mobilised against the Indaba since the start. Progressive political and trade union organisations decided not to participate, apparently hoping the venture would disappear, split asunder or lack the necessary state support for success.

This lack of progressive activity around the Indaba will make it more difficult to oppose publicly the next stage of the Indaba process - the testing of support. Groups opposed to Indaba will have to operate under restrictions of a state of emergency. They will face similar tactical issues to those of the tricameral elections - whether to boycott actively, passively ignore, or participate.

'WHAT ALL THE PEOPLE WANT'

Indaba has been presented as something all sensible people would want - if only they knew what it was they wanted. Most local press, with the exception of the Sunday Tribune, has had no criticism about Indaba's style and content.

Indaba set up a number of committees to facilitate 'expert' or 'academic' contributions. These included: a constitutional committee - five professors and three practising lawyers; an administrative committee - senior Kwazulu government and NPC officials; an education committee; an economics committee; and an image management committee chaired by Tongaat-Hulett's Chris Saunders. This last committee was disbanded because of dissatisfaction of far-right groups within the Indaba.

But there are major differences between the tricameral election and an Indaba referendum or other test of opinion: this is an initiative from outside central state; it involves Inkatha and its well-known leader as well as 'liberal' capital; it aims to abolish apartheid in Natal, is a regional venture, and is occurring under a state of emergency.

Many ideological symbols have been mobilised to ensure participation: 'Zuluness', 'Englishness', regional

'realities', etc.

Some participants have considerable power over constituents. Inkatha for example has had no scruples in laying down the political line to the Kwazulu Legislative Assembly or its employees. None of Buthelezi's preconditions for participation in the National Statutory Council - the unbanning of organisations, lifting the state of emergency and the release of political prisoners - have been met. But he is willing to launch a regional initiative which seeks direct state links and has major national implications if implemented.

THERE MUST BE A BETTER WAY

Opposition to Indaba will have to mobilise in the face of a hostile press, secrecy, large pro-Indaba funding, a repressive state, considerable economic and administrative power of some Indaba participants, and a high degree of political agreement within the Indaba.

The political 'middle ground' will be occupied by the Indaba alliance, the size and legitimacy of which will depend largely on the resolution of issues relating to the 'protection of minority rights', an issue of central concern to the far right within the Indaba.

Indaba's 'alliance of reform' aims for international credibility, 'development aid' and investment. But Indaba will have to produce more than a weak bill of rights and a complicated, conservative constitution. Abolishing crude apartheid will allow developments capital has been wanting desperately: assisting the growth of a black middle class; and regional extension of petty-bourgeois interests through Inkatha-like patronage to African traders, professionals and civil servants.

The rationalisation of administrative and other services suggested by the Indaba may allow limited improvement in areas like health, education and some pensions.

But the Indaba proposals in Natal will not solve the problems of the majority of South Africans; housing, water, sewerage, education, jobs and democratic participation. To meet these demands, 'rationalised' and non-racial control will have to be introduced by regional government once the euphoria of the

political campaign has worn off.

Inkatha's aggressive ethnic nationalism has been forgotten by many. 'We will brook no disruption of our efforts, and those who try to disrupt us must be served with notice today that when the spirit of the Zulu people is spat upon, when our right to exist is denied, when our right to make our own thrusts at the enemy apartheid is denied to us, we will return with a total Zulu anger and repulse those who do these things to us', said Buthelezi at a Shaka Day celebration last year.

This trend must be of great concern to progressives both in the region and nationally. A Natal where Inkatha is the major factor could mean its political style of intolerance for alternative political and class representation will dominate. It will also mean that for the first time a 'black' political organisation will gain a say in political structures outside direct state initiative. Inkatha will claim to have played a formative role in the process of 'reform' - an important ideological victory and channel for Buthelezi's national ambitions.

Present tensions and weaknesses in the Indaba have to be analysed and exploited if a campaign is launched against its proposals. This involves exposing its anti-democratic and anti-popular style. But the state of emergency has effectively limited open opposition politics outside the Indaba, and such a campaign might therefore not be possible.

Indaba critics will have to ensure the debate does not centre around the Indaba's high publicity achievements (such as the bill of rights) and other future achievements in the field of 'reform politics'. They will also have to pose alternatives, and separate principles such as the protection of minority rights and democratic decentralisation from the content given to them in the Indaba proposals.

Some analysts have described the 'Natal-Kwazulu option' as the 'seat of the counter-revolution' - the first time there is the possibility that the forces of conservative politics may take the political as well as the ideological lead for a significant number of people.

To ignore the Indaba as another tricameral dead-end is a mistake. For it can mobilise a bigger social base than any of the tricameral parties or proposals have been able to do.

Worker-controlled Production



On 1 May 1985 over a thousand workers at BTR Sarmcol's Howick plant went on strike. For years their union, the Metal and Allied Workers Union, had been struggling for recognition from management. Now workers had lost patience with management delays. Those on strike were dismissed, and the Sarmcol dispute continues to be fought nationally and internationally. Workers have formed a number of co-operatives since the strike began. These generate some income and employment, and involve striking workers in democratically-structured activities. WIP spoke to representatives of the Sarmcol Workers Co-operative (SAWCO). The majority of SAWCO members come from Mpophomeni township, scene of recent Inkatha-linked violence against MAWU members.

Why did workers decide to form a co-operative, and can you describe the process of setting it up?

After Sarmcol fired us we did not know how we would live. We thought of each doing our own work to get something to live on. A general meeting of Sarmcol strikers decided representatives from all the areas where we live should discuss this. These representatives established a committee called the SAWCO Central Co-ordinating Committee.

We organised a seminar with this committee, Sarmcol shop stewards and some outside advisors. Office bearers were elected to act as a finance sub-committee for SAWCO. They were also to run the weekly representatives' committee meeting. The representatives report back to all the people in their areas. We thought this was a fair way of expressing democracy.

Why did the co-op choose to start projects like silkscreening, the acting group, and agriculture?

We decided to start with the T-shirt silkscreening co-op because various unions had made a commitment to order from us. The T-shirt co-op started with eight people and now has 25 full-time workers.

We thought the acting group was important, because plays they produced would pass on the message and show the struggle of Sarmcol workers. We did not want people to forget our struggles. Nine people work in the play group.

We also wanted to create jobs and supplement our food parcels. So we looked for some land to farm. We negotiated with the Catholic Church to lease about fifty acres. About 15 members work and plant vegetables on this farm.

Even before the Sarmcol strike many of our children were not getting enough to eat. This problem became worse when we were all fired. So ten people, together with some voluntary doctors and nurses, formed a health committee.

This committee started by checking the health of all the strikers' children and measuring their weight and height. There is a follow-up every month. Children who are badly nourished get extra food from a special donation.

Some strikers were being treated for health problems inside Sarmcol, and we realised we had to care for them. So we organised a health screening for these workers.

When the strike started a group of five organised food parcels for the strikers. This has led to the bulk buying project. This is not off the ground yet, but the intention is to buy in bulk and sell goods cheaply to the strikers, with no profit motive. The bulk buying scheme will hopefully involve the whole community.

We also decided to start a newspaper so people could find out what is happening in these projects. The newspaper also covers events in the community. Two people run this project.

Have the structures of the projects been adapted to meet production needs?

The T-shirt co-op has had some training to improve skills. Before, we waited a long time for screens to be made, but have now learnt to make our own. We are going to buy more equipment for screen printing and many things will change then.

Are responsibilities shared or rotated? Are there people who have taken on specific tasks? And how are finances controlled?

When T-shirt printing started we rotated all the jobs. But now some jobs need a lot of training so we are not changing round functions.

Each co-op elects office bearers who meet with their group every Monday. They then report on their activities in the SAWCO Central Co-ordinating Committee.

All the expenses for the projects are approved by the Central Co-ordinating Committee.


Is the co-op financially viable? And can the silkscreening project compete with capitalist printers?

There are two production projects: the farm, and T-shirt printing. T-shirts are sold at similar prices to capitalist products but we cannot make big profits or even pay the kind of wages they pay. We still have a long way to go before we make enough money.

In the agricultural co-op we have not farmed a full season and harvested all the crops. So we still have to assess the income. Transport costs are a problem for this project because the farm is far from where the workers live.

How are issues of conflict and discipline dealt with?

Problems that come up in projects are first discussed in the individual projects. If they are not resolved they



Workers at the silkscreen printing project of SAWCO

are put to the Central Co-ordinating Committee. If the issue is not resolved at this committee it goes before a general meeting of SAWCO members.

What lessons have been learnt about organisation and management since the co-op started?

We believe that when starting a co-op, members must discuss the ideas of co-operative work right at the beginning and make their commitment to this way of working. If they do not discuss these things they will end up in conflict and expect others to take responsibility for all the problems.

How do community members and striking workers not employed in the co-op participate?

We invite community people to join SAWCO as associate members. There are some who have volunteered to take part in projects.

What is the relationship between the co-op, MAWU and COSATU?

SAWCO is part of MAWU - it has two members on the MAWU Southern Natal Branch Executive Committee and through this is represented on the National Executive Committee. MAWU is an affiliate of COSATU and this is how SAWCO is linked to COSATU.

How has the project influenced the worker movement in Natal?

SAWCO's development has created interest in co-operatives from some unions. But there is a lot to be explained to union members about how a co-op works and its problems. Even members of MAWU need to be more educated about how to build co-operatives. But we are aware that the Sarmcol workers play has had a wide influence among unions and community organisations all over South Africa.

From the Horse's Mouth

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The Inkatha Youth Brigade was formed in 1977. It currently claims more than half-a-million card-carrying members. But as with its parent organisation, membership claims should be assessed with caution.

There are numerous incidents of alleged Brigade and Inkatha involvement in vigilante violence against anti-Inkatha organisations and individuals. Yet the Brigade insists it follows a policy of non-violence.

A Work In Progress correspondent in Pietermaritzburg recently interviewed Inkatha Youth Brigade Chairman Musa Zondi. During the interview, additional comments were made by Siegfried Bhengu, Kwazulu's political information officer; Ntwe Mafole, Youth Brigade national organiser; and Matthew Sibanda, Youth Brigade secretary.

Responses to questions are published as an indication of what Youth Brigade leaders claim about their organisation. They do not reflect the editorial policy of WIP, its staff or contributors.

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There are numerous allegations of Inkatha and Youth Brigade involvement in vigilante-type violence against members of other organisations. For example, in the killing of MAWU members in Mpophomeni, it has been alleged that Inkatha Youth Brigade members were bussed into Mpophomeni. Minutes after their arrival, MAWU members were abducted and killed. Your urban representative, Mvelase, confirmed that Inkatha members were bussed into the township. The Bureau for Information blamed Inkatha for the violence, and shortly afterwards two Inkatha members were arrested but then released because police said they did not have enough evidence against them. Yet Inkatha and its youth movement claim to be non-violent. How can you justify this

Mafole: There are Inkatha members in Mpophomeni. The Minister of Welfare, Steven Sithebe was to address a rally organised by Inkatha and the Mpophomeni community. When the Mpophomeni Youth Congress (MPOYCO) heard about this, a member said they were going to attack Inkatha members. After this clear statement, they attacked Youth Brigade members guarding the hall the night before the rally. Brigade members only defended themselves when MPOYCO members attacked them.

Each time Inkatha defends itself, we are accused of violence. Inkatha has

nothing to do with the killing of those MAWU people. Not one of our members was involved.

Bhengu: Inkatha does not have shop stewards. The United Workers Union of South Africa (the Inkatha-linked union - eds) does. To drag Inkatha's name into trade union fights is irresponsible. Take the blame to UWUSA, they have a mouth to defend themselves.

Black education is in crisis with pupils rejecting Bantu Education, boycotting classes, and burning schools. The Department of Education and Training has introduced highly repressive and unpopular regulations in the schools. What is Youth Brigade education policy, especially regarding Bantu Education and the schools crisis?

The Youth Brigade is a segment of the Inkatha effort. Brigade and Inkatha policy is 'Education for Liberation'. We believe education should be a tool to bring about liberation. We abhor Bantu Education like every freedom-loving person and favour a system of education relevant to people's needs.

But unless we are politically liberated we cannot have a normal education system catering for our needs, since we do not have a say in parliament. We cannot isolate education from other issues in this country.



Inkatha: waving flags is half the story

Many youth and student organisations see school boycotts as a way of dealing with the crisis. What is the Brigade's stand on this?

The tactic of boycotts adopted by other student organisations is their own choice. We respect their endeavour to right the education crisis.

But in the Brigade we do not believe that boycotting our education will help solve the schools crisis. We know the powers that be in South Africa did not intend to make education available to the black man. Only the churches allowed us to have educated black leaders in South Africa and other parts of Africa. So it would merely be playing into the hands of our oppressors to boycott education. While we respect others' decisions, we think they are wrong.

What does the Brigade see as the solution to the education crisis?

Student and youth organisations should be part of mainstream black political efforts to right wrongs in the political system as a whole. Some organisations propose People's Education, but whatever its merits or demerits, they can never implement this if they are not in power. That is why we say the key to all

problems in South Africa is to be in power politically.

Is Inkatha or the Brigade doing anything to make the education syllabus more relevant to the needs of a liberated South Africa?

In 1978 the Kwazulu government introduced a subject called Ubuntu-Botho (good citizenship). In Ubuntu-Botho children are taught that history did not begin in 1652 with the advent of white settlers. We see nothing new in the principle of People's Education since that is what Ubuntu-Botho is all about.

What are the main subjects of the Ubuntu-Botho syllabus?

The syllabus does not suggest children should be taught only about Inkatha. It caters for all liberation movements, past and present. The ANC, PAC, Black Consciousness, liberation movements in other African countries, and the history of Black Americans all receive attention. It is a gross mistake to accuse it of being an Inkatha subject.

But many say Ubuntu-Botho is youth indoctrination.

It is far from that. Is teaching

children ANC history indoctrination about Inkatha? Years back, teachers were terrified to utter the name 'Oliver Tambo', because the Education Department said they should not meddle in politics. It is legal here in Kwazulu. I do not know any step as revolutionary as that. Pretoria could not stop this because it was done by us, and we are in power here.

Is Ubuntu-Botho then equivalent to the National Education Crisis Committes's idea of People's Education?

The idea of this so-called People's Education has not been clarified. At this stage it is quite inferior to Ubuntu-Botho.

Mafole: 'People's Education' is more political than academic. Those who promote People's Education do not want to define the concept. When you ask them to, you end up at loggerheads with them. So it remains a slogan.

Bhengu: The contradiction in People's Education is that it rejects parental authority over pupils. It says children should be completely independent, they should denigrate their fathers. They are fighting their upbringing - what we call informal education in the family. Our ethnic structure provides cultural education and then you mix it with the scientific education which throws you into the technological world. People's Education is nothing but a cliché.

What is the relationship between the youth at Mandleni-Matleng camp and the Youth Brigade?

Emandleni-Matleng is a Youth Brigade project. There are vast backlogs in housing, education, agriculture and health in urban and rural communities. Youth are called upon to engage themselves in a project of social reconstruction. They are trained to help various communities where there are health or other problems. As members of the Youth Brigade they are conscientised to do something about the black man's plight. The camp is one of our main activities.

But there have been allegations that the youth at Mandleni-Matleng receive military training and that Inkatha is in that way forming a military wing.

This is not true. Mandleni is part of a reconstruction, not a military, programme. Those who make these allegations aim to denigrate us. If



Inkatha vigilantes: the other half of the story

Inkatha were to form a military wing, it would be the biggest army in the black community. But the youth at Mandleni-Matleng do not receive military training.

It has often been said that whenever students boycott classes, Inkatha members are the first to arrive and sjambok the boycotters or force them back into the classrooms.

Mafole: That is said by those who want to villify Inkatha and advocate an anti-Inkatha reaction in South Africa and abroad. Inkatha has never done that. The same thing was said in 1980 when Kwamashu students boycotted classes. If anyone has proof of these actions they should come forward. I am sure parents of Kwamashu students sjambokked them. That definitely happened. They may have been Inkatha members, or members of other organisations, but parents took it upon themselves to send children back to school.

Bhengu: We have evidence that people from outside have intimidated children not to go to school, and beat up those who attend classes. Students not only boycott classes, they are sjambokked out of classrooms. Hence the burning of schools. It is the people who prevent children from going to school who burn the schools.

Since there have been so many clashes between 'comrades' and members of the Youth Brigade, has the Brigade done anything to hold peace talks with these comrades?

We have tried to consult with them. We met with the Azanian Students Organisation (AZASO) in 1985. But it did not want to be seen to meet with us. The problem with comrades is that they are faceless. It is difficult for our organisation which has structures and leadership and can be located at any time, to meet with a faceless organisation.

I remember when Rev Mcebisi Xundu, then Natal chairman of the UDF, was still in Lamontville. We held several talks with him trying to tone down the violence in the township, but he admitted he had no control over what was going on since his organisation was uncontrollable.

What are relations like between the Youth Brigade and the black consciousness groups?

We do not have any formal relationship with them. But while we differ on matters of strategy, there have never been violent clashes between us. That is how black politics should be. Differing is natural, but we should respect each other.

Does the Brigade have formal relations with any trade unions?

There is a lot of disunity generated by divisive forces at present. The Youth Brigade does not wish to meddle in union affairs. We support the trade union movement without coercing it to look upon us with favour. We would like to see a trade union movement free from ideologies. It is detrimental for liberation movements to misuse trade unions for their own ends. Only after solving workers' problems can trade unions answer their national call and be part of the struggle.

Some organisations have said that the state of emergency has benefitted Inkatha, since none of its members have been detained under emergency regulations.

That is a lie. The state of emergency has been as unfortunate for us as for other organisations. We reject it totally and regret it has been declared twice. It imposed a number of restrictions on us. In some areas we could not hold public meetings.

But Inkatha has a lot of power and is in a position to do many things other little organisations cannot do against the state. So when people see Inkatha hold meetings in spite of curbs imposed by the state of emergency they think it is because the government favours us.

You held a meeting with the Afrikaner Studentebond in 1984. Why?

We believe there are two things which can happen between blacks and whites. The root cause of all this country's problems is the rejection of blacks by whites. We believe we have either to kill whites or talk to them. We have to persuade them to abandon their foolish method of rule before it is too late. At the meeting we won over a few souls who repented from the old idea of clinging to apartheid. The spin-off from the meeting was the establishment of a new organisation, Youth For South Africa, born out of the disillusionment of some ASB members.

Would you seek similar meetings with an organisation like NUSAS?

NUSAS is caught up in the same problems as the UDF, and tries to isolate and reject us. Successive NUSAS presidents have passed derogatory remarks about us in spite of the fact that we never go out of our way to insult them.

Many organisations reject involvement in government-created institutions. But Inkatha, for example, participates in the bantustan structures. What does the Youth Brigade feel about this?

Some organisations which reject this strategy claim to be Marxist or to follow the teachings of Marx and Lenin. It is ironical because Lenin landed the Bolsheviks in power in Russia during the 1917 revolution through participating in the Russian parliament.

So in fact Inkatha is following a Leninist strategy. We would even use the devil as long as we arrive at our destination.

Does the Youth Brigade believe apartheid can be reformed or do you believe in its complete eradication?

Saying apartheid cannot be reformed is an unfortunate cliché. Reform simply means transforming society completely. I do not know why some have problems with the term 'reform'. It is only those who are bent on a violent revolution who do not like to see reform because they think it is pushing dirt under the carpet.

How do you see a future South African society?

We want a truly democratic society. We believe in a multi-party democracy where people will be free to decide and form political parties to represent them. We believe in a country where people will not be restricted by ideology or victimisation.

And what kind of economic system?

We want to avoid ideologies since we do not have a mandate. Deciding on an economic system is a matter beyond party politics. The people of this country have the prerogative of designing an economic future they wish to bring about. But in Inkatha we have never known any system other than the free enterprise capitalist system which is capable of bringing about more job opportunities. We would like to hear of any system that does better.

We are not saying capitalism is perfect. It involves a lot of immoral practices but we feel it is better than any other system.

An issue which has remained a bone of contention between the progressive and black consciousness movement is whether whites have a role to play in the struggle. What does the Youth Brigade feel?

They do have a role. This is not a racist struggle. It is a struggle to free the country from racism. At the same time we believe black organisations should be black-led. In the past we saw a lot of black efforts being thwarted as a result of involving white liberals in black organisations. We resent liberals who come into our organisations and want to lead the entire effort.

There are organisations which have only Indian and coloured members. Inkatha is for Africans only. Laws operating in this country make us separate entities against our will, but at times this is a reality. We can achieve more if our people remain as they are in their organisations. But we do not condemn non-racial organisations.

There is a notable absence of women in the leadership of the Youth Brigade. Why?

Sibanda: Women just do not go for leadership positions. We normally have at least one woman per term of office and this is too bad. But we have quite a number of active ones now as compared to the past.

What is the organisational structure of the Brigade?

It falls under the direct control of Inkatha president, Chief Gatsha Buthelezi, who appoints the youth movement's chairman.

The executive consists of the national chairman, secretary, treasurer, national organiser, and five additional members and ex-officio members who represent the Brigade on the Inkatha Central Committee.

Then there is a 'think-tank' committee which plays an advisory role to the national executive. It comprises mini-committees on media and publicity, projects, finance, human rights, foreign relations, education and culture, and sports and recreation. The Brigade is itself divided into branches and regions.

Continuing the Debate

COSATU Strategy in Natal

COSATU's strategies to meet the combined threat of Inkatha and UWUSA are the subject of controversy. When Mike Morris argued that COSATU's affiliates had to strengthen their factory-floor position to be able to tackle Inkatha, a senior COSATU official accused him of proposing a union withdrawal from political struggle. Morris disagrees: he did not propose anything of the sort. And he accuses the COSATU official of hiding behind his organisation.

GEOFF SCHREINER, education secretary of the Metal and Allied Workers Union, writing in his personal capacity, disagrees strongly with the attack on the Morris article. He argues that the response both misrepresents Morris, and falsifies the history of FOSATU in Natal.



There are many problems with the anonymous reply in WIP 45 to my article on 'Inkatha, UWUSA and COSATU'.* The author has so grossly misrepresented the substance of my piece that to engage in a point-by-point refutation would necessitate writing the same article all over again.

I want to comment only on the author's rather peculiar method of presenting himself. He calls himself a 'senior COSATU official writing in his personal capacity'. Throughout the article he presents his arguments as if they are COSATU policy, and adds that my position is 'at odds with COSATU's general programme'. In other words, the conclusion the reader is meant to draw is that the debate involves COSATU versus Morris.

This is not true. And the author's style of presentation is extremely undemocratic. You cannot write something in your personal capacity, omit your name but mention your organisation, and then present your argument as if it is that organisation's policy. That unfairly pulls rank on the person you are criticising.

The author has put forward views which may seem to the ordinary observer to be dominant within COSATU. But this is done in such a way that he cannot be taken to task for appearing to speak on behalf of the organisation.

*The article by Mike Morris, 'Lessons from May Day', appeared in WIP 43. The response, 'Winning Away Inkatha's Base', was published in WIP 45.

In 'Lessons from May Day' (WIP 43) Mike Morris raises important considerations for trade unionists and political activists involved in the struggle against Inkatha in Natal.

The response, 'Winning Away Inkatha's Base' (WIP 45) is far less instructive and fails to get to grips with the basic contentions made by Morris. The article also lacks historical specificity and accuracy and veers into wild sloganeering. This does not advance debate on these crucial issues.

The author claims Morris argues that trade unions should withdraw from the political arena. This is because Morris calls for intensified shop-floor organisational pressure to defeat Inkatha's new labour wing, the United Workers Union of South Africa (UWUSA).

The strategy suggested by Morris, claims the author, will leave the political terrain in Natal open to Inkatha, and is at odds with COSATU policy which calls for 'concerted and calculated involvement in the liberation struggle'. The author says COSATU and its affiliates are bound to contest the political arena. In the context of Natal/Inkatha, he suggests a programme of engaging Inkatha as an organisation and 'even challenging it to come into particular campaigns'.

But Morris does not at any stage in his article suggest that COSATU should withdraw from political struggle. The only retreat he advises, and which the COSATU author agrees with, is from high-profile personalised attacks on Inkatha leadership. These have done nothing to advance the organisation of COSATU affiliates in the region.

Morris has two basic contentions. Firstly, that UWUSA is the weak underbelly of Inkatha because it forces Inkatha into an area where it is organisationally weak and lacking in expertise. This is where COSATU unions are most experienced and best organised. Secondly, because Inkatha has tied itself to UWUSA, a defeat of the latter would constitute a major political setback to Inkatha's position in Natal.

This strategy is definitely feasible. Already UWUSA has proved itself to be a much smaller animal than its initial barks suggested. Those unions with strong shop-floor organisation like FAWU, CWIU and MAWU, intensified their factory drives after the formation of UWUSA and have succeeded not only in holding off UWUSA's challenge but in

pushing it back.

Even with the assistance of the state which detained all COSATU officials in Northern Natal (Inkatha's hinterland) during the state of emergency, UWUSA has failed to make any substantial progress.

But this is no reason for complacency. UWUSA is backed by massive financial resources from abroad and will no doubt intensify its campaigns and develop expertise and experience.



UWUSA worker power: yet to be a force

For Inkatha, enormous political credibility depends on the success of UWUSA. Labour is the only area in Natal where Inkatha does not have a major organisational presence. And as the tragic events at Mpophomeni in December 1986 and the violent attacks on trade union leaders show, force will increasingly become part of the drive for Inkatha allegiance in the labour sphere.

Morris's contentions are part of a broad political strategy. At no point does he claim the struggle against UWUSA should be waged exclusively at the factory level. On the contrary, Morris suggests COSATU should, from an independent working-class base, take initiatives to build alliances and develop working class-practices and policies in the Natal townships.

The crucial questions are what kind of initiatives and what sort of alliances? Morris does not attempt to answer these questions. The COSATU author ignores the question of the nature of alliances. But he does provide examples of political campaigns which engaged Inkatha with the intention of demonstrating its

bankruptcy, isolating the Inkatha hierarchy and dismantling its support.

The author's examples are not entirely accurate. Neither are they particularly instructive. They fail to provide any details or analysis which help other unionists and activists to learn from them. And there is no analysis of the actual basis of Inkatha's support nor any indication of how such campaigns could be put into practice in the context of COSATU in 1986-87.

THE 'RED LIGHT' OF FOSATU

The COSATU author not only rejects Morris's proposals as a retreat from political struggle. They are also attacked as a resurrection of 'old un lamented positions adopted by Natal FOSATU in its heyday'. This meant that 'whenever FOSATU was faced with the challenge of involvement in struggle around a particular issue it held up the independent working-class position as the red light'.

This, according to the author, was coupled with an equally 'dubious line' on political alliances, ie 'Because we have members in both UDF and Inkatha, we cannot make alliances with either. To do so would be a source of division among the workers'. The effect of these policies, the author states, made it much easier for Inkatha to consolidate huge political gains in Natal.

These are very serious criticisms, yet the author provides no evidence at all to back them up - understandably so because they are historically and factually inaccurate.

FOSATU did refuse to affiliate to the UDF. There was a concern not to split FOSATU membership belonging to a wide range of different (often hostile) political groupings (UDF, AZAPO, Inkatha, etc). The decision was also based on the belief that, at the time, formal affiliation (as opposed to co-operation) could jeopardise the independence of the working-class movement and undermine proletarian leadership.

Other important independent unions like the Food and Canning Workers Union, the General Workers Union and the Commercial, Catering and Allied Workers Union of SA adopted similar positions. This was not because they or FOSATU were

against political alliances or engaging in political struggle. On the contrary, all pledged genuine co-operation with the UDF and all groups committed to bringing an end to the apartheid regime and economic exploitation.

The political campaigns launched jointly around issues like the occupation of townships by troops (the massive 1984 stayaways) and the imposition of the state of emergency (the consumer boycotts of white shops) are evidence of FOSATU's co-operation and commitment to political struggle.

There are also many examples of local level co-operation between FOSATU affiliates, and youth and civic groupings around specific community and factory issues such as removals in Brits and Uitenhage, unemployment in Springs, rents in the Vaal, and the Simba-Quix, Bakers, Dunlop and Sarmcol strikes to name but a few.

It was FOSATU and its affiliates which, in contesting the Natal political arena, engaged Inkatha in programmes such as the Empangeni bus boycotts, the consumer boycotts in response to the state of emergency, and the campaign against busfare increases in Pietermaritzburg.

To claim that FOSATU or the majority of its affiliates had a line of 'political non-engagement' is simply false. To suggest that FOSATU lumped together 'progressive civic and militant youth groups with Inkatha...as treacherous populists' is not borne out by the facts. Affiliation to the UDF was not a prerequisite for joint actions. These were initiated and effected on the basis of a common commitment to the struggle for liberation - but from positions of organisational independence and autonomy.

This situation did not end with the dissolution of FOSATU and the formation of COSATU. COSATU did not affiliate to the UDF or any other political grouping. It reasserted its organisational independence and the leading role of the working class and committed itself to working in the liberation struggle in co-operation with other organisations and classes.

There was a crucial question which remained on the agenda, unresolved from the earlier period: what form should alliances, both of an organisational and class nature, take to secure working-class leadership and working-class interests. But questions about whether

to engage in political struggle and form alliances were settled many years before.

The picture that the author seeks to paint of COSATU's policy of calculated involvement in the liberation struggle in opposition to FOSATU's position is distorted and inaccurate. FOSATU affiliates were not introduced to the political arena when COSATU was formed. The basis for many of COSATU's early initiatives had already been laid by these FOSATU affiliates.

So COSATU's formation does not represent a 'break' with FOSATU but a complex process of transition incorporating much of the past but with new tactics in changed historical circumstances.

COSATU is an amalgamation of different strands of political unionism committed to engaging in the liberation struggle and to forming alliances. But the precise form of such engagement and alliances is still being debated. This will continue, hopefully in a spirit of mutual trust and respect; and mindful that it should not divide the federation in such a way as to lessen the strength of its political interventions nor weaken its primary responsibility to working-class interests.

OPENING AN INKATHA ROAD

The COSATU author's claim that FOSATU's policies in Natal made it 'so much easier for Inkatha to consolidate huge political gains in Natal' must also be challenged. Again no historical analysis is offered to back up these claims.

The author says FOSATU withdrew from contesting the political arena in Natal, and failed to challenge Inkatha to come into particular campaigns with the aim of winning away its base. This has been shown up as factually inaccurate. The issue therefore is not whether political engagement took place or not. Rather it is whether FOSATU's political strategies allowed Inkatha to consolidate its position in the province.

Any serious analysis of this question must carefully take account of the particular historical circumstances to determine what real possibilities existed at the time. Political struggle is not just about direct confrontation, particularly if this means constant

setbacks and defeats. This not only undermines organisation but can destroy confidence as well.

In assessing FOSATU's strategies against Inkatha in Natal, one must consider alternative strategies which have been employed and their success or failure. For example, it is a fact that the ex-FOSATU unions (and others which adopted similar views) which, because of the tactical positions they adopted towards Inkatha, now constitute the backbone of COSATU in the region. And it cannot be ignored that directly confrontational initiatives have been singularly ineffective in winning away support from Inkatha.

FOSATU developed at a time when Inkatha was already firmly entrenched in Natal. The issue is therefore not so much that FOSATU failed to stop Inkatha's rise, but that Inkatha failed to stop the rise of FOSATU as an independent working-class organisation. It failed because FOSATU's strategies created enough space to build the fledgling union movement and bring important worker leaders - initially Inkatha members - into its ranks.

These early years of patient building of organisation and alternative political options enabled FOSATU affiliates to challenge seriously Inkatha's ideological dominance in the mid-1980s. This challenge took place in the political arena by engaging in those campaigns already mentioned - the consumer boycotts, bus boycotts, protests, and stayaways.

If this process had started on any sizeable scale at FOSATU's formation in 1979, when affiliates in the region had no more than a few thousand members, virtually no recognition and no shop steward councils, and when political circumstances were vastly different, it would have amounted to suicide. It is extremely unlikely that COSATU's inherited strength in Natal would have been sufficient to take on UWUSA, let alone engage Inkatha on open political terrain.

This does not mean FOSATU made no tactical errors in its six years of existence. Naturally it did. But the point is that if criticisms are to be made of the federation they should be historically specific and not sloganistic. Only in this way can unions and other progressive organisations learn from these mistakes.

The Morris article raises a number of

important issues about the struggle against Inkatha. For example, it is crucial that COSATU unions put maximum effort into defending their organisational presence against UWUSA on the factory floor. They will then retain a stable base from which to continue their interventions, together with other organisations and classes, in the political sphere.

ISSUES FACING COSATU

What Morris suggests is not that up-to-date. Many COSATU unions have already successfully put their weight behind organisational drives against UWUSA. But as UWUSA is likely to step up pressure continuously, these efforts should continue and unions be given maximum support by other progressive organisations.

In the case of strikes or mass mobilisation campaigns youth, civic and other groups need as far as possible to respond to union calls for assistance and support.

The question as to what type of political initiatives should or can be launched in Natal is far more complex and requires a thorough analysis of the basis of Inkatha's support in the region. The point Morris does raise through his article is that the relative

weakness and vulnerability of oppositional forces should not be underestimated in relation to Inkatha which enjoys massive support from the state, capital, the media, and lucrative international slush funds. And its control of all institutions within Kwazulu means it determines access to most basic facilities such as land, housing and education.

In this context unions and other progressive organisations must seriously consider the implications of increasingly violent confrontations between Inkatha and others. These are best offset with creative and innovative strategies.

These may involve challenging Inkatha to come into particular political campaigns, contesting local elections, or reaching standoff arrangements. But the crucial measure is how most effectively, and at least cost, to win political dominance.

National organisations will have to give greater recognition to the political specifics of Natal/Kwazulu, and to the need for regional and local organisations to develop, and to receive backing for, strategies based on these.

And these local and regional organisations will need to co-ordinate strategic approaches and implement them through joint co-operation based on a common commitment to the struggle for national liberation and socialism.

In South Africa's 'Banana Republic'

Venda was the third South African bantustan to become legally 'independent'. Since 1979, its ruling administration has jailed the political opposition, tortured and killed detainees, created a president-for-life, and declared a one-party state. PAT SIDLEY visited the capital of this South African-created 'republic'.

There is an area of large, comfortable and plush-looking homes in the suburbs of Venda's capital, Thohoyandou.

They contrast sharply with the round mud huts and pointed thatched roofs that are the homes of most Venda people in this picturesque and hilly area.

Tall layers of security fencing separate the suburb from the remainder of Thohoyandou, protecting its white inhabitants from the rest of Venda.

The South African 'embassy' is among the large houses, and nearby are buildings 'where they torture people', according to our guide.

Not far away are the Venda Defence Force barracks, disparagingly described by the guide as the 'SADF'. For much of its top brass are white South African officers.

The cops in Venda, said the guide, would probably still call whites 'baas' and 'missus' - but they would behave much more 'independently' to any Venda they believe is causing trouble in the region.

The 'trouble' there is called anti-apartheid resistance by those causing it. But there is very little 'trouble' in evidence - and with the release of Dean Tshenuwani Simon Farisani there are currently no political detainees in Venda.

The only evidence of Venda's 'independence' is the compulsory presence of a Sun International Hotel and casino. The hotel gives its guests a guide book to the delights of the Northern Transvaal - not Venda - and suggests they may wish to visit a crocodile pit in the centre of town.

Venda's half a million inhabitants live on two small patches of land covering about 6 000 square kilometers in the North-Eastern Transvaal.

At 'independence' on 13 September 1979, Venda had one tarred road and 13 kilometers of railway line. The government offices were served by one telephone line. Since then things have improved slightly, thanks in part to generous decentralisation incentives, which, say industrialists, are among the most attractive on offer.

But few have been attracted. According to various informants in Venda, this has opened up the way for corruption, where some industrialists have claimed large amounts back from the central government for expenses they may not really have incurred.

Alex Boraine, former Progressive Federal Party member of parliament, once said Venda was a 'land of hunger, corruption and sudden death' where the president lived in 'obscene affluence' in a R175 000 house, where the opposition was jailed and most of the population starving. He also pointed out that South African taxpayers subsidised Venda to the tune of R300-million a year.

'THE BIG CHIEF'

Venda President Patrick Mphepu's preferred title translates as 'the big chief' but he has settled for 'His Excellency'. Mphepu has proclaimed himself 'president-for-life' and created a one-party state in Venda. This move was slammed by all except the fawning Afrikaans press. It quoted academics urging people not to judge Venda by Western standards, but to see it 'through African eyes'.

Mphepu was handpicked by Pretoria for

the job, but many Venda's have little respect for the man. One claims to have heard him say on the Venda broadcasting service that he will never die.

The president's inability to speak either English or Afrikaans is legendary, and some question his proficiency in Venda too. As his schooling only went as far as Standard Five, his literacy even in Venda may be questionable. Inevitably, His Excellency owns a stake in a banana plantation, according to residents.

Both the president and members of his administration have been taken to task by local churches over the issue of their concubines (as distinct from more than one lawful wife under tribal custom). Some members of the administration have been denied holy communion by the Evangelical Lutheran Church for this 'unchristian' tendency.

NO VELVET GLOVE ●●●●●

But there Venda's Mickey Mouse aspect ends and the fear begins. Mphepu has come under fire for forced - and unhygienic - circumcision of young men at puberty which often results in infections and occasionally death. Local doctors have offered to perform the operation under clinical conditions, to no avail. A missionary said protests were met with a 'bigger than ever circumcision school' in which many suffered.

And it was not for nothing the world raised its voice in protest and fear for the well-being of the four-times detained Dean Farisani. Farisani was detained twice in Venda before this latest spell, and once during 1977 in South Africa. In 1981 he was so severely tortured by Venda authorities that one of his three children ran away from the vision of her battered father shouting: 'He is not my father'. He was beaten, made to sit for hours on an imaginary chair and given shocks through electrodes placed on his ears and testicles.

Dean Farisani has never been charged with any offence. But he only narrowly escaped the fate of a young 18-year-old friend, Tshifiwa Muofhe, who died from injuries inflicted in jail. The pastor who preached 'thou shalt not kill' after

Muofhe's death, was detained and tortured too.

No Venda police were convicted for these outrages although the courts established that police were responsible for Muofhe's death - he had lost more than a litre of blood and suffered severe injuries to his scrotum, head, back and kidneys.

The police were found not guilty despite an inquest finding to the contrary, but in an out-of-court settlement the family was awarded R150 000. Farisani and a colleague, PN Phaswana were awarded R13 500 for damages they suffered. After these incidents a group of clergymen wrote to the president-for-life to tell him detention without trial was 'demonic'.

The official view on 'justice' is probably contained in the words of the chief of police, Major-General TR Malaudzi who said about a group of political detainees: 'Just because they were acquitted it does not mean they are not guilty'. He also claimed there was no detention without trial in Venda despite all evidence to the contrary.

More clues about 'justice' can be seen in the court roll in the foyer of the Venda Supreme Court where the week's hearings are pinned under the signs: 'criminal courts', 'civil' and 'death sentences'. This last refers to the punishment meted out regularly for ritual killings.

'TERROR IN THE AIR' ●●●●●

Active resistance barely exists in Venda. With isolated exceptions, little of the conflict South African and other bantustans have encountered reached Venda. It was nipped in the bud so fiercely that a tangible air of terror pervades and all but the bravest - and the clergy - are silent and fearful.

During last year's school disruption in South Africa, some violence occurred, and schools in Sibasa closed for a short while. Youths attacked government vehicles and after being sjambokked and teargassed on the university campus, about 1 200 university students stayed away in protest. But this was shortlived.

The 'official opposition' no longer exists, having been jailed before independence in 1979. Democracy



Four-times detained Venda activist Dean Farisani

Mphephu-style had him lose the elections in 1973 and 1978, but he loaded the assembly with nominated chiefs, later jailed the opposition, made himself 'president-for-life' and then proclaimed his desire for a one-party state.

On the occasion of State President PW Botha's speech at the opening of Parliament last year, Mphephu said: 'Democracy is for those who have the will to participate', and he counted himself a democrat along with Botha.

THE ONLY VISIBLE RESISTANCE

In an effort to involve Venda in 'the national struggle', and to introduce national issues into Venda's political life and consciousness, the Northern Transvaal Action Committee was set up. A founder member said it hoped to bring apartheid issues into open debate in Venda. This group also intended to provide concrete help for workers, since trade unions do not officially exist in Venda.

A non-existent meeting of the

organisation was banned, and its whole executive flung in jail, where many were tortured. According to Edward Lambani, the group's publicity secretary and now a law student running a community advice centre, South Africa wants Venda to be as docile as possible. 'It is a buffer state. South Africa does not want anything to go wrong, it wants Venda quiet'.

He also referred to Venda's strategic position as a route for guerillas travelling from Zimbabwe or Mozambique into South Africa. Describing the pervasive fear in Venda, he said that the largest group of employed Venda's are civil servants who find themselves demoted, with lower salaries or fired if they dissent. 'The government has a network of influence. My political stance leads me to be persecuted by my own relatives who are employed by the government', he said.

Lambani's advice centre is sponsored by the only remaining visible sign of resistance. This is a group of local clergy inspired by the Confessing Church Movement in Hitler's Germany, who formed what they call the 'Confessing Fellowship'.

Formed specifically to deal with

apartheid issues, there is a call to civil disobedience of apartheid laws in its preamble and constitution. Dean Farisani, a founder member, said it aims to bring black and white South Africans together.

So far, its activities have been confined to talks and prayer meetings, and setting up the advice centre which deals with problems detainees may encounter, legal advice, workers advice and legal claims. Invited speakers, like Anglican Bishop Simeon Nkoane, have been stopped at roadblocks and prevented from talking at its meetings.

Among its members are a group of Dutch pastors and missionaries from one of the more conservative Dutch Reformed Churches, who have been involved in the Venda community since their arrival some 30 years ago. This small group of missionaries provides many of the doctors for Venda's three hospitals. The mission used to run the hospitals, but now falls under the Venda government. While feeding schemes prevent the worst effects of starvation in some parts of the 'country', about 400 children are admitted annually to the wards suffering from malnutrition.

Doctors attached to the mission described difficulties involved in treating detainees. Venda police will not allow them into police cells. A plan to set up some form of regular check-up for detainees by hospital doctors was thwarted because Venda police believed some doctors were too sympathetic to detainees.

One doctor described a cell in which a detainee had been held. Made entirely of corrugated iron, the cell was nowhere near any shade and without water. The toilet, such as it was, could not be cleaned. The detainee was forced to lie on the cement floor to try and cool down in the heat which reached extremely high temperatures. He had to beg for water from warders. The doctor said the many suicides among detainees and prisoners could be avoided, with better conditions.

CREATING CITIZENS OF VENDA ●●●●●

Some of Venda's population was forced into the area, including Farisani who was moved from a well-watered and prosperous community near Louis

Trichardt to a dry and impoverished spot in Venda.

More recently, the South African government removed a community from Tshikota, an established township 2 km outside Trichardt, to a new township called Vleifontein, some 25 km away. This township was incorporated into Venda in April last year, after splitting up the residents into language groups. South Sotho speakers had to move 100 km away to Seshego in Lebowa. Vleifontein residents were not told that the move involved loss of South African citizenship.

Resistance which developed around the issue was swiftly smashed with largescale detentions and security force action. Some were charged with public violence and malicious damage to property.

The less-violent means of crushing dissent in Venda has involved expulsion of clerics and 'trouble-makers'. Several attempts have been made to get rid of Dean Farisani. One involved Venda administration officials who had been denied communion after complaints from the church about their concubines. They wrote to the bishop asking him to get rid of Farisani as he had been taking part, they alleged, in illegal political activity.

A Dutch missionary was threatened with expulsion after a bible-school camp was raided during a game of cops and robbers. Children playing were held for questioning and it was said they were being taught to be 'terrorists'.

Others have left before they hit trouble. Our guide pointed to an empty church school now used by the Venda Defence Force. This was where National Union of Mineworkers' general secretary Cyril Ramaphosa received his early education before leaving the Venda area.

Although his old friends in the area - among them Dean Farisani's wife, Mudzunga (Regina), were disappointed that Ramaphosa left the church, he could certainly not have pursued his current trade union career in Venda.

Trade unions officially do not exist in Venda. Says Edward Lambani: 'The law is silent on trade unions, so they are not recognised as legal bodies and therefore cannot take any legal action as a body'.

But in the face of this, the most recent Venda publicity book available, some four or five years out of date, claims Venda has been swamped with people wishing to become Venda citizens.

Community Opposes New Style Removal

Duncan Village is to be upgraded. But government plans to improve living conditions in this squalid East London township will force over thirty thousand people from their homes. And the 'upgrading' aims to create legitimacy for a community council rejected by township residents and the East London City Council. FRANZ KRUGER looks at the implications of 'orderly urbanisation' in Duncan Village.

In East London's squalid Duncan Village township, the state is developing a copybook example of its new 'orderly urbanisation' policy.

A massive programme of social restructuring, under the guise of upgrading the township, is underway. As a result, about two-thirds of the present population will lose their homes.

The project is designed to rebuild the legitimacy of the community council - recently renamed the Gompo Town Committee - while turning Duncan Village into a settled, well-off township. For the majority of township residents, it means being dumped in some as yet undisclosed place, probably within the borders of the Ciskei bantustan.

Since the mid-1960s Duncan Village has been under threat of removal to Mdantsane, 25 km from East London and situated just over the Ciskei border. Despite concerted resistance by residents, the state slowly whittled away the township. Residents were moved out to Mdantsane, and sections of Duncan Village turned into sites for coloured and Indian housing.

DUNCAN VILLAGE REPRIEVED

The Buffalo Flats coloured area was allowed to grow around the township. This left Duncan Village as an enclave between Buffalo Flats and other coloured areas on the one side, and the white suburb of Amalinda on the other. Meanwhile, government administrators spent as little money as they could on upkeep, leaving the township to deteriorate into a slum.

In 1983 government announced that the area known as Ziphunzana would be upgraded. But the rest of the township would still have to move.

Two weeks after violence erupted in Duncan Village on 11 August 1985, State President Botha secretly visited the township. He was reportedly shocked by conditions there. Shortly afterwards, on 29 August, a further reprieve was announced: the whole township was to be retained, and 99-year leasehold introduced.

Among the first targets of the 11 August violence were community councillors, whose houses were burnt during that night. They fled to East London, and spent the next months living in various East London hotels at state expense.

The councillors had always been in a vulnerable position. They had been rejected by their own community, and bodies like the East London City Council began to see that the council had no legitimacy.

The city council embarked on a highly unusual series of meetings with the UDF-affiliated Duncan Village Residents Association (DVRA). The talks ended in an agreement that the city council would take over the administration of Duncan Village, in consultation with the DVRA. Even the National Party MP for East London City, Peet de Pontes, accepted the DVRA's legitimacy, and concluded an agreement with it about the schools crisis. Both agreements later collapsed.

But central government found the local political situation intolerable, where elements of local state negotiated with a popular structure like the DVRA. Upgrading plans were an integral part of the state's response to this political problem.

It is not known when plans for upgrading Ziphunzana were drawn up. But in April 1986, eight months after the decision to retain the rest of the township, Setplan, a firm of consultants, presented their proposals for upgrading. The problem was implementation. And the biggest stumbling block was the DVRA with its legitimacy and newly-established street committee structure.

HEUNIS BACKS THE COMMUNITY COUNCIL

On 12 June, the national state of emergency was declared. In East London, security forces focused specifically on the DVRA. Other organisations were largely left alone, but an estimated 300 DVRA members and officials, right down to street committee level, were detained.

In July, the new mood in central government was spelt out to the East London City Council. A council delegation met with Minister of Constitutional Development and Planning Chris Heunis, seeking permission to take over administration of Duncan Village, and to deal officially with the DVRA rather than the community council.

Heunis gave the delegation a severe dressing down, warning that government would not jettison the community councils, so crucial to the Regional Services Council concept, and a key element of the reform project at a local level.

Under no circumstances would the city council be allowed to deal with the DVRA, and - significantly - new elections for the community council would only be held after the upgrading plans had been completed. In this changed climate, with representative community leadership in jail or hiding, the state could begin to implement its plans.

UPGRADING DUNCAN VILLAGE

The upgrading plans divide Duncan Village into three parts: Ziphunzana north of the Douglas Smit Highway, the main township artery; Ziphunzana south of the highway, and Duncan Village

proper, also known as Ward 1, the oldest and most depressed area.

The only other surviving African area in East London is Cambridge Location, a small site of about 120 houses, which seems to have been simply forgotten by government planners. The recommendation to retain and upgrade Cambridge Location was made only in June 1986, and it is unclear whether a formal decision on this has been taken yet.

A new bypass road presently being built will form the northern boundary of Duncan Village. It will be a buffer between the township and white Amalinda, where there has been fierce opposition to the retention of Duncan Village.

* Ziphunzana, south of Douglas Smit, is the best area of Duncan Village, with houses comparable to those in townships around the country. The area will be least affected by upgrading, with no change to existing houses. Occupants are regarded as owners, and accordingly bear responsibility for any improvements.



Bulldozer clears rubble from a house in the way of the new bypass road

Over 200 additional houses are planned for spaces between existing housing. Upgrading here will include road improvements, stormwater drainage and electricity. 'D-Section' is an area of emergency housing, and plans call for 'high-density infill'. Officials would not be drawn as to what this means. They said plans had not been finalised, but it may involve the construction of flats.

* Ziphunzana north of Douglas Smit is largely open ground at present, but contains C-Section, an area of emergency

housing which has survived long beyond its planned ten-year lifespan. A large number of shacks have been built here. Plans provide for about 1 216 sites, of which 337 will be slightly larger, for better-class housing. These are to line the new bypass, and officials admit this is because of the outcry in white Amalinda over the retention of Duncan Village.

Besides school, church and business sites, plans also provide for a massive police station on a 23 280 square metre plot. The police station is situated at the meeting point of Douglas Smit Highway, the new bypass and Greenpoint Road, which is the main artery through Buffalo Flats.

The police station will probably serve both Duncan Village and the coloured areas.

The most controversial aspect of the plan is that the 3 000 families in C-Section will be removed. C-Section has the reputation of being the most militant part of Duncan Village, and the removal plan is sure to be resisted. The state's intentions emerged, apparently inadvertently, at a public information meeting called by the city council in early November 1986. The 'mayor' of the newly-styled Gampo Town Committee announced that the 3 000 families would have to move, to the intense embarrassment of state officials present.

* Plans for Duncan Village proper are the most complex, because the current situation is so confused. By mid-January, 150 new houses around Ndende Street were almost complete. This former shack area was cleared in early 1984, and has been vacant since then. Most of these houses will be made available to people displaced by the new bypass road. Many are shack dwellers, and it is unlikely they will be able to afford these new houses.

These dwellings include about 20 set aside for 'community officials', in other words town committee members and policemen left homeless in the violence.

For it is clearly a state priority to move councillors back into the community they are supposed to represent.

Among other features are 23 elite plots on the northern side, again fronting Amalinda, 365 new sites to be built on the 'infill' principle, and 162 houses for coloureds still administered by the city council. These will be

handed back for African occupation.

The old 'Municipal Native Housing Scheme' is also to be redeveloped. This area has the highest concentration of shacks (planners speak of 100% coverage of the area between houses).

Redevelopment will entail enlargement of sites, which will



Security fencing around new houses for 'security officials'

mean 'you may lose a site here or there', as a local official put it. All shacks will be cleared away.

THE FOUR PHASES

Besides the bypass road and the Ndende Street houses, another project is underway. The Office for Community Services, formerly the East Cape Development Board, is to build 220 'infill' houses in Ziphunzana South. This project is financed by funds set aside nationally for job creation, and labourers are being paid a fixed wage of R4 a day.

The rest of the upgrading project will fall into four phases. Phase one is the development of the open ground in Ziphunzana North, excluding C-Section. Contracts for roads and other services have already been awarded. Government will not build the houses, which will be offered to contractors and individuals for development.

Phase two involves upgrading Ziphunzana South, phase three the removal and redevelopment of C-Section, and phase four the upgrading of Duncan

Village proper. Officials said, however, that the phases would not necessarily follow chronologically.

Officials have insisted that C-Section will not be moved until alternative land is available. But it is not clear which sites are being investigated.

DEVELOPMENT OR FORCED REMOVAL?

The new, upgraded Duncan Village will have space for just over a third of its current population of about 60 000 people. Official figures state there will be about 3 800 sites available when the upgrading is complete. At one family per site, and 6,2 people per family (the figure used by the planners), there will be room for only 23 560 people.

The total number of people who will have to move is greater, as some areas, notably C-Section, will be cleared for upgrading to take place. No shacks or unauthorised occupation will be tolerated in the new Duncan Village.

Officials would not be drawn on the amounts residents will be expected to pay for new houses. Government policy provides for residents to pay for improvements on existing houses and it seems likely costs will be high.

The high cost of housing, strict policy against squatting and other measures are intended to keep the majority of poor and unemployed out of an upgraded Duncan Village, where a stable community of urban insiders is intended as a buffer zone for East London's white residents.

THE DVRA RESPONDS

Despite severe repression, the DVRA has managed to keep its key structures intact. How the organisation will oppose the upgrading plans is not yet known. But soon after the plan to remove C-Section emerged, the association issued a lengthy statement outlining its position on the upgrading.

The residents' association distanced itself from the project: 'Nothing is being done in the area in consultation with the people of Duncan Village'. The township would be made into a 'town for the well-off, the so-called black middle class. The poor and the unemployed will be buried in an underdeveloped bantustan with a galloping rate of unemployment, and be forgotten.

"Upgrading" is clearly a newly-coined word for forced removals. Any black township is always too over-populated to be upgraded, so half of the population is "trekked" to some dark corner of the world never to return'.

The DVRA called on the authorities 'to abandon this farce of upgrading. We do want our community made a better place to live in, but not through cruel disruption of people's lives with forced removals in pursuit of some political party policy. We resent dealings over our heads with people deciding what is good for us.

We demand real consultation and active participation in the "betterment" of Duncan Village - from drawing of plans to the last house built. If we cannot be consulted, we demand to be left to build our own township. We are confident we can do it. We resent the rush to "upgrade" it as a voting campaign when it has been "Dirty Village" for so many years without any concern shown'.



Shacks in the back yard of one of the older Duncan Village houses

Choose Sides and Organise

A strategy on the academic boycott must both strengthen progressive organisation in South Africa, and further isolate the South African regime and its allies. MIKE MORRIS of the University of Natal suggests this can best be done by forming a progressive academics' organisation in the universities.

Pressure to strengthen the academic boycott as part of the isolation of South Africa has increased noticeably.

South African academics need to develop an appropriate political response to this pressure, showing a commitment to changing this country. By doing this, they can ensure that rising international anger against apartheid will lead to organisational benefit for intellectuals opposed to the regime.

LINKING ACADEMIC AND OTHER FREEDOMS

University staff associations and administrations are often quite rightly accused of resting on memories of the 1959 marches in defence of academic freedom. Academic freedom has been turned into a university committee issue rather than the broad mobilising political concern it should be.

Locked within university structures, the academic freedom slogan has not even been used to attack daily state intrusions. For example, academia has never defied state censorship in university libraries.

Academic freedom has not been linked to the general struggle for freedom of expression. Nor has it been used to forge co-operation with other groups (eg the press) which face even greater threats to their freedom of expression.

Progressive intellectuals and university authorities must play a more active organisational and political role within their institutions. Otherwise their argument for freedom of expression as a democratic right will not be taken seriously by political forces outside the universities.

Those urging an academic boycott should not forget that the current relative tolerance for left-wing analysis, concepts and progressive academics at South African universities is a result of major ideological struggle and organisation over the past decade. For it was not easy to put forward such views in the late 1960s when government used censorship provisions widely and effectively, and created an environment hostile to such analysis.

There were very few active left-wing academics in the universities then compared to today. And the idea of placing academics' work at the service of union and community organisations, as has happened over the past five years, was not even imagined.

But the acceptance and spread of progressive ideas within and beyond universities into other areas of organisation and struggle should not be taken for granted. These gains can be reversed.

A complex ideological struggle in and outside universities has expanded the parameters of 'intellectually and socially acceptable' thought. This struggle influenced and was influenced by community, student, union, and political struggles, despite state attempts to seal off intellectual and political analysis from progressive traditions.

As a result, English-speaking universities are not functionally uniform state institutions advancing various white supremacist ideologies. Rather, they are characterised by contradiction and struggle over alternative forms of analysis and world views.

Unfortunately much discussion on the

role of universities and intellectuals is crude and moralistic. Too often it lacks a sense of the importance of exploiting internal university contradictions and facilitating organisational struggles.

Apartheid is an object of moral outrage and international support groups, which are primarily moralistic, wish to bring about its immediate downfall by the total isolation of South Africa. In doing so they often ignore the centrality of contradictions within South Africa, and the need to organise internal opposition to apartheid on all possible fronts.

Exile and international politics directed against apartheid is currently in transition between two fairly incompatible strategies.

The general attempt to isolate South Africa internationally derives from the 1960s, after internal organisation was smashed. It did not distinguish between those openly and legally opposing the regime and those supporting apartheid. This strategy sees South African universities and academics as part of the apartheid system, and as racist reactionaries responsible for its continuation.

The second strategy is based on the changed conditions of the past few years: increased internal opposition from mass-based organisations; and the desire by various groups, previously either directly or indirectly supporting apartheid, to distance themselves from the current regime.

This strategy stresses worsening contradictions within the country, and distinguishes between those who support and those who oppose the regime. Its goal is to strengthen internal opposition, and at the same time internationally isolate the South African regime.

This strategy is seen in calls for a broad front to oppose the current regime, and increased contact between the ANC and a wide variety of organisations and individuals wishing to distance from the South African state.

Calls for a general, undifferentiated academic boycott run counter to this more-recent strategy. Progressive academics cannot be asked to ally themselves with forces opposing apartheid, while internationally they are attacked as upholders of apartheid.

The dilemma is clear: if the academic boycott is universal, it ignores

internal contradictions and struggles and does not assist in organising academics within South Africa; if it is selective, who does the selecting, what criteria are used and how will it help build internal opposition?

THE PROBLEM OF DEFINITION

Recent events have significantly shifted the terms of this debate and provided a way out of the dilemma. ANC thinking has shown signs of a strategic change on the issue, and there are moves afoot to organise progressive academics inside the country. Within ANC circles, some are adopting the slogan 'isolate the South African regime' as a more precise, organisationally strategic demand than the isolation of South Africa.

This slogan immediately points to internal contradictions, struggles and forces. It stresses isolating not only the South African regime but also 'its supporters', and implies support for organisations and individuals in opposition.

Every academic therefore faces a strategic choice: are you a supporter of the current regime? If you do not wish to be so aligned then choose to distance politically and align yourself with the forces of opposition.

The problem remains as to criteria assessing support for the regime as opposed to support for the forces of opposition. An obvious answer might be an academic's intellectual work. If it is 'progressive' perhaps the person could be regarded as being on the side of opposition forces. This is conceivable for social scientists. But even then, who would be the judge, and by what criteria could work be assessed? And the process of assessment would be very time consuming.

Even if such problems could be overcome, what about progressive academics whose work cannot be categorised by content? This large constituency includes natural scientists, the medical fields, engineering, commerce, music, and the arts. Would this approach give such a group a real choice? Would it encourage them to join a broad bloc against the apartheid regime?

No natural scientist can envisage a career without international contacts.

Progressive academics in these fields would have to give up their professions, engage in 'pop' science of inferior quality or emigrate, if their opposition to apartheid is judged by the content of their research. By default they would be excluded from oppositional choice and left with only a conservative option. They would either be driven into the arms of the state or into apathy, thereby directly or indirectly 'supporting the regime'.

ACADEMIC ORGANISATION IS THE ANSWER

The answer to this problem of assessment must be found in an academic organisation which directly concerns its members, as university intellectuals, in confronting unacceptable political and educational university practices, as well as focusing on the broader political issues at stake.

These decisions and actions cannot remain at the level of individual choice, but must be organisationally based to have any real effect.

Individual academics may support the UDF, AZAPO, ANC, PAC, Unity Movement, PFP, COSATU or CUSA/AZACTU. But how can it be decided which of these is acceptable as an organisation opposing the current regime? Basically, academics must take political control of their own constituency and to this end an internal progressive organisation of academics is urgently needed.

The precedent set by the National Medical and Dental Association (NAMDA) is pertinent. NAMDA is committed to an anti-apartheid profile in its policies, practices and relation to mass struggles. It allows progressive medics to align themselves in an organisation broadly opposed to the current regime.

NAMDA has earned credibility in the international health world. Despite South Africa's isolation in world health circles, NAMDA was invited to attend the recent conference of African medical associations in Lesotho, and given permanent observer status. A distinction was drawn between an internal progressive medical organisation receiving international support and the South African regime and its supporters

which continued to be isolated.

The lesson for academics is that the current debate about the academic boycott should aim to build organisational opposition to the apartheid regime among progressive university intellectuals, rather than creating internal division and disorganisation.

Progressive academics could form a broad national organisation which, through policies and educational practice, opposes the apartheid regime. If academics contribute towards isolating the regime then they should expect to receive international support. Those who align themselves with the regime must accept whatever consequences the international academic community throws at them.

With this in mind some academics have discussed forming a progressive organisation for university-based intellectuals.

Such an organisation will face two problems: formulating political policy broad enough to include significant sectors of the academic community; and creating specific policies and practices which ensure academics do not join just as a political sop to external pressure, or for access to an international travel card.

An organisation taking up the following issues may help to overcome these problems:

- * broad political rights;
- * the universities' relevance to society;
- * apartheid practices in the universities;
- * reform of university education;
- * democratising the universities;
- * basic conditions of service of university academics.

While intellectuals are notorious individualists and difficult to organise, they are at a political crossroad. If a progressive national organisation of university academics is formed, intellectuals could help to deflect, credibly and constructively, the international pressure for isolation to the point where it should be focused - the South African regime.

But if progressive academics do not grasp this opportunity they will have no-one to blame when they find themselves increasingly isolated.

State Moves Against People's Courts

By 1986, new structures of administration were developing in some of South Africa's conflict-ridden black townships. Black local authorities had collapsed, and unofficial institutions - street and area committees, people's courts - began emerging. The declaration of a national state of emergency in June 1986 was widely seen as one state attempt to smash these new structures. More recently, the state has charged a number of alleged people's court organisers and participants. GLENN MOSS looks at this developing trend, and then reports on some current political trials.

The state is again acting against people's courts, and has charged a number of alleged participants with sedition, assault and furthering the aims of the banned African National Congress.

One of the hardest hit is Johannesburg's Alexandra township, where at least 15 community leaders and activists face sedition charges in four separate trials. Township-based people's courts as a system of local law will be at the centre of these proceedings.

In most instances, the accused have been in detention for extended periods, some since the declaration of the national state emergency on 12 June 1986.

SEDITION AND TOWNSHIP RESISTANCE

Sedition is an unusual charge in South African political trials. One of the few occasions where it has been invoked by the state in the last 40 years followed the Soweto students' uprising of 1976-77. In that case, 11 prominent leaders of the now-banned Soweto Students Representative Council were charged, largely on the basis of their organisation of student meetings, demonstrations, protest marches and stay-at-home campaigns. While all 11 were convicted of sedition, only four served jail sentences, including now-prominent United Democratic Front leaders Murphy Morobe and Sechaba Montsitsi.

A number of elements must be present before an accused can be guilty of sedition. These include an unlawful gathering which aims to undermine state authority by defying or subverting the authority of the government. However, sedition does not involve an attempt to overthrow or coerce the government, and this makes it a less-serious charge than high treason.

Legal sources claim security police investigated charges of treason against the Alexandra group, but Attorney-General KPO von Lieres und Wilkau felt all the elements of treason were not present in the operation of people's courts. Interestingly, von Lieres was the prosecutor in the Soweto Students Representative Council sedition trial, which was the first time such charges had been brought since leaders of the 1946 mine workers' strike faced allegations of seditious conduct.

In the Alexandra cases, general secretary of the Metal and Allied Workers Union, Moses Mayekiso (38), faces sedition charges together with Richard Mdakane (28), Paul Tshabalala (21) and Obed Bapela (28). Bapela is currently on trial in Uitenhage, charged with furthering the aims of a banned organisation. This follows the raising of South African Communist Party and Soviet Union flags at the July 1985 funeral of murdered Cradock leaders Matthew Goniwe, Fort Calata, Sparrow Mkonto and Sicelo Mhlauli.

Mayekiso, who heads the Alexandra Action Committee, was detained by police in June last year. His detention sparked an international and local campaign for

his release. He and his co-accused are still in custody.

In a second case Mike Beea (45), chairman of the Alexandra Civic Association, is also charged with sedition. Beea, detained by police in October last year, is also still in custody. Speculation is that he has been charged separately because of long-standing differences between the Alexandra Civic Association and Mayekiso's Action Committee.

In a third sedition trial, Steven Morake (23) and Aaron Vilikazi (21) face charges arising from the operation of people's courts in Alexandra. They and the other Alexandra accused may be in for a long wait in jail before their trials begin. For the state has indicated it intends testing the issue of people's courts in yet another Alexandra-related sedition trial before proceeding against the others. In this trial, David Mafutho and seven others face charges in the Rand Supreme Court in April in a sequel to a police raid on an Alexandra people's court last year.

If the attorney-general uses his power under the Internal Security Act to prohibit bail while the David Mafutho trial takes place, then Mayekiso, Beea and their co-accused will spend many further months in custody before trial proceedings even begin.

TRIALS AND PEOPLE'S COURTS

While the sedition charges are thus far the most serious to be levelled against participants in people's courts, there have been a number of lesser charges in the past few months.

In Cape Town, 52 emergency detainees from Guguletu were charged with undermining the state's authority by conducting people's courts during May and June last year. In the first of these trials, six accused were convicted of assaulting two sisters. Evidence in the trial revealed that a people's court hearing had been convened at the Nyanga Art Centre because some township residents felt one of the sisters had not been punished severely enough by a Langa magistrate. She was given a suspended sentence after being convicted of stabbing another township resident in

the arm.

A people's court convened to try the two sisters sentenced them each to 60 lashes with a sjambok. A video-recording made a week after the lashings, showed bruises and small open wounds on the buttocks and thighs of the sisters.

The chairman of this people's court was sentenced to five years imprisonment, with three years suspended; three members of the court who lashed the sisters received five-year jail sentences, with half suspended. The 'clerk of the court' was jailed for five years, three-and-a-half of which were suspended. And the complainant, who charged the sisters in the people's court, was fined R500 and sentenced to a year's imprisonment, suspended.

The remainder of the Cape Town accused may still face charges of sedition.

In the Pretoria magistrate's court, six Soshanguve residents were charged with attempted murder after a people's court allegedly sentenced another township resident to 400 lashes.

Humphrey Mkize claimed a group of 'comrades', including the six accused, tied him to a pole and accused him of burning tyres belonging to the 'comrades', stealing alcohol, and killing someone. He was then taken to a Soshanguve school where a people's court hearing took place. He and three others were sentenced and lashed.

Mkize claimed he was forced to take off his trousers and lie on a table with his hands tied under the table. The six accused and several others gave him 400 lashes. Some doubt exists as to the truth of these allegations, as all six accused were acquitted in this trial.

In a new development, the state has charged five Atteridgeville residents with furthering the aims of the ANC by participating in a people's court.

Police raided this court, which was dealing with a minor dispute between two youngsters, one of whom broke a pair of spectacles belonging to the other. The two were called before a court, and told to resolve their differences amicably. They were later called before the court again and reprimanded for shouting abuse at each other in the street. During these proceedings police stormed the church hall where this was taking place, and arrested those present.

Documents confiscated by police during

the raid included notebooks stamped 'Black Rock 3 Area Committee', allegedly belonging to the UDF-affiliated Atteridgeville-Saulsville Residents Organisation.

While these cases all deal with alleged participation in people's courts, the Alexandra sedition trials are expected to cover a far wider range of issues, including area and street committees, and people's power.

In Brief

Acton Mandla Maseko (36)

Simon Dladla (40)

Two Alexandra men have been charged with placing land mines in the Breyten and Volksrust areas.

Acton Maseko and Simon Dladla face a main count of treason, with six alternative counts of terrorism, furthering the aims and membership of the ANC, possession of arms and ammunition, attempted murder, and malicious damage to property.

According to the state, Maseko joined the ANC in 1976 and underwent military training over a number of years in Tanzania, Russia, Angola and Swaziland. During 1985 he began working together with Dladla, also a trained ANC guerilla.

On a number of occasions they illegally crossed from Swaziland to South Africa, and investigated possible targets for sabotage in the Breyten and Volksrust areas. The state claims they aimed to terrorise the local farming community.

During April 1986 they transported land mines from Swaziland into South Africa, and on 21 April placed these on roads running through two farms in the Breyten area. On the farm Mooiplaas a vehicle carrying two farm workers set off a mine, seriously injuring the workers and destroying the vehicle.

At the farm Vlakfontein, a tractor driven by a farm worker detonated a land mine, injuring three workers and destroying the tractor.

Six weeks later, Maseko and Dladla again crossed into South Africa and placed mines on two farms in the Volksrust area. On 10 June, a motor car driven by 18-year old Martin Jakobus Coetzer set off a mine on the farm Boshhoek, injuring the driver and destroying the vehicle.

On the same day a tractor detonated a mine on the farm Bloemhof, injuring two farm workers.

Later in June, the accused, now in Johannesburg, recruited two people into the ANC, and gave them rudimentary training in the use of firearms, explosives and hand grenades. On the night of 22 June, all four were stopped in a routine road block in Edenvale. Maseko was found in possession of a Makarov pistol and hand grenade, and all four were arrested.

Finally, the state alleges that Maseko set up a dead letter box in the Pretoria area during 1979. It contained detonators, hand grenades, plastic explosives and TNT.

The trial is due to begin during April in a Piet Retief circuit court.

Moeketsi Israel Lesia

Peter Parks Tebogo Ditsebe

Two ANC activists in the Orange Free State have been sentenced to terms of imprisonment.

Early in the morning of 19 February 1986, Isreal Lesia and Parks Ditsebe were walking along a gravel road between the eastern Free State villages of Gumtree and Clocolan. Arrested by the police, they were both detained for security police interrogation during the next seven-and-a-half months. When they finally appeared in court, they faced charges of ANC membership, undergoing military training, and possession of arms caches.

Lesia admitted he had buried an AK 47 and ammunition in the cemetery of a black township outside Bloemfontein.

Ditsebe admitted that he had undergone military training in Angola, East Germany and Russia, and had established an arms cache containing three AK 47 machine guns, ten hand grenades and a quantity of ammunition near Ficksburg.

In the Bloemfontein Supreme Court, Lesia was sentenced to three years imprisonment, and Ditsebe to ten years.

Alexander Lebogene Montoedi (36)

Joseph Tobela (74)

John Nhtlantla Buthelezi (23)

Simon Ngwenya (25)

Elias Sikhosana (19)

Victor Sibiya (22)

Richard Sibiya (21)

COURTS

Meshack Mashinini (20)
Bonakele Thuthu (26)
Vusimuzi Jeremiah Mtjali (22)
Mfanya Robert Hlatswayo (21)

A circuit court in Heidelberg is hearing a terrorism trial involving 11 Duduza residents. This trial follows the eruption of violence in Duduza in May 1985, and the subsequent spread of township unrest throughout the East Rand. Two months later, State President PW Botha declared a state of emergency.

In addition to the terrorism charge, the accused face nine counts of arson, 22 counts of malicious damage to property, and four attempted murder charges.

The state alleges that during May 1985, a meeting held in Duduza resolved to act against the South African Police. In particular, it was decided to keep police out of the township; to kill, injure and intimidate police; and to attack police houses. In addition, it was decided to intimidate and kill community council members and whites, and attack their property.

On 18 May, the funeral of the son of one of the accused took place. After this funeral, the houses of policemen and community councillors were attacked. The next day, violence intensified, and municipal buses were attacked.

That night, Duduza inhabitants were woken up and ordered to join in the fighting. Mass marches took place in the township streets. One of these marching groups set off to Sonnestraal Road and attacked passing vehicles.

The accused are charged with responsibility for a number of these incidents:

- * the houses of seven black policemen were attacked and set on fire, causing combined damage of R30 000;
- * in at least five separate incidents, police vehicles were attacked and stoned;
- * on 20 May, nine vehicles belonging to white Nigel residents were attacked along Sonnestraal Road. In some of these incidents, vehicle drivers were forced from their cars and assaulted. On 21 May the driver of one of these vehicles, Gertina Aletta de Lange, died as a result of injuries sustained in an attack;
- * in Duduza, the houses and shops of community councillors were attacked and burned down, while on a number of

occasions crowds attacked Nigel City Council buses with stones and petrol bombs;

- * during the period 18-20 May, Duduza residents were mobilised to dig trenches in township roads. As a result, police vehicles were unable to patrol the area;
- * and on 20 May, Duduza's residents were organised to stay away from work for the day.

The state claims that as a result of these activities, all public services in the township collapsed, and members of the community council fled Duduza in fear of their lives.

The accused, all of whom have been in custody since last year, were refused bail after the attorney-general issued a certificate which prevented the courts from hearing a bail application.

The state, which intends calling over 70 witnesses, claims the accused include members of the Duduza Civic Association, the Duduza Parents Crisis Committee, and the now-banned Congress of South African Students.



Twelve Tumahole residents are on trial for the murder of a municipal policeman. The accused, aged between 15 and 23, have been charged in the Free State Supreme Court, sitting in the small town of Heilbron. In addition to murder, they face charges of public violence.

The trial is a sequel to the events of 29 May 1986, when a crowd killed municipal policeman Joseph Mokoena, and attacked a number of houses in the Parys township of Tumahole.

According to the state, a group of youths singing freedom songs passed Mokoena's house early on that May morning. Mokoena opened fire on the crowd which dispersed, but then regrouped and returned. They attacked Mokoena's house, and the homes of Miriam Phalatsi and Ismael Sefadi. Stones, bottles and petrol bombs were thrown at these three houses, and Mokoena again opened fire on the crowd.

He was then attacked and stabbed, his body covered with tyres and plastic, and these set alight using petrol and paraffin.

Shortly after, police arrived and the crowd fled.

Strikes and Disputes: Transvaal

COMPANY AND AREA	UNION	WORKERS	DATE	EVENTS AND OUTCOME
African Telephone Cables Brits	MAWU	500	10.11	Workers went on strike after a wage dispute with management. They demanded an across-the-board increase of 66c an hour. Management offered 9c. On 10 November workers staged a sleep-in strike at the factory. Management began negotiations with MAWU the following day.
Anglo Alpha Lichtenburg	BCAWU		Sept	Anglo-Alpha's cement division signed a recognition agreement with the union. This was accompanied by an across-the-board wage increase of R90 a month.
Aranda Textile Mills Randfontein	TWIU		14.11	Aranda Textile Mills and the TWIU signed a recognition agreement which includes disciplinary, grievance, retrenchment and maternity leave procedures.
Ciba-Geigy Kempton Park	CWIU	150	19-21.01	Workers stopped work protesting against the retrenchment of eight union members and management's negative attitude to the issue. The action was called off after management agreed to consider the feasibility of a union proposal for a short-time work programme to avoid retrenchments.
Elgro Hotel Lichtenburg	CCAWUSA	44	29.12	Workers were fired after a colleague was allegedly assaulted by the hotel manager's relatives. Workers demanded an assurance that similar incidents would not occur again. After a brief stoppage the workers were fired. CCAWUSA claimed the workers were unfairly dismissed and began negotiations with the hotel's holding company, Western Province Cellars.
Empire Paper Waste Industria	PWAWU	50	26.01	A worker died after falling into a paper shredder. Workers refused to work until all machinery and trucks had been inspected. Union officials were present at the inspection and a number of machines and vehicles were found to be unsafe. The union claims there were no safety guards or safety rails in front of the paper shredder.
Great North Road Hotel, Pietersburg	BLAGU		25.11	Workers staged a work stoppage after management refused to recognise the union. Management refused to negotiate and 23 workers were dismissed.
Henlock Wynberg		200	28.11	Workers downed tools after management decided to stop bonus pay-outs. Workers also accused management of renegeing on an agreement for overtime pay made three months previously.
Jabula Foods Springs	FAWU UWUSA		07.01	Rivalry between FAWU and UWUSA resulted in the death of three workers and injuries to seven others in the last few months. On 19 June 1986 five UWUSA members were suspended following the killing of a FAWU official, Moses Mtuli. After arbitration the UWUSA members were reinstated. They returned to work on 5 January 1987 but violence erupted when they allegedly insulted FAWU members, who told them to leave. On 26 January a FAWU member was shot dead by unidentified assailants. The following day an UWUSA member was hacked to death at the factory. Each union blames the other for the violence.
JG Strydom Hospital	SABMAWU	500	17.11 -	Five hundred workers went on strike after hospital authorities failed to respond to demands presented to them in October. Grievances centred on wages, racial discrimination and working conditions.

COMPANY AND AREA	UNION	WORKERS	DATE	EVENTS AND OUTCOME
				<p>Workers were given an ultimatum to return to work by 18 November. After failing to do so, hospital authorities fired the workers and were granted a court order prohibiting workers from entering hospital premises. Workers were arrested when they refused to leave the premises. They appeared in court on 19 November but refused to pay admission of guilt fines. The strikers were released and the case postponed to 26 November. A further 100 workers downed tools in sympathy.</p> <p>Hospital authorities refused to negotiate with the union, claiming they did not recognise any outside worker representative. SABMAWU began plans to contest the court order prohibiting striking workers from hospital premises.</p> <p>On 26 November charges of trespassing and contempt of court against the workers were withdrawn. But on 3 December, the supreme court confirmed the order prohibiting workers from entering hospital premises. Workers returned to work on 4 December pending a settlement between the union and hospital authorities. However, the dismissal of 324 workers was confirmed by management.</p> <p>On 7 January four striking workers brought a court application for reinstatement. Judgement on 21 January turned this down.</p>
Kagiso Town Council	SABMAWU	100	11.11	Council police went on strike demanding a pay increase from R250 to R500 a month. They were fired and evicted from council barracks on 13 November. An application was lodged with the supreme court and workers were provisionally allowed to return to their barracks. A hearing on the application was set for 14 February. Meanwhile the workers remain on strike.
Meyer Steel	NUSAW	38	12.12	Management agreed to reinstate workers fired for not reporting for work on 17 November after a dispute with the company.
Mondi Springs, Durban, Cape Town, Piet Piet Relief	PMAWU	1 500	20.01-	<p>Following a deadlock in wage negotiations, workers at five plants went on strike. They demanded 70c/hour across-the-board. Management's offer ranged from 50c to 65c. On 23 January, workers voted in favour of strike action. On 28 January, talks resumed between PMAWU and management. Talks later collapsed and workers went on strike on 2 February. Two days later the dispute was not resolved despite an improved offer from Mondi. On 11 February workers returned to work after agreeing to a 50c/hour increase in the lower grades backdated to 1 January and a further increase of 5c/hour in July. This will raise the minimum hourly wage to R3,15. Skilled workers will now get 65c/hour increase with a further 5c in July.</p> <p>The union sees the settlement as a victory in that it secured national as opposed to plant-level wage negotiations. This is a new phase in negotiations in the pulp and paper industry. National consolidation provides a strong base to oppose the monopolies which control the paper industry: Anglo-American, Gencor and Barlows.</p>
Raylite Batteries Benoni	MAWU	129	15.10	Following wage-paid workers' refusal to work on the Kruger Day holiday, five workers were suspended and accused of intimidation. Negotiations failed and workers went on strike on 15 October. Management fired the workers after they did not meet a return-to-work ultimatum. On 28 November the union applied for mediation to settle the dispute.

COMPANY AND AREA	UNION	WORKERS	DATE	EVENTS AND OUTCOME
Southern Sun Hotels	HARWU		15.01	HARWU signed an interim recognition agreement with Southern Sun's Hotels. The union has majority membership in 20 of the group's hotels.
Standard Telephone Boksburg	MAWU	2 000	11.11	Workers went on strike after wage negotiations broke down. They demanded an increase to a minimum of R3/hour.

Strikes and Disputes: W Cape

Amalgamated Chemists Milnerton	CWIU	60	24.09	Workers were dismissed after a stoppage over management's delays in recognising the union. They ended the strike after management agreed to negotiate with the union.
Bossie Clarke Feeds Klipheuwel	FAWU	17	03.12	Settlement was reached in the industrial court after workers brought a case of unfair dismissal against management. This follows an incident in October, when workers were retrenched with immediate effect. They claimed unfair dismissal on the grounds that no reasons were given for dismissal nor had accepted procedures been followed.
Dairymaid Cape Town	FAWU	130	16-26.01	Ice cream vendors went on strike protesting the closure of a number of depots on 31 January, and the retrenchment of about 150 workers. Workers at other plants within the Tiger and Imperial Cold Storage Group pledged solidarity action and 550 workers at Dairy Belle went on strike. After negotiations, management agreed to extend the date of retrenchments to 31 March. The parties would discuss the retrenchment procedure. Workers returned to work but management would not agreed to mediation.
Multi-Bou Cape Peninsula	BWU, SAW, AAWU	180	12.01	Workers returning from annual leave were told their services had been terminated. Those dismissed included artisans and labourers. Management said the last-in-first-out principle had been applied. Workers said they received no advance warning and were consulting lawyers.
PG Glass Epping	CWIU	300	24.11	After wage negotiations had been in progress for three weeks, workers went on strike. Workers demanded R3,50 /hour, but management's final offer was R2,61 plus 15c/hour from June. Negotiations continued after workers agreed to return to work.
Plessy SA	EAWTU		12.09	<p>Management has signed recognition agreements and set minimum wage rates with five unions. One agreement was signed with the Amalgamated Engineering Union, Engineering Industrial Workers Union, Radio, TV, Electronic and Allied Workers Union, and the SA Electrical Workers Association. The other agreement is with the Electrical and Allied Workers Trade Union.</p> <p>The agreements provide for a minimum wage rate of R2,75/hour for new employees and an increase of five cents/hour after a six-month training period. A further five cents/hour is added for each year up to 10 years service, with a further 10c added for 15 and 20 years service. The agreement also provides for union access to members on company premises, and a standard disciplinary and grievance procedure.</p> <p>In January 1987, Plessy said it would create 300 temporary jobs at its Retreat factory. But workers would have to accept R2,55/hour - slightly less than the minimum negotiated for the factory. The Electrical and Allied Workers Union objected saying this would encourage other firms to bring down wages and proposed increasing productivity to avoid losses.</p>

COMPANY AND AREA	UNION	WORKERS	DATE	EVENTS AND OUTCOME
Nampak Bellville	PWAWU	100	28.11	Workers stopped work in protest over the time management allocated for wage talks. Negotiations had been in progress for some time but management restricted the latest round of talks to 90 minutes over two days. Workers demanded more time be given to the talks but management suspended talks until the workers returned to work.
SASCO Rondebosch	FAWU		11.11	Workers went on strike because a new driver was hired in preference to retrenched workers. Management claimed no retrenched worker was qualified. The union claims management failed to consult it on the issue.
Spekhenham	FAWU		12.09	After a work stoppage on 5 September in support of demands for recognition of FAWU, workers voted in favour of the union in a ballot held on 12 September. Management has now recognised the union.
Tiger Oats Maitland	FAWU	200	17.10	After wage talks deadlocked, workers went on strike on 13 October. They returned later after management agreed to continue negotiations. Workers demanded R121/week minimum while management offered R115/week. On 17 October workers went out again, this time protesting management's refusal to dismiss a foreman who assaulted a worker. Management and FAWU agreed to negotiations to resolve the issue.

Strikes and Disputes: E Cape

Checkers Mdantsane	CCAWUSA	120	08.11	Workers went on strike after 12 workers were fired when they refused to accept a change in the shift system at the Mdantsane store. Workers at four other Checkers stores in the region went out in solidarity. Workers at the Amalinda store were fired after a picket. After negotiation between the union and management all the workers were reinstated.
Harvestime Perseverance	FAWU	500	22.10- 05.11	Workers went on strike over pay demands. The matter went to mediation and the workers returned to work pending the outcome of the hearing.
Posts and Telecom East London	POTWA	29	12.12	Workers were fired after a strike over the dismissal of three shop stewards. After negotiations the issue was resolved and the workers reinstated.

Strikes and Disputes: Natal

Cargo Carriers Durban	TGWU	200	03.11	Workers went on strike protesting against low wages and were dismissed. In response to the dismissals workers at the Transvaal and Free State depots also went out on strike. All the workers returned after management agreed to re-employ the Durban workers.
Clover Pietermaritzburg	FAWU	168	15.10-	The dispute at Clover Dairies continues. Nearly 170 workers were dismissed last June and despite lengthy negotiations management has only offered a progressive reinstatement of workers once vacancies become available. This resulted in the formation of a national shop stewards committee and a decision to re-open talks with management for a national recognition agreement and a negotiated settlement in the strike.

COMPANY AND AREA	UNION	WORKERS	DATE	EVENTS AND OUTCOME
				Meanwhile, the most recent emergency regulations have placed the supreme court hearing on the boycott of Clover products in doubt. In September management obtained an interim interdict restraining FAWU from calling a consumer boycott. The case was due to be heard in March but new regulations have outlawed consumer action in support of worker demands.
Coates Brothers Isipingo	CWIU	130	28.01	After a wage dispute deadlocked, workers voted in favour of strike action. Workers demanded two increases which amount to R32 a week, while management offered R26.
Unilever Maydon Wharf	CWIU	1 240	23.01	Workers went on strike protesting management proposals that would cut their living standards by 6%, and attempts to force an overtime agreement with a discredited liaison committee without worker support. Workers also demanded a 39% wage increase. The strike occurred after management warned 11 workers who breached an agreement about a shorter working week.
Zululand Creosoting KwaMbonambi	BAWU	600		Workers were dismissed and evicted from the company-owned compound for refusing to join UWUSA. In a recent industrial court hearing, management was criticised for dismissing workers and then evicting them from company-owned compounds. But the court ruled against an application for reinstatement on the grounds that BAWU is an unregistered union. The union was granted leave to amend the application and has applied for the appointment of a conciliation board.

Strikes and Disputes: Mines

Goedehoop (Amcoal) Witbank	NUM	2 000	20.01	Miners went on strike demanding the removal of a worker who promoted ethnic divisions. The union began negotiations with management and miners agreed to return to work on 28 January following the workers' suspension.
Grootvlei (Gencor), Springs	NUM	5 000	04.12	Miners went on strike when a worker was fatally shot by police and eight others were injured after a union meeting. The dispute was resolved after talks between management and NUM.
Kinross (Gencor), Evander	NUM	6 000	06-09.11	Workers went on strike over the dismissal of regional organiser, Eric Vala, and three other union members. The strike was suspended pending negotiations between NUM and mine management.
Kinross (Gencor) Evander	NUM		24.11	A worker was killed and a number of others were injured when fighting broke out on the mine. NUM alleges union members were attacked by mine security and indunas as part of management's plan to disorganise the union.
Matla Colliery (Gencor) Kriel	NUM	2 000	25.11	Dissatisfied with relations between NUM and Kinross management, workers went on strike. They returned after two days but were locked out, and management began conducting disciplinary hearings. As a result 94 workers were dismissed and the other strikers were given final warnings. The union attempted to negotiate and refer the matter to mediation.
President Steyn (Anglo), Welkom	NUM	2 200	15.12- 06.02	Violence has resulted in the death of 39 miners and injuries to 177 others since mid-December. In response, management fired 2 200 miners. NUM said it would take Anglo to court over the dismissals.

COMPANY AND AREA	UNION	WORKERS	DATE	EVENTS AND OUTCOME
Vaal Reefs	NUM	500	24.11	Violence erupted at the mine over an ongoing bar boycott. Twenty workers were killed and 72 injured. NUM says the bar boycott had been in effect for some time and had widespread support. Violence broke out when shaft stewards co-ordinating the boycott were attacked by indunas. As a result of the violence 500 workers resigned and returned home.
Anglo American	NUM			In response to ongoing mine violence which claimed 62 lives, Anglo-American issued a newspaper advert distancing itself from the conflict. It claimed a number of factors were to blame for the violence: the state of emergency; general unrest; frustration from blocked career advancement and reports of repatriation. It claimed these had been worsened by irresponsible action, intimidation, forced boycotts of liquor outlets and stores, illegal work stoppages and coercion of workers. NUM claims the conflict is rooted in the institutions of oppression and exploitation which exist on the mines. NUM alleges the induna system, migrant labour and the hostel system are at the root of the conflict. The union also insists that management is involved in the instigation of violence.

NUM FIGHTS GOLD FIELDS OVER STRIKE BALLOTS

In October, annual mine wage talks were resolved when the Chamber offered increases of between 19,5% and 23,5%. Anglo-American, Gencor and JCI were party to this agreement. Gold Fields and Rand Mines Collieries pulled out of the talks and were not part of the agreement. NUM resolved to negotiate separately with them and embark upon strike action if necessary.

Negotiations between Gold Fields, Rand Mines Collieries and NUM continued. On 12 November management offered the same income security package that had been agreed to in the main talks. The union rejected the offer.

NUM asked the conciliation board to rule Goldfields' actions an unfair labour practice. The union argued that Goldfields non-negotiated August wage adjustments, after they had pulled out of the wage talks, constituted an unfair labour practice. The union argued that unilateral increases in such circumstances are unfair; that Gold Fields was in contempt of established labour practices; had attempted to subvert the union; and that the increases were disadvantageous to workers in lower job categories.

The dispute was not resolved, and NUM decided on a strike ballot. Rand Mines Colliery agreed that a ballot could be held at its Douglas mine.

Gold Fields agreed to provide facilities at only three of its mines: Deelkraal, West Driefontein and Libanon. NUM applied to the industrial court for an order allowing it ballot facilities at the four other Gold Fields mines: East Driefontein, Venterspost, Doornfontein and Kloof.

On 24 November, NUM applied to the industrial court to compel Gold Fields to allow strike ballot facilities at all seven mines. NUM was granted this order, but on 26 November mine management urgently appealed against the decision, claiming the four mines were not officially part of the dispute. On 18 December NUM members brought an urgent application against Kloof Gold Mine to allow them to hold a strike ballot. The court ruled that the application was not urgent and the hearing postponed.

A supreme court decision on 15 January denied NUM access to strike ballots at the four Gold Fields mines.

The strikes and disputes listed represent a small fraction recorded. State of emergency regulations forbidding the reporting of some strikes, selectivity, and the many instances of shop-floor conflict SARS is not aware of, make this strikes and disputes table extremely incomplete.

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Page 3: OK Strike



Page 16: Inkatha Youth



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CONTENTS

	Page
OK Workers in Class War 'ANTI-APARTHEID BOSSES ARE NOT OUR FRIENDS'	3
Natal/Kwazulu Indaba REGIONAL RULE FOR INKATHA?	7
Sarmcol Strikers Co-operative WORKER-CONTROLLED PRODUCTION	13
Inkatha Youth Brigade FROM THE HORSE'S MOUTH	16
Continuing the Debate COSATU STRATEGY IN NATAL	21
Mphepu Lives Forever IN SOUTH AFRICA'S 'BANANA REPUBLIC'	26
Duncan Village COMMUNITY OPPOSES NEW STYLE FORCED REMOVAL	30
The Academic Boycott CHOOSE SIDES AND ORGANISE	34
Courts STATE MOVES AGAINST PEOPLE'S COURTS	37
STRIKES AND DISPUTES	41

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