

WORK IN PROGRESS

40



launch of a huge union federation

IN THIS ISSUE:

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Fort Beaufort; Vigilantes and the state;
the UDF — front or political party?;
Urbanisation and influx control

Editorial

The formation of a giant new trade union federation has placed the politics of the working class firmly on the agenda. For the Congress of South African Trade Unions (COSATU), representing nearly 450 000 paid-up members, has made it clear that it sees a role for the organised working class in national politics.

It is not yet certain what the nature of COSATU's political intervention will be. Whether its style of politics will be similar to that of already-existing opposition organisations, or whether the union federation will develop its own form of specifically working-class politics, remains an issue for debate and struggle within COSATU.

It is also not yet clear what the nature of COSATU's alliance will be with popular organisations like the United Democratic Front and its affiliates. The terms of an alliance, and the specific way in which the organised working class relates to popular politics, are issues likely to be determined during the course of 1986.

But what is meant by a specifically working-class politics? Does this imply any form of politics in which a large number of workers are involved? Or does it refer to socialist politics? And if the latter is the case, does this suggest that the end goal of political activity is socialist transformation, or is there a type of politics different from the forms associated with ruling class, petty-bourgeois, or populist politics?

These are difficult questions. A number of trade unions declined affiliation to the UDF because they argued that its structure, and the structure of many of its affiliates, were inappropriate for working-class political activity. This suggests that working-class politics is not only about an end goal, but also about the organisational structures and practices of working class activity.

This is the key question which the formation of COSATU raises: is there a type of politics different from current oppositional and anti-apartheid struggle? And if so, what political forms and modes of organisation are most appropriate for the organised working class.

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Working-Class Politics to the Fore

The recently-formed Congress of South African Trade Unions is South Africa's largest ever union federation. YUNUS CARRIM examines the union traditions that have come together in COSATU, and concludes that despite differences within the federation, its formation puts working-class politics firmly on the agenda.

After four years of painstaking discussions, the majority of South Africa's emergent unions came together in Durban from 30 November to 1 December last year to form the Congress of South African Trade Unions (COSATU).

With 33 unions representing 449 679 paid-up members, COSATU is the largest ever trade union federation in South Africa's history. It is significant not only in size, but because it represents unions in almost all major economic sectors, including mining, metal, automobiles, chemicals, textiles, food, transport, wood and paper, municipal services, and commercial and catering.

But its even greater significance is the enormous political weight it will have on the struggle for change in South Africa. As congress convenor Cyril Ramaphosa noted in his opening address: 'The formation of COSATU represents a tremendous victory for the working class. Never before have workers been so powerful and united, and never before have they been so poised to make their mark in society. In this period of crisis, the question that echoes through every section of society - the state, capital and the democratic movement of this country - is how will the Congress make its mark on South African society'.

That COSATU sees for itself an assertive political role was repeatedly stressed by the newly-elected representatives of the federation. Said general secretary Jay Naidoo: 'Our members are demanding this. Wider political events directly affect them, and they want their unions to respond to this and put the stamp of workers on these struggles'. This was necessary, he said, to ensure that 'the wealth produced by the workers is controlled by them and shared for the benefit of all

the people in a future South Africa'.

COSATU president Elijah Barayi, speaking to over 10 000 people at the public launch of the federation, called for the nationalisation of the mines and other major industries, and in interviews with the press said that COSATU would work towards the creation of a socialist state in South Africa.

The inaugural congress, however, passed no specific policy on COSATU's general political direction. An enormous debate rages within COSATU at present on how it should play a political role and what the substance of its politics should be. The emergence of a cohesive perspective and strategy depends crucially however on the extent to which COSATU is able to establish a synthesis of the two traditions of trade unionism that it brings together: industrial, more class-oriented unionism, and general, more popular-oriented unionism.

THE TWO TRADITIONS

Each of these traditions varies widely and their generalisation here is somewhat crude. Industrial unions organise workers belonging to a specific industry. Most of these unions developed in the wake of the 1973 Durban strikes. They have concentrated mainly on recruiting members, securing recognition agreements, establishing strong shop-floor structures, winning workplace demands and providing workers with skills and experience to effectively assume control of their unions.

In creating powerful national

industrial unions they adopted a tactically flexible approach to official industrial relations machinery, being prepared, for example, to register with the Department of Manpower in terms of the Labour Relations Act, or take part in industrial councils, if this strengthened their organisation.

For the most part, they have avoided overt involvement in wider political and community issues. They have taken up some wider issues directly affecting their members, but through their own structures as far as possible. Joint campaigns with other organisations have been on the basis of their strength on the shop floor and without affiliating to these organisations.

Among the reasons advanced by these unions for not affiliating to the popular movement have been:

- * possible divisions in their ranks because members identify with different political organisations;
- * differences in structure, organisational practice and politics between mass-based unions and activist-based political organisations;
- * the popular movement is not fundamentally committed to working-class interests and would subordinate unions to ends not primarily in workers' interests.

The industrial unions have identified their main political task as developing worker organisation, creating worker unity and developing worker leadership as a basis for a working-class politics, which would provide an alternative to popular movement politics.

Some of the criticisms of this approach, labelled 'workerist', have been:

- * it equates the trade union movement with the working class;
- * as unions are not political parties they cannot demand the leading role in the popular struggle, and though they want this role because of their organised strength they are at the same time afraid of being subordinated;
- * they have yet to spell out in what organisational form a working-class politics will be developed, especially as they have not as unions been able to give leadership to the wider political struggle.

Broadly, the industrial union approach has been identified in different ways with the unions in the Federation of South African Trade Unions (FOSATU), the General Workers Union (GWU), Food and

Canning Workers Union (FCWU), Commercial, Catering and Allied Workers Union (CCAWUSA), Cape Town Municipal Workers Association (CTMWA), and certain unions in the Council of Unions of South Africa (CUSA).

The second tradition, general unionism, provides for the organisation of workers irrespective of the industries to which they belong into a single union. General unions sprang up overnight as a result of new legal provisions for African trade unions in 1979, the economic boom and an upsurge of township struggle. Some of them signed on huge numbers of workers, often through strike waves and mass township meetings.

But they have not been able to consolidate themselves on the shop floor in terms of significant paid-up membership, recognition agreements or shop steward structures, as they do not organise along industrial lines. This has not been helped either by their refusal in principle to register or take part in industrial councils.

Most general unions are based in one region. Some have branches elsewhere, but these operate somewhat autonomously, with links at leadership level rather than from factory to factory.

The general unions have explicitly committed themselves to wider political and community issues, and most affiliated to the United Democratic Front (UDF). They have tended to blur the distinction between community and workplace as forums for organisation, arguing that 'the workers are the community and the community the workers'. Weak shop-floor structures and constant state harassment have reinforced their 'community orientation', which in turn has reinforced their weakness on the shop floor.

Among the reasons these unions have offered for affiliating to the UDF have been:

- * the need to overcome the limitations of trade union activity and prevent a slide into economism;
- * the organised participation of workers through their unions will serve to give the popular struggle a working-class content and direction;
- * other classes and strata outside the union movement are indispensable to the wider political struggle and working-class leadership of these can only be ensured by waging struggles together with them in the popular movement.

This approach, labelled 'populist' has been subjected to various criticisms:

- * its abstract political approach to trade unionism, which does not recognise the specificity of the trade union terrain, has prevented the development of unions on the shop floor;

- * as it does not organise workers specifically as workers and has not been able to develop strong, national industrial unions, it has not been able to give workers a sense of their organised power;

- * as it does not have a powerful organised base it is not able to give the popular movement a working-class content and leadership.

Broadly, this tradition of unionism is identified with the South African Allied Workers Union (SAAWU), General and Allied Workers Union (GAWU), National Federation of Workers (NFW), and the recently disbanded Municipal and General Workers Union (MGWU), among others.

Essentially the two traditions of unionism differ over how to link economics and politics, and what the content of the politics should be. This reflects itself in the differences over how to create working-class leadership and the role of trade unions in this process.

The tensions between and within these traditions were reflected in four years of 'unity talks' aimed at bringing the unions together into one federation. Thirteen meetings were held between August 1981 and June 1985. Debates raged over issues of registration, industrial demarcation, participation in industrial councils, when the federation should be launched, its form and voting structure, financing, affiliate voting strength, the role of paid officials, relations with the international trade union movement, and the role of whites.

But the unions drew closer in a context of deepening recession, increasing industrial monopolisation and sophistication of management strategies, tightening state repression and dramatic escalation of township struggles. As industrial unions came under increasing pressure from their memberships to take up political issues, so general unions, with considerably shrunken bases, have been pressured to establish a strong shop-floor presence.

There are still tensions between the unions. But COSATU has brought most of them together. Now it has the enormous

task of welding these unions into a powerful and effective federation.



Fundamental to this task is the merging of unions to create one union per industry. Jay Naidoo stressed: 'It's absolutely essential that we achieve the mergers as soon as possible. We can only be a powerful force on the shop floor and in the struggles outside if we are based in national industrial unions'.

COSATU's inaugural congress demarcated industrial sectors and set March 1986 as the deadline for mergers. If progress is not satisfactory by then, a special mid-year national congress will be convened to assess developments. The mergers will have to triumph over past hostilities and differences in organising methods, structures, politics and personalities, and splits within COSATU over this cannot be discounted.

The UDF-aligned unions stressed their commitment to merging into industrial unions. Said spokesperson Themba Nxumalo, general secretary of NFW: 'We accept that COSATU must be based on industrial unions. That's where the power is. We have already begun merging workers in the municipal and railway sectors ourselves. We only accepted general unions because of the specific conditions we faced, and as an initial strategy in organising workers'.

The UDF will lose most of its union affiliates when larger industrial unions absorb general unions. Is the UDF not concerned about losing this working-class constituency? UDF spokesperson Billy Nair says: 'No, we have urged our unions to go into COSATU. Union unity is paramount at this stage. We are fully behind COSATU and look forward to working closely with them. The unions are not our only working-class constituency. The UDF is a force in the townships - and who is the majority there if not workers?'

The most successful merger talks so far have been between industrial unions. GWU and Transport and General Workers Union, and Sweet, Food and Allied Workers Union and FCWU are negotiating mergers. Talks are relatively advanced in the motor and metal industry between the Metal and Allied Workers Union, National

Automobile and Allied Workers Union, and the United Mining, Metal and Allied Workers Union of South Africa. Two UDF unions, the Johannesburg-based Municipal and General Workers Union and the Durban-based Municipal Workers of South Africa, merged on the eve of the COSATU launch, and are to meet the Cape Town Municipal Workers Association to form a single municipal workers union.

If the mergers are successful, COSATU will have large national industrial unions in excess of 100 000 in mining, 70 000 in metal, 60 000 in commerce, 50 000 in food, 30 000 in transport, 25 000 in textiles and 20 000 in both chemical and municipal sectors.

UNIONS OUTSIDE COSATU

While COSATU is the largest trade union federation in the country, there are substantial numbers of workers organised outside it and a considerably greater number still to be organised.

The black consciousness-oriented CUSA and the Azanian Confederation of Trade Unions are believed to have 180 000 and 70 000 signed-up members respectively. Their paid-up membership is believed to be substantially less, with the vast majority of these in CUSA. CUSA, a loose federation of 11 industrial unions, is strong in the chemical, construction, food and transport sectors. AZACTU is also a loose federation of nine general and industrial unions.

Both these union groupings refused to join COSATU because of their opposition to its non-racial policy and their commitment to anti-racism instead. There may be practical differences between non-racialism and anti-racism in community organising - for example, the Natal Indian Congress would not be acceptable to anti-racists. But practical differences for union organisation between these two approaches are less clear.

An anti-racist approach, as understood by CUSA, means that white workers can join the unions as members and even assume leadership roles if elected by workers, but white organisers cannot be 'superimposed' as leaders on the unions.

However, workers usually appoint organisers, whether white or black.

Moreover, the involvement of white intellectuals in the union movement does not necessarily negate black working-class leadership, any more than the involvement of black intellectuals necessarily promotes it. Differences between the black consciousness groupings and COSATU are more abstractly ideological and seem to reflect a concern to maintain individual and organisational identity - and appear to be at leadership level rather than between groups of workers.

AZACTU and CUSA have meanwhile established a 'close working relationship' and are exploring a possible merger, but at present AZACTU appears more enthusiastic than CUSA. COSATU, for its part, has stressed that the door remains open to these, and other unions, to join it.

The other significant grouping of organised workers is in the Trade Union Council of South Africa (TUCSA). TUCSA suffered a loss of over 120 000 members in the last two years, and now has about 340 000 paid-up members in 43 industrial unions. Half of these are coloured and Indian, a quarter African and a quarter white.

More importantly, there are several large unions which recently left TUCSA because of its conservatism. COSATU representatives say there are 'indications' of support for COSATU from some of these unions, but 'internal organisational problems' prevent them from joining at the moment. COSATU will probably attempt to win some of these unions over in the near future. Talks are under way with one of them.

The federation is weak in the building, domestic and state sectors and has no organisation in the crucial agricultural sector. The inaugural congress decided to establish national unions in construction and agriculture. The organising of farm and domestic workers will take place despite the lack of legal recognition of unions in these sectors.

COSATU also resolved to intensify its efforts to organise in the bantustans: 'We shall not hesitate to exercise our rights to organise in plants based within the bantustans and we are fully prepared to defend ourselves against repression by whatever effective means at our disposal'.

A decision was also taken to form an Unemployed Workers Union as part of a broader campaign against unemployment

that will include support for co-operative schemes set up by retrenched and dismissed workers.

COSATU will be addressing itself to tasks that the union movement has not tackled before on an organised national basis. It will be interesting, for example, to see how unions of farm, domestic and unemployed workers are fitted into a federation of industrial unions based on strong shop-floor structures.

DEMOCRATIC STRUCTURES

COSATU's structure is based on its five principles of worker control, non-racialism, one union per industry, representation according to paid-up membership and national co-operation between affiliates. COSATU intends to function as a tight federation. Jay Naidoo: 'There's the onslaught from the state and management. The recession is getting worse. So we must have massive unity to act decisively'.

The structure of the new federation provides for this unity through democratic national, regional and local structures. The major decision-making body is the biennial national congress, made up of delegates from all affiliates represented in proportion to their paid-up membership. The main tasks of the congress are to adopt federation policies, to consider constitutional amendments and elect office bearers.

Elected at the inaugural congress were:

- President: Elijah Barayi (NUM)
- First Vice-President: Chris Dlamini (SFAWU)
- Second Vice-President: Makhulu Ledwaba (CCAWUSA)
- Treasurer: Maxwell Xulu (MAWU)
- General Secretary: Jay Naidoo (SFAWU)
- Assistant General Secretary: Sydney Mafumadi (GAWU)

The last two are paid full-time posts. The central executive committee (CEC) will appoint two other national full-time office bearers - education officer and newspaper editor. No paid official has voting rights, and workers must constitute a majority in all federation

structures and meetings.

Between national congresses the CEC will run the federation. The CEC consists of national office bearers, regional area chairpersons and two delegates from unions of 15 000 or less, and four delegates from unions with more than 15 000 members. The CEC meets at least four times a year. It will consider applications for membership, set up sub-committees, establish regional areas, settle disputes between affiliates and appoint full-time employees.

In between CEC meetings the executive committee, which has very limited powers, will meet at least once. It comprises the national office bearers and four members elected from the CEC. The executive assists the general secretaries and carries out CEC instructions.

The federation will also have regional structures. A region will be established where three or more affiliates have a significant presence. The congress determined these regional areas: Northern Transvaal, Witwatersrand-Vaal, Highveld, Western Transvaal, Northern Natal, Southern Natal, Orange Free State, Northern Cape, Western Cape and Eastern Cape.

Each regional area will have a regional congress comprising affiliates in the region represented in proportion to paid-up membership. While subordinate to the federation's CEC, it will elect office bearers, appoint full-time officials and pass policy concerning the region. Meeting once every four months, its main task will be to encourage co-operation among affiliates and co-ordinate regional activities.

Between regional congresses, the regional executive committee (REC), meeting at least once a month, will manage the affairs of the region. The REC is made up of two delegates per affiliate in the region and regional congress office bearers.

Shop stewards councils will bring together all shop stewards in a particular locality, and will give workers their most immediate sense of identification with the federation.

The regional structures are crucial to workers' sense of control over the federation. Through these structures they will be able to develop a greater sense of unity and the power of being organised into a large federation. The success of these structures in the

coming months will be an important barometer of COSATU's success in welding the different unions into an effective federation.

UNITY IN STRUGGLE

Union unity could also be facilitated by struggles waged together. COSATU has taken some bold resolutions which, if implemented, could draw the unions closer. The resolution on unemployment called for concerted unity against retrenchments and factory closures.

COSATU stated its intention to launch a campaign for a legally enforced national minimum living wage - 'one of the strongest points for organising the unorganised'.

COSATU decided too to launch a campaign for the right to strike - to 'continue a relentless campaign which will allow workers full freedom of association, assembly and picketing for strike action. This requires that all forms of security legislation that deny these rights be removed'. The right of unions to strike in 'essential services' and to establish strike funds was also called for.

COSATU resolved to fight for the end of the migrant labour system and threatened national strike action if migrant workers were repatriated to the 'homelands' or the neighbouring states.

Resolutions were passed opposing the state of emergency, bantustans and federalism as a solution to the country's problems, and a call was made for the unconditional release of political prisoners and the unbanning of organisations as a 'prelude to the creation of a democratic South Africa where all shall live in peace and prosperity'.

While supporting disinvestment, COSATU committed itself 'to ensure that the social wealth of South Africa remains the property of the people of South Africa for the benefit of all and further commit ourselves to the principle of international working-class solidarity action as the most powerful form of solidarity action with our struggle'.

COSATU also committed itself to a vigorous campaign against sexual inequality at the workplace, in the wider society and in the federation



COSATU president Elijah Barayi at the launch

itself. Progress is to be monitored by a worker-controlled sub-committee of the federation's education programme.

It was resolved to set up a strenuous education programme that 'politicises, mobilises and organises the working class so that it plays the leading role in the liberation of our society and its transformation into an economic, social and political system that will serve the needs of those who are now oppressed and exploited'.

A resolution urged COSATU affiliates to seek links with other progressive unions in Southern Africa. Another

called for the boycott of the Johannesburg Centenary Celebrations and the organisation of an alternative programme 'to highlight the 100 years of oppression and exploitation in Johannesburg and in particular the mining industry'.

SUPPORT AND OPPOSITION

COSATU was welcomed by a wide range of organisations internally and internationally. Amid the flood of support messages was a message from the South African Congress of Trade Unions (SACTU). In a press statement a Lusaka-based SACTU spokesperson said: 'We don't see any antagonism between SACTU and the new federation. SACTU has always had a very positive attitude to the new federation, and believes that a federation like COSATU has to exist to unite the trade unions, to unite the working class'. He also called upon CUSA, AZACTU and unions that have left TUCSA to join COSATU.

At a conference in Harare a few days after COSATU's launch, Jay Naidoo had informal talks with representatives of the ANC and SACTU who approached him. He reported that they welcomed the federation 'as a progressive step in the struggle for workers' rights and as part of the struggle for freedom in South Africa'.

He said they agreed that COSATU should unite all workers 'while remaining independent and accountable to the needs and aspirations of the working class as expressed through its leadership and the structures of COSATU'.

Naidoo told the ANC/SACTU delegations that 'we do not want superficial changes - black faces replacing white in parliament, or black bosses replacing white - where the repressive machinery of state and capital remains intact, used in the service of different masters'.

He expressed COSATU's commitment to a society 'not only free from apartheid, but also free from the exploitative, degrading and brutalising economic system under which black workers in particular suffer. This means a restructuring of society in order that the wealth of the country is shared equitably among the people'.

COSATU's overt political stance has

been broadly welcomed by organisations inside and outside the country. Inkatha however has vociferously condemned COSATU. Buthelezi accused it of being a 'new front' for the ANC and of 'declaring war' on Inkatha. Inkatha secretary general Oscar Dhlomo said: 'We have all along tried to steer clear of politicising labour. Therefore we have encouraged our own members to join existing trade unions. We feel trade unions have to do with the rights of workers. We do not want to hijack their agendas for our own selfish rights'. But Inkatha has since resolved 'to reserve our right to mobilise the full strength of Inkatha's workers to find alternative means of negotiating for worker rights if any particular trade union abandons this prime responsibility in favour of playing a party political role'. Inkatha members were also urged to report any 'hostile reference' to Inkatha by trade unionists.

Attacking unions which 'put politics before employees' rights' and 'prey on worker benefits' at an Inkatha central committee meeting in early January, Buthelezi suggested Inkatha set up branches in every factory, open a labour office and train organisers to deal with workers. He stressed that workers should recognise that unions were vital to workers and to the country as a whole, but unions had never liberated an African country and would not liberate South Africa.

Replying to Buthelezi's claim that COSATU was directed against Inkatha rather than Pretoria, Sydney Mafumadi, COSATU assistant general secretary, said: 'COSATU is committed to the struggle against economic exploitation and national oppression. We have never stated that we're gearing all our energies to fighting one particular bantustan leader. If he's hysterical about our formation, then we are not answerable to him'.

Jay Naidoo dismissed as 'rubbish' claims that COSATU is an ANC front. 'We are a front for the workers, but in the present political climate you cannot separate workers' demands from politics'.

On COSATU's attitude to Inkatha, he said: 'COSATU has a definite political profile that it will state very boldly and if this comes into conflict with certain organisations that do not agree with our interests then there will be conflict. We will try our utmost to

avoid conflict in the interests of building unity among the oppressed but we will not tolerate anti-working class activity from any organisation that exists outside the federation'.

He said that if COSATU was attacked by any organisation for any decisions or initiative taken with a mandate from its membership, 'that organisation will have to place itself in the camp of the enemy and those that are opposed to the liberation of our people'.

Tensions between Inkatha and COSATU will be most intense in Natal where substantial numbers of COSATU workers also belong to Inkatha - though what meaning Inkatha membership has for them is difficult to say.

On 19 January, a group of workers met in Empangeni and decided to set up an alternative federation of trade unions. Spokesperson Philemon Gumede said it would unite workers who 'believed in free enterprise and opposed disinvestment'. It would be linked to Inkatha since 'our objectives are the same'.

At a special congress COSATU has 'strongly condemned' this as divisive. It has warned employers, who sponsored buses to the meeting, against supporting these 'potential company sweetheart unions'.

A COHESIVE POLITICS

The issue of Inkatha will have to be dealt with sensitively, but it re-emphasises the need for COSATU to forge maximum unity and the workers' firm commitment to COSATU and to the struggle against both racial oppression and economic exploitation. To do this COSATU will have to develop a more cohesive politics and strategy.

What the content and form of this will be is difficult to say. One has to guard against any 'instant analysis' as the situation is much too fluid and there are processes unfolding that have yet to congeal. Crudely, there would seem to be three general perspectives overall within COSATU.

The first, probably the least significant, entails uncritical support for the popular movement, of which the trade unions are seen as no more than the industrial arm. In effect, unions must affiliate to the popular movement as would student, women's or youth

organisations, without setting any specific terms to this. Since the popular movement automatically represents worker interests there is no need to develop a specific working-class politics. Union power should be used to boldly confront the state and complement the struggles in the townships. This perspective may be identified with the most conservative shades of the populist tradition in trade unionism.

The second perspective also sees the involvement of unions on the terrain of popular politics but from a distinct working-class position. The popular movement is not necessarily socialist but is a site of class struggle. The power of the trade union movement should be used to give it working-class content and direction. This has become crucial since in the dramatic upsurge of township struggles over the past 18 months, the youth and the radical petty bourgeoisie, rather than the workers, have been in the forefront determining its pace and direction.

To ensure working-class leadership of these struggles, unions must enter an alliance with the popular movement on terms favourable to workers, on the basis of their organisational strength on the shop floor and without sacrificing their independence. Working-class politics will be developed and the popular movement won over to it through struggles facilitated by this alliance. This perspective can be crudely identified as developing from industrial unionism in a way that avoids the extremes of populism and workerism.

The third perspective sees the popular movement as being unable to represent the interests of workers primarily, and therefore as a whole it cannot be won over to working-class politics. Differences in structures, dynamics, practice of democracy and class interests preclude this. Greater emphasis should be placed on using union structures to develop a working-class politics.

The unions' politics should not be determined by the momentum of the popular movement. The unions have painstakingly developed organisation on the shop floor which will be weakened and divided if the unions are pushed by a momentum that they cannot primarily determine. However this does not mean being aloof from the wider political struggle. Nor does it preclude tactical alliances with the popular movement over

issues.

An extreme shade of this perspective however sees the populist movement's interest in the unions as aimed at containing them and using them to serve ends not in the interests of workers specifically. The unions should therefore develop their politics independent of the popular movement as far as possible. The organised strength of the union movement should be used to develop working-class organisations outside the shop floor.

Some adherents of this perspective see this process culminating in the formation of an independent working-class party in the long term. This overall perspective can be identified as a more politically assertive development of the workerist tradition in trade unionism.

There is no simple correspondence between particular COSATU unions and each of these perspectives. Most are presently heaving with debate and perceptions are often influenced by regional conditions.

Tensions between the latter two more important perspectives were reflected in differing interpretations of the validity of statements issued by the newly-elected federation's representatives. Adherents of the third perspective expressed concern that the office bearers were expressing views for which they had no mandate. The president's speech at the public rally was criticised, particularly his statement that COSATU would call for a pass-burning campaign if apartheid was not dismantled within six months. It was pointed out that even if there was general agreement within COSATU, such decisions had to develop organically out of shop-floor struggles and through the carefully nurtured democratic practises so crucial to the development of a working-class politics.

The office bearers concerned stressed they were reflecting the views and aspirations of rank-and-file members. The statements issued had not deviated radically from the resolutions drafted for discussion at the congress, even if all of these were not finally tabled because of time constraints. They pointed out that what they had said was consistent with the general political direction provided in the constitution, the preamble of which begins: 'We the trade union representatives here, firmly commit ourselves to a unified democratic

South Africa free of oppression and economic exploitation. We believe this can be achieved only under the leadership of a united working class'. They said too that the turmoil conditions of the launch of a large federation like COSATU could not be approached in terms of an abstract, mechanistic concept of democracy.

The tensions within COSATU could lead to splits and hamper unity to some extent, but overall a significant degree of unity is likely to emerge. Jay Naidoo said: 'In a federation as large as ours it's natural that there will be differences, especially in the initial stages but also because of the dynamic situation we find ourselves in. There's lots of debate going on at the moment and COSATU wants to encourage that. But make no mistake, we have enough common ground within COSATU, despite our differences, to be a very powerful and effective force in this country'.

It is not yet clear how this power will be used. It is clear that COSATU will use its organisational strength on the shop floor to pursue the interests of workers in the wider political struggle. COSATU is unlikely to affiliate to any political organisation at this stage. It is more likely to seek alliances with other organisations on terms that are favourable to it.

This could mean joint campaigns around issues like the state of emergency, the effects of the recession, May Day and the ethnic education system.

The UDF will welcome this, according to Billy Nair. 'Although the UDF has not met yet to formally discuss this, we are quite keen to co-operate with COSATU. They are talking of fighting unemployment and the pass laws and campaigning for minimum wages. We too are committed to this. One thing we should think about is the formation of an even broader front of the UDF, COSATU and other organisations to take up campaigns together'.

Themba Nxumalo, NFW general secretary, said: 'We need the support of community organisations. Unemployment is one of our biggest problems and we can't fight it without the community organisations. We also need their support for other issues we decided to fight at the COSATU launch. But we must also give support to the struggles in the townships. It is the workers who are mostly affected there and who must be in the leadership'.

The alliance between unions and community organisations will be significantly influenced by regional conditions.

At a local level, the shop stewards councils are likely to play a more assertive role in issues affecting workers beyond the shop floor. One strand of thinking within COSATU is that another structure should be formed that brings together local shop stewards and representatives of community and political organisations on an organised basis, to jointly take up economic and political issues but on certain clearly defined terms.

The extent to which COSATU will be able to determine its alliance with other organisations will depend on its strength on the shop floor. COSATU has yet to consolidate itself. It will have to invest considerable energy in tasks including: creating one union per industry; setting up federation structures; launching the education

programmes; trying to organise unorganised workers; defining relations with other unions; developing international ties; fighting retrenchments and dismissals; taking up struggles to extend worker control of the labour process; campaigning to extend the industrial relations terrain; organising support for unemployed workers and taking up a campaign for a national minimum living wage.

COSATU's presence is likely to transform not just the industrial relations terrain but the entire political terrain. COSATU clearly has the potential to give the wider political struggle for change a specifically working-class content and a much more radical thrust - 'to make', as Cyril Ramaphosa said, 'the politics of the working class the politics of all the oppressed people in this country'.

One thing is clear, though. The formation of COSATU puts working-class politics firmly on the agenda.

Front or Political Party?

Is the United Democratic Front acting as a political party, while structured as a broad front? RICHARD DE VILLIERS, member of a UDF affiliate, considers the implications of this question.

In the years following the UDF's national launch at Rocklands in August 1983, a great deal of confusion has developed about its structure. The central question: is the UDF a genuine front, or is it really a political party which calls itself a front?

The commercial media and the state through the courts have at various times expressed this confusion. Malicious and deliberately misleading as such discussions often are, the perplexity is nevertheless well-founded. It is shared by many sympathetic supporters of the UDF who are politically active in its affiliates.

The problem is not just an academic or a semantic one. Confusion as to the UDF's nature has caused the movement to lack clear direction and to disappoint many who welcomed its launch and tried to contribute to its success.

In the past year the UDF has suffered severe blows which have crippled it in some regions. Activists and many leaders have been jailed. Some have been murdered. Members have been intimidated and beaten up. False information, distortions and outright lies have been spread. 'Dirty tricks' teams, thugs and trained hit-men have been used against it. Its offices in Cape Town were burnt down.

None of this was unexpected; many anticipated that the state would try to crush the UDF. The question is: did the UDF equip itself in the best possible way to deal with the expected onslaught, or did it leave itself vulnerable to a repeat of what happened to progressive individuals and organisations in the 1960s?

THE MEANING OF CRITICISM

A critique of the UDF does not imply that critics would or should turn their backs on the organisation. But it does mean that careful debate is needed as to how to achieve a non-racial and democratic South Africa.

My comments are made in the knowledge that there are major regional variations in the UDF, and that it is often easier to criticise than to organise successfully. Certainly criticism can sometimes be dangerous: it can provide ammunition to hostile media and the organisation's enemies. It can cause discontent and sow division. Individuals in leadership positions may regard criticism as a personal attack, and build up animosity to those who express it.

This critique is intended as a constructive one, as a contribution to improvement of organisational effectiveness. It aims to be part of the continuous process of self-reflection essential to progressive organisations, in the belief that it will be seen as a tiny contribution to strengthening such movements in South Africa. It is based on the belief that when we are successful we must know why, and when we fail we must also understand why.

What follows is not a detailed assessment of the UDF which gives full weight to the progress it has made. It deliberately highlights the difficulties and problems encountered by one individual involved in a UDF affiliate. Other individuals may have different experiences. These comments are

presented in gratitude to those whose efforts and sacrifices have taken the UDF this far, and in the belief that for it to go further, tighter and more coherent strategies need to be followed.

POLITICAL PARTY OR FRONT

The UDF has often acted as a political party, though it does not have the structure of a party. As a result, its practices are sometimes undemocratic and directionless. To solve this problem, wider questions about fronts and political parties need to be addressed:

- * what is a front and how does it differ from grassroots organisations and from political parties?
- * how is a front structured?
- * why and when is a front preferable to a political party?

Failure to pose and answer such questions is the root of many problems faced by the UDF. The UDF is not a political party - and it should not operate as one.

Establishing a functioning party requires that a number of conditions be met:

- * a high level of political awareness among thousands of people;
- * disciplined and extensive grassroots organisation;
- * frequent meetings of membership;
- * properly mandated leadership;
- * democratically formulated policy on a wide range of issues, from education to foreign affairs;
- * leadership that regularly reports back to membership;
- * membership that participates in and pays subscriptions to the central organisation;
- * a constitution, and annual congresses at which policy is taken and office bearers elected;
- * and, most important, a political climate in which progressive opposition to apartheid can organise relatively freely.

Few of these conditions exist in present-day South Africa. The nature of the law, and actions of repressive organs of state, do not allow for such an organisation to develop at this stage.

Yet some activists have tried to make a political party out of the UDF. They fail to realise that a front is an

umbrella body. Strictly speaking, it is not an organisation, but a network which stands above and co-ordinates some joint activities of its affiliates.

Affiliates themselves may resemble political parties, where they are grassroots organisations closely tied to their membership. But the front itself should not take policy on issues outside those around which it was formed. Rather it is for the affiliate organisations to formulate detailed policy with their defined constituencies.

The front does need a clearly defined and specific mandate within which to operate. As a co-ordinating umbrella organisation, it should not initiate or form new policy, or take up issues outside of its mandate. A front should only carry out those campaigns to which it has been mandated or directed by its affiliated organisations.

The advantage of a front over a political party is that it is able to unite a collection of different interest groups behind broad principles. It is not restricted to a constituency with the same interests and opinions, as is a political party. A front's membership cuts across a range of classes and interests, linking loosely a large number of organisations which may not normally find common ground.

The front structure has disadvantages too. It is cumbersome and slow to react, for example. But in South Africa's repressive political climate, advantages outweigh the disadvantages.

The UDF was founded to unite as many diverse representatives of opinion and interest as possible against Botha's new deal, a strategy which seemed sound in the political context. But since then the UDF has acted like a political party on a number of issues, though it does not have party structures. It took up the issue of repression in the Ciskei, for example; the attacks on students at Ngoye University; and the student boycott of Natal University's medical school.

PROBLEMS OF THE FRONT AS PARTY

Discussion on policy at UDF meetings has ranged widely, covering the many issues which confront progressives in South Africa. If the UDF were a

political party whose officials are directly mandated to formulate policy, this would not be a problem. But difficulties have emerged.

The UDF has tended to pre-empt and take the place of progressive organisations in campaigns. In the case of the issues mentioned above, the respective Detainees' Support Committees and, in the case of the medical school, the Joint Academic Staff Association - both UDF affiliates which should have been fighting these issues - were displaced by the UDF.

sacrifice. But this type of politics does not necessarily build organisations.

It may even prevent affiliate leadership from developing organisational skills. UDF input on an issue tends to be temporary, for the duration of the crisis or campaign; once over, there is seldom consolidation of success and organisation. When a specific issue becomes prominent, major organisational resources are channelled into the community or interest group concerned. But because of this



In the Natal medical school boycott, for example, all progressive resources of the UDF's central organisation were diverted into day-to-day handling of the campaign. The issue was taken out of the hands of students - the constituency concerned - and the UDF dissipated its energies. As a student issue, it should have been handled by students through their organisations. The UDF should have expressed support, but not taken over.

The UDF tends to chase after issues in this way. The working week of any senior UDF official involves a vast number of different meetings and issues to attend to. Such commitment is of course positive, and often demands considerable

intervention, its members have learned few of the lessons and gained few of the organisational skills which could have developed.

The UDF leadership, which works so hard to do so much, is an easy target for the state. This makes it possible for the state to deal crippling blows - as it has done in the past and will continue to do - by removing individual leaders.

A further problem emerging from the tendency to act as a party within a front structure is that policy on a number of issues is often taken by representatives of affiliated organisations who have no mandate to do

so.

Affiliate representatives attending meetings of UDF decision-making bodies - such as regional councils - often find themselves taking decisions on issues they did not know were going to be discussed, and which had not been debated in their affiliated organisations. Under such circumstances, affiliate representatives lack a mandate: they can express only subjective views and decide only in their personal capacities.

Campaigns which result from decisions taken in this way are difficult to sustain. Plans are not discussed and modified at grassroots level, but are handed down from the UDF policy-making body. As such, decisions often do not obtain the necessary commitment from affiliate organisations to be successful.

CONSIDERATIONS

The ultimate success or failure of the UDF depends on its affiliate organisations. Tremendous strides have been made in some regions, where grassroots organisation is real and solid. But in affiliating to the UDF some organisations lost their initial impetus as energies, leadership and spokespeople were absorbed by UDF rather than local activity. But in fact it is grassroots impetus, often inspired by localised and specific issues like rents or transport, that keeps national political struggle alive.

Originally some UDF sympathisers believed that as many organisations as possible should be encouraged to affiliate to the front, in an effort to make it appear strong. Small groups without a constituency were accepted as affiliates. Where it was thought a gap existed, new organisations were even formed, which then affiliated. But mere existence of many affiliates does not necessarily mean strength.

Predictably, organisations without strong roots have either collapsed at

the first gust of state repression or dissolved in apathy.

A number of proposals emerge for debate:

- * The UDF should stick to the limited mandate given to it by affiliates.
- * It should intervene and initiate campaigns only on those issues which have been thoroughly canvassed by affiliate organisations.
- * The growth and activities of affiliated grassroots organisations must be a priority. Activists need to structure their time and resources accordingly. UDF calls on affiliated organisations should be rare, and made only in terms of the limited mandate given it.
- * There should be fewer meetings. Emergency meetings on policy, at which uncanvassed issues are discussed, should not be called at all. Affiliated organisations should send only fully briefed and properly mandated representatives to UDF policy-making meetings. This requires that issues for discussion be known well in advance so that they can be democratically canvassed within affiliated organisations.

* The UDF should not react hastily to issues. In a front, slowness does not necessarily mean weakness, if its reactions are thoroughly canvassed and referred back to affiliates.

* Representatives of affiliated organisations who raise new issues at policy meetings must have a mandate from their organisations to do so. Where the UDF takes up an issue, it should be clear how its intervention adds to rather than duplicates an affiliate's programme.

* Individual donors should not be encouraged to contribute funds directly to the UDF. Donations should rather be made to the affiliate organisations to which contributors belong. Affiliates should in turn pay affiliation fees to the UDF.

The UDF could over-extend itself by trying to intervene in all issues of political resistance in South Africa. The front needs to limit itself and its objectives: this is what its present structure dictates. To act otherwise makes the UDF directionless and undemocratic.

Fort Beaufort Under Emergency Rule

Claims of police abuse have emerged from many of South Africa's townships. But information is hard to come by. GLENN MOSS examines a rare description of life under emergency rule.*

Hidden behind emergency and other powers, South Africa's civil war in the townships continues as security forces and their allies attempt to beat angry resistance into submission. Townships under emergency regulations are sealed off from outside scrutiny, but occasionally the atmosphere of emergency rule is revealed through interviews, affidavits and court proceedings.

Assault and abuse of power by police, township residents allege, is a way of life in the Fort Beaufort townships of Tinis and Dorrington. Recent court applications in this area briefly lifted the veil of secrecy behind which police act under emergency powers. But the story of Fort Beaufort is not unique.

Fort Beaufort is a small rural town, 143 km east of East London. Most of its 10 000 inhabitants are black, and live in the surrounding townships.

The declaration of a state of emergency in the Fort Beaufort district on 21 July 1985 confirmed the continuation of police abuses already established as part of community life.

FORT BEAUFORT: THE BACKGROUND

Daily life in the Fort Beaufort townships is a struggle. The small, four-roomed houses each shelter about seven or eight people. The houses are crowded together. There is no

*Much of the information in this article comes from a report by John Watson, commissioned by Cheadle, Thompson and Hayson; and from affidavits by residents of Tinis and Dorrington.

electricity, no tarred roads, no proper sewerage system (buckets only) and no swimming pool, stadium, or halls.

Health services are virtually non-existent. There is a poorly equipped clinic (two sisters, no doctor) and residents tend to use the hospital outside the township. The area has one social worker.

Despite endemic unemployment, township rates have increased regularly. Pensioners complain that the administration board deducts rent from their pensions before they receive their payouts. People may expect to be out of work for two, three, four or more years, but they may not seek employment in urban areas. Instead, the authorities pressurise people to work in the Ciskei and Transkei.

Employment in Fort Beaufort itself is no guarantee of a living wage. Men with families earn R15 a week as labourers for the East Cape Development Board. Some 60 or 70 are employed like this. Short-term contract workers with firms like LTA Construction take home R40 a fortnight. Some live-in domestic workers earn as little as R30 a month.

Many workers previously relied on mine recruitment campaigns offering six- or nine-month contracts. These pay more than other forms of employment, but recently the local administration board placed limits on the number of recruits.

Four main community organisations have identified with residents' grievances over the past few years. The Congress of South African Students (COSAS), a national organisation until its recent banning, addressed the grievances of students. Two local groups, FOYCO (the Fort Beaufort Youth Congress) and FOWA (the Fort Beaufort Women's Association), are both represented on a fourth body,

Organ of Peace. This seeks to represent township residents on issues like housing and service conditions, rents, and unemployment.

State and local authority response to community organisation has been uncompromising. Township residents have experienced an ongoing campaign of police action: harassment, intimidation, assaults, arrests and detentions.

Community leaders insist that police act without regard for legal and other restraints. A recent case in the Grahamstown Supreme Court illustrates the attitude of a plainclothes constable from Fort Beaufort, called as a witness. When asked why it was necessary to take a statement from a ten-year-old at 12-15 am he answered: 'I was busy, and he said he did not mind'.

The state-imposed system of community councils, and councillors' actions, are major issues in Fort Beaufort. The 17 councillors who are supposed to represent the community were never elected. When pressurised by local residents to resign, the councillors moved out of Tinis and Dorrington to live in surrounding areas. Some stay as far afield as Alice and Seymour, in flats provided by the authorities.

Residents see councillors as part of the machinery of state oppression. In 1984 there were six funerals for people allegedly shot by councillors and their associates. In each case, police became involved, leading to further shootings. During 1985 funerals became an increasingly important means for residents to express their anger, defiance and 'solidarity with fallen comrades in the struggle', as one resident put it.

Public funerals are now banned under emergency regulations, and police warned residents that they would 'get 15 years' for attending such funerals. In one instance, people charged with attending the funeral of shooting victim Lulama Kama were sentenced to five years' imprisonment.

Amidst national protest and unrest, in October 1984 the Fort Beaufort branch of COSAS initiated a schools boycott which extended to boycotts of the Cape Teachers' Training College. The result was a total disruption of education during 1985. Of the five township schools, three have been burnt since the boycotts began. Students boycotted in protest against teachers collaborating with authorities and demanded the

transfer of a principal and teacher who had pointed out 'troublemakers' to police. Students were arrested and detained on school premises.

The schools were grossly overcrowded and staffed by unqualified and poorly qualified teachers. Boycotters called for better facilities, a recognition from authorities of the inequalities in their education, and demanded the formation of a students' representative council.

Authorities responded by closing schools and unleashing the police. Arrests and searches were made without warrants. Members of COSAS and FOYCO were subject to repeated arrests and detentions, and many were forced to leave Fort Beaufort in the face of harassment. Meetings were banned and attempts to organise residents and students were violently disrupted. Community councillors were prominent in these actions, but local police prevented residents from laying charges against councillors or police.

In March 1985 protest broadened to include a consumer boycott of all shops in town. Community organisations formed Fort Beaufort Unity to co-ordinate the boycott. It was virtually total for 12 weeks until May, when organisers suspended it to enable local authorities to respond to boycotters' demands. These included: that students who had been expelled for failing to write examinations be readmitted; improved living conditions (the installation of electricity, roads and proper services); and phasing out of community councils. These demands were ignored as police tried to break the boycott.

On 14 July 1985 the consumer boycott was resumed, but police powers to combat the boycott were greatly extended under emergency regulations. All members of the security forces were given full discretion to control the movement of individuals, and to arrest and detain without warrant. In response, two new demands were added - that the state of emergency be lifted and that troops and security forces be withdrawn from the townships.

According to township residents interviewed, the pattern of abuses, beatings and shootings continued as before, except that police now believed they were indemnified by emergency regulations. Police closed the three main township retail outlets, Nondump Supermarket, America Qeqe Stores and

Kiviets General Dealer for the duration of the boycott. Residents claim they were beaten by police and community councillors if they walked near these shops.

The shop owners, who, residents said, 'had nothing to do with the organisation of the boycott', were detained and their employees harassed. This left a few small private outlets, householders operating as shops, as the only sources of food and supplies. Boycotters went to Alice to shop, but police stopped buses and threatened passengers.

On 11 November the boycott was again suspended - a move announced through pamphlets and posters, since meetings were prohibited. If there was no response to demands, the organisers intended to resume the boycott at the end of November. The owners of the three township stores remained in detention under emergency regulations.

Black residents of Fort Beaufort have little faith in local courts to protect them. They fear victimisation if they lay charges against police, officials and community councillors. Police, they allege in affidavits, warn people not to take action against unlawful assaults and shootings. And residents believe that the local magistrate is in alliance with community councillors.

Detentions are systematically used to 'remove' people from the community. Many allege that police torture detainees. Although precise figures are not available, several hundred residents were arrested in 'unrest-related incidents' during 1985. Presence at a funeral or gathering has resulted in arrest and charges of public violence. This was the case before the state of emergency as well.

The full extent of police abuse and action is difficult to establish: non-residents may not enter the townships without permits.

Institutions of government and state have lost legitimacy. As one resident said, 'There is no law anymore - this is a society without law'. With the breakdown of the judicial system, 'people's courts' have been established, in an attempt to prevent escalating township crime, and to settle disputes.

During November 1985, the Presbyterian Church of South Africa, the Federation of South African Trade Unions, and a number of Fort Beaufort township residents decided to act on the

situation in Tinis and Dorrington. They instructed a Johannesburg firm of attorneys, Cheadle, Thompson and Hayson, to investigate allegations of assault on Fort Beaufort residents by police and community councillors.

LE GRANGE FAILS TO RESPOND

Lawyers involved took affidavits from over 135 people. Since allegations of police assault outnumbered those against community councillors they decided to record only severe instances of councillor violence, and compile detailed allegations of police assault.

But complaints against the police were so numerous that affidavits were taken mainly from those allegedly assaulted by, or in the presence of, Fort Beaufort police station commander, Captain Grobber. In less than two days, over 40 affidavits were taken from complainants, of which 34 were sent to Law and Order Minister, Louis le Grange, for action. At least 20 referred to assaults in which Grobber had participated.

Most other affidavits sent to Le Grange detailed unlawful police assaults in Grobber's presence. Twelve of these made reference to a Sergeant Sijila, who is inter alia alleged to have sjambok-thrashed a 12-year-old epileptic child.

The lawyers involved claim that the affidavits reveal a consistent pattern of abuse by Fort Beaufort police. This includes:

- * malicious damage to property;
- * unlawful assault;
- * misuse of emergency powers of arrest;
- * failure to investigate offences; and
- * prevention of citizens from laying complaints at the Fort Beaufort charge office, particularly where the complaint is against a member of the police or community council.

On submitting the 34 affidavits, ex-moderator of the Presbyterian Church Dr Alan Maker pointed out to Le Grange that the latter had undertaken to 'investigate any and every accusation of police brutality or abuse of police authority'. Lawyers hoped for an investigation which would

- * deal with police found guilty of offences;
- * end the pattern of abuse by police in Fort Beaufort;

* show the Fort Beaufort community that police are not above the law.

Lawyers and Dr Maker undertook not to release the affidavits to the media unless the pattern of police abuse continued after the affidavits had been with Le Grange for a reasonable time. The minister failed to respond and according to township residents the pattern continued.

COMMUNITY COUNCILLORS AS VIGILANTES

On 21 December, Fort Beaufort community councillors assaulted two children. The parents attempted to lay charges against the councillors, but Sergeant Sijila ordered them to leave the police station. After discussions with community leaders, the parents then brought an urgent court application to restrain three community councillors from unlawfully assaulting their children; compelling the Fort Beaufort police station commander to investigate complaints of assault against community councillors; and restraining Sergeant Sijila from preventing complaints of assaults from being investigated.

Early in January, a supreme court judge granted an interim order against the community councillors and Sijila. The judgement acknowledges that community councillors, under the protection of members of the police, are involved in violent vigilante actions against township residents.

AFFIDAVITS SUBMITTED TO LE GRANGE

This account of events before the state of emergency, by 17-year-old Zola Pikini, is supported by nine further affidavits.

At midnight on 8 March 1985, during a vigil for the death of a son of the Ntsangana family, Zola Pikini heard a noise outside and a number of people ran into the house. 'The police kicked the doors open and Captain Grobbler and Sergeant Sijila entered the room where I was and set about beating us with sjamboks and batons. I was struck on my back by Sergeant Sijila with a sjambok and Captain Grobbler hit me on the head with a baton'.

Pikini fled into a nearby room and heard three shots and a number of screams. Police ordered everyone outside into waiting vans. On the way people were beaten by the police 'armed with batons and sjamboks'.

For some time the group was kept in the truck at the Fort Beaufort police station charge office. While being transferred to smaller trucks parked nearby 'we were obliged to proceed through parallel lines of policemen who thrashed us with sjamboks and batons... I was struck on my left shoulder, right forearm and right temple with a sjambok and on my head with a baton as a result of which I suffered various cuts and bruises'.

During the process of counting, taking names, addresses and fingerprints, the group was continually ordered to return to the Bedford truck. Each time as they climbed on they were assaulted. Pikini was hurt on the back, arms and head. The group was then taken to Cookhouse and detained for the weekend.

Pikini stated: 'On 21 March 1985 I was released on bail. During my detention I received no medical treatment. I did not lay a charge of assault against the policemen who had assaulted me as I feared that I would be victimised and harassed if I did so'.

In an affidavit Singapi Danster, 23, said he noticed a Casspir behind him as he was walking home from the Dondumas Supermarket on 15 April 1985.

'When I looked round I saw a white policeman in the Casspir pointing a gun at me. He fired a shot and a number of pellets struck my body. I raised my hands above my head and walked to a corner close by. I looked back and saw a black policeman in the Casspir taking aim at me. He too fired a shot and I was again struck. I fell to the ground but managed to crawl to my house'.

Danster says he was taken to Victoria Hospital in Alice where six pellets were removed from his body, 'but the remainder have not been taken out'.

In her affidavit, Ester Toni, a 45-year-old unemployed mother said that on 18 August 1985 at 11 pm she saw an armoured vehicle ('Hippo') stop outside the house. A number of police, including Captain Grobbler, alighted from the Hippo. 'He wanted to know where the petrol bomb was that my son, Sithombele, had been carrying'.

Toni claims that Sithombele, who had returned from the nearby shop five minutes earlier 'with a cabbage, bread, margarine and one packet of beef stock was definitely not carrying a petrol bomb'.

Toni said she watched while Captain Grobbler searched Sithombele and found money in his pocket. 'Grobbler grabbed Sithombele in an attempt to put him in the Hippo. I was desperate that he should not be taken by the police as I feared that he would be beaten up, so I grabbed him as well.

'Grobbler let go of my son who immediately ran into the house. I ran after my son. Grobbler followed us by kicking the door down, which was not locked. He was followed by three policemen, two whites and one black.

'Grobbler was carrying a rifle and he began to hit my son with the butt of the gun. He hit him a number of times on the head and the back. I rushed to the corner where my son was screaming with pain and put myself between him and the policeman. We both fell to the floor as Grobbler repeatedly hit us both with the rifle. The blows fell mainly on myself, however it was impossible to completely protect my son. Most of the blows landed on my thighs and I screamed from the pain'.

Toni said that neither Grobbler nor the other policemen asked questions during the assault. She said Grobbler left and then 'returned and began to beat me with a sjambok. I was hit approximately five times. I screamed and begged him to stop. I still have these marks on my back from this thrashing'. The policemen then left.

'I was bleeding and in a lot of pain. However, I realised the importance of laying a charge against the person who had beaten me, so after resting for a short while Sithombele and I helped each other to the Fort Beaufort police station.

'When we got to the police station we went to the charge office and told the white policeman on duty that we wanted to lay a charge of assault. He replied that we should complain to the community councillor and not at the police station. I realised that they were not going to allow me to lay a charge so I and my son went home'.

Edward Rangule, a 73-year-old pensioner, said in an affidavit that on a day in July 1985 he heard that police had

assaulted someone at the supermarket. When he arrived there 'I saw my son Siphwo, who works there, running around the back of the building. The police who were waiting outside the shop caught him'.

Rangule said a black policeman grabbed Siphwo by the shoulders and bashed him against the wall hitting his head against the wall. Siphwo managed to get away but was caught again, 'forced to the ground, kicked and beaten with the butts of the long guns... This continued for about three minutes. Siphwo was just lying on the ground and was limp and appeared to be unconscious'.

Rangule immediately took his son to Adelaide hospital. Siphwo was unconscious and bleeding from his nose and from a cut on the forehead. 'He appeared to experience a fit in the car on the way and his body was jerking uncontrollably'.

From Adelaide hospital Siphwo was transferred to Port Elizabeth where he spent three weeks. On returning home he continued to be treated at the Fort Beaufort hospital, and was recently readmitted there. 'When he returned home he could not see properly. He had passed standard seven and was able to read prior to the assault, but afterwards his vision was affected and he cannot now see properly, nor read as he used to. Whenever it is hot he has persistent headaches. When he runs he often falls over and cannot maintain his balance. When he talks he suddenly makes illogical statements. The doctors told us that he has permanent brain damage.

'I do not know why the police beat Siphwo in this manner'.

In an affidavit, 35-year-old Leontine Tamsanqa told of a raid on his home in Dorrington on 27 July 1985 at about 2 am. A number of both black and white policemen, including Captain Grobbler, kicked down the front door and the bedroom door and entered the bedroom.

After breaking into and searching the wardrobe, Captain Grobbler 'began assaulting me with a baton he was carrying. I was also struck a number of times with sjamboks by other policemen'. Tamsanqa was then assaulted by the Zulu-speaking policemen standing in a line from the bedroom to the dining room.

'I was struck severe blows all over my torso and can remember being hit by Captain Grobbler with a baton on my

mouth. In addition, I was kicked in the groin with a booted foot by a black policeman'.

Tamsanqa said the policemen eventually left at about 2-45 am. 'At no time was I informed for the reason for their attack. I did not lay a charge against Captain Grobber and his police as I heard that he would assault me again'.

Nkosana Makaka, 18-years-old, told of a Hippo arriving outside his house on 9 September 1985 at about 10 am. When three white policemen climbed out Makaka and his sister Frieda walked into the house as 'I was very scared of these policemen'.

The policemen went into the house and accused Makaka of stoning vehicles. They ignored Makaka's denials and 'took me to the Hippo. I climbed in and saw a lot of policemen inside. As soon as the Hippo started to move a number of these policemen started to hit and kick me. I was hit repeatedly with batons and rifles. One of the kicks hit me full in the stomach and for a short while I could not breathe. I was kicked so hard

in my ribs that I still suffer pain on the left side of my chest'.

On arriving at the station some of the police got out of the Hippo. 'I could hear them shouting "kaptein, kaptein". I heard what I presumed to be his voice telling the policemen to thrash me further rather than keep me in custody'.

Makaka said five policemen kicked him while he lay on the floor of the Hippo screaming with pain. 'They ordered me not to scream... The blows landed all over my body, especially on my torso. My stomach and ribs were extremely painful and at times I could not help screaming.

'A white policeman gave me an orange and told me to eat it, skin included. I ate it quickly. I was then told to eat more oranges or I would be hit. In all I was forced to eat 11 oranges with their skins on. The policemen screamed with laughter while this was taking place'.

Makaka said that after some time the policemen kicked his stomach and laughed. 'Eventually the Hippo stopped some distance from my house and they told me to get out'.

COMMUNITY COUNCILLORS AND POLICE

Fort Beaufort community councillors have a history of vigilante action and assault. According to residents, local police do little to stop them.

Tendikile Marele, a 16-year-old scholar, alleges that in May 1985, on his way to a shop in Fort Beaufort, he was confronted by a black and a white policeman.

'The white policeman grabbed hold of me and forced my arms behind my back'. Marele claims the policemen forced him to go with them to the house of Connie Stofile whose house had recently been burned down. Stofile is the brother of Michael Nohashe, a Fort Beaufort community councillor. Stofile spoke to the police in Afrikaans and 'I was struck approximately four times on the head with a black plastic baton and I became dizzy. This beating took place in the presence of policemen who made no attempt to intervene or come to my assistance'.

Marele was then taken to the Fort Beaufort prison and detained for the weekend. 'On Monday 23 May, I was charged with stoning and burning the house of Connie Stofile, the person who had assaulted me'. Marele was detained

for 16 days and then found not guilty and discharged. He said cuts on the back of his head sustained in the beating were dressed at the prison clinic.

Toyise Mlenze, a 16-year-old student, also fell victim to community councillor violence. He states in an affidavit that on 22 October 1984, at about 11 pm, he heard a noise coming from a neighbour's house. He went outside and heard people walking past in the dark. 'When they were a little distance away I saw one of these people pointing a gun towards me. I turned around to go back into the house and before I could move away I was shot in my right side by this person'.

Mlenze said he fell to the ground and as the people entered the yard 'I recognised Mr Matikinca, Mr Nelson Yoyo, and Mr Gabashe, all three of whom are community councillors. Mr Gabashe beat me with a stick while I was lying on the ground'.

While in hospital as a result of the attack Mlenze made a statement to the police and laid a charge. 'As far as I know nothing ever came of this charge'.

Nolwandle Mathe is a 34-year-old mother.

Recently, she applied to the supreme court to protect her son Themba, 11, who had been attacked by a vigilante group led by community councillors. When she tried to lay charges against the councillors, she alleges that the police protected them. She said that just before midnight on 21 December 1985 she heard the sound of Themba screaming from across the street where he was sleeping at the house of a friend, Xolani Rangule. She ran across the road and 'I saw a number of men running out of the front door. I recognised Sithombo Mbewu, Taya Nzima and Makwezi Gabashe, all of whom are community councillors in the Fort Beaufort location.

'I ran into Rangule's house and saw my son Themba lying on the floor of the dining room. He was crying loudly and I could see his stomach was bleeding'.

Mathe said she rushed to pick up her son who seemed hysterical with pain. She could see blood dripping through the white vest he was wearing. 'He told me he and Xolani had been asleep in the bedroom when Nzima, Mbewu and Gabashe and a number of other black men had entered the bedroom and immediately started to hit them with sjamboks and sticks.

'I took him home and stripped off his clothes and washed him. He had a number of sjambok marks on his upper torso. There was one deep gash on his chest

which was bleeding badly. He also had sjambok marks on his shoulder and side of his back'.

On Sunday 22 December, Mathe, Themba, Rangule and his son Xolani, and a Mr Batyi who had also allegedly been assaulted by community councillors the previous day, went to the police station in Fort Beaufort to lay charges. On the way they saw councillor Mbewu near the community councillor's accommodation in Tinis. Mathe claims he said he was 'surprised that our sons were still alive and that he would not rest until they were dead'.

At the police station a black constable Danster began to take a statement from Rangule. Then Sergeant Sijila came into the office and 'told us that our children would continue to be beaten and that our case would not succeed. He told Danster to stop taking Mr Rangule's statement as he was wasting the government's money by doing so'.

Mathe said Sijila told them to leave the charge office and report the case at the police station in the black township. There is however no police station in the Fort Beaufort township.

'On 1 January 1986, Mbewu came to my house looking for Themba. I told him that he was not at home, and that he, Mbewu, should rather kill me. He replied that he would not kill me but would be satisfied with the death of my son'.

POLICE MOVE FORT BEAUFORT DETAINEES

Mtunzi Qhina is the chairman of the Fort Beaufort Consumer Boycott Committee. On 4 January 1986, police detained him and his 60-year-old mother, Elsie Qhina. According to those present when Mtunzi was arrested, he was brutally assaulted by police, and the assaults continued at the Fort Beaufort police station.

His sister, Nomonde Qhina, described his arrest: 'Sergeant Sijila found Mtunzi sleeping with his girlfriend, Nosicelo Mbovane. Sijila began to punch Mtunzi repeatedly while he lay in bed. I saw Sijila grab Mtunzi's scrotum and pull it violently while he squeezed. When he stopped doing this he put his hand on Mtunzi's throat and began to throttle him.

Qhina said a white policeman also assaulted Mtunzi, slapping and punching him a number of times. 'After a short

while Sijila stopped pulling Mtunzi's scrotum and with one hand on Mtunzi's neck he punched him on the side of the head a number of times'.

Nosicelo Mbovane said Mtunzi was taken to the Fort Beaufort police station that night and Sijila and a white policeman took turns in assaulting him. 'They kicked him on the ankles, shins and knees. Throughout the assault Mtunzi was screaming loudly. Mtunzi's mother and myself were crying. Mrs Qhina was begging the policemen to stop assaulting her son but they ignored her'. Mbovane said the assault lasted one-and-a-half hours. 'I do not know if the assaults continued after 3 am because Sijila took me out of the police station when he left'.

On 7 January, family members notified the commissioner of police that they intended to bring an urgent application to restrain police from assaulting Mtunzi Qhina and another Fort Beaufort detainee, Mfundo Mdiza. On the same day,

the detainees were moved from Fort Beaufort to Port Elizabeth. The judge hearing the application, Justice Donald Kannemeyer, ruled that the application to restrain Fort Beaufort police was therefore unnecessary as the detainees were no longer in their hands.

Police have denied that they assaulted Mtunzi Qhina. A Doctor Botha of Fort Beaufort states that he examined Mtunzi on 4 January, after his arrest, and found no evidence of assault. Yet the prison doctor at St Albans prison in Port Elizabeth has stated that on 7 January he found marks on Mtunzi. And at the time of the application, the police district commissioner gave an assurance that Fort Beaufort police would be

denied access to detainees transferred to Port Elizabeth. Perhaps he feared that the police of Fort Beaufort were out of control.

Towards the end of January, police released Mtunzi, his mother and another Fort Beaufort detainee. Residents of Fort Beaufort's townships claim that, since the court applications, police have been acting with some restraint. But questions remain: why did it take costly court proceedings to limit the actions of police and community councillors? And, importantly, why did Law and Order Minister le Grange fail to respond to the 34 affidavits submitted to him?

TRANSFORMATION

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Probing the Links

Vigilante attacks on progressive activists have escalated dramatically in the last few months. JEREMY SEEKINGS examines who the vigilantes are, their relation to the local state and possibilities for curbing their activities.

On 11 January 1986, Chief Ampie Mayisa, a Leandra community leader, was stabbed, hacked and burnt to death by vigilantes. Newspapers gave this murder front-page coverage, but it was no isolated incident. Vigilantes have assaulted, shot, threatened and burnt the houses of many leaders, activists and residents in townships country-wide.

The last week of November 1985 saw an unprecedented number of vigilante attacks in Huhudi outside Vryburg, and in Tumahole outside Parys in the northern Free State.

On 25 November vigilantes dragged Sylvester Gasebue, a young activist of the Huhudi Civic Association (HUCA), from his house and killed him. Another youth was shot in the head. The day before, the same vigilantes attacked three HUCA members returning home from a meeting. The three were hospitalised. On 26 November the home of HUCA leader Hoffman Galeng was burnt down; one occupant was hospitalised. Another was abducted, and was later found in a mortuary, shot dead.

On 29 November Lefu Rasego, a young COSAS activist in Tumahole, was hacked to death with garden tools. Earlier that week the houses of several Tumahole Civic Association and Tumahole Youth Congress leaders were stoned. School students were badly beaten up, and death threats liberally but sincerely bandied about.

Reports from Queenstown and Fort Beaufort, Durban, Cape Town, Kroonstad, Ekangala and Moutse (both east of Pretoria) also detail recent vigilante activity. The Welkom township of Thabong suffered a wave of vigilante attacks early in 1985.

Vigilantes' defence of the status quo is not a new phenomenon. But, until

recently, groups usually operated in or from bantustan areas. Ciskei authorities brought in vigilantes from rural areas in an attempt to break the 1983 Mdantsane bus boycott, for instance, and Inkatha has organised vigilantes in Durban's townships, as have KwaNdebele officials in Moutse and Ekangala.

Novel forms of repression shape the terrain of resistance as much as reform initiatives. Vigilantes not only threaten the lives and property of activists and the sustained operation of township organisations, but also influence the balance of power in the affected township. In some cases, vigilantes in magisterial districts not covered by the state of emergency have disrupted civic and youth organisations to a greater extent than have security forces in townships under emergency regulations.

WHO ARE THE VIGILANTES?

The recent wave of vigilante attacks reflects fundamental divisions in black townships.

In Huhudi, Fort Beaufort and Thabong, vigilantes are grouped around community councillors; in Tumahole, around black police. In Leandra they are led by residents who support the community councillors and are suspected police informers. Thus the core of vigilante groups is made up of people regarded as part of 'the system'.

In Huhudi the councillors are determined to break the power of HUCA, which developed considerable authority in the township after successfully lobbying for a reprieve against removal

to Bophuthatswana. Residents perceive the council as unrepresentative and allied to the Northern Cape Development Board.

In Thabong seven councillors actively participated in vigilante assaults and killings.

The broader membership of these groups is harder to categorise. People join vigilante groups for diverse and highly individual reasons.

In Tumahole, for example, three families make up most of the members of the 'A-Team', a vigilante group. One family includes a black policewoman, who is regarded by Tumahole residents as the vigilantes' leader, and her brothers. Two particularly brutal vigilantes, allege township residents, are the policewoman's lover and his brother, once a COSAS member. The second family are close friends of the first. The brothers in the third family played in the same football team as members of the first two families.

Though blood ties, love and football might inform an individual's personal decision to join the vigilantes, such a move is more fundamentally guided by wider class interests.

Opposition to progressive township organisation comes primarily from a growing group of embryonic capitalists such as shop, shebeen, and taxi owners, and from teachers, police and local state officials. Often people are members of both groups; for example, most councillors also own businesses. These occupations are concerned in central sites of struggle such schools and local authorities, or have become highly politicised as in the case of taxi owners in transport boycotts, or retailers in consumer boycotts.

In Tumahole only two teachers support the civic association and youth congress. Several teachers are members of the A-Team.

Where vigilante leaders have access to money but insufficient local support, they sometimes recruit in impoverished rural areas. Though such recruitment is common among bantustan-based vigilantes, it is rare among recent township groups. However, in Thabong and Huhudi vigilantes supplemented local supporters with recruits from rural Msinga in KwaZulu and Bophuthatswana.

Leandra vigilantes have a broader base: formerly, 'insiders' with section 10 rights and 'outsiders' without urban rights were united in the face of

removal, but this distinction now seems to be the central cleavage in the community. The vigilantes play on the 'insider' resentment that township organisations' defence of 'outsiders' provokes confrontations with the police.

While vigilantes do act in the interest of the local state by intimidating opposition, they are not directly motivated by such reasoning. Their material interest in stability, a related inclination towards conservatism and fear for their lives and property form the basis of their violent defence of the status quo.

VIGILANTES AND THE LOCAL STATE

What are the precise relations between vigilantes and the local state?

Bantustan-based vigilantes are connected closely to senior state officials, and often operate as unofficial paramilitary forces.

Victims of attacks in Ekangala and Moutse identify their assailants as closely linked with the KwaNdebele authorities who are undeniably keen to absorb both the township and the district into KwaNdebele. Vigilante groups in the Durban townships seem to comprise Inkatha members and members of the KwaZulu Legislative Assembly. Their victims are often activists in organisations which oppose the incorporation of townships into KwaZulu, or who are generally opposed to Inkatha.

The vigilante group in the Ciskei township of Zwelitsha was formed in response to a call by Ciskei president, Lennox Sebe.

The relationship between vigilante groups in townships and local state bodies is less clear, though township activists regard vigilantes as part of 'the system'.

The alleged involvement of black policemen in vigilante groups would suggest a high likelihood of official tolerance. Vigilante actions may be illegal, but they effectively hit at 'agitators'. One vigilante victim, reporting the attack to the police, was told: 'You come here when you are in trouble, but you forget that you broke our houses', and was threatened with arrest.

Belief that ends justify the means is clearly indicated in the stance of

township councillors accused of establishing vigilante groups. According to the minutes of a meeting between businessmen and the Thabong Town Council, the mayor said: 'Under the guidance of council members patrols were organised and inspired by the old axiom "spare the rod and spoil the child". All meetings of potential stone-throwers and arsonists were broken up with no more violence than the energetic use of sjamboks and the result has been most satisfying. Thabong has been scourged of rowdiness and we intend to keep it that way'.

The Lekoa Town Council in the Vaal Triangle proposed establishing 'law and order committees'.

Frustration with conventional responses to township opposition is evident in a speech made by a Soweto councillor. He told a Sofasonke Party rally that 'he had asked the government to allow councillors to avenge attacks on their homes, and to embark on full-scale vigilance aimed at rooting out "abo siyayinyova" (trouble makers) in township streets... Hopes that security forces would "bring peace" were a pipe-dream'.

There is evidence that vigilantes receive support from local senior police and development board officials. Vigilante activities may be considered an alternative to police 'clean-up' operations. In Queenstown, vigilantes controlled by the Labour Party-dominated management committee of the coloured township are being retrained and equipped by the SADF, ostensibly because they constitute a 'civil defence commando'.

Vigilantes in Tumahole obtained firearms resembling those used by the police. Vigilantes themselves seem to believe that they have police support. Township residents claim that police boast of having formed vigilante groups and that they sometimes even engage in what amount to joint operations.

It is impossible to be certain of the relationship between vigilantes and the local state. But even if they are not encouraged, let alone co-ordinated or initiated by the authorities, it is only necessary for them to be tolerated to constitute a major threat to township organisation.

Township activists are torn between two responses. The first, favoured by the youth, is to fight back in the streets. The second is to work through

the courts. Whilst a violent response might bolster the position of the township youth, a legal response might create a dependence on organisations not associated with the township.

LEGAL ACTION OR COUNTER-VIOLENCE

Suspicion of legal action seems widespread, primarily because of time delays involved, but also because it is widely felt to hold little chance of success. However, Tumahole activists who were sceptical of legal action now admit that they did not expect the vigilantes' activities to escalate to murder.

In Thabong, vigilante activities were curbed through a combination of legal action and counter-violence in the township. The Black Sash was contacted by township residents, and in conjunction with lawyers collected statements from victims and witnesses. These were handed to the attorney general of the Orange Free State who laid charges against several vigilantes.

Press publicity and parliamentary lobbying by the PFP put further pressure on the Southern Free State Development Board and the Welkom police to curb vigilante activity. According to a former COSAS activist, the attacks began to stop 'after legal action was taken against the vigilantes. Now the Thabong town clerk is frightened that maybe his job is jeopardised because he gave the vigilantes the combis of the administration board'.

The withdrawal of official tolerance changed the balance of strength in the township. 'When the people saw that the vigilantes were now at a disadvantage, they fought back', said the former COSAS activist. 'Before, if we had tried it, it would have meant suicide', said another activist. At least four vigilantes were killed.

Seeking official prosecution of vigilantes is not easy. The attorney general of the Northern Cape refused to take action against vigilantes in Huhudi. Likewise the police treated each incident individually and declared each 'finalised' without pressing charges.

In January 1986 lawyers acting for residents in Leandra and Fort Beaufort successfully applied for supreme court interdicts against vigilantes. But an application for a temporary interdict in

Kroonstad was turned down. Interdicts do not in themselves guarantee any constraint on attacks, but they can induce panic among vigilantes and discourage local police from offering their support.

Attempts to establish street committees constitute another potential response which has been undertaken only in parts of the Eastern Cape such as Port Elizabeth, Uitenhage and Cradock. Comprehensive grassroots organisation seems to make township-based vigilante operations impossible and also allows activists to control their more militant 'comrades', the 'amabutho'. However, creating street committees is a long-term response as most townships are not sufficiently organised.

FUTURE VIGILANTE ACTIVITY

Under the Black Local Authorities Act of 1982, town councils may appoint their own 'law enforcement officers'.

In December 1984 the Lekoa Town Council proposed the appointment of 37 officers and 269 constables. At the

graduation of a batch of municipal police students in the Vaal in November 1985, the Minister of Constitutional Development and Planning, Chris Heunis, declared that at least 5 000 municipal police would be trained in the next six months.

In Thabong some former vigilantes were recruited into the new municipal police. In Tumahole, vigilantes exist alongside the municipal police. Municipal police cannot undertake the same activities as vigilantes either in their own interests or under orders. So it is likely that the vigilantes will continue unchecked alongside the expanding municipal police force.

The townships most likely to witness vigilante activity are those with resident councillors or black policemen who can form the core of a group. Small townships are particularly prone to the emergence of vigilantes as they know their opponents, and because police and other local state officials feel greater freedom to act as, or tolerate, what they please. If legal initiatives to isolate vigilantes from official protection fail, unpredictable and disruptive vigilante operations will continue uncurbed.

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Urbanisation and Influx Control

The President's Council report on urbanisation is the most recent contribution to a major overhaul in official policy. In the first of a two-part discussion of its implications, DOUG HINDSON explores the mechanics and consequences of South Africa's changing social strategy.

The President's Council (PC) report, 'An Urbanisation Strategy for the Republic of South Africa', appeared in September 1985. Undeniably, it implies abandonment of the territorial and constitutional aims of apartheid outlined in the 1947 Sauer report.

This original blueprint of Grand Apartheid called for measures to slow and ultimately reverse black urbanisation in favour of the territorially and ethnically segregated bantustans. In contrast, the PC report relinquishes the original objectives of territorial - but not necessarily residential - apartheid, and calls for abolition of influx control and the pass laws.

The report's premise is that urbanisation is both inevitable and economically desirable. State intervention in the urbanisation process, it argues, should be restricted to ensuring that it occurs in a planned or 'orderly' fashion: 'The challenge as regards the South African problem of urbanisation lies in finding a positive approach, which recognises the common features and inevitabilities of urbanisation trends all over the world, and is designed to deal with these, as well as the acceptance, accommodation and effective economic and socio-cultural integration of the urban population as a whole, in as orderly and cost-effective a manner as possible'. (1.19)

Influx control could not achieve this, the report argues, so it calls for the replacement of influx control with a positive urbanisation strategy: 'Neither the present system nor any other direct form of "negative" influx control should be retained. There is, however, a need for a positive

approach to urbanisation that would allow the orderliness of the process to be promoted. It is necessary for influx control to be replaced by a positive urbanisation strategy that, by making use of market forces, subsidies and development, among other things, will encourage people to settle in certain suitable areas rather than forbidding them to move to certain urban areas'. (9.152)

This strategy entails changes in the methods of control over the movement and settlement of population. It involves

- * substituting economically integrated metropolitan and development regions for the bantustans as the spatial bases of population settlement planning;
- * replacement of traditional pass and influx controls with (formally) racially neutral measures such as squatter, slum and health regulations;
- * a shift away from direct prohibitions over movement, physical presence, residence and employment in designated areas, in favour of indirect measures, notably regionally differentiated financial penalties and incentives designed to influence settlement patterns.

Government is considering the report. As it coincides with recently accepted policy changes in industrial location strategy and local and second tier government, it is likely that the National Party will accept its substance, and weave the recommendations into its evolving constitutional plans.

The report leaves open the question of a constitutional dispensation to replace territorial apartheid. Without making specific recommendations the report favours the extension of mobility and settlement rights within greater South Africa to citizens of the formally

independent bantustans of the Transkei, Bophuthatswana, Venda and Ciskei (the so-called TBVC countries).

The issue of citizenship was deliberately excluded from the commission's terms of reference and its recommendations have been formulated so as to be compatible with a range of geographically and ethnically based constitutional dispensations.

METROPOLITAN AND DEVELOPMENT REGIONS

In the same way that influx control complemented Grand Apartheid, the PC's urbanisation strategy meshes with the state's regional strategy - what the report refers to as the policy of spatial ordering. It is explicit about this framework: 'The Committee would like to state clearly that planning intervention in the form of incentives and disincentives is regarded as essential at both the macro-spatial and the micro-spatial levels to promote orderly urbanisation, especially in the absence of direct control measures'.

(5.17.4)

Elsewhere it states that: 'Future urbanisation linked to industrial development should be spread over larger geographical areas and therefore more evenly, with a reasonable degree of stimulation of urban development in the outer peripheral areas of certain metropolitan areas and large towns and not so much in remote border areas'.

(5.29)

The PC report does not spell out the details of this policy of regional spatial ordering. It accepts the recommendations of two other reports: the Croeser report on 'Financing of Local Authorities in South Africa' and the Kleu report on 'Industrial Development Strategy'. Government has accepted both sets of recommendations, which deal respectively with metropolitan government and the policy of industrial dispersal.

The PC's policy of spatial ordering and planned urbanisation is shaped by two distinct kinds of spatial units: development regions and metropolitan regions.

The total surface of South Africa has been divided up, provisionally, into eight (or possibly nine) development regions. One region corresponds closely

with the boundaries of Natal and another with the Orange Free State (OFS), two fall roughly within the Cape Province, and four (or five) within the Transvaal.

Significantly, these regions encircle and in some cases cross-cut the borders of the bantustans, to form integrated planning and administrative units. Since 1982 these development regions have provided a framework within which certain state institutions, notably the Development Bank and Regional Development Action and Liaison Committees, have been operating. It is also possible that these regions may provide the geographical basis of a future federal or confederal order.

A recent act of parliament, based on the Croeser working group's report, provides for demarcation of one or more metropolitan regions within each of these development regions. It allows for creation of third tier governmental structures called Regional Services Councils (RSCs) to administer the metropolitan areas.

Metropolitan regions underpin a system which differs from the present one in significant ways:

- * black local authorities are to be represented (within a weighted electoral system) on the RSC's alongside representatives from white, coloured and Indian local authorities;
- * an RSC may include local authorities from a bantustan where they fall within the ambit of the metropole;
- * the RSCs are to make up a single fiscal system. Taxes levied on white businesses are to subsidise infrastructural expenditure in black townships within the RSC concerned - relaxing the financial self-sufficiency principle in an important area of local government finance.

Incentives and disincentives are to be applied within the metropolitan and development region framework - ostensibly to foster a more even distribution of population and economic activity both within development regions and across the country as a whole.

Considerations of cost and efficiency should, according to the aims of this policy, take priority over political or constitutional objectives, where the two conflict.

The PC report intends fiscal incentives and disincentives to play a decisive role in determining location of urbanisation. These, along with more direct controls over settlement, are

seen as indispensable in order to avoid direct pass and influx controls.

THE CARROT AND THE STICK

The main source of RSC revenue is to be a tax on the turnover, and on wage and salary bills of businesses within their jurisdiction. This is likely to raise labour costs and reduce the incentive to employ, particularly unskilled, unproductive labour.

The policy aims to encourage relocation of labour-intensive enterprises and those with a low ratio of profits to turnover (insofar as such activities are not location-bound) to areas outside the boundaries of the metropolitan regions.

Costs passed on to consumers within the RSCs will reduce workers' incentive to move to metropolitan areas, and are intended to weigh most heavily on low-income earners and people with large numbers of dependents - in short, African families trying to move from the rural areas to the core metropolitan areas.

Urban business interests have already indicated strong opposition to these measures. And it is very doubtful that revenue necessary to support expenditure for township infrastructures will be raised, or that significant employment will be induced to relocate to the deconcentration areas.

In theory, once the necessary township infrastructure has been provided, the aim of metropolitan fiscal policy is to ensure that the standard of services supplied in an area is tied directly to the contributions of the local authorities concerned. This allows for residential differentiation according to the wealth and expressed preferences of the communities concerned. Essentially, this policy will privatise the supply of services and individualise the costs of their consumption.

This approach has already sparked off violent confrontation between black communities on the one hand, and development board officials, police and (since the declaration of the state of emergency) military forces on the other. Without further application of repressive force it is no more likely to succeed in the future than in the recent past.

Despite its importance to the evolving regional strategy, metropolitan fiscal policy is not on its own seen as sufficient to effect the desired geographical dispersal of production and population. A system of incentives to attract industry from metropolitan core areas to deconcentrated areas within regions, and from relatively well endowed to poorer regions is to be coupled to it.

INDUSTRIALISATION INCENTIVES

As conceived since 1981, regional industrial dispersal aims to prevent population concentration in established metropolitan centres. It is also designed to re-allocate production from expanding metropolitan areas, such as the Witwatersrand, to declining ones, such as Port Elizabeth and Cape Town. The Kleu report on industrial development strategy updated this policy, and a white paper on the report endorsed it. It differs from traditional border industrial decentralisation policy both in terms of aims and methods.

The primary aim is no longer to make viable bantustan economies. Instead, emphasis has shifted towards establishing a relatively small number of growth points, most of which are likely to be either satellites of the metropolitan centres or existing medium-sized industrial towns.

Where possible these growth points are being encouraged in areas close to bantustans to make them accessible to working-class commuter belts within their boundaries.

In applying the policy, there has been a shift from negative sanctions to positive incentives. Instead of prohibiting increased black employment in the core industrial areas - the effect of section 3 of the Physical Planning Act - employment-linked subsidies, tax relief, relaxation of health and safety regulations, and exemption from wage determinations are increasingly used to promote employment growth in decentralised (or deconcentrated) areas.

The success of this industrial location strategy depends in part on what 'deconcentration' means. Areas such as Onverwacht in the OFS and Ekangala on

the far East Rand are examples of deconcentration mentioned by the PC report. Clearly a policy which attempts to relocate employment and people to such areas differs little from the old bantustan policy.

IMPLICATIONS

For three decades industrial decentralisation policy in South Africa has been intimately connected with the aims of territorial apartheid. The evolving industrial dispersal policy adopted since 1982 attempts to dissociate itself from this heritage by reorganising its system of disincentives and subsidies within spatial units defined by economic and physical, rather than explicitly racial, considerations.

The new development regions cross-cut, encircle and fragment the bantustans, integrating their populations into new planning units centred on the metropolitan areas.

These development regions could potentially dissolve and eventually supercede the existing racial and ethnic foundations of planning, administration and political representation in South Africa. This however depends crucially on South Africa's future political order.

The deconcentration strategy lends itself to a number of possible political arrangements: deconcentration areas may remain under bantustan political authority; they may in time be drawn into the ambit of metropolitan government; or - most likely in the short to medium term - they may be placed under some form of joint local government.

However, there is little doubt that the present government intends to retain residential segregation as the basis of political representation, whether at the second (regional) or third (metropolitan) level of government. It is attempting to weave ethnicity and race into the fabric of the planning regions through the policy of residential and industrial deconcentration.

Where geography allows, new deconcentrated areas are being sited in areas which are both on the metropolitan peripheries and the bantustan borders. Old commuter areas already located in

such areas are being redefined as deconcentrated areas. Examples are Ekangala on the East Rand, Umlazi and Kwamashu near the Durban-Pinetown area, Mdantsane near East London and Onverwacht (Botshabelo) near Bloemfontein. This racial dimension will not be lost to the opposition, and will be resisted on grounds both of racism and the economic costs and material deprivation for the communities affected.

CONCLUSIONS

The urbanisation strategy set out by the President's Council will be examined with considerable scepticism, if not suspicion, by all who oppose apartheid. Rightly so. The President's Council was set up as midwife to the Total Strategy, a reform programme conceived by the state in the immediate aftermath of Soweto 1976. Its greatest achievement to date is the abortive tricameral parliament, a racially constituted structure that has played no small role in deepening the crisis of the apartheid state.

It is difficult to imagine a less credible source for an urbanisation policy in a future South Africa. Nevertheless, critics of the report who probe no further than its parentage miss the mark. One criticism which will undoubtedly be directed at the report is that it builds disguised influx control into the urbanisation strategy, for example in the form of the policy of industrial and residential dispersal.

But in fact what the PC report proposes is not the old system of influx control in disguise, but rather a strategic shift in the aims and basis of state management of the urbanisation process. Failure to recognise this will merely weaken the capacity of opposition to respond forcefully to this initiative.

In NIF 41, Hindson will continue his examination of the PC report by examining other proposed methods of controlling urbanisation in South Africa.

SACTU Co-ordinator Found Guilty

Sipho Zachius Binda (33)

Early on the morning of 26 September 1984, police constable Buti Norman Ngaki was patrolling the border between Botswana and the formally independent bantustan of Bophuthatswana. Near the village of Makgobestad he came across two young men. Because they were strangers in the area, he arrested one, named Stanford. The second, Sipho Binda, ran off, but was apprehended after a chase.

Ngaki took his prisoners to the Makgobestad police station, where he searched them. In one of Binda's pockets, he found a passport in the name of Robert Jabu Nguni. It was subsequently established that the passport was false. In another pocket, claimed Ngaki, he found 35 rounds of AK 47 ammunition. One-time ANC camp commander Sipho Binda, himself a trained guerilla but now working for SACTU in Botswana, was in police custody.

Bophuthatswanan authorities took Binda to Mafikeng, where he was blindfolded and interrogated for five days without proper sleep. Then he was handed over to South African security police.

After many months, he was transferred to Johannesburg's Diepkloof prison as an awaiting-trial prisoner. There he went on a protest hunger-strike, according to family members.

Binda's trial began in the Johannesburg Regional Court on 19 August 1985. He faced charges under the Terrorism and Internal Security Acts. According to the prosecution, he underwent military training in ANC camps, and subsequently trained others in one of these camps.

Binda pleaded not guilty to both charges, which covered the period 1977 until his arrest in September 1984. But he admitted that he left his Soweto home in May 1977, and a few months later his family received a letter with a foreign stamp, in which he wrote that he had joined the ANC.

Two ex-ANC members testified against Binda. By court order, their identities may not be made public, as they fear reprisals for having given evidence. Both have testified in other trials. Their evidence can be published as long as it does not reveal their identities.

The first to testify, referred to as 'Miss E' by the presiding magistrate, left South Africa in 1978 as a 16-year-old scholar. She had been involved in a schools boycott, and was extremely dissatisfied with the quality of her education. When she reached Botswana she joined the ANC and eventually reached Cuba, where she studied Spanish and politics. On her return to Africa, the ANC made provision for her to study further at a military academy in East Germany. First, however, the ANC insisted that she undergo military training. During 1982 she accordingly trained in an ANC camp in Angola, and met Binda in December of that year. She knew him by his Umkhonto we Sizwe (MK) name, Mandla Jwara. Shortly after meeting him, he became camp commander.

In 1983, the ANC sent 'Miss E' to Mozambique as a member of the ANC's Transvaal Machinery. She entered South Africa on a number of occasions as a courier, carrying messages and supplies to ANC units within the country.

During October 1984 the commander of the MK's Transvaal Machinery sent her on a mission into South Africa. She believes that as a result of betrayal - either by a captured courier or a South African agent within the Transvaal Machinery - she was arrested on 17 October near Piet Retief.

According to the evidence of 'Miss E', she at first refused to co-operate with her security police captors. But after a number of months of solitary-confinement detention, and interrogation, she decided that she had been betrayed from within the ANC, as police had information which she had not divulged. As a result, according to her evidence, she turned against the ANC, became intensely anti-communist, and decided to destroy the ANC. On that basis, she agreed to testify for the state in a series of trials.

The state's other major witness was 'Mr M', a trained ANC guerilla who left South Africa in 1976 and underwent ANC training in Angola and the Soviet Union. He was then deployed with Joshua Nkomo's ZIPRA forces in Rhodesia, along Beit Bridge in the south. This was his operational area. When the ceasefire was announced, and Robert Mugabe's ZANU won

the election, 'Mr M' and his forces had to retreat to Zambia, as their presence was known to neither Ian Smith's Rhodesian government, nor Mugabe's forces.

During January 1984, in Luanda, the witness saw the accused in the company of a number of people he had trained with in ANC military camps, but had no further contact with him. He knew Binda by his MK name.

According to this witness, an ANC camp commander has to be creative, have leadership qualities, a high standard of discipline and be fully conversant with military and political matters. Camp commanders were appointed by top ANC leadership, and reported directly to the chief of staff.

The state's final witness was security policeman, Colonel JH Buchner, who told the court that between 1976 and September 1985, there were 355 politically-motivated 'deeds of terror' in South Africa. There was a sharp increase in guerilla and sabotage incidents between October 1984 and September 1985, with 99 incidents in that period compared to 55 in the previous 12-month period.

Binda declined to give evidence in his own defence, and was found guilty on both counts - undergoing military training, and training others. However, the presiding magistrate did not believe Bophuthatswanan policeman Ngaki's evidence that Binda had AK 47 ammunition in his pocket when arrested.

Binda handed the court a written statement in which he set out his frustrations as a black school child, explaining how, after matriculating in 1971, he became actively involved in labour affairs, and interested in politics.

Binda's identity document indicated that he was from Standerton, although he had never been there, and he could accordingly not qualify for residential rights in Soweto. These general frustrations were sharpened during the unrest of 1976, when a friend of his was shot while attending a funeral. By 1977, he saw no alternative but to join the ANC as a soldier.

He arrived at a training camp in Angola in July 1982, and was subsequently appointed camp commander. In December 1983, after becoming aware of new labour developments within South Africa, he joined the South African Congress of Trade Unions (SACTU). He went to Lusaka for training in the labour field, and was subsequently transferred to Gaborone in early 1984. At the time of his arrest, he was Transvaal co-ordinator for SACTU, stationed in Botswana. His duties included monitoring the labour situation, liaising with trade unions, and writing reports for international labour organisations.

According to his statement, Binda had not intended entering South Africa for either ANC or SACTU activities. He had crossed the border to assist SACTU members to enter Bophuthatswana, from where they were to travel to Lesotho.

At the end of October, Binda was sentenced to five years imprisonment for undergoing military training, and six years for actively training others while he was a camp commander. As many as 300 ANC recruits could have passed through his hands during this period, according to the presiding magistrate.

These sentences will run concurrently, and Binda will effectively serve six years imprisonment.

ANC Bases in Ingwavuma

Wilfred Mapumulo (28)
Robert Dumisa (26)
James Marupeng (26)
Norbert Buthelezi (23)
Bhekizazi Mthelhuva (31)
Vusumuzi Nyawo (30)
Amos Mafuleka (21)
Joel Makhunga (27)
Mfinywani Basali (41)
Dumazwini Myeni (35)
Bofana Mafu (35)

Boy Mvubu (39)
Nokuhamba Nyawo (64).
In December 1984 four young ANC guerilla fighters, sent into the Ingwavuma district to set up bases and train locals, were taken into security police custody.

As a result of information gained during the interrogation of the four, a police special task force set off for a cave in the Engwini district of

Ingwavuma.

At about 2-30 on the morning of 24 December, Lieutenant Michael Frier called to those inside the cave to come out. No one answered, and a shot was fired. Frier opened fire on a person near the cave, and saw him fall to the ground. Later, police found a dead man in the cave with a 9 mm Luger pistol and an AK 47 rifle. A bold ANC plan to establish long-term bases in Ingwavuma, and train locals militarily, had been uncovered.

As a result, 13 people faced charges of terrorism, alternatively the illegal possession of arms, in the Natal Supreme Court, sitting in Estcourt.

The state alleged that the accused recruited and trained Ingwavuma's local population in the use of weapons. Bases were established in Ingwavuma for this purpose, and arms caches stored in caves.

According to the state, Mapumulo, Dumisa, Marupeng and Buthelezi were trained militarily by the ANC outside South Africa. Early in 1984 they gathered with other trained guerillas in Swaziland. Aided by the Nyawo family, they illegally entered South Africa, and established military bases in caves in the Nhlalavane area of Ingwavuma. They then, according to the state, recruited and trained local residents in the use of weapons. Marupeng was also charged with setting up a base in the Nkungwine area of Ingwavuma.

The state further alleged that the four trained guerillas had in their possession 16 machine guns, 16 anti-tank hand grenades, 29 hand grenades, seven bazooka projectiles, 33 anti-personnel mines, three land mines, a limpet mine, a home-made bomb, two Luger pistols and 4 900 bullets.

At the beginning of the trial, Mapumulo, Dumisa, Marupeng and Buthelezi refused to plead, and told presiding judge Andrew Wilson that they did not recognise the jurisdiction of the court to try them. They accordingly refused to participate in the proceedings.

In a statement made on behalf of all four, Norbert Buthelezi admitted that they were 'soldiers of Umkhonto we Sizwe, arrested in the course of duty'. As such, they demanded prisoner-of-war status in terms of the Geneva Convention. He told the court that they rejected the idea that they had committed a crime in their fight against

apartheid. 'To participate in this court would be a betrayal of millions of blacks who suffer daily here... We are prepared to face the consequences (of our decision) however bitter they may be'.

Buthelezi said they rejected the South African courts as 'a loyal and faithful arm of the very government we wish to destroy', arguing that their cause was too precious to be soiled by participating in the 'lowly and sinister exercise of a court that is not a people's court but a mockery of justice'.

One of the state's first witnesses was a former member of Umkhonto we Sizwe who, by order of the court, cannot be named. After receiving military training in guerilla warfare at ANC bases in Angola, he and 19 others were flown to the Soviet Union for further specialised training. Norbert Buthelezi was part of the group.

They returned to Angola in mid-1983, and then moved on to Mozambique for additional training. A group, including Buthelezi, Dumisa, Marupeng and the witness, crossed by foot into Swaziland where the ANC instructed them to establish arms caches and training bases in Ingwavuma.

On their second attempt to establish bases, the witness deserted and returned home, where he was arrested by security police, and detained for five months.

Msongomane Nyawo, son and brother of the Nyawo's charged in the trial, told the court that during February 1984 he travelled to Swaziland. There he met his uncle, Jameson Mngomezulu, an ANC member. In a rondaval where he was staying, his uncle showed him a cache of arms including AK 47 rifles, a machine gun and hand grenades. At his uncle's home, he met two of the accused, Dumisa and Buthelezi.

Mngomezulu urged Nyawo to join the ANC, but the witness declined. However, some time later his brother, Vusumuzi Nyawo, agreed to assist people infiltrated into Ingwavuma by Mngomezulu.

Another member of the Nyawo family, Zodwa, also gave evidence in the trial. She told the court that Mapumulo, Dumisa and Buthelezi had stayed with her family at their kraal in Ingwavuma during 1984. Buthelezi told her that he had undergone ANC training so that he could destroy targets such as police stations.

A third Nyawo family member, Theabi, also gave evidence for the state. Under cross examination, she described a police assault on her while in detention. She said that she was interrogated through the night at the Jozini police station, and slapped and kicked after she fell to the ground. As a result, her body was bruised and swollen, her mouth bleeding, and she was partially deafened in her right ear. Shortly after police arrested her and a number of her family members, they were taken to a 'punishment camp' at Ingwavuma, where she and her mother saw her brother, Zeblon, being assaulted by police.

Police claimed they found a detailed diary of ANC movements in Ingwavuma between August and November 1984. Allegedly written by Robert Dumisa, the diary tells of fears and doubts expressed by recruits in the Ingwavuma district, and the need to gain their confidence. 'Their full participation will be determined by our first 50 operations', the diary states. 'We will die here rather than retreat... People have no confidence about our capability to strike at the enemy and win. Now it is up to us to demonstrate our capability to fight more than the Boers and win the war. People want a practical man. If need be, they must see our dead bodies, they must bury them. So that they say: "They never left us. They died teaching us how to fight the enemy"'. According to evidence before the court, two trained guerillas were killed when police sought out the caves in which arms had been stored.

As the trial neared its end, seven of the accused were found guilty of terrorism as defined in the Internal

Security Act. The first four accused, who had refused to participate in the trial and demanded prisoner-of-war-status, were found to be active ANC members who had undergone military training. They had established arms caches in caves in the Ingwavuma area, and trained locals in the use of weapons.

Vusumuzi Nyawo and Dumuzweni Myeni assisted the first four in their activities, which included recruiting and training residents of the Ingwavuma area in the use of weapons.

Boy Mvubu was convicted for failing to report the actions of the other accused to the police, although he knew they were illegal.

The remaining accused were found not guilty. The presiding judge found that they believed their lives would be in jeopardy if they did not take part in the activities of the guerilla group, and for this reason they went for training in the bush.

On 6 December 1984, in the Escourt Circuit Court, presiding judge Wilson handed down sentence: Robert Dumisa, leader of the group, was jailed for 12 years; Norbert Buthelezi, group commissar, received a 10-year sentence; Wilfred Mapumulo and James Marupeng will each serve eight years; Vusumuzi Nyawo and Dumuzweni Myeni were jailed for seven years each, with four years of this suspended; Boy Mvubu was given a suspended sentence of two years.

After sentence had been passed, Norbert Buthelezi asked the judge if their weapons could be returned to them on 'the day of freedom'. A smiling judge Wilson replied that they should perhaps 'wait and see'.

UDF Organiser on Terrorism Charge

Abel Kaobitsa 'Bushy' Mape (28) The United Democratic Front's Northern Cape organiser, 'Bushy' Mape, is currently facing a charge of terrorism in terms of the Internal Security Act. Alternatively, alleges the state, he has contravened the Act by furthering the aims of the ANC.

The state claims that, between December 1983 and January 1985, Mape was involved in a number of activities associated with the ANC. According to

the charge sheet:

* During December 1983, Mape travelled to Botswana with Kgogolo Frans Monare. He introduced Monare to an ANC member named Rangwane, who suggested that Monare undergo political training in Zambia. Monare refused.

* In January 1984, Mape unsuccessfully attempted to get Monare to reconsider the ANC's offer of training.

* Sometime in May 1984, Mape transported three people, who intended

undergoing ANC military training, to the Botswana border. There he advised them how to cross the border.

* In June or July 1984, he took another group of three to the same border for the same purpose.

* During July or August 1984, Maape sent Monare to Botswana to meet two ANC members named Wally and Phaladi.

* In September 1984, Maape again sent Monare to see Phaladi in Botswana, giving him a sealed envelope for delivery to the ANC.

* In July 1984, Maape suggested to Edwin Boitsemelo Moloalwa that he attend a course on 'political media' in Botswana.

* Subsequently, Maape took Moloalwa to Botswana, where he introduced him to ANC member Phaladi. In Gaborone, Maape discussed the use of violence in political struggle with Moloalwa, and indicated that members of the ANC would discuss this further with him.

* Maape visited Augustine Maropong at his house in Kimberley, saying that the ANC had ask him to make contact.

* During May 1984, Maape visited ex-ANC member Ndabagithetwa Collins Glanaga in Galeshewe, and asked him for information about old ANC members and activities.

Maape's trial takes place in Kimberley in February 1986.

'Escaped' Detainee Guilty of Treason

Joseph Boitomelo Leepile (26)

Justice Mafa Ngidi (31)

Sipho Stanley Ngwenya (34)

In a recently-concluded treason trial in Johannesburg, three witnesses refused to testify for the state; an accused married one of these witnesses during a lunch-hour recess; and, according to the defence, security police allowed one of the accused to escape from detention so that he would assassinate an ANC military commander.

Leepile, according to the state, underwent ANC military training in Angola and East Germany between 1976 and 1984. During 1977 and 1978, he worked as an ANC military instructor in Mozambique.

The state alleged that, from 1979 to 1983, he worked in the ANC's logistics department. On a number of occasions he conveyed personnel and weapons from Mozambique to Swaziland, for use in South Africa.

On about 27 May 1984, Leepile unlawfully entered South from Swaziland to undertake various ANC missions:

- * establish a weapons storage place on the East Rand;
- * recruit members for the ANC;
- * make contact with his co-accused, Ngidi, and assist him in the training of ANC members and supporters;
- * arrange accommodation for ANC members entering South Africa.

Ngidi, according to the state, left South Africa in 1976, and underwent military training in the Soviet Union and Angola. He trained various people in

Swaziland in the use of arms and explosives during 1983.

On 25 May 1984, he illegally entered South Africa to establish weapon storage places on the East Rand and in Soweto; and to recruit, train and accommodate ANC members. When he entered South Africa, he was in possession of various explosives devices.

The state alleged that, on 28 June 1984, Ngidi escaped from security police while being transported from Soweto to Johannesburg. He then fled to Swaziland to make contact with the ANC, but returned to South Africa in August 1984 when he was again detained by security police.

The third accused, Ngwenya, became an ANC member in 1983, according to the state, and was trained in Swaziland by Ngidi and Lawrence Khumalo.

He returned to South Africa and sabotaged the railway line between Langlaagte and Randfontein on the day of the white referendum on the new constitution (2 November 1983).

The state also claimed that Ngwenya possessed explosives, sabotaged the railway line between Bosmont and Newclare, and attempted to recruit people as ANC members.

Three people, called as witnesses by the state, refused to testify against the accused. Sylvia Mobena was sentenced to 12 months imprisonment for refusing to testify, but at the end of the trial the court suspended her sentence as her refusal to testify had not materially affected the course of the trial. Trade

unionist Duma Nkosi also refused to give evidence, and was jailed for nine months. And Marilia Nhlabatsi, common-law wife of Ngidi, refused to testify against Ngidi. Subsequently, she and Ngidi were legally married during a court lunchbreak, and the presiding judge ruled that she was not compelled to testify against her husband.

Defence counsel suggested that Ngidi's 'escape' from police custody was a 'collusive escape' in which police assisted. Evidence suggested that Ngidi then went to Swaziland on a mission to kill the Swaziland-based commander of the ANC's Transvaal Machinery. But when he reached Swaziland, ANC officials did not believe his escape story, and tried to kill him. He then fled back to South Africa, was arrested, and charged with treason.

Towards the end of the trial, Leepile

and Ngidi pleaded guilty to charges of treason, and Ngwenya was acquitted. In mitigation, the defence argued that both Leepile and Ngidi had been seriously affected by deaths of close friends in the Soweto unrest of June 1976. In addition, both accused had, by May 1984, become disillusioned with the ANC, and had not participated in its activities since then.

The presiding judge accepted that the accused were rank-and-file members of the ANC, whose treasonable actions had been committed outside of South Africa. In passing sentence, Justice Ackerman said that both men had good prospects for rehabilitation, as they were intelligent, not innately revolutionary, and had not previously broken the law.

Leepile was sentenced six years, half suspended, while Ngidi was jailed for eight years, half suspended.

Strikes and Disputes: Transvaal

COMPANY AND AREA	UNION	WORKERS	DATE	EVENTS AND OUTCOME
Allan Maskew Isando	SAAWU	75		On 15 October 1985, 75 workers were fired from Allan Maskew. The union prepared a pamphlet in support of the dismissed workers, but on 5 November, after an application by the company, the supreme court restrained SAAWU from printing or distributing the pamphlets.
ASEA Electric Pretoria	MAWU	800	07-18.11.85	Workers voted to strike after union-management talks deadlocked. Talks resumed on 18 November, and workers ended the strike. MAWU threatened further action if worker demands were not met by 6 December.
Baragwanath hospital		1 700	08-25.11.85	On 8 November, 900 cleaners, messengers, kitchen staff and nurse aides staged an hour-long stoppage over wages and service conditions. On 13 November, provincial authorities said demands would only be considered in March 1986. The next day, police arrested 840 workers and charged them with attending an illegal gathering. On 18 November, hospital authorities fired 1 700 nurses and auxiliary workers, and the SADF took over hospital services. Nurses were given 24 hours to vacate hostels. Three student nurses brought an urgent court application to halt their eviction from hostels, and to declare the dismissals invalid. This was successful, and 940 dismissals were overturned. Wage increases, backdated to 1 November, were introduced.
Barlow Rand Kew	MAWU SABS		30.10.85	MAWU declared a dispute after rejecting a management offer of 6c/hour across-the-board, and a R50 bonus. The offer was accepted by SABS.
Cheeseborough-Ponds Wadeville	CWIU	250	22-24.01.86	Workers went on strike demanding a minimum wage of R3,25 an hour. The existing rate was R2,70. They also demanded May Day as a paid public holiday, a 40-hour week, one month's annual bonus, and five days compassionate leave. Strikers slept on factory premises, and threatened to move their families to the factory if demands were not met. The union and management agreed to R3,25 an hour, May Day as a paid company holiday, a yearly bonus, and the reduction of the working week by hour to 44 hours.
CNA Gallo	CCAWUSA	700	27.11- 04.12.85	Ten rounds of wage negotiations deadlocked, and in October the union applied for a conciliation board. CCAWUSA's demand was for a R600 annual increase. The union held a strike ballot and threatened a consumer boycott. At the end of November, a conciliation board met, and on 4 December both parties agreed to a R580 per year increase. This agreement affects 1 000 workers in 311 outlets nationally.
Coca-Cola Pretoria	FCWU	689	30.10.85	Workers went on strike over the dismissal of four colleagues.
Coca-Cola Clayville	FBWU		29.01.86	Workers returned to work after striking over the dismissal of a shop steward.
Dorbyl Germiston	MAWU	3	08.10.85	Three shop stewards, dismissed for union activity, were reinstated by a 'special arbitrator'.

COMPANY AND AREA	UNION	WORKERS	DATE	EVENTS AND OUTCOME
DHL	SASD&TWU		06.11.85	Workers dismissed for membership of the SA Scooter Drivers and Transport Workers Union were reinstated by the Industrial Court.
Farm Fare (Premier Food)	SFAWU	497	14.10.85	Workers were locked out following a lengthy dispute over wages and working conditions. Management gave workers an ultimatum to return to work and sign forms accepting revised working hours, R9,30 a week increase, and overtime when required. The union accused Premier of imposing changes without consulting workers or their union. Farm Fare subsequently agreed to withdraw the forms and negotiate overtime with shop stewards.
Facts Investors Guide Johannesburg	MWASA	7		After a work stoppage in December 1984, management dismissed eight workers. Subsequently the Industrial Court ordered their reinstatement, but management has refused to do this. MWASA has laid criminal charges against Facts.
Fedmis Phalaborwa	SACWU	500		After a long-standing dispute, the union applied for a conciliation board. This was not appointed within the stipulated 30 days, and workers prepared to strike. The Minister of Manpower has also failed to appoint conciliation boards in SACWU disputes at Karbochem (Newcastle) and Air Products (Kempton Park and Vanderbijlpark).
Henkel	CWIU		Nov 1985	Minimum wages were increased 19%, from R100 to R119 per week. This was above the rate of inflation for 1985.
ISCOR	SABS and 7 other unions			SABS and three other unions refused to accept an inferior pay offer. The unions claimed that four other unions attempted to intimidate them over the wage offer. SABS members at ISCOR also expressed anger about a management circular to whites only, headed 'Must not be communicated with blacks'.
Kanhym Market (Gencor subsidiary) Pretoria	SFAWU	200	30.01.86	Workers went on strike after management refused to negotiate retrenchment procedures, and union recognition. Forty-three workers were retrenched because of the company's move to Germiston. This issue sparked off sympathy strikes at three Pretoria supermarkets: Pick 'n Pay, OK Bazaars, and Checkers.
Matthey Rustenburg Refiners Wadeville	CWIU	200	29.01.86	Workers went on strike demanding a 23% increase to bring the minimum wage to R3,30 per hour, May Day as a paid holiday, and the introduction of a long-service allowance. Workers returned to work the next day, but declared a dispute with the company, which indicated that it was willing to negotiate a settlement.
Metal Box Rosslyn	SAAWU	500		Workers downed tools when, after retrenching 22 black workers, management employed three whites. On 7 November, striking workers were told to return to work or face dismissal. As a result, 300 were fired. Workers called for a community boycott of Metal Box products, but management obtained a court order restraining SAAWU from organising the boycott. Late in January, pamphlets calling for a boycott of Metal Box products were distributed in surrounding townships and rural areas.
Pretoria Modern Supply Brits		16	17.01.86	Sixteen workers were dismissed following a wage dispute in which workers claimed management had secretly given an employee an increase.

COMPANY AND AREA	UNION	WORKERS	DATE	EVENTS AND OUTCOME
MW Murdoch Brits	MAWU	90	05.11.85	Workers downed tools after management and the union deadlocked over wage demands.
OK Bazaars Pretoria	CCAMUSA		08.01.86	Workers went on strike at three OK branches over the dismissal of two employees, allegations that a sales manager had assaulted a worker, and complaints about a white till-controller.
Paxellent Products Johannesburg	PWAMU	150	16.10.85	Workers demanded that three dismissed co-workers be reinstated and given a fair hearing on why they left work during work hours to fetch identity cards. The dispute went to arbitration and the three were reinstated in early November.
Pilkington Shatterprufe Springs and Port Elizabeth	CWIU			CWIU concluded national negotiations at three Pilkington plants during November. During negotiations there were work stoppages at all three plants and a ban on overtime. Final settlement included equalisation of minimum wages to R3,04 an hour; an annual bonus of four weeks' wages; and extra public holidays, including May Day.
Printpak Gravure Industria	PWAMU	90	09.10.85	Workers went on strike in support of a dismissed colleague who defied a management order to change jobs. Management threatened to cancel its recognition agreement with the union and seek an eviction order against workers, who were sitting in at the factory. Both parties agreed to arbitration, but workers remained on strike. Arbitration ordered the reinstatement of both the dismissed worker and the strikers. Workers returned to work on 28 October.
Post Office Lewisham Yard Krugersdorp	GAMU	200	06-07.11.85	After months of attempting to negotiate with management, workers walked out in protest over low wages of R216 per month, and unfair dismissals. Some returned the following day, and management said grievances were being investigated.
Pretoria City Council	Union of Pretoria Municipal Workers	4 500		A recognition agreement signed between the city council and the newly registered UPMA includes grievance and negotiation procedures.
Putco Body and Coach Brits	NAAMU	125	20.12.85	On 20 December, Putco announced the closure of this plant, after workers had gone on leave. Management claims that talks with the union will occur in the new year.
SABC		1 000	Oct 1985	SABC set a target of 1 000 jobs to abolish in rationalisation process. Some employees met to discuss action against the SABC, and the possibility that rationalisation programme masked a witch-hunt against dissidents. MWASA has filed papers with the Industrial Court for the reinstatement of dismissed workers.
SA Bureau of Standards	SAAMU	280	03.12.85	Workers went on strike when new employees were granted higher wage increases than long-service employees. SAAMU claims workers did not strike, but worked in the garden as a sign of protest. On 9 December, workers were given a 30-minute ultimatum to return to work, and were then fired. On 20 January 1986, 125 workers were reinstated by management. The remainder are considering legal and industrial action.
Siemens Pretoria	MAWU	13		MAWU has filed a court application for the reinstatement of 13 workers dismissed in July 1985 from Siemen's Waltloo factory. The union argues that the dismissals were unfair.

COMPANY AND AREA	UNION	WORKERS	DATE	EVENTS AND OUTCOME
Trident Steel	SEAWU	35		The union banned overtime after a wage dispute in July 1985. Workers were demanding an increase of R1 per hour at the time, but were dismissed after talks deadlocked. At the end of December, the Industrial Court ruled that management should pay workers six months's salary, but did not order reinstatement as this would disrupt the company's business.
Trinity Plant Rental and Stocks; Stocks Construction	BAMCWU			The union has applied for a conciliation board hearing to settle two disputes over the dismissal of union members. BAMCWU alleges that the dismissals constituted unfair labour practices.
TW Beckett Isando	SFAWU	350	05.11.85	Workers were dismissed after a four-day strike over the dismissal of two shop stewards who allegedly used false identity cards to enter company premises. Workers claim that a white industrial relations manager also used false identification, and had taken money from them to get section 70 rights. After striking workers were dismissed, SFAWU called on all COSATU unions for support.
Triple P Chemicals Edenvale	CWIU	30		On 18 November, workers downed tools after a shop steward was dismissed for attending a court hearing during working hours. Negotiations deadlocked, and the union claims workers were locked out on 20 November. Police were on standby during the strike.
Twins Propen Holdings Isando		130	13.10.85	On 13 October, the entire work-force downed tools over a wage dispute.
Unilever	CWIU	130		On 14 October, workers downed tools protesting that management had increased job loads, but not wages. Workers stayed out on strike for two weeks. Workers at S & CI, a Unilever subsidiary, staged a sympathy stoppage, and management threatened to dismiss them, as well as the other strikers. After negotiations, a settlement was reached whereby workers could either go back to original jobs, or receive a wage increase of R100 per month.
Woolworths Roodepoort	CCAWUSA		08.01.86	Workers went on strike at the Westgate branch of Woolworths, in Roodepoort. Striking workers claimed that a staff manager acted in a racist manner. Management suspended the manager pending an investigation. The union said that it had not organised the strike, and urged workers to return to work while negotiations with management took place.

Strikes and Disputes: Mines

COMPANY AND AREA	UNION	WORKERS	DATE	EVENTS AND OUTCOME
Benk Colliery	NUM	1 600	12.01.86	Workers went on strike demanding the release of a colleague arrested after allegedly preventing people from entering a nearby shop which workers were boycotting.

COMPANY AND AREA	UNION	WORKERS	DATE	EVENTS AND OUTCOME
Goede Hoop Collieries (Amcoal) Witbank	NUM	2 400	Jan 1986	The entire workforce went on strike protesting against the unfair dismissal of a shaft steward. Management agreed to transfer the steward.
Impala Platinum Mine (Gencor) Bophuthatswana Wildebeestfontein North and South, Bafokeng North and South	NUM BONUME	30 000	01.01.- 08.01.86	<p>Workers went on strike at four mines. Grievances included low wages, poor working conditions, management refusal to allow NUM recruiting facilities, overtime without pay, Unemployment Insurance Fund benefits, death benefits, and taxation. Negotiations took place between management, employee representatives and the Bophuthatswana government. NUM is not recognised in Bophuthatswana though it claims 50% membership at the mine. The Bophuthatswana National Union of Mine Employees (BONUME) does not have official recognition.</p> <p>About 15 000 workers returned to work on 2 and 3 January but there was a large stayaway thereafter. On 6 January, 20 000 workers were dismissed from three mines after ignoring an ultimatum to return to work. Management said the strike was illegal. 7 000 workers returned to work at Bafokeng North on 8 January, and the remaining 3 000 resigned. NUM claimed 27 miners were hit by rubber bullets at Wildebeest North mine and 26 were admitted to hospital. Forty-eight miners were arrested and appeared in court.</p> <p>BONUME intends applying for an interdict for the reinstatement of the dismissed workers. The union claims that the company violated Bophuthatswana labour law by not going to a conciliation board to solve its dispute. It claimed the dismissals were unfair because workers were intimidated by NUM. NUM has described BONUME as a sweetheart union.</p> <p>The Bophuthatswana Manpower Ministry has set up an industrial board to make recommendations about conditions of service on the mines.</p>
Libanon Gold Mine Westonaria	NUM		Jan 1986	The NUM boycott of three mine concession stores continued even though the Transvaal consumer boycott had been called off. The boycott was called because prices were higher than in town, food at the restaurants was always stale, GST was charged on all commodities, and workers were not treated politely at mine stores. Workers buy goods from an Indian trader, 2 km away, who has agreed to reduce his prices.
Marievale Consolidated Mines (Gencor)	NUM	1 000	01.09.85- Jan 1986	<p>Workers were dismissed following a two-day strike at the beginning of September 1985. On 13 September, Marievale brought an urgent supreme court application to establish its right to dismiss workers and evict them from mine hostels where they were staying by virtue of an earlier Industrial Court ruling. The Rand Supreme Court ruled that the company was entitled to evict workers who were legally dismissed when they broke their contracts by withholding their labour. But at the end of October, the Industrial Court ordered the company to reinstate the workers and ruled that the number of miners qualifying for reinstatement be agreed to between the employers and NUM.</p> <p>In November, NUM brought an urgent application to the Rand Supreme Court to</p>

COMPANY AND AREA	UNION	WORKERS	DATE	EVENTS AND OUTCOME
				<p>restrain the management of Marievale from assaulting or killing union members. The order was granted.</p> <p>On 22 November, Marievale brought an urgent application in the Transvaal Supreme Court asking that the Industrial Court order be set aside as the reinstatement of about 400 workers would result in severe after-tax profit losses and the possibility of faction fights on the mines. In mid-January the Supreme Court turned the application down, supported the Industrial Court ruling that it was an unfair labour practice to dismiss legally striking workers.</p>
<p>Phosphate Development Corporation (Foskor) Phalaborwa</p>	<p>NUM</p>	<p>1 500</p>	<p>12.12.85- 17.01.86</p>	<p>Three hundred and eighty nine workers were dismissed in December 1984 when they downed tools after NUM's general secretary, Cyril Ramaphosa was arrested. A conciliation board, set up to look at the dispute, could reach no agreement after two sittings. Then, in a continuation of the same dispute 1 500 workers were dismissed after a three-hour work stoppage on 12 December 1985. Workers decided to occupy the hostels. Lebowa police attacked and injured ten workers. Management agreed to refer the dismissals to mediation, but the strike was resumed on 16 January 1986. Workers also demanded the reinstatement of five shop stewards dismissed the previous month. Workers returned the next day heeding an ultimatum, but no-one was reinstated. Foskor and NUM are currently negotiating a recognition agreement.</p>
<p>Rand Mines Duhva Colliery Witbank</p>	<p>NUM</p>	<p>1 200</p>	<p>30.12.85-</p>	<p>Miners went on strike against the 28 December arrest of 28 unionists by mine security officials, who alleged that there had been intimidation to enforce the call for a Black Christmas. The miners were handed to police, charged and found guilty of disturbing the peace and sentenced to R100 each or two months in jail. The strike ended when the parties agreed that mine management would secure the release and pay the fines of the 28 convicted miners. NUM is appealing against the conviction and sentence of its members.</p>
<p>Randfontein Gold Estates (JCI) Westonaria</p>	<p>NUM</p>	<p>571</p>	<p>25.01.86</p>	<p>Over 550 miners were dismissed following a clash between miners and police on 21 January. Nine people including two white police were killed. NUM claims miners were forced from their hostels, assaulted and bussed home. The violence on 21 January erupted when police declared a union meeting held in the open veld near Cooke No 2 shaft illegal. The union said the meeting was held off mine property because of harassment by mine security and the banning of mass meetings in the hostel. NUM said the ban was an attempt by management to force workers to abandon the month-long boycott of the mine beerhall.</p>

Strikes and Disputes: Natal

COMPANY AND AREA	UNION	WORKERS	DATE	EVENTS AND OUTCOME
Fine Scrap Metals Jacobs	BAWU	42	18.10- 12.11.85	Workers went on strike on 18 October when management withdrew 10 October as a paid public holiday. Workers were dismissed. BAWU applied to the Industrial Court and the workers were reinstated on 12 November and received 50% of the pay lost since dismissal.
Mondi Paper Company Merobank Durban	PWAMU	1 500	11.12.85	PWAMU declared a dispute when wage negotiations deadlocked. PWAMU demanded a 35c/hour increase with a further increase of 5c in July 1986. Management offered a 27c/hour with a 3c July increase.
Natalia Development Board	SFAWU	1 000	30.10.85	Industrial Court arbitration ended an 18-month-long wage dispute. Lower wage scale workers got up to 55% increases. The minimum monthly wage increased from R215 to R333 backdated to 1 March 1985. Existing salaries were given an additional 5,5% increase backdated to 1 January 1985. In January 1985, SFAWU which does not belong to the council rejected the council negotiated 12% increase and demanded that the board negotiate with the union. The board refused claiming it was regulated by the Dept of Co-operation and Development. In May workers went on strike demanding to see the Minister of Co-operation and Development. The board granted increases which were then vetoed by the minister.
Nicholas Kivi Pinetown	CWIU	90	22-26.11.85	On 22 November CWIU held a strike ballot after management allegedly refused to negotiate wages and working conditions. The company warned that the strike was illegal and workers faced dismissal and said the union should conclude the recognition agreement. Management and CWIU disagreed over whether the union represented all employees including those not members of the union. Workers returned to work after a one-day strike on 26 November pending the outcome of a Conciliation Board on 10 December.
Romatex Jacobs	NUTW			During November 1985 workers downed tools when management put up a notice incorrectly reflecting the state of wage negotiations. Management apologised but refused to pay workers for time lost during the stoppage. Workers went on strike again and on the fifth day of the strike management agreed to pay two-and-a-half day's wages.
McWillaw Steel Isipingo	MAMU	3	16.7.85-	MAMU applied for reinstatement of three workers dismissed for 'serious misconduct'. Management said they had assaulted the shift foreman and police had to be called in. A disciplinary hearing was held in May to investigate workers grievances. The foreman was reprimanded for carrying a gun to work and using abusive language. The hearing was adjourned.

Strikes and Disputes: OFS/Cape

COMPANY AND AREA	UNION	WORKERS	DATE	EVENTS AND OUTCOME
Allied Publishing Cape Town		209	03.11.85-	Newspaper vendors went on strike demanding a wage increase. Argus street sales were disrupted and management attempted negotiations on 5 November but 209 vendors were dismissed. At a meeting in Cape Town on 30 January various organisations decided to boycott the <u>Argus</u> if the vendors were not re-employed by 31 January.
Atlantis Diesel Engines	EIWI	1		The Industrial Court ordered management to reinstate a worker dismissed on 3 May 85 for refusing to remove a UDF lapel badge. He had received written warning for this and for abuse of company property - pinpricks in the overall. A new company rule prohibited the promotion of any political cause or organisation. The worker was told to refrain from displaying political badges or slogans on the premises.
City Tramways Cape Town	Tramways and Omnibus Workers Union	200	18.09.85	Bus services to black and coloured townships were severely affected when 130 drivers were fired for refusing to work in dangerous township conditions. They protested lack of protection from stoning after a driver was admitted to hospital after a stone-throwing incident. As workers walked to union offices they were charged by police and dispersed. Twelve were arrested. Drivers returned to work. The twelve appeared in court on 20 September. There were no charges and they were not asked to plead.
Murray and Roberts Cape Town	SAAMU	1 587	26-28.08.85	On 12 and 26 August workers went on strike demanding union recognition, the reduction of hostel rentals from R16,50 to R6 or a 31,25% wage increase, a reshuffle of hostel staff, particularly nightwatchmen who allegedly steals from workers. After a three-day strike workers were dismissed. On 30 August the company was granted an interdict preventing SAAMU from organising illegal strike action, picketing the company premises or intimidating, harassing or interfering with company employees. A dispute was declared. Judgement was reserved in the Cape Town Supreme Court on 23 October. Many dismissed workers continued living at the company hostels and on the 24 November the hostels were burnt down.
University of Cape Town	Workers Committee	662	November 1985	A workers committee representing 662 workers signed an interim agreement with UCT administration. They will now work on a full agreement covering negotiations, dispute procedures, discipline and the rights and duties of shop stewards.
Welkom Town Council	Orange-Vaal General Workers Union	300	19.12.85	Bus drivers and cleaners went on strike to demand the return of union documents confiscated from shop stewards by a white council employee, and the dismissal of this employee. Additional demands were the reinstatement of four drivers allegedly dismissed after the stoppage, union recognition and the opening of wage negotiations. Workers returned to work.



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